| dc.contributor.author | Habib, Camille. | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-10-21T12:37:46Z | |
| dc.date.available | 1993 | |
| dc.date.issued | 1993 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.other | AAINN87460 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10222/55357 | |
| dc.description | A state's decision to go to war should be made after its decision-makers have carefully considered the purpose for introducing military forces and the risks involved. In particular, decision-makers are expected to calculate whether the state's foreign policy environments are favourable to secure the desired objectives through military means. But a state's military capability is not alone a sufficient instrument in the planning of foreign policy. The failure to consider the psychological, internal, and external constraints which, in the final analysis, tend to explain and predict a state's behaviour is a clear formula for political disaster. | en_US |
| dc.description | Historically, Israelis have demonstrated an understanding of the essential linkage between military might and political purposes. Between the late 1940's and the early 1980's, Israel had survived four wars with its Arab neighbours, and this in itself is a testimony of the importance of conducting a limited military action under favourable foreign policy conditions. However, when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, something went wrong. In that war, the IDF had won, at best, an elusive victory. Although the PLO was forced to evacuate West Beirut, Palestinian nationalism in the West Bank and Gaza Strip remained well and alive. Besides, Israel was unable to impose a peace treaty on Lebanon because its "friends" there were not willing to abandon their Arab affiliation for fear of Syrian reprisals. | en_US |
| dc.description | Broadly speaking, this study focuses on analyzing those factors which led to the demise of Israel's policy in Lebanon. Of course, there are many explanations to why Israel found itself in such a quagmire. At least part of the answer is to be found in the apparent disregard by Defense Minister Ariel Sharon to the shortcomings of military means to achieve political goals at acceptable costs. In addition, Israel's failure in Lebanon also bears witness to the relevancy of the Clausewitzian literature in determining the outcome of a contemporary military conflict. It will be concluded, however, that a comprehensive understanding of Israel's fruitless campaign in Lebanon is to be found at the Lebanese level. In other words, Israel's misperception of the nature of Lebanon's polity, its communal realities, and its political actors had a profound impact on the failure of its military campaign in achieving nothing but unexpected and undesired results. | en_US |
| dc.description | Thesis (Ph.D.)--Dalhousie University (Canada), 1993. | en_US |
| dc.language | eng | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Dalhousie University | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | en_US |
| dc.subject | History, Middle Eastern. | en_US |
| dc.subject | Political Science, General. | en_US |
| dc.title | The consequences of Israel's invasion of Lebanon, 1982: Failure of a success. | en_US |
| dc.type | text | en_US |
| dc.contributor.degree | Ph.D. | en_US |
