

The Kashmir Dispute

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THE State of Jammu and Kashmir, as known in modern times, came into existence in 1846, after the First Sikh War, when, by the Treaty of Amritsar, the East India Company sold the Kashmir territory to Gulab Singh, the Dogra chief of Jammu. Of this transaction, the British historians, Thompson and Garratt, have written:—

“Yet this selling of a Muslim people to a family extravagantly Hindu has resulted in rebellion even in our post-War world, which British power had to suppress; and the scandal of the Kashmir transfer was felt even at the time, in an uneasy, subconscious fashion.” (*Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India*, Second Edition, 1935)

Concerning Gulab Singh, Sir Herbert Edwardes, who was frequently with him, said: “He was the worst native I ever came in contact with, a bad king, a miser and a liar.” This may have been a reason for the opposed entry into his new dominions when Sheikh Imamuddin, the Muslim governor of Srinagar, rebelled and defeated Gulab Singh’s troops. As a measure of help in establishing himself, the East India Company lent Gulab Singh some British officers, including the celebrated John Nicholson, then a young lieutenant.

Thus began the State’s ill-starred career which has culminated in a bitter quarrel between India and Pakistan, rendering friendship between them impossible until a settlement is found.

KASHMIR is a land of mountain and river, situated high in the Himalayas and bordering on China, Tibet, India and Pakistan. It is nearly 85,000 square miles in extent and it has a population of some 4,000,000 according to the census of 1941. Of these 4,000,000 people, seventy-five per cent are Mussulmans, the remainder are principally Hindus and Buddhists. The Hindu population is concentrated in Jammu Province where it formed about forty-five per cent of the inhabitants, and it follows that in the three provinces of Kashmir, Poonch and the Frontier Districts, the proportion of Hindus is negligible. Since the partition, and the events to be described later, the communal proportions, especially in Jammu, have been disturbed owing to the forced and voluntary migrations of Muslims and the resettlement of Sikhs and Hindus. Nevertheless, the population of the State remains predominantly Muslim.

The communications of Kashmir, that is, the rivers and roads, lie in a south-westerly direction, towards and into Pakistan. The only natural route into India is by way of the Banihal Pass which, for half the year, is buried under snow.

The principal revenue is derived from timber, the natural and cheapest outlets for which are the rivers flowing into Pakistan. In addition, Kashmir produces crude herbs and drugs, fruits and vegetables, woollen textiles, wood-carvings and some precious stones. The tourist trade is important

and, constituting a further source of income, it has long been the custom for Kashmiris to migrate to other parts of India, either temporarily or permanently, seeking employment from the earnings of which they send money to support their families in Kashmir. This migration was particularly true of Muslim Kashmiris of all classes for whom the future, as will be seen, held little promise and this accounts for the especially sincere and sentimental interest of many Muslims in the destiny of Kashmir and its people.

The Dogras are a clan of the Rajputs, a military caste of Hindus and in Kashmir their rule was absolute. All wealth and power were concentrated in their hands and in the hands of their administrators, the Kashmiri (Hindu) pundits, a class of men possessing a high level of ability and from whom Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru's ancestors were drawn some two hundred years ago. In the entire history of the State there has never once been a Muslim Prime Minister, apart from the present holder of that office, Sheikh Abdullah, and the circumstances which have raised him to this degree of eminence form part of the dispute itself. The State Army was composed almost entirely of Dogras and the civil services were confined, in similar degree, to Hindus. In such circumstances, it is not surprising to learn that the Muslim majority was dissatisfied and restless and that the movement for a more liberal policy acquired a communal character which it has retained.

Mr. Nehru has written that "in Kashmir, a long continued process of conversion to Islam had resulted in 95% of the population becoming Moslems, though they retained many of their old Hindu customs. In the middle nineteenth century, the Hindu ruler found that very large numbers of these people were anxious or willing to return en bloc to Hinduism. He sent a deputation to the pundits of Benares inquiring if this could be done. The pundits refused to countenance any such change and there the matter ended." (*The Discovery of India* — 1946) Considering the situation of the Muslims in the State, it is a question whether the desire

for re-conversion was due so much to spiritual longing as to material advantage.

In 1924, the Viceroy of India paid a visit to Kashmir and the discontented Muslims presented to him a memorial setting out their grievances and the redress they sought. In 1931, the agitation crystallised into the All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. The work of this organisation led to disturbances in the State and the intervention of the British Government which appointed three successive Commissions to enquire into the causes of unrest, as a result of which reforms were instituted and a Legislature was set up on an elective basis.

