Canadian Foreign Policy and Namibian Independence, 1977-1990

by

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"What was yesterday is not today also."

This thesis is dedicated to the people of Namibia, without whose patience and perseverance there would not have been as successful an ending to the struggle for Namibia's independence as there was, and to all of those around the world who helped them achieve their goal.

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Abstract

Namibia's independence in March 1990 marked the culmination of over a hundred years of struggle against colonial rule. For the last thirteen years, 1977 to 1990, Canada had been involved in the international efforts to release Namibia from South Africa's control. As Canada had little economic or strategic ties to either Namibia or South Africa, the motivation for these efforts was obviously different from the motivation of some of the other countries involved, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. The fact that Canada's efforts were channelled through the United Nations and the Commonwealth is also significant as these organisations had not been seen as being effective in their efforts to achieve a solution to the question of Namibian independence.

The fact that active involvement by Canada in the Namibian question even occurred, and the manner in which this goal was pursued leads one to question the motives for Canadian involvement, the methods used, and the resources devoted to securing a peaceful solution to the conflict. Canada's status as a "middle power" seems to provide most of the answers to these questions, as it explains why Canada would want to become involved in the issue when it did, and why Canada played the roles and provided the types of assistance to the process which resulted in Namibia's independence. This thesis will examine the middle power theory and the kind of foreign policy behaviour that one can expect from a middle power. Subsequent chapters will review Canada's participation in the issue, focusing on the period of active involvement (1977-1990), and relate the expectations to the roles assumed and the assistance actually provided by Canada. In doing so, it will be shown that the middle power theory is suitable as a means of analyzing Canadian foreign policy and that Canada's performance *vis-à-vis* Namibian independence throughout the period in question is best explained using the middle power framework.

Abbreviations

A-G	Administrator-General of Namibia (Appointed by South Africa)
CCFMSA	Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa
CG	Contact Group
CHOGM	Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
CIVPOL	Civilian Police Monitors (UNTAG)
DTA	Democratic Turnhalle Alliance
FLS	Front Line States
435	United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978)
GNP	Gross National Product
JC	Joint Commission (Cuba, South Africa, and Angola with the United States and the Soviet Union as observers.)
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Liberação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
R.S.A.	Republic of South Africa
SADF	South African Defence Force
SAG	South African government
SWA	South West Africa (Known as Namibia after 1968)
SWANU	South West African National Union
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organisation
SWAPOL	South West Africa Police
U.K.	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
U.S.	United States of America
U.S.S.R.	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly

UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITA	União Naçional para a Independēncia Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSR	Special Representative on Namibia of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Martti Ahtisaari)
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group

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I think that it is impossible to truly appreciate all the work and effort that goes into writing a thesis until you actually try to write one. This is especially true of the contribution by others. I would like to thank very much all those who have contributed to this thesis in one way or another. Many people put time aside from their schedules so that they could meet with me and they are mentioned in the bibliography. The contribution of these people, and of the many others who also helped me, cannot be fully appreciated by such a brief acknowledgement. Although they are not specifically mentioned in the text of the thesis, what these people contributed cannot be overstated.

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Of course, no matter how many people may have helped, the thesis which follows and the views it contains are my own, as are the errors and omissions.



Map 1: Namibia

Source: Centre d'information et de documentation sur le Mozambique et l'Afrique australe (CIDMAA), "Towards Namibian Independence: prospects for development and cooperation," (Montréal, Québec: CIDMAA, 1984) 4.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Africa's last colony, Namibia, finally became independent on March 21, 1990 after over a hundred years of colonial rule by Germany and South Africa. Despite the various setbacks which had occurred both before and during the independence process, the Namibian people persevered and were rewarded with their own political sovereignty. Although the majority of the credit for the success of the process belongs to the people of Namibia, they were not alone in their struggle to win independence. A majority of the world community had supported the right of Namibians to determine their own future throughout most of the 1970s and 1980s, although the support was more often than not merely rhetoric. Regardless, the support of the international community had prevented South Africa, the ruling power after 1915, from annexing Namibia. As the level of concern over the Namibia situation increased, five Western powers undertook an initiative in the late 1970s which resulted in a plan for independence. This plan, accepted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1978, served as the foundation for the

independence plan which began in 1989 and concluded with Namibia's independence in early 1990.

Canada was one of the five Western countries which drafted the plan adopted by the United Nations (UN). Although Canada could be described as the least powerful, economically, politically, or militarily, of the five countries, it did play an important role both in the drafting of the plan and in trying to get the plan implemented. Canada also had a significant role in the actual implementation of the plan. This leads one to question why Canada was so involved in an issue which had potentially little reward for Canada. The economic ties between Canada and Namibia have always been negligible and there was little prospect for any improvement. The answer to this question would seem to lie in the conception of Canada as a "middle power". While the middle power theory, not unlike many other theories in political science, is rather vague and contains many ambiguities, the theory has often been used in attempts to analyze Canada's international behaviour. Given the circumstances, its seems logical to apply this theory, which is discussed in depth in the next chapter, to the case of Canadian involvement in Namibian independence. While there are inconsistencies between the kinds of behaviour one would expect from a middle power and what Canada actually did, these mainly occurred before Canada began its active involvement on the issue in 1977. This thesis will examine Canada's involvement in relation to its status as a middle power and show, with some minor exceptions, that the foreign policy behaviour exhibited

by Canada on this issue does indeed conform with the expectations raised by the middle power theory.

In order to do this, it is necessary to first examine the middle power theory in more depth. Chapter Two will review the history of the theory and some of its more prominent characteristics. The chapter will also show that it is fair to describe Canada as a middle power, not only because of its economic power, which is sometimes viewed in the modern world as being more important than mere military might, but also because of the international roles which Canada has chosen to take on. However, it is also important to realise that the very preference for multilateral diplomacy that is one of the characteristics of a middle power foreign policy also makes it very difficult to ascertain the exact nature of any particular country's contribution to the overall success or failure of a multilateral initiative. As a result of this difficulty, parts of this thesis rely heavily on interviews granted to the author by members of the United Nations Secretariat, and of the Canadian diplomatic, academic, and non-governmental communities.

After discussing the theory and its implications for a middle power's foreign policy, the thesis will then relate a brief history of Namibia before 1977, the beginning of the Western initiative and Canada's direct involvement in the issue. This will focus mainly on the period since the Second World War, although the early colonial history and the involvement of the League of Nations will be addressed.

That chapter will conclude with an examination of Canada's policy on the Namibia question, as it became known, before the mid-1970s.

After this historical overview, the thesis will examine Canada's active participation in the process which led to the acceptance by the UN Security Council of Resolution 435 (1978), often referred to as Resolution 435 or even just 435, which embodied the Western plan for the Namibian independence process. The thesis will also examine the factors which prevented the implementation of this plan from 1978, when it was originally intended to begin, until 1989, when it did begin. Canada's behaviour during this period will be considered, including Canada's pursuit of the matter outside of the UN. Before concluding, the thesis will examine what Canada contributed during the actually implementation period and how this helped to ensure that the process was a success.

Finally, the thesis will conclude by relating all of this activity to the expectations raised by the middle power theory. This will show that Canada did indeed act as a middle power throughout the period under scrutiny, 1977-1990. By doing this, the thesis will show that the middle power theory can be applied to Canada and is indeed a suitable framework for analyzing Canadian foreign policy.

CHAPTER TWO: THE MIDDLE POWER THEORY

For much of the post-Second World War era, Canadians, their government, and much of the international community have regarded Canada as a "middle power" in the international system. Although what is meant by this term is frequently unclear, it has come to dominate the study of Canadian foreign policy in much the same way as the theory of realism dominates international relations theory. Although the tenets of the middle power theory do not go unchallenged, many of the alternate frameworks of analysis are in fact responses to middle power theory and are, therefore, heavily reliant on the dominant theory.[1]

Like many other political science theories, one of the major detriments of the middle power concept lies in its lack of authoritative definitions. One of the theory's most significant flaws lies in what is meant by the term "middle power".

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[1]For details of some of the alternate frameworks of analysis, see Michael Hawes, *Principal Power, Middle Power, or Satellite* (Toronto, Ontario: York University, 1984), and David B. Dewitt and John J. Kirton, *Canada as a Principal Power: A Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations* (Toronto, Ontario: John Wiley & Sons, 1983), among others.

Unfortunately, unlike those in the pure sciences, terms in political science often have multiple meanings. This can frequently lead to bewilderment and confusion and problems in theory-building and empirical research. As the term "middle power" is not clearly defined, it is not surprising that it is difficult to arrive at agreed definitions of the membership of this group. The great and super powers, by contrast, form a fairly distinct group.[2] As well, there is often a high degree of consensus over which countries can be classified as small states (e.g., Malaysia, Kenya, Albania, etc.).[3] Membership in the great and super power groups has usually been dependent on a state's military capability, but this simple criterion is undergoing a reevaluation in the modern world. This is due to the fact that military power is no longer viewed as being as important as it once was. The growing importance that has been attached to economic capabilities has been increased due to the relative decline in the overall power of the Soviet Union despite its still large military. As the extent of the economic confusion within the Soviet Union, and the rest of Eastern Europe, has become apparent, the inability of the Soviet Union to sustain the former level of spending on military and foreign policy has become evident. Instead of being seen as a super power, the

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[2]The great powers are usually defined as France, Great Britain, and sometimes Germany and Japan. The latter two countries are relatively insignificant militarily, but are powerful economically and strategically. The super powers are the U.S.S.R. and the United States, although the status of the former is now being questioned.

[3]Broadly termed, the small powers include what have become known as the members of the Group of 77 (G-77). This is even the case with some of the larger members of the G-77 (e.g., India and Nigeria) as these countries tend not to assume the roles normally associated with middle powers.

Soviet Union is now a great power, mainly due to its still formidable military might. This realisation has helped to increase, relatively, the power of other countries such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. While the membership of these groups may be fairly clear, when one begins to deal with the countries which lie in between these two groups, the boundaries which divide the groups can become unclear.

The membership becomes even more unclear when one begins to add other criteria, including foreign policy behaviour and intangibles such as influence and contributions to the international community. Although these may not seem like very important factors, there are the basis of the entire concept of the middle power theory. Mere economic, political, or military capabilities are not enough to qualify for middle power status; it is necessary that a state assume certain types of attitude and foreign policy behaviour before it can truly be counted as a middle power. These hard-to-quantify factors make defining what a middle power is even harder and, as one increases the level of scrutiny, the effects of the fundamental flaws of the concept can build upon themselves and the study can become less and less rigorous.

Despite these inherent disadvantages, the middle power concept is indeed useful in the study of Canadian foreign policy. The concept is one that has long enjoyed widespread acceptance among both academics and practitioners alike. As

a result, the concept has had a profound effect on the conduct of Canada in the international arena. However, before one can attempt to develop a definition of what a middle power is, and therefore what kinds of foreign policy behaviour one can expect from such countries, it is helpful to review the history of the concept.[4]

The Origins of the Middle Power Concept

Although it has achieved its highest level of prominence since the Second World War, the idea of middle powers is much older. Its history dates back to at least 300 B.C., when Mencius (Meng K'o or Meng Tzu) divided the state system of the Chou dynasty in China into big, middle, and small states.[5] This method of state classification was also used during the times of the ancient Indian and Greek state systems. With the end of the Middle Ages, the confusion of the European state system ended, although the system then entered a period of flux which continued until the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. This period was also one where states of different levels of power entered into a variety of relations with each other.

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[4]For a more detailed examination of the evolution of the idea of middle powers, see chapters one, two, and three in Carsten Holbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics* (New York City, New York: St Martin's Press, 1984).

[5]Bernard Wood, *The Middle Powers and the General Interest* (Ottawa, Ontario: The North-South Institute, 1988), 5.

The Concert of Europe

It was not until the Congress of Vienna in 1815 that the European system achieved a recognisable, stable hierarchy; this became known as the Concert of Europe. At the Congress, the European states were divided into four classes, with only the five states in the preeminent class, Prussia, Austria, Great Britain, Russia, and France, being of any significance.[6] This hierarchy continued to function until the early part of this century and scholars throughout this period dealt with the idea of middle powers and the various roles that could be played by them. However, it was in the regional sub-system of the German Confederation that the idea of middle powers flourished the most and, in 1816, the Confederation recognised the status of middle powers when it designated nine of its thirty-nine members as such, with their votes being weighed accordingly.[7]

The League of Nations

It took another "world war" to change the system established by the Napoleonic Wars and the Congress of Vienna and, in 1919, thirty-two countries attended the Paris Peace Conference with the intention of creating a new world order. Regardless of the sentiments expressed beforehand, the Conference was dominated by the victorious great powers almost from the beginning. Lesser powers, such as Brazil, Australia, Belgium, and Canada, could only protest and

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[6]Wood, *Middle Powers*, 6.

[7]Wood, *Middle Powers*, 7.

did so to the best of their abilities.[8] The protests did achieve some results however. The Council of the League of Nations was expanded from great powers only to include other members. However, these would not be drawn specifically from the "middle" and "minor" powers as the South African delegate to the Conference, General J.C. Smuts, had suggested.[9] The criteria for selection were left up to the League Assembly and this was to prove to be an almost constant source of irritation for the League. Brazil left the League in protest over being "demoted" to a lesser rank of powers, although the status of Spain and Poland was recognised when they were awarded semi-permanent Council seats.[10] Despite the problems *vis-à-vis* their position in the League, most middle powers were content to play respectable and significant roles in it. Some middle powers, however, Canada included, were "less than responsible and constructive."[11] Regardless of the varying roles played by its members, the League was, of course, unable to stop the slide into yet another world war.

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[8]Canada and the other British Dominions had to struggle to even be allowed to have separate status at the Conference as many, including some British officials, felt that the Dominions should be represented by Great Britain alone.

[9]J.C. Smuts, *The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion* (London: n.p., 1918), summarised in Edmund Jan Osmańczyk, *The Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Taylor and Francis, 1985), 467.

[10]Wood, *Middle Powers*, 8.

[11]Wood, *Middle Powers*, 9. For a detailed description of Canada's involvement in the League, see Richard Veatch, *Canada and the League of Nations* (Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 1975).

Middle Power Concept Since the Second World War

Although the League of Nations was the first formal attempt to form an international collective security organisation, it was not, needless to say, the last. Nor did it represent the end of attempts to institutionalise the status of middle powers. Even before the League of Nations' replacement, the United Nations, was established in 1945, the Canadian government had advanced the concept of "the functional principle" which was to prove the basis for many attempts by middle powers to wrest some power away from the great powers and to moderate the actions of such powers.

The functional principle had been announced by Prime Minister Mackenzie King as early as July 1943. The Prime Minister stated that it would be necessary to balance the need for sharing power among nations in post-War international organisations with the desirability of limiting involvement as a means of promoting "effective authority." Therefore, it seemed logical that the responsibilities assumed by a country should be commensurate with the applicable capabilities of that country.

> Representation [in international organisations] should be determined on a functional basis which would admit to full membership those countries, large and small, which have the greatest contribution to make to the particular object in question.[12]

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[12]Canada, House of Commons, *Debates, Fourth Session — Nineteenth Parliament*, vol. V, 1943 (Ottawa, Ontario: Edmond Cloutier, 1944), 4558.

Not surprisingly, this idea was endorsed by other middle powers such as Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, Poland, Belgium, and the Netherlands. This argument was buttressed by the participation and contribution by many of these countries, especially the former British colonies, during the two world wars. The functional principle was important to the roles played by middle powers because it advocated that responsibilities accepted or set upon a country should reflect the abilities of that country. This meant that, while it was to be expected that the great powers would continue to function as the primary keepers of the peace, middle powers would have a larger role in the decision-making in matters where they had sizable abilities. When countries such as Australia and Canada had prosperous economies but placed relatively insignificant emphasis on their military capabilities, the functional principle would at least allow them to play an economic role commensurate with their capabilities.

As a result, the functional principle became embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Article 23 of the Charter, which deals with the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, advocates that the capabilities and contributions of candidates be the primary criteria for election to the Security Council.

> ...[D]ue regard being specially paid, in the first instance, to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance

> of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the organisation, and also to equitable geographical distribution.[13]

Indeed, the functional principle would seem to be reflected in the first elections to the UNSC: Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, Poland, the Netherlands, and Australia.[14] However, the history of the United Nations has shown that it has been the latter part of this paragraph, "equitable geographical distribution", which has proved to be the more important when the non-permanent members of the Security Council are being chosen.

Article 44 is another illustration of how the functional principle became incorporated in the UN Charter, as the Article allows states which had been asked to use their militaries for punitive measures to be represented on the Security Council. As the Canadian delegation to the San Francisco Conference felt that it would be likely that middle powers would be likely to supply at least some of those forces, it seemed reasonable to ensure that such states would be "consulted rather than ordered to take action" by the permanent members of the UNSC.[15] This would ensure that states with the capability of enforcing Security Council decrees would be able to have a voice in the decision-making process.

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[13]United Nations, United Nations Charter, Article 23, paragraph 1, as amended. Reprinted in Osmańczyk.

[14]Bernard Wood, "Towards North-South Middle Power Coalitions," *Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South Dimension*, ed. Cranford Pratt (Kingston, Ontario; Montreal, Québec: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), 79.

[15]Holbraad, *Middle Powers*, 59.

However, the reality of the functioning of the United Nations revealed that these gains would amount to little. This was especially true in the Security Council. Once the co-operation of the permanent members ceased, i.e., with the advent of the Cold War, the UN failed to develop into the effective means of keeping the international peace that it had been envisioned as being. As the focus of power shifted from the Security Council to the General Assembly (UNGA), the loci of the power shifted to the small states (e.g., the Group of 77) which commanded the UNGA through the sheer weight of their votes.[16]

It is important to note that not all of the so-called middle powers had worked towards the same goals at the founding of the United Nations. For example, Australia had not always wanted representation on the Security Council to be based on capabilities alone. Australia had originally wanted the elected members of the UNSC to be selected on the basis of geographical representation and had only come to agree with the position advocated by Canada later. As the principal regional power in the Pacific, the idea of regional representation was obviously far more attractive to Australia than to Canada, located next to the United States.[17]

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[16]Holbraad, *Middle Powers*, 64.

[17]Holbraad, *Middle Powers*, 60-62.

Carsten Holbraad cites three main reasons why it proved impossible to fully incorporate the idea of middle powers into the UN Charter. The first is the aforementioned lack of unity among the middle powers, which reflected the problem of identifying which states were indeed middle powers. Associated with this was the issue of whether middle powers were to be a fixed group or should the list of them remain open (i.e., a static or dynamic group of states).[18] Secondly, the attempts to create greater roles for middle powers were, not surprisingly, resisted by the great powers. The permanent members of the Security Council regarded the efforts of the middle powers as attempts to usurp some power away from the great powers. What is more surprising is that the small powers also resisted the attempts by the middle powers to create a niche for themselves. This was because the small states feared that the entrenchment of another group of states would further marginalise the already marginalised small states. Holbraad contends that it was the co-operation between the small and great powers which resulted in the original Canadian proposal for the selection of non-permanent members of the UNSC to be weakened into what became Article 23.[19] The third reason why the middle powers were unable to achieve their goal of establishing a greater role for themselves at the San Francisco Conference was that the great powers remained fairly well unified during this period. Unlike later years, in 1945 the great powers' interests still coincided to a large extent and they

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[18]Holbraad, *Middle Powers*, 64.

[19]Holbraad, *Middle Powers*, 64, especially note 35 on that page.

were, therefore, able to resist the efforts of the middle powers to, as the great powers viewed it, undermine their authority.[20]

Although attempts to embody concepts which would have enhanced the roles of middle powers (e.g., the functional principle) into the UN Charter were not a great success, the attempts to include the concept in the structure of other international organisations proved to be more successful. The structures of both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or the World Bank) recognised that countries play different roles in the global economies. As a result, countries were allocated quotas and weighted votes based on their economic status and capabilities. Although there was no middle power position *per se*, general reluctance among the middle powers ensured that the great powers involved were not allowed to dominate these organisations to the extent that they did the United Nations.[21]

Unfortunately, the organisation whose structure would probably have reflected the status of middle powers to the greatest extent was never established. The "suggested charter" of the international trade organisation (ITO), drafted by the United States, received a great deal of criticism from some of the less

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[20]Holbraad, *Middle Powers*, 65.

[21]Wood, "Towards North-South Middle Power Coalitions," 79-80.

industrialised middle powers (e.g., Australia, India, Brazil, and China) and was heavily modified by them at the conferences in London (1946), Geneva (1947), and Havana (1947-1948). The changes would have given more power to states regarding regulating foreign investment, protecting infant industries, and promoting internal development. However, the United States had withdrawn its support for the ITO by this point and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was organised in its place.[22]

After the immediate post-War attempts to institutionalise the status of middle powers in international organisations, little further progress was made, mostly due to the commencement of the Cold War. As international politics became a struggle between the two super powers, the middle powers found it more and more difficult to work together to advance their collective cause.[23] This did not, however, mean that the study of middle powers and their activities ceased, or that middle powers were no longer regarded as having a meaningful role to play in international relations. What did occur was that the roles played by middle powers centred more on informal associations than on the formal ones.

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[22]Wood, "Towards North-South Middle Power Coalitions," 80-81.

[23]It would often be the case that middle powers would find themselves on the opposite sides in a dispute not because they were opposed themselves, but rather that the super powers that they were allied to were contesting the issue at hand. An example of this could be the involvement of various middle powers in the Vietnam War as these countries (e.g., Canada and Poland) had no direct interest in the issue but were involved because of their super power alignment.

For instance, the Group of Ten (G-10), which included both great and middle powers, took on a reforming role within the IMF during the 1960s and 1970s. As well, the Director-General of the GATT is advised by the "Seven + Seven" group of developed and developing countries.[24]

What is a Middle Power?

Despite the acceptance of the middle power concept by Canadian and other academics, and the studies which resulted from this, the definition of what a middle power is remains vague. Almost every study of the idea has adopted similar, but different, definitions. This has serious implications for any thoughtful analysis utilising the concept. This does not mean, however, that it is impossible to use the idea of middle powers in scholarly works; the number of works which do make use of the concept would belie that assumption. What it does mean is that it is necessary to make clear what one means by the term middle power before the analysis can begin.

The Term "Middle Power"

The term "middle power" has been defined in many different ways over the years. Often, these definitions have proved to be the basis for long, acrimonious debates over which factors should be included and the weighting, if any, to be

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[24]Wood, "Towards North-South Middle Power Coalitions," 81.

assigned to these. In some cases, the factors included in the definition can include various subjective elements such as "prestige" or "influence." In his book, *The Middle Powers and the General Interest*, the first volume in the "Middle Powers in the International System" series, Bernard Wood cites a number of fairly recent works which have used Gross National Product (GNP) to determine if a country enjoys middle power status.[25] Mr Wood asserts that the "GNP automatically captures aggregate economic power, wealth and/or population size, and to a substantial extent, military *potential*" (emphasis added).[26] However, while accepting GNP as an acceptable measure of the tangible abilities of a country, Mr Wood reserves the right to modify this index on the basis of "judgements of the intangible factors and the contextual ones"; i.e., the context in which a state's abilities are being applied and various other subjective factors.[27] Based purely on GNP, countries which rank as middle powers include Italy, China, Canada, Brazil, Spain, the Netherlands, India, Poland, Australia, Mexico, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Argentina, South Korea, and South Africa.[28] As can be seen from this brief list, middle powers cover a range of geographical, political, and economic spheres.

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[25]These works include Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson, *The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization* (New York City, New York: Yale University Press, 1973).

[26]Wood, *Middle Powers*, 17.

[27]Wood, *Middle Powers*, 17.

[28]See Table 1 in Wood, *Middle Powers*, 18.

