

Youth Engagement and Get-Out-The-Vote Organizations: Are they a Viable
Solution to the Problem of Youth Engagement?

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List of Tables

Table 3.1:	Civic Engagement Programs	60
Table 3.2:	Catalogue of Organizations	72
Table 4.1:	Registered Charities	79
Table 4.2:	Registered Charities' Revenue	80
Table 4.3:	Registered Charities' Expenditure	81
Table 4.4:	Not-for-profits	93
Table 5.1:	Registered Charities	101
Table 5.2:	Not-for-profits	114
Table 5.3:	Registered Charities and Not-for-profits	120

Abstract

Get-out-the-vote organizations are thought to be one of the many solutions to address the issue of youth voting. Yet, research into the success or failure of these organizations has been very limited. This paper will examine the successes and failures of these organizations, solely in the context of whether or not they are able to persuade youth to get out and vote. As such, the act of voting and the impact these organizations and their programs have on this act is what is being examined in this paper, not the general political participation of youth. Given that research indicates these organizations are not targeting the correct segment of the youth population. The initial postulation of this paper is that these organizations are failing in their mandates, as they are already targeting the segment of the youth population, namely university students who are voting regardless of these efforts. This leaves the question of why these organizations continue to invest money in an area that doesn't need it, and why governments continue to give money to these organizations. Are they merely a sandbox for youth organizers, a way for governments to feel that they are trying to tackle the problem or simply a product of the times, with no real ambition or idea to solve the problem of youth voting?

List of Abbreviations Used

CASA	Canadian Alliance of Student Associations
CFS	Canadian Federation of Student Associations
CRA	Canada Revenue Agency
DSU	Dalhousie Student Union
Stats Can	Statistics Canada
Students NS	Students Nova Scotia
GOTV	Get-out-the-Vote

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The 42nd federal election held on October 19, 2015, produced one of the largest voter turnouts in recent Canadian history. This increase was largely attributed to the uncommonly high participation of Canadian youth. Despite this increase in turnout among youth, youth engagement in elections throughout Canada and the world remains low. This led Elections Canada to develop a host of programs in order to address this motion. These included the launch of the Inspire Democracy website as a platform to disseminate research on youth participation as well as to share information on how to enhance youth civic engagement in Canada. Elections Canada also collaborated with several different groups in order to determine the best methods by which to reach youth. This renewed focus on youth engagement also led to the rise of various civic engagement organisations. Three years later in 2007, Brenda O’Neil wrote “Young Canadians display a pattern of civic and political engagement that differentiates them from other Canadians. They are less likely to vote, are less likely to be members of political parties and interest groups, are less interested in politics and know less about politics than other Canadians.” 2) Yet, the results of Canada’s 42nd General Election, gave the illusion that these organisations were in fact being successful. Given that youth voter rates increased by over 12 per cent in this election, one of the possible reasons for this increase was touted as being the result of the work of civic engagement organisations. Indeed, an organisation (Canadian Alliance of Student Associations) which sponsored some get-out-the-vote initiatives in the lead up to the 42nd general elections, credited the work of get-out-the-vote organisations for the increase in youth turnout.

One reason for the higher voter turnout among young Canadians may have been the efforts by organizations to increase youth voter turnout. For example, CASA and Apathy is Boring actively engaged youth participation in the fall election. This work seems to have been effective, with over one in three of youth who voted (37 per cent) reporting being encouraged to vote by an organization working to increase turnout among younger voters. (12)

Despite such claims, did these organizations actually have a significant impact on the 42nd general election, to the point that youth voter rates increased?

The aim of this paper is not to determine whether or not these organizations were effective during the 42nd general election, but rather whether or not these organizations are executing their mandates effectively. This will be done by examining their revenue sources and expenditure in order to determine whether or not they are seeking to increase youth participation or simply seeking to attract funding. It must be noted at this point that the success of these organizations can never be causally established, as it is difficult to effectively determine what was the motivation behind a person voting with absolute certainty. Therefore, this evaluation will seek to provide the clearest picture of these organisations and their activities, and seek to demonstrate if they are at least successful in achieving their goals within their target population.

As will be discussed later, the initial postulate of this paper is that these organizations are failing in their mandates, as they are already targeting the segment of the youth population, namely university students who are voting regardless of these efforts. This leaves the question of why these organizations continue to invest money in an area that doesn't need it, and why governments continue to give money to these organizations. Are they merely a sandbox for youth organizers, a way for governments to feel that they are trying to tackle the problem or simply a product of the times, with no real ambition or idea to solve the problem of youth

voting? In order to determine this, the literature relating to the issue of youth voting must first be examined. To this end, this paper will be broken down into five chapters. The first chapter will provide an introduction to the issue of youth voter turnout and detail the reasons why youth do not vote. The second chapter will provide an overview of some of the challenges facing the voluntary sector. The third chapter will introduce the civic engagement organizations, and provide a profile of them. The fourth chapter will form the basis of analysis for the paper. In this chapter, the work of the organizations will be examined, along with the programs and finances of each organization to determine their sources of income, as well as where each organization is spending its money. It is hoped that by examining the financials of each organization, a clearer picture of how much money each organization receives as well as each organizations source of income. From here, this chapter will then seek to determine where the money is being spent in an effort to determine what proportion of each organization's income is spent on attempting to foster civic engagement. The final chapter will provide final thoughts on the analysis and the way forward. Here, possible solutions as to how to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of civic engagement organizations will be discussed.

In so doing, this paper will draw on a multipronged approach that ranges from an historical overview and analysis of the phenomenon of youth voting, as well as the voluntary and nonprofit sector of Canada, to an analysis of civic engagement organizations and their impact on the act of voting. Referencing the historically low turnout rates among youth and the reasons posited for these low rates, this paper will posit that Get-out-the-vote organizations are targeting the wrong segment of the youth population.

1.1 Methodology

Information for this project will be gleaned from both primary and secondary sources. It will begin with historical research that will draw on studies funded by Elections Canada into youth voter turnout, as well as tax returns filed by the various civic engagement organizations to the Canada Revenue Agency. It is important to note here that given that a great deal of research has not been done on this subject matter, the tax returns of the organizations will form the basis of the analysis. As such, the financials that have been submitted in each organization's tax return will guide the discussion of these organizations. To this end, a percentage of the total revenue spent on fostering or attempting to foster civic engagement will be determined. This percentage will not be an absolute percentage but will be determined solely by using the information provided in each organizations' tax return. As such, this percentage will be determined by factoring in the number of programs pursued by each organization along with the various expenses. Any expenditure including salaries reported to the CRA or in the yearly budgets of an organization is considered to be program related and will be counted as being used to foster civic engagement. Percentages will be calculated based on the amounts spent, relative to total revenue generated. An overall percentage spent on fostering civic engagement will be calculated. This particular percentage will be calculated by determining the total expenditure of the organizations on program related activities. This total will then be calculated as a percentage of the organization's total expenditure to determine what percentage of its revenue was spent fostering civic engagement. Once more, it should be noted that these percentages are not absolute, and were done to enable an easier analysis of the organizations. With regards to the latter, this paper will use secondary sources such as

journal articles, specifically written on the phenomenon of youth voting as well as the voluntary sector of Canada and its role in Canadian society.

In addition, contemporary data on youth disengagement and civic engagement organizations through primary and secondary sources will be reviewed to support the notion that civic engagement organizations are already targeting the segment of the youth population, namely university students who are voting regardless of their efforts. Ultimately, this research project will attempt to determine whether or not civic engagement organizations are actually effective and needed. Canada's youth are interested in politics but after years of being routinely and systematically ignored in most policy decisions, have lost. In the end, it is expected that the results will show that youth may not be voting in large quantities but the ones that are already voting are the one who these organizations continue to routinely target with their programs and initiatives. Consequently, it is expected that even if these organizations do spend significant portions of their budgets seeking to foster civic engagement, they are doing it within the youth cohort that is already actively voting. In order to determine this, the literature relating to the issue of youth voting must first be examined.

Limitations

Despite gleaning a vast majority of information from primary sources, the bulk of which were tax returns filed to the CRA, some information was gleaned from interviews. These interviews indicated that greater attention should be paid to the finances of the organisations. In all the interviews conducted, each participant indicated that their greatest issue was that of funding. Each participant postulated that in order to properly achieve their organisation's aims, more funding was needed. This prompted me to look at the funding sources of the

organisations. Though the initial plan was to use interviews as the basis of analysis, the lack of concrete information from the interviews, prompted a change in approach. As such, one limitation of the methodology was the lack of applicable information gained from the interviews. Another limitation was the lack of uniformity in the tax returns filed by the organisations. Though all organisations had to file tax returns, some of these returns were not of the same quality. Some returns were very detailed while others were not. Additionally, all the organisations had not filed their returns for the most recent fiscal period. Consequently, some were for the most recently passed fiscal year at the time of research, while some were still to be updated.

1.2 Reasons Youth Don't Vote

There are voluminous amounts of literature on the topic of youth involvement in politics, with regards to their participation in the formal realm. Most analyses of youth engagement are done in relation to their voting trends, or in other words, formal politics. While this can be a useful tool for examining youth engagement, it is not an effective one for measuring youth engagement. It does not adequately take into consideration, other potential avenues that youth maybe engaging in politically, that fall outside the realm of formal politics. Yet, numerous publications and academics continue to use youth voting trends as their barometer for youth political engagement. As such, the scope of this literature review focusses on the main reasons postulated for the lack of youth participation in formal politics, and why these continue to be the leading explanations of youth engagement. The most prominent explanations of youth disengagement, cohort, life cycle, period and socio economic effects will be examined, in order to determine why these continue to be the most prominent explanations

of youth disengagement, and why it is a common misconception that youth are politically apathetic.

Socio Economic Effect

One explanation usually touted as to why youth are not politically engaged, relates to education, as an indicator of socio economic status, though family income could also be an adequate measure of socio economic status. It is widely believed that the more education a person has, the more likely they are to vote. As posited by Gidengil et al (2003) “education remains one of the best predictors of turnout, because it provides the cognitive skills needed to cope with the complexities of politics, and because it seems to foster norms of civic engagement” (10). Yet, declining voter turnouts are coming at a time when “unprecedented numbers of young Canadians continue their education beyond high school.” (Gidengil et al, 2003, 10). As such, it is difficult to explain the declining turnout with regards to education.

This explanation encounters many pitfalls, as it is predicated upon youth engagement being measured by voter turnout. It also ignores the growing number of youth who have university degrees, that also do not vote. Using data collected through surveys, Gidengil et al (2004), posit that “since the 1993 federal election, turnout has dropped over thirty points among those with less than a high school education and fifteen points or more among those who have completed high school or some postsecondary education” (111). Yet the same authors acknowledge that some young Canadians with university educations are turning away from electoral politics in search of more active forms of political engagement. For example, Gidengil, et al, (2004), claim “if this is all so, we have a puzzle: unprecedented numbers of

Canadians are graduating from university, and yet turnout to vote has declined precipitously since the 1988 federal election. Could it be that the link between education and political engagement is weakening?" (7) Despite acknowledging this, Gidengil, et al (2004), go on to postulate that "education equips people with the cognitive skills needed to navigate the complexities of politics" (110), yet, voter turnout amongst young university graduates is still declining. The argument could be made that they have the cognitive skills to determine that formal politics is not the best arena for them to participate in. If they can acknowledge this trend, why is it that they continue to tout education as an explanation for a lack of political engagement among youth? One theory is that this explanation provides the necessary backdrop to address the phenomenon of declining youth voter rates, as it provides a context for the decline. It is therefore for these reasons that education does not offer an adequate explanation for the lack of political engagement among youth on its own.

Yet, scholars such as Gidengil, Blais, Neviite and Nadeau (2004), continuously posit that the decline in turnout "is in fact confined to those with less than a university education; [as] turnout has held steady among young graduates" (111). In discussing this particular point, it was noted that Gidengil, et al, (2004), claimed that since the 1993 general election voter turnout among youth has fallen thirty points among those who have less than a high school education, and fifteen points among those who have completed high school and or some college. If the declining voter turnout is attributed to those who do not have a postsecondary education, why then has it also dropped significantly (fifteen points) among who have some post-secondary education? Could it be that youth who may have taken one university or college course are counted as having some postsecondary education or is graduation the yard stick by

which postsecondary education is measured? Gidengil, et al fail to address this question, instead opting to focus on the high level of non-participation among those with no post-secondary education. “The rising education levels of today’s youth co-exist with lower levels of political knowledge, less voting, a diminished sense of civic duty to vote and less interest in formal politics” (MacKinnon, Pitre, Watling 2007, 7). Given that there is evidence that voter turnout among youth with post-secondary education is decreasing as well, it is interesting that, a lack of education continues to be touted as a reason for the declining voter turnout among Canadian youth. Though a lack of education does provide a possible explanation for the declining voter turnout, it should be examined within the context of other things such as life cycle and cohort effects. On its own education as an indicator of socio economic status is not an adequate explanation for the declining youth turnout. Other factors play an important role such as the time period during which a young person may have grown up. Thus, the period effect is another explanation usually touted for the decline in youth voters.

PERIOD EFFECT

A period effect is “the variation in the youth participation rate caused by the particular year in which that participation is observed” (Statistics Canada 2008). Indeed, given recent attempts by the Canadian government to increase the levels of youth voting, such as prevoting, as well as setting up voting booths on campus to allow students to vote at school, youth voting rates actually increased during the 42nd federal election in October, 2015. Voting among 18-25 year olds increased by 18.3 per cent, going from 38.8 per cent in the 2011 federal election to 57.1 per cent in the 2015 Federal election. Similarly, the voting rate among 25-34 year olds also increased by 12.3 per cent from 45.1 per cent in 2011 to 57.4 per cent in 2015. (Elections

Canada 2016). Though some civic engagement organisations may argue that this increase should be attributed to the work of these organisations. A recently concluded study commissioned by the Canadian Alliance of Student Associations indicates that during the 42nd federal election on October 19, 2015, there was an increase in the number of youth voting. This study attributed this increase in a small way to the work of get-out-the-vote initiatives.

According to the report, one in three youth who reported voting claimed to have done so as a result of the efforts of an organization working to increase voter turnout among youth. Yet, there is no mention of who these youth are or how this was determined. Additionally, the report also claimed that programs aimed at mobilizing the youth vote seem to have been particularly effective at targeting post-secondary education students, who were more likely to report being encouraged to vote by an organization affiliated with get-out-the-vote initiatives.

Though the impact of these organisations and their initiatives should not be ignored, it is difficult to envision them having a significant impact in such a relatively short period of time. As such, a more likely explanation for the increase in voter turnout is the “Trudeau effect”, much like that of the Obama effect. Like Obama, Trudeau arrived at a time of division, with many Canadians fed up with the Stephen Harper government. Subsequently, Trudeau like Obama represented a change, if not at the very least the appearance of such. It can therefore be argued that this increase in voter turnout among youth could very well have been a consequence of the Trudeau effect.

The Trudeau effect like the Obama effect can be touted as a possible reason for the increase in voter turnout at the last federal election. The Obama effect “encouraged an extraordinary amount of new popular engagement in the political process, sparking millions of

Americans to overcome their endemic disgust with politics and their sense of powerlessness within the U.S. sociopolitical order” (Street 2009, 204). The same can be said about Trudeau and his impact on the Canadian population. With an ever-increasing dislike for the Harper government, turnout rates among voters increased in general, with overall voter turnout increasing by 7.6 per cent (Elections Canada 2016). Interestingly, Elections Canada attributes this increase to an increase in participation among youth, as the turnout rates among older voters decreased overall. This overall increase can be attributed to the Trudeau effect coupled with a lack of confidence in the Stephen Harper administration. The overall increase in voter turnout, which as was stated earlier was largely influenced by youth, was the largest overall turnout since the 35th general election held in 1993. Again, this points to other reasons being the catalyst for this increase apart from the work of civic engagement organisations. As such, we now turn to the two most compelling explanations of youth voter turnout, life cycle and cohort effects.

Life-Cycle Effects

Life cycle effects describe “a mediated process of aging that changes political attitudes and associated behaviour; more specifically, it records systemic change in a variable as an individual age” (Sadow, 2008, 19). This compelling explanation as to why youth don’t vote, takes education into account, but not in the same way that Gidengil, et al, use it. Instead, this explanation argues that life cycle and cohort effects, explain why youth do not vote in high numbers. For instance, life cycle effects, offer the explanation, that youth do not vote because they are busy pursuing their educations, and may have moved away from home, to a new province, where they are not eligible to vote. As previously stated, life cycle and cohort effects,

are especially useful in telling researchers about a youth's current stage of life, their likely level of maturity, as well as their stake in society, and other factors that might be expected to influence their political involvement. (Howe, 2010).

Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde (1998) claim that "low participation among the young, however, appears to be a lifestyle phenomenon. As young Americans marry, have children, and develop community ties, their turnout tends to increase" (76). This falls under life cycle effects, as it looks at the current stage of a youth's life, in an attempt to determine why they may not vote. Another social characteristic posited by Margaret Conway (2002), who using elections statistics from the 1998 election, claims that younger citizens participate less in politics due to their high rate of mobility. This means that individuals who have lived in an area for a relatively short time are less likely to vote, and younger citizens move more frequently than older citizens do. A further reason for low voting participation among youth is that rates of political participation among young adults tend to be low, due to the primacy of non-political concerns such as obtaining an education, finding a mate, and establishing a career. (Strate, Parrish, Elder and Ford III, 1989). Philip Converse and Richard Niemi (1971), posit

young single persons in their twenties are inevitably preoccupied with two rather personal quests: the quest for a mate and the quest for a suitable job. These quests are to some degree incompatible with devotion of attention to broader events. Once a mate is found-and this generally means some kind of tolerable job as well-the individual begins to take a more stable role in adult life and can afford to turn his eyes outward in a new degree. (461).

Thus, youth are less likely to vote because they are not in a position to adequately focus enough of their time or attention on the process. While it could be argued that this effect would have always been present, cohort effects as will be discussed next explain why it is more prevalent today.

Moreover, according to the life-cycle effect explanation, rates of political participation among youth tend to be low, because they are more interested in obtaining an education, finding a mate and establishing a career. This explanation is most compelling, because it presents youth as having a fluid life, which is more often than not the case. Most youth who are eligible to vote in Canada, do not have the social stability to actively take part in politics. Most are either away at university, or not in a stable career and therefore, more interested in finding a stable career. According to Warren Clark (2014), there are five markers of adult transition, leaving school; leaving the parental home; full time full year work; a conjugal union and having children. By examining census data between 1971 and 2001, Clark is able to demonstrate, that the pace of each transition is slower than in 1971. For instance, Clark (2014), claims that “young people are increasingly expected to continue their school [as] 95 per cent of parents with children under the age of 19 believe that education after high school is important or very important.” Therefore, youth today have come to age at a particular time, when post-secondary education is increasingly being seen as important, as indicated by the figure of 1.04 million students enrolled in Canadian universities as of 2005. (Berger, 2009). Given this vast number of students enrolled in university, this explanation seems to be the most logical, as it offers a well-rounded explanation of youth engagement. According to Howe (2010), empirical results reveal that both life cycle and cohort effects contribute to low voter turnout.

Cohort Effects

Cohort effects deal with the “effect that having been born in a certain time, region, period or having experienced the same life experience (in the same period), has on the development or

perceptions of a particular group. These perceptions, characteristics or effects are unique to the group in question” (Atingdui, 2001). According to MacKinnon, Pitre and Watling (2007),

Generation Y [those born after 1979] came to age at a particular time when politics and things political (including the role of government became devalued), trust in public and private institutions was eroding, the age of deference was in decline, post-materialism and greater cognitive mobilization were on the rise, hierarchical forms of political participation were increasingly being rejected, the pervasive influences of information and communication technologies (ICT) contributed to a speeded-up and action oriented culture, greater individual choice was trumpeted as a social good, and the government adopted private sector “client” orientations in its relations with the public. (8)

Therefore, declining voter turnout could potentially be a good thing or not even a new phenomenon, as youth are simply too busy to properly devote enough time, as well as having grown up during a time when the importance of formal politics was declining.