During the years which followed, it was apparent that the ruler of the State disliked this measure of democracy and clashes between him and the popular parties were frequent. Meanwhile, Sheikh Abdullah, who did not accept the two-nation theory (i.e. the basis of the Muslim League's claim for a separate homeland namely, Pakistan) had formed his own party, the Kashmir National Conference. In view of the events which are now overtaking him in Jammu, it is a matter of significance and interest that Sheikh Abdullah rejected any form of communal thinking. Although he was at difference with the Kashmir Muslim Party, Sheikh Abdullah was in agreement with them in his opposition to the Maharaja who arrested him during World War II. On that occasion, Mr. Nehru hastened at once to Kashmir to conduct his defence, but at the border he was refused entry and Sheikh Abdullah remained in jail.

IN June, 1947, the British Government announced the transfer of its power in the sub-continent to two new Dominions, one of which would be India, and the other, Pakistan, to be formed out of predominantly Muslim areas in British India. Within certain limitations, the Indian States were given the right to accede to either Dominion, or otherwise remain independent. In the ensuing days of that month, Mr. Gandhi, Mr. Nehru, Mr. Acharya and Mrs. Kripalani, all leaders of Congress, visited Kashmir and met Sheikh

Abdullah in his prison cell. Leaders of the RSS (a militant Hindu body, now declared illegal in India) also went to Kashmir and met similar organisations in the State.

At the same time, the Muslims of Kashmir were not inactive and the Kashmir Muslim Conference, which was represented in the Kashmir Legislature, debated a resolution, proposed by its Working Committee, that Kashmir should declare itself independent. The proposal was lost in favour of a counter-resolution favouring accession to Pakistan. The wisdom of this act may be doubted on several grounds, but it is clear evidence of the sentiments of politically organised Muslims in Kashmir prior to the actual partition.

In August 1947, at the moment of partition and independence, the Maharaja of Kashmir entered into a "Standstill Agreement" with Pakistan by which Pakistan became responsible for Kashmir's Defence, Communications and Foreign Affairs. The immediate purpose of this agreement was to secure for Kashmir its essential supplies and its communications with the outside world. Meanwhile, communal disorders had broken out in India itself; mass migrations were in train and scenes of misery and carnage were enacted throughout the Punjab and elsewhere. The contagion of violence spread to Kashmir and attacks on Muslims began. The Kashmiris are not, to use the words of Sir Owen Dixon, a resolute people, but in Poonch there are many veterans of the old Indian Army and they put up a resistance which became successful. Collaborating with the Kashmir Muslim Conference an Azad (free) Kashmir Government was set up and from defence the Muslims passed to attack. Kashmir resounded with the noise of battle and the Muslims gained the upper hand.

Such was the situation when, on 29 September, Sheikh Abdullah was released from prison without having completed the term to which he had been sentenced and by 10 October he arrived in Delhi. On 18 October, the Prime Minister of Kashmir announced that if lawlessness did not cease, he would be obliged to call for outside assistance and from the words

of Mr. Nehru it appears that both Sheikh Abdullah and the Prime Minister of the State addressed an appeal for the help of the Government of India, together with a request to be allowed to accede. On or about 23 October, Pathan tribesmen entered Kashmir in aid of their Muslim co-religionists and on 24 October the request for help was considered by the Defence Committee of the Indian Government. On 25 October the Maharaja was obliged to leave his capital and the day following he addressed a letter to Lord Mountbatten, the Governor-General of India, again appealing for assistance, requesting accession to India, and adding that it had been decided to set up an interim Government, in which Sheikh Abdullah should work with his Prime Minister. The matter was discussed once more in the Defence Committee and on 27 October Lord Mountbatten signified his acceptance of the accession, expressed gratification that Sheikh Abdullah would be associated with the Maharaja's Government and added that the accession was conditional upon its confirmation by the people of Kashmir when order had been restored. The same morning, Indian air-borne troops arrived at Srinagar and went into action.