Although Mr Wood's definition of middle powers is but one of many, it does serve to illustrate how difficult it can be to attempt to define the term. Though not very precise, it seems sensible to begin by using the definition employed by Carsten Holbraad. According to him, a middle power is

> ...a state occupying an intermediate position in a hierarchy based on power, to a country much stronger than the small nations though considerably weaker than the principal members of the state system.[29]

It also seems reasonable to use GNP, as advocated by Mr Wood, as the measure of a state's power and to thereby achieve a synthesis the two definitions. Although vague, this combined definition does provide a rough guideline for determining whether a country is a middle power or not, regardless of the economic or political régime in place, or the geographical location. Based mainly on their economic performance, India, South Korea, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and many other countries have been characterized as middle powers.[30]

Possible Roles For Middle Powers

Over the centuries, middle powers have played a variety of roles. In the post-Second World War era, these roles have expanded in scope and importance. However, these roles can be classified into five broad categories. These are regional or sub-regional leadership, functional leadership, stabilizing conflict,

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[29]Carsten Holbraad, *The Role of Middle Powers* (Ottawa, Ontario: School of International Affairs, Carleton University, 1972), 4.

[30]For other examples, see Wood, *Middle Powers*, 18.

negative roles, and general multilateral leadership.[31] Of these roles, the part of regional or sub-regional leader is the most established in the international system. Many of the middle powers are considered regional or sub-regional leaders, including Brazil, India, Australia, and Indonesia.[32] Although the other specific leadership role, functional leadership, is not as established in international relations, it has proved to be of foremost importance to the middle powers in the post-Second World War period. As was mentioned above, this idea received its first public enunciation in Prime Minister Mackenzie King's speech to the Canadian Parliament in 1943. Functional leadership can occur in a number of areas, including international economic relations.[33]

According to Bernard Wood, sixteen of the thirty-three middle powers that he has identified (based on their 1979 GNP) qualify as regional or sub-regional leaders. Another fourteen could be designated functional leaders, meaning that a total of thirty out of thirty-three middle powers perform some sort of leadership role. Of those, twenty-two, or two-thirds, qualify as either a regional or functional leader.

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[31]See Table 1.

[32]On occasion, Canada has even been described as a regional power without a region.

[33]Wood, *Middle Powers*, 19.

Table 1: Possible Roles for Middle Powers

- Regional or Sub-regional Leader
- Functional Leader
  - In Economic Management
  - In the International Commons
  - In International Law and Justice
- Stabilizing Roles
  - Separating Other Powers
  - Counter-balancing or Neutralizing
  - Mediating
- Negative Roles
  - Free-riding or Fence-sitting
  - Status-seeking
- 'Good Multilateral Citizenship': General Commitment and Leadership

Source: Bernard Wood, *The Middle Powers and the General Interest* (Ottawa, Ontario: The North-South Institute, 1988), 31.

Another of these roles which has gained importance since the Second World War is the ability of middle powers to stabilise actual or potential conflict. This role can take on a number of forms including separating adversaries and helping to neutralise imbalances in the (regional) power structure. What has proved to be most likely is that the middle powers will play some sort of mediating role between the antagonists (e.g., the lending of their impartial "good offices").

Although all of the roles mentioned so far are positive ones, middle powers can play negative roles as well. Middle powers have often been criticised for

adopting various policies solely as a means of increasing their own status, regardless of the consequences. Many scholars assert that the struggles to increase the position of middle powers in the international system in 1815, 1919, and 1945 were motivated in part by desires to augment the status of middle powers.[34] Writers such as Charles Kindleberger go further and charge that middle powers sometimes enjoy a "free ride" in the international economic and/or political system(s) at the expense of both the great and small powers.[35] Both of these roles could have potentially damaging effects for the international system.

The last role played by middle powers is a more general one; that of commitment to strengthening multilateral decision-making institutions. This is viewed as one method of reducing the almost overwhelming domination of the great powers. Of course, middle powers must avoid making these organisations too democratic as that could mean that the minor powers, large in number if not in status or influence, could take over effective control of the institutions.[36] Canada has a long history of being committed to multilateral institutions[37] and

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[34]Wood, *Middle Powers*, 20.

[35]Charles P. Kindleberger, "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods and Free Rides," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (June 1981): 242-254. Cited in Wood, *Middle Powers*, 20.

[36]It has been said that this is what has happened to the United Nations General Assembly since the decolonisation of Africa and Asia occurred.

[37]See Table 2.

many Canadian foreign policy scholars have written that this arises out of a reluctance to link Canada too closely to the United States.

Canada as a Middle Power

Having determined, albeit in broad terms, what middle powers are and what types of roles they can play, it is necessary to specifically examine Canada in terms of being a middle power and what this may mean in terms of the kind(s) of foreign policy behaviour one can expect.

Is Canada A Middle Power?

Based on the definition outlined above, there is little doubt that Canada is indeed a middle power. Even using other definitions, Canada is almost always ranked as such. Firstly, it is clear that Canada is not nearly as strong as the dominant powers in the post-Second World War state system. The United States, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, China, Australia, Germany, and many other nations are more powerful than Canada in terms of their military capabilities.[38] As well, although a member of the Group of Seven, often described as the seven richest states in the world, Canada and Italy are regularly referred to as the junior members of that Group. Even if one accepts a definition

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[38]This is based on assessments of the size, equipment, and training of these states' armed forces.

of "power" which encompasses more than just the military might of a country, Canada's effective power falls far short of that wielded by other nations.

Having made the point that Canada does not rank among the most powerful of nations, it is necessary to also point out that Canada is not among the weakest of states either. Canada, despite what many Canadians seem to think, has a strong and prosperous economy.[39] In 1980, Canada's GNP of over $361,720 million was the seventh largest in the world, after the United States, Japan, West Germany, France, the U.K., and Italy.[40] In 1986, Canada's per capita GNP was growing at an annual rate of 1.8 per cent which, although not as high as the rate in some developing nations, was only marginally behind the growth rate in Japan and France (1.9 per cent).[41] The standard of living enjoyed by the average Canadian is one of the highest in the world.[42] Although it may be a junior member, Canada does belong to the Group of Seven and the Trilateral Commission. Relative to other members of international institutions

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[39]According to Dr Ray Cline's figures, Canada ranked fifth out of sixty-six countries in an assessment of those countries' economic capabilities. George Thomas Kurian, *The New Book of World Rankings*, 3rd ed. (New York City, New York: Facts on File, 1991), 83.

[40]Kurian, 68-9.

[41]Kurian, 71.

[42]The Canadian government spent over a third (33.36 per cent) of its budget on social security and welfare items in 1987 and Canadians had the fourth highest level of per capita consumption in 1985. Kurian, 82, 92.

such as the World Bank, the Commonwealth, or the International Monetary Fund, Canada is obviously one of the more affluent.

This prosperity is also reflected in Canada's status politically. Canada has long been regarded as one of the leaders of the Commonwealth and other international organisations. Although not a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Canada has been selected as a non-permanent member five times, almost more times than any other member of the United Nations.[43] Canada also acts as the representative of many countries on the inner councils of various institutions (e.g., the IMF and World Bank).

This last point is linked to Canada's influence. Influence and power may be linked, but they are not synonymous.

> Influence means the modification of one actor's behaviour by that of another ... Power means capability; it is the aggregate of political resources that are available to an actor ... Power may be converted into influence, but it is not necessarily so converted either at all or to its full extent. Although those who possess the greatest power may also exercise the greatest influence may also exercise the greatest influence, this is not logically necessary.[44]

Therefore, some countries which may be counted as middle powers based on their *capabilities*, may not in fact exercise the *influence* of a middle power. For

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[43]Canada has been elected to the Security Council for a term roughly once every decade.

[44]Cox and Jacobson, 3-4.

example, while South Africa may rank as a middle power based on its GNP, the twenty-ninth largest in the world in 1979, its international isolation (e.g., expulsion from many international sporting federations, the refusal of the UN General Assembly to accept the South African delegation's credentials, the loss of its seat on the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors in the late 1970s, etc.) makes it difficult to include the country among the other middle powers when international influence is taken into account.[45] As well, South Africa's past regional policy of destabilisation was one which promoted South Africa's own security by promoting insecurity (e.g., rebel movements such as the MNR in Mozambique) in the other countries of southern Africa.

Canada is not the only country to qualify for middle power status. Many other states legitimately deserve this status whether they desire it or not. Australia is also a middle power. South Africa once was and may still be, although the shackles of apartheid and sanctions make an objective assessment of the country's status difficult. Many of the European nations have long been regarded as middle powers (e.g., the Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries, and Belgium). However, the problems which the Eastern European nations are presently facing may cause the European middle powers to focus almost exclusively on that region in the immediate future.

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[45]Wood, "Towards North-South Middle Power Coalitions," 73, 77-8.

Middle Powers Roles Played by Canada

Firstly, Canada can be expected to play a role as a functional leader. As an industrialised, developed nation, Canada plays a leading economic role. Many of the organisations of which Canada is a member are functional in nature, especially the economic ones.[46] Canada was one of the founding members of many of these organisations (e.g., the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Colombo Plan) and continues to play a large role in most of them.

While able to fulfil a functional leadership capacity, Canada is unable to act as a regional leader due to its location next to the United States. To play this type of role, a middle power needs to have more (political) room to manoeuvre than the close proximity of the United States allows Canada. Countries such as Australia and India may have close ties to great or super powers, but they do not have their powerful allies placed between them and the rest of their region. Even less powerful middle powers such as Brazil are able to play a larger regional role than Canada because they are not so close to a great power. Even the role of sub-regional leader is denied to Canada due to various political, economic, cultural, and geographical factors, although some argue that Canada's role in the Caribbean approaches that of a regional leader.

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[46]See Table 2.

Table 2: Examples of Canadian Membership in International Organisations

Asian Development Bank (ADB)
Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific
Commonwealth
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)
Inter-Parliamentary Union
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or the World Bank)
International Energy Agency (IEA)
International Finance Corporation (IFC)
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
International Hydrographic Organisation
International Labour Organisation (ILO)
International Lead and Zinc Study Group
International Maritime Organisation (IMO)
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
International Sugar Organisation
International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
International Tin Council
International Whaling Commission
International Wheat Council
International Wool Study Group
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
Organisation of American States (OAS)
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
United Nations (UN)
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)
Universal Postal Union (UPU)
World Health Organisation (WHO)
World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO)
World Meteorological Organisation (WMO)

A second middle power role that Canada often plays is that of a stabilizing influence. On occasion, this has meant that Canada has been part of a "buffer" between adversaries. Examples of this include Canada's participation in all but one of the United Nations peace-keeping operations.[47] Canada's history of involvement in these operations began long before the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) suggested by Lester B. Pearson in 1956 and continues to the present day.[48] The Canadian involvement in these operations goes beyond the military to include civilian, police, and financial participation.

Quite often, this role can take the form of functioning as a mediator between the protagonists. Since Canada has only limited strategic interests (e.g., in North America and Europe), it is frequently viewed as a neutral third-party whose agenda is not hidden and is, therefore, a country which can be trusted. Canada's limited economic ties to the southern Africa region, its traditional bonds with the third world as a whole and southern Africa in particular (e.g., through

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[47]The exception was the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM). It should be noted that "peace-keeping" is being used in a larger sense than just military operations. Peace-keeping is now often used to describe joint military-civilian or even just civilian operations, as is shown by a recent workshop held in Ottawa, Ontario, entitled "The Civilian Aspects of Peace-keeping."

[48]As announced recently, Canada is participating in the United Nations force which has been sent to the Western Sahara.

the Commonwealth), and its status as a developed state combined to make Canada acceptable as a mediator *vis-à-vis* Namibia.[49]

Lastly, Canada has a extensive history of supporting multilateral efforts and organisations. As was mentioned above, Canada belongs to a number of formal and informal international institutions.[50] Canada was a founder of some of these and has often been a major actor in these institutions. Among the more prominent institutions in which Canada plays such a role are the Commonwealth, where Canada took over the lead from the former colonial power, the United Kingdom, in relation to South Africa and Namibia, and the United Nations. In any number of articles, speeches, and books, the point is made that Canada has a deep commitment to these organisations.

Although one could expect Canada to try to play all of these positive roles, it is important to recognise the limitations placed upon the actions of a middle power. Probably the most notable of these are the interests of the super powers. For Canada, this usually means the interests of the United States. Once the interests, especially the strategic interests, of a super power become involved in an

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[49]See chapter four.

[50]According to the most recent figures, Canada belonged to sixty-one inter-governmental organisations in 1990. *Yearbook of International Organizations, 1990/91*, 8th ed., 2 vols., ed. Union of International Associations (Munich, Germany: K.G. Saur, 1990), vol. 2, 1725.

issue, the ability of a middle power to effectively intervene becomes drastically reduced.[51] For instance, it would not be feasible for a middle power to attempt to reach a settlement proposal in the Middle East as the region, especially Israel, is important to the interests of the United States.

As well, the limited resources of a middle power, which help to make it less threatening, also mean that the middle power is usually unable to establish any kind of solution unless the countries involved are willing to accept the solution. Since most middle powers do not have the means to project their military power on a global basis, their militaries are usually not employable in these matters, except in peace-keeping roles. Similarly, in most cases, middle powers do not have the economic ties or leverage to force a party in a dispute to accept a settlement. While the great powers are equally unable to impose a solution, the leverage which they have at their disposal is usually much greater.

As a consequence of these limitations, it would be unreasonable to expect a middle power to resolve a dispute unless the opponents are willing to work towards that end. In other words, the adversaries have to be actually working towards a resolution in order for a practical solution to be found. As well, if any great power, and especially either of the super powers, becomes involved in an

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[51]Although to a lesser extent, the same argument can be made once the interests of any great power become entangled in an issue.

issue, i.e., the issue becomes an area of friction between them, then the ability of a middle power to mediate the conflict is reduced to almost nil. Therefore, once this situation occurs, it would not be surprising to find that middle powers are unable, or even unwilling, to function as a mediator in the dispute.

CHAPTER THREE: NAMIBIA PRIOR TO 1977

Although Namibia has only recently achieved statehood, it has, like most other African states, had a long colonial history. While formal German colonial rule only lasted thirty-six years, from 1884 to 1920, many have argued that Namibia's colonial phase continued from the establishment of German rule until independence in 1990. As is often the case, the present makes little sense without some cognizance of the past and this chapter is designed to provide the background necessary to understand how the Namibia question had developed and what the situation was before the events of the mid-1970s occurred. The background is crucial if one is to understand how the racist policies of apartheid came to be established and maintained in Namibia, and what the situation was before Western states, including Canada, became seriously involved in the issue.

Therefore, this chapter will briefly examine the progression of European encroachment upon Namibia from the first arrival of European explorers until the formal establishment of colonialism in 1884. Then the chapter will look at how

the German occupation was supplanted by South African rule. Much of the chapter will focus on the post-Second World War period and how the United Nations became involved in the Namibian issue. As well, the chapter will include an overview of the development of the nationalist movement within Namibia and of Canada's minor involvement in the issue prior to 1977.

Early European Contact and German South West Africa

Europeans first arrived on the Namibian coast in 1485 when the Portuguese explorer Diogo Cao landed at Cape Cross, to the north of modern Swakopmund. In 1486 another Portuguese explorer, Bartholmew Diaz, landed near the present sight of Lüderitz. There were other landings along the coast after these two, but it was not until the 1670s that Dutch explorers from the Cape of Good Hope community made face-to-face contact with the indigenous peoples of the region. Even then, it was another hundred years before White settlers arrived in the area which was to become known as South West Africa (SWA).

About 1793, some Dutch settlers from the Cape of Good Hope region moved to Namibia and established themselves as farmers, with some settling as far north as Grootfontein. These settlers marked the beginnings of White interest in the area and, by the mid-nineteenth century, traders had extended their

networks as far north as the Etosha Pan.[52] The intrusion of the traders in the area was accompanied by the spread of missionaries, spearheaded by representatives of the London Missionary Society and the Wesleyans, but also including German and Finnish Lutheran missionaries.[53] Missionaries had been sent to Namibia from 1802 on, and a permanent German Lutheran mission was established near Okahandja as early as 1844. The missionaries also acted as explorers and many advocated the annexation of the territory by their respective homelands.[54]

The Annexation of Walvis Bay

The first annexation of Namibian territory occurred in March 1878 when Great Britain annexed the Walvis Bay enclave.[55] Walvis Bay had originated as a port for whaling ships and had then expanded into a trading and missionary post.[56] The Cape Colony, then under British rule, had wanted to annex all of the Namibian coast because of rumours of great mineral wealth, but the British

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[52]Peter H. Katjavivi, *A History of Resistance in Namibia* (London, U.K.; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Paris, France: James Currey; OAU; UNESCO, 1988), 5.

[53]The success of these missionaries can be seen in the level of Christianity in the present population, presently estimated at some 90 per cent. *Africa South of the Sahara, 1991* (London, U.K.: Europa Publications, 1991), 752.

[54]The term "South West Africa" originated with one of the missionary-explorers. Katjavivi, 6.

[55]I. Goldblatt, *History of South West Africa: from the beginning of the nineteenth century*, (Cape Town, R.S.A.: Juta & Co., 1971), 62.

[56]Goldblatt, 12

authorities were reluctant to take control over any more territory than they felt was absolutely necessary to protect their interests. Until 1884, Walvis Bay was British territory, although it was administered from Cape Town. In that year, it was formally "annexed" by the Cape Colony.[57] Control over the enclave passed to the Union of South Africa when it became an independent country in 1910 and then to the Republic of South Africa in 1961. However, Walvis Bay was administered as part of Namibia from 1925 until the mid-1970s.

German South West Africa

Although the European explorers had exposed Namibia to outside (i.e., European) influences, White settlement did not begin on a large scale until after the founding of a European village near Angra Pequena, the site of Diaz's 1486 landing, in 1883. At that time, a German businessman, Adolf Lüderitz, made an agreement with a local chief to establish a fishing port on the coast. The port was later renamed after its founder and remains one of the centres of the Namibian fishing industry to this day. Soon after this agreement was reached, German "protection and sovereignty" was extended to the settlement and the surrounding area by an agreement between the Imperial German government and the local

[57]Goldblatt, 84-87.

chief.[58] Other agreements extended the area claimed by Germany into the interior. German control was given legitimacy by the other European powers at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, although it took German troops to establish effective control over the territory through a policy of divide and conquer.[59]

However, this policy was not completely effective and the Herero, Nama, and other tribes engaged in a war of resistance against the Germans from 1904 to 1907. Unfortunately for the rebels, the Herero rebellion was put down before the Nama rebellion effectively began. This allowed the Germans to suppress the rebellions separately and the authorities then proceeded to exterminate some 75 to 80 per cent of the Herero population, along with 35 to 50 per cent of the Nama tribe.[60] Many of the surviving Hereros fled to the neighbouring British protectorate of Bechuanaland, now independent Botswana, from which they continued to protest the foreign occupation of their homeland.

Once the rebellions had been suppressed, the German administration continued on with the style of government which had led to the uprisings. According to Peter Katjavivi, there were three main elements of German colonial

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[58]Richard Voeltz, *German Colonialism and the South West Africa Company, 1894-1914* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Monographs in International Studies (Africa Series, No. 50), 1988), 1.

[59]Helmut Bley, *South-West Africa under German Rule, 1894-1914* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1971), xxv.

[60]Katjavivi, 10.

rule. Firstly, land was expropriated from native Namibians and redistributed to Whites. Secondly, traditional social and political structures were undermined as a means of fashioning Black Namibians into colonial subjects. Lastly, the now landless Namibians were practically forced into becoming a source of labour for the mines and farms which were now controlled by Whites. In return, the Namibians received only limited opportunities for a low-level education.[61]

The deterioration in the conditions of Black Namibians continued unchecked until the Great War. Then, in 1915, at the request of the British government, the Union of South Africa invaded South West Africa and defeated the German forces after a short five month campaign. For the rest of the war, and until the establishment of the League of Nations Mandate in 1921, South West Africa was administered by the South Africans under martial law.

The League of Nations Mandate

Once the Great War ended, one question which the Paris Peace Conference attempted to address was what was to happen to the former German colonies, including the Cameroons, Togoland, Ruanda-Urundi, Tanganyika, and South West Africa. The creation of the League of Nations seemed to provide a relatively simple solution and the mandate system of the League was established.

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[61]Katjavivi, 11.

South Africa, acting on behalf of Great Britain, was to administer the Class C Mandate over South West Africa, beginning January 1, 1921.

> Under the terms of the Mandate, South West Africa was to be regarded as a "sacred trust of civilisation" and the Mandatory [the Union of South Africa] shall promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being, and the social progress of the inhabitants of the Territory.[62]

The public intent of the League mandates was to develop the territory and its peoples towards their eventual independence. However, Generals Smuts and Botha, South Africa's leaders at the Paris Conference, had been told that they could treat the Mandate over South West Africa as "the equivalent of a 999-year lease".[63] This attitude was also reflected in the terms of the Mandate which instructed South Africa to regard SWA "as an integral portion of the Union of South Africa" and that the territory could best be administered as such.[64] South Africa did exactly that and thereafter applied its internal policies (e.g., apartheid) to the territory.

As a result of this attitude, South Africa's administration failed to live up to the high standards set down by the League. South Africa's rule during this period served to advance the interests of Whites only and ignored the interests

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[62]Katjavivi 13.

[63]Alfred T. Moleah, *Namibia: The Struggle for Liberation* (Wilmington, Delaware: Disa Press, 1983), 24.

[64]Quoted in Moleah, 23.

and needs of others as much as possible. South Africa continued with the land expropriation begun by the Germans and encouraged more White settlement. Despite the repatriation of some six thousand German soldiers and officials after the Great War ended, the White population continued to grow and, by 1925, was double that of 1914.[65] In that same year, the South African government granted limited self-government to South West African Whites *only*, including former German subjects still living in the territory.[66]

Throughout the interwar period, the League of Nations Mandate Committee queried the territory's political development and pressured the South Africans to change their policies. However, the Committee lacked any sort of authority over South Africa and voluntary changes of any significance were not forthcoming. It was not until just before the outbreak of the Second World War that the Committee began to seriously apply pressure on South Africa in an effort to force changes. Once the war was on, however, the supervision of the mandated territories ceased and no changes to South Africa's policy were made.[67]

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[65]Ruth First, *South West Africa* (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin Books, 1963), 107.

[66]Goldblatt, 220.

[67]For a more detailed description of this matter, see chapter thirty-seven in Goldblatt.

The Post-Second World War Mandate

After the Second World War ended, the United Nations was created to supersede the League of Nations and learn from its mistakes. It was expected that all of the League of Nations mandates would be transferred to the new UN Trusteeship Council. This was the case with the Mandates administered by Britain (Tanganyika, and parts of the Cameroons and Togoland), France (parts of the Cameroons and Togoland), and Belgium (Ruanda-Urundi).[68] However, when the UN first met in 1945, South Africa asked to be allowed to incorporate South West Africa into the Union of South Africa. The matter was referred to the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee of the General Assembly and, after some deliberation, it was decided that South Africa's proposal should be rejected and that South West Africa should indeed become a trustee territory under UN supervision.[69] South Africa moved quickly to oppose this decision and began to treat South West Africa as South Africa's fifth province. This included electing white representatives to both houses of the Union Parliament and a transfer of control over Native affairs back to the Union.[70]

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[68]Tanganyika later combined with Zanzibar to form Tanzania. The French and part of the British territories of the Cameroons formed Cameroon, while part of the British territory opted to join Nigeria. The British portion of Togoland joined Ghana and the French part became Togo. The Belgian mandate of Ruanda-Urundi later formed Burundi and Rwanda.

[69]United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 65 (1946). The vote was none against, nine abstaining, and thirty-seven countries, including Canada, voting in favour.

[70]Moleah, 30-35.

Petitions to the United Nations

From 1946 onwards, a growing number of petitions were presented to the United Nations either by, or on behalf of, Black Namibians.[71] Although the South African authorities regularly refused to grant passports to any Namibians that they felt might try to undermine the "legitimacy" of South Africa's occupation, petitions, speeches, and people were smuggled out of the territory and made their way to New York. In 1946, there had been only one petition; as early as 1960, the number had grown to over 120.[72] One petition of particular interest was the 1956 petition from the Tribal Congress of the People of Ukuanyama in Ovamboland which requested, among other items, that the Canadian government administer the territory under UN trusteeship.[73] However, the UN response to this petition made no mention of that request and was, in any case, destroyed by the South African Commissioner before it reached the Congress.[74]

The End of the Mandate

Although the UN had formally rejected South Africa's bid to annex Namibia, it did not initially take any substantive measures to end South African

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[71]See chapter six in Katjavivi.

