In Defense of Sass: On Approaching Schizophrenia Through the Lens of Wittgensteinian Solipsism

Abstract

In this work, I defend Louis Sass’s use of Wittgensteinian treatments of solipsism as the basis for an interpretive framework for schizophrenia. I first offer further evidence in support of Sass’s project from the writings of Wittgenstein and from the autobiographical writings of the schizophrenic jurist Daniel Paul Schreber. I also argue for additional connections between Wittgensteinian solipsism and experiences characteristic of schizophrenia. In part two, I undertake a refutation of Rupert Read’s critique of Sass’s project. I argue that Read’s appropriation of Peter Winch’s philosophical writings in this critique is misguided, and that Winch’s notion of extending one’s own perspective towards a target culture aligns well with Sass’s project. I then analyze Read’s critique’s use of the ‘austere’ interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. I argue that the ‘austere’ interpretation itself is untenable, due to its dependence upon implicit equivocation. I conclude that even if this were not the case, however, the ‘austere’ account of Tractarian methodology should be understood as aligning with, rather than opposing, Sass’s project – even as this project is portrayed my Read. In light of these considerations, I conclude that Read’s critique of Sass fails.