In November, Mr. Jinnah met Lord Mountbatten and made proposals whereby the two Governors-General should be empowered to stop hostilities in Kashmir and hold a plebiscite in the State under their joint supervision. Lord Mountbatten undertook to convey these proposals to the Indian Government, but no reply was ever made to them. It may be the Indian Government felt that Lord Mountbatten might be at a disadvantage in dealing with the inexorable and brilliantly-equipped Mr. Jinnah, or perhaps they were more than satisfied to see that the Indian forces had recovered the initiative and were driving their opponents out of the Kashmir Valley. At all events, the failure of the Azad Kashmir troops to hold or destroy the Srinagar airfield was a blunder from which their fortunes never recovered.

The entry of the Pathan tribesmen into Kashmir was considered by Sir Owen Dixon, the United Nations Representative,

to have been inconsistent with international law and, furthermore, in May 1948, Pakistan sent its own troops into the contest, an action which Sir Owen stated he was also ready to hold as being similarly inconsistent. The despatch of Pakistan troops followed upon an appreciation prepared by Sir Douglas Gracey, then Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, as well as from the pressure of public opinion which foresaw that India's final offensive would destroy all opposition as well as all who were involved in it. The entry of Pakistan troops made it difficult, if not impossible, for India to force a military decision and there is reason for thinking that, at one time, Pakistan could have inflicted severe reverses had the Government not restrained its military commanders.

Meanwhile, by reason of the measures of help given to the Azad Kashmir forces, India appealed to the United Nations in January 1948, asking that Pakistan be declared an aggressor. Pakistan joined issue at once and, as the world knows, the argument has continued, without decision, for five years. Admittedly a cease-fire line has been fixed, United Nations observers have been posted, a plebiscite administrator has been appointed, two United Nations Representatives have wrestled with the problem as well as with the parties to the quarrel and several resolutions of the Security Council have been passed. Thus, while it cannot be said that the UN has been inactive, Pakistan has not been declared an aggressor, nor exonerated from the charge, and there has been no plebiscite in Kashmir.

ON the facts, a number of conflicting claims have been made both by Pakistan and India. India says that Pakistan is an aggressor who cannot be treated as having the same standing in the dispute as that of India and it is for this reason that India refuses arbitration with Pakistan. India also claims that the accession was legally accomplished under the lawful rule of the Maharaja and therefore Kashmir is now a part of the Indian Federation. India has in fact claimed that

what takes place in Kashmir is a matter of domestic concern only, but a plebiscite is conceded. India does not recognize the Government of Azad Kashmir and declares that the presence of Indian troops in Kashmir is indispensable to the security of the State and the people.

On the same facts, Pakistan claims that the accession to India was fraudulently induced and that it followed from a conspiracy hatched between the time that the British relinquished power and the partition was completed. Pakistan further claims that the people of Kashmir had, and have, the sole right to determine their own future and that the process of that determination, namely, a plebiscite, should be conducted as soon as possible under impartial supervision which, in Pakistan's view, only the United Nations could assure. Pakistan does not believe that any plebiscite supervised by India or the present Kashmir Constituent Assembly can be regarded as either fair or free. As to the disturbances which began in Poonch and spread throughout Kashmir, Pakistan claims that these were provoked by the Maharaja himself who initiated violence against his own Muslim subjects shortly after the partition of August 1947.

Without lightly dismissing the labours of the Security Council, it is not proposed to follow the Council in detail throughout the immense verbiage that has characterised its deliberations. No doubt, the Council has secured what its orators call "a large area of agreement", but on the initial vital issue it has scarcely brought the parties to terms. This issue is that of demilitarization, i.e. the withdrawal of troops on both sides, so as to make the plebiscite possible. A United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan was set up and in consequence of its resolutions of 1948 and 1949, India and Pakistan have agreed that a plebiscite shall be held and that the troops in Kashmir shall be withdrawn. It has been settled that all tribesmen, as well as the Pakistan troops, shall evacuate Kashmir and that India shall maintain in Kashmir only sufficient troops to maintain security. The Plebiscite Administrator is to decide the question of disposition of the troops remaining, which

includes the Azad Kashmir forces who belong to the soil.

Following a resolution of the Security Council of 1950, Sir Owen Dixon was appointed to assist India and Pakistan in preparing a formula for demilitarization. In his report, Sir Owen concluded that the existing Government of Sheikh Abdullah was not likely to assure an impartial plebiscite and that India could not be brought to agreement on the essential question. India rejected Sir Owen's report which was also prematurely criticized in Pakistan and the attacks from both sides are probably a fair testimonial to its accuracy and impartiality. However, Sir Owen's recommendation that the parties be left to settle the problem between themselves was generally unacceptable so that the UN stands charged with the responsibility of solving the dispute as well as deciding justly what the future of Kashmir is to be. The consequence of the Dixon report was a reference back to the Security Council which debated the matter early in 1951 and passed a further resolution appointing a second Representative who was to proceed to the sub-continent in order to secure demilitarization. The same resolution called on the parties to submit to arbitration if necessary.