[72]Katjavivi, 40.

[73]United Nations, General Assembly, "Petition from the Tribal Congress of the people of Ukuanyama, Ovamboland" in Supplement 12 of *The General Assembly Official Records (XI)* (New York City, New York: United Nations, 1956), 34-5.

[74]United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 1058 (1956), and First, 40.

rule in the territory. During the 1950s little was done internationally to end South Africa's control over Namibia. However, the late 1950s did see the emergence of organised, popular movements inside Namibia which advocated an end to the Mandate and eventual independence. Before 1958, most of the resistance to South Africa's rule had been centred around various traditional organisations, such as the Herero Chiefs' Council. In 1958 the Ovamboland People's Congress (OPC) was formed by Namibians working and/or studying in Cape Town. Its formation was quickly followed in 1959 by the establishment of the South West African National Union (SWANU), which had the support of the Herero Chiefs' Council. SWANU and the OPC's successor, the Ovamboland People's Organisation (OPO), initially worked together and the OPO President, Sam Nujoma, now President of Namibia, served on the SWANU executive committee.[75] However, many members of the OPO felt that SWANU was too dominated by the Herero Chiefs' Council to function as an umbrella organisation for the nationalist movements and, in 1960, the OPO became the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), although SWANU and SWAPO continued to work together for many years.[76] SWAPO also co-operated with other groups within Namibian society to present Namibia's case to international

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[75]Katjavivi, 42.

[76]Katjavivi, chapter 7.

forums, thus helping to increase the world community's awareness of what became known as the "Namibia Question".[77]

However, after a few years had passed, SWAPO and SWANU began to compete with each other for international support. The rivalry first gained importance after the founding of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. One of the goals of the OAU was to promote the liberation of African countries from colonial rule. To this end, the OAU established its Co-ordination Committee for the Liberation of Africa which received funds from the members of the OAU. In 1965, the Committee designated some of those funds to be divided between SWAPO and SWANU. However, as SWANU preferred not to begin an armed struggle at this point, their share of the funds were not given to them. As a result of SWANU's reluctance to take up arms against the South African forces, SWAPO received the OAU's endorsement as the Namibian "liberation movement" and thereafter received increased international stature.[78] The increased international stature also helped SWAPO to broaden its support within Namibia and the number of non-Ovambos who joined increased.

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[77]Katjavivi, 45.

[78]Denis Herbstein and John Evenson, *The Devils are Among Us: The War for Namibia* (London, U.K.: Zed Books, 1989), 14-15.

The emergence of independent African countries during the late 1950s and early 1960s also helped to increase attention on Namibia in other ways. In 1960, Liberia and Ethiopia, the only two Black African countries which had been members of the League of Nations, challenged South Africa's rule in Namibia at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague. Unfortunately, the Court decided in 1966 that the two countries had no right to bring the case to court and therefore refused to rule on the matter.[79] A few months later, in October 1966, the UN General Assembly formally terminated South Africa's mandate and established an *ad hoc* Committee for South West Africa to advise the General Assembly on how the territory should be administered.[80] Not only did Canada support Resolution 2145, Canada served on the *ad hoc* Committee.[81] When the Committee reported in 1967, however, Canada did not support its recommendation to create the United Nations Council for South West Africa (after 1968, the UN Council for Namibia) to take over the administration of the territory until independence could be realised.[82] This was because the Canadian government felt that it was impractical to grant the Council the authority to

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[79]Katjavivi, 57.

[80]United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 2145 (1966). Two countries (South Africa and Portugal) voted against the resolution, three abstained, and 114 supported it.

[81]The other members of the Committee were Chile, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Finland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, the U.S.S.R., and the U.S. United Nations, General Assembly, *The General Assembly Official Records (XXI)* (New York City, New York: United Nations, 1966), 1471 Plenary Meeting, 11.

[82]United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 2248 (1967).

administer Namibia when there was little likelihood that South Africa would relinquish its control over the territory. Although these actions ended South Africa's hopes of ever formally annexing Namibia, the Council was indeed unable to fulfil its mandate as South Africa refused to even grant it access to Namibia, let alone co-operate with it.

The Beginning of the Armed Struggle

Shortly before the termination of the mandate, SWAPO had its first armed clash with the South African security forces.[83] The decision to launch an armed struggle against the South African occupation forces had been taken as early as 1962.[84] However, it took a few years for the recruits to be trained and equipped. As well, bases had to be established inside Namibia and along on the other side of the border.[85] Although the military wing of SWAPO, later to become the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), was quite small at the time, its mere existence was enough to help prompt the South African government to arrest all of the prominent SWAPO members that it could. Using retroactive legislation, the South African government prosecuted thirty-seven SWAPO

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[83]Paul L. Moorcraft, *African Nemesis: War and Revolution in Southern Africa (1945-2010)* (London, U.K.: Brassey's, 1990), 104.

[84]Herbstein and Evenson, 14.

[85]Originally, the bases along the border were located in Zambia. This meant that the SWAPO forces had to travel through the Caprivi strip before they entered the main part of the territory. However, after Angola achieved independence in the mid-1970s, SWAPO was able to establish bases directly across the border from Ovamboland.

members on charges of terrorism. All but two were convicted, with some being sent to the infamous Robben Island maximum security goal.[86]

From the End of the Mandate Until the Formation of the Contact Group

The Namibian issue returned to the International Court of Justice in the early 1970s when a sub-committee of the United Nations Security Council asked the Court to examine the legal implications of South Africa's continuing occupation of Namibia in light of the termination of the Mandate by the General Assembly. Unlike the "non-ruling" of 1966, in 1971 the Court decided that South Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal and should therefore end at once.[87] This ruling spurred activists in Namibia to launch strikes and other politically-motivated activities which were brutally repressed by the security forces.

In 1973, over the objections of Canada and eighteen other countries, the UN General Assembly voted to recognize SWAPO as the "authentic representative of the Namibian people."[88] In 1976, the General Assembly "upgraded" SWAPO's status to that of the "*sole* and authentic representative of the Namibian people"[emphasis added][89] and then conferred observer status on

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[86]Katjavivi, 61-64.

[87]Katjavivi, 65-66.

[88]United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 3111 (1973). The vote was two against, seventeen abstaining (including Canada), and 107 countries in favour.

[89]United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 31/146 (1976).

SWAPO.[90] As on the previous resolution, Canada did not support either of the resolutions because government officials felt that it was nonsensical to designate a single party as the "sole and authentic" voice of any group of people, especially when other political parties and liberation movements had and did exist.[91] These resolutions, along with the 1974 *coup d'état* in Portugal, Angola's colonial power, caused the South Africans to increase the number of security forces in Namibia and, by mid-1974, it was estimated that the number of South African Defence Forces (SADF) stationed in Namibia exceeded 15,000.[92]

The Invasion of Angola

South Africa used some of these forces in 1975 when it invaded Angola in a move against the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola[93] (MPLA), one of the three national liberation movements then operating in Angola. At the time of Angolan independence, November 1975, the Portuguese efforts to have a peaceful transition to independence had failed and the colonial authorities simply

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[90]This position included a non-voting seat in the General Assembly and all the relevant committees. United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 31/152 (1976).

[91]Canada has opposed the granting of similar status to other liberation movements (e.g., the Palestine Liberation Movement) for the same reasons.

[92]Katjavivi, 88.

[93]In English, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

left the country, leaving the MPLA in control of the capital, Luanda.[94] Even before formal independence, the Soviets had begun sending aid to the MPLA, while the United States opted to support both the Frente Naçional de Libertação de Angola[95] (FNLA) and the União Naçional para a Independēncia Total de Angola[96] (UNITA), the latter of which already enjoyed South African support.[97]

Late in 1975, South Africa, UNITA, and the FNLA launched a series of attacks against the MPLA forces which resulted in the MPLA being pushed right back to Luanda. The MPLA was saved from annihilation by Cuban "instructors and advisors" and these forces stopped the SADF-UNITA-FNLA forces less than two hundred kilometres from Luanda.[98] Although the South African forces withdrew from Angola in early 1976, they continued to enter Angola regularly.

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[94]James Barber and John Barratt, *South Africa's Foreign Policy: The search for status and security, 1945-1988* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 187-88.

[95]The National Front for the Liberation of Angola.

[96]The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

[97]Zaire, Zambia, Gabon, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, and France were also providing some sort of support for one or the other of these groups. Robert Scott Jaster, *The Defence of White Power: South African Foreign Policy under Pressure* (Houndmills, U.K.: Macmillan Press, 1988), 71.

[98]Barber and Barratt, 195.

This resulted in the Cuban forces remaining in Angola as well.[99] The common enemy of South Africa made the joining of forces between SWAPO and the MPLA obvious and, as was mentioned above, SWAPO and PLAN established bases along the Angola-Namibia border. As well, the Angolan army, Forças Armadas Populares para a Libertação de Angola[100] (FAPLA), provided training and other support for PLAN.

The Turnhalle Conference

As SADF and the other security forces were able to effectively counter the military threat posed by PLAN/SWAPO,[101] the South African government was unwilling to make any political concessions until 1974 when the Turnhalle Talks were announced. These talks, organised by the South Africans, were supposed to lead to a form of independence for Namibia, but the talks failed to gain any sort of international legitimacy as the delegates had been selected by the South Africans and excluded various groups, including SWAPO. Although the delegates at the Conference represented parties, not tribes, the parties, on the whole, represented single tribal groups. For instance, the National Party of South West Africa was the spokesman for the Whites.

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[99]Another effect of the South African invasion was to speed the recognition of the MPLA régime by other countries. Jaster, 73-5.

[100]People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola.

[101]Moorcraft, 105-106.

However, despite these flaws, the Turnhalle Conference was important in that it signified that the South Africans had realised that international pressure had made it impossible to incorporate South West Africa into the Republic. As a result, the South African government had embarked on an attempt to find an internal solution which would be acceptable internationally and exclude SWAPO and other anti-South African groups. However, South Africa retain a great deal of influence, if not control, over the proceedings by providing many of the support staff (e.g., the constitutional lawyers that would be needed to draft any constitutional proposals) and through the close links between the National Party in South Africa and South West Africa.

Canadian Involvement in the Namibia Issue

Before 1977, Canada had had little involvement in the Namibia issue. In fact, Canadian public interest in South Africa did not really begin until the commencement of the Boer War (1899-1901).[102] After the war, relations between Canada and South Africa focused on Imperial matters, as both countries desired to increase the autonomy of the Dominions. While co-operation towards this goal existed, the limited scope of the goal ensured that relations between the two remained a relatively low priority for both countries.[103]

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[102]Brian Douglas Tennyson, *Canadian Relations with South Africa: A Diplomatic History* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982), 1.

[103]See chapters one, two, and three in Tennyson.

Thus, it was not until almost the end of the Great War that Canada had any contact with the Namibia issue. During the war, it became clear that South Africa and some other Dominions, with some support from Great Britain, were determined to retain control over the German colonies that they had occupied. However, the United States was adamant that these colonies not be absorbed into another empire in any case. As one of Canada's war aims was to help ensure continued good Anglo-American relations, this dispute held serious implications. As it was, the Canadian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden, was called upon to act in a mediating role between the Dominions and the United States at the Paris Peace Conference. Eventually, all of the Dominions were persuaded that it would be best if they would agree to operate within the international trusteeship system that had already received the support of the American President, Woodrow Wilson. Canada played an important role in this, due to its status as the senior Dominion, and helped to persuade Australia and South Africa to accept League of Nations mandates instead of outright annexation.[104]

During the inter-war period, Canada had little to do with the issue of the League mandates. Indeed, during this period the foreign policy pursued by the South Africans made "the Canadians appear relatively conservative after

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[104]When compared to Australia and its demands for outright annexation, South Africa appeared as a moderate country, willing to negotiate over the matter and accept a mandate. Tennyson, 57-60.

1923,"[105] although the countries continued to co-operate on a number of issues concerning relations between the U.K. and the Dominions. In fact, in his book on Canadian-South African relations, Brian Tennyson only makes mention of the League of Nations twice during the inter-war period, neither of which have anything to do with Namibia, and Richard Veatch's book has little on the issue of the mandates at all, let alone South West Africa.[106]

Thus, it was not until after the Second World War that Namibia became much of an issue for Canada. Even before the UN was created, Canada had already been working to escape involvement in the trusteeship question. During the San Francisco Conference, the Commonwealth representatives had met to consider both the Security Council and the trusteeship questions. However, Prime Minister King "took little part" in the discussion of the second question and, in a consistent manner, Canada was active in avoiding more involvement in the trusteeship issue than it absolutely had to.[107] In fact, Canada's reasons for opposing South Africa's proposed annexation of Namibia had little to do with Namibia *per se*. Canada's concerns over the issue had more to do with the propaganda value to anti-colonialist powers (e.g., the Soviet Union and its allies)

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[105]Tennyson, 67.

[106]See Veatch, *op. cit.*

[107]Canada was only on the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee of the UN General Assembly because all UN members were, but Canada "resolutely refrained" from becoming involved with the Trusteeship Council which was to oversee the administration of the transferred mandates. Tennyson, 118.

in the United Nations of such a unilateral incorporation of a mandated territory than with Namibia itself. When South Africa formally announced its desire to annex SWA at the General Assembly, the Canadian representative took no part in a debate among the Commonwealth delegates on the issue, although heated words were exchanged between the representatives of New Zealand and South Africa.[108] However, while the Canadian delegation to the Fourth Committee initially followed this pattern of silence, Canada did adopt a firmer stance and was the only White Commonwealth country to support a resolution calling upon South Africa to propose a trusteeship agreement.[109]

Having started off the post-war period so positively, Canada quickly returned to policy of inaction. While Canada supported resolutions asking the International Court of Justice to rule on South Africa's obligation to place the South West Africa Mandate under UN supervision (1948) and the establishment of a committee to negotiate with South Africa on the issue (1950), the Canadian delegate did not address the Fourth Committee on the issue, nor was there any significant interest shown by the House of Commons when the issue was mentioned there.[110] Perhaps the best example of the Canadian disinterest occurred in 1953 when Canada was asked by the United States and South Africa

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[108]Tennyson, 118.

[109]Tennyson, 120.

[110]Tennyson, 132-3.

to serve on the newly created Committee on South West Africa. Canada refused to serve on the Committee which had been established in order to provide some form of UN supervision of the territory.[111]

This attitude of trying to advance the cause of Namibian independence without becoming involved continued up until 1966 and Canada's membership on the *ad hoc* Committee for South West Africa, created by the General Assembly. However, once the *ad hoc* Committee had reported, Canada once again retreated to a position of verbal support at the United Nations for the cause of Namibia's independence, while not actually taking an active role in the issue. The exception to this rule only occurred when the issue threatened to upset some of the other members of the Commonwealth, as was the case in 1961 when Canada joined these countries in opposing South Africa's application for re-admittance to the Commonwealth.

Overall, Canada's performance concerning Namibian independence prior to 1977 was not very outstanding. The policy adopted was a consistent one of supporting UN resolutions aimed at promoting the cause of Namibian independence while avoiding direct involvement as much as possible. As the international pressure on the issue increased, however, it became harder for

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[111]Oddly enough, Canada had been the only White Commonwealth member to support the creation of the Committee in the first place. Tennyson, 133.

Western nations, Canada included, to pursue this style of policy. As the anti-apartheid, anti-South Africa movement grew, so did the pressure on Western governments to effect meaningful action aimed at convincing South Africa to abandon its apartheid policies.

With the launching of the Turnhalle conference, it had become clear that South Africa's strategy of doing nothing *vis-à-vis* the status of Namibia had ended. The setbacks at the United Nations and in other international forums had forced the South African government to recognise that it could no longer simply ignore the question of Namibian independence. As well, events in the region and the continent, such as the growing number of independent Black African states, had helped to make the political cost of occupying South West Africa increase. Previously, the international community had been divided enough that any action taken, or even proposed, against South Africa had been by (politically or economically) weak states or had been only rhetoric. However, the events of 1977 showed that this had begun to change and some of the more powerful actors in the international system began to deal with the situation in Namibia on a serious basis for the first time.

CHAPTER FOUR: CANADA AND THE CONTACT GROUP

The Namibian question had appeared on the UN agenda on an annual basis since 1946, but little had been done to remove South Africa from its occupation of the territory. Even though the League of Nations Mandate had been formally repealed in 1966, few countries seemed willing and able to force South Africa to adhere to international law. However, this situation began to change shortly before the November 1976 presidential election in the United States. With the Carter administration came changes in American foreign policy, including a recognition that not all issues should be viewed as part of the struggle between the two super powers and an increased emphasis on human rights. The implications of these shifts in the United States' South Africa policy were considerable as apartheid incorporates such a blatant disregard for the rights, human and political, of a large segment of the South African population. As well, there was increased anger worldwide over South Africa's oppressionist policies following the Soweto riots and the death of Steve Biko in 1976. As the global

frustration surrounding South Africa's racial policies increased, so did the pressure at the United Nations that something be done to force South Africa forward on a number of issues, including withdrawal from Namibia.

However, this pressure and the intention to force change in southern Africa were nothing new. What was new was the reaction of the powerful industrialised states. Although no industrialised country publicly supported South Africa's policies, few had offered active opposition either. The few states of the North which were active opponents of the apartheid régime, e.g., the Scandinavian countries, tended not to have particularly strong trade or investment ties with South Africa. This meant that they did not have the leverage necessary to "encourage" changes in South African policy. Therefore, it was necessary that changes occurred to the South and southern Africa policies of the countries which did have the leverage (i.e., South Africa's major political and economic partners). The events which occurred in 1977 and 1978 marked the beginning of those changes which, though moving forward, evolved slowly. As international outrage increased so as to challenge South Africa, so official policy changed. This is not to imply that the foreign policies of South Africa's major trading partners, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Japan, France, and the U.S., changed radically. Rather, the policies of those and other industrialised states underwent an evolution fuelled by public opinion which made it worthwhile for these countries

to try to persuade South Africa to change its policies internally and in regards to Namibia.

This chapter will examine some of the significant events which led up to the new attitude. After doing so, the chapter will study the results, namely the formation of the Contact Group and the Western initiative to draft a plan which would lead to a peaceful transition to Namibian independence. The process which led to the passage of Resolution 435 and the achievements of the Contact Group will precede an examination of Canada's involvement with the Group. The different roles played by Canada and the importance of these will be looked at, as will Canada's reaction to the new policy adopted by the Reagan administration after it assumed office in January 1981.

Background

Before one can examine the effects of the new strategy, it is useful to survey the changes which led to the new situation. Among the most significant were the election of a new American president, Jimmy Carter, in 1976 and the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 385 (1976). Although it may not have been evident in at the time, both of these events were to have profound implications for progress towards Namibian independence.

President Carter and American Foreign Policy

Before 1977, successive American governments had paid little attention to the issue of Namibia. President Ford's Secretary of State Dr Henry Kissinger had attempted to negotiate settlements for the conflicts in Namibia and Rhodesia shortly before the 1976 election. However, his shuttle diplomacy had little long-term effect beyond that of providing the American government with a significant amount of background work on the issues.[112] In part, the reluctance of the American government to become involved in the conflicts in southern Africa lay in South Africa's role as a supplier of strategic minerals and its position on the "Cape Route", along which most of the West's oil supply flows.[113]

The fact that the election of Jimmy Carter represented change for the foreign policy of the United States had been clear since before the election. In a briefing paper prepared for the Democratic presidential candidate in October 1976, Cyrus Vance recognised the importance of the Rhodesian and Namibian issues and saw positive action on these as a means of proving to the Third World that an administration headed by Governor Carter would carry through on what the Carter team had been saying during the election campaign; the use of

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[112]The involvement of Secretary Kissinger had also led to American support for Resolution 385 (1976). Margaret P. Karns, "Ad hoc multilateral diplomacy: the United States, the Contact Group, and Namibia," *International Organization* Vol. 41, No. 1 (Winter 1987): 97.

[113]See Tables 9 and 10 in Barber and Barratt, 353-54.

international forums to promote "the rights of free men" and displaying a greater sensitivity to and awareness of international issues.[114]

Like most new administrations, the Carter government was eager to set itself apart from its predecessors. That the new administration was quite different from previous ones soon became very clear. One example of this was the government's commitment to multilateralism which was demonstrated by the appointment of Cyrus Vance as Secretary of State. Vance was committed to trying to solve international problems via multilateral means. Furthermore,

> all of the [other] senior foreign-policy posts were filled with people sympathetic to the UN as an organization through which the United States should work to maintain international peace.[115]

These appointments included Andrew Young as permanent representative to the United Nations, as well as Don McHenry as Young's deputy. These officials helped to alter the direction and pace of U.S. policy by emphasising human rights, placing South Africa in an African, rather than a global, context, and displaying a commitment to ending apartheid.[116]

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[114]Cyrus Vance, "Appendix I: Overview of Foreign Policy Issues and Positions," *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy*, (New York City, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983) 256, 441, 443.

[115]Karns, 98-9.

[116]Interview given by President Carter to Raph Uwechue, December 1977. Reprinted in Colin Legum, *The Western Crisis over Southern Africa: South Africa, Rhodesia, Namibia* (New York City, New York: Africana Publishing, 1979), 243-4.

The commitment to multilateralism was also shown by the administration's use of the United Nations. Although President Carter's government did not have an entirely harmonious relationship with the United Nations and its agencies, it was felt that the UN was a worthwhile organisation.[117] As a result of this conviction and the appointment of officials such as Vance and Young, the American government utilised the United Nations as a means of dispute resolution worldwide, and emphasised adherence to the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[118]

However, not all of the Carter administration's new officials accepted these changes. An example is President Carter's choice as National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who continued to view most international issues primarily in terms of East-West relations.[119] Both Brzezinski and Anthony Lake, head of the State Department's policy planning staff, promoted a more conciliatory tone towards South Africa. Lake saw changes in South African policy as coming from within, i.e., due to pressure from South African Blacks, and preferred the U.S. to "set clear limits on the scope of our relations [with Southern Africa]."[120]

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[117]For examples of the U.S. commitment to and use of the United Nations, see Vance's memoirs, *op. cit.*

[118]For instance, the U.S. put great pressure on the Shah of Iran and President Somoza of Nicaragua to improve their human rights records.

[119]Vance, 91-2.

[120]Quoted in Barber and Barratt, 232.

Resolution 385 (1976)[121]

The passage of Security Council Resolution 385 in January 1976 marked another important milestone along the way to Namibian independence. This Resolution, which received support from both smaller states and Western powers, laid out a number of stipulations regarding how Namibia was to become independent. After condemning South Africa for its occupation and repression, the Resolution stated that the Namibian people should be allowed to choose their own destiny by "the holding of free elections under United Nations supervision and control".[122] The next paragraph of the Resolution said that these elections would be held for Namibia as a single entity, rather than for separate sections of the territory (e.g., Ovamboland).[123] Lastly, 385 demanded the release of all Namibian political prisoners, whether held in Namibia or South Africa, the abolition of "all racially discriminatory and politically repressive laws and practices," and the free return of all Namibians from exile.[124]

At the time of its adoption, the most significant aspect of Resolution 385 was that it had received support from all the members of the Security Council.

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[121]For the full text of Resolution 385 (1976), see appendix I.

[122]Paragraph 6.

[123]Elections had been held in Ovamboland in 1973 and 1975 after it had been declared "a self-governing area within SWA/Namibia." André du Pisani, *SWA/Namibia: The Politics of Continuity and Change* (Johannesburg, R.S.A.: Jonathan Ball, 1986), 229-37.

[124]Paragraph 11.

