| dc.contributor.author | McGraw, Patricia Anne. | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-10-21T12:38:24Z | |
| dc.date.available | 1998 | |
| dc.date.issued | 1998 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.other | AAINQ36588 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10222/55601 | |
| dc.description | Options theory is used to define the nature of the borrower-lender contract and to demonstrate that the existence of lender environmental liability fundamentally alters the risk-sharing for a bank lender with a secured debt contract. In the event of bankruptcy, some courts have passed environmental costs from the government to the secured lender by removing the liability limits inherent in the lending contract while continuing to allow the company's shareholders to retain their limited liability. Stulz and Johnson's (1985) model of secured debt is extended and the mathematical model of Lai (1995) is used to treat the process as the transfer of a guarantee from the government to the lender and to demonstrate that secured debt can be worth less than unsecured debt. The incentives created for borrowers, lenders and regulators are examined for their effects on capital markets. | en_US |
| dc.description | Thesis (Ph.D.)--Dalhousie University (Canada), 1998. | en_US |
| dc.language | eng | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Dalhousie University | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | en_US |
| dc.subject | Economics, Commerce-Business. | en_US |
| dc.subject | Political Science, Public Administration. | en_US |
| dc.title | Changing contracts: The impact of lender environmental liability on secured debt, corporate financing and public policy. | en_US |
| dc.type | text | en_US |
| dc.contributor.degree | Ph.D. | en_US |