India rejected this resolution and when Dr. Frank Graham was appointed by virtue of it, the Indian Government stated that while Dr. Graham was welcome to visit Delhi, there was nothing to discuss with reference to Kashmir unless it be Pakistan's aggression.

Dr. Graham laboured mightily and perhaps extended the "area of agreement", but in the end he failed. In March 1952, when the time came to report to the Security Council, he asked for more time which was given, but on the question of demilitarization, India would not give way. General Devers proposed a formula which Pakistan accepted, but not India, and Dr. Graham dropped both the formula and General Devers. Nevertheless, despite Dr. Graham's failure, the parties were persuaded to discuss the matter further at Geneva in August 1952, when Sir Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, met the late Mr. Ayyengar, a Minister of

the Indian Government. These talks were abortive since it was apparent that Mr. Ayyengar had no authority to conclude agreement on any issue and as soon as a point reached the stage of decision, Mr. Ayyengar was obliged to refer back to Mr. Nehru.

Three months later, the Security Council resolved that the parties be called upon to settle their difference and this led to a further debate in the Council to settle the question of the troops permitted to remain in Kashmir. Out of this, developed an interesting situation in which the Indian representative claimed that so long as the Azad Kashmir forces were in being, it would be necessary for India to maintain not less than 28,000 men in the State, but so soon as the Azad Kashmir forces were disbanded, the Indian Army units could be reduced by 7,000. Pakistan at once accepted the higher figure and proposed that the parties should proceed to the Truce Agreement and the plebiscite, the question of the disposal of the Azad forces being left to the Plebiscite Administrator as provided in a resolution of the UN Commission. India rejected the proposal and, among the grounds of rejection elaborated by Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit, it was asserted that Pakistan's suggestion was disingenuous for the reason that the Azad Kashmir forces amounted to about 30,000 men.

Consequent upon this debate, the parties met again in Geneva early in 1953 for discussions with Dr. Graham, but although Dr. Graham's report on this meeting is awaited, it does not appear that any tangible progress was made.

Evidence is not wanting that, in the negotiations at Lake Success and elsewhere, India has shown a certain intractableness which has made progress difficult. Hence it is that several proposals approved by the Security Council that might take the problem nearer to a conclusion have been rejected by India. The proposal for arbitration, endorsed by President Truman and Mr. Attlee; the proposals for demilitarization suggested by General McNaughton; the proposals of Sir Owen Dixon; the proposals of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers; the proposal of the Brazilian

Ambassador and the resolution of the Security Council of March 1951—all have been received by India with disapproval. The reason for this has been stated on more than one occasion by Mr. Nehru when he has pointed out that the Security Council has blundered, not once, but several times. Doubtless India is not at fault if it refuses to be led into error, but the possibility remains that it is India which is wrong.

DURING all these years, events in KASHMIR have not stood still. In 1951, the National Conference, Sheikh Abdullah's party, resolved that a Constituent Assembly should be convened and for this purpose elections were held. The move was greatly criticised as being an interference with the status quo, prejudicial to an impartial settlement of Kashmir's destiny. Nevertheless, the elections proceeded and resulted in the confirmation of Sheikh Abdullah's power and he felt strong enough to negotiate with India on the basis of a speech which he made in April 1952, that Kashmir's accession to India must be of a restricted nature so long as communalism has a foothold on the soil. He claimed that the accession must be limited to Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications, but in all other matters Kashmir must be independent. The speech was welcomed in Pakistan and Mr. Nehru confessed he was not happy about it. However, Sheikh Abdullah temporized by making a further speech in which he warned others not to read in his words what was not, in fact, there. In the June following, Mr. Nehru stated: "We proceed and the Kashmir Government proceeds on the basis of Kashmir being a constituent unit of the Federation or Union of India with all the consequences that flow from it."