The (then) recent interest of the United States in resolving conflict in southern Africa played a large part in the American support for the Resolution. With time, however, the Resolution's importance was to be as a starting point for negotiating a settlement plan. This was because much of the international community came to regard the provisions of 385 as the minimum acceptable standard that any proposal was to be measured by. Once the Contact Group began operating, the fact that *de facto* minimum standards had already been established proved to be very important.

Establishment of the Contact Group

In January 1977, several events occurred which had important implications for Namibia. For one, the Carter administration replaced the Ford government, with the changes in attitudes, personnel, and objectives referred to above. As well, Canada assumed a seat on the UN Security Council for the fourth time. At the same time, pressure was mounting at the UN for greater action, including mandatory sanctions, over the problems of southern Africa. This was fuelled by concern that South Africa was going to grant "independence" to Namibia under the auspices of a constitution drawn up by the Turnhalle Conference. Such a solution which would have been unacceptable to the international community because it would have allowed the South Africans to, in a *de facto* sense, dictate the terms of independence to Namibia as they had done with the Transkei and the other "independent" homelands.

Since the new American administration did not want to have to vote against a resolution condemning South Africa and imposing mandatory sanctions, another option, one acceptable to the Western countries, the Front Line States (FLS), and South Africa, had to be found. This proved to be the rationale behind the formation of the Contact Group, or the Western Five as it was sometimes known. Although the origin of the idea is unclear, Andrew Young and Don McHenry proved more than willing to adopt it.[125] The Contact Group was, as Margaret Karns described it, "an ad hoc multilateral mediating and facilitating team in close proximity to but not directly linked with the United Nations."[126] This approach was adopted in part due to the recognition that the United Nations had to be somehow involved in the independence process,[127] but would be best suited to implementing a solution as it was rather a cumbersome organisation for negotiating a solution to a problem as complex as Namibia.[128]

The Western initiative was launched early in January 1977 after the five Western members of the Security Council (Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany having joined the Security Council as of January 1) met at the Canadian

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[125]The idea may have started with President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Don McHenry, or Gerald Helman of the State Department. Karns, 99-100.

[126]Karns, 93.

[127]Paragraph 7 of Resolution 385 states that "it is imperative that free elections *under the supervision and control of the United Nations* be held" so that Namibians could determine their own future (emphasis added).

[128]Karns, 99.

Permanent Mission to the United Nations.[129] A leading Canadian official wrote later that this meeting was meant to help the five countries "discuss the challenges which lay ahead, and what we [the Western members] could and should do to further the effective work of the Council."[130] At the meeting, it was recognised that the problems of southern Africa were going to be placed high on the Council's agenda. This was because the African members of the UNSC, Benin and Libya, with the aid and support of the other non-aligned members of the Council, were already working on a series of draft resolutions concerning apartheid, Rhodesia, and Namibia. These drafts apparently contained provisions dealing with mandatory sanctions and the supply of arms to national liberation movements in southern Africa.[131]

Up until that time, this type of resolution had always failed to be adopted by the Security Council due to the veto power of the permanent members, usually the Americans and/or the British. However, for the reasons mentioned above, Andrew Young was keen on ensuring that the United States made a positive contribution towards aiding the liberation of African peoples. Therefore, he advanced the idea to the Western members of the UNSC that they launch a two-

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[129]During 1977 and 1978, the other members of the Security Council were: Benin (1976-77), India (1977-78), Libya (1976-77), Mauritius (1977-78), Pakistan (1976-77), Panama (1976-77), Romania (1976-77), and Venezuela (1977-78).

[130]William H. Barton, "Namibian Retrospective," (Unpublished, 1991), 1.

[131]Barton, 1.

pronged initiative in an attempt to avoid opposing the legitimate concerns of the African countries.[132] First, the Western Five would try to persuade the African members of the UN Security Council to work with the Western members in an attempt to draft a positive resolution which would state that the Security Council was determined that apartheid must end and majority rule instituted in South Africa. Unfortunately, while the African members of the UNSC initially agreed to work with the Five on the joint declaration, it ultimately proved unsuccessful. This was because the "gap between what the Africans felt had to be said and done, and what the Western governments could accept was too great to be bridged."[133] When the negotiations ended and the debate in the Security Council began, in November 1977, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States voted against the Africa resolution due to its calls for the implementation of mandatory sanctions. The only positive result of this part of Ambassador Young's initiative was the imposition of a compulsory arms embargo against South Africa,[134] the first time that mandatory sanctions had been imposed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.[135]

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[132]Barton, 2.

[133]Barton, 3.

[134]United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 418 (1977).

[135]The arms embargo against South Africa was also the only time that mandatory sanctions were used by the United Nations prior to the 1990 sanctions imposed on Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait.

The second part of Mr Young's plan was that the Five give an undertaking to the African members of the UNSC to use their influence over South Africa to promote Namibian independence on terms that would be acceptable to the United Nations. As well, the Five would also inform the South African government that they would no longer be as willing to resist anti-South African measures at the UN unless Pretoria proved its willingness to negotiate in good faith *vis-à-vis* Namibian independence.[136] This was understood to imply that sanctions were a definite possibility if progress was not forthcoming.

Objectives of the Contact Group

At a broad level, the Contact Group only had one objective. This was to establish a plan which would result in Namibia's independence. At the outset, it was decided that the plan would be based on the principles encompassed by Resolution 385 (1976). To accomplish this, the plan would have to ensure that the United Nations had a large role to play in the elections which would precede the transfer of power to the government of an independent Namibia. As well, the plan would have to ensure the participation of SWAPO before it would be acceptable to the international community. Furthermore, the South Africans would have to be assured that any settlement proposal would not guarantee a SWAPO victory, otherwise they would be unlikely to agree to it. The South

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[136]Barton, 2.

Africans would also have to agree not to implement any internal solution, whether based on the results of the Turnhalle Conference or not.

Before any progress towards an agreement could be made, it was necessary to first establish a negotiating process. South Africa and the United Nations had been in conflict over Namibia, apartheid, and Rhodesia for so long that it was clear to many that the two would not be able to negotiate seriously over Namibia. By offering themselves as mediators, the Western Five provided the South African government with a means of negotiating with the international community without recognising UN authority over Namibia.[137] As well, the use of mediators would allow for a much broader scope of participants than would otherwise be possible. South Africa was not willing to negotiate with SWAPO, and the UN would have insisted on SWAPO's direct involvement in any UN-organised talks. Through the intervention of the Contact Group, it was possible to include SWAPO and the Front Line States[138] in the negotiating process, although these participants did not initially meet directly with the South Africans at this point.

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[137]Geisa Maria Rocha, *In Search of Namibian Independence: The Limitations of the United Nations* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989), 101.

[138]The Front Line States were involved because they were SWAPO's main supporters and, as countries in the region, they had a great deal to gain from a peaceful settlement to regional conflicts, including those in Namibia and Angola.

The Turnhalle Conference's Constitutional Proposals

Shortly before the Western initiative began, the Turnhalle Conference Constitutional Committee produced its final proposals. Concurrent with the January 1977 meeting of the Western Five, the Turnhalle Conference had established a Constitutional Committee to be responsible for producing the final drafting of the constitution. The Constitutional Committee was chaired by Dirk Mudge of the National Party of South West Africa. By March 18, this task was complete and the draft accepted by the full Conference. As expected, the proposed constitution embodied the three tier government established by the South Africans, and this was to be headed by a president and a Ministers Council. The membership of the legislative body, the National Assembly, would be distributed among the eleven ethnic groups. The second tier governments, the ethnic authorities, would be responsible for supplying services to their people, regardless of location in the territory. The most notable aspects of the draft were the provisions for the protection of human rights regardless of origin, race, sex, politics, or creed.[139]

The draft constitution clearly showed that the Turnhalle Conference had, as many had suspected, been operating as a tool of the South African government.[140] It enshrined the concept of the "Bantustan" system which

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[139]Du Pisani, *SWA/Namibia*, 330-32.

[140]Du Pisani, *SWA/Namibia*, 332.

separated the different ethnic groups. As well, the constitution provided that the wasteful and unequal system of the Bantustans would continue and that the Whites would continue to hold a disproportionate amount of power. As a result, the proposal came in for serious criticism from inside Namibia, as well as from abroad.[141]

Operations of the Contact Group

The Contact Group initiative met resistance from the South Africans and from other members of the United Nations. The South African government resisted because it thought that there might be some way of giving Namibia its independence which would also preclude SWAPO from taking power. Other states regarded the Contact Group as merely trying to delay the independence of Namibia and allowing South Africa to set up some sort of neo-colonial régime instead, presumably to be based on the Turnhalle proposals.[142] As well, the negotiations between the Group and South Africa constituted a *de facto* recognition of South Africa's authority in Namibia, which was contrary to the 1966 General Assembly termination of the Mandate and the 1971 International Court of Justice ruling on the issue. However, after some persuasion, both sides agreed to proceed with the Group's mediation. While neither side gave up the option of reversing their decision, as witnessed by the continuation of the Turnhalle talks

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[141]Du Pisani, *SWA/Namibia*, 332-33.

[142]Rocha, 101.

and the guerilla war between SWAPO and SADF, they both recognised that a peaceful solution was better than an on-going war which had a high cost, both in terms of money and human lives. The South African officials also believed that it would be possible to design a settlement which would be internationally acceptable and somehow prevent a SWAPO election victory. If this was possible, than South African would have shown its willingness to co-operate with international forces (e.g., the UN), which could be useful when anti-apartheid measures were being discussed in Western capitals, while preventing another communist régime from being established on its borders.[143]

The Negotiations

To achieve the goals referred to previously, the Contact Group initiated a series of meetings. To begin with, the Group met with what was widely regarded as "the principal obstacle to a settlement", the South African government.[144] This began in early April with the presentation of an aide-mémoire to South African Prime Minister Vorster on behalf of the Five which confirmed the Contact Group's desire to negotiate a settlement in accordance with the provisions of Resolution 385 (1976).[145] In the note, the Five requested that the South Africans halt the activities of the Turnhalle Conference on the grounds that

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[143]Legum, 181-2.

[144]Karns, 100.

[145]Du Pisani, *SWA/Namibia*, 336-37.

its work did not meet the standards set out in Resolution 385. The aide-mémoire also stated that the absence of South African willingness to work towards an internationally acceptable solution would be taken into account by the Western Five governments when considering future policy. In that case, the Group would have to, in the words of Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Don Jamieson, "consider very seriously the measures to be taken."[146]

Prime Minister Vorster agreed to hold talks with the Five in Cape Town later in April. Before these began, however, Mr Vorster met with the Turnhalle Constitutional Committee. He informed them of the impending talks and arranged for a five-man committee from the Conference to be in Cape Town during the South African-Group meeting.[147] By refusing to halt the work being done by the Turnhalle Conference, the Prime Minister left South Africa's options open. If the negotiations with the Contact Group proved successful, from a South African point of view, then an internationally acceptable solution would be implemented. If an agreement acceptable to the South Africans could not be reached however, then the option to pursue an internal solution would still be available.

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[146]United Nations, General Assembly, *The General Assembly Official Records (S-IX)* (New York City, New York: United Nations, 1978), 46.

[147]Du Pisani, *SWA/Namibia*, 228.

The negotiating team which arrived in Cape Town in April 1977 was led by Don McHenry, who was assisted by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. The other participants were also of ambassadorial rank. Although Mr Vorster and his foreign minister, Roelof "Pik" Botha, kept the Turnhalle committee informed about the progress of the discussions, none of the Contact Group representatives met with the representatives of the Turnhalle Conference or any internal Namibian parties until May, after the talks with South Africa had ended.[148] After three days of negotiations, it became clear an agreement had been reached that the Contact Group would not immediately place pressure on South Africa to withdraw from Namibia or hold elections. There remained three main issues to be resolved: firstly, Western demands that the Turnhalle proposals for an interim government not be implemented; secondly, what constituted United Nations "supervision and control" of elections; and thirdly, the details of the withdrawal of South African security forces from Namibia before the elections.[149]

After the initial contact, regular meetings of the Western Five's representatives at the UN began in New York, as well as by their Ambassadors in South Africa.[150] Despite the initial reluctance of some of the participants,

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[148]Du Pisani, *SWA/Namibia*, 339-40.

[149]Du Pisani, *SWA/Namibia*, 339.

[150]David Scott, *Ambassador in Black and White: Thirty Years of Changing Africa* (London, U.K.: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981), 197.

progress was forthcoming.[151] During the first ten months of the negotiations, the Five did not advocate any particular position on the implementation of 385. Rather, they held consultations with the South Africans, SWAPO, the Front Line States, members of the UN Secretariat, and the internal Namibian parties. After each set of talks, the Group would brief the other parties on the proceedings and then consult with them.

During this time, the Contact Group partially achieved one of its demands. The Turnhalle Conference's constitutional proposals had been ratified by Namibian Whites in a May referendum. In June, the Group held another series of meetings in Cape Town. After those meetings, and with the approval of the Contact Group, Prime Minister Vorster announced to the South African Parliament that the Turnhalle process was to be by-passed through the appointment of an Administrator-General (A-G), responsible to the South African State President, who would govern the territory until independence.[152] However, while effectively terminating the Turnhalle proposals for the time being, Mr Vorster did not reject the possibility of an interim government entirely.[153] In September, the first A-G, Judge Marthinus Steyn, was appointed. Soon after,

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[151]For further details on the actual proceedings of the negotiations, see the speech given by Don Jamieson on behalf of the Contact Group at the Ninth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1978, *op. cit.*

[152]Jaster, 63.

[153]Du Pisani, *SWA/Namibia*, 357-58.

he repealed many racist laws including the pass laws, and those which prohibited inter-racial sex and marriage. As well, numerous other restrictive regulations and laws were either set aside or relaxed.[154] Shortly after this process began, Dirk Mudge left the National Party of South West Africa after an unsuccessful leadership challenge. He went on to form the all-White Republican Party which "stood for the total abolition of all racially discriminatory practices, the pursuit of ethnic politics and the formation of a strong first-tier national government."[155] Not surprisingly, the Republican Party adopted a modified version of the Turnhalle Conference Constitution as its manifesto and joined with other like-minded ethnic parties to form the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) in November 1977.

After June, the Contact group held a series of meetings in New York and South Africa with the different parties. As a result of these talks, it had become "sufficiently" clear to the Western Five what the major problems were and they began to draft a plan to overcome these in December 1977. This first plan was discussed at "proximity" talks held in New York in February 1978. SWAPO and South Africa participated, but did not meet face-to-face at these talks; rather, the Contact Group continued to act as the intermediatory between them. The plan proposed that a representative of the UN work with the Administrator-General to

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[154]Du Pisani, *SWA/Namibia*, 363.

[155]Du Pisani, *SWA/Namibia*, 369-77.

run Namibia during the transition. As well, both SWAPO and SADF would abide by a cease-fire and be confined to a limited number of supervised bases, SWAPO in Angola and SADF in Namibia. Lastly, the elections would be held by December 31.[156]

Unfortunately, after only a few days at the talks, South African foreign minister Botha left New York declaring that the proposed plan would result in Namibia being "overrun and governed by Marxist terrorists [i.e., SWAPO]."[157] Following the break off of the talks, Prime Minister Vorster announced that elections would be held in December 1978 and independence granted to Namibia regardless of the UN's position. In response, the Contact Group tried to resolve the differences between SWAPO and the South Africans. Significantly, the South Africans were most concerned with the implementation of the proposed formula, whereas SWAPO was upset by the formula itself. Basically, SWAPO wanted the South Africans to be subservient to the UN during the transition phase, an idea which was, to the South African, totally unacceptable.

The Proposal

After further talks and much re-drafting, a second proposal was presented to the parties at the end of March. Then it was presented to the Security Council

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[156]Du Pisani, *SWA/Namibia*, 389.

[157]Quoted in Jaster, 64.

on April 10 as document "Proposal for a settlement of the Namibia Situation" (S/12636). The plan proposed that the UN Secretary-General appoint a Special Representative (UNSR), who was to ensure that the conditions existed for the holding of "free and fair elections and an impartial electoral process." In this task, the UNSR was to be assisted by the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG).

Although the elections were to held under the "supervision and control" of the UN, they would be administered by the South African appointed Administrator-General. The A-G was also responsible for: repealing all restrictive regulations, freeing political prisoners, allowing the unhindered return of Namibians in exile, and maintaining law and order. As well, South African forces in Namibia would be reduced to a total of 1,500 troops who would be confined to one or two bases in the north, Grootfontein and Oshivello. All other military forces in the territory would be disbanded. The military and civilian components of UNTAG, the size and composition of which were to be decided on by the Security Council in consultation with the Secretary-General and the Special Representative, would monitor adherence to the plan.

On April 25, while the General Assembly's Special Session on Namibia was proceeding, the South Africans announced their acceptance of the proposal with three conditions: one, if an independent Namibia requested it, South African

forces could remain in the territory after independence; two, South African troops would only begin to withdraw after all hostilities had ended; and three, that it was clear that South Africa would maintain law and order up until independence. On the same day that this was announced, South Africa arrested members of SWAPO operating legally inside Namibia and, a few days later, SADF attacked a SWAPO camp at Cassinga, 250 kilometres inside Angola.[158] Speculation was that South Africa was trying to get SWAPO to reject the proposals of the Western Five.[159] Indeed, SWAPO broke off the formal negotiations, but continued informal talks with the Group and later returned to the negotiating table.

While South Africa continued to prepare for unsupervised elections, the Contact Group continued to try to reach an agreement. In early June, the Front Line States accepted the proposal, which led SWAPO to do the same two weeks later. On July 27, under the chairmanship of Canada, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 431 (1978) which called upon the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative and to report back to the Council as soon as possible concerning the implementation of the Contact Group's proposal. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim quickly appointed Finnish diplomat and UN Commissioner for Namibia Martti Ahtisaari as his Special Representative.

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[158]Jaster, 66.

[159]Du Pisani, *SWA/Namibia*, 393.

Although it appeared as though progress was occurring, it soon became obvious that all was not well. When the Secretary-General reported back to the Security Council in August, his recommendations sparked some controversy.[160] According to the report, UNTAG should include 7,500 military and 1,200 civilian personnel. These would monitor the cease-fire and confinement to base of both SWAPO and SADF, prevent infiltration, monitor the disbanding of other paramilitary forces, monitor the police, supervise and control all aspects of the elections, advise the UNSR on repealing discriminatory regulations, and ensure the absence of intimidation or other activities which might impede the holding of elections. South Africa responded to the proposals by objecting to the size and composition of the UNTAG forces, especially the inclusion of civilian police,[161] and the fact that Mr Waldheim's plan would make it impossible to hold elections before the end of 1978 as had been intended.

On September 20, Mr Vorster simultaneously announced his resignation as Prime Minister and said that South Africa was opting for the second track, which meant that elections would definitely be held in Namibia before the end of the year. A few days later, the Security Council accepted the Secretary-General's report by adopting Resolution 435 (1978).[162] The newly elected Prime Minister

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[160]United Nations Security Council, date 29 Aug 78 (S/12827).

[161]These were intended to monitor the local police operating in Namibia, not to take over their duties.

[162]For the full text of this Resolution, see appendix II.

of South Africa, P.W. Botha, formerly the defence minister, immediately rejected the plan. Although negotiations continued and some further agreements and "clarifications" were reached, South Africa refused to delay the elections. At the same time, SWAPO's attitude was also hardening and the prospects for a peaceful solution continued to decline.

In early December, the South African administered elections were held. Five political parties or alliances competed for the fifty seats in the Constituent Assembly, with the DTA winning forty-one of them.[163] Although the elections were accepted by the South African government, they were condemned internationally. Despite the setback, the Contact Group continued to try to mediate the conflict. During this period, SWAPO and SADF continued to fight each other on and off the battlefield. Within Namibia meanwhile, the DTA continued the process of removing restrictive and racist regulations in the hopes that this would gain them international recognition.[164]

In August 1979, President Neto of Angola proposed that a demilitarized zone (DMZ) be created along the Angola-Namibia border during the transition phase. This was an attempt to allay South Africa's concerns about the restriction

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[163]For details of the vote, including geographical distribution, see du Pisani, *SWA/Namibia*, 420-22.

[164]Du Pisani, *SWA/Namibia*, 434-35.

to base of SWAPO forces in Angola, as the UN would be unable to monitor them. However, South Africa was slow to respond to the idea and finally rejected it as impractical.[165] By early 1980, statements made by South African officials implied that they had written off the 435 plan even while they continued to negotiate. South Africa continued to promote the internal government in Namibia by extending its powers and every time a compromise was reached about a dispute over the UN plan, the South Africans would raise another issue. The "final issue", which was raised again and again by Pretoria, was the impartiality of the United Nations. South Africa argued that, having given special status to SWAPO, the UN would be unable to treat all parties equally once the elections began.[166]

By this point, mid-1980, many participants were frustrated and SWAPO demanded the end of the Contact Group as it had failed.[167] However, others, including the recently elected leader of now independent Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, pushed for the continuation of the Group and its efforts. This is rather ironic as it was the election of Robert Mugabe as Prime Minister and Zimbabwian independence, the result of the Lancaster House talks mediated by the British government, which had in part caused the South Africans to decide

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[165]Du Pisani, *SWA/Namibia*, 438-43.

[166]As the only part of the United Nations organisation that had done this was the General Assembly (see above), this argument was weak.

[167]Du Pisani, *SWA/Namibia*, 446.

that it would be necessary to strengthen the internal Namibian parties if a SWAPO victory was to be avoided.

The Contact Group Under President Reagan

After the 1980 election in the United States, progress *vis-à-vis* Namibian independence slowed to the point of stalling.[168] Combined with the 1979 election in the U.K. which brought Margaret Thatcher to power, the American election reflected a significant swing rightwards in politics in Western Europe and North America. However, a conference was held in Geneva in early 1981 which aimed to resolve the outstanding differences once and for all.[169] By agreeing to attend what was termed "a pre-implementation multi-party meeting", South Africa continued to give the impression that progress was possible, if not actually probable. As well, by including internal parties such as the DTA in its delegation, the South Africans hoped to gain more legitimacy for their internal solution.[170] Such an international coup was needed as the DTA had fared worse than had been expected in the autumn 1980 second-tier (ethnic) administration elections.

Since the Geneva Conference took place during the Presidential transfer of power in the United States, the American delegation suffered from great

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[168]See chapter five below.

[169]André du Pisani, *Namibia Since Geneva*, (Braamfontein, R.S.A.: The South African Institute of International Affairs, 1981) 2.

[170]Du Pisani, *Namibia Since Geneva*, 3-4.

uncertainty as to what their policy was. The uncertainty allowed the South Africans to continue to delay, which they did because they felt that the Reagan administration would be more sympathetic to them.[171] South Africa had also been shaken by defeat of their preferred candidate, Bishop Muzorewa, in the 1980 Rhodesia-Zimbabwe elections.[172] These events made the South African government doubt the ability of the internal parties to beat SWAPO in an election. Therefore, despite a conciliatory package of proposals put forward by the UN, the Front Line States, and the Contact Group, the South Africans proved unwilling to move closer towards implementation.[173]

After Geneva, the Western Five and the UN Secretariat did not view the chances of independence occurring soon as high. On the other hand, SWAPO, the South Africans, and the DTA felt that they had "won" in that they all thought that there international profile and prestige had increased.[174] However, the Contact Group continued to try to keep events moving forward and met in Rome to co-ordinate a new initiative. This involved efforts to ensure economic, political,

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[171]While the effects of the new American policy of "constructive engagement" on the Namibia issue will be dealt with in the next chapter, it was clear very early on that the Reagan administration was displaying a much more sympathetic attitude towards South Africa. This was most evident in the people appointed to senior foreign policy positions, such as Dr Chester Crocker (Assistant Secretary of State for Africa) and Jeane Kirkpatrick (Ambassador to the United Nations).

[172]Barber and Barratt, 267.

[173]Du Pisani, *Namibia Since Geneva*, 4-6.

