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dc.contributor.authorMalloy, MacGregor
dc.date.accessioned2017-05-03T12:14:39Z
dc.date.available2017-05-03T12:14:39Z
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10222/72889
dc.description.abstractIn the wake of relativistic field theories in physics, all of our most fundamental physical theories shared three properties regarding the way that they described the world. First, properties of objects were always determined. Second, systems always evolved deterministically. Thirdly, no causal relationship between two separate regions in space was immediate or had superluminal effect. These properties of theories are called determinacy, determinism and local causality, respectively. These properties all correspond to classical metaphysical principles about the structure of the world. It will be shown that the theory of quantum mechanics has none of these properties and so therefore introduces a tension between the classical metaphysical description of the world and the descriptions given by our most fundamental physical theories. John Stewart Bell showed that no entirely correct theory of quantum mechanics has the property of local causality. I argue that this implies that local causality is metaphysically untenable.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.subjectPhysics--Philosophyen_US
dc.subjectScience--Philosophyen_US
dc.subjectQuantum theory--Philosophyen_US
dc.subjectmetaphysicsen_US
dc.titleDoes Quantum Mechanics Establish the Final Failure of Causality?en_US
dc.date.defence2017-04-28
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.contributor.degreeMaster of Artsen_US
dc.contributor.external-examinern/aen_US
dc.contributor.graduate-coordinatorDr. Michael Hymersen_US
dc.contributor.thesis-readerDr. Melanie Frappieren_US
dc.contributor.thesis-readerDr. Tyler Hildebranden_US
dc.contributor.thesis-supervisorDr. Letitia Meynellen_US
dc.contributor.ethics-approvalNot Applicableen_US
dc.contributor.manuscriptsNot Applicableen_US
dc.contributor.copyright-releaseNot Applicableen_US
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