RETHINKING THE LEGAL ARCHITECTURAL FRAMEWORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE REGIME: AN EVALUATION OF THE COMPLIANCE MECHANISM WITHIN THE PARIS AGREEMENT

Abstract

The Paris Agreement is a significant change in international environmental law that prioritises three important factors: transparency, inclusion, and iterative ambition, whereas previous frameworks depended on harsh penalties and top-down enforcement. This thesis studied the Agreement’s compliance mechanism (Articles 4, 13, and 15) to determine whether a facilitative approach can be a successful international legal response to the climate catastrophe. Using a mixed-methods approach (doctrinal legal, comparative legal, and qualitative content analysis), this involved contrasting the Paris model with earlier international environmental law regimes, illustrating a transition from coercive enforcement to facilitative compliance. The results showed that three crucial elements are necessary for the Paris Agreement to be effective: transparency, reputational pressure, and iterative improvement through the use of tools like the Global Stocktake and the Enhanced Transparency Framework. Broader participation is made possible by the Paris Accord's soft law mechanisms, such as nationally specified contributions, which encourage gradual norm internalisation. Article 15's non-punitive design demonstrates political pragmatism by striking a balance between openness and ambition and ensuring almost universal participation. The research suggests that hybrid models, which combine facilitative tools with selective harder elements like graduated review mechanisms, offer the most promising way forward despite practical challenges like those associated with voluntary reporting. The Paris Agreement's Implementation and Compliance Committee's effectiveness should be further examined, with comparative studies across other international regimes potentially testing the effectiveness of hybrid compliance models.