The Formal Foundations of Our Epistemic Practices

Abstract

There is a dominant tradition in epistemology that largely begins with René Descartes’ search for a firm foundation for the sciences. Epistemologies after the fashion of Descartes that seek what he sought—namely, real foundations that act as epistemic guarantors—are invariably forced into a radically sceptical position about the possibility of knowledge. There is an alternative tradition in epistemology, i.e., the contextualist tradition, which sees its modern instantiation in the work of Michael Williams, who was largely inspired by Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Looking further back into history to the early-modern period, Thomas Reid represents an early instantiation of this tradition. In what follows, I pursue and defend an account of the contextualist tradition in epistemology, arguing that ultimately our capacity to know is constituted by our form of life, that is, by the kinds of creatures we are, and the kind of aims and interests we happen to have. Further, I argue that the contextualist account of knowledge, in abandoning the notion of real intrinsic epistemic properties, is not driven into a radically sceptical conclusion, and so, presents a viable alternative to traditional epistemology.