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dc.contributor.authorFertsman, Erik
dc.date.accessioned2020-12-14T17:39:44Z
dc.date.available2020-12-14T17:39:44Z
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10222/80087
dc.description.abstractAnalysts have long attempted to explain the patterns of change in the quality of post-Soviet political regimes, but few systematic inquiries exist on the matter. In this thesis, I present a new account of such patterns of change centered on interactions between political groups and banks in Ukraine. Research on Ukrainian has shown that political groups related to banks tend to hold outsized levels of political influence. Drawing on new empirical evidence, including the infamous case of PrivatBank, I find that the situation with political groups and banks in Ukraine appears to be analogous to those described by rentier theories. I argue fluctuations in Ukraine’s political regime may be linked to fluctuations in the number of licensed banks furthering the power of political groups in the country. I test this hypothesis using the GETS statistical modeling approach. The results of the analysis offer initial support for the proposed hypothesis.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.subjectpolitical regimesen_US
dc.subjectdemocracyen_US
dc.subjectbankingen_US
dc.subjectUkraineen_US
dc.titleA Hypothesis on Banking and Democracy: Explaining Changes in Ukraine's Political Regimeen_US
dc.date.defence2020-10-16
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Political Scienceen_US
dc.contributor.degreeMaster of Artsen_US
dc.contributor.external-examinern/aen_US
dc.contributor.graduate-coordinatorKatherine Fierlbecken_US
dc.contributor.thesis-readerDavid Blacken_US
dc.contributor.thesis-readerRobert Finbowen_US
dc.contributor.thesis-supervisorRuben Zaiottien_US
dc.contributor.ethics-approvalNot Applicableen_US
dc.contributor.manuscriptsNot Applicableen_US
dc.contributor.copyright-releaseNot Applicableen_US
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