

Canada's Part in World Security

By J. R. MALLORY

The Plan For Peace

EVEN before the delegates assembled at Dumbarton Oaks late in August, 1944, the broad lines on which they would plan their security organization were apparent. Just as the League of Nations with its elaborate safeguards for the sovereignty of its tiniest members, reflected the ideas of 1919, so the thinking of the nineteen forties is reflected in the post-war organization which the great powers now want. Whatever the difference in detail, there is, far more than there was in 1919, complete agreement on one thing. If there is to be peace, there must be an organization of nations to keep it. The swift German break through in the Low Countries in the summer of 1940 effectively destroyed the notion that any power is strong enough to stand alone.

It was the small powers who were the principal gainers from the settlement in 1919. The small European nations, created by the fragmentation of the great continental empires, owed their lives in part to the belief that this diffusion of power would do away with the danger of imperialism in Western Europe. The effect of the war was in any case to emaciate the strength of the remaining great powers save the two most distant from the conflict. The result was that the small powers found in the League a fairly workable international machine for a world of small nations untroubled by the few remaining anaemic or aloof giants. The balance on which the League rested, was broken by the resurgence of great and ambitious powers whose strength was greater than any wavering coalition that could be brought against them.

It is clear that this war has almost wiped out the small powers as forces in

international politics and it is the great powers—particularly the USSR and the United States—which are emerging from the struggle with strength and purpose unimpaired. It is evident that both countries have written off the small powers as useful vehicles for keeping the peace. The tremendous strength that Germany was able to muster against the world has led them to believe that the prevention of aggression in the future can lie only in the reliance on overwhelming military power to keep the peace. The Dumbarton Oaks text shows that they want a world organization with teeth strong enough to protect the interests of those powers in maintaining the peace in the future.

What was accomplished at Dumbarton Oaks was the planning of a world security organization which largely avoided the great structural flaws of the League of Nations. It is an organization where authority is centred in those states which will have to bear the burden of enforcing peace, and it plans an organization which will bring unified force to bear in time.

At the moment the three great western powers are more interested in creating a peaceful environment for themselves than in abstract justice. Their primary purpose is now to apply the most obvious lessons of the war, of which the first is to provide for the timely and effective use of force against an aggressor. Anything which conflicts with this paramount necessity is likely to be sacrificed in order to achieve the primary purpose. Furthermore, since the impact of the war and the outlook for the future of the Big Three is in each case different, a certain amount of efficiency has had to be sacrificed in order to achieve agreement, as, for example, on the contentious matter of voting procedure on the Security Council. On this point no agreement was possible at Dumbarton Oaks, but the method by which agreement was reached, suggests a useful procedure for all matters of this kind.

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The Three Phases

Dumbarton Oaks was conducted largely at the expert level. It worked at devising machinery that was both workable and sufficiently practical to stand a good chance of ratification by the Big Three. The second phase was the phase of high diplomacy at Yalta. The Crimean meeting in February was between the Big Three themselves, where, as a result of hard bargaining and diplomatic give and take, outstanding problems raised by the experts could be settled by the only people with the authority to settle them—the governments of the three great powers. Then, unity achieved, the major difficulties overcome, the three could throw the whole scheme open to general discussion at a conference of the United Nations at San Francisco in April. This has avoided much of the frustration of the conference at Paris where the smaller powers had to be sidetracked while the Big Four wrangled behind closed doors. The initial disagreements at San Francisco over matters that had blown up after the Yalta meeting such as the Polish and Argentine affairs further emphasized the necessity of prior agreement and consultation continuously between the Big Three. The divergence in outlook and interest between the United States and the Soviet Union is such that there is constant danger, in spite of good will on both sides, that the main objectives may be lost by difference over particular and in themselves unimportant issues.

Already the method has yielded results far more satisfactory than could have been expected from a general conference on which the main lines of agreement had not already been prepared. One of the first snags was the question of voting procedure. It was impossible to settle this question at Dumbarton Oaks so the matter was simply left open to be settled, as far as the Security Council was concerned at Yalta.¹ The Russians were in the beginning utterly opposed to the idea that the Security Council

could or should be used against one of the permanent members. At Yalta the permanent members of the Council were conceded the right "to veto any direct action proposed to enforce peace." But at the same time any power involved in a dispute was barred from taking part in council deliberations on such preliminary steps as the decision to brand a country an aggressor or to conduct further investigation into an international dispute.² This is clearly a modification of earlier Russian opposition to throwing the affairs of any of the major powers under the purview of the Security Council, and is the kind of compromise solution which would not have emerged easily from a general conference.