Paul Howe, posits that there are two types of non-voters, habitual non-voters and intermittent non-voters. For Howe, habitual non-voters are those who never vote, while intermittent non-voters, are those who vote sometimes but not always. While this distinction is more present in American research on voting, it is largely overlooked in research on the Canadian case (Howe, 2007). Howe (2007) therefore believes that this information is especially useful, in determining appropriate methods of electoral outreach. Nonetheless, there is a growing assumption in recent research and analysis of voting among young Canadians, that, declining voter turnout among youth is as a result of a rise in habitual non-voters. For example, Henry Milner (2002), believes that there are some young voters who are ‘politically informed’ and reject voting for something they consider more meaningful. While this is cause for concern, Howe does caution that this assumption has not been empirically verified, and as such, is not necessarily the case. Instead, Howe (2007) postulates that a “lower voting level among the young could simply represent an increase in the number of intermittent non-voter and/or a

decrease in the incidence of voting among young intermittent non-voters” (10), or as it is more commonly referred to a cohort effect. In an attempt to prove this, Howe, analyses elections in 1974, and 2004. Interestingly, Howe (2010) discovers that in the 1974 election, there were very few habitual non-voters, with persons classified in this way only comprising 1.3 percent of the entire population. In contrast, the 2004 election indicates that the number of habitual non-voters increased to 15.7 percent, much higher than in 1974. Howe, therefore concludes that contrary to his initial postulation, habitual non-voting is now more prevalent today among young people than it was in the past. Alarming, he also claims that the data may actually, “under-represent the number of habitual non-voters to a significant degree” (Howe, 2010), as the data was collected through surveys, and habitual non-voters, are less likely to participate in surveys than intermittent non-voters. Consequently, the increase in the number of habitual non-voters represents part of the cohort effect as this change has occurred over time. To augment this belief that there is a growing number of young habitual non-voters, there is research that may indicate, why these numbers are growing, due to a disaffection among youth with politics in Canada. To further articulate this point, we will now look at research done in both the United Kingdom and Canada.

It is widely touted that youth are disaffected with politics and government, this explanation is more prominent in research done on the United Kingdom, by persons such as Craig Berry, who after surveying members of the youth wing of the Labour Party, claim youth “expressed a profound aversion to Britain’s political culture, casting its custodians as phoney, careerist and elitist and most explicitly related this to their experience in the Labour Party” (Berry, 2008). Likewise, there is research on Canadian youth that support this claim. According

to MacKinnon, Pitre and Watling (2007) “Young people feel that government has little to do with them – they don’t tend to connect the role of government with issues they think are important.” Yet, Howe is quick to dismiss this explanation claiming that “it does not seem to be a significant force undermining participation in politics, either in general or among young Canadians in particular” (Howe, 2010). Instead, he is more inclined to focus on inattentiveness to politics and the weakening of social integration. Similarly, Henry Milner in his book *Civic Literacy* (2002), does a cross national comparison on political attentiveness. In order to do this, Milner examines rates of newspaper reading, and level of political knowledge, two factors he considers critical to the vitality of a democratic citizenry. His conclusions demonstrated that young Canadians fared very poorly relative to their European counterparts, on geopolitical knowledge. For Howe (2010), political inattentiveness, and in particular “low levels of political interest and knowledge and spotty attention to public affairs via news media, is having a deleterious effect on the political involvement of young Canadians” (4), this is a similar position to Gidengil, who argues that youth are “tuned out” of politics.

Gidengil, et al posit that declining voter turnout, is as a result of young Canadians being “tuned out”. The argument here is that young Canadians are much less interested in politics and as a result know much less about what is going on politically. Again, the notion that knowledge makes the act of voting easier permeates Gidengil’s argument that young Canadians are tuned out. Gidengil, et al (2004), argue that “knowing about the issues, where parties stand, and who the leaders are makes it easier to decide which party to vote for” (112). However, contrary to others who place the responsibility for a lack of interest squarely at the feet of Canadian youth, Gidengil, et al postulate another possibility for this lack interest, related to a

lack of effort on the part of political parties and candidates to reach out to young voters. For Gidengil et al, if people were contacted by political parties during the 2000 election campaign, their odds of voting increased significantly. Yet, young Canadians were the least likely to have been contacted, with “fewer than one in three report[ing] any contact by a party or candidate” (Gidengil, et al, 2004, 112). This is more in line with behaviours seen in the United Kingdom, where, youth felt that politicians did not listen and were not engaged with people like them.

Further, cohort effects also take into consideration the time period in which youth have grown up. Today’s youth are growing up in a climate which is much faster paced than before. They can do almost anything without leaving the comforts of their home. From taking classes, shopping or even finding a significant other online. This means that youth are looking for the easiest way to vote. If voting were as easy as signing an online petition, then youth voting rates may increase. “If young people’s time is more limited in today’s world, however, then perhaps increasing the ease with which they might vote could result in higher participation rates” (O’Neill, 2003, 18). This explanation accepts the fact that youth today, are burdened with more responsibilities than the youth of yesterday. It therefore acknowledges that formal political participation may not be at the top of their priorities at the moment.

Additionally, another explanation usually posited which could be considered a cohort effect is that youth do not have a civic sense of duty or are apathetic. According to Andre Blais (2003), an important motivation for voting is a sense of duty. Many youth today, are increasingly believing that the political system does not cater to them, and in particular, have a low sense of political efficacy. Henn, Weinstein and Forrest (2005) examine why young people are disengaged from politics. Like Dermody, Hammer-Lloyd and Scullion (2010), Henn et al. also

postulate that youth are skeptical of the way in which the political system is organized and led as well as being turned off by politicians and political parties. Interestingly, Henn et al. posit that young people did not feel as though there were enough significant opportunities for them to have an impact on politics. With such beliefs increasingly having an impact on youth, it is easy to see why youth may not have a sense of duty when it comes to voting.

Additionally, inattentiveness to politics is not an adequate explanation of youth engagement. This explanation predicated its analysis on voter turnout. To cite inattentiveness to politics as an explanation for declining youth participation, which in itself is determined by voter turnout, over looks other forms of political engagement. For instance, research by Pattie, Syed and Whiteley, (2004), Hooghe and Stoole (2004) as well as O'Neill, (2007), indicates that Canadian youth look for engagement that has personal meaning and delivers faster results than traditional routes. They use the market place to practice consumer citizenship and turn to boycotts and boycotts as forms of political expression. Therefore, political inattentiveness among youth only appears to occur in the formal realm. Further, given the shortcomings with looking at only this type of engagement, it can be argued, that it may not actually be a lack of attention paid to the formal realm of politics, but rather, that youth are aware of what happens in formal politics and dislike what they see. As such, this explanation may not even be adequate to address declining voter turnout among youth, as inattentiveness could also be explained as being a result of youth being in tune with formal politics, and consciously choosing not to vote.

Likewise, it has been noted, that in the case of countries such as the United Kingdom, youth are in fact distrusting of politicians and politics. Similarly, Gidengil, et al., (2003), also

posit that “three in five [young Canadians] believe that the government does not care what people like them think and two in five believe that political parties hardly ever keep their election promises” (10). Even if youth do not trust politicians, and do not actively vote, does not mean that they are not politically engaged. Gidengil, et al (2003), also posit that political discontent is not a particularly good predictor when it comes to staying away from the polls, as many people who are “disaffected with politics, choose to vent that frustration by voting against the incumbent” (11), a point that is further bolstered by the most recent federal election, as it can be argued that this was the case. It also does not have any empirical backing, as authors such as Howe (2010), have demonstrated that there is not a factually based link between disaffection with formal politics, and lower rates of voter turnout. As a result, it cannot properly explain the lack of political engagement with regards to voting among youth on its own.

These four effects are the most prominent explanations of youth turnout, yet when examined more closely are rife with inadequacies. Though they may address and explain a few of the reasons for low voter turnout, they do not offer an adequate overall explanation for this low turnout. At many points these explanations contradict themselves and fail to justify their claims. Yes, low voter turnout among youth is an issue but each explanation appears to indicate that while voter turnout is low, youth political participation in general is not. The discussion of these explanations was intended to demonstrate the complexities of explaining youth voter trends. These trends cannot be explained with simple explanations as the reasons will constantly change. The 42nd Federal election demonstrated why it is difficult to specifically pinpoint a reason for low youth voter turnout. In order to fully understand this phenomenon,

all these explanations must be considered together and even then, still may not be able to fully explain the issue. Nonetheless, the validity of these explanations was not the intention of this chapter but rather to provide an overview of the most popular explanations posited for low youth voter turnout. As such, this paper will now provide an overview of the non-profit sector of Canada.

Chapter 2

How do Civic Engagement Organisations Operate?

In the realm of Get-Out-the-Vote (GOTV) initiatives, there are two types of civic engagement organizations that operate, registered charities and not-for-profit corporations. While both work with the aim of increasing or to some extent educating the public on the benefits of civic engagement, the organizational structure of each varies.

A not-for-profit organization is defined as a “a corporation [where] no part of the income or profit of which is distributed to its members, directors or officers” (Oleck, 1988, 5).

As such, all not-for-profit corporations share three general characteristics:

1. They are specifically designed as not-for-profit when organised.
2. Profits or assets may not be divided among corporate members, officers or directors in the manner of corporate share dividends
3. They may lawfully pursue only such purposes as are permitted for such organisations by statutes.

Not-for-profit organisations are thus divided into three not-for-profit categories “(1) public benefit (such as museums, schools and hospitals); (2) mutual benefit (such as cooperatives, trade or professional associations, and clubs); and (3) private benefit (such as tax-exemption-benefit-seeking organizations as low-cost housing developments, etc)” (Oleck, 1988, 6). While it may be argued that there is a difference between non-profit and not-for-profit organizations, for the purpose of this paper, they will be considered to be the same. Similarly, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) defines not-for-profit organizations as “associations, clubs or societies that are not charities and that are organized and operated exclusively for social welfare, civic improvement, pleasure, recreation, or any other purpose except profit. (Canada Revenue Agency, 2016)

Further, the terms not-for-profit and charitable at first glance appear to mean the same thing. However, they are distinctly different. “A not-for-profit corporation is not necessarily a charitable corporation; but a charitable corporation necessarily is a not-for-profit corporation. Not-for-profit is a general term, while charitable is a specific one” (Oleck, 1988, 7). The Canada Revenue Agency defines a registered charity as

“charitable organisations, public foundations, or private foundations that are created and resident in Canada. They must use their resources for charitable activities and have charitable purposes that fall into one or more of the following categories, relief of poverty, the advancement of education, the advancement of religion and other purposes that benefit the community” (Canada Revenue Agency, 2016).

Consequently, colleges, universities and research institutes are considered charitable organisations according to the CRA.

Using this iteration of charitable organisations, it would be easy to believe all civic engagement organisations are charities. Yet, as will be further discussed, a vast majority of the organisations that deal with youth voter engagement are considered not-for-profit organisations because they are operated by student associations. Student unions are generally tasked with representing the interests of the student body to the university administration as well as to the wider community. According to the British Council, the United Kingdom's international organization for cultural relations and educational opportunities, the role of student unions is to provide “representation, academic support and advice, welfare advice and support, sports clubs, societies and social activities. Students’ unions fundamentally believe in students being active political citizens, and campaign on various issues on a national and local level.” (British Council, 2016). Moreover, a perusal of the by-laws and governing principles of the student associations examined reveal a general consensus on their, which is mainly to

promote religious, artistic, literary, educational, social, recreational and sporting activities for its members and others. In doing this, all student associations are tasked with electing a board of governors to deal with the running and functioning of the association. In this sense, student associations are dependent upon volunteers, while charitable organizations are able to rely on paid full time staff in achieving their aims.

The first student unions can be traced back to medieval times. “The relationship between students and the university was structured as one of status, which was defined by membership in the university corporation” (Makela and Audette-Chapdelaine, 2013, 270). Students were subsequently subject to university norms and the corporation was recognized as the competent authority for their interpretation and enforcement. “Students were not initially understood as a polity within the university having their own interests; rather, students determined the interests of the university” (Makela and Audette-Chapdelaine, 2013, 271). During this period, student authority was at the center of university governance. The authority was organized according to student nations modelled as guilds. These nations or guilds were responsible for arranging lodgings for new students as well as hiring and disciplining professors, determining curriculum and mediating conflicts between students and the local population. (Cardozier, 1968). Student power gradually eroded over the centuries and by the time the first universities were established in North America in the seventeenth century, much of the control of students, had been ceded to faculty. Nonetheless, these student organizations did not simply disappear, rather, they continued to exist and evolve as institutions organized by students to govern their own affairs and represent their collective interests, that is, as student associations. (Ashby, 1970). Though both universities and student associations have undergone significant

changes since medieval times, contemporary Canadian student associations still engage in many of the same types of activities as medieval student unions. They now “organize many of the internal affairs of the student community, they represent students in both matters of curriculum and university policy, and they operate as representatives of the students’ interests towards the wider community” (Makela and Audette-Chapdelaine, 2013, 272). Student associations have thus assumed the role of the non-profit and voluntary sector, with regards to university students. Yet, what role if any do student associations play in the Canadian voluntary sector? To determine this, the issue of youth voting as well as the non-profit sector and in particular the literature related to both these areas, must be examined.

2.1 Challenges Facing the Non-Profit and Voluntary Sector

Beginning in the 1980s, neoliberal policies began a trend that led to the downsizing or closing of many community services. This created a void in the organisations able to administer and deliver such services. In response to this, voluntary groups began to emerge to fill these voids. As such, in a “context where private and public sector services or supports have been downsized or eliminated, the voluntary and non-profit sector has been increasingly called upon to fill the gap” (Ryser and Halseth 2014, 44). This increased presence or insertion of the voluntary sector in public policy delivery, has led to various studies on the success and failures of these organisations. Despite these various studies, certain areas in which these organisations operate have not been fully explored. One such area, is that of civic engagement and the work of various civic engagement organisations in this arena. The success or failure of this particular type of organisation has not been extensively studied, given the inability to draw a causal link

between the work of these organisations and the act of voting. This makes it difficult to determine the value of these organisations, or whether or not they have been successful in their mandates. Given this, the act of voting and the impact these organisations have on this act is what will be examined in this paper, not the general political participation of youth. To be more precise, the investment of resources on trying to foster civic engagement among youth, is the crux of discussion for this paper. The non-profit and voluntary sector faces various challenges to achieving its goals. These include operational barriers, financial barriers, limited human resources and policy barriers (Ryser and Halseth 2014). While these barriers all address individual shortcomings of the voluntary and non-profit sector, they are all interrelated. In some cases, evidence of two or more barriers operating at the same time can be observed. While this review will cover all of these barriers, it is expected that some of the challenges faced by the non-profit sector could possibly be explained by one or more of these barriers.

Mellahj and Wilkinson (2004) identify two leading schools of thought in the study of organisations' success and failure. They call these schools of thought deterministic and voluntaristic (Wollebaek 2009). As Hannan and Freeman (1989) posit, organisational ecology is the central deterministic theory. According to this perspective "ecological factors (such as organisational density and the size and age of the organisation) and environmental factors (demographic, economic, and regulatory changes) determine the life chances of organisations" (Wollebaek 2009, 268). Ironically these characteristics are all outside the organisations' control. On the other hand, the voluntaristic school is an agency-oriented approach, and places particular emphasis on the "organisational structure, role and composition of the board, and how problems are perceived and solved" (Wollebaek 2009, 268).

Though organisational ecology has identified several liabilities that elevate the risk of failure among voluntary and non-profit organisations, these liabilities can also be categorised as operational barriers. Operational barriers can include but are not limited to what the organisation does and why (Sorriento and Simonetta 2011). This arises sometimes when the issue the organisation was established to address has changed, been solved or no longer exists (Ryser and Halseth, 2014). As Stinchcombe (1965) noted, one such risk is the liability of newness, which implies that recently founded organisations are inexperienced, lack the resources to ensure resilience in times of crisis and have not yet mustered sufficient external support. This suggests that they are more likely to disband than mature organisations. Similarly, Aldrich and Auster (1986) suggest that small organisations face many of the same difficulties as new organisations. These problems include difficulties raising capital, training the workforce, and carrying administrative costs. Kreutzer and Jager (2011) argue that conflict can emerge in organisations that have a mixture of volunteer and paid staff. This mixture can sometimes lead to conflicts over the allocation of the organisations resources, along with the organisation's management practices as well as its preference for formal as opposed to informal work. The conflict over the preference for formal or informal work can result if paid staff execute the same tasks that volunteers do for free. This results in roles and responsibilities of the organisation's staff as well as any partner organisations becoming unclear. Therefore, organisational ecology argues supported by various empirical studies that large size increases the probability of survival (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Freeman, Carroll, and Hannan, 1983; Singh, Tucker, and House, 1986; Twombly, 2003). It is therefore expected that the smaller

organisations examined in this paper will not be as successful as the larger organisations in generating income, recruiting staff as well as the overall delivery of their mandate.

Moreover, Wollebaek (2009) further supports this belief by arguing that larger organisations with hierarchical structures are likely to be more successful. According to Wollebaek:

higher levels in the organisations possess expertise that the local chapter can draw on, they can assist during periods of crisis or decline, or they can even put the group on hold for a period of time while awaiting the emergence of new activists. The links to a regional or national purpose also indicate that there is more at stake than maintaining the activity here and now; the fate of a larger cause is also important. This fosters a stronger sense of loyalty to the organisation, which is likely to postpone termination.

Larger organisations are believed to have a higher survival rate than that of smaller organisations due to “institutional embeddedness” (Baum and Oliver, 1991). Institutional embeddedness argues that “ties to the environment, such as municipal authorities, donors, other organisations, or private companies, provide associations with legitimacy and access to economic and social capital” (Baum and Oliver, 1992). Again, this indicates that larger organisations are likely to be more successful than smaller ones.

Another variable upon which the success or failure of voluntary and non-profit organisations hinges is the composition of the board. As Wollebaek (2009) postulates, “boards with a high proportion of members with high occupational attainment [are expected] to fare better than others” (273). The argument here is that “persons with higher education, a close correlate of occupational status, and administrative work experience are expected to have superior managerial skills” (Wollebaek 2009, 273). While this is difficult to assess in the context of GOTVs, as their boards are usually a mixture of business professionals, young professionals and in some cases students, it once again highlights an operational barrier. Another barrier that

this variable highlights is the financial barrier these organisations face. Many of these organisations and in particular smaller organisations rely heavily on volunteers. As Baum and Oliver (1992) posit, institutional embeddedness can increase an organisation's chances of accessing social and economic capital, yet many of these organisations are operating in a field that is saturated with similar organisations, as well as an increasingly small pot of government funding programs (Allen, Smith and DaSilva 2013). This has made it increasingly difficult to recruit volunteers and in some cases paid staff, resulting in "conflict across communities as different groups move from a cooperative to a competitive environment" (Ryser and Halseth, 2014, 45).

In addition to fewer grant programs, many of the "funding programs have outdated frameworks or misunderstand [the] realities and operating costs" (Halseth and Ryser 2010, 45). This decrease in funding has further been exacerbated by the retrenchment of industry and business support since the recession of 2008, along with the fact that government funding has increasingly only been delivered on a short-term basis, limiting the ability of voluntary groups to secure stable resources for staff (Walk, Schinnenburg and Handy 2013). This has created a viscous circle for smaller voluntary and non-profit organisations whereby they "need volunteers to access funding, but need funding to attract and retain volunteers" (Imagine Canada 2006, 16).

Volunteer recruitment appears to be the biggest challenge faced by the voluntary and non-profit sector, which brings to the fore the issue of limited human resources. Difficulty in attracting and retaining volunteers is widely touted as one of the biggest issues affecting the sector. One of the biggest concerns for this sector is the decreasing ability of volunteers to offer

long term commitments. This has severely limited the ability of organisations that are reliant on volunteers to plan for the future (Imagine Canada 2006). This particular concern is rooted in the inability to attract sufficient funding. Competing in a sector to which funding has been routinely cut, many of the volunteers are being given jobs for which they are unqualified or do not have the relevant training. This has led to many organisations losing volunteers because of burnout, inadequate management and training, yet another example of an operational barrier.

According to Imagine Canada (2006), “few organisations can afford the time or money to properly manage or train their volunteers. As a result, volunteers feel pressured and overloaded which leads to burnout” (4). A common belief among many organisations in the voluntary sector is that this problem arises not only due to reduced funding, but also as a result of what many felt was a general underappreciation of the contributions of volunteers by both the organisations as well as the funders (Imagine Canada 2006).

Moreover, a similar problem, that of the recruitment and retention of staff can also be linked to the issue of decreased funding for the voluntary sector. This particular problem can be said to span two barriers, the operational barrier and the financial barrier. Due to decreased funding to the sector, many organisations do not have stable funding to provide staff with permanent positions that have competitive salaries and benefits. This has resulted in organisations hiring much more inexperienced staff on short-term contracts. (Imagine Canada 2006). This results in high staff turnover rates, as staff only stays long enough to acquire the experience to secure a better paying position in government or the private sector. This places further pressure on the organisation to plan for the future, incurs high recruitment and training costs, along with placing increased pressure on the remaining staff leading to further turnover.

As such, a circle is created whereby staff retention is very low resulting in numerous spinoff effects.