[174]Du Pisani, *Namibia Since Geneva*, 6.

and security stability in the region following independence.[175] At the Ottawa meeting of the Group of Seven (G-7) in July of 1981, Namibia was discussed and the commitment to Resolution 435 reaffirmed, although it was clear that the Americans were also pursuing a unilateral policy by this time. At the end of that month, the Contact Group met in Paris and agreed to work on "*strengthening and complementing* Resolution 435."[176] Further meetings were held, though little progress was being made.

The Contact Group's actions received a welcome boost at the 1981 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Australia. The meeting effectively endorsed the Western negotiations by agreeing to allow the West to continue its leadership role, although the leaders also demanded that the process be speeded up.[177] Partly as a response to those demands, the Contact Group presented SWAPO, South Africa, the internal parties in Namibia, and the Front Line States with a document entitled "Principles Concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an Independent Namibia". This constituted phase one of a new three phase plan designed by the Americans. Phase two concerned agreement on the implementation of the plan (provisionally to be completed by April 1982) and phase three was the actual implementation of the

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[175]For details, see du Pisani, *Namibia Since Geneva*, 7.

[176]Du Pisani, *Namibia Since Geneva*, 11.

[177]Du Pisani, *Namibia Since Geneva*, 14-5.

plan.[178] After meetings in Ottawa, the Group modified its proposals for proportional representation in the Constituent Assembly. The changes led to the rejection of the package by SWAPO.[179] After further modifications, which effectively moved the proposals back to the original electoral system, the proposals were accepted by all parties and were presented to the Security Council in July 1982 and presented to the UN Security Council (S/15287).

Even before the first phase had been completed, phase two had begun. The size and composition of the military component of UNTAG was quickly settled and a series of provisions meant to ensure UN impartiality were agreed on.[180] At this time, Prime Minister Botha announced South Africa's willingness to move onto stage three, the implementation of 435, although a few conditions remained to be settled.[181] The most important of these concerned the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola *before* the transition process began.[182]

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[178]Rocha, 135.

[179]Rocha, 138-40.

[180]Many of the details of the impartiality package remained confidential until after the start of the transition phase in 1989.

[181]Du Pisani, *SWA/Namibia*, 479-80.

[182]Barber and Barratt, 281. Also see chapter five.

Achievements of the Contact Group

At this point, the Contact Group's efforts came to an effective end. Having devoted considerable time and effort since 1978, the Group's members were disheartened and disillusioned by South African intransigence and the new policy of "constructive engagement" which had been adopted by the United States under the Reagan administration.[183] Although the Group ceased to function as a mediating body once the South Africans invaded Angola towards the end of 1982, it was never formally disbanded. The members continued to hope for a solution, but the fact that the most powerful of its members opposed any thought of sanctions made it impossible for them to force progress. As well, the fact that the U.S. had decided to "go it alone" by pursuing constructive engagement divided the majority of the Group from the most powerful and the Contact Group was therefore reduced to the role of impotent observer.

Despite the non-resolution of the Namibia issue, the Group had achieved several significant arrangements. Firstly, they had established a negotiating process where none had existed before. By bringing SWAPO, the Front Line States, the UN, and South Africa together, even if it was not always face-to-face, the Group provided a means of establishing the differences between the parties. This had to be done before any resolution to the problem could be drafted. Secondly, the Group drafted a settlement proposal which was, eventually,

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[183]For more on constructive engagement, see chapter five.

accepted in principle by all parties concerned. Although some issues (i.e., the status of Walvis Bay) had to be by-passed for this to occur, it was nonetheless a significant step forward because the 435 plan provided the foundation for all further negotiations on Namibian independence. Lastly, the Western Five had been instrumental in helping bridge the gap between what the South Africans and SWAPO were prepared to accept in regards to the implementation of 435. Without the concessions wrangled from both sides by the Five, the Front Line States, and the UN Secretariat, there could never have been any chance of implementing the settlement proposal.

The greatest proof of the success of the Contact Group lies in the fact that the settlement plan was eventually implemented and proved successful.[184] As well, the hopes expressed, publicly and privately, during the period from 1977 to 1982 showed that people in the international community believed that the Group's plan could and would succeed.[185] While the Contact Group proved to be unsuccessful in getting the parties to the point where Namibia would become independent, the Five did move the process closer to fruition than ever before. Ultimately, the strategic interests of the United States, Western unwillingness to

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[184]See chapter six.

[185]Almost every description of the Contact Group's efforts makes mention of the fact that independence was expected to occur in 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, etc. The fact that elections were not held in those years rarely did more than temporarily dampen the enthusiasm.

impose sanctions, and South African fears of another Marxist régime in southern Africa proved to be enough to temporarily compromise the achievements of the Group.

Canada's Role in the Contact Group

Canada's role within the Contact Group is one that is hard to define. As is often the case when dealing with a small group of states all working together towards the same end, the role and accomplishments of any one is hard to single out. However, Canada did play a number of fairly significant roles. While its contribution may not have been the most important, Canada did augment the workings of the Contact Group in a number of worthwhile and significant ways.

The Inclusion of Canada In the Contact Group

The fact that Canada was included at all is an important point. At the simplest level, the reason why Canada was included was that Canada was a Western member of the Security Council in 1977. However, while that goes some way to explaining Canadian involvement, it does not explain many things, such as why Canada would want to be involved in the efforts of the Contact Group. The American initiative came at a time when the Canadian government had decided that its South African policy was no longer adequate.[186] Due partly to mounting public criticism, the Canadian government began searching for an alternate policy

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[186]Tennyson, 181.

which would increase the public profile of the anti-apartheid view of the government, preferably without great economic cost to Canada.[187]

While the government may have been considering other options, such as the trade restrictions announced in 1977,[188] that Canada's initial involvement in the Contact Group was due to its fortuitous election to the Security Council is undisputable.[189] As a member of the UNSC, it was felt that Canada had an obligation to assist in the process. This was due partly to a desire to "do good", but also out of an obligation to aid its ally, the United States. All of these motivations are examples of how a middle power is expected to behave. Firstly, Canada was co-operating with its friends and allies. Among the other participants in the initiative were Canada's major trading and security partners. As well, the government felt that participating in the Group would help demonstrate Canada's interest in and commitment to growth and development in Africa.[190] Secondly, those allies included one super power (the United States) and three great powers (France, Great Britain, and West Germany). This meant that the process should have had a fairly good chance of succeeding. Thirdly, the cause was one which

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[187]Tennyson, 182-3.

[188]For more on these other changes, see David Nobbs, "The Southern African Policy Review: The 1977 Reforms and the Diplomacy of Constraint," Master of Arts Thesis (Ottawa, Ontario: Carleton University, 1983).

[189]Interview with several Canadian and United Nations officials, May 1991.

[190]Tennyson, 184.

appealed to Canada as it embodied a multilateral approach to the issue.[191] The fact that the intention was to work with, although not within, the structure of the United Nations was also attractive to Canada. This would allow Canada to further promote its long-standing commitment to the organisation and to see to it that the UN was given a large role to play in the transition to independence.[192]

Within the Contact Group, Canada served a number of purposes. Canada has an internationally recognised commitment to promoting human rights. As well, it had a history of interest in southern Africa which had displayed itself during the debate over South Africa's membership in the Commonwealth in 1961.[193]

Relations with Other Participants

Once included within the Contact Group, Canada proved to be an important conduit for information and discussions. When discussing the formation and composition of the Contact Group, Margaret Karns wrote that "Canada has always had good liberal credentials and Commonwealth connections with the

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[191]Don McHenry described the Group as a means of sharing the risks of negotiating. Quoted in Karns, 101.

[192]The close co-operation and consultation between the Group and the UN Secretariat, along with the role assigned to the UN under the plan proposed in S/12636, provides evidence of this.

[193]At that time, Canada was the only White Commonwealth member to oppose South Africa's readmission.

African states."[194] Given that three of the Front Line States, Botswana, Tanzania, and Zambia, are members of the Commonwealth, Canada's membership in the Group proved useful.[195] Of course, Britain was also a member of the Commonwealth. However, Canada has had a long, proven history of good relations with the non-White members of the Commonwealth concerning southern Africa whereas the U.K. has more often been perceived as being less liberal in its approaches to the region and related issues.[196]

Despite its generally anti-apartheid stance, Canada still had stable relations with the South Africans.[197] This allowed Canada to help bridge the communication gap between South Africa and its neighbours. By acting as an intermediatory, Canada provided the means for a constructive, pragmatic dialogue between the parties without the demands imposed by international scrutiny. The private nature of the mediation by countries such as Canada also allowed the parties involved to express themselves without the pressure of "playing" to the

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[194]Karns, 101.

[195]This number rose to four after Zimbabwe became independent in 1980.

[196]Examples of these liberal tendencies include Canada's role in reshaping the membership of the Commonwealth to allow non-White countries and republics, usually former African and Asian colonies, to be members. As well, Canada is often credited with playing a leading role in rejecting South Africa's 1961 membership application after it had become a republic.

[197]Interview with Canadian diplomat, May 1991.

international media or domestic public opinion.[198] The credibility with both sides that Canada enjoyed was lacking among the other members of the Contact Group. The economic and political ties that Britain, the U.S., and West Germany had to South Africa and Namibia made these countries less trustworthy to the African states. France's level of participation in the Group was always the lowest of the Five and, in any case, the South Africans regarded France as being more sympathetic towards SWAPO.

Lastly, Canada's relations with SWAPO were better than those of the other members of the Contact Group, with the possible exception of France.[199] SWAPO regarded Canada as being less (East-West) ideologically motivated than the U.K., U.S., or West Germany.[200] SWAPO depended on France and Canada to present its viewpoint to the other members of the Contact Group, although SWAPO could not be assured of how faithfully this was done. As a result of Canada's past foreign policy behaviour and lack of economic or strategic interests in Namibia, SWAPO felt more comfortable dealing with it than the U.S. or West Germany. This allowed for fuller discussion regarding the settlement proposals, as SWAPO had no doubt that Canada was dealing in good faith.

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[198]Often the difference between what was said privately and publicly by the parties was striking. For example, during the transition phase it was not unusual to hear that some of the African countries were taking SWAPO to task privately while supporting SWAPO's actions to the fullest in public.

[199]Interview with Canadian government official, May 1991.

[200]Personal Interview with the author, July 1991.

Sanctions

Although by no means the most economically powerful member of the Contact Group, Canada did play a significant role in it. In regards to South Africa, Canada could even be described as the *least* influential member of the Group.[201] The other four were all among South Africa's top five trading partners and investors from the United States and the United Kingdom had large amounts of capital invested in South Africa's economy.[202] Canadian investment in South Africa and Namibia, while not insignificant, was by no means a potential threat of any magnitude.[203] Therefore, alone, Canada could not have made a viable threat towards South Africa. However, Canada, acting in co-operation with the other four members of the Group, could present an economic threat towards South Africa. According to the UN Council for Namibia, 143 out of the 236 foreign companies known to be operating in Namibia have their headquarters in either the U.S. or the U.K.[204] Since the majority of foreign investment in South

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[201]Harald von Riekhoff, "Canadian Attitude and Approaches to the United Nations Security Council," Background Paper No. 26 (Ottawa, Ontario: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, February 1989) 5.

[202]For details, see United Nations, Centre on Transnational Corporations, *The Activities of Transnational Corporations in the Industrial, Mining and Military Sectors of Southern Africa*, (New York City, New York: United Nations, 1990).

[203]For an analysis of Canadian economic interests in Namibia, see Susan Hurlich, "Canadian Transnational Corporations in Namibia: An Economic and Political Overview," *Allies in Apartheid: Western Capitalism in Occupied Namibia*, ed. Allan D. Cooper (London, U.K.: Macmillan Publishing, 1988), 8-38.

[204]United Nations, Council for Namibia, "Report of Standing Committee II: Report on the Activities of Foreign Economic Interests Operating in Namibia," 1986.

Africa is British, and most of the foreign bank loans came from American banks, these countries wield great influence over the South Africa. Although there was no doubt about the potential influence of the alliance, Canada had doubts about the willingness of other members of the Group to transform potential into reality.[205]

However, this did not become an issue until the effective rejection of the Group's plan by South Africa in September 1978. At that point, many countries expected the Contact Group to initiate, or at least support, calls for sanctions. Surprisingly, sanctions were considered seriously at a high level in Washington. On October 6, 1978, the U.S. National Security Council voted to support sanctions if a meeting with Prime Minister Botha later that month failed to produce results.[206] After that meeting, when no progress had been made, sanctions were still not pursued because "only the Canadians [among the members of the Contact Group] ... were fully prepared to impose sanctions."[207] In fact, it became apparent that Britain had no intention of imposing sanctions.[208] By this time, the United States had entered the preparations for the 1980 election and the Carter administration "was in no position to press a contrary view" as the

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[205]Barton, 2.

[206]Vance, 308.

[207]Karns, 108.

[208]Interview with former Canadian diplomat, May 1991.

Republican candidate, Ronald Reagan, criticised the administration's foreign policy record.[209]

Given the attitudes of some of the other members, it would have been unreasonable for Canada to have attempted to pursue unilateral sanctions.[210] An action of this kind would have caused serious rifts, if not outright fractures, within the Western Five. As well, the limited extent of trade and investment between Canada and South Africa would have made it unlikely that sanctions imposed by Canada alone would have had a significant effect. Of course, sanctions would have had a rhetorical effect, but would have probably cost Canada its continued membership and influence in the Contact Group. As the Canadian government continued to feel that the Group could play an important role in pushing the UN plan closer to implementation, it was felt that continued participation was useful. As well, such a unilateral action would have been contrary to the multilateral approach that Canada had assumed.

Despite these valid arguments for not imposing sanctions in the late 1970s, it must be recognised that the aversion of the Contact Group to do so is often

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[209]Barton, 5.

[210]It is important to realise that Britain, France, and the United States could have vetoed any attempt to impose mandatory sanctions through the United Nations.

cited as one of the primary reasons for its failure.[211] Canada's refusal to press more forcefully for sanctions, while understandable, is nonetheless regrettable. If the Contact Group had allowed sanctions to be imposed on South Africa in 1979, it is likely that the resulting economic crisis in South Africa would have speeded resolution of the outstanding issues. However, this was not to be the case.

Canada as Spokesman for the Contact Group

Each member of the Contact Group acted as its spokesman on occasion. The choice was usually dependent upon the audience being addressed. For instance, first the Americans and then the British acted as spokesman when dealing with the South Africans.[212] However, Canada served as the Group's spokesman on a number of significant occasions. Due to its "liberal credentials and Commonwealth connections", Canada often served as spokesman when dealing with the African states, especially the members of the FLS.[213]

Canada, through its representatives to the UN, also served as a spokesman at that forum as well. Don Jamieson, the then Secretary of State for External Affairs, was chosen to present the summary of the Group's efforts to the Special

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[211]For example, see Antoni A. Shelton, "Carrots Without Sticks: The Contact Group's Mediation Failure in Namibia," Master of Arts Thesis, (Ottawa, Ontario: Carleton University, 1987).

[212]Karns, 102.

[213]Karns, 101, 102.

Session of the UN General Assembly in 1978.[214] Ambassador Barton presented the settlement proposal (S/12636) to the Security Council and spoke on behalf of the Group on several occasions.

Overall, Canada's role within the Contact Group was as a facilitator and moderating influence.[215] Canada's good relations with the other members of the Group and what were at least amicable relations with the other participants in the talks allowed Canada to help bridge the gaps in communication between all concerned. In doing so, Canada leant its implicit, and often explicit, approval for the process which served to reassure both participants and non-participants alike. While this may not seem like a very important role, it would be incorrect to disregard the importance of bringing the different parties together and enabling them to conduct negotiations in good faith. Although Canada's contribution of ideas to the Group is indeterminable, due to the collective nature of the Group's negotiations, it is safe to say that Canada helped to provide an atmosphere conducive towards good negotiations. As well, Canada's participation in the Contact Group helped to ensure that the Group's proposals would not be as unacceptable as earlier plans had been.[216]

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[214]United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records (S-IX)*, Third Meeting, 45-49.

[215]Tennyson, 185.

[216]The Good Offices Committee, formed in 1957, had recommended partitioning Namibia. The plan would have left South Africa in control of most of the mineral and agricultural resources and was, in any case, simply unacceptable to the Afro-

CHAPTER FIVE: CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT AND THE DEMISE OF THE CONTACT GROUP

While the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan as President of the United States did not signify the immediate end to the Contact Group, it was obvious that the change in government did mean that changes in attitudes and policy were also occurring in American foreign policy. It became clear that the Reagan administration preferred a return to "a more traditional diplomatic approach involving the unilateral pursuit of a policy" towards Namibia, as opposed to the "ad hoc multilateral mediating and facilitating team" of the Contact Group.[217] The Reagan administration was traditional in other ways as well. While the initiatives of President Carter's government represented a break from previous policy, the policy that President Reagan adopted was more akin to a return to what had gone before. The unilateral approach to solving the Namibia issue was very much like the 1976 attempt by Dr Kissinger to find a solution to the

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Asian countries. Tennyson, 141-2.

[217]Karns, 92, 93.

Namibian and Rhodesia questions. In many ways, the election of President Reagan was a case of "one step back" after the "two steps forward" brought about by the efforts of the Contact Group.

The changes in U.S. policy on South and southern Africa had a profound effect on the involvement in the Namibia issue of the other members of the Western Five. As the U.S. implemented its own strategy, the other members were left to pursue their own policies, without any significant attempt to being made to co-ordinate those. This chapter will examine the new American policy of constructive engagement and the implications that its adoption held for the Western initiative. The chapter will also look at how Canada responded to the new situation. Although Canada's pursuit of Namibian independence through multilateral means continued, it was clear that the level of intensity on the issue had decreased dramatically. Yet again, Namibia had become a subcomponent of the larger issue of South Africa. Ironically, the low profile which Namibia enjoyed under constructive engagement was one of the factors which ultimately allowed for the progress which resulted in the implementation of the UN plan.[218]

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[218]Interview with a Canadian government official, May 1991.

Constructive Engagement

The fundamental change in the attitude of the new administration was represented by the policy of constructive engagement. This policy, which was first outlined in an edition of the journal *Foreign Affairs*, advocated a much more conciliatory approach towards South Africa.[219] In the article, Chester Crocker, who became Reagan's Assistant Secretary of State for Africa in 1981, emphasised the durability of the South African régime and the limits of American influence over it. The article advocated that the United States support change towards majority rule in South Africa while trying to ensure that damage to U.S. interests, especially economic interests, was kept to a minimum. In other words, Crocker argued that the United States could not force changes to South African policy, but could encourage it. Therefore, the U.S. should apply pressure to change on the South African government *and* support any positive action undertaken by the régime. Although the attitude espoused by the Reagan administration was more positive then those of the administrations prior to Carter's, it was nevertheless a dramatic move backwards in the view of many.

The Context

One of the most telling signs of change was the context in which Namibia was viewed by the Reagan government. Under the Carter administration, many

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[219]Chester Crocker, "South Africa: Strategy for Change," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Winter 1980/1981): 323-51.

senior officials viewed Namibia within a regional or an African context. This was also the case for a number of other problems on the continent (e.g., Somalia and Ethiopia). Although the Carter government had not ignored the wider (i.e., East-West) implications of these struggles, many of the officials involved in shaping American foreign policy thought that the only way of limiting communist expansion in Africa was to restore, or even create, stability to a situation.[220] This, of course, involved solving conflicts, both regional and internal. These views had led to the initiative of the Western Five and the entire negotiating process outlined in the previous chapter.

However, with the advent of constructive engagement in 1981, this point of view changed. Instead of seeing Namibia as an African, southern, or even southwestern (i.e., Namibia and Angola) African problem, the Reagan government reverted to viewing it within a global, East-West context.[221] This meant that the issue was no longer one in which the United States was involved primarily out of a desire to resolve conflict. Rather, the U.S. was once again interested in thwarting perceived Soviet-Cuban expansion, which would further American strategic goals.[222] When questioned about Namibia at his Senate confirmation hearings, Secretary of State-designate General Alexander Haig said

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[220]Vance, 274.

[221]Barber and Barratt, 276.

[222]Jaster, 113.

that the U.S. "should not put in jeopardy the interests of *those who share our values* ... above all, our interests in a strategic sense."[223]

The Approach to Solving the Issue

Along with the change in the context in which the issue was viewed came a change in how to deal with the issue. Under President Carter, the Americans had tried to work either within or close to the UN. This had been one of the prime reasons for the formation of the Contact Group and the style of multilateral diplomacy concerning Namibia which had characterised the 1977 to 1980 period. When the government changed, this changed as well. The new administration and its officials, such as Permanent Representative to the UN Jeane Kirkpatrick, showed little interest in the Namibian problem and the UN as a means of resolving it.[224] This was shown by the fact that the leading role within the bureaucracy for the Namibian problem shifted back from the U.S. Mission at the UN to the African Affairs Bureau of the State Department.

The change in the centre of decision making was matched by a change in attitude towards the UN as a whole. Whereas the Carter administration had regarded the UN as a diplomatic forum of some use, the Reagan team did not. As subsequent events where to show, the American government had many

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[223]Quoted in Jaster, 112.

[224]Karns, 113.

complaints about the United Nations, including its impartiality, spending, and methods. Probably the best example of this new attitude came in 1984 when the United States pulled out of UNESCO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation, because some of its programmes were perceived as being anti-Western. Another example was the reversal of U.S. policy *vis-à-vis* the UN Law of the Sea conference, UNCLOS III, which ultimately resulted in the Law of the Sea treaty not being accepted by the United States.

The change in the *locus* of decision making back to Washington did not, however, mean a higher profile for the Namibia issue itself. Except for a trip by Deputy Secretary of State William Clark to southern Africa in June 1981, "high-level interest and attention to Namibia was lacking in the Reagan administration."[225] What interest the administration did evidence in the region had to do with the issue of Cuban and Soviet support for the MPLA régime in Angola.

Linkage

Out of the change of context and the desire to pursue a unilateral approach arose a new emphasis on the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. While the presence of these troops in Angola had been viewed with some concern by the Carter administration, that government had felt that a

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[225]Karns, 113.

solution in Namibia and the resulting withdrawal of South Africa's forces from the territory would lead to the end of foreign troops in Angola.[226] The Reagan administration did not take such a benign view. By mid-1981, it was reported in the *New York Times* that Chester Crocker was suggesting that U.S.-South African co-operation in southwestern Africa might represent "an opportunity to counter the Soviet threat in Africa."[227]

The idea of linkage, i.e., connecting the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola with Namibian independence, was first raised with the South Africans in June 1981 during Deputy Secretary of State Clark's trip to southern Africa. After the initial talks regarding movement towards independence for Namibia had broken down into mutual accusations, the Americans asked South African Foreign Minister Botha if he would support an independence plan if it also guaranteed the withdrawal of Cuban troops.[228] Not surprisingly, he agreed to the proposal.[229]

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[226]While many at the State Department held this view, other powerful Washington figures, including Zbigniew Brzezinski and the President, never fully accepted this idea. For example, see Vance, 274, and Brzezinski's own book, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981*, (New York City, New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983) 143.

[227]Quoted in Jaster, 113.

[228]According to Jaster, the idea was raised partly as an attempt to keep the talks going. See Jaster, 113.

[229]South Africa had, for many years, been representing itself as a bulwark against the spread of communism in southern Africa. As well, even before the formation of the Contact Group, the SAG had stated that keeping SWAPO out of power was one of its primary goals in Namibia. Barber and Barratt, 221.

However, much of the motivation for linkage originated in American internal politics. The conservative President Reagan was under pressure from the right-wing of the Republican Party to "roll back" Soviet expansion in the Third World.[230] As a result, in April of 1981, the Angolan government was informed that the removal of the Cuban troops would have to precede U.S. diplomatic recognition of the régime and, a month later, the Americans made it clear that the troop withdrawal would have to be part of any future agreement on Namibian independence.[231]

Probably the most astonishing part of the linkage issue was that the South Africans had not made the withdrawal of Cuban troops a precondition for a settlement before. Given their concerns over the "Soviet menace", the perception of SWAPO as a Marxist movement,[232] and the South African involvement in Angola,[233] it is surprising that the South African government had not pressed for some form of linkage previously. It would, therefore, be reasonable to assume that the South Africans had not felt that such a proposal would have been permissible. Once the U.S. began to advocate the idea, however, it obviously was

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[230]Barber and Barratt, 276.