The flurry of disagreement which blew up at the opening of the San Francisco Conference provides further demonstration of the realities of the situation. Without prior and, necessarily, secret agreement among the great powers little can be accomplished, while given that agreement in principle the smaller powers fall quietly in line at the price of some modification in detail. The crucial question for the future then is how far the great powers are likely to agree.

Condition of Peace

Actually of course there can be no peace if the three large powers do not agree, and no organization, however ingenious, can get around that fact. The real problem for the future is whether the strong powers can continue to agree on the desirability of peace. Their participation in the World Security Organization and in other agencies of international co-operation will help to iron out small grievances before they become large grievances and help to keep internationalism alive. But nothing can guarantee peace in a situation where there are large powers with great military strength and a profound difference of interest in so many fields.

1. Cf. Chapter VI, Section C of the Dumbarton Oaks proposal (*International Conciliation*, No. 405, November, 1944).

2. *Winnipeg Free Press*, 6th March, 1945. The inclusion of France among the permanent members of the Security Council was also the result of the Yalta discussions.

From that point of view the difficulties which beset any kind of international organization are so great that what has actually been accomplished so far need not be minimized. Any workable world settlement must be a compromise of deeply held convictions and of old fears. The Dumbarton Oaks draft takes account of the existence of these obstacles. The Russian anxiety about voting procedure in the Council is not based on hostility to international order but on unfortunate past experience. The Russians cannot forget that because they are not a capitalist country, it is extremely easy to rouse sentiment against them in the West and it is at the same time rather difficult to create any sympathy. That is why they are going to build up their own private security system by ensuring that their borders are surrounded by a close alliance of friendly states as a reinforcement to the guarantees of a world security organization. They also remember that the western powers in the past were singularly deaf to fascist aggression but achieved a white heat of collective security sentiment during the first Russo-Finnish war. A further obstacle to any tightly organized peace system is the traditional unwillingness of both the United States and Great Britain to commit themselves in advance to any course of action which might be inconvenient to their interests in the future.

There is a danger in positive commitments in that, in the case of the great powers concerned, their positive character might prevent their acceptance by the public. Quite obviously this is not a problem which is likely to worry the government of the Soviet Union, for in that country public opinion seems to have the happy knack of following the requirements of government policy. But the other two are not so fortunate. The American experts in particular knew that a strong body of sentiment against all kinds of entangling alliances is ready and waiting in that country to attack all forms of international collaboration. Consequently the Dumbarton Oaks text may be taken as the maximum which the

experts consider that the American public will take.

This difficulty is not confined to the United States. It is also true of the United Kingdom. There are strong groups within the Conservative party who are opposed to collective security and international collaboration—particularly with the Soviet Union—and who might, if the Conservative party is able to win the coming election, make the acceptance of even the Dumbarton Oaks text difficult.

Canada in the World Organization

One refreshing element of realism at Dumbarton Oaks was the sharp distinction between small and great powers which gives to the small powers only quasi-independent status in the Organization. In one way this is a good thing. It will prevent the large powers from trying to build up parties of satellites among the small powers in order to control a block of votes, which was one of the less desirable features of the old League. In many ways the admission of the small powers to full status at Geneva was an embarrassment. They do not—for they cannot—vote as individuals. They must for security's sake group themselves around the nearest large power. Even at San Francisco this was evident in the vote on the admission of Argentina. The Latin American states supported the stand of the United States in a body, while the small states of western Europe either opposed it or abstained. The Russian hostility to wider powers for the Assembly is based on a fear of these mechanical majorities as well as on a real scepticism of the military value of the small powers in keeping the peace. It may for some purposes be desirable to recognize the independence of small powers but it must be admitted that their role in a non-peaceful world is necessarily different from that of a great power.

Canada's part in the post-war world must of course be that of a small power. The Dumbarton Oaks left little room for the small powers to exercise initiative

n the World Security Organization. There are, however, as discussion before and at San Francisco made clear, a number of middle powers whose importance is too great to ignore and whose contribution is too valuable to lose in a peace-keeping organization. Among those powers prominent examples are Canada and the Netherlands. The original draft of the security plan left too little room for these powers but they are important enough so that in time a modification in practice—if not in form—is likely to give them a more responsible share in the security organization.

