Reason, Reasons, and Reasoning

Abstract

Proceduralists about practical rationality and reasons for action argue that practical rationality is only capable of criticizing our reasons for action when, through deliberation, they are reachable through our current beliefs and desires. Using this model of practical rationality, proceduralists also typically argue that the only reasons for action we have are instrumentally valuable ones. Substantivists disagree, however, and argue that practical rationality is capable of criticizing our actions despite our desires, preferences and interests. Substantivists argue that although we have instrumental reasons for action, there are also other reasons for action we have, specific non-instrumental ones, which we are required to act for on pain of irrationality. In this thesis I argue that a substantivist model of practical rationality and reasons for action is correct, and that understanding practical rationality and reasons for action in this way has surprising consequences for moral theory.