| dc.contributor.author | Lanoszka, Anna. | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-10-21T12:35:09Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2001 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2001 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.other | AAINQ66634 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10222/55761 | |
| dc.description | The geopolitical changes that have occurred over the last two decades have provided the impetus for the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). And yet the Uruguay Round of negotiations that eventually gave birth to the WTO took over four years of preparations and seven more years of talks to complete. Unlike its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 (GATT), the WTO is a formal rule-based member institution with its own strengthened dispute settlement mechanism. Furthermore, and in contrast to the GATT, the WTO scope is vastly enlarged to include such new issues as investment, services and intellectual property. | en_US |
| dc.description | The WTO accession process is a test of what it means to be a WTO member. Since the organization has changed dramatically the criteria for joining it reflect the magnitude of these changes. WTO accession is difficult and lengthy because it corresponds to implementing a demanding package of WTO agreements. For the candidate countries the WTO membership has enormous political and other implications, since it goes to the heart of the most fundamental questions about the role of the state in the economy and the meaning of economic globalization. | en_US |
| dc.description | The establishment of the WTO brings attention to the fact that new developments in the world economy have intensified the interaction between international and domestic law. Particularly in transitional and developing economies, international rules play a significant role in guiding the reform of political, legal and economic institutions. The WTO instructs reforming states to build the legal institutions needed to coordinate a market economy and to ease the integration of those states into the global economy. However, in a bargaining situation for WTO accession where candidates have no power and face highly intrusive demands for internal reforms, the process raises the questions of what are the long lasting consequences of implementing international legal rules by economically weak states. | en_US |
| dc.description | Thesis (Ph.D.)--Dalhousie University (Canada), 2001. | en_US |
| dc.language | eng | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Dalhousie University | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | en_US |
| dc.subject | Political Science, International Law and Relations. | en_US |
| dc.title | The World Trade Organization (WTO) and the accession process: Testing the implementation of the multilateral trade agreements. | en_US |
| dc.type | text | en_US |
| dc.contributor.degree | Ph.D. | en_US |
