On the Use of Thought Experiments in the Metaphysics of Race

Abstract

In the metaphysics of race, philosophers continue to rely on the use of thought experiments even as they openly disagree about how they should be conducted. This is a methodological problem and, in my thesis, I argue how it could be resolved. My solution is simple: treat thought experiments as games of make-believe understood as epistemically valuable imaginings generated in response to fictional narratives. By drawing on Letitia Meynell’s argument for a new account of the content of thought experiments, I adopt Kendall Walton’s theory from Mimesis as Make-Believe to understand texts that represent fictional narratives as props prescribing imaginings to readers. Thought experiments are represented by fictional narratives, too. Walton’s theory shows how this works in detail, allowing for the isolation of methodological problems in thought experiments without resorting to metaphysically loaded explanations.