Universalization and Respect for Persons
| dc.contributor.author | Meigs, Sandra | |
| dc.contributor.copyright-release | Not Applicable | |
| dc.contributor.degree | Master of Arts | |
| dc.contributor.department | Department of Philosophy | |
| dc.contributor.ethics-approval | Not Applicable | |
| dc.contributor.external-examiner | unknown | |
| dc.contributor.manuscripts | Not Applicable | |
| dc.contributor.thesis-reader | Steven Burns | |
| dc.contributor.thesis-supervisor | Richmond Campbell | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-12-03T15:08:44Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2024-12-03T15:08:44Z | |
| dc.date.defence | 1979-10 | |
| dc.date.issued | 1979-10 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This thesis is concerned to show that the notion of respect for persons as persons is essential to morality. Chapter I, based on an article written by Harry Silverstein, shows that any moral theory that is based solely on the principle of universalization fails in three ways. The underlying reason for such failures is that such theories lack a notion of respect for persons. Chapters II and III analyze the notion of respect for persons. Through this analysis and a discussion of empirical factors concerning self-respect,it is shown that respect for persons is desirable and reasonable. The Conclusion shows how a moral theory that is based on the notion of respect for persons can avoid the failures of moral theories that are based on the principle of universalization. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10222/84711 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | Ethics | |
| dc.subject | Universalization | |
| dc.title | Universalization and Respect for Persons |