A Quantum-based Signcryption for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Networks

Abstract

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are used for monitoring industrial processes such as power grids, water supply systems, traffic control, oil and natural gas mining, space stations and nuclear plants. However, their security faces the threat of being compromised due to the increasing use of open access networks. Furthermore, the emergence of quantum computing has exposed a new type of threat to SCADA systems. Failure to secure SCADA systems can lead to catastrophic consequences. For example, a malicious attack can take control of the power supply to a city, shut down the water supply system, or cause malfunction of a nuclear reactor.

The primary goal of this thesis is to classify attacks on SCADA systems, identify the new type of attack based on quantum computing, and design a novel security scheme to defend against traditional attacks as well as the quantum attack. The proposed Signcryption scheme provides both encryption and intrusion detection. In particular, it detects the man-in-the-middle attack as this intrusion can lead to others. The signcryption scheme is built on the foundation of the fundamental BB84 cryptographic scheme and does not involve computationally expensive third-party validation. We simulate the proposed scheme using the Quantum Information Toolkit in Python. Furthermore, we validate and analyze the proposed scheme using security verification tools, namely, Scyther and Prism.