Canada's Record

Status is, however, one thing and performance another. In the past Canada has sought to perform two distinct but complementary roles in the international sphere. One has been that of a small power in line with our increasingly wide definition of the nature of dominion status. The other has been the assumption of the traditional role of what Mr. Churchill felicitously called the linchpin between the United States and Great Britain. In the past our performance as a linchpin has been seldom either happy or successful. We have shown no marked ability to modify either British or American policy in the common interest and too often the two larger powers have seemed to regard Canada as the object of a sacrificial ritual to cement their friendship.

In our other role as a small power our influence on the international scene in the two decades between the wars was never great and seldom good. Our early opposition to Article X of the Covenant of the League, combined with our insistence on the status of a full member, certainly did nothing to strengthen the idea of collective security. Nor did we earn the gratitude of League supporters by our performance in the first two major threats to peace, Manchuria and Abyssinia. In the former the Canadian delegate to the League will be long remembered for having spoken strongly on both sides of the dispute and in the latter

we became involved in the unfortunate misunderstanding over the imposition of oil sanctions on Italy.

Nevertheless, events since 1939 have forced upon us a status far greater than any to which we might have aspired in the past. In the summer of 1940 we were the second power in a dwindling and seemingly hopeless coalition against Germany. On the military and production side our performance is recognized as remarkable. It is not so easy to say that our diplomatic role has been as significant.

In no case have we participated largely in the relations between the liberating powers and the occupied countries. In one case, Greece, it was stated that as no Canadian lives were directly involved we felt no call to intervene,³ but that objection should not apply to either Italy or Belgium. In the case of Greece an old bogey reappeared when Mr. Churchill informed the British House of Commons that the dominions had been "informed."⁴ While this may have been a legitimate debating device in defence of a much criticized policy, it recalled too readily Mr. Churchill's part in "consulting" the dominions in the Chanak affair in 1924. Mr. King, however, made it clear in this case that no advice had been asked and none given.

On these points it is perhaps not fair to press criticism too far until all the facts are available. It would be unreal after all to expect the great powers to share the leadership too widely when theirs is the main load of military responsibility. There are, however, certain areas of international relations in which we can play a large part. While we have only a small population and are still a small military power, we are one of the great producers of foodstuffs and raw materials, and our location, combined with our large technical equipment and experience, give a uniquely important place in international aviation. In dealing with problems of this type our inter-

3. *Winnipeg Free Press*, 15th December, 1944.

4. *Ibid.*, 14th December, 1944.

est is vital and the contribution we can make is relatively great.

Canada's Role in International Co-operation

The preservation of peace is not altogether a matter of high diplomacy and the provision of military security against aggressors. It also depends on practical everyday things like food and stable currencies. The peace of the world depends just as much on what kind of governments people have as on their determination to enforce collective security. Depressions breed war because they breed disorder, and bring revolutionary extremist groups to the fore. Unstable currencies which throttle world trade and destroy men's sense of security and faith in their governments, inadequate food supplies which turn hungry men into desperate men unwilling to compromise and to wait are the things which make wars possible.

It is a pity that it is not possible to take seriously the Economic and Social Council planned at Dumbarton Oaks, for it would provide a useful emphasis of these problems. But it is apparent from the composition of this body, from the fact that the Great Powers are not even certain of membership and that it meets discontinuously, that very little action can be expected from it.⁵ Its only chance of success will flow from whatever success attends the work of those functional bodies whose activities it is supposed to co-ordinate.

Many people who remember the failure of the League of Nations, remember that much of its quiet but efficient work in achieving health standards, in the removal of barriers to communication and commerce were destroyed with the League because they were too closely tied to it. There is now a strong feeling, which has already influenced the planning of international organizations, that many of the fields of international co-operation not directly connected with the prevention of war might stand a better chance of

success if they are not tied too closely to the World Security Organization.⁶ We, in Canada, should welcome this tendency because then we can measure our participation in international problems by the extent of our interest in each question. The creation of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in which we are playing a major part, is an example of this type of organization. The international monetary authority planned at Bretton Woods is another, and the most recent is the international air authority whose composition was discussed at the Chicago conference.