One such spinoff is the capacity of an organisation's human resources (Ryser and Halseth 2014) or an inability to attract funding because of an inability to attract qualified staff or to properly train volunteers to deal with the needs of the organisation. This particular problem is more prevalent among smaller organisations. The decrease in funding available has prevented some organisations from attracting qualified staff or adequately training volunteers. This has resulted in smaller organisations having to rely on underqualified staff and volunteers to compile the funding application. Added to this is the increasing reluctance of funders to fund core operations. "Instead, funders appear to be only interested in funding projects. This makes it difficult for organisations to pay for core expenses like finance and administration, human resources, and infrastructure which, in turn, makes it difficult for them to meet the accountability requirements of funders" (Imagine Canada 2006, 12). This has resulted in more organisations and in particular smaller ones being unable to properly fund their operations.

Another persistent issue highlighted by the literature is the general feeling of being undervalued most organisations in this sector believe comes from the government. This can be considered a policy barrier. Policy barriers arise when government policy fails to keep up with the changing realities of the voluntary sector. This usually occurs when governments try to "reduce the level of risk to central governments rather than to provide a more supportive policy environment for the voluntary sector operating on the ground" (Ryser and Halseth 2014, 46). Interestingly, this undervaluation is not blamed solely on the government, but rather on the inability of organisations in this sector to demonstrate their value to governments, business and

the general public. Though it was noted that organisations would like the government to have greater collaboration with the non-profit and voluntary sector before making policy changes, it was acknowledged that the sector must also do a better job of communicating its value to governments, businesses and the general public. Essentially, it was acknowledged that the voluntary and non-profit sector must be able to more effectively market itself (Imagine Canada, 2006).

One final issue that is that of an attitudinal barrier faced by the voluntary sector. This revolves around the attitudes and actions of an organisation's leader or leaders. This particular barrier is believed to be a result of what McKinney and Kahn (2004) refer to as organisational protectionism, the entrenchment of positions and unrealistic expectations. Similarly, Sobel, Curtis and Lockie (2001) also identify a reticence to accept change as contributing to this attitudinal barrier. While this particular barrier is not as prevalent in the literature on the voluntary sector, it must be noted in this review as it will form part of the basis of analysis for one of the organisations (Engage Nova Scotia) examined in this paper. Though it is presented as a negative impact, it can also be viewed as being positive, if viewed from a point of view that places an emphasis on the role of the leader and the impact a specific type of leader can have on an organisation. This particular 'barrier' may be able to garner more funds for an organisation due to the influence of a leader but it can also lead to accusations of favouritism. Ultimately, attitudinal barriers can negatively or positively impact an organisation.

Consequently, an overview of the literature on challenges faced by the voluntary and non-profit sector indicates that there are four main challenges faced by organisations in this sector: (operational, financial, limited human resources and policy barriers). Further, those

organisations most affected by these challenges appear to be the smaller ones. It also reveals a trend whereby organisations are unable to attract funds which in turn leads to them being unable to attract volunteers and staff, which makes attracting funds even more difficult. Though brief, this demonstrates some of the issues that are expected to arise during this paper. It is expected that larger organisations will be able to attract more funding from governments and donors, whereas smaller organisations will struggle in this respect. It is also expected that given this, the larger organisations will be better able to achieve their goal of fostering civic engagement.

2.2 The Canadian Non-profit and Voluntary Sector

The non-profit sector has played a major role in the Canadian economy and policy formulation for many years. Until 2009, the government of Canada published a yearly report of the non-profit sector of Canada. Though the last report was published almost eight years ago, it contains some very pertinent information that can be applied today.

Often referred to interchangeably as “civil society”, the “voluntary”, “third” or “independent” sector, this group of organizations plays a critical role in society, separate from that of governments or corporations, and is central to community engagement and the building of social capital (Statistics Canada 2007). Theoretically, all non-profit institutions operating throughout the Canadian economy have similar structural and operational characteristics. They are institutionalized to some extent with a specific purpose or mandate. They do not generate profits for the purpose of distributing profits among specific persons, owners or directors. They are self-governing and able to control their activities, and, finally, membership and

contributions of time and money are not required by law or as a condition of citizenship (Statistics Canada, 2007).

Nonprofit and voluntary organizations address needs and interests of citizens that governments and the private sector do not (Statistics Canada 2005). Nonprofit and voluntary organizations are diverse, in both their areas of activity and their organizational characteristics. Yet, underlying these differences is a common characteristic, “they are instruments for Canadians’ collective action and engagement in civic life” (Statistics Canada 2005, 13). Nonprofit and voluntary organizations tend to occupy specific niches: most have a local focus, and many concentrate on addressing the needs of specific segments of the population. Collectively, however, these organizations have a very broad scope of activities, and they touch almost every aspect of Canadian life (Statistics Canada 2005). With their broad scope of activities, nonprofit and voluntary organizations work to address the full range of human needs, improving the quality of lives and providing essential services on which Canadians have come to depend. For example, nonprofit and voluntary organizations provide social services, ranging from day-care centres for children and services for youth to caring for seniors. They also provide opportunities for Canadians to become engaged in their communities by participating in sports, recreation or the arts or by addressing social and environmental issues. Nonprofit and voluntary organizations provide education and training, housing and shelter, and provide places for people to attend to their spiritual needs. Many address the needs of specific segments of the population, such as persons with disabilities, new Canadians or the homeless. These organizations often extend our social safety net to catch those who are not served by government or private programs and services, acting in some instances as an extension or

agency of government (Statistics Canada 2005). Nonprofit and voluntary organizations tend to be focused on providing services within their own neighbourhood, city, town or rural municipality.

A key legal distinction is between those organizations that are registered charities and those that are not. Registered charities are able to provide receipts for donations that can be used to claim tax credits. This gives registered charities an advantage over other nonprofit and voluntary organizations in their ability to attract donations from individual Canadians as well as corporations. Moreover, registered charities benefit from the provision that charitable foundations can disburse funds only to qualified donees, of which registered charities are the largest single group. Registered charities may also be exempt from paying income tax and property taxes. They may be eligible to receive partial rebates on the payment of federal taxes on goods and services and provincial sales taxes in some provinces. Further, to maintain their charitable status, these organizations must fulfill certain requirements, such as devoting the bulk of their revenues to charitable activities, filing annual information returns to the Canada Revenue Agency and refraining from all political advocacy. More than half of all the nonprofit organizations in Canada are registered as charities, a privilege conferred only on organizations whose activities are clearly directed to public rather than private benefit (Statistics Canada 2005). The Canada Revenue Agency reports approximately 80,000 registered charities in Canada.

The interests, talents and energies of individual Canadians drive nonprofit and voluntary organizations. Virtually all organizations are governed by boards of volunteer directors, which define the missions and objectives of these organizations. More than half of all organizations

are run completely through the contributions of volunteers—in the form of donations of both time and money. Collectively, these organizations draw on more than two billion volunteer hours, the equivalent of more than one million full-time jobs, and more than eight billion in individual donations to provide their programs, services and products (Statistics Canada 2005).

Within the nonprofit sector of Canada, the average age of organizations is 29 years. The number of years that organizations have been operating varies significantly with their primary area of activity. The relationship between length of operation and primary activity may reflect changes over time in the popularity of various causes. The more recent founding of certain types of organizations suggests that they have been instituted to meet current needs (Statistics Canada 2005). Given that civic engagement organizations that promote Get-out-the-vote activities are a relatively new phenomenon, this is representative of them.

Non-profit organizations continue to make significant contributions to the economic and social well-being of Canadians. In 2007, the value added or gross domestic product (GDP) of the core non-profit sector amounted to \$35.6 billion, accounting for 2.5 per cent of the total Canadian economy (Statistics Canada 2007). In addition to these funds, core non-profit institutions derived roughly one-third of their revenue from three additional sources: membership fees (15.9 per cent), donations from households (12 per cent) and investment income (4.9 per cent) (Statistics Canada 2007). The majority of government funding to the core non-profit sector came from provincial jurisdictions. The core nonprofit sector refers to charitable and nonprofit organizations that are not hospitals and universities (Statistics Canada 2007). Of all provincial transfers to the overall non-profit sector, the core segment received on average 15 per cent, with the share of total provincial transfers representing 13.9 per cent in

2007. Provincial government transfers rose \$4.2 billion over the eleven-year period to reach \$10.9 billion in 2007, growing 62.8 per cent over this period. Interestingly, universities and colleges which for the purposes of the report were not considered part of the core nonprofit sector, are more reliant on income generated from the sales of goods and services rather than public funding. To this end, this universities and colleges derived one-third of their revenue from the sales of goods and services, which were dominated by tuition fees, while only half of their revenue came in the form of government transfers from provincial sources (Statistics Canada 2007). The core non-profit sector relies on a significantly broader set of revenue sources, with sales of goods and services ranking at the top of their list. A standard text book definition of sales of goods and services are “the monetary exchange by a consumer for goods or services provided by a supplier, where the end result is a transfer of goods, property or services from the supplier to the consumer.” While transfers from households remained the domain of the core segment, these organizations also obtain significant revenue from membership fees (Statistics Canada 2007).

Many nonprofit and voluntary organizations consider their volunteers and paid staff to be one of their greatest strengths, and the National Survey of Nonprofit and Voluntary Organizations (NSNVO) demonstrates how important both are. Virtually all nonprofit and voluntary organizations rely on volunteers to some degree, and more than half rely solely on volunteers to fulfill their mission. Many Canadians volunteer for more than one organization. As a result, nonprofit and voluntary organizations report a combined volunteer complement of over 19 million that contribute more than two billion hours of volunteer time, or the equivalent of more than one million fulltime jobs. From the perspective of an individual organization, this

represents an average of 14,492 hours, or 7.5 full-time jobs per year (Statistics Canada 2005). Volunteers serve a variety of functions in nonprofit and voluntary organizations. Ninety three percent of volunteers are engaged exclusively in activities such as delivering, or helping to deliver, programs and services and engaging in fundraising and campaigning activities. Collectively, these volunteers account for 91 per cent of volunteer hours. While 31 per cent of these volunteers give their time only once or twice a year, for example, to do campaigning or fundraising, 69 per cent are more frequently engaged by the organizations for which they volunteer. (Statistics Canada 2005)

Most people who volunteer for nonprofit and voluntary organizations do so with registered charities. Although registered charities represent only 56 per cent of organizations, they account for 71 per cent of all volunteers and 67 per cent of total volunteer hours. (Statistics Canada 2005) While organizations with annual revenues of more than \$10 million make up only one per cent of all organizations, they account for 20 per cent of all volunteers and 13 per cent of total volunteer hours. The 13 per cent of organizations with revenues of \$500,000 or more accounted for 41 per cent of all volunteer hours. The smallest organizations (revenues under \$30,000) make up 42 per cent of all organizations, but account for only 12 per cent of volunteers and 15 per cent of total volunteer hours (Statistics Canada 2005). The bulk of volunteers are engaged by organizations that have relatively small staff complements where 64 per cent of volunteers are engaged by organizations with fewer than 10 staff. The largest paid-staff organizations (staff complements of 25 or more) engage only 14 per cent of all volunteers (Statistics Canada 2005). In most cases, civic engagement organizations would be among those

organizations with small staff complements and as such, would be one of those organizations that accounted for 64 per cent of all volunteers.

Volunteers can be seen as the life line or nervous system of these organizations.

Volunteers are responsible for a significant portion of activities that help these organizations to achieve their goals. In the most recent report on volunteering in Canada released in 2015, the Canadian government posits that “in 2013, 44 per cent of Canadians aged 15 years and older volunteered for a charitable or non-profit organization” (Statistics Canada 2015, 4). This is particularly interesting as the rate of volunteering among teens aged 15 to 19 was the highest of all age groups. Moreover, the top four sectors which benefitted the most from volunteers were social services such as day care centres for children and services for youth to caring for seniors, which accounted for 25 per cent of all volunteers in Canada, sports and recreation at 24 per cent, education and research at 20 per cent and religious organizations at 19 per cent. (Statistics Canada 2015). Of particular note is that over the last decade rates of volunteering in the social services, sports and recreation sectors have held steady. This further demonstrates the importance of volunteers to these organizations.

Volunteering can take many forms, involving a variety of activities and benefiting a diverse range of organizations and groups. It can be episodic, meaning participation in one or two events over the course of a year, or more regular and ongoing involvement, such as a weekly commitment to a specific cause (Statistics Canada 2015). Age appears to be the most consistent predictor of volunteer involvement, with the 2013 rate of involvement among teens being the highest in the report. Interestingly, there appears to be a reason why volunteering rates among this age group appears to be highest given that some reported volunteering

because it was mandatory. “One in five volunteers aged 15 to 19 reported that they volunteered because they were required to do so, either by their school or some other way” (Statistics Canada 2015, 5). For example, one such program exists in Ontario, where high school students are required to complete at least forty hours of volunteer work in order to graduate. “Students must also complete 40 hours of community involvement while in high school and must meet the provincial literacy requirement” (Ontario Ministry of Education 2014). Similar programs exist in British Columbia, Newfoundland and Labrador where students are required to complete 30 hours and the North-West Territories where students are required to complete 25 hours. Nova Scotia, Manitoba and Prince Edward Island also have similar programs, but offered as electives rather than mandatory classes (Sagan, 2015). Another explanation for the high amount of youth volunteers hinges on the job market. “Almost half of volunteers (47 per cent) under the age of 35 were motivated by possible job prospects” (Statistics Canada 2015, 6). Volunteering gives young people a chance to gain valuable experience in the workforce, and can sometimes be counted as work experience, which highlights another reason why it is important to study these organizations and their initiatives, as they are molding youth leaders for the future.

Another trend that emerged in the report was the correlation between higher rates of volunteering and high levels of education. “With a volunteer rate of 55 per cent, university graduates were most likely to report volunteering in the previous 12 months, as compared to Canadians with lower levels of educational attainment” (Statistics Canada 2015, 8). This once again raises an issue that will be discussed in greater detail later, that these organizations and initiatives appear to be target the segment of the youth population already engaged and not

the actual segment that is not presently engaged. “In 2004, 27 per cent of all volunteers had a university degree, increasing to 32 per cent in 2013. This increase largely reflects the changing educational profile of Canadian society and corresponding pool of university graduates available to volunteer” (Statistics Canada 2015, 8). However, it was not specified whether or not these “university graduates” were recent graduates or those who would have graduated in the 1960s and 1980s. As such, it is difficult to determine whether or not this increase is as a result of the impetus of new graduates or the increasing involvement of senior citizens with university degrees.

With such high rates of volunteering among youth, what exactly do they spend their time doing as volunteers? It appears as if the area where volunteers spend the majority of their time is organizing events and fund raising. “In 2013, nearly half (46 per cent) of volunteers organized, supervised or coordinated events, and about the same share (45 per cent) helped with fundraising” (Statistics Canada 2015, 11).

These statistics demonstrate the importance of the nonprofit and voluntary sectors to Canadian life, as these trends appear to continue today. Using these reports as part of the basis of analysis, the success of civic engagement organizations and their get-out-the-vote initiatives will be examined. Though the impact of these organizations can never be causally established, these statistics will act as an excellent basis for comparison and evaluation of these organizations and their programs. Similarly, using the latest report on the voluntary sector of the Canadian society released in 2015, the importance of volunteers and the ease with which some organizations can attract volunteers will also be assessed. It is important to note that while these reports provide a solid base from which an evaluation can be done, they are not the

best barometer of the success and failures of these organizations and their programs. However, they do provide examples of the standards by which the Canadian government judge these organizations.

Moreover, it is imperative to note, that the success and failures of these organizations will be examined based on how they use their resources to persuade youth to get out and vote. As such, the act of voting and the impact these organizations and their programs have on this act is what is being examined in this paper, not the general political participation of youth. Consequently, the evaluation of the success or failure of these organizations will also rely on their ability to get youth voting, given that it is my belief that these organizations are not targeting the correct segment of the youth population.

Chapter 3

CIVIC ENGAGEMENT ORGANISATIONS PROFILES

Low youth engagement and in particular voting has been a major concern not only for Canada, but also for many governments throughout the world. The reasons for this perceived lack of engagement have been plentiful, and various solutions have been posited on how best to rectify the issue. Civic engagement organizations have been one such solution that has been increasingly promoted by the Canadian government in recent years. As such, this section will introduce the organizations that will be examined. It will profile the organizations outlining their dates of incorporation, governing structures, among other things in order to give an idea of what the organization is focused on. The organizations will be profiled based on their status as either a registered charity or not-for-profit. To this end, there are five registered charities and four not-for-profits, which will be examined. The registered charities are 1. Samara Canada, 2. Springtide Collective for Democracy Society, 3. Engage Nova Scotia Civic Engagement Society, 4. CIVIX and 5. The Apathy is Boring Project, the not-for-profits are the 1. Canadian Alliance of Student Associations, 2. Dalhousie Student Union, 3. Canadian Federation of Students and 4. Students Nova Scotia. What makes these organizations unique is their voter education and civic engagement programs. To this end each organization is distinctive in its own right, as will be demonstrated.

3.1 Registered Charities

Samara Canada

Samara is a registered charity listed under the name *The Samara Project*, and business registration number 843093295RR0001. Officially established on December 22, 2012, Samara is

registered as a charitable organization, with a listed charity type of education (CRA, 2016).

Located in Toronto Ontario, Canada, Samara's efforts are not focused exclusively in Ontario, but unlike most of the other organizations examined in this paper, Samara has more of a national reach. Samara's main focus as listed with the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) is the support of schools and education, and as such its activities are related to voter education and civic engagement. Samara employs full time and part time staff, and is governed by a board of directors or trustees.

Samara is listed as having eight Trustees, where a trustee is defined as "An individual person or member of a board given control or powers of administration of property in trust with a legal obligation to administer it solely for the purposes specified." (Oxford Dictionary, 2016). The purpose of these trustees is to ensure that Samara continues to operate with its initial founding principles in mind. Of the eight listed trustees, seven are considered to be at arm's length with the other trustees. The term "at arm's length describes a relationship where persons act independently of each other or who are not related." (CRA, 2016). Interestingly, one of the trustees, Michael MacMillan also sits on the board of another registered charity being examined in this paper, namely CIVIX. Samara's current ongoing programs include

1. Conducting research into public matters affecting the well-being of Canadians and their communities, and disseminating and making public policy information available.
2. Arranging and conducting seminars, courses, conferences and workshops on public issues facing Canadians and their communities.
3. Promoting citizen engagement and volunteerism in communities across Canada. (CRA, 2016).

Further, Samara claims that its "primary areas in which the charity is now carrying out programs to achieve its charitable purposes are public education, other study programs and research" (CRA, 2016). In terms of these two purposes Samara reported that 60 per cent of its

time and resources were spent on public education and other study programs, while 40 per cent was spent on research.

According to CRA records concluding at the end of 2015, Samara had seven full time employees and three part time employees. Samara reported that for the year 2015, it recorded \$884,612 in revenue and spent \$609,991 on salaries, with two of the full-time employees being paid between \$80,000 and \$119,999, and the remaining five being paid between \$40,000 and \$79,000. The total reported expenditure for part time employees was \$92, 928. (CRA,2016). In addition to the paying of salaries, Samara spent another \$262,550 across the following areas: 1. Professional and consulting fees: \$81,912; 2. Occupancy cost: \$44,801; 3. Office supplies and expenses: \$39,999; 4. Advertising and promotion: \$37,584; 5. Travel and vehicle expenses: \$21,871; 6. Outreach: \$20,113, 7. Research grants: \$12,562; 9. Amortization of capitalized assets: \$3,708. Samara's total expenditure for 2015 was reported as \$872, 541 (CRA, 2016). This speaks to an organization which is clearly trying to foster civic engagement, yet, it is important to examine where Samara's revenue comes from, given that they reported not engaging in fundraising activities for the year 2015 (CRA, 2016).

Samara reported issuing tax receipts for a total of \$48, 555 in 2015, while it also reported receiving \$630,330 from other registered charities. It was also reported that Samara received a total of \$106,562 for which tax receipts were not issued. Additionally, Samara received \$37,410 in funding from the federal government and another \$27,683 from provincial and territorial governments. There was also \$32,623 in unaccounted for revenue for the period of 2015. (CRA, 2016). This breakdown means that 71 per cent of their revenue came from other registered charities, while seven per cent came from a combination of federal and provincial

governments. This seven per cent was the lowest percentage received by any of the charitable organizations in this study. Of note is the percentage that came from organizations or persons who would receive a tax deduction, as this equated to 12 per cent. This was the largest percentage of this type of revenue received by any of the charitable organizations examined in this paper.

Springtide Collective

Springtide Collective is a registered charity listed under the name *Springtide Collective for Democracy Society*, and business registration number 838267136RR000. Officially established in 2012, the society is only listed as having being officially registered by the Canada Revenue Agency on February 9, 2015. Springtide Collective is registered as a charitable organization, with a listed charity type of education (CRA, 2016). Located in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada where all its efforts are concentrated, Springtide's main focus is listed simply as "education organizations – not elsewhere classified" (CRA, 2016). Similar to Samara, Springtide is governed by a Board of Directors/Trustees, and employs both full time and part time staff, though the amount of staff Springtide employs is vastly smaller than Samara. Springtide's board of directors comprises seven directors, none of whom sit on the boards of any other organizations being examined in this paper and are all at arm's length of the other board members.

