The Nonlinguistic Mind: Nonlinguistic Concepts, Normativity, and Animal Cognition

Abstract

I argue that at least some nonlinguistic animals have conceptual capabilities. First, I show that positions that take linguistic capabilities to be necessary for conceptual capabilities are unable to explain the possibility of concept acquisition. Second, I argue that awareness of abstract relations requires conceptual capabilities and success at relational matching-to-sample tasks require awareness of the abstract relations of same and different. Crows and amazons are able to succeed at relational matching-to-sample tasks, so we should attribute conceptual capabilities to them. Third, I argue that at least some nonlinguistic animals are able to have and present reasons by making and having explicit content. Fourth, I argue for an externalist account of inference that takes epistemic responsibility to be a deontic status. Fifth, and finally, I argue that at least some nonlinguistic animals should be regarded as living in normative communities because their communications meet the conditions for assertions.