[231]Jaster, 113-14.

[232]In contrast, SWAPO was characterised as being a *nationalist*, and thus not necessarily a Marxist, organisation during a number of interviews with officials of various Canadian governmental and non-governmental organisations, May 1991.

[233]Karns, 115.

acceptable and the South Africans latched onto linkage with great vigour as a means of preventing Namibian independence until South African security concerns were assuaged.

The Contact Group and Linkage

Almost as soon as the policy of linkage was adopted, the other members of the Contact Group responded by rejecting it.[234] Even the change in American policy to advocating "parallel movement", i.e., negotiating on Namibian independence and Cuban troop withdrawal at the same time, failed to pacify the members of the Group.[235] These members opposed the idea, not because they were unconcerned about the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, but because they felt that such demands would undermine their credibility with African states. More importantly, the members of the Contact Group felt that linkage between the issues fell outside of the Groups's limited mandate to negotiate a settlement over Namibian independence.[236] Indeed,

> former members of the Carter administration say that they never considered linkage between the Cuban troops and a Namibia settlement because the issue could not be negotiated within a UN framework.[237]

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[234]Jaster, 114.

[235]Jaster, 114.

[236]Karns, 116.

[237]Karns, 115.

African states, many of whom wanted the Cubans out of the region, were unable to support the policy because it was regarded as compromising Angola's sovereign right to invite foreign forces to aid in the defence of Angola.[238] The Secretariat and the majority of the members of United Nations also rejected linkage, basically for the same reasons as African states (i.e., interference in the internal affairs of a member state).

Effectively, the issue of linkage removed the Namibian question from the Contact Group's limits. With greater emphasis being placed on the Cuban-Soviet involvement, the answer to the impasse over Namibia became an East-West super power solution. That is to say, no settlement was possible as long as the two super powers continued to back their regional allies on this issue. Therefore, the Contact Group became marginalised and effectively ceased to function, although it was never formally disbanded. The Group continued to meet after 1982, albeit without the participation of one member[239] and with some members admitting that the "meetings were *proforma*, and that they attended only 'to keep the structure in place' while awaiting a change in US policy."[240] However, it was

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[238]Karns, 116.

[239]The government of France announced that it was suspending it membership in the Contact Group in December 1983. However, despite France's non-participation in the Group's meetings, it never actually formally withdrew.

[240]Jaster, 114.

clear that the initiative of the Western Five had collapsed and that their ability to achieve further progress had come to an end.

Canada's Reaction

Along with the other members of the Contact Group, Canada rejected the concept of linkage, implicit or otherwise. However, once linkage became an issue — ultimately, *the* issue — preventing the implementation of 435, Canada had little choice but to tolerate the marginalisation of the Contact Group. As a middle power and close ally of the United States, it was not within Canada's power to change American policy if the U.S. believed its strategic concerns to be at stake in an issue. This did not mean, however, that Canada withdrew from the issue. As American and British reluctance to apply sanctions or pursue the matter through other multilateral means made action at the United Nations almost impossible, Canada began to pursue Namibian independence and other matters involving southern Africa through another multilateral forum, the Commonwealth.

Canada, the Commonwealth, and Namibia

Although Namibia had never come under direct British rule, the League of Nations Mandate had been granted to the South Africans to be exercised on the behalf of the British monarch.[241] As the British colonies in Africa became independent in the 1950s and 1960s, their governments took an interest in

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[241]Up until 1961, the British sovereign had also been monarch of South Africa.

ensuring that the other colonies in Africa also achieved independence and majority rule. Therefore, the question of Rhodesia, South Africa, and Namibia were placed high on the agenda of the Commonwealth.[242] One of the principles adopted at the 1971 CHOGM in Singapore rejected racial discrimination and, as long ago as the 1975 Commonwealth summit in Jamaica, the Commonwealth leaders had expressed their willingness to welcome an independent Namibia into the organisation. Since then, the Commonwealth had repeatedly dealt with Namibia and other southern Africa issues. As three, later four, members of the Front Line States and two members of the Contact Group belonged to the Commonwealth, it should not be surprising that "the Commonwealth has played a key part in mustering and focusing the international response [on Namibia], and Canada has played a disproportionately large role [in this process], both within the Commonwealth and elsewhere."[243]

During the Contact Group's negotiations, the Commonwealth had repeatedly expressed support for the Western Five's efforts.[244] At the 1981

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[242]All three of these countries were not in the Commonwealth for most of the time that they were Commonwealth issues. South Africa left after becoming a republic in 1961; Rhodesia's 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) was never recognised and it therefore, at least technically, remained a colony of Great Britain until 1980; and Namibia had no opportunity to join the Commonwealth until after independence in 1990.

[243]Bernard Wood, "Canada and Southern Africa: A Return to Middle Power Activism," *The Round Table* 315 (1990): 280.

[244]Commonwealth (The), Secretariat, *Racism in Southern Africa: The Commonwealth Stand*, (London, U.K.: The Commonwealth Secretariat, 1989) 27.

Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Australia, the leaders had endorsed the plan embodied in Resolution 435. Soon after the Contact Group's initiative came to an effective end, the Commonwealth's interest in southern Africa was reaffirmed by the release of the Commonwealth Accord on southern Africa at the 1985 CHOGM in the Bahamas. In the Accord, the Commonwealth condemned South Africa's occupation of Namibia and its policy of apartheid.[245] The leaders tried to restart constructive negotiations through the establishment of an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to talk with the South African government. Canada was specifically called upon in the document to help with this process and did so with the selection of Archbishop Edward Scott, Primate of the Anglican Church of Canada, as one of the members of the EPG. Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada since the autumn of 1984, and Prime Minister Indira Ghandi of India had helped to mediate between Prime Minister Thatcher and the rest of the Commonwealth so as to allow the Accord to be agreed upon.[246] The U.K.'s refusal to agree to further measures or the imposition of sanctions against South Africa propelled Canada into assuming a leadership role within the Commonwealth on southern Africa issues. As a result, at the 1987 Vancouver CHOGM, Canada proposed further and more comprehensive sanctions.[247] More importantly though, Canada also promoted the establishment of the

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[245]Reproduced in the Commonwealth, *Racism*, 61-64.

[246]Wood, "Canada and Southern Africa," 287.

[247]"The Okanagan Statement and Programme of Action on Southern Africa," in the Commonwealth, *Racism*, 70-5.

Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa (CCFMSA). The Committee, composed of the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Canada, Guyana, India, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, was to monitor sanctions and to help co-ordinate Commonwealth aid to the FLS.[248] The Committee is chaired by Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs.[249]

The Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa has played an important role in helping co-ordinate the anti-apartheid efforts of Commonwealth members; for example, by commissioning various studies and focusing attention on issues such as the "re-labelling and channelling of South African exports through third countries."[250] The Committee also drew attention to the financing of South Africa's international debt and foreign trade. While the Committee has never advocated radical measures, it has continue to try to persuade countries to enforce sanctions more effectively and the Committee has never wavered in its support for sanctions as a means of promoting peaceful change.[251] The Committee has also served, and this is especially so in the case of Namibia, as a

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[248]Wood, "Canada and Southern Africa," 288.

[249]Commonwealth, *Racism*, 74-5. Until 1991, Brian Mulroney's Secretary of State for External Affairs was former Prime Minister Joe Clark.

[250]Commonwealth, *Racism*, 47-8. Until just before the implementation of 435 began, most Namibian exports were classified as originating in South Africa.

[251]Commonwealth, *Racism*, 48-9.

forum for discussion and the expression of concern over developments in the southern Africa region.[252]

Although the references to Namibia by the Commonwealth have most often occurred in the context of statements concerning southern or South Africa, there can be little doubt that the organisation has, to borrow a phrase from the United Nations Security Council, remained seized of the issue. The Commonwealth has consistently supported efforts to implement Resolution 435 (1978) and opposed South Africa's attempts to establish an internal solution. The Canadian participation in and promotion of the Commonwealth's interest in southern Africa was recognised by President Kaunda of Zambia when he chose to describe Canada "as another of the 'front-line states' ranged against apartheid South Africa."[253] Like the Contact Group, the Commonwealth is a multilateral forum. This makes it difficult to establish precisely the nature of the contribution of any one state. However, comments such as President Kuanda's make it clear that Canada has played an important leading role *vis-à-vis* Namibia and southern Africa within the Commonwealth.

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[252]Interview with an official of a Canadian non-government organisation, May 1991.

[253]Wood, "Canada and Southern Africa," 280.

The Effect of Linkage on Canada's Involvement

Despite Canada's serious pursuit of Namibian independence through the Commonwealth, the level of intensity surrounding the issue had decreased because of the new American strategy of linkage. Once southwestern Africa was again perceived as an area of contention between the two super powers, the effectiveness of middle, and even great, powers on the issue decreased noticeably. Certainly, it made further attempts to work through the UN almost useless, though Canadian efforts to use the UN to encourage progress in southern Africa continued.[254] Canada's activities in the Commonwealth provided it with a forum where the only state with significantly greater power, the U.K., refused to support or block any actions against South Africa. As a result, Canada continued to perform an important role in keeping international attention on the region.

While the practical effect of all this may be open to doubt, it is clear that Canada helped to bridge the gap between the members of the Commonwealth over southern African issues. As the Commonwealth is composed of both First and Third World nations, its resolutions and declarations are accorded greater significance internationally than those of Third World-only organisations such as the Organisation of African Unity or the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).[255]

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[254]Prime Minister Mulroney used his speech at the UN General Assembly in 1985 to threaten South Africa with comprehensive sanctions and a breaking off of diplomatic relations.

[255]Interview with the author, July 1991.

By overcoming the British resistance to discussing the issue, Canada contributed to the continuing process of placing greater scrutiny and pressure on South Africa. The international focus on South Africa and Namibia that Canada thus helped to sustain came to fruition as the international and South African domestic situations changed.

The Breakthrough

The changing circumstances of the late 1980s resulted in serious negotiations being held between South Africa, Angola, and Cuba. These talks, mediated by the United States, came about due to two major reasons. First, the threat of communist expansion, which had been a preoccupation of the Reagan administration, was becoming less of a threat as changes within the Soviet Union from 1985 on gradually led to a great improvement in Soviet-American relations. The reduced tensions between the super powers meant, *inter alia*, reduced support for conflict between their allies in southern Africa. Although the U.S. had been trying to encourage a positive dialogue within the confines of constructive engagement, negotiations had been sporadic and not very successful until the international situation had improved. However, even more compelling to reaching a solution in southern Africa than the increased international super power co-operation was the regional situation itself.

In Angola, events had not gone well for South Africa and its allies since late 1987. In September of that year, the Angolan army, with Cuban support and Soviet equipment, renewed their campaign against UNITA.[256] UNITA was only able to repulse the attacks with the aid of the South African military, especially the South African Air Force.[257] Statements by the South African Defence Minister, Magnus Malan, continued to emphasise the possibility that a SWAPO takeover of Namibia would eventually lead to the communist domination of the whole of southern Africa. However, these statements were also revealed the depth of the concerns of South Africa over the increased military capabilities of Angola and its communist allies, and how this was causing the balance of forces to shift away from South Africa and UNITA. As far as South Africa was concerned, these fears were confirmed in early 1988 when it became obvious that the UNITA drive for Cuito Cuanavale, a town in the Cuando-Cubango province of Angola, would fail without South African intervention. Even after South African had intervened in support of UNITA, the combined forces were only able to achieve a military stalemate.

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[256]Barber and Barratt, 341-2.

[257]South Africa defended its involvement on the grounds that an MPLA-Cuban victory would have given SWAPO and the African National Congress greater access to Namibia and South Africa, and would, therefore, have posed a direct threat to South Africa's own security. Barber and Barratt, 342.

The stalemate, along with the changed international situation and domestic unrest within South Africa over another war in Angola, resulted in the start of the U.S.-mediated negotiations.[258] The series of talks, which were held at locations around the world, were conducted mainly by senior officials, with the occasional intervention by ministers. In early May 1988, talks began in London. This marked the first time that Angola, Cuba, and South Africa had actually met together with a view to resolving the conflict in southwestern Africa. The progress continued at meetings in Cairo (June 1988) and New York City (July 1988), where agreement was reached on a set of principles for settling the conflict in the region.[259] The first principle re-affirmed the necessity of basing any settlement about Namibian independence on Resolution 435. The New York Principles were elaborated upon by the Protocol of Geneva (August 1988) which set November 1 as the proposed starting date for the 435 process as well as setting out goals regarding Cuban and South African troop withdrawals from Angola, the cessation of hostilities, and other means of building confidence and reducing conflict.[260]

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[258]Although SADF losses in Angola were low compared to those suffered by Angola and UNITA, they were nonetheless significant as they resulted in increased public concern over South Africa's involvement in Angola. One newspaper editorial likened Angola and South African support for UNITA to the America involvement in Vietnam. Jaster, 178.

[259]See annexure 5, "New York Principles," in South Africa (Republic of), Department of Foreign Affairs, *Namibian Independence and Cuban Troop Withdrawal* (Pretoria, R.S.A.: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1989), 29.

[260]Annexure 6, "Protocol of Geneva," in South Africa, 30-1.

At the same time as these talks were going on, agreement had been reached between Cuba and Angola over the timetable for the withdraw of Cuban troops over a twenty-seven month period beginning before April 1, 1989.[261] Although not implicit in these agreements, the American and South African insistence on linking the issues of Cuban troops in Angola and Namibian independence had proved successful. Further meetings in New York City (November 1988) and Brazzaville (December 1988) set a new date for implementing 435 (April 1, 1989) and provided for the signing of both the bilateral (Cuban-Angolan) and trilateral (South Africa-Cuba-Angola) agreements[262] which started the official process of preparing for the implementation of 435 and the bilateral agreement.[263] The Brazzaville Protocol also established a Joint Commission (JC), composed of Cuba, Angola, and South Africa, with American and Soviet observers, to help promote discussion about and resolution of disputes. The bilateral and trilateral agreements were duly signed at UN headquarters in New York on December 22, 1988. The 1988 agreements set the scene for the transition towards Namibian independence to begin by clearing

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[261]Annexure 4, "Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the People's Republic of Angola [the bilateral agreement]," in South Africa, 26-8.

[262]See annexures 9, "The Protocol of Brazzaville," and 1, "Agreement among the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and the Republic of South Africa [the trilateral agreement]," in South Africa, 36-7, 16-7.

[263]The U.S. had kept members of the UN Secretariat informed of the progress of the talks and the Special Representative and members of his staff had attended some of the meetings. This meant that some general planning had already begun for the implementation. Interview with a UN official, May 1991.

away the last remaining obstacles to the implementation of Resolution 435. This involved satisfying South Africa's security concerns, as well as the strategic interests of both super powers, and the concerns of the international community as a whole.

CHAPTER SIX: CANADA AND THE TRANSITION PERIOD

As a result of the agreements reached between Cuba, Angola, and South Africa in 1988, it appeared as though Namibian independence was a real possibility when Canada rejoined the United Nations Security Council for a two year term beginning January 1989. Appearances became reality and, during the next fifteen months, the Canadian government contributed significantly to the Namibian independence process in a variety of ways. Much of the motivation for this involvement originated in Canada's earlier participation in the Contact Group. However, Canada's seat on the 1989 and 1990 UN Security Councils, and its long-standing commitments to peacekeeping and multilateral diplomacy through the UN and the Commonwealth also played an important role in ensuring that Canada would be heavily involved in the process. However, before any progress could be made in Namibia itself, it was necessary for Canada to participate in the deliberations at the United Nations in New York.

This chapter will review the Security Council deliberations in 1989 on UNTAG and the role that Canada played in them, and look at the other contributions made by Canada to the pre-implementation phase of UNTAG. Then the chapter will focus on UNTAG itself, the roles played be UNTAG, and what Canada did to encourage the success of the UN plan. The chapter will also assess Canada's direct involvement during this time and show how all of this activity can be seen as a prime example of middle power internationalism.

The United Nations in New York

The first venue of Canadian action regarding Namibia in 1989 was, as it had often been, the United Nations in New York. Canada's involvement at the UN was concentrated in the Security Council, though Canada did play a significant role in the planning for the implementation of the settlement plan in the General Assembly and through the UN Secretariat. The different roles that Canada played in the planning for and implementation of the transition process help to illustrate Canada's commitment to multilateral efforts. Although not a permanent member of the Security Council, Canada played an important role in helping resolve the disputes that came up in the UNSC over UNTAG and Namibia as a whole. Without the sort of impartial mediating role that Canada was able to fulfil, both in the Security Council and elsewhere, the process of implementing Resolution 435 (1978) may not have been completed, let alone been as great as success as it proved to be.

The Security Council and Canada: The Second Time Around

The United Nations Security Council that Canada joined in 1989 was very different from the Council in 1977/1978.[264] For one thing, the Cold War, if not actually over, was definitely not as great an obstacle to the functioning of the UN Security Council as it been previously. The resulting co-operation between the permanent five members of the Security Council, for example on Middle East issues, allowed for a higher level of effectiveness and the results were being hailed as a sign of the renaissance for the United Nations as a whole. Although it was not the only issue discussed in the Security Council, Namibia tended to dominate much of the Council's debates and activities during the first three months of 1989. Much of the debate centred on the size, composition, and cost of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group which was to assist the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in supervising and controlling the transition process. The size and composition of UNTAG had been broadly outlined in the Contact Group's settlement plan (S/12636) and then elaborated upon by the subsequent reports of the Secretary-General.[265] As originally envisioned, UNTAG's military was to have been composed of seven infantry battalions, one of

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[264]In 1989, the Security Council was composed of Algeria, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal, the U.K., the U.S.S.R., the U.S., and Yugoslavia. In 1990, it was the permanent five plus Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Finland, Malaysia, Romania, and Zaire.

[265]These included United Nations Security Council documents S/12827 (29 August 1978), S/12869 (28 September 1978), S/12903 (21 October 1978), S/12938 (24 November 1978).

which was to held in reserve. The military component (i.e., the seven battalions plus military observers, the logical, engineering, communications, command, and air support forces) could have totalled up 7,500 personnel. In addition, there were to be 360 civilian police monitors (CIVPOL), and a number of other civilians who were to assist in the supervision of the election process and the administration of UNTAG.[266]

Shortly before the signing of the agreements which allowed for the 435 process to begin, however, the representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council met with the Secretary-General and requested that the size and composition of UNTAG be reviewed before implementation began with a view to reducing the costs.[267] The permanent members thought that the situation had changed enough from that of 1978 to allow for a reduction of the force. It was felt that the agreements provided for a substantially reduced degree of tension which would allow UNTAG to "carry out its primary function ... in a substantially more economical manner."[268] As the Secretary-General noted, the five permanent members of the Security Council were especially concerned because the five would be responsible for 57 per cent of UNTAG's budget under

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[266]See United Nations, Security Council, S/12827 and S/12869.

[267]For details of this and the subsequent meetings outlined here, see part two of Security Council document S/20412, "Further Report of the Secretary-General Concerning the Implementation of Security Council Resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) Concerning the Question of Namibia," (23 January 1990).

[268]United Nations, S/20412, 15.

the special scale of assessments used to finance UN peacekeeping operations.[269] As UNTAG's projected cost was over U.S.$700 million, this would have amounted to almost $400 million.[270]

To no one's surprise, the attempt to reduce UNTAG's budget was opposed by the representatives of the Non-Aligned Movement, including the Front Line States, Nigeria, and SWAPO, at a meeting with the Secretary-General on December 21, 1988.[271] The Permanent Representative of Zimbabwe, speaking for the NAM, argued that the "consolidation of the South African military, police and administrative" sectors of the occupation government had made the situation even more complex than in 1978. Therefore, the non-aligned countries had concluded that, if anything, the size of UNTAG needed to be increased, not reduced, if the Special Representative was to be able to supervise and control the South African-administered elections in an effective manner. The views expressed by the Zimbabwian representative were re-iterated in a letter from President

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[269]The 57 per cent for peace-keeping operations is as opposed to the 45 per cent of the regular UN budget that the permanent members pay.

[270]Chris Brown, "Canada and Southern Africa: Autonomy, Image and Capacity in Foreign Policy," *Canada Among Nations, 1989: The Challenge of Change*, ed. Maureen Appel Molot and Fen Osler Hampson (Ottawa, Ontario: Carleton University Press, 1990), 209.

[271]This group had a meeting with the Secretary-General the day after the permanent five had met with him (i.e., the day before the signing of the agreements in New York). United Nations, Security Council, S/20412, 15-6.

Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Chairman of the NAM at the time, and by a ministerial delegation from the Front Line States.[272]

When the UN Security Council began discussions on the matter on January 11, 1989, the two sides maintained their positions. The Canadian delegation recognised the validity of both sides' concerns and attempted to "provide language that would meet the concerns of both parties and end the deadlock."[273] After a few days, Resolution 629 (1989) was adopted by consensus. The resolution made note of the changes in the situation within Namibia and the region, while also recognising the desirability of making UNTAG as cost-effective as possible without reducing its ability to fulfil the missions entrusted to it under Resolution 435.[274] The resolution called upon the Secretary-General to keep both of these considerations in mind when preparing his report on the implementation of 435.

The desires of both parties were reflected in the Secretary-General's report of January 23 (S/20412). The Secretary-General advanced a compromise position for UNTAG. First, the size of the Special Representative's staff was to remain

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[272]The letter arrived in late December 1988, while the ministerial delegation met with the Secretary-General in early January 1989. United Nations, Security Council, S/20412, 16.

[273]Canada, Department of External Affairs, Summary of events, "Canada on the UN Security Council 1989-90: Documents and Statements," January to March 1989.

[274]Resolution 629 also confirmed April 1, 1989 as the date for the implementation to begin.

the same. Second, the number of civilian police monitors was to be increased from 360 to 500.[275] Third, the Secretary-General advocated that the military component of UNTAG be comprised of three enlarged infantry battalions with the further four battalions to be kept in reserve. The three enlarged battalions would, according to the Secretary-General, provide the same number of troops as five regular battalions, but with fewer command staff and a comparable reduction in the number of support personnel. This would reduce the overall size of the military component to an approximate total of 4,650 personnel, including military observers and headquarters staff.[276] However, if events dictated it, the Secretary-General reserved the right to request the speedy deployment of the extra battalions and expected that all the members of the UNSC would act in support of such a request (e.g., by supplying the necessary aircraft to airlift the extra troops to Namibia).

The changes to the police monitor and military components of UNTAG, along with a decision that the repatriation of Namibians in exile by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) would be funded separately, reduced the overall cost of UNTAG to approximately $416 million. As the

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[275]This figure was subsequently revised twice and eventually reached 1,500.

[276]In fact, the number of military personnel deployed with UNTAG reached a maximum strength of only 4,493 in November 1989. United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping*, 2nd ed. (New York City, New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1990), 445.

Secretary-General had anticipated, the compromise satisfied neither side: "I [the Secretary-General] have therefore thought it right to submit to the Council a concept of operations which will not be wholly satisfactory to either side, nor to me ..."[277]

With the presentation of the Secretary-General's report to the UNSC, the debate was renewed. Canada and other countries raised points for clarification. For instance, the Canadians expressed concern about the separate funding of the UNHCR's repatriation efforts, as these were seen to be central to the success of the whole 435 process.[278] The Secretary-General submitted an explanatory statement (S/20457) to the Security Council in response to these queries. He explained that all the members of the Council, including the permanent five, had expressed their support for increased military deployments if requested by the Secretary-General and had assured him of their assistance in those deployments. He also made mention of the concerns about the funding of the repatriation effort and attempted to reassure the members that this would not be a problem. Shortly thereafter, the Security Council adopted the Secretary-General's plan in Resolution 632 (1989) on February 16, 1989. According to Canadian officials, the Canadian delegation was very active in drafting this resolution and in the overall

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[277]United Nations, Security Council, S/20412, 17.