Springtide's current ongoing programs include two programs *Off Script* and *Make Democracy Better*. *Off Script* is a program where interviews are conducted with "former elected officials as research and education material for better understanding how provincial government does and could work" (CRA,2016). *Make Democracy Better* involves researching

“specific policy alternatives for improving democracy, publish[ing] the findings, host[ing] community events to share the findings, solicit[ing] citizen input, and shar[ing] those findings with the public, government and other stakeholders” (CRA, 2016). Springtide has also implemented three new programs called *Local Decisions*, the *Educational Speaker Series* and a *Young Voter Education Project*. The *Local Decisions* program involves “workshops and training to members of the public considering running for office, and [aims to] deliver voter education programming in the lead up to the 2016 municipal elections.” The *Educational speaker series* incorporates “public conversations with experts, political actors, and thinkers who have experience or ideas on politics and democracy to share.” While *Young Voter Education* is a collaboration between Elections Nova Scotia and Springtide “to raise awareness of opportunities for young voter engagement” (CRA, 2016). These programs unlike the others are not all geared towards increasing youth voter turnout, but at increasing civic engagement and understanding. Unlike the other organizations, Springtide of one of two registered charities including Engage Nova Scotia, that did not simply push programs aimed at university students. Unlike Samara, Springtide does not list any primary areas in which the charity is carrying out programs to achieve its charitable purposes.

Springtide employs both full time and part time staff, but not to the same extent as Samara. Springtide is only listed as having one full time and three part time staff members. Similarly, Springtide does not generate as much revenue as Samara, with a total reported revenue for 2015 of \$134,445. Of this reported revenue, \$75, 141 was spent on salaries, with the lone full time employee being paid between \$40,000 and \$79,999 a year. The total expenditure on part time employees was reported as \$17,323. (CRA,2016). In addition to paying

salaries, Springtide spent an additional \$50,601 across the following areas: 1. Professional and consulting fees: \$17,028; 2. Occupancy costs: \$7,992; 3. Purchased supplies and assets: \$7,386; 4. Travel and vehicle expenses: \$5,263; 5. Office supplies and expenses: \$4,562; 6. Education and training for staff and volunteers: \$4,560; 7. Advertising and Promotion: \$3,273; 8. Interest and bank charges: \$481; 9. Licenses, memberships and dues: \$56. Springtide's total expenditure for 2015 was reported as \$125,241. (CRA, 2016). However, the CRA lists the total amount paid in salaries, outreach and community programs or charitable activities as \$96,249. Given this, Springtide would have spent 77 per cent of its revenue on efforts to foster greater civic engagement in Nova Scotia. However, if expenditure on management and administration, as well as fund raising is also counted as part of Springtide's efforts to foster greater civic engagement, this figure increases to 93 per cent. This is particularly impressive, given that Springtide's revenue was not as much as Samara.

Unlike Samara, Springtide had to fundraise, and subsequently spent a total \$7,854 on fundraising. This equates to six per cent of its revenue spent on an area that may not have been included or counted as part of its civic engagement efforts. If Springtide did not have to spend this money on fundraising, it may have been able to use it to further aid in its goals. Either way this should not be held against it as it is a far smaller and younger organization than Samara.

Similar to Samara, Springtide did report issuing tax receipts for various donations. Springtide reported issuing tax receipts for a total of \$8,244 or six per cent of its total revenue. However, the reported amount for which tax receipts were not issued was \$19,813. Springtide also reported receiving \$10,000 or seven per cent of its total revenue from other registered charities. Interestingly, the amount of money received from the federal government was less

than that received from provincial or territorial governments. It was reported that the total received from the federal government was \$2,847, while the total received from provincial or territorial governments was \$8,360. The majority of Springtide's revenue however appears to have come from the sale of goods and services as well as royalty revenue and partners. The amount reported from the sale of goods and services was \$49,831, while the reported amount received from royalties and partners was \$35,350 (CRA, 2016). This means that 37 per cent of Springtide's revenue came from its own efforts while 26 per cent came from royalties and partners. As such, it would appear as if the vast majority of Springtide's revenue comes from its own efforts and the support of its partners, while eight per cent came from government resources. Though the total amount received from government sources was not as much as Samara, the percentage was more than Samara's which is interesting given the size and age of an organizations such as Springtide. Unlike Samara, Springtide only received six per cent of its revenue from organizations or persons who would receive a tax credit. This was also the second largest amount received in this category across all the registered charities examined.

Engage Nova Scotia

Engage Nova Scotia is listed under the name *Engage Nova Scotia Civic Engagement Society*, and business registration number 854284924RR0001. Engage Nova Scotia was officially established on October 6, 2010 under the name Envision Halifax. It was not until 2012 that the organization formally adopted the name Engage Nova Scotia. (CRA, 2016). Engage Nova Scotia is registered as a charitable organization, with a listed charity type of education. Engage Nova Scotia's main focus is listed as teaching institutions or institutions of learning. (CRA, 2016).

Similar to other registered charities, Engage Nova Scotia is governed by a Board of Directors/Trustees, with a current listing of thirteen directors. None of these directors sit on the boards of any of the other organizations examined, though one of them Mark Coffin is the founder of the Springtide Collective for Democracy Society. They are all reported as being at arm's length with the other board members. While this information was provided in documents secured from the Canada Revenue Agency, further examination of the organization's listing under the charities listing form does not list the names of the directors or trustees.

Engage Nova Scotia's current ongoing programs include three programs, *Share Thanksgiving*, *Cumberland County Life* and *Stepping up Conferences*. *Share Thanksgiving* is a program in its second year designed to match immigrants with a local family for the Thanksgiving holiday. *Cumberland County Life* is a "session designated to promote collaboration and generate concrete actions that could be undertaken without government assistance to improve the economy" (CRA, 2016). While the *Stepping Up Conferences* is a collaboration between "Engage Nova Scotia, the Halifax Partnership, the Cape Breton Partnership, the Community Sector Council of Nova Scotia, and other partners to illuminate stories of success, and mobilize action" (CRA, 2016). Engage Nova Scotia also launched five new programs in 2015 which included the *Impact Book Unlaunch and Workshop*, *A New Partnership: Building Relationships through Education*, *North Shore Governors Gathering*, *Lowering the Waterline* and *Ideas Marketplace*. (CRA, 2016). Like Springtide Engage Nova Scotia was one of two registered charities where the majority of programs were not directed at university students. Engage Nova Scotia does not list any primary areas in which the charity is carrying out programs to achieve its charitable purposes.

Moreover, Engage Nova Scotia is the only registered charitable organization that does not employ part time employees, with a listing of four full time employees and no part time employees. Engage Nova Scotia's revenue for 2015 places it in third among the registered charitable organizations examined, reporting \$610, 522 in revenue. Of this reported revenue, \$196,048 was spent on salaries, with the one of the full-time employees being paid between \$80,000 and \$119,999 a year, while the remaining three were paid between \$40,000 and \$79,999 a year. (CRA,2016). In addition to paying salaries, an additional \$376,828 was spent in the following areas: 1. Professional and consulting fees: \$226,608; 2. Unaccounted Expenses: \$110,542; 3. Donated goods used in charitable activities: \$28,380; 4. Travel Expenses: \$7,480; 5. Amortization of capitalized assets: \$1,886; 6. Office supplies: \$1,884; 7. Interest and bank charges: \$48. Of note is an expense of \$110, 542 for which no specific explanation is given, which was also the largest reported unaccounted expense across all the organizations examined. This along with the total paid in salaries as well as other minor expenses, brought the total expenditure for 2015 to \$572,876. (CRA,2016). If all the above expenses with the exception of the unaccounted for expenses, as well as the amount paid in salaries is considered to have gone towards furthering the aims of the organization, then Engage Nova Scotia would have spent a total of \$462,334 or 81 per cent of its total revenue on efforts to foster greater civic engagement in Nova Scotia. Though this is a significant amount to invest in efforts for greater civic engagement, it is still not as much as the other registered charities which would have spent more of their revenue on similar efforts. This is particularly notable in the case of an organization such as Springtide which is younger, has considerably fewer resources, and was still able to dedicate more of revenue to civic engagement programs.

A similar pattern emerges in the amount of revenue Engage Nova Scotia received for which it issued tax receipts. Engage Nova Scotia reported issuing tax receipts for a total amount of \$140,775, or 23 per cent of its total revenue (CRA,2016). This was by far the most received by any of the registered charities or any of the organizations examined. Interestingly, there was no reported income for which tax receipts were not issued. Engage Nova Scotia was the only registered charity not to receive any revenue from other registered charities. Another interesting point was the amount of money Engage Nova Scotia received from governments. While no income was reported from the federal government, Engage Nova Scotia reported receiving \$464,878 from provincial or territorial governments. (CRA, 2016) This accounted for 76 per cent of its total revenue for the year 2015, an amount that far exceeds all of the other charitable organizations, with the exception of CIVIX. As such, it is difficult to understand why Engage Nova Scotia did not invest more of its revenue in civic engagement programs, given that it received most of its money from governments. One explanation for this maybe that there may have been conditions attached to the funds received.

CIVIX

CIVIX is listed under the name *CIVIX* and business registration number 873006829RR0001. Officially registered on December 8, 1999, its listed charity type is education, with its main focus being listed as support of schools and education (CRA, 2016). Registered in Toronto, CIVIX, like Samara, has a national reach. CIVIX describes itself as “a national civic education charity building the habits and skills of citizenship among young Canadians” (CRA, 2016). CIVIX like the other registered charities is governed by a Board of

Directors/Trustees, with a current listing of eight directors. Like most of the other registered charities, no trustee sits on the boards of any of the other organizations examined and all are at arm's length with the other trustees. CIVIX employs three full time and three part time employees (CRA, 2016).

CIVIX currently has four ongoing programs *Student Vote*, *Student Budget Consultation*, *Rep Day* and *Democracy Bootcamp*. *Student Vote* is “the flagship program of CIVIX, [and it] coincides with official election periods. Students learn about government and the electoral process, discuss relevant issues and cast ballots on the official election candidates.” (CRA, 2016). *Student Budget Consultation* runs between elections and involves government budget consultations for youth. *Rep Day* coordinates visits between high school students and their elected representatives, and *Democracy Bootcamp* offers professional development opportunities for teachers (CRA, 2016). Further, in the registered charity information submitted to the CRA, CIVIX claimed that “primary areas in which the charity was carrying out programs to achieve its charitable purposes was public education and other study programs”, claiming that 100 per cent of its emphasis was in this area (CRA, 2016). CIVIX along with Apathy is Boring was one of two registered charities which used its programs to target high school students. Both are bilingual organizations which work closely with Elections Canada, and this may explain why their programs specifically target high school students. Elections Canada generally tends to fund projects that revolve around the act of voting.

The total reported revenue of CIVIX was the most out of any of the registered charities with a reported total of \$2,150,021. (CRA, 2016). Of this reported revenue, \$608,585 was spent on salaries. Employing a total of twelve employees, eight full time and four part time, two of

the full time employees are paid between \$80,000 and \$119,999 a year while the remaining six are paid between \$40,000 and \$79,000 a year. (CRA, 2016). CIVIX also spent an additional \$55,958 on compensation for part time employees (CRA,2016). In addition to paying salaries, an additional \$1,523,194 is spent across the following areas: 1. Materials Production: \$976,551; 2. Education and training for staff and volunteers: \$363,697; 3. Travel expenses: \$67,954; 4. Occupancy cost: \$56,668; 5. Office Supplies and expenses: \$33,108; 6. Professional and consulting fees: \$17,409; 7. Advertising and promotion: \$6,735; 8. Interest and bank charges: \$1,072. This total along with the amount paid in salaries brought the total expenditure to \$2,131,779. (CRA, 2016). If the above expenses along with the amount spent on salaries is considered to have gone towards fostering civic engagement, CIVIX would have spent 99 percent of its revenue on fostering civic engagement. However, the Canada Revenue Agency reports that for the period CIVIX only spent \$1,997,979 on charitable activities, which would mean that it only spent 93 per cent of its total revenue on fostering civic engagement. The total expenditure of CIVIX on charitable activities places it second in terms of total amount of revenue invested in civic engagement programs behind Samara by only one percent.

In terms of how the revenue was generated, the pattern of donations received from organizations or persons for which a tax receipt was issued continues. However, the total amount of this type of revenue received was the lowest of all the charitable organizations. CIVIX reported receiving \$30,767 of this type of donation which equates to one percent of its total revenue, which was by far the lowest amount of revenue generated by any of the charitable organizations in this category. Like Engage Nova Scotia, there was no reported revenue for which a tax receipt was not issued. Nonetheless, CIVIX did receive \$338,978 from

other registered charities. This accounted for 16 per cent of its total revenue which was the third highest proportion among all organizations in this category. The bulk of CIVIX's revenue appears to have come from government sources with \$1,251,186 coming from the federal government and another \$311,628 coming from provincial or territorial governments (CRA, 2016). This put the total amount received from governments at \$1,562,814 or 73 per cent of its total revenue. This was the second largest portion of this type of revenue among any of the registered charities received from any government. Finally, CIVIX also received \$120,000 or five per cent of its total revenue from sources outside of Canada, though the source of this revenue is not stated.

The Apathy is Boring Project

Apathy is Boring is listed under the name *The Apathy is Boring Project/Le Projet L'Indifférence Est Ennuyeuse* and business registration number 859483349RR0001. The organization was officially registered on March 24, 2009, with its listed charity type being education. Like Springtide, its main focus is listed as education organizations – not elsewhere classified. (CRA, 2016). Registered in Montreal, Apathy is Boring like both Samara and CIVIX has a national reach. Like the other charitable organizations, Apathy is Boring is also governed by a Board of Directors or Trustees, with a current listing of seven directors. Unlike the other charities however, these directors are all listed as not being at arm's length of the other directors. None of these directors sit on the boards of any of the other organizations examined. Apathy is Boring employs five full time and five part time employees, meaning that it ties with Samara for the second most people employed.

Apathy is Boring currently has one ongoing program, which uses multimedia, art, film, TV, Internet projects, written materials, seminars and lectures, to advance education by increasing Canadian youth awareness and understanding of their vote in Canadian Elections and how to participate in the Canadian democratic process (CRA, 2016). The primary area in which the organization claims it is carrying out programs to achieve its charitable purposes is listed as public education and other programs, claiming that 100 per cent of its emphasis was in this area (CRA, 2016). Like CIVIX, Apathy is Boring works with Elections Canada and targets high school and junior high students with its programs. Given the close working relationship with these two organizations and Elections Canada, they could be viewed as creatures of Elections Canada. For this reason, it is important to study where the money comes from as the source of funds could explain the specific programs each organization pushes. If an organization's funding base is not diversified and they rely heavily on government funding, as is the case with CIVIX, the programs developed and executed maybe a reflection of this.

Apathy is Boring's total reported revenue for 2016 was \$215,909 (CRA, 2016), which placed it fourth among the registered charities in terms of total revenue. Of this reported revenue, \$195,499 was spent on salaries. Employing a total of ten employees, five full time and five part time, five of them were paid less that \$40, 000 a year (CRA, 2016), making them the least well paid of all persons employed by any of the charitable organizations examined. A total of \$16,774 was spent on part time staff, again making them the least paid part time staff of the registered charitable organizations. Apart from the reported amount spent on salaries, another \$55,998 was spent across the following areas: 1. Occupancy Costs: \$18,825; 2. Contracts; web hosting and Insurance: \$13,311; 3. Travel expenses: \$9,984; 4. Office supplies and expenses:

\$5,878; 5. Professional and consulting fees: \$4,000; 6. Interest and bank charges: \$2,266; 7. Education and training for staff and volunteers: \$1,105; 8. Advertising and promotion: \$255; 9. Amortization of capitalized assets: \$224; 10. Licenses, membership and dues: \$150. Even though the reported amount spent on salaries was \$195,499, Apathy is Boring reported amount spent on charitable activities was \$165,485 meaning that \$30,014 in money paid out in salaries did not counting towards charitable activities. This leaves the question of what type of work was done for this payment. Of all the charitable organizations, Apathy is boring was the only one to run a deficit, with a total expenditure of \$251,497 (CRA, 2016), a deficit of \$35,588. This created an interesting statistic, as it could be argued that Apathy is Boring spent 77 per cent of its total revenue on activities aimed at increasing civic engagement. However, given that their total expenditure was \$251,497, it could also be argued that they spent 66 per cent of their total expenditure on activities aimed at increasing civic engagement. This is particularly interesting because the Canada Revenue Agency uses 66 per cent as the official figure of how much Apathy is Boring spent on charitable activities. This would mean that Apathy is Boring spent the least amount of all the charitable organizations on charitable activities. nonetheless, for the purpose of this paper, the figure of 77 per cent which is based on their total revenue will be used, meaning that Apathy is Boring would tie for third with Springtide in terms of percentage spent on charitable activities.

Apathy is Boring also received revenue in the form of donations. The reported amount received in this form was \$34,035, which equated to 16 per cent of its total revenue. This placed it second in terms of receiving these types of funds. Similar to Engage Nova Scotia and CIVIX, there was no reported income for which a tax receipt was not issued. Yet, Apathy is

Boring did receive \$53,100 from other registered charities, accounting for 24 per cent of its total revenue. This placed it second among similar organizations in terms of this type of funds received. Apathy is Boring also received a portion of its revenue from government sources, with a reported total of \$15,375 from the federal government and \$22,794 from provincial or territorial governments, for a total of \$38,169 in funds received from government sources. This accounted for 18 per cent of its total revenue, placing third amount the registered charities in this category. The bulk of Apathy is Boring's revenue came from its own efforts with a reported amount of \$80,949 coming from the sale of goods and services (CRA, 2016). This was the equivalent of 37 per cent of its total revenue which was the same percentage as Springtide in this category. It also received \$8,915 from sponsorships which accounted for 4 per cent of its total income.

These organisations appear to target a segment of the youth population that is already voting, university students. Samara's ongoing programs are an example of this. Of Samara's three ongoing programs, at least two are aimed at university students. Though Samara only provides an overview of their programs, a closer look reveals that with the exception of Samara's Vote PopUp program, the vast majority of its programs targeted youth in university or high school. Despite the Vote PopUp program not specifically targeting university or high school students, it did reveal a worrying trend. Of all the organisations examined, if any of them collaborated with a voting agency whether provincially or federally on a project, the project always involved activities related to the act of voting. This was evident in the projects which Samara collaborated with Elections Canada on.

Similarly, Springtide in particular, has one program in collaboration with Elections Nova Scotia, called *Young Voter Education*. This particular program targets students in high school and university. The other programs though available to younger persons are rarely if ever attended by youth. The majority of Springtide's events are attended by older citizens. This demonstrates that when the program is not directly aimed at young people, they very rarely take part. This can be tied to the cohort and life cycle effects, where youth are not at a stage in their lives to actively engage or be interested in politics.

On the contrary, Engage Nova Scotia's programs were interestingly geared towards groups that were not student based. This is very interesting given that Engage Nova Scotia is not like the other civic engagement groups examined. Engage Nova Scotia on its initially conception was not to be a civic engagement organisation aimed at increasing voter turnout. As such, the programs run by Engage Nova Scotia, are not aimed at increasing voter turnout. Only when Engage partners with other organisations does it pursue activities aimed at increasing voter turnout.

Moreover, CIVIX continues the trend of programs aimed at students, except, CIVIX's programs almost exclusively target high school and junior high students. Of CIVIX's four ongoing programs, all are geared towards high school and junior high students. This is not surprising, as another organisation Apathy is Boring, also implements programs that specifically target high school and junior high students. Both of these organisations are bilingual organisations funded by Elections Canada. They both work closely with Elections Canada, and subsequently push programs that revolve around the act of voting, as these are the programs that are usually funded by Elections Canada. This means that with the exception of Engage Nova Scotia, these

organisations all target the segment of the youth population that is already engaged, or are too young to be engaged.

This is potentially worrying as the issue of youth engagement is one that has been increasing steadily. Yet, these organisations continue to push programs that target persons already engaged. This could be a result of the funding model under which these organisations currently operate. Without the ability to attract enough funds to have the necessary staff to run their initiatives and programs, it appears as if these organisations are using students to demonstrate immediate and clear cut examples of their projects at work. As will be discussed later, this could be a ploy for these organisations to attract more funding in the future.