Canada at Chicago

The Chicago conference on aviation is a highly instructive example of the problems of international organization for peace and a good illustration of the kind of international action in which Canada can play a most useful part. Our own contribution to the conference was great. Our experts did a fine job of preparing detailed plans to submit to the conference. Our representatives, particularly Mr. Howe and Mr. Symington, laboured actively and intelligently to achieve agreement at the conference. We came away from the conference with a recognized place in the organization and with the provisional location of the organization in Montreal. Both were tributes to our position and our importance.

But the Chicago conference was a failure. The British and American delegations failed utterly to reach agreement on any plan which might have made air transport anything except a source of anarchy and friction in international relations. They failed through inability to understand one another. The British desire for the regulation of air traffic by an international authority was born of a desire common to all countries which have actually suffered from the war to regain some part of a fair share of air transport in the future. Obviously coun-

5. Cf David Mitrany. *The Road to Security*. London (National Peace Council) 1944.

6. The reasons are cogently summarized in David Mitrany. *A Working Peace System*.

tries which have built military aircraft alone for five years cannot provide themselves with carriers overnight, and countries overrun by the enemy cannot organize airways for perhaps years. Yet this view was translated by the Americans as a wish to govern the airways of the world by cartels and monopolies and in general to challenge the sacred cow of free enterprise.⁷ It is evident of course that the American attitude was a reflection of the strength and the ambitions of the great privately-owned American airlines. Clearly in these conditions any far-reaching agreement was impossible and no comprehensive agreement was in fact reached. If the Chicago conference is a portent of the tenor of future international conferences, the opponents of internationalism need have no fears for the future.

7. American sensitiveness on the subject of free enterprise may be a serious obstacle to good relations in the period after the war. The desirability of preserving free enterprise is a popular and, on the whole, a harmless platitude, but it has a powerful effect in lifting American public opinion from the rational to the irrational plane. There are powerful private economic interests in the United States which hold or seek to hold, advantageous positions in other countries—positions from which they can be dislodged only by undertakings of comparable economic strength, which in most cases means government sponsored undertakings. The declaration made at the Mexico City Conference of American Republics aimed at "the encouragement of a maximum of private enterprise and a minimum of state interference with it," may be taken as evidence that they have been successful in enlisting the aid of American diplomacy in their objectives. This, of course, is what happened at Chicago. The well-organized opposition which the American Bankers' Association is mobilizing against the International Monetary Fund proposed at Bretton Woods is further evidence that opinion on the methods to deal with the peace are far more sharply divided in the United States than in any other of the United Nations. Even if this division were not so clearly one of principle, it would still be unfortunate because it makes for uncertainty, and uncertainty is bad for international confidence.

The magnitude of our role in the Chicago conference as well as in such bodies as UNRRA does however, suggest that in the future we may be rather more than a small power in world affairs.

It is perhaps worth concluding with more hope than the facts seem to warrant. Those who find in the first half of 1945 an atmosphere incapable of nourishing international co-operation, are prone to forget how often—at least since 1939—that common sense and an awareness of high purpose have prevailed in the last ditch. After all the difficulties that have to be overcome are formidable. The differences of attitude between, for example, the United States and the Soviet Union are so great that what has already been accomplished, represents a far greater willingness to compromise and to make concessions than is generally recognized. Much has already been accomplished before the fighting has ended, and that of the solid enduring kind which may encourage further efforts in the future. When we recall that courageous remnant of the International Labour Office (which sought refuge, significantly, in Montreal) which was all that remained of the world order of the twenties and compare it with the number of actually functioning forms of international co-operation which now exist, there is at least ground for hope. If it were not that the problems of western Europe have so far been met by the surprising vitality of free institutions in the liberated countries we could be more certain—and more gloomy—in predicting the course of future events.

Canada's Place in The British Commonwealth

By GWENDOLEN M. CARTER

IF we succeed in establishing an effective international security organization, many may ask whether the Commonwealth relationship will continue to have value for Canada. Those who do so can have little awareness of what

significance membership in the Commonwealth has had for Canadian national life. But equally important for the future is the fact that without the Commonwealth, there would be little chance of achieving and maintaining the type of international setting which Canada needs. It may be true, paradoxically, that the

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