What They Do in the Shadows: Understanding How and Why States Engage in Proxy Wars

Abstract

Proxy wars have been an ever-present part of conflict in history. Supporting a group with a common enemy is an effective and generally low-cost endeavour that allows a backer to conduct a wide range of operations. The contemporary understanding of this topic through the lens of principal-agent theory offers a good basis for understanding how these operations unfold. However, this theory fundamentally undersells the role of deniability in shaping how much control a backer can have over their proxy. The goal of this thesis is to fill the existing gap in the research by proposing a new theoretical approach that considers how deniability impacts control. In order to fill this gap, this thesis will conduct a series of congruence analyses to provide in-depth micro-level research on the ins and outs of these types of conflicts. Beyond this, I will use a large-N study to provide a macro view of the trends in the data. This thesis has found that deniability has a negative correlation with control, as deniability increases, control goes down. This offers a new direction for proxy war literature to examine as an expansion of research on this topic can help us uncover more about the correlation between control and deniability.