A few weeks later, agreement was reached between Mr. Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah on certain questions and, as a result of this agreement, Mr. Nehru claimed that the accession of Kashmir to India was complete, but he conceded it could be set aside by a plebiscite. By this agreement Kashmir secured a small measure of autonomy which other India states do not enjoy. India has recognized Kashmir's flag

and has agreed that Kashmir may elect its own Sadar-i-Riyasat (the head of the state) subject to the condition that the first elected head shall be the heir of the former Maharaja of Kashmir. Kashmir has been included in the Indian Five Year Plan on terms of considerable generosity and, most significant of all, India is constructing an all-weather road route to Kashmir, by driving a tunnel through the mountains beneath the Banihal Pass.

Such a trend of events does not, by any means, satisfy all Indians, many of whom suspect Sheikh Abdullah's sincerity. They believe that he desires an independent Kashmir in which his will be the dominating voice and that his friendship with India is intended only to secure the material aid required by a country incapable of feeding itself much less develop. The slight degree of independence implicit in such matters as recognition of the Kashmir flag, has aroused strong opposition in Jammu from the chauvinistic Hindu body, the Praja Parishad, and there have been frequent civil disturbances resulting in death and injury. Sheikh Abdullah has been the object, during his visits to Delhi and elsewhere in India, of violent criticism and at his meetings there have been interruption and disorder. Mr. Nehru has publicly condemned the activities of the Praja Parishad, which he describes as communalistic and allied to the RSS, but in spite of this the movement, which is widely organized in India, continues to call for the outright incorporation of Kashmir in India, or, at least, the partition of Jammu and the abolition of the Kashmir flag which has, on more than one occasion, been torn down from public buildings. Sheikh Abdullah has incurred further anger by his statement that the national language of Kashmir is Urdu (a language of strong Muslim associations, although not by any means the monopoly of Muslims) and not Hindu, which, under new dispensation, is India's national language.

IT is now necessary to consider the consequences of the quarrel upon the parties to it. Beginning with Pakistan, there is no doubt that the future of Kashmir is a matter of the gravest concern since,

with India astride the State, there is much to fear, not only for military reasons, but also in relation to the supply of water from the rivers which flow into Pakistan from Kashmir and upon which the vast irrigation systems of the Punjab and Sind depend. A substantial interference with the supply of water would turn into desert millions of acres now producing food. With Kashmir dominated by India, Pakistan is encircled in the north by India, Kashmir and Afghanistan with which country India maintains very friendly relations. These are the material questions which Pakistan cannot ignore apart from the ties of religion, culture and blood. Pakistan is highly conscious that all factual considerations, including the circumstances and basis of the partition, make Kashmir the natural partner of Pakistan rather than of India, but whether or not India denies this, Mr. Nehru has publicly made it plain that the last thing he desires for Kashmir is to see it linked to Pakistan. He has stated that if Kashmir joins Pakistan it will be ruined and, after so much time has passed, it seems that Mr. Nehru is ready to go far to avert that catastrophe.

It would be difficult to claim that the links which bind Kashmir to India are equal in significance and little attempt has been made by India to do so since India's case rests mainly on legal considerations. It can scarcely be said that India's prosperity or food supply will be jeopardised if Kashmir were lost, or that it will be encircled. No doubt there would be a loss of valuable timber, and a tourist trade of some importance, but no one would assert that in the economy of India these items are prominent. Mr. Nehru, and doubtless others, have a sentimental interest in Kashmir, but even when the fullest allowance is made, it is not easy to conclude that India's interest in the State is, on any ground, equivalent to that of Pakistan whose moral claim is also clearly greater.

The immediate, leave alone future, consequences of the quarrel upon the contestants are of great importance. So long as it endures, both are mistrustful of each other and both are bitter. In this atmosphere, both are spending disproportionately on armaments (in each case about one half of the national budget is spent on the armed forces) The lives and property of

minorities in each country are insecure. Both nations are obsessed with the Kashmir quarrel and to this extent the policies and practice of each are thereby distorted and unbalanced. Whereas India and Pakistan should be good neighbours, living and trading harmoniously together so that each can obtain the benefits of the natural economic relationship that today is half-stifled, they are trying to live as independently of each other as possible with damaging results. It is indisputably clear that if they could fully use their mutual and natural channels of trade, the prosperity of each would increase overnight, but in the present state of the Kashmir quarrel such is not possible.