[278]Canada, Department of External Affairs, Summary of Events.

process of reaching compromise between the different groups on the Security Council.[279]

Before the issue could be fully resolved, however, the General Assembly had to approve the UNTAG budget. The non-aligned countries continued to press for the maximum number of troops possible, but the permanent five resisted the pressure and the NAM members eventually conceded the point. Once UNGA had approved the budget, in early March,[280] the way was clear for the establishment of UNTAG and the beginning of the transition. However, with the end of the budget debate in the Security Council, the UNSC's role in the transition was largely that of a debating forum without a direct impact on the actual implementation of the transition. It nevertheless helped focus attention on matters of contention during the process. The UNSC also served as a venue of discussion where information could be disseminated and the concerns of the Non-Aligned Movement countries could be expressed and, hopefully, assuaged. With the approval of the budget by the UN Security Council and General Assembly, the centre of decision-making moved from UN Headquarters to the headquarters of UNTAG in Windhoek.

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[279]Canada, Department of External Affairs, Summary of Events, and interview with a Canadian diplomat, May 1991.

[280]United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 43/232 (1989).

Canada's Contribution to the Planning for the Implementation of Resolution 435

It should not be surprising that, given Canada's long history of involvement in UN peacekeeping operations and regard for the functional principle, Canada is usually very involved in the planning for UN field operations. On this occasion, Canada helped with the planning for the implementation through the (semi-permanent) assignment of Canadian personnel to the UN Secretariat, most especially the Field Operations Division. Canada also assisted with the initial deployment by seconding an officer of the Canadian Armed Forces, Lieutenant Colonel J-R Hinse, to the United Nations, where he acted as the head of the UNTAG reception/assistance team.[281] This team oversaw the logistical arrangements for the deployment of the UNTAG forces, which involved the work of over seventy people in New York and Namibia and the co-ordination of air, sea, and land transport for over five thousand personnel. Canada also contributed some aircraft in order to help speed up the deployment after the incidents of April 1.

UNTAG and the Implementation of Resolution 435

These early signs of commitment were followed by a number of different actions which helped to display the Canadian commitment to ensuring that the process being supervised by UNTAG would be as successful as possible. These

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[281]United Nations , United Nations Transition Assistance Group, "Completion of UNTAG Reception Phase," Mission Update (Windhoek, Namibia: UNTAG, 10 May 1989).

actions made it clear that Canada was dedicated to supporting UNTAG in any way possible. The tasks that UNTAG faced were enormous, and UNTAG itself was none too small. However, UNTAG, like the UN as a whole, was dependent on the co-operation of the members states, especially South Africa, for its success.

UNTAG and the Preliminaries to the Elections

Before one can assess Canada's contribution to UNTAG, it would be useful to have a brief overview of what the Special Representative and UNTAG were meant to do and did do. Basically, the role of the Special Representative, assisted by UNTAG, was to ensure that the elections for the Constituent Assembly were free and fair. This involved working with the Administrator-General, Louis Pienaar, to repeal discriminatory and repressive laws and regulations, as well as setting up electoral procedures which would allow all adult Namibians to vote without fear of reprisal before, during, and after the elections. As well, UNTAG was responsible for monitoring the cessation of combat and the withdrawal of all the South African Defence Forces from Namibia, with the exception of 1,500 SADF troops who would be confined to two bases and monitored. These few remaining troops would have to be withdrawn within a week of the election results being released. The UN military would also be responsible for monitoring the dismantling of all official paramilitary organisations, not including the police. CIVPOL was to monitor and assess the activities of the South West African Police (SWAPOL). All the parts of UNTAG

were also responsible for "showing the flag" (i.e., the presence of the UN) and helping to ensure that the local population recognised and trusted the impartiality of the UN forces.

To fulfil these major roles, the Special Representative had a staff, including the military, in excess of 4,700 people drawn from over seventy-five countries.[282] Unfortunately, due to the delay in approving the budget, most of these people were not yet in Namibia by April 1 when SWAPO guerrillas entered Namibia from their bases in Angola. The South African officials assumed that these forces had hostile intentions and demanded that the South African security forces deal with the threat as SWAPOL was being overwhelmed. As the A-G clearly had responsibility for maintaining law and order during the transition phase and the movement of SWAPO forces was obviously in violation of the agreements (although their "hostile intent" was doubtful), the Special Representative had little choice but to agree to allow the South African forces out of base. Otherwise, he risked the collapse of the entire process.[283] The resulting massacre, as it has been termed, left up to three hundred SWAPO and thirty South African soldiers dead.[284] The implementation of Resolution 435 was only saved from collapse

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[282]See appendix III.

[283]According to one source, ending the process immediately was President P.W. Botha's first choice, but he was dissuaded from this by British Prime Minister Thatcher. Interview with a Canadian diplomat, May 1991.

[284]Brown, 210.

by the speedy co-operation of the Joint Commission. The JC, in collaboration with the United Nations, detailed a plan to allow the SWAPO fighters to assemble at UNTAG-supervised sites from which they would be transported back to bases in Angola.[285]

However, once this substantial obstacle had been overcome, events progressed quickly. On April 24, even before the situation in the north had stabilised, the Administrator-General released a draft proclamation regarding the registration of voters. The draft proclamation was open to public comment for twenty-one days, after which the staffs of the A-G and the UNSR worked together to resolve the issues of disagreement.[286] By July 1, the negotiations were finished and the results, i.e., the amended proclamation, published. A similar pattern was followed in conjunction with the proclamations on the registration of the political parties and the elections, settled on September 4 and October 13 respectively.[287]

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[285]Annexure 23, "Mount Etjo Declaration by the Joint Commission," in South Africa, 74-7. In the end, most of the SWAPO infiltrators returned to Angola without outside assistance.

[286]Much of the information in this and the following paragraphs comes from United Nations, United Nations Transition Assistance Group, "Implementation of the United Nations Plan for Namibia," (February 1990).

[287]The registration of parties proclamation established the requirements for a party or alliance to be listed on the ballot and helped to reduce the number of contestants to a manageable ten. For the names of these parties/alliances, see appendix IV.

The process of publishing draft proclamations allowed for public input into the final proclamations and, more importantly, ensured that the Special Representative had agreed to them before they were finalised.

> The exchange of letters between the Special Representative and the Administrator-General on the three proclamations governing the registration of voters and the elections set out the way and manner in which the Special Representative would supervise and control the entire electoral process.[288]

In the process, it was also established that any disputes concerning registration or the elections would be resolved by the officials of the A-G and UNTAG working together. This helped to ensure UN participation throughout the process, and served a twofold purpose: first, that the UNSR would be satisfied that the election process was free and fair and, if he was not, that disputes would be resolved before they could jeopardise the process as a whole; and, second, the high profile and level of UNTAG involvement helped to reassure Namibians and international observers of the legitimacy of the procedure. This impression was re-enforced by the fact that the decision to extend the voter registration period was only reached after consultations between the Administrator-General and the Special Representative.[289]

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[288]United Nations, United Nations Transition Assistance Group, "Implementation," 5.

[289]United Nations, United Nations Transition Assistance Group, "Implementation," 6.

UNTAG and the Election Process

UNTAG had opened offices throughout Namibia and used these to establish contact with the local population and to prepare for voter registration and the elections.[290] As most Namibians had never participated in free elections before, this involved voter education as well as the logistical preparations for both events. The logistics alone were formidable. For instance, during the registration period, July 3 through September 23, there were over 170 South African-appointed registration teams, supervised by UNTAG personnel, assigned to cover over 2,200 permanent and temporary registration points throughout the country. All of the UNTAG teams had to be briefed on the situation and their duties. The number of supervisors involved in the elections themselves was smaller, but they had only four days, November 7-11, to complete their work. The 1,753 UNTAG electoral supervisors were assigned to supervise over 350 polling stations, only 215 of which were permanent ones. Three hundred and fifty-eight election supervisors were drawn from the military component of UNTAG, 510 came from within the UN system, and the remaining 885 supervisors were drawn from twenty-seven UN member states. In addition, over one thousand police monitors

[290]See map 2.



Map 2: UNTAG Offices in Namibia

Source: Courtesy of External Affairs & International Trade Canada

were involved in monitoring SWAPOL activities at the polling stations and in regards to the guarding of ballot boxes at the polling stations and during transportation.[291]

During the registration period, 701,483 Namibians registered to vote which represented over 102 per cent of the expected turnout.[292] Of those who registered to vote, 701,483 (96.4 per cent) actually voted.[293] Even before the results, shown in appendix IV, were announced, the Special Representative had announced that he "certified that the electoral process in Namibia had, at every stage, been free and fair and that it had been conducted to his satisfaction."[294] The Constituent Assembly first met November 21, 1989 and moved quickly to adopt the 1982 Constitutional Principles as the basis for the draft constitution. As SWAPO had failed to gain two-thirds of the seats in the Assembly, this meant that the Constitution would have to gain the support of at least some of the smaller parties in order to be ratified. In the end, a spirit of co-operation

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[291]United Nations, United Nations Transition Assistance Group, "Implementation," 28-35.

[292]The estimated number of eligible voters was prepared by the Administrator-General's office based on the 1981 census. The discrepancy is due to the inaccuracy of the initial census which was compounded by the population growth rate which was seemingly arbitrarily selected the A-G. United Nations, United Nations Transition Assistance Group, "Implementation," 41.

[293]United Nations, United Nations Transition Assistance Group, "Implementation," 54.

[294]United Nations, United Nations Transition Assistance Group, "Implementation," 38.

prevailed and the Constitution was adopted unanimously in February 1991, with independence being set for March 21.

Major Problems During the Implementation

The overall success of the election process did not mask the fact that serious problems occurred throughout the process. On the very first day of the implementation, April 1, there had been the fighting between SWAPO and the South African security forces referred to above. The confusion surrounding the invasion and the subsequent fighting continued to provoke hostility and suspicion throughout the independence process.[295] It was suspected that the South Africans had had some foreknowledge of the invasion and had waited in order to gain favourable publicity.[296]

The impression that the South African authorities were trying to undermine the position of SWAPO was re-enforced by the clear bias in the state-controlled media, the South West African Broadcasting Corporation (SWABC). During June and July, the Namibia Peace Plan Study and Contact Group monitored the SWABC broadcasts and "documented a 'distinct bias' against

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[295]Brown, 210.

[296]Some members of the Canadian non-governmental and academic communities attributed what they saw as a less hostile attitude towards the South African régime on the part of several Western governments, including the Canadian government, to these events. Interviews with the author, May 1991.

SWAPO (and UNTAG)."[297] UNTAG's Department of Public Information countered by producing short radio and television programmes which were broadcast on SWABC. As well, the Special Representative pressed the A-G to encourage SWABC to adopt a more balanced viewpoint and to allow equal access to the media for all registered political parties.

Another source of concern were the rumours regarding foreign funding of Namibian political parties. Although rumours were a constant facet of the Namibian political scene, these ones were persistent enough to be awarded a semi-factual status.[298] However, it was not until 1991, in the wake of a domestic scandal, that the South African government admitted to having funded seven political parties during the Namibian elections.[299] The majority of the funds would have been contributed to the DTA, but, as the sum involved was in excess of Rand 100 million, there would have been enough to go around. According to South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha, SWAPO was also receiving foreign funds and he has claimed that these funds totalled many times the amounts provided by the South African government.[300]

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[297]Clyde Sanger, "Namibia: The Black Man's Burden," *Behind the Headlines* Vol. 48, No. 4 (Summer 1990): 10.

[298]This observation is based on the time spent in Namibia by the author during July and August 1989.

[299]Christopher S. Wren, "Pretoria Spent $35 Million To Influence Namibian Vote," *New York Times* [New York City, New York] (26 July 1991): A3.

[300]Wren, A3.

While suspicions existed as to the foreign funding of parties during the election, the Special Representative was unable to pursue the matter as nothing in any of the agreements prohibited the practice. Although the Administrator-General and his staff, along with the Special Representative and his staff, were committed to acting in an impartial manner, there were no restrictions placed on the other parties *vis-à-vis* their impartiality, including the South African government in South Africa.

A prominent issue which continued for many months concerned intimidation by the South African authorities. Many members of *Koevoet*, a counter-insurgency unit, had been integrated into SWAPOL in early 1989. As members of the police, the *Koevoet* unit was not obliged to be disbanded as a para-military organisation. Given their reputation for brutality and killing, it was not surprising that continued operations by them provoked great fear, especially in Ovamboland.[301] UNTAG, the UN Security Council, the Secretary-General, international observers, and many Namibians demanded that *Koevoet* be disbanded or strictly confined to base. Success in eliminating fears of intimidation was only partial. However, the Commission for the Prevention and Combatting of Intimidation and Election Malpractices, appointed by the A-G and headed by Judge Bryan O'Linn, and the demobilisation of most *Koevoet* personnel in September and October, helped to reduce the fears somewhat.

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[301]Sanger, 10.

Another major problem concerned the release of political prisoners. For the South Africans, this was primarily an issue of distinguishing between "political" and "criminal" prisoners.[302] Under Resolution 435, an impartial, international jurist was to decide the difference between the two and decide who was to be released.[303] While this worked eventually, the delays caused considerable worry. An issue that lasted longer, however, was the issue of SWAPO "detainees" who were being held in Angola. The detainees had been arrested by SWAPO's internal security police while the movement was in exile and had been accused of being South African spies. Although the UN established a fact-finding mission to visit SWAPO gaols in Angola, they failed to account for some 315 out of an alleged 990 prisoners.[304] The SWAPO explanations of the circumstances surrounding the arrests and imprisonment of these people failed to satisfy many people, both in and outside Namibia, and is believed to have cost SWAPO votes in the elections.

Canadian Involvement Within UNTAG

Canadians were involved in UNTAG in a variety of ways. Even before the UNTAG budget had been agreed to by the General Assembly, the Canadian government was actively demonstrating its commitment to the independence

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[302]Brown, 210

[303]This scheme had been included in the Contact Group's initial proposal (S/12636) and had been included in the refined versions of the UN plan.

[304]Sanger, 11.

process. It presented an advance of $11.9 million (Canadian) to Martti Ahtisaari, the Special Representative, in order to help get the implementation started. Not only did this represent nearly 80 per cent of Canada's anticipated assessment, but Canada was also the first country to contribute to UNTAG. In total, Canada contributed $15 million to UNTAG.[305] The Canadian government also provided $2 million for the repatriation of Namibian refugees. Although these amounts cannot be considered huge by any means, they did represent a substantial portion of the overall budgets. For instance, Canada's financial contribution to UNTAG represented approximately 3.6 per cent of the total budget, but this was one of the largest contributions by a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council.

More important than the money, however, was Canada's contribution of personnel and various forms of technical assistance. Some 250 members of the Canadian Armed Forces provided logistical support for the UNTAG forces in the southern half of the territory. These troops helped supply all the UNTAG forces, civilian and military, in their sector and co-ordinated their actions with the Polish contingent which was responsible for logistics in the north. The commander of the Canadian contingent in UNTAG, Colonel M.K. Jeffery, was also the chief liaison officer for the military component of UNTAG. In addition, Canada helped to provide some elements for the air unit during the early stages of the

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[305]Brown, 212.

deployment.[306] As well, a small detachment of Canadian military police were assigned to a multi-national military police unit which provided security and maintained order on some of military bases being used by UNTAG.

The Canadian government also seconded a number of civilians to assist UNTAG in carrying out its duties. Of these, the most prominent were the one hundred members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (R.C.M.P.) who formed part of the second group of five hundred police monitors requested by the Special Representative through the Secretary-General.[307] This deployment was especially significant as it marked the first occasion that the R.C.M.P. had served outside of Canada in a civilian capacity.[308] As members of a community-based police force, the R.C.M.P. officers were able to quickly gain the trust and respect of local Namibians, despite the language barrier.[309] Twelve former R.C.M.P. officers travelled to Namibia to serve as fingerprint experts during the election period. As well, on very short notice, Elections Canada organised fifty experienced election supervisors from across Canada for the November elections,

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[306]M.K. Jeffery (Colonel), "The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) Namibia," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 6 (Summer 1991) 7.

[307]Brown, 212.

[308]Members of the R.C.M.P. had served overseas during wartime in conjunction with the Canadian military. Conversation with senior R.C.M.P. officers, July 1991.

[309]Interview with a United Nations official who served with UNTAG, May 1991.

the largest contingent from a single country.[310] Another Canadian who was sent out to help the UN was Harry Neufeld, a computer expert from British Columbia, who was placed in charge of computerising the Namibian electoral lists. This involved some complicated computer programming to help eliminate duplicate registrations and various discrepancies as well as producing a list of eligible voters for use at the polling stations.[311]

Canada, the Commonwealth, and Namibia

Another means of Canadian involvement in the transition process was within the Commonwealth. Although the process had already begun, this did not stop the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa from discussing the issue at their February 1989 meeting in Zimbabwe. At that meeting, concerns were raised about the reduced size of UNTAG and some of the other Committee members demanded that UNTAG be restored to its original size. Canada, as the only member of both the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers and the UN Security Council, tried to act as a moderating influence on the demands of the other members of the Committee by explaining the rationale behind the reduction.[312] Although Canada was not fully successful

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[310]Interview with a Canadian diplomat, May 1991. For more details on the experiences of the Canadian election observers, see "Birth of a Democracy: Canadian 'Midwives' in Namibia," *Contact*, No. 70 (April 1990): 2-9.

[311]United Nations, United Nations Transition Assistance Group, "Implementation," 18-9.

[312]Interview with a Canadian diplomat, May 1991.

in convincing the other members of the Committee about the viability of a smaller UNTAG, at least the Committee confined itself to expressing its concerns and did not reject the revised plan.

The Commonwealth Committee continued to discuss the situation in Namibia at their August 1989 meeting in Australia. At that time, the Committee members drew attention to concerns over intimidation (e.g., *Koevoet*) and the draft election proclamations. They also recommended the establishment of a Commonwealth observer group to visit Namibia and report prior to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting to be held that fall in Malaysia. Subsequently, an observer group was formed which included Bernard Wood, head of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS). The public articulation of concerns at the Committee meetings and the 1989 CHOGM, along with the report of the observer group,[313] helped to alleviate the reservations of many members of the Commonwealth. At all of these stages, Canada, as the leading, liberal industrialised Commonwealth member, played an important role in helping find the middle ground between the initial, sometimes extreme, positions of some Commonwealth members and what was realistically

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[313]Commonwealth (The), Secretariat, *Preparing for a Free Namibia: Elections, Transition and Independence*, The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group on Namibia, (London, U.K.: The Commonwealth Secretariat, 1989).

possible (e.g., the size of UNTAG).[314] The Canadian involvement on the UNSC also helped to reassure the Commonwealth members that the revised plan was the best possible balance between the original plan and what the permanent five had wanted.[315]

Direct Canadian Participation

Canadians did not confine their involvement in the transition process to multilateral organisations such as the UN and the Commonwealth. The Canadian government also established a diplomatic Observer Mission in Windhoek to report directly to Ottawa on the transition process.[316] The Observer Mission, staffed by six Canada-based and some locally-engaged staff, sent reports back to Ottawa, the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations in New York, and any other Canadian mission which were interested in or involved with Namibia.[317] These reports allowed the Canadian government to produce its own assessment of the situation in Namibia and possible courses of action that could be taken to overcome or prevent obstacles. The Mission liaised with the A-G's

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[314]Interview with an official of a Canadian non-governmental organisation, May 1991.

[315]Interview with a Canadian diplomat, May 1991.

[316]In order to have diplomatic status, members of the Observer Mission were technically accredited to the Canadian Embassy in Pretoria, but were resident in Windhoek and operated independently.

[317]The Canada-based staff of the Mission consisted of two officers from External Affairs and International Trade Canada, a military advisor, an office manager, a secretary, and a communicator.

administration, UNTAG, SWAPO and other political parties. The members of the Mission travelled throughout Namibia so as to meet with UN and other officials and familiarise themselves with the situation around the territory.

However, the Mission did more than just report back to the Canadian government. It also tried to provide positive suggestions to the staffs of both the UNSR and the Administrator-General in order to help resolve the problems with the draft proclamations and other issues.[318] In this regard, one former UNTAG official described the participation of the Canadian Observer Mission as being particularly helpful and supportive of the 435 process.[319] The Observer Mission also carried out several multilateral efforts of its own, including a démarche with several other countries on the detainees issue.[320] Although the impact of such endeavours is hard to determine, it is undoubtable that they did have the effect of helping to focus international attention on this and related issues.[321]

The Canadian Observer Mission also served as neutral territory where local political and religious leaders could freely meet with UNTAG and South

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[318]Interview with a Canadian diplomat, April 1991.

[319]The same official also noted that UNTAG welcomed all the observer missions, diplomatic or otherwise, but singled out the Canadian mission as one of the ones most obviously committed to ensuring the success of the process. Interview with a United Nations official, May 1991.

[320]Interview with a Canadian diplomat, May 1991.

[321]Interview with a Canadian diplomat, May 1991.

African officials.[322] This was most evident at the Canada Day (July 1) celebrations at the Mission, which also served as the Mission's official opening. At the reception hosted by the Mission, various Namibian politicians, business leaders, UNTAG officials, and members of the Administrator-General's staff met with each other, often for the first time.[323] The Mission also tried to co-operate with and support the activities of the Canadian non-governmental and governmental (usually Members of Parliament) observer groups that arrived in Namibia throughout the year. On one occasion this included the presentation of four thousand Canadian ballot boxes by Walter McLean, a member of the Canadian House of Commons, to the Administrator-General, who described them as Namibia's first foreign aid.[324]

Several Canadian Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) participated in the process as well. This usually took the form of participation in observer groups, although Oxfam-Canada had also been sponsoring a variety of aid projects in Namibia since 1983.[325] The observer groups included a wide assortment of Canadians, including labour leaders, scholars, former politicians, and officials of

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[322]Interview with a Canadian diplomat, May 1991.

[323]The reception and the meetings that it permitted received considerable local press coverage. Interview with a Canadian diplomat, May 1991.

[324]Quoted by several Canadian diplomats during interviews, April and May 1991.

[325]Joachim Pütz, Heidi von Egidy, and Perri Caplan, eds., *Namibia Handbook and Political Who's Who: Post-Election Edition, 1990*, 2nd ed. (Windhoek, Namibia: Magnus, 1990), 343.

NGOs. These groups, sometimes accused of having a pro-SWAPO bias, helped focus Canadian and international attention on some of the major issues within Namibia (e.g., intimidation, the draft electoral laws, etc.).[326] One member of an observer group which visited Namibia in July, Flora MacDonald, Secretary of State for External Affairs under Prime Minister Clark in 1979-1980, was able to communicate the group's concerns directly to Joe Clark, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, immediately before the beginning of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers meeting in Australia. Ms MacDonald felt that the concerns raised by the group were clearly reflected in the stance adopted by the Committee.[327] The group also held news conferences in Namibia and Canada which gave a higher profile to their concerns and recommendations, Namibian independence, and to NGO involvement.[328]

Once the elections had finished, so did most of the Canadian involvement in Namibia. The Mission continued its reporting, but there was often little to report on as most of the drafting of the Constitution took place behind closed doors. Mission personnel continued to have meetings with the Special

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[326]Sanger, 14.

[327]Interview with the author, July 1991.

[328]Canadian Council of International Cooperation (CCIC), "Statement by Canadian NGO Observer Mission," Press Release (Windhoek, Namibia: Canadian Council of International Cooperation, 27 July 1989), and "Report of CCIC Fact-finding Mission to Namibia" (n.p.: Canadian Council of International Cooperation, July 1989).

Representative, the Administrator-General, and political and religious leaders, but the urgency and intensity that had been so evident during the April-November 1989 period was now missing. Now the interest of the Mission, Canadian NGOs, and most Namibians was focused on post-independence development prospects. As this was primarily a long-term concern, the immediate need for action lessened.

