Semantic Externalism: From Wittgenstein to Putnam

Abstract

It is not widely acknowledge that Putnam's initial foray into semantic externalism is Wittgensteinian. Some philosophers (Anthony Rudd, for one) argue that, as he has become more Wittgensteinian in recent years, Putnam has effectively abandoned his own early externalism. In this thesis I suggest that this perception is mistaken.

I argue, contrarily, that Putnam's early extemalism, circa "The Meaning of 'Meaning"', is a continuation of the account of language offered by Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations. Specifically, I argue that: (1) Wittgenstein and Putnam share a negative thesis, whereby meaning is not determined by psychological facts about speakers; and (2), they share a positive thesis-according to which, the environment itself has a role to play in determining meaning-as the 'use' in Wittgenstein's 'meaning is use' is identified in terms of a speaker's interactions with the social and physical environment in which the speaker is situated. That is, Putnam' s semantic external ism just is Wittgenstein's view that use determines meaning.