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dc.contributor.authorBingeman, Emily Venita
dc.date.accessioned2020-12-15T15:25:59Z
dc.date.available2020-12-15T15:25:59Z
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10222/80096
dc.description.abstractThe aim of this dissertation is to build a concept of epistemic responsibility that takes seriously insights from feminist epistemology, addiction studies, and disability theory. I use John Greco’s knowledge-as-achievement account as a starting point, and demonstrate how an ability-centred account such as Greco’s can be undergirded with these insights to create a concept of epistemic responsibility that better captures the complex social and political nature of our epistemic practices. I begin in Chapter 1 by outlining the contours of the project and making an argument for the importance of projects that create porousness between feminist epistemology and mainstream epistemology. In Chapter 2 I outline five key insights in feminist epistemology that I use both in assessing Greco’s theory and in guiding the reconstruction. I argue that accommodating these insights will require, at a minimum, a thoroughly social/non-individualistic concept of epistemic responsibility. The strategy that I take to build such a concept is threefold. First, in Chapter 3, I provide a theoretical background of currently existing social/non-individualistic concepts of responsibility that serve to lay a groundwork for my notion of epistemic responsibility. The goal is not to provide a comprehensive survey of the work on responsibility, but rather to draw out tools and frameworks that are helpful in thinking through epistemic responsibility. Second, in Chapter 4, I develop an extended analysis of a concrete phenomenon that I take to be a thoroughly social/non-individualistic context of responsibility ascription: responsibility for addiction, or rather for the harms associated with drug use. And finally, in Chapter 5, taking all of the insights and tools that I have gathered in Chapters 2-4, I embark on the project of theory reconstruction. I begin by outlining the strengths and weaknesses in Greco’s theory with respect to the insights I have highlighted. I then bring in disability theory in order to shore up the notion of ability operative in Greco’s account which I argue allows us to better account for the social and political complexities of epistemic practice.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.subjectEpistemologyen_US
dc.subjectDisabilityen_US
dc.subjectFeminist Epistemologyen_US
dc.subjectSocial Epistemologyen_US
dc.subjectAddictionen_US
dc.subjectResponsibilityen_US
dc.subjectEpistemic Responsibilityen_US
dc.subjectFeminist Theoryen_US
dc.subjectDrug Useen_US
dc.subjectKnowledgeen_US
dc.subjectIgnoranceen_US
dc.subjectHermeneuticsen_US
dc.subjectEcosystemsen_US
dc.titleEPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY: ON THE RELEVANCE OF FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY TO MAINSTREAM EPISTEMOLOGYen_US
dc.date.defence2020-10-30
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.contributor.degreeDoctor of Philosophyen_US
dc.contributor.external-examinerHeidi Grasswicken_US
dc.contributor.graduate-coordinatorGreg Scherkoskeen_US
dc.contributor.thesis-readerTyler Hildebranden_US
dc.contributor.thesis-readerDuncan MacIntoshen_US
dc.contributor.thesis-supervisorKirstin Borgersonen_US
dc.contributor.ethics-approvalNot Applicableen_US
dc.contributor.manuscriptsNot Applicableen_US
dc.contributor.copyright-releaseNot Applicableen_US
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