There are two further considerations to be taken into account. The passage of time has enabled India to do much towards consolidating a grip on Kashmir and it would be in defiance of common-sense that this is so. The re-settlement of Sikhs and Hindus in Jammu Province and the construction of the road under the Banihal Pass are the best material evidence of it. A consciousness of this is one reason for Pakistan's insistence on an early plebiscite. On the other hand, during the years that have passed, Pakistan has been able to effect a change in world opinion on the Kashmir issue and, if the world's press is a guide to such matters, it is clear enough that whereas, at the outset, opinion was generally favourable to India, today it is sympathetic to the claims of Pakistan.

It is often said in Pakistan, and the same view has more than once been expressed in influential quarters elsewhere, that the Kashmir dispute is a grave danger to world peace and may lead to the next world war. It is easy to say but less easy to understand. As a precipitating cause of war, no doubt the Kashmir quarrel would answer the purpose as well as anything else, but as a possible fundamental cause, it seems remote in the present context of world affairs, and especially in view of Russia's apparent indifference to the matter if that can be judged from the infrequent Russian interventions at the debates on the subject. It is correct that the quarrel is a political one and therefore has the dangerous potentiality of being seized upon and exploit-

ed, but so far it is difficult to discover any attempt to do this.

Such are the history, the issues and the consequences as they affect Pakistan and India, but what of Kashmir whose voice is scarcely heard and what of the UN whose thunders reverberate and signify little?

For Kashmir, the situation is one of tragedy and uncertainty. The present connection with India has secured neither liberty for the people nor political calm. Reliable observers record that under the government of Sheikh Abdullah there is no free exercise of civic rights and the presence of the Indian Army does not encourage thinking in any direction which is not towards India. The local opposition to Sheikh Abdullah is communal and violent and carries with it a threat to the Muslim majority of the State. The people live in an atmosphere of tension for which the United Nations organisation is now responsible.

Economically it is a question whether the people are either better or worse off than they would be in partnership with Pakistan. India is obliged to support the State and Pakistan would have to do the same. There is, however, the probability that the impoverished Muslim majority would, in partnership with Pakistan, have a chance to improve their prospects in life, whereas in the present circumstances there is certainly less opportunity. The Muslims of Kashmir have always been a depressed community and there is small reason for believing that a connection with India would emancipate them from that condition.

THE claims and contentions in the Kashmir dispute have been argued until they are threadbare and they have been reduced, by the leaders on either side, to two simple views of the case. Mr Nehru has explicitly stated that the basic fact before the United Nations is Pakistan's aggression. Khwaja Nazimuddin has said equally clearly that the fundamental issue is the right of the people of Kashmir to determine their own future by a plebiscite freely and fairly conducted. After five years' discussion, it should not be beyond the UN's powers to decide these matters. If Pakistan stands charged with aggression, let the issue be decided and

since all are agreed upon a plebiscite it remains only to execute it fairly. For all of this, the UN cannot escape the responsibility it clearly assumed when Sir Owen Dixon concluded that the parties should be left to settle the matter between themselves. That was the opportunity for the UN to disembarass itself if it wished but it did not do so.

The fact is that the true significance of the Kashmir quarrel transcends by far the rights and liabilities of India and Pakistan. The claim of the people of Kashmir to a just and prompt decision is beyond argument although, after the passage of five years, it is doubtful if much weight is attached to it. Indeed, the Security Council seems to have forgotten that justice delayed is justice denied and, even more dangerous, that any dispute is a greater test of the tribunal which judges it than of the parties involved in it. It is a test, not only of impartiality, but also of courage.

The proceedings of the Security Council contain an element of irresponsibility that is disquieting. To cite but one instance, there are the words of Sir Gladwyn Jebb, speaking on the Kashmir dispute in December 1952, on behalf of Great Britain. He said: "I cannot emphasize too much that, for its part, the United Kingdom Government believes that a settlement of this dispute can be brought about only through agreement between the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan. There is, therefore, in our view absolutely no question of anyone's imposing a settlement." Thus, it appears, it has taken two years to bring the British Government to an opinion perilously close to that of Sir Owen Dixon and what is worse, the unconditional right of the Kashmiris to an impartial plebiscite—or indeed, any plebiscite—is implicitly denied.

Mr. Trygvie Lie complained of the difficulties of his situation because the Russians ignored him. However reprehensible this conduct was, it is but a presage of the shape of things for, if the United Nations cannot bear with the tasks it has undertaken, the day will come when the whole of its political structure will be ignored by all mankind—a fate the pusillanimous deserve and ultimately achieve.