CHAPTER SEVEN: CANADA AS A MIDDLE POWER AND NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE

The preceding chapters have examined the events which led to Namibia's independence and Canada's roles in this process. Now it is necessary to evaluate those roles and in light of the expectations identified in Chapter Two *vis-à-vis* the foreign policy behaviour of middle powers. This will be done on as much of a chronological basis as possible and will, therefore, follow much the same pattern as the chapters. However, the purpose of this chapter is not to review the events. Rather, it is intended to show how the foreign policy behaviour of the Canadian government did, on the whole, follow a pattern of behaviour which is consistent with that of a middle power as established earlier. These roles included: acting as a regional leader; acting as a functional leader; stabilising conflict, which embraces separating adversaries, balancing power structures, and mediation; and strengthening multilateral decision-making institutions. As well, middle powers can also act in a negative manner by seeking solely to increase their own status or obtain a "free ride."

Prior to the Formation of the Contact Group

Before the Second World War, Canada had not really been involved in the issue of Namibia. When it was involved, however, it was usually in a mediating or bridging capacity. An example of this occurred at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference when Canada helped persuade South Africa to accept the League of Nations Mandate over South West Africa as opposed to annexing the territory. Canada's bridging role continued on after the Second World War when the problem of Namibia's future began to become an international issue. However, between 1945 and 1977, Canadian interest in Namibian independence was low. Canada participated in the UN General Assembly votes which rejected the incorporation of Namibia into South Africa and formally ended the South Africa's mandate over the territory. Canada also participated on the UN General Assembly ad hoc Committee for South West Africa. However, Canada did not support the Committee's recommendation that the United Nations establish a Council to administer the territory. The Canadian government also refused to support the General Assembly's granting of special status to SWAPO, for the reasons already mentioned. While the Canadian government was participating in these votes, that was about the extent of the involvement as Canada was consistent in its refusal to become engaged in any action beyond merely voting.

Outside of the UN, Canada was also largely uninvolved in this issue. In the Commonwealth, Canada had helped to make South Africa withdraw its re-

application for membership in 1961. The opposition was due to South Africa's racial laws which, at that time, applied to Namibia as well. However, even during that brief moment of public condemnation, Canada and the Commonwealth tended not to deal with the question of Namibia except as a sub-issue within the South Africa issue.

Therefore, from the end of the Second World War until Canada assumed its seat on the UN Security Council in 1977, Canada did little to help or hinder Namibian independence. However, the refusal of most Western states to support the UN Council for Namibia allowed South Africa to disregard the Council with virtual impunity. The reluctance of Western countries to impose sanctions also allowed South Africa to weather the verbal assaults launched against it by the independent African and Asian countries. Thus, when discussing this period, it is fair to say that the Canadian attitude on the issue was very much in line with that adopted by its friends and allies; in other words, one which was not very active or displayed great interest. Although this does not mean that the policy which was adopted necessarily meets the expectations raised in Chapter Two, it is understandable when one considers that Canada was quite active in other issues and conflict resolution worldwide (e.g., Vietnam, Korea, Western Europe, etc.). As well, the fact that Canada did not choose to operate on its own is consistent with the middle power theory.

The Contact Group

Once Canada joined the UN Security Council in 1977 and the Contact Group was formed, Canada's involvement began to increase dramatically. It was at this time that Canada begin to act as a mediator, bridging the gap between the U.S., the Front Line States, and SWAPO. Of course, the Western initiative was begun by the Americans and the Canadians were involved mainly because of their seat on the UNSC. As well, as has already been mentioned, it is hard to single out the efforts and achievements of any particular country in a multilateral effort such as the Contact Group. However, this problem is actually the result of one of the middle power characteristics which was noted in Chapter Two; the preference for pursuing foreign policy goals through multilateral means. The use of a multilateral negotiating effort not only allowed for the participation of Canada, but it also allowed the Canadian government to take part without any great fear of being dominated by the United States.

Participation in the Contact Group also allowed Canada to act as mediating power. Canada was included in the Group partly because of its relations with the other participants. As has already been noted, Canada had passable, if not good, relations with all of the other actors. Since Canada had decent relations with South Africa, and both shared some similar history,[329] it

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[329]For example, both Canada and South Africa were former British colonies, had fought together during both World Wars, had worked together to help found the United Nations, and had inherited some aspects of British culture.

was not surprising that Canada proved to be acceptable to that side in the dispute. Of course, this is not to imply that Canadian participation was not regarded with some element of misgiving by the South Africans; Canada had not been regarded as a ally of South Africa since 1961. On the other side of the dispute, Canada's connections with other African states, many of whom were also members of the Commonwealth, proved to be very beneficial when it was necessary to persuade the governments of these countries to allow the Contact Group to start and then continue its efforts. Without the links to these countries, it is doubtful if the initiative could even have begun.[330] Once begun, the process could have easily lost its legitimacy if African countries had rejected it. The fact that they did not is attributable to both the efforts of the members of the Contact Group and to the desire of the African countries, especially the Front Line States, to reach a peaceful solution.

Canada's interest in acting as a part of the mediating body can also be viewed as a manifestation of another middle power role. This is that of separating powers involved in a conflict. By promoting the Contact Group, Canada helped to reduce the on-going hostilities between South Africa and its neighbours. This was because the Group represented a potentially viable, non-violent solution to the Namibia issue. While not evidently likely in 1977, it was possible that further lack of progress in southern Africa may have resulted in

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[330]Barton, 2-3.

increased violence by the national liberation movements (e.g., SWAPO and the African National Congress) and their allies in the region. As it was, the African countries and national liberation movements continued to place pressure on South Africa through their support for the armed struggle, but they also pressed for *negotiated* change through the Contact Group and the Lancaster House talks on Rhodesia-Zimbabwe.

Overall, Canada's participation in the Contact Group falls within what Bernard Wood described as "good multilateral citizenship." Canada had, largely by a coincidence of timing, been allowed to take part in a process which would allow Canada to: help resolve a conflict; act as a mediator; and do both of these while operating within a multilateral environment. All of these roles are consistent with the expectations raised of a middle power's foreign policy in Chapter Two. Even the criticisms of Canada's participation in the Group can be seen as falling within the parameters established earlier as much of the criticism is based on the accusation that Canada only joined the Group in order to improve its status. Status-seeking was one of the negative roles that were mentioned earlier.

Canada and the Period of Constructive Engagement

After Ronald Reagan was elected president of the United States, the Contact Group's efforts to mediate the Namibia issue encountered

insurmountable problems as both the United States and the U.K. became increasingly unwilling to pursue the Group's efforts any further. Once the U.S. had opted to employ an unilateral policy regarding southern African, including the Namibia issue, the Group became marginalised. Canada's reaction to this process proved typical of a middle power in that Canada continued to pursue the matter through multilateral means, although the Canadian government recognised that the chances of success were limited due to the super power interests that were seen to be at stake. An example of this was Canada's reluctance to allow the Contact Group to end. Along with the other three members, Canada continued to advocate that the Group had the potential to play a further part in the process at some future point. The Canadian government was not alone in this view,[331] and its commitment to the idea and past achievements of the Group showed that Canada was not prepared to abandon multilateral means in regards to Namibia. Of course, adopting this view also allowed Canada and the other members of the Group to abstain on all votes at the UN which dealt with Namibia on the grounds that they had to remain impartial. Not surprisingly, this opened them up to criticism for not taking the tough line with South Africa that they had promised to do.

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[331]A Canadian academic mentioned that some of the Front Line States had opposed the idea of Canada withdrawing from the Contact Group. Interview with the author, May 1991.

Another element of Canada's reaction was to try to find a new means of promoting the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978). A new venue was found in the Commonwealth and, after 1984, Canada helped to lead the way within the Commonwealth on southern African issues. Canada's leadership and influence was recognised through the inclusion of Canadian representatives on the Eminent Persons Group (Archbishop Edward Scott), the 1986 London Review Meeting (Prime Minister Mulroney), and the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa (chaired by the Secretary of State for External Affairs). Canada vigorously pursued questions of southern Africa, including Namibia, through the Commonwealth and helped to ensure that the demands of the majority of members did not greatly exceed what the minority (i.e., Great Britain) were prepared to accept.[332]

Although Canada did not ignore the issues surrounding southern Africa after the Contact Group effectively ended, Canada did adopt a posture which allowed it to pursue the Namibian question at a lower level of intensity. In part this was due to a desire not to overly criticise American policy and, at the same time, in recognition that there was little Canada could do at that point. Once Namibian independence became a super power issue, in this case with the super powers acting through proxies, the limited resources that Canada could or would

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[332]Canada's balancing act at the various Commonwealth meetings provides another example of it playing a mediating role.

devote to the issue were negligible. One reason why Canada had supported the Contact Group and its decision not to allow the imposition of sanctions on South Africa was the recognition that Canada did not have the necessary economic leverage to take effective economic action against South Africa on its own. Certainly Canada could have imposed unilateral sanctions, but without the participation of South Africa's major trading partners, the U.S., the U.K., Japan, and West Germany, the effect of these sanctions was presumed to be insignificant. This is the fundamental reason why unilateral sanctions were not considered as a serious option by Canada.

Canada's inability to promote movement forward on the question of Namibian independence during this period can be directly attributed to the desire to play a constructive middle power role. By seeking co-operation (i.e., negotiations) rather than confrontation (i.e., sanctions) with both its allies and South Africa, the Canadian government was attempting to play the role of a "helpful fixer." Overall, this attitude and the recognition that there was little that Canada could do *vis-à-vis* Namibia until the United States either abandoned constructive engagement or achieved a breakthrough meant that Canada, largely of its own volition, was "left off the team" until after a settlement was arrived at.

The Transition Phase

Once that solution had been found however, Canada reached another peak of involvement in the Namibian question. In doing so, the Canadian government also provided another example of the functional principle referred to in Chapter Two. Canadian involvement in UNTAG was primarily one of supplying people and technical assistance. This is most obviously the case with the Canadian military contingent of logistics personnel. The argument also applies to the temporary assignment of computer expert Harry Neufeld, the members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the fingerprint experts, and the election monitors. In each of these areas, Canada had expressed willingness to provide assistance and the government's response to UN requests for help was rapid. All of the tasks which Canadian personnel participated in were areas in which they had significant expertise.

In addition to the personnel contributed, the other types and manner of aid which were contributed also follow the functional principle. For instance, the 4,000 ballot boxes were contributed in part because Elections Canada had these, but no longer had a use for them.[333] It was also anticipated that the boxes would, due to their metal construction and country of origin, help reassure Namibians and international observers alike of the integrity of the ballots.

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[333]Elections Canada had replaced the heavy metal boxes with a new lighter box and was storing the old-style ballot boxes until they could be disposed of.

Canada's financial contribution, although by no means huge, was significant, as was the fact that Canada advanced the UN most of its assessment for UNTAG even before the budget had been finalised. Canada also provided funds for the UNHCR's repatriation of Namibian refugees and for some small aid projects during the transition phase. Significantly, the majority of the aid money was channelled through Canadian NGOs operating in Namibia. As some of those groups had been operation in Namibia for a number of years, they had the expertise, contacts, and knowledge to apply the aid money more effectively than either the Observer Mission or the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) could have done on their own.[334]

Canada's activities on the UN Security Council and within the Commonwealth during the transition phase continued to follow the path of a middle power. In both forums, Canada helped to find compromise positions on issues such as the size of UNTAG and its budget, the demobilisation of *Koevoet*, and how the elections were administered. Given the tendency of African states to demand a great deal on issues of this kind, and the reluctance of the permanent members of the Security Council to fund all of those demands, it proved necessary to meet the concerns raised by the members of the Non-Aligned Movement and Front Line States without overly antagonising the industrialised nations, which, of

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[334]The Observer Mission distributed some $500,000 of aid funds on its own.

course, Canada is one of. Canada had the established relations with these groups which made it possible for Canada to function as a "bridge" between them.

Conclusion

At this point, it should be clear that Canada's participation in the Namibian independence process does indeed confirm the conceptualisation of Canada as a middle power. Although Canada's involvement was not always at a consistently high level, it was consistent in its attempt to enable a peaceful transition to majority rule. During the thirteen years that Canada was directly involved in the issue, Canada continued to push for the implementation of a peaceful resolution and, along with the rest of the world, was rewarded in 1990 with the independence of Namibia.

Acting as a middle power provided Canada with both opportunities and responsibilities. Canadian governments were quick to pursue the opportunities and this led to Canada's roles within the Contact Group, the Commonwealth, and UNTAG. However, those same governments were not as eager to embrace the responsibilities. Canada's record regarding the implementation of meaningful sanctions, while better than some other noteworthy industrialised countries, is nonetheless less than the rhetoric used by Canadian politicians would have led one to expect. This is more of a case of exaggeration than anything, but the

differences between what the government of the day was preaching and what it actually was able or chose to do is a matter of some controversy even today.[335]

Despite the criticism, however, the fact that Canada played a significant role in the Contact Group is undoubtable. According to a variety of sources, including officials of the Canadian government, Canadian non-governmental organisations, the United Nations, and other interested organisations, Canada was an important actor in the process which resulted in Namibia's independence. However, Canada was certainly not an all-important actor. If the question "Was Namibian independence possible *without* Canadian participation?" is asked, then the answer would have to be an unequivocal "Yes." However, if one asked "Would the independence of Namibia have followed another course if Canada had not participated?", the answer would once again be "Yes." As an official of a Canadian non-governmental organisation said during an interview early in 1991, Canada had functioned as a "significant secondary actor" in regards to the Namibian issue since 1977.[336]

Without Canadian involvement, the basis for the transition phase, the settlement proposal of the Contact Group (S/12636), would not have been the same. Without Canada's credentials, the initiative of the Western Five may not

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[335]For example, see Brown, 222-3.

[336]Interview with the author, May 1991.

even have been accepted by the African countries, although such a rejection would probably not have stopped the initiative. As the settlement proposal proved to be the foundation for all the negotiations which followed, the contribution of the members of the Group cannot be underestimated. Although Canadian involvement in and co-operation with UNTAG may not have guaranteed UNTAG's success, the involvement and co-operation did help to solve some problems and to alleviate many others.

Of the members of the Contact Group, the one which deserves the most credit and the most blame is undoubtedly the United States. Without the adoption of constructive engagement, it is conceivable that the South Africans would have been under considerably greater international pressure to withdraw from Namibia. As it was, resolution of the issue had to wait until domestic pressure from within the Republic of South Africa, along with changes in the international environment, demanded an end to the occupation of Namibia. During all of this time however, the American government remained committed to reaching a settlement. For the Reagan administration, the question had become under what terms would such a settlement be reached. That was answered in 1988 when the Cuban-Angolan-South African agreements were reached under the U.S.-brokered negotiations. Until then, the United States was at once, paradoxically, the greatest obstacle to and the greatest facilitator of Namibian independence.

Once the international hurdles had been cleared, it soon became obvious that the people who were going to make the process work were not the Americans, the Angolans, the Canadians, the South Africans, or even the United Nations and its personnel, it was the people of Namibia. After twelve long years of waiting, the independence process began and the Namibians were the ones with the most to gain and the most to lose. In the end, they won due to their willingness to preserver through the hardships of the election process and their willingness to co-operate with each other regardless of the past. The Constitution adopted by the Constituent Assembly has become a model for other nations to follow. The spirit of give and take that was adopted by the Assembly during the drafting of the Constitution continued on past independence and clearly demonstrated that all of the inhabitants of Namibia, regardless of colour, were prepared for the independence that they had been waiting for so long.

What independence also helped to show is that it is the responsibility of the developed, industrialised countries which have already achieved their independence to help people who still struggle for freedom to achieve it. Although Namibians are legally independent, their economic dependence on South Africa continues and it is staggering. Along with the rest of the Front Line States, Namibia's economy is heavily integrated with that of South Africa. While Namibia has great potential wealth, it will take time and money to develop these resources. That money will most likely come from South Africa unless the

industrialised countries, such as Canada, are prepared to fund the necessary development projects. So far, the response from the North has been less than gratifying and the immediate prospects for Namibia, while not grim, are not exactly encouraging either. As none of the roles for middle powers mentioned earlier makes specific note of development assistance, this situation will hopefully raise more reflection on the potential leadership of middle powers in this area. As for Namibia, while formal independence has been achieved, the process leading to real independence from South Africa is just beginning.

Appendix I: UN Security Council Resolution 385 (1976)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1885th meeting, on 30 January 1976

The Security Council,

Having heard the statement by the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia,

Having considered the statement by Mr Moses M Garoeb, Administrative-Secretary of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO),

Recalling General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, which terminated South Africa's mandate over the Territory of Namibia, and resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967, which established a United Nations Council for Namibia, as well as all other subsequent resolutions on Namibia, in particular resolution 3285 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974 and resolution 3399 (XXX) of 26 November 1975,

Recalling Security Council resolutions 245 (1968) of 25 January and 246 (1968) of 14 March 1968, 264 (1969) of 20 March and 269 (1969) of 12 August 1969, 276 (1970) of 30 January, 282 (1970) of 23 July, 283 (1970) and 284 (1970) of 29 July 1970, 300 (1971) of 12 October and 301 (1971) of 20 October 1971, 310 (1972) of 4 February 1972 and 366 (1974) of 17 December 1974,

Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 that South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its presence from the Territory,

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia,

Concerned at South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia and its persistent refusal to comply with resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971,

Gravely concerned at South Africa's brutal repression of the Namibian people and its persistent violation of their human rights, as well as its efforts to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia, and its aggressive military build-up in the area,

Strongly deploring the militarization of Namibia by the illegal occupation régime of South Africa,

1. *Condemns* the continued illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia by South Africa;
2. *Condemns* the illegal and arbitrary application by South Africa of racially discriminatory and repressive laws and practices in Namibia;
3. *Condemns* the South African military build-up in Namibia and any utilization of the Territory as a base for attacks on neighbouring countries;
4. *Demands* that South Africa put an end forthwith to its policy of bantustans and the so-called homelands aimed at violating the national unity and the territorial integrity of Namibia;

5. *Further condemns* South Africa's failure to comply with the terms of Security Council resolution 366 (1974) of 17 December 1974;
6. *Further condemns* all attempts by South Africa calculated to evade the clear demand of the United Nations for the holding of free elections under United Nations supervision and control in Namibia;
7. *Declares* that in order that the people of Namibia be enabled to freely determine their own future, it is imperative that free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations be held for the whole of Namibia as one political entity;
8. *Further declares* that in determining the date, timetable and modalities for the elections in accordance with paragraph 7 above, there shall be adequate time to be decided upon by the Security Council for the purposes of enabling the United Nations to establish the necessary machinery within Namibia to supervise and control such elections, as well as to enable the people of Namibia to organize politically for the purpose of such election;
9. *Demands* that South Africa urgently make a solemn declaration accepting the foregoing provisions for the holding of free elections in Namibia under United Nations supervision and control, undertaking to comply with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations and with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 in regard to Namibia, and recognizing the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia as a nation;
10. *Reiterates its demand* that South Africa take the necessary steps to effect the withdrawal, in accordance with resolutions 264 (1969), 269 (1969) and 366 (1974), of its illegal administration maintained in Namibia and to transfer power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations;
11. *Demands* again that South Africa, pending the transfer of powers provided for in the preceding paragraph:
    (a) Comply fully in spirit and in practice with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
    (b) Release all Namibian political prisoners, including all those imprisoned or detained in connection with offenses under so-called internal security laws, whether such Namibians have been charged or tried or are held without charge and whether held in Namibia or South Africa;
    (c) Abolish the application in Namibia of all racially discriminatory and politically repressive laws and practices, particularly bantustans and homelands;
    (d) Accord unconditionally to all Namibians currently in exile for political reasons full facilities for return to their country without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment;

12. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter and to meet on or before 31 August 1976 for the purpose of reviewing South Africa's compliance with the terms of this resolution and, in the event of non-compliance by South Africa, for the purpose of considering the appropriate measures to be taken under the Charter.

Appendix II: UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2087th meeting on 29 September 1978

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 385 (1976), and 431 (1978), and 432 (1978),

Having considered the reports submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 432 (1978) (S/12827) and his explanatory statement made in the Security Council on 29 September 1978 (S/12869),

Taking note of the relevant communications from the Government of South Africa addressed to the Secretary-General,

Taking note also of the letter dated 8 September 1978 from the President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) addressed to the Secretary-General (S/12841),

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia:

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General (S/12827) for the implementation of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation (S/12636) and his explanatory statement (S/12869);
2. *Reiterates* that its objective is the withdrawal of South Africa's illegal administration of Namibia and the transfer of power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations in accordance with resolution 385 (1978);
3. Decides to establish under its authority a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in accordance with the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General for a period of up to 12 months in order to assist his Special Representative to carry out the mandate conferred upon him by paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 431 (1978), namely, to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations;
4. Welcomes SWAPO's preparedness to co-operate in the implementation of the Secretary-General's report, including its expressed readiness to sign and observe the cease-fire provisions as manifested in the letter from the President of SWAPO dated 8 September 1978 (S/12841);
5. Calls on South Africa forthwith to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution;
6. Declares that all unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral process, including unilateral registration of voters, or transfer of power, in contravention of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and this resolution are null and void;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council no later than 23 October 1978 on the implementation of this resolution.

Appendix III: Composition Of UNTAG By Nationality

Nationality	Civilian Staff	Military Personnel
Algeria	1	0
Antigua	2	0
Australia	4	304
Austria	7	0
Bahamas	1	0
Bangladesh	0	25
Barbados	6	0
Belgium	1	0
Belize	1	0
Brazil	1	0
Cameroon	1	0
Canada	**3**	**301**
Chile	6	0
China	1	0
Colombia	2	0
Cuba	1	0
Cyprus	1	0
Czechoslovakia	0	20
Denmark	2	132
Ecuador	1	0
Egypt	3	0
Ethiopia	9	0
Finland	3	887
France	12	0
Gambia	3	0
Germany, West	7	0
Ghana	10	0
Greece	2	0
Guatemala	1	0
Guyana	3	0
Haiti	1	0
Iceland	1	0
India	4	21
Indonesia	2	0
Iraq	2	0
Ireland	5	20
Italy	5	94
Ivory Coast	1	0
Jamaica	10	0
Kenya	8	889

Nationality	Civilian Staff	Military Personnel
Lesotho	1	0
Libya	1	0
Malaysia	0	889
Mexico	1	0
Netherlands	2	0
New Zealand	2	0
Nigeria	3	0
Norway	3	0
Pakistan	1	20
Palestine	2	0
Panama	0	19
Peru	4	20
Philippines	13	0
Poland	0	373
Romania	1	0
Senegal	2	0
Sierra Leone	2	0
Spain	2	85
Sudan	1	20
Sweden	5	0
Switzerland	2	149
Syria	1	0
Tanzania	2	0
Thailand	6	0
Togo	0	25
Trinidad and Tobago	7	0
Tunisia	1	0
Turkey	1	0
Uganda	7	0
UK	28	175
Uruguay	1	0
USA	28	0
USSR	9	0
Yemen	1	0
Yugoslavia	0	25
Zaire	2	0
Zambia	1	0
Zimbabwe	2	0
TOTALS:	280	4493

NOTE: Finland, Kenya, and Malaysia supplied the three enlarged battalions for UNTAG.

Source: UNTAG, press releases, (Windhoek, Namibia: n.p., 9 May and 11 May 1989).

Appendix IV: 1989 Namibian Election Results

Party	Votes	Seats
Aksie Christelik Nasionaal (ACN)	23,728	3
Christian Democratic Action for Social Justice (CDA)	2,495	0
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) Van Namibie	191,532	21
Federal Convention of Namibia (FCN)	10,452	1
Namibia National Democratic Party (NNDP)	984	0
Namibia National Front (NNF)	5,344	1
South West Africa People's Organisation - Democrats (SWAPO-D)	3,161	0
South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO)	384,567	41
United Democratic Front of Namibia (UDF)	37,874	4
TOTAL	670,830	72

Source: United Nations, United Nations Transition Assistance Group, "Implementation of the United Nations Plan for Namibia," (Feburary 1990), 38.

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