Table 3.1: Civic Engagement Programs			
Organisation	Number of Programs	Ongoing Programs	New Programs
Registered Charities			
Springtide Collective for Democracy Society	5	1. Off Script 2. Make Democracy Better	1. Local Decisions 2. Educational Speaker Series 3. Young Voter Education Project
The Samara Project	2	1. Everyday Political Citizen	1. Vote PopUp
Engage Nova Scotia Civic Engagement Society	8	1. Share Thanksgiving 2. Cumberland County Life 3. Stepping up Conferences	1. Impact Book Unlaunch and Workshop 2. A New Partnership: Building Relationships through Education 3. North Shore Governors Gathering 4. Lowering the Waterliness and Ideas Marketplace
CIVIX	4	1. Student Vote 2. Student Budget Consultation 3. Rep Day 4. Democracy Bootcamp	N/A
Apathy Is Boring Project	1	1. #5MMV	N/A
Not-for-Profit Organisations			
Canadian Alliance of Student Associations	N/A	N/A	N/A
Students Nova Scotia	1	1. More engagement with political parties	N/A
Dalhousie Student Union	N/A	N/A	N/A
Election Agencies and Political			

Elections Canada (Inspire Democracy)			
Young Liberals	N/A	N/A	N/A
Campus Conservatives	N/A	N/A	N/A
Canadian Federation of Students	N/A	N/A	N/A

3.2 Not-for-profits

The not-for-profits examined in this paper all share a distinct commonality. All of them are formal university associated student led and run organizations. Unlike the registered charities, they rely less on fundraising and are generally able to generate more income than the registered charities, as will be reflected in their profiles.

Canadian Alliance of Student Associations (CASA)

The Canadian Alliance of Student Associations (CASA) is corporation listed under the name Canadian Alliance of Student Associations (CASA), business number 895325660RC0001 and corporate number 315436-0. (Corporations Canada, 2016). Officially incorporated on June 27, 1995, CASA is registered in Ottawa. CASA is “a non-partisan, not-for-profit student organization composed of student associations from across Canada.” It represents undergraduate, graduate and polytechnic associations. (CASA, 2016). CASA’s mandate is to “advocate for students using policy development and research, awareness campaigns, government relations, and partnerships with other stakeholders” (CASA, 2016).

Like all corporations, CASA is governed by a Board of Directors or Trustees, elected on an annual basis “at a special meeting of members duly called for that purpose.” (CASA Bylaws, 2015, p.2). CASA is currently governed by a board of directors comprising seven directors, who oversee the executive director, who, in turn, manages the full-time staff. Although these directors all sit on the boards of their various university student unions, none of them sit on any of the other not-for profit corporations examined in this paper. CASA also employs five full time staff members including the executive director.

As such, CASA has several ongoing programs which range from Get-Out-the-Vote initiatives, to advocating for the reduction of student debt, creating more work opportunities for students who graduate and lobbying for greater funding for research projects to name a few. This means that CASA cannot invest the same amount of money in get-out-the-vote initiatives as a charitable organization that is solely focused on a similar area.

CASA's total reported revenue for the fiscal year 2015 was \$500,205. (Ouseley Hanvey Clipsham Deep LLP, 2015). Of this \$493,014 came from membership dues while the remainder \$7,191 came from conference fees. Consequently, 99 per cent of CASA's revenue came from membership fees while one per cent came from conference fees. CASA's yearly expenses however, were more than their revenue for 2015, and this led them to run a deficit similar to The Apathy is Boring Project. CASA's total expenditure for 2015 was \$510,165 (Ouseley Hanvey Clipsham Deep LLP, 2015), which was a deficit of \$9,960. As previously mentioned, CASA does not focus specifically on Get-Out-the-Vote initiatives and as such, this means that their expenses are divided across more areas. To illustrate, the following are the major areas that CASA would have spent money in throughout 2015: 1. Salaries and Benefits: \$307,241; 2. Conferences: \$42,735; 3. Public Relations: \$37,664. Though it is fair to believe that some of those funds would have been spent on Get-Out-the-Vote initiatives, it would be presumptuous to assume that a vast majority of it was.

While it is fair to assume that CASA did not spend a significant amount its revenue on Get-Out-the-Vote initiatives, it is important to note that it has a dedicated federal Election fund. The federal election fund is "reserved for Federal Elections or other on-campus referendums of a similar election type event. This fund is used for the purchasing of advertising, document

preparation, consultations and other election related costs” (Ouseley Harvey Clipsham Deep LLP, 2015). At the end of CASA’s fiscal year April 30, 2015, the amount in this fund stood at \$110, 262. Given that the last Federal election was held in October 2015, it can be safely deduced that they would have used this fund then. Nonetheless until CASA releases its next financial statement in April 2017, it cannot be determined how much they would have actually invested in Get-out-the-vote initiatives during the 2015 federal election. Therefore, as it stands, the amount spent on public relations can be the only measure of how much they would have spent on get-out-the-vote initiatives, assuming that all of this sum was actually spent in this area. Consequently, taking this into consideration CASA would have spent 7.5 per cent of its revenue on these initiatives, which does not come close to similar efforts by the charitable organizations.

Dalhousie Student Union (DSU)

The Dalhousie Student Union (DSU) is a registered not-for profit corporation incorporated in 1863 under the Societies Act of Nova Scotia. The DSU is registered in Halifax, and represents the interests of all Dalhousie students within the university and beyond. (Dalhousie Student Union, 2016). The DSU “advocates for student rights, builds community on campus through events and by supporting nearly 400 societies, and provides discount services to save you money!” (Dalhousie Student Union 2016).

Similar to other not-for profit corporations, the DSU is governed by an executive Board of Directors, elected on an annual basis in the winter semester for a term of one year. The DSU’s board of directors comprises five student executives. While the DSU is an independent

student union it still falls under the umbrella of the Canadian Alliance of Student Associations (CASA), and as such, members of its executive are able to sit on the Board of Directors of CASA. Currently, none of the DSU's executive sit on CASA's board of directors, or any of the other not-for profit corporations examined in this paper. In addition, the DSU employs twelve full time staff members who look after the day to day operations of the Union.

As a student union, the DSU has several ongoing programs aimed at advocating for the rights of its members. These programs range from get-out-the-vote initiatives to various student services and include but are not limited to student health plans, a campaign to raise awareness for mental health as well as facilitating the activities of various student societies. (Dalhousie Student Union, 2016). Like the Canadian Alliance of Student Associations, this means that the DSU is not able to invest a significant portion of its money in get-out-the-vote initiatives, because it devotes its revenue to its own programs.

The DSU's reported revenue at the end of its financial year in March 2016 was \$7,120,795 (PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2016). While this is a significant portion of money and is more than any of the other organizations reported, the actual operating fund of the DSU is only \$2,737,599 as a significant portion of their yearly revenue is restricted to health insurance (PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2016). The majority of this income came from the student run bar the Grawood, which accounted for \$574,587 of the \$2,737,599 or 21 per cent of the DSU's operating revenue. It is important to note this because the student run bar also accounts for a significant portion of the DSU's expenditure with a total of \$677,724 being spent on the bar or 25 per cent of the DSU's total expenditure. This means that the remaining 75 per cent of the DSU's operating revenue has to be divided between the various societies and

campaigns. This is remarkable given that the DSU claims to support almost four hundred societies. (Dalhousie Student Union, 2016). For example, the following are the top expenses of the DSU: 1. Student Union Building Operations: \$772,089; 2. Council administration: \$415,556; 3. Programming and Initiatives: \$397,176; 4. Retail Services: \$136,688. These are a few of the expenses reported by the DSU for their last financial year, but the total reported expenditure was \$2,720,024 or 99 per cent of their total revenue.

Given that the DSU has to divide its expenditure among several different programs, get-out-the-vote initiatives would most definitely fall under the programming and initiatives expenditure. Though it would be unfair to assume that the entirety of this expense was or is spent on get-out-the-vote initiatives, for the purposes of this paper it will be assumed that it is. In such a case, that would account for 14 per cent of the DSU's total expenditure, falling way below the amounts invested by charitable organizations.

The Canadian Federation of Students (Nova Scotia)

The Canadian Federations of Students (Nova Scotia) (CFS) is listed under the name Canadian Federation of Students – Nova Scotia, registry identification number 3012437. (Access Nova Scotia, 2016). Officially incorporated on September 29, 1997 under the Societies Act of Nova Scotia, the Canadian Federation of Students (Nova Scotia) is registered in Halifax. The Canadian Federation of Students (Nova Scotia) is a non-chartered provincial component of the Canadian Federation of Students. Like the Canadian Alliance of Student Associations, the Canadian Federation of Students represents the interests of post-secondary students across Canada. It performs the following functions:

1. to further the goals of the Canadian Federation of Students as outlined in the Preamble;

2. to represent, promote and defend the common interests of students studying at Canadian post-secondary institutions;
3. to promote and support the interests and activities of democratic student organizations in all provinces and at all educational institutions in Canada;
4. to bring together post-secondary students from all parts of Canada to discuss and take common, democratic positions on questions affecting students;
5. to represent Canadian students in the federal level of decision-making and to do so by speaking on their behalf with one united voice;
6. to formulate a national programme that will serve as a framework for coordinating the efforts of representative post-secondary student organizations throughout Canada. This programme will summarize a long-term strategy for achieving the objectives of students in post-secondary education; will describe general ways of reaching those objectives; and will be revised periodically as new objectives and approaches become appropriate;
7. to do all other things that are incidental or conducive to these purposes. (Canadian Federation of Students Constitution and Bylaws, 2015).

While the Canadian Federation of Students is a national organization, the CFS (Nova Scotia) is considered a provincial component of the national CFS as outlined in its bylaws. It is thus empowered to “establish policy in its own name provided the policy does not contradict policy of the Federation.” (Canadian Federation of Students Constitution and Bylaws, 2015). Though the CFS (Nova Scotia) is a provincial component of the national CFS, it is still governed by its own Board of Directors, elected on an annual basis. The current board of directors comprises nine directors. As the CFS (Nova Scotia) is a provincial component, it has the right to automatically receive a minimum level of funding from the national CFS (Canadian Federation of Students Constitution and Bylaws, 2015). Therefore, in order to assess the expenditure of the CFS (Nova Scotia), the financial statements of the national CFS must be examined.

The reported revenue of the national CFS for 2015 was \$7,414,581. (MNP LLP, 2016). The vast majority of this revenue came from membership fees, which accounted for \$4,389,240 or 59 per cent of the total revenue. The reported expenditure was \$7,854,702, indicating a deficit of \$440,121. (MNP LLP, 2016). Like both the Canadian Alliance of Student Associations

and the Dalhousie Student Union, the CFS divides their expenditure across a variety of programs. The national CFS' major expenditure came in the following areas: 1. Student work abroad: \$1,303,499; 2. Component allocations: \$1,007,775; 3. Campaigns: \$959,057.

Considering that there are ten provincial components and assuming that all components receive an equal allocation, each component would receive \$100,777.

As encountered with similar organizations, it is difficult to fully determine how much of the money allocated to campaigns is spent on get-out-the-vote initiatives. Therefore, treating it as if all this money is dedicated to such programs, it would become apparent that the CFS' spends 13 per cent of its revenue and 12 per cent of its total expenditure on such programs. This is far less than charitable organizations and places it behind the DSU in this area. Unlike the Canadian Alliance of Student Associations (CASA), the CFS does not have a dedicated election fund, which might indicate that it does not necessarily place the same importance on get-out-vote campaigns as CASA

Students Nova Scotia

Students Nova Scotia is listed under the name Students Nova Scotia Association registry identification number 3012437. (Access Nova Scotia, 2016). Officially incorporated on February 18, 2005 under the Societies Act of Nova Scotia, Students Nova Scotia is registered in Halifax. Students Nova Scotia is an "alliance of Nova Scotia post-secondary student associations" (Students Nova Scotia, 2016), and is comprised of six member associations. The six member associations are the Acadia Students' Union (ASU), Cape Breton University Students' Union (CBUSU), Saint Francis Xavier University Students' Union (The U), Saint Mary's University

Students' Association (SMUSA), Kingstec Nova Scotia Community College Student Association (KNSCCSA) and Annapolis Valley Nova Scotia Community College Student Association (AVNSCCSA). Students Nova Scotia “give[s] students a united voice in Nova Scotia, helping set the direction of post-secondary education by researching challenges, identifying solutions, and creating the political space needed for these solutions to happen.” (Students Nova Scotia, 2016).

Like the other not-for profit corporations, Students Nova Scotia is governed by a Board of Directors comprised of Presidents and Vice-Presidents from each member association, and an executive director. The executive director manages the day to day operations of the organizations staff, which is comprised of three persons including the executive director. The executive director is the only full time staff member, with the other two being part time. (Students Nova Scotia, 2016). Currently, Student Nova Scotia’s Board of Directors is comprised of thirteen directors from the various member associations. None of these directors sit on the boards of any of the other not-for profit organizations examined here.

Students Nova Scotia’s role as an advocacy group for Nova Scotian post-secondary students, means that like the other not-for profit organizations, it does not devote all of its funds to get-out-the-vote initiatives. Some of its programs as outlined in its “Annual Plan 2016-2017” include, “More Engagement with Political Parties; Expanding Student Opportunities; Advocating on University Funding; Increasing involvement with Nova Scotia Community Colleges; and Ensuring internal stability”. These programs demonstrate the diversity of Student Nova Scotia’s activities. For the purposes of this paper, “More Engagement with political parties” will be considered as part of its get-out-the vote initiatives, as one of its components

includes “sharing social media moments with all candidates via the get out the vote website and accounts” (Students Nova Scotia, Annual Plan 2016-2017).

Encouragingly, of all the student run not-for profit organizations examined, Students Nova Scotia was the only one that explicitly outlined being more engaged with political parties as one of its major plans for 2016. The plan of becoming more engaged with political parties was aimed at increasing the connection with opposition parties, as well as engaging all political parties prior to and during the provincial election. Efforts to do this would include inviting opposition members to board meetings or events; producing a platform tailored to each party; and inviting all candidates in the ridings representing Student Nova Scotia member institutions to participate in the get-out-the-vote campaign. (Students Nova Scotia, Annual Plan 2016-2017). To this end, Student Nova Scotia’s budget is structured to include a budget for the provincial election. Interestingly, Students Nova Scotia also provides quarterly financial and planning reports of its programs, which none of the other organizations examined do.

Students Nova Scotia’s reported income for its unaudited financial statements as of April 30, 2016 (end of fiscal year), was \$137,630 (Bluenose Accounting, 2016). This has since been revised in its quarterly report as of October 2016 to \$118, 515.62. (Students Nova Scotia, Quarterly Financial Report, 2016). This revision is the result of Students Nova Scotia having not received all of its promised funds, for their special projects as of yet. For example, the D250 grant¹ which the organization relies on has not been approved yet. Further, “new information

¹The D250 or Democracy 250 grant was established following the 250th anniversary celebrations marking the birth of parliamentary democracy in Canada. The purpose of the trust is to provide assistance to non-profit organizations, teachers or students (sstu.nstu.ca/images/D250LegacyTrust%20Application%20Outline.txt)

has come from D250 to inform StudentsNS that the funds for the *Provincial Election* are the only ones they're considering at this time and in the future as the grant is closing." (Students Nova Scotia, Annual Plan 2016-2017). Of this reported income, \$109,060.62 or 92 per cent has come in the form of membership fees.

On the other hand, Student Nova Scotia's reported expenditure since the beginning of its fiscal year is \$50,890.88. Unsurprisingly, the majority of this expenditure has come in the form of human resources expenses, which accounted for \$24,051.29 or 47 per cent of its total expenditure so far. Special projects have accounted for \$16,945.68 or 33 per cent of its total expenditure so far. Given that Student Nova Scotia has not received all of its funds as yet, especially the grant for the provincial election, it is interesting that it has still invested \$5,172.33 of its total expenditure in programs related to the election. This has accounted for 10 per cent of their total expenditure for the year so far, which, while not as much as the Canadian Federation of Students and the Dalhousie Student Union, still indicates the level of importance it places on get-out-the-vote initiatives.

These profiles provide a snapshot of these organizations and their operations, yet they do not explain how or even why they may or may not have spent the amounts they have to foster civic engagement. Though there are some figures pertaining to the amounts spent or received by these organizations, they do not fully explain how the organizations would have used these sums to promote their aims. As such, the next section will explore in greater detail the finances of these organizations, ultimately demonstrating the ways in which each organization sought to foster civic engagement as well as their overall investment in this area.

Table 3.2: Catalogue of organizations, current to January, 2017			
Registered charity			
Organization	Founded	Mission statement	Governing structure
Springtide Collective for Democracy Society	2012	A democracy where it's easier to think of reasons to step up and get engaged, than it is to think of reasons to stay home.	7 -member executive
The Samara Project	2009	Samara Canada is dedicated to reconnecting citizens to politics. Established as a charity in 2009, we have become Canada's most trusted, non-partisan champion of increased civic engagement and a more positive public life.	8 -member executive
Engage Nova Scotia Civic Engagement Society	2012	Engage Nova Scotia will help foster the emergence of a more vibrant, inclusive and resilient society by promoting and enabling the engagement and collaboration of all Nova Scotians in designing and building the future we want	13 -member executive
CIVIX	2013	Our vision is a strong and inclusive Canada where all young people are ready, willing and able to contribute to their country.	4 -member executive
Apathy Is Boring Project	2004	A Canada where every young Canadian is an active and creative citizen, and youth are meaningfully engaged in all aspects of the democratic process.	14 -member executive
Not-for-profit organizations			
Canadian Alliance of Student Associations	1995	Canada will achieve an accessible, affordable and high-quality post-secondary education system whose students enjoy an excellent quality of life.	Two-member executive, plus three elected Directors
Students Nova Scotia	2003	StudentsNS is an advocacy organization that gives students a voice with government, in the media, and in our communities through partnerships and campaigns. We believe that student success depends on working cooperatively when possible as an honest and transparent partner.	Two-member executive, plus three elected Directors
Elections Agency and political parties			

Elections Canada (Inspire Democracy)	1920	Welcome to Inspire Democracy, a place where organizations and citizens like you can find research and share information on how to encourage youth civic engagement in Canada.	Chief Electoral Officer appointed by Parliament, plus staff
Young Liberals	1945	The Commission of the Young Liberals of Canada promotes the perspectives, policies, and ideas of Young Liberal members. It is not a separate entity from the Liberal Party of Canada, but is rather a part of it, and mirrors its structure in many ways.	Two-member executive, plus three elected Directors
Campus Conservatives	2003	Get Trained. Win Elections. Stand Out	
Dalhousie Student Union	1863	Our vision is to be recognized nationally as a leading advocate and provider of innovative and valued services for students. We strive to be the primary destination for Dalhousie students to engage in leadership and involvement within the University and greater community.	Two-member executive, plus three elected Directors
Canadian Federation of Students	1981	The Canadian Federation of Students exists to perform the following functions: 1. to further the goals of the Canadian Federation of Students as outlined in the Preamble; 2. to represent, promote and defend the common interests of students studying at Canadian post-secondary institutions; 3. to promote and support the interests and activities of democratic student organizations in all provinces and at all educational institutions in Canada; 4. to bring together post-secondary students from all parts of Canada to discuss and take common, democratic positions on questions affecting students; 5. to represent Canadian students in the federal level of decision making and to do so by speaking on their behalf with one united voice; 6. to formulate a national programme that will serve as a framework for coordinating the efforts of representative post-secondary student organizations throughout Canada. This programme will summarize a long-term strategy for achieving the objectives of students in post-secondary education; will describe general ways of reaching those objectives; and will be revised periodically as new objectives and approaches become appropriate;	Two-member executive, plus three elected Directors

Chapter 4

Financial Analysis

In 2004, the House of Commons unanimously adopted a motion calling on Elections Canada to undertake initiatives to encourage youth voter turnout in Canada (Parliamentary Information and Research Service 2016). This led Elections Canada to develop a host of programs that included the launch of the Inspire Democracy website as a platform to disseminate research on youth participation as well as to share information on how to enhance youth civic engagement in Canada. Elections Canada also collaborated with several different groups to determine the best methods by which to reach youth. This renewed focus on youth engagement also led to the rise of various Get-out-the Vote organisations. However, it was not until the spring of 2015 that Elections Canada began working closely with civil society groups such as the civic engagement organisations, asking them to promote the online registration service which had been in existence since 2012.

The success of these organisations can never be causally established, as they have not been in existence for a long time and their activities have rarely been examined. Further, what can be counted as success? While financials are one way of assessing the success of these organisations, accountability can also be a useful tool of analysis. For this reason, a set of criteria had to be established on which to examine and analyse these organisations.

Consequently, these organisations were evaluated by examining the structure of their boards as well as their budgets. Examining their budgets involved looking into their programs both ongoing and new, the source of their funding relating to if it was in the form of government funding or donations, whether or not the organisation operated nationally or locally, if the organisation acted as an extension of government (i.e. are they contracted by government to

conduct a program on its behalf), if the organisation relied more on volunteers versus paid staff, who the organisation and their programs targeted and finally where the organisation spent the majority of its income.

While these will be the criteria by which the organisations will be analysed, the actual analysis of the organisations and their programs will be done in three separate contexts, spanning two sections. Firstly, registered charities will be evaluated against each other, secondly, non-profits will be evaluated against each other, and finally, all the organisations will be evaluated against each other. The first section will examine the financials of all the organisations. This will be done by evaluating their sources of revenue. The second section will examine the civic engagement programs run by each organisation. In this section, the organisations will be evaluated based on their programs, staff complement compared to the number of volunteers employed, expenditure on salaries, as well as other general expenses and finally their overall expenditure. It is hoped that by examining the amount of staff and volunteers employed as well as the number of programs and areas of expenditure, a clearer picture of how the money is spent will be revealed. It is important to explore the full time and part time distinctions of staff, as full time staff is the only permanent staff at the organisation. Having a continuing permanent employee provides continuity, and subsequently organisational failure could occur if employees are not at the organisation on a permanent basis. Ultimately, it is hoped that a detailed evaluation of each organisation's expenditure and programs will reveal whether or not they are trying to remedy the issue of youth participation or simply using the issue as a means of attaining funds for their organisation.

In addition, the organisations will also be examined in the same three contexts. It is important to note that the success or failure of these organisations can never be causally established. As such, this evaluation will seek to provide the clearest picture of these organisations and their activities, and seek to demonstrate if they are at least successful in achieving their goals within their target population. However, before getting to the crux of the discussion it is important to briefly provide a literature review to set the context in which these organisations operate. This brief review is based on a Statistics Canada report on all voluntary and non-profit organisations.

Many nonprofit and voluntary organizations earn income by providing goods and services for a fee, some also depend substantially on governments—particularly provincial governments—for funding. Smaller organizations rely heavily on donations of money and in-kind donations of goods and services. (Statistics Canada 2005) Smaller organizations depend more on earned income from non-government sources than do larger organizations. For example, among those with annual revenues of less than \$30,000, earned income accounts for 51 per cent of total revenues. In contrast, organizations with annual revenues of \$10 million or more receive 31 per cent of their revenues from earned income from non-government sources. Membership fees appear to be a more important source of revenue for smaller organizations. Most revenues from gifts and donations come from donations made directly by individuals (eight per cent of total revenues) or from corporate sponsorships, donations and grants (three per cent). Smaller amounts are received as disbursements from other nonprofit and voluntary organizations (two per cent of total revenues) and from fundraising organizations or private, family or community foundations (one per cent) (Statistics Canada 2005). Smaller organizations

also rely more upon gifts and donations for revenues than do larger organizations. Gifts and donations account for about one-third of total revenues among organizations with annual revenues of less than \$250,000, but for just 8 per cent of revenues for organizations earning \$10 million or more. This pattern is driven almost exclusively by fluctuations in individual donations; other types of gifts and donations are relatively constant, regardless of the size of revenues (Statistics Canada 2005).

Larger organizations depend more on government funding than do smaller organizations. Government sources account for approximately 58 per cent of total revenues for organizations with annual revenues of \$10 million or more, but only 12 per cent of total revenues for organizations with annual revenues of less than \$30,000. The association between greater government funding and larger annual revenues is particularly striking for government payments for goods and services. Organizations with annual revenues of \$10 million or more report almost 10 times the government revenue for goods and services than do organizations with less than \$30,000 in annual revenues (19 per cent versus two per cent of total revenues). Provincial grants and contributions account for 33 per cent of all revenues of organizations with annual revenues of \$10 million or more. Federal government grants are most significant for organizations with larger revenues. Reliance on municipal government funding is quite similar among all organizations, regardless of size of revenues. (Statistics Canada 2005). However, for the purpose of this paper, large organizations will be considered to be those who have a yearly income in excess of five hundred thousand dollars.

The one common characteristic among these nine organizations, is that they are all governed by a board of directors, however, this is where the similarities end. Each organization

in the two respective groups all share common characteristics to that group. All registered charities are governed by a board of directors whose members are appointed, while the non-profits are governed by an elected board of directors whose members are elected by the members at large. Likewise, all the registered charities are required to register with the Canadian Revenue Agency, while all the non-profits are formal university-associated student run organizations. Moreover, all the registered charities examined in this paper, have considerably less income than the non-profits. For example, the registered charities on average reported an annual income of \$605,420.80, while the non-profits reported on average an annual income of \$3,808,524.16. Similarly, all the non-profits with the exception of Students Nova Scotia recorded a total yearly revenue as well as operating budget of more than five hundred thousand dollars a year.

Table 4.1: Registered Charities

Organization	Revenue	Expenditure	Number of Employees	Full Time Employees	Part Time Employees
CIVIX	\$2,150,021	\$2,131,779	12	8	4
Samara	\$884,612	\$872,541	10	7	3
Engage Nova Scotia	\$610,522	\$572,876	4	4	0
Apathy is Boring	\$215,909	\$251,497	10	5	5
Springtide Collective	\$134,445	\$125,241	4	1	3

Table 4.2: Revenue

Organization	Amount Received from Federal Government	Amount Received from Provincial Government	Amount Received for which Tax Receipts were issued	Amount Received from Other Registered Charities
CIVIX	\$1,251,186	\$311,628	\$30,767	\$338,978
Samara	\$37,410	\$27,683	\$48,555	\$630,330
Engage Nova Scotia	\$0	\$464,878	\$140,775	\$0
Apathy is Boring	\$15,375	\$22,794	\$34,035	\$53,100
Springtide Collective	\$2,847	\$8,360	\$8,244	\$10,000

Table 4.3: Expenditure

Organization	Salaries	Unaccounted Expenditure	% Revenue spent on Fostering Civic Engagement
CIVIX	\$608,585	\$97,462	93%
Samara	\$609,991	\$32,623	98%
Engage Nova Scotia	\$196,048	\$110,542	81%
Apathy is Boring	\$195,499	\$0	66%
Springtide Collective	\$75,141	\$0	77%

4.1 Financial Analysis of Registered Charities

Of the five registered charities examined, CIVIX recorded the most revenue and the highest operating budget. Samara was second, with a total revenue and operating budget of almost three hundred thousand less. Engage Nova Scotia with a total operating budget and revenue of just over \$600,000, rounded out the registered charities with both a total revenue and total operating budget of more than \$500,000 a year. They were followed by Apathy is Boring who reported a total revenue of just over \$200,000. The final registered charity, Springtide Collective recorded the lowest revenue of all the registered charities with a reported total of less than \$150,000, with a total yearly revenue of \$134,445.

How did these organisations go about raising their necessary funds? Remarkably, only two of the registered charities reported raising money from the sale of goods and services. These two organisations reported the least total revenue of all the registered charities. Apathy is Boring reported receiving \$80,949 from the sale of goods and services, while Springtide Collective reported receiving \$49,831 similar efforts. In both instances this accounted for 37 per cent of their total revenue. In terms of raising funds from their own efforts, it would appear as if those organisations with an annual income of less than \$500,000 rely more on their own efforts to generate income. For example, in 2015, Springtide Collective engaged in activities such as draws and lotteries, fundraising galas and dinners, planned giving programs, targeted corporate donation and sponsorships along with more traditional methods such as telephone solicitations, collection plates and internet solicitations. Springtide held an awards ceremony on March 8, 2016. The cost to attend this awards ceremony was \$55 or \$25 for students or low-income persons. Moreover, another example of the type of fundraiser Springtide uses in is their upcoming Co-Resolve

Leadership program, aimed to “help citizens more readily engage with, and navigate conflict resolution and consensus-based decision making in their workplaces, community organisations, political associations and personal lives” (Springtide Collective, 2017). The cost of attending this program is \$750 for general admission and \$500 for students and non-profits (Springtide Collective 2017). Springtide was also the only organisation to report generating income (\$35,350) from royalties and partners. While it was not reported where this money came from exactly, it is likely to have come from one of the organisations that Springtide has worked with. These include, Samara, Engage Nova Scotia and Elections Canada. However, given that there is no record of Elections Canada giving any money to Springtide, it is more likely to have come from Samara and or Engage Nova Scotia. This accounted for 26 per cent of Springtide’s total revenue. In total, 63 per cent of Springtide’s total revenue came from its own effort and those of its partners. Similarly, none of the registered charities reported receiving any income from membership or conference fees.

The next apparent major source of income for registered charities appears to be in the form of government grants. With the exception of Samara and Springtide, the registered charities reported receiving at least 15 per cent of their total revenue from a government source. CIVIX led the list with 83 per cent of its revenue coming from government sources, such as Elections Canada, as well as federal and provincial governments. The majority of CIVIX’s revenue from government sources came from the federal government as it reported receiving \$1,251,186 from the federal government. It also received \$1,243,098 over the period of January 1, 2015 to September 30, 2016 from Elections Canada for Management Consulting; procurement specialist and the Student Parallel Election Program (Elections Canada 2017). It was followed by Engage Nova Scotia which reported that 76 per cent of its total revenue came from the government of Nova Scotia. Apathy is Boring was third with 18

per cent of its total income coming from government sources, such as the federal government and the Quebec provincial government. Though it did report receiving \$15,375 from the federal government, there was also an additional \$17,303 that Apathy is Boring received from Elections Canada for communications professional services and dissemination of Elections Canada materials for the 2015 General Election (Elections Canada 2017). This money was part of a contract which lasted from February 16, 2015 to December 18, 2015. Samara and Springtide rounded off the list with 7 per cent and 8 per cent respectively. It is interesting to note that though Samara is listed by Elections Canada as one of its partners for the 2015 federal election, it only received seven per cent of its total income from government sources. This is particularly interesting as the government through Elections Canada would have contracted out some of its voter education and mobilization outreach services during this period to Samara. Like Apathy is Boring, Samara was also awarded a contract from Elections Canada for the period of May 25, 2015 to December 18, 2015. This contract was worth \$24,910 and was for advertising services (Elections Canada 2017). Though all these organisations received portions of their income from government sources, the similarities become more apparent when the government source is factored in. The organisations which reported an income in excess of five hundred thousand dollars, received the majority of their income from government sources.

Both CIVIX and Engage Nova Scotia which recorded revenues in excess of \$500,000, reported receiving over 50 per cent of their income from government sources. With the exception of Samara, all the registered charities reported receiving the majority of their funding from provincial governments as opposed to the federal government. Of the organisations to receive funding from government sources, Engage Nova Scotia with a total reported revenue of 76 per cent from government sources, led the way in terms of

donations, all of which were from the Government of Nova Scotia. CIVIX was second in terms of total revenue received from government sources and reported receiving the majority of its funds (73 per cent) from government sources, of which 14 per cent or \$27,683 came from the Government of Ontario. Apathy is Boring was third on the list reporting that 18 per cent of its income came in the form of government grants. Of this portion of money received 11 percent or \$22, 974 came from the Quebec provincial government. Both Springtide and Samara round off the list with Samara once again recording the lowest proportion of income from government sources. Springtide reported receiving eight per cent of its total revenue from government sources while Samara reported receiving seven per cent of its income from government sources. Of these reported amounts, less than 10 per cent came from provincial government sources.

Thought it was expected that larger organisations with revenues in excess of \$500,000 would rely on government funds, Samara did not fall into this category. Only seven per cent of its total income came from government sources, which was the lowest proportion among registered charities. Despite receiving significant portions of money from Elections Canada during the period of April 2014 to December 2015, Samara still recorded the lowest total income received from government sources. This revealed an interesting trend among the organisations, as it appears that those organisations who receive money from Elections Canada do not count it as money from the federal government. This could be due in part to Elections Canada being a government agency and not the government itself. In the cases of CIVIX, Samara and Apathy is Boring, they all received money from Elections Canada that was not reported as money from government sources. This was likely a result of their financials being filled before they received all their respective funds from Election Canada. As such, the true sum of money they would have received from government

sources is not adequately reported, as some of these funds may not have been fully paid out at the time of their filings. This indicates that some of these organisations who receive funds from Elections cannot include the full sum of the contract at the time of filing, as they may not have received the full sum of the contract.

Another source of income for registered charities came in the form of donations from other registered charities. It was expected that the smaller organisations, those with annual incomes of less than \$500,000 would not be as reliant on donations from other registered charities as the larger organisations. All the registered charities with the exception of Engage Nova Scotia reported receiving donations from other registered charities. In this category, Samara was the biggest beneficiary, reporting that \$630,330 of its total revenue came from other registered charities. This accounted for 71 per cent of Samara's total income, which is not surprising as larger organisations tend to rely more on this type of funding. Though the majority of the rest of charities reported income from other charities, none of them received as much of their total revenue in this form. The closest organisation to Samara in this regard was Apathy is Boring, who reported receiving 25 per cent or \$53,100 of its total revenue in this form. It was followed by some distance by Springtide who reported receiving seven per cent or \$10,000 in this form and CIVIX who rounded out the list at 4 per cent or \$51,087 of its total revenue in this form. While it is not surprising that both Apathy is Boring and Springtide received such low portions of this type of income, it is surprising that CIVIX received the lowest portion of this income among the registered charities. As the registered charity with the largest income, it was expected that a greater portion of its income would have come from other registered charities. However, this was not the case, which could be linked to CIVIX's main target group, which is high school students. Given that they are not able to vote or take part in elections, other

charities may have been less inclined to give money to CIVIX as its target group was less likely to be impacted immediately.

Smaller organisations are more reliant on “donations of money and in-kind donations of goods and services” (Statistics Canada 2005, 22). This was the next major source of income for these organisations. All the registered charities reported receiving income in this form. Engage Nova Scotia led the way in this category, reporting that 23 per cent or \$140,775 of its total income came in this manner. It was followed by Apathy is Boring which reported 16 per cent or \$34,035 of its total revenue came in this form. These were the only two registered charities that reported receiving more than 10 per cent of their total revenue in this form. The remaining charities were only able to record single digit percentages, with Springtide leading the way, reporting that six per cent or \$8,244 of its total revenue came from this avenue. Springtide was closely followed by Samara on five per cent or \$48,555 and CIVIX who rounded out the list on one per cent or \$11,000. The final source of income for registered charities came in the form of donations for which tax receipts were not issued. However, only two of these types of organisations (Samara and Springtide Collective) recorded receiving such funds. Springtide led the way in this regard, reporting that it received 14 per cent or \$19,813 of its total revenue in this manner while Samara reported receiving 12 per cent or \$106,562 of its total revenue in this manner. This reliance on these two types of funding was more in line with the expected results. As is demonstrated, it is the two organisations with incomes of less than five hundred thousand dollars that were more reliant on donations and sales of goods. The three larger registered charities in terms of reported income, were not as reliant on donations and sales of goods as the smaller organisations. The two smaller organisations were the most reliant on funds raised from their own efforts, as this accounted for 37 per cent of their total revenue.

In terms of total expenditure, the order of these organisations remains the same, with CIVIX spending the most money, followed by Samara, Engage Nova Scotia, Apathy is Boring and finally Springtide. All with the exception of Apathy is Boring, reported spending at least 80 per cent of their total revenue. Apathy Is Boring was the only one to run a deficit, spending 116 per cent of its total revenue. While it would be fair to assume that this expenditure is all on fostering civic engagement, there are various other factors that play a role in determining whether or not this is the case. All these organisations employ both full time and part time employees. As such, one factor that plays a role in determining the purpose of their expenditure is the amount paid out in salaries. Another factor is the specific areas that this money is spent in. This meant that the budgets of each organisation had to be analysed in order to determine where the money was being spent. Ultimately, this allowed for a better break down of each organisation's expenditure to facilitate an accurate description of how much funds were spent on fostering civic engagement.

One common theme that appears is the apparent reliance of these organisations on volunteers. Only one of the registered charities had a total combined staff including part time and full time staff of more than ten employees. Of the five registered charities, CIVIX employs the most employees, (12). It was followed by Apathy is Boring (10) Samara (7), and Springtide Collective and Engage Nova Scotia each with four. Though there are some differences in the number of employees each organisation employs, the real difference is in whether they are employed full time or part time. In this regard, CIVIX leads with a total of eight full time employees and four part time employees. This indicates that CIVIX may not be as reliant on volunteers as the other organisations. It also indicates that CIVIX may be better poised to carry out its agenda than the other registered charities, as its eight full time employees may allow it to better organise and execute its programs. This may have been

the reason it was one of Elections Canada's main partners during the last federal election. Samara, another organisation that was one of Elections Canada's main partners during the last federal election, reported having fewer than five part time employees, along with Springtide Collective. This indicates that these two organisations maybe more reliant on volunteers. Engage Nova Scotia was the only organisation to report not having any part time employees. In terms of full time employees, CIVIX led the way with eight full time employees closely followed by Samara who reported having seven and Apathy is Boring with five. Unlike Samara though, CIVIX and Apathy is boring did employ part time employees as well, reporting a part-time contingency of five and four respectively. They were followed closely by Engage Nova Scotia with four full time employees and no part timers and Springtide with one full time and three-part time employees.

Having full time employees enables an organisation to achieve its goals, so those organisations with more full-time employees and greater compensation for said employees, should foster greater civic engagement. Therefore, in an effort to demonstrate such, the amount paid in salaries by each organisation will now be discussed. Though CIVIX employs the most persons, its total amount paid out in salaries was not the most among registered charities. Leading this list is the organisation who employs the third most employees. Samara with a staff compliment of seven employees paid a total of \$609,991 in salaries. Of this amount, five of the seven employees were paid between \$40,000 and \$79,999, the remaining two being paid between \$80,000 and \$119,999 with \$92,928 going towards part time employees (Canada Revenue Agency 2016). The amount spent on salaries by Samara equated to 69 per cent of its total revenue. CIVIX the organisation with the largest staff compliment reported the second highest amount paid in salaries, reporting paying \$444,806 or 38 per cent of its revenue in salaries. Among the full time employees, six were paid

between \$40,000 and \$79,999 while the remaining two were paid between \$80,000 and \$119,999. Additionally, \$55,958 was spent on part time employees. Given that CIVIX was the only registered charity to report an annual revenue of more than one million dollars, it is particularly interesting that it spent the second largest portion of their revenue on salaries. This should indicate that it was able to invest more of their revenue into areas and projects aimed at fostering greater civic engagement.

Likewise, Engage Nova Scotia reported paying \$196,048 or 32 per cent of its revenue on salaries. With a staff complement of four, all of whom are full time employees, three employees were paid between \$40,000 and \$79,999, with the fourth employee being paid between \$80,000 and \$119,999. Engage Nova Scotia was one of the three registered charities to report revenues in excess of \$500,000, yet it spent the lowest percentage of all the registered charities on salaries. This again indicates that it potentially had extra monies to invest in other areas and projects to foster greater civic engagement. Whether or not this was the case will be explored in greater detail later. The organisation with the second largest staff complement, Apathy is Boring, reported spending \$195,499 or 91 per cent of its revenue on salaries. Employing a total of ten employees, five full time and five part time, this money was distributed among the full time employees in the following manner. All five full time employees were each paid between \$1 and \$39,999. Though this was the second lowest amount in terms of raw dollars spent on salaries, it was, however, the largest percentage of total revenue spent on salaries by all the registered charities. Unsurprisingly, Springtide Collective reported spending the least on salaries, reporting spending \$75,141 or 56 per cent of its revenue in salaries. Even though this was the least amount of money spent on salaries by any of the registered charities, it was the third highest percentage spent on salaries by any of the registered charities.

Organisations in the non-profit sector generally tend to rely heavily on volunteers. According to Statistics Canada (2005) 13 per cent of organizations with revenues of \$500,000 or more accounted for 41 per cent of all volunteer hours. The smallest organizations (revenues under \$30,000) make up 42 per cent of all organizations, but account for only 12 per cent of volunteers and 15 per cent of total volunteer hours. The bulk of volunteers are engaged by organizations that have relatively small staff complements where 64 per cent of volunteers are engaged by organizations with fewer than 10 staff. This indicates that those organisations that do not employ a large number of employees would rely a lot more on volunteers. This was taken into consideration when determining what percentage of an organisation's revenue was spent on fostering civic engagement. Though the amount paid in salaries was used as one of the indicators to measure effort put into fostering civic engagement, it included other factors such as occupancy costs; contracts; web hosting and Insurance; travel expenses; office supplies and expenses; professional and consulting fees; interest and bank charges; education and training for staff and volunteers; advertising and promotion; miscellaneous. The amount of money spent in each of these areas was taken into consideration, in determining the overall percentage they spent on fostering civic engagement. As such, any expenditure reported to the Canada Revenue Agency in each organizations' charity return was counted as being program directed and counted towards fostering civic engagement, unless otherwise specified by the CRA. There were some cases where all the reported expenditure was not counted as going directly to charitable activities. In such cases the variance in the overall percentage spent on civic engagement was noted. This led to the following being determined.

The amount spent by each organization on salaries was important, but it did not tell the full story of whether or not that organization truly sought to foster greater civic

engagement. The pattern among the top two registered charities continues. Samara which spent the largest percentage on salaries, also invested the largest percentage in fostering civic engagement, spending 98 per cent of its total revenue in this area. It was followed closely by CIVIX who invested 93 per cent of its total revenue in fostering civic engagement. However, this is where the similarities end. Engage Nova Scotia invested the third most in fostering civic engagement, investing 81 per cent of its total revenue in this area. This stood out because it spent the lowest percentage on salaries. This should indicate that it used a significant portion of its remaining revenue on fostering civic engagement. In fourth was Springtide which spent 77 per cent of its total revenue on fostering civic engagement. This stands out given that Springtide only spent 56 per cent of its revenue on salaries. In addition, given that it was the only organization to employ one full time staff member, it is impressive that it was still able to dedicate this much of its revenue to fostering civic engagement. Apathy is Boring was the only registered charity which spent less than 70 per cent of its total revenue on fostering civic engagement, as it only spent 66 per cent in this area. This is very interesting given that Apathy is Boring spent largest percentage on salaries (91 per cent). Given this, it is remarkable that it was still able to spend so little on fostering civic engagement. This could be explained by the fact that Apathy is Boring was also the only registered charity to report a deficit. When this deficit is taken into consideration, the total percentage spent by Apathy is Boring on fostering civic engagement increases to 77 per cent. Though these amounts were spent by each registered charity on civic engagement. They do not tell the full story of the money. As such, the programs which each organization pushed must be examined, to fully determine, if the amounts spent on civic engagement by these charities were truly representative of their efforts.

Table 4.4: Not-for-Profits

Organization	Total Revenue	Total Expenditure	Amount Paid in Salaries	Amount Received from Membership Fees	% Revenue spent on Fostering Civic Engagement	% Revenue from Membership Fees	% Revenue Paid in Salaries
Canadian Federation of Students	\$7,414,581	\$7,854,702	\$407,290.00	\$4,389,240	13%	59%	5%
Dalhousie University Student Union	\$7,120,795	\$2,720,024	\$103,308.00	\$1,276,724	14%	18%	1%
Canadian Alliance of Student Associations	\$500,205	\$510,165	\$307,241.00	\$493,014	8%	99%	61%
Students Nova Scotia	\$118,515.62	\$50,890.62	\$24,051.29	\$109,060.62	10%	92%	20%

4.2 Financial Analysis of Not-for-profits

Of the four not-for-profits examined, the Canadian Federation of Students reported the most revenue and the largest operating budget. The Dalhousie University Student Union was second with a total revenue of \$7,120,795 and an operating budget of \$2,737,599. The difference in the operating budget and total revenue is as a result of the Student Union being unable to dedicate its entire revenue to its daily operations, as it has several other areas which it must cater too as well. Apart from these two organisations, no other not-for-profit reported a total revenue or operating budget in excess of one million dollars. Consequently, the Canadian Alliance of Student Associations (CASA) and Students Nova Scotia round out the list of not-for-profits, with a total income and operating budget of \$500,205 and \$118,515.62 respectively.

Though these organisations appear to have a considerably larger amount of revenue, it should be noted that unlike registered charities, these organisations are not entirely dedicated to fostering civic engagement. These organisations sometimes have to deal with other issues not particularly associated with civic engagement. For example, the Canadian Federation of Students who has the largest operating budget of all the not-for-profits, has to dedicate some of its time and resources to other issues such as student advocacy on issues such as tuition fees, and ensuring that the university and campuses are catering to the needs of all students. This may potentially lead to some of these not-for-profit organisations not being able to invest as much money as they would like in fostering greater civic engagement. This made it particularly difficult to determine what funds were spent on employees as well as civic engagement programs and how many employees were employed by each organisation for the specific purpose of fostering greater civic engagement. This

required examining the overall expenditure of each organisation and then determining what particular areas constituted fostering civic engagement. To this end, expenses such as campaigns and government relations; elections strategy; elections preparedness fund; or any political related expense, counted towards the expenditures that would qualify as activities aimed at fostering greater civic engagement. Though these numbers may not be a true representation of what these not-for-profit organisations actually spend on attempting to foster greater civic engagement, they do provide an idea of the amounts and types of resources these organisations place on this action.

Despite this prevalent and prominent role on campus, these student associations rely on a lot of volunteers in order to achieve their aims. This has led to various persons involved with student associations to lament the lack of volunteers or the inability of their organizations to properly achieve its aims in terms of reaching out to more youth. For example, one member of the Young Democrats posited

I guess engaging youth outside a federal election is always difficult and engaging youth when you don't have a member of parliament or you are not in government is really hard. If there is no visible opportunity for change young people and people in general are less likely to want to help you. So right now, we are under a majority government and won't have an election for another three or three and a half years, so there is not really an urge to volunteer now, so I think our challenge is to keep young people interested and engaged and to keep what we have going. (K. Goodridge, personal communication, August 23, 2016).

This highlights not only the fact that it is difficult to encourage persons to volunteer outside of a federal election but also the difficulty student associations have in recruiting volunteers to aid in their get-out-the-vote initiatives.

This has led registered charities appear to have an edge over non-profits in terms of achieving their aims. Given that charities are usually able to have a dedicated full time staff member to coordinate all their social activities, they appear to have an edge over student

associations when it comes to managing and planning social outreach programs. This was again highlighted by one of the members of the Young Democrats who stated

Having a dedicated paid staff person is always a good resource for any political campaign. We didn't have access to a full-time youth coordinator/organiser in this region but we did have a member of the federal young Democrats executive who was instrumental in helping us to organise the society and get it off the ground. Then we had the support of the campaign as well but paid staff people with experience in particular to put a group together and keep the institutional feeling there (K. Goodridge, personal communication, August 23, 2016).

It therefore, appears that charitable get-out-the-vote organisations have the edge over student associations when it comes to organising get-out-the-vote initiatives because they enjoy the luxury of having a full time paid staff member dedicated to planning and overseeing these events. This allows these organisations to actively recruit and manage volunteers, rather than having to rely on a volunteer, to manage and recruit more volunteers.

The main difference between not-for profit and charitable organisations in this paper is the issue of fundraising. In the case of this paper, all not-for profits are considered to be student run organisations. This means that they generally do not have to worry about fundraising, as they usually have a steady supply of funds in the form of membership dues.

To illustrate this point, a member of the Dalhousie Student Union stated

That's the beauty of being a student union, we have funds, we don't fund raise, we're a membership based organisation so every one of our members pay fees when they pay their tuition, so we have a substantial budget as the largest student union in the province, and because we partnered with the national CFS (Canadian Federation of Student unions) they also have a lot of resources and it was like we had to design and print all those materials ourselves. We didn't have to fundraise. (K. Goodridge, personal communication, July 18, 2016).

Similarly, a member from the Canadian Federation of Students based in Nova Scotia stated that while their organisation does engage in fundraising, a vast majority of their funds are derived from membership fees,

Federation members pay depending on the region about \$18 a year in membership dues and that money goes towards running campaigns. We're usually able to raise the money we need. Unlike other not for profits, we are usually able to raise the money we need because we do have a stable membership base and a stable fee coming in and that is a huge advantage to the organisation in that we basically have some security in knowing each year what our income is going to be so we can plan campaigns (K. Goodridge, personal communication, August 16, 2016).

Yet, it appears that this still poses some challenges for these organisations when focusing on get-out-the-vote initiatives. For example, the Dalhousie Student Union, while not having to focus on fundraising, still has to manage its yearly income across a variety of different programs and initiatives. In its 2015 Budget, the Dalhousie Student Union's annual revenue had to be divided among twenty-eight different initiatives and programs. As a result, while the revenue for 2015 was reported as \$1, 338, 011.02, only \$89, 090.43 or less than seven per cent of that revenue was spent on student advocacy and communications and outreach. Likewise, a look at the Canadian Federation of Students' budget reveals a similar trend, where its revenue has to be divided among several different programs and initiatives. If this is contrasted against a charitable organisation such as Samara, one can see how the allocations of funds are concentrated more on get-out-the-vote initiatives and programs. Of the reported \$884, 612 in revenue that Samara received in 2015 (CRA, 2016), \$680,250 or 76.8 per cent of this was spent on salaries and outreach. It is clear that more than fifty percent of its funds was spent on trying to encourage greater civic participation. This further demonstrates that funding plays a significant role to the success and or failure of both registered charitable organisations and not-for-profits that work in the get-out-the- vote

realm. Though funding is an integral part of these organisations they could not exist unless there was a real issue to address.

While it has been established that the not-for-profits in this study generally have multiple projects and programs besides fostering civic engagement to deal with, none of them spent more than 20 per cent of their total revenue on fostering civic engagement. The Dalhousie Student Union spent the most of all the not-for-profits in this area, investing 14 per cent of its total revenue to foster greater civic engagement. It was closely followed by the Canadian Federation of Students who spent 13 per cent of its total revenue in this area. Though these figures appear low, some not-for-profits even invested less money in this area. Students Nova Scotia was third, investing 10 per cent of its total revenue in fostering civic engagement, while the Canadian Alliance of Student Associations rounded out the list investing just eight per cent of its total revenue in this area. Though these organisations usually have other priorities, one of the reasons they may not be inclined to invest more money in this area may lie in the target group. These programs and initiatives generally tend to target university students, the youth cohort that is already engaged and likely to vote. These organisations may have realised this and decided to not invest too much money. The other factor is that all the not-for-profits examined in this paper are student led and run organisations and are ultimately responsible for championing student issues. While the act of voting may be a problem among youth in today's society, it isn't a problem among university youth. As these organisations already work closely with university students, they may be privy to this information and ultimately choose to invest substantially less in this area.

When the House of Commons unanimously concluded that youth voting rates were in decline and needed immediate attention, various Get-out-the-vote initiatives emerged. Cooperation between these organisations and the government was not immediately apparent, but it has increased in recent years. This was especially visible during the 42nd Federal Election, as Elections Canada collaborated with several different Get-out-the-vote organisations such as Samara and CIVIX. As these organisations have improved their programs, the government has increasingly come to view them as another possible way to bolster civic engagement and subsequently increased its funding to such organisations.

Currently, the government appears content to leave the job of youth engagement to these organisations simply acting as a financier. This is particularly good as “two primary lines of reasoning can be found concerning the relationship between civil society and democratic political practice. The first considers that civil society organisations create social capital as schools for citizenship that teach democratic culture and foster trust and civil engagement. The second sees them as generating political capital by promoting pluralism” (Casey 2016, 37). While in theory this is the impact civil society organisations can have, it has yet to be decisively discerned whether or not this has been the case. In order to discern this, the organisations and their programs will be evaluated. They will be evaluated by examining their programs both new and ongoing, the amount of staff employed compared to volunteers, the amount paid in salaries and their general expenditure. The relationship between these organisations and the government will also be discussed in order to determine whether or not the organisations are acting as extensions of the government. Further, given that many of these organisations operate on the contributions

of volunteers, the entrepreneurial capacity building of these organisations will also be evaluated. Like the previous section, the organisations will be evaluated in three separate contexts, with the registered charities being evaluated against each other, the not-for profits against each other and finally all the organisations against each other.

Table 5.1: Registered Charities

Organization	Revenue	Total Expenditure	Amount Paid in Salaries	Amount Received from Federal Government	Amount Received from Provincial Government	% Revenue from Federal Government	% Revenue from Provincial Governments
CIVIX	\$2,150,021	\$2,131,779	\$608,585	\$1,251,186	\$311,628	59%	14%
Samara	\$884,612	\$872,541	\$609,991	\$37,410	\$27,683	4%	3%
Engage Nova Scotia	\$610,522	\$572,876	\$196,048	\$0	\$464,878	0%	76%
Apathy is Boring	\$215,909	\$251,497	\$195,499	\$15,375	\$22,794	7%	11%
Springtide Collective	\$134,445	\$125,241	\$75,141	\$2,847	\$8,360	2%	6%

5.1 Registered Charities

All the registered charities reported having at least one ongoing or new civic engagement program. Engage Nova Scotia was the registered charity to have the most civic engagement programs in place, nonetheless, it did not employ the most employees. Although Engage Nova Scotia ran the most civic engagement programs it employed the least number of employees. Engage Nova Scotia employed only four persons all in full time positions. Given that they had such a small staff compliment this should have meant that Engage Nova Scotia would have been more reliant on volunteers. The nature of Engage Nova Scotia's civic engagement programs meant that it could only be run with the help of numerous volunteers. All of Engage Nova Scotia's programs were community based and without the help of various communities and families, they would not have been successful. It is clear that volunteers were a necessary component of Engage Nova Scotia's civic engagement programs. While the importance of volunteers to Engage Nova Scotia's programs is clear, the percentage of its revenue spent trying to foster civic engagement is not indicative of the number or programs it would have run.

Springtide Collective, the registered charity with the second most civic engagement programs, but the lowest total revenue of all the registered charities still managed to employ the same number of employees as Engage Nova Scotia. Despite employing the same number of employees as Engage Nova Scotia, Springtide was only able to employ one of them on a full-time basis. This should have meant that Springtide would have been heavily reliant on volunteers, as it could not have had an adequate staff complement to effectively facilitate the running of its civic engagement programs. Yet, the nature of its programs may not have necessarily required a large number of volunteers. Springtides programs were all very similar to town hall meetings or educational speaking series, meaning volunteers may

not have been of great importance. In addition, Springtide usually tries to pay students when they work for them, which may have also reduced the number of volunteers it would have used,

CIVIX, the registered charity with the third most civic engagement programs at four employed the most employees of all the registered charities. With four continuing civic engagement programs, CIVIX had a total staff complement of twelve employees, with eight of them being full time and four being part time employees. With such a large staff compliment, it is likely that CIVIX did not need to rely on volunteers as much as the other registered charities. This could have meant less time being spent on training volunteers and more time to dedicate to the planning and execution of their civic engagement programs. Given the nature of CIVIX's civic engagement programs, it also possible that it may not have been as reliant on volunteers as an organisation such as Engage Nova Scotia.

The registered charity with the fourth most civic engagement programs Samara, also employed the joint second largest number of staff members, with a total staff compliment of ten, seven of which were full time and the remaining three being part time. Having such a large staff compliment would enable Samara to be better able to recruit volunteers. At the same time, it could also mean that Samara did not have to rely as heavily on volunteers as the other registered charities. Like CIVIX, the nature of Samara's civic engagement programs may not necessarily have necessitated the use of volunteers. With the exception of their Vote PopUP program, Samara's civic engagement programs appear to be less reliant on volunteers, and more so on their full-time staff. Yet, Samara's website has a section inviting persons to volunteer, which would indicate that they actively seek volunteers.

Apathy is Boring was the registered charity with the least amount of civic engagement programs with only one such program on offer. Nevertheless, Apathy is Boring

still employed the second largest staff compliment with a total of ten employees, five of which were full time and the remaining five being part time. Unlike the majority of registered charities examined, Apathy is Boring's civic engagement program necessitated the use of volunteers. In particular, their campaign for the 2015 Federal election relied heavily on volunteers. Apathy's #5MMV programs relied on volunteers who "attended concerts from coast to coast handing out election resources and answering questions their peers Yet, were the amounts expended on salaries concurrent with the total staff complements?

Unsurprisingly, one of the organisations with the largest staff complement expended the largest percentage of their revenue on salaries. Apathy is Boring which had a total staff complement of ten, spent 91 per cent of its total revenue on salaries. This was by far the largest percentage expended by any of the registered charities. In fact, none of the other registered charities spent more than 75 per cent of their total revenue on salaries. This is even more remarkable given the fact that Apathy is Boring only had one civic engagement program running. Why did Apathy is Boring spend so much money on salaries compared to the other registered charities despite having the least civic engagement programs of them all? This may be explained by the fact that Apathy is Boring may not have contracted out as much of its services as the other registered charities. While examining the financials of all the registered charities, a trend became apparent. All the registered charities reported an interesting expense, namely professional and consulting fees. While this is not uncommon, professional and consulting fees are usually associated with outside services which the organisations have contracted out to another organisation or person. These persons could potentially be board members and the category professional and consulting fees maintains the appearance of being at arm's length with the organisation. Though this was evident in

all the financials of the registered charities, Apathy is Boring was the registered charity which recorded the lowest total spent in this category. Apathy is Boring only spent \$4,000 or two per cent of its total revenue in this area. As such, this could explain why it may have spent such a large portion of its revenue on salaries. It should also be noted that Apathy is Boring was the only registered charity to run a deficit. This may also have factored into why it may have spent such a significant amount on salaries.

The organisation to expend the second largest percentage of its revenue on salaries was Samara, though it spent considerably less in this area than Apathy is Boring. Samara spent 69 per cent of its total revenue on salaries which was 22 per cent less than Apathy is Boring. However, Samara also spent significantly more money on professional and consulting fees, spending \$81,912 in this area. This accounted for 9 per cent of its total revenue. As such, this may explain the apparent difference in percentages spent on salaries. By spending a larger amount on professional and consulting fees Samara may have been able to offset the amount spent on salaries. Also of note is the fact that Samara spent almost five times the amount on part time salaries despite having less part time staff than Apathy is Boring. Despite having two fewer part time staff members than Apathy is boring, Samara still managed to spend more in this area than Apathy is Boring, spending \$92,925. This was the equivalent of 15 per cent of Samara's expenditure on salaries. Samara still spent a considerably lower percentage of its revenue on salaries, a fact that appears to be the result of the use of professional and consulting fees.

Springtide Collective spent the third largest proportion of its revenue on salaries. Salaries accounted for 56 per cent of Springtide's total revenue. Springtide also had the lowest expenditure of all the registered charities. Despite this fact, it still managed to spend the third largest proportion on salaries. Like the other top two registered charities,

Springtide also reported a professional and consulting fee expense. This expense was \$17,028 or 12 per cent of its total revenue. Despite having the third largest proportion spent on salaries, Springtide employed the least number of employees but still spent more on salaries than CIVIX an organisation with three times the number of employees. This is particularly interesting because CIVIX also had the largest staff compliment of all the registered charities at twelve. Again, the expense of professional and consulting fees is present in CIVIX's expense report and could also explain why it may have spent only 38 per cent of its total revenue on salaries.

The organisation which spent the least amount on salaries was Engage Nova Scotia. Despite having the most civic engagement programs, Engage Nova Scotia also had the smallest staff compliment at four. This may explain why it spent the least of all registered charities on salaries. Another explanation lies in the fact that of all the registered charities Engage Nova Scotia also spent the most money on professional and consulting fees. These fees accounted for 40 per cent of Engage Nova Scotia's total revenue. This is the most likely cause of Engage Nova Scotia's low salary expense. All the organisations reported a professional and consulting fee expense, however, the larger the amount spent in this area, the lower the percentage spent on salaries. As such, it appears as if professional and consulting fees allowed some organisations to further offset their salary expense. It was therefore apparent that the organisations who spent larger sums of money in this area were able to spend less on salaries. While professional and consulting fees allow organisations to employ the services of trained professionals, they can also stunt the growth of these organisations. Contracting out services prevents those employees and volunteers from learning how to do these tasks. This can severely hurt the human resources capacity of organisations, which in turn can lead to the organisation being unable to attract funding due

to not having qualified staff. While professional and consulting fees can be seen as addressing the issue of underqualified staff, they still contribute to them at the same time, by depriving staff of valuable training opportunities.

Civic engagement organisations are civil society groups that seek to ensure that citizens are getting out to vote. As such they can be effective tools to build the social capital of citizens and in particular youth. While these organisations rely on volunteers, it appears that they are not giving the less experienced a chance to develop their skills in these organisations. Despite all these organisations using at least one volunteer, they do not give less experienced persons an adequate chance to further develop their skills. This is as a result of these organisations contracting out portions of their work. If the amounts spent on part time salaries are compared to the amounts spent on professional and consulting fees, it becomes apparent that these organisations could invest more in part time salaries. All the registered charities reported professional and consulting fee expenses with the exception of two organisations, all spent almost an equivalent amount or more on professional and consulting fees as they did on part time salaries. The only organisation not to report any expenditure on part time salaries was Engage Nova Scotia. The only other organisation to not spend as much on professional and consulting fees was the Apathy is Boring Project, though this was accounted for in the fact that it spent 91 per cent of its total revenue on salaries. The other organisations spent similar amounts on both salaries and professional and consulting fees. For example, Samara which spent \$92, 925 on part time salaries split across three part-time employees, also spent \$81,912 on professional and consulting fees. A similar trend was seen with Springtide Collective which spent \$17,323 across three employees and a further \$17,028 on professional and consulting fees. Though the type of services rendered for these fees was not indicated, it represents a trend that appears to be

apparent in most of the organisations and in particular the registered charities. The necessity of these services is not being questioned but rather, whether or not some of this money could not have been put towards employing more part-time staff, training volunteers or even making a small cash payment to volunteers to cover expenses. For this reason, these organisations appear to be failing to even adequately provide training for persons to further improve and promote their programs. Rather than spending these amounts of money on professional and consulting fees, it might be more helpful if the organisations were to actually use this or a significant portion of this money to train part time staff members to carry out these services. This could lead to better trained volunteers, enabling these organisations to be better able to deliver their civic engagement programs.

Having established the number of civic engagement programs, with regards to the number of staff members as well as amounts spent on salaries, it is now pertinent to discuss the corresponding percentages spent by each organisation on civic engagement. This is to determine whether or not the overall spending of these organisations on civic engagement was concurrent with the number of civic engagement programs run as well as the amounts spent on staff members.

Despite having the most civic engagement programs, Engage Nova Scotia still did not spend the largest percentage of its revenue on fostering civic engagement. This is particularly interesting given that Engage Nova Scotia spent the second lowest percentage of its revenue on salaries, at 32 per cent. Despite having the smallest staff compliment and the most civic engagement programs, Engage Nova Scotia still managed to spend less on civic engagement than both CIVIX and Samara, who both employed more staff and had almost half the amount of civic engagement programs as Engage Nova Scotia. This should have given Engage Nova Scotia more funds to spend on fostering civic engagement. Yet,

when their expenses are examined in greater detail, it is clear to see why they may not have spent more on fostering civic engagement. Apart from spending 32 per cent of their total revenue or \$196,048 on salaries, Engage Nova Scotia spent an additional \$264,352 across four other areas. These were professional and consulting fees; donated goods used in charitable activities, travel expenses and office supplies. Also of note was a sum of \$110,542 in expenses with no specific explanations. This is particularly interesting as this amount which is unaccounted for in their tax return, was more than likely not spent on fostering civic engagement. Additionally, the sum of \$226,608 spent on professional and consulting fees, also indicates another amount that may not have been spent entirely on civic engagement programs. Again, while these contracts may have been related to civic engagement, it is likely that all of it was not spent in this area, and as such would have been yet another instance in which funds may not have been fully allocated to fostering civic engagement. Finally, another expense that was also unrelated to civic engagement was travel expenses which accounted for \$7,480. This again was an expense that could have been related to civic engagement, yet it is unlikely that all of this money was spent on civic engagement related activities. This again demonstrates how Engage Nova Scotia may have been able to spend more money on civic engagement.

On the contrary, Samara which spent a larger percentage of its revenue on salaries (69 per cent), managed to spend 98 per cent of its total revenue on fostering civic engagement. Like Engage Nova Scotia, Samara did have similar expenses which included professional and consulting fees; advertising and promotion; research grants and outreach. Though Samara would have contracted some of its services out as would be represented by professional and consulting fees, the amount spent in this area was far less than that of Engage Nova Scotia, with Samara spending \$81,912 in this area. In total, across these four

areas, Samara spent a total of \$152,171, which was considerably less than the amount spent by Engage Nova Scotia in the same areas, as well as significantly less than what Engage Nova Scotia would have spent on professional and consulting fees. This highlights a worrying trend as not only does Samara generate more income than Engage Nova Scotia, they also employ more employees and have a greater national reach. Of more significance is the fact that Samara was also one of Elections Canada's main partners during the 2015 federal election. Once more, Samara was one of two organisations which also gave grants to other registered charities, again highlighting an area in which Samara was attempting to do more to foster civic engagement. This means that among the registered charities, Samara spent the largest percentage of its revenue on fostering civic engagement, spending 98 per cent of its revenue in this area.

Moreover, CIVIX the only other registered charity apart from Engage Nova Scotia to spend less than 40 per cent of its total revenue on salaries (38 per cent), also spent more on fostering civic engagement than Engage Nova Scotia. CIVIX ended up spending 93 per cent of its total revenue on fostering civic engagement, which meant that it spent the second largest proportion on fostering civic engagement. Like the other organisations, CIVIX also had other expenses besides salaries. These included materials production; occupancy costs; travel expenses; office supplies and expenses; professional and consulting fees; research grants and scholarships; advertising and promotion and miscellaneous. Across these eight areas, CIVIX spent a total of \$736,810. Unlike Engage Nova Scotia, CIVIX, did not spend a significant amount on professional and consulting fees, with this expense only accounting for \$21,963. The expense that accounted for the majority of the \$736,810 was materials productions. Given that CIVIX had four programs running, which all revolved around students, it is easy to see why this may have been such a large expense. Like Samara, CIVIX

also invested in other charities, spending \$13,096 on research grants and scholarships. Consequently, it is easy to see why it would have been able to spend 93 per cent of its total revenue on fostering civic engagement.

Springtide Collective spent the third least percentage on salaries Springtide and ended up spending almost the same proportion of its revenue on fostering civic engagement as Engage Nova Scotia. With a total of five civic engagement programs, and a total staff compliment of four employees, one full time and three part time, Springtide Collective was still able to spend 77 per cent of its total revenue attempting to foster civic engagement. This was only four per cent less than Engage Nova Scotia, who employed four full time staff members and had more civic engagement programs than Springtide. While this could indicate that Springtide was better able to use the limited resources it had, it could also indicate that Engage Nova Scotia was able to recruit more volunteers than Springtide. However, it also raises the question of why Engage did not invest more money trying to foster civic engagement if it was able to recruit more volunteers. Like the other organisations, Springtide Collective, spent money in the following areas, professional and consulting fees; advertising and promotion; education and training for staff and volunteers; and fundraising. Springtide was also the only organisation to employ fewer than two employees, and as such relied heavily on volunteers. This meant that it would have to spend money to train and educate these volunteers. Similarly, Springtide recorded the lowest revenue of all the registered charities and as such relied on fundraising through its own efforts in order to generate income. This represented another area in which it had to spend funds that could have been otherwise allocated. In addition, unlike Engage Nova Scotia, Springtide did not have any unaccounted for expenditures. Given this, it is remarkable that Springtide with the limited amount of resources it had was able to invest a similar

percentage in fostering civic engagement as an organisation which generated four times the amount of revenue it did, and did not have to rely as heavily on fundraising and donations as Springtide.

Finally, the only registered charity to spend less than Springtide on fostering civic engagement was the Apathy is Boring Project, which spent 66 per cent of its total revenue in this area. Though this was the lowest amount spent among the registered charities, Apathy is Boring was a special case. It was the only registered charity to run a deficit, with its expenditure being \$35,588 more than its revenue. If a deficit was not run, Apathy is Boring would have ended up spending 77 per cent of its total revenue on fostering civic engagement. However, when the deficit is taken into account this figure drops to 66 per cent. Apart from paying salaries, Apathy is Boring spent an additional \$55,774 across the following nine areas: occupancy costs; contracts, web hosting and insurance; travel expenses; office supplies and expenses; professional and consulting fees; interest and bank charges; education and training for staff and volunteers; advertising and promotion; and miscellaneous. Even though the reported amount paid out in salaries was \$195,499, the Canada Revenue Agency only credits Apathy is Boring as spending \$165,485 on charitable activities. This meant that \$30,014 paid out in salaries did not count towards charitable activities. Of note also is the fact that Apathy is Boring had two expenses which the other registered charities did not have, being, web hosting and insurance and interest and bank charges. Together these two expenses totaled \$15,577, which is just under half their total deficit. It is fair to assume that these two extra expenses would have contributed to their deficit. Unlike Engage Nova Scotia, there were no unaccounted expenses. As such, it is easy to see why it was only able to invest 66 per cent of its total revenue on fostering civic

engagement. Had it not run a deficit it would have spent more on fostering civic engagement.

All in all, among the registered charities, significant amounts were spent on civic engagement. However, a trend emerged, whereby the paying out of professional and consulting fees was present in all their expenditures. While this should not generally be viewed as a bad thing, these fees, may not always be related to the direct aims of these organisations, as it affords these organisations the flexibility to pay salaries without taking on employment status. As a result, greater oversight of this particular area is needed as it would appear that some organisations may be able to use this to their benefit, or in order to divert potential funds away from programs. Likewise, any reported miscellaneous expenses totaling more than \$5000 should also require a detailed explanation of where this money went, so as to avoid situations like that with Engage Nova Scotia where there was an expense in excess of \$100,000 that was unaccounted for. While these were, the trends observed among the registered charities, different trends emerged among the not-for-profits.

Table 5.2: Not-for-Profits							
Organization	Total Revenue	Total Expenditure	Amount Paid in Salaries	Amount Received from Membership Fees	% Revenue spent on Fostering Civic Engagement	% Revenue from Membership Fees	% Revenue Paid in Salaries
Canadian Federation of Students	\$7,414,581	\$7,854,702	\$407,290.00	\$4,389,240	13%	59%	5%
Dalhousie University Student Union	\$7,120,795	\$2,720,024	\$103,308.00	\$1,276,724	14%	18%	1%
Canadian Alliance of Student Associations	\$500,205	\$510,165	\$307,241.00	\$493,014	8%	99%	61%
Students Nova Scotia	\$118,515.62	\$50,890.62	\$24,051.29	\$109,060.62	10%	92%	20%

5.2 Not-for-profits

Among the not-for-profits, there were different trends that emerged. Of the four not-for-profits, two ran deficits. Additionally, all with the exception of one spent less than 50 per cent of their total revenue on salaries. Though these organisations on average generated more income than the registered charities, they all spent considerably less on fostering civic engagement. What accounted for such low investment among the not-for-profits? For one, they are all student led and run organisations and subsequently, had other areas outside of civic engagement to deal with. This meant that their resources had to be divided among a variety of programs.

Of the not-for-profits, the Canadian Alliance of Student Associations spent the largest percentage of its total revenue on salaries. It spent a total of 61 per cent of its revenue on salaries. Despite spending this percentage on salaries, the Canadian Alliance of Student Associations still only spent eight per cent of its revenue on fostering civic engagement. Apart from salaries, the Canadian Alliance of Student Associations spent money in the following two areas, conferences and public relations. Together these two expenses totalled \$80,399. Together with the salaries these three areas accounted for \$387,640, still \$122,525 less than its total expenditure. The remaining \$122,525 is accounted for when all their other expenses are taken into consideration. Apart from the three aforementioned expenses, the Canadian Alliance of Student Associations had seventeen other expenses, which accounted for the \$122,525. The Canadian Alliance of Student Associations list as one of its assets a Federal Election Fund, which at the time of its tax filing had \$110,262 in it. Though it is fair to assume that this fund was used during the 2015 Federal Election, there was no mention of it being used in its budget, and as such it was not taken into account when determining the amount spent on fostering civic

engagement. Further, a closer look at its expenses demonstrates the many ways in which it divides its income among other projects. For instance, it had to spend in the areas of telecommunications, translation as well as travel and meeting expenses, which were all in excess of \$5000. This is further explained by the fact the Canadian Alliance of Student Associations is a national organisation that represents the interest of thousands of students across Canada. This means that not only is it concentrating on other programs but it also needs to be able to spread its revenue across these areas.

Moreover, the not-for-profit that reported spending the second largest percentage of its revenue on salaries was Students Nova Scotia. It reported spending 20 per cent of its total revenue on salaries. In addition to spending 20 per cent of its total revenue on salaries, it also spent 10 per cent of its total revenue on fostering civic engagement. Like the Canadian Alliance of Student Associations, Students Nova Scotia is concerned with a wide range of student related activities that do not include civic engagement. However, of all the not-for-profits this was the only organisation that listed “more engagement with political parties” as one of its current programs. It was also one of only two not-for-profits to not run a deficit. Interestingly, Student Nova Scotia stood to be able to invest more than the 10 per cent of its total income in fostering civic engagement, as at the time of its budget, there were still some unfinished projects. In total, Students Nova Scotia had seven projects which ranged from a leader lab; board education; student assemblies; more than yes; youth employer awards; advocacy week and provincial election. At the time of its budget it had only spent \$16,945.68 on these projects, with the Leader lab accounting for \$11,257.06 and the provincial election accounting for \$5,172.33. The budgeted amount for the provincial election had not been entirely spent with a budget allocation of \$16,000 for the election.

This indicates that Students Nova Scotia could potentially invest even more money in attempting to foster more civic engagement.

The Canadian Federation of Students spent the next largest percentage of its revenue on salaries, with salaries accounting for five per cent of its total expenditure. This is important given that it was the not-for-profit with the largest income and operating budget. Not only did it have the largest income and operating budget among not-for-profits, it also had the largest income and operating budget of all the organisations examined. It was also the other not-for-profit apart from the Canadian Alliance of Student Associations to run a deficit. Despite spending only 5 per cent of its revenue on salaries, the Canadian Federation of Students only invested 13 per cent of its total revenue in fostering civic engagement. Though this was the second largest percentage among the not-for-profits, it was still significantly lower than the lowest percentage invested by the registered charities. Again, like the other not-for-profits, the Canadian Federation of Students also had to invest its income in areas other than civic engagement. This meant that the bulk of its revenue was spent in the following three areas, student work abroad; component allocations and campaigns. Together, these three areas accounted for \$3,270,331 or 44 per cent of its total revenue. Apart from these three areas, the Canadian Federation of Students had twenty-one other areas in which it spent its revenue, with a further four of these twenty-one areas accounting for another 36 per cent of its total revenue. It is therefore easy to see where it would have spent its money and why it was unable to invest more money in fostering civic engagement.

The final not-for-profit, the Dalhousie Student Union spent just one percent of its total revenue on salaries. This however did not translate into a larger investment in fostering civic engagement as the Dalhousie Student Union spent 14 per cent of its total

revenue in this area. Though this was the largest percentage invested by any of the not-for-profits, it was still significantly lower than the percentage invested by the registered charities. Importantly, the Dalhousie Student Union did generate the second largest total revenue and operating budget not only among the not-for-profits but also among all the organisations examined. In addition, the Dalhousie Student Union was concerned with other issues besides civic engagement. For instance, despite having an operating budget of \$2,737,599, it spent a considerable amount of this in the following areas, student union building operations; council administration; programming and initiatives and retail services. Together these four expenses accounted for \$1,721,509 or 63 per cent of its total operating budget. In addition to these four areas, the Dalhousie Student Union also had to divide the remaining 37 per cent of its operating budget among twelve other areas. In light of this it is remarkable that it was still able to invest 14 per cent of its total operating budget on fostering civic engagement.

While it is clear that the not-for-profits invested significantly less money in attempting to foster civic engagement, it is also apparent that they had to divide their resources among far more areas. However, despite this fact, the reason they invested significantly less than the registered charities could be as a result of something else other than having more areas in which to spend. The not-for-profit organisations are all formal university-associated student run organisations and may have realised that they don't need to invest a significant portion of their funds in fostering civic engagement. The main issue with all these organisations is that they appear to be targeting the youth who are already civically engaged. Despite the general impression of all youth as disaffected, the youth cohort of the population that is most engaged politically are university students. All the not-for-profit organisations examined target university students with their programs. Given that

the not-for-profits are student run, they may have already discerned that this particular cohort of the youth population is not as disengaged as previously thought. Likewise, these organisations may not be caught up in the general society wide concern about citizen engagement. Indeed, given that these organisations are run by a youth cohort that already views the act of voting as an archaic institution with no real chance of effecting change, dedicating a large portion of their time and effort to this area may not be of prime concern. This could have resulted in them preferring to pursue other avenues of engagement for their members. This may have led them to not invest the same amounts into fostering civic engagement as the registered charities have.

Table 5.3: Registered Charities and Not-for-Profits					
Organization	Revenue	Amount Paid in Salaries	% Revenue spent on Fostering Civic Engagement	% Revenue from Federal Government	% Revenue from Provincial Governments
Canadian Federation of Students	\$7,414,581	\$407,290	13%	0%	0%
Dalhousie University Student Union	\$7,120,795	\$103,308	14%	0%	0%
CIVIX	\$2,150,021	\$608,585	99%	58%	14%
Samara	\$884,612	\$609,991	98%	4%	3%
Engage Nova Scotia	\$610,522	\$196,048	75%	0%	76%
Canadian Alliance of Student Associations	\$500,205	\$307,241	8%	0%	0%
Apathy is Boring	\$215,909	\$195,499	66%	7%	11%
Springtide Collective	\$134,445	\$75,141	93%	2%	6%
Students Nova Scotia	\$118,515.62	\$24,051.29	10%	0%	0%

5.3 Analysis of both Registered Charities and Not-for-profits

Lester Salmon (1987) noted that non-profits are hampered by four potential failures: insufficiency as they cannot meet needs, particularism where their activities focus on limited constituency, paternalism where an agenda is set with little end user input, and amateurism where they do not have to the capacity to effectively manage programs (cited in Casey 2016). The non-profits examined in this paper do not appear to be unduly afflicted by these short comings. “Non-profits flourish when either, or both, market failure (for-profit firms have no interest in a good or few trust that it can be delivered with equity and accountability) and government failure (government cannot deliver a public good efficiently) have occurred” (Casey 2016, 52). In the area that these non-profits are focussed on, it appears as if they should be flourishing. With respect to fostering greater civic engagement among youth in terms of voting, it is apparent that for-profit firms have no interest, as there is nothing to be gained for them from this activity. On the other hand, governments have failed to efficiently and effectively encourage higher voter turnout among youth. This has led to greater cooperation between non-profits in this area and the government of Canada.

Cooperation between the government and the non-profit sector of Canada has certainly increased. For example, the non-profit sector of Canada received 49 per cent of its total funding from government sources (Statistics Canada 2005). In addition, this increased cooperation between the non-profit sector and the government has been documented by various academics who have posited that “the relationship between government and the non-profit sector has been characterised more by cooperation than conflict, as government has turned exclusively to the non-profit sector to assist it in meeting human needs” (Salmon, 1994, p.115).

Indeed, such cooperation between government and voluntary organizations appears to have been the case as in Canada's 42nd general election on October 19, 2015. Elections Canada coordinated with various non-profit organisations to attempt to foster greater civic engagement. "Starting in spring 2015, a total of 59 organisations helped to distribute more than 11 million hardcopy information and held 105 events to inform target groups on when, where and the ways to register and vote" (Elections Canada 2016). Six of these organisations were among those examined in this paper and included Samara, Apathy is Boring, CIVIX, Canadian Federation of Students, Canadian Alliance of Student Associations and Springtide Collective for Democracy Society. Three of these organisations (CIVIX, Samara and Apathy is Boring) had official contracts from Elections Canada, the other three had verbal agreements (Elections Canada 2017).

Similarly, Elections Canada has been known to work with the heads of the main national student associations in the past to determine how best to facilitate student voting on election day. In the January 2006 federal election, voter registration and polling stations were set up on campuses to make it easier for young people to vote. A similar project was undertaken by Elections Canada during the 2015 federal election. During the 2015 federal election, Elections Canada partnered with CIVIX which was responsible for the Student Vote Program carried out among high school students which simulated election day activities, with students playing the role of returning officer, voter and all other positions and roles fulfilled on that day (CIVIX 2016). Another partner of Elections Canada during the 2015 federal election was The Apathy is Boring project which was responsible for the #5MMV program, which sought to raise awareness about the power of numbers and the power of youth to mobilize and together have a meaningful impact in their communities (Apathy is Boring 2015). Elections Canada and Samara Canada collaborated on Samara's Vote PopUp

program for 2015. This program was a downloadable Vote PopUp kit, through which “community groups could recreate a polling place to foster interest in the election and demystify the voting process for first time voters” (Elections Canada 2016). To support the program which took place in varying locations such as a homeless shelter in Calgary, a settlement agency in Toronto, a mobile library in Ottawa and a farmers’ market in Vancouver, Elections Canada supplied ballot boxes, posters and voter information products. This further reiterates Salmon’s point that governments around the world including Canada have been increasingly contracting out some of its outreach activities or initiatives to non-profits.

Moreover, Samara’s Vote PopUp initiative was the only initiative of all the groups to target youth outside of universities and high schools. Samara reported that their Vote PopUp initiative, was downloaded 456 times, helped more than 2000 Canadians practice voting and involved 330 community groups (Elections Canada 2016). Of all the registered charities, Samara appears to be the one to have the strongest working relationship with Elections Canada. A quick perusal of the Inspire Democracy website which is the youth oriented version of the Elections Canada website, reveals that Samara has the most publications of any of the groups examined. Similarly, in the official report of the 42nd General Election, Samara’s Vote PopUp initiative is specifically mentioned by name. Given this apparent close relationship with the government, it would be expected that Samara would receive a significant portion of its revenue from government sources. However, this was not the case as Samara only received seven per cent of its total revenue from government sources.

Of the nine organisations examined, the seven per cent of the Samara’s revenue which came from government sources, was the lowest percentage of this funding received

by any organisations. When Samara's total revenue from the government is compared to another similar organisation CIVIX that also works with the government, there is a significant gap in the amount of revenue received from government sources. CIVIX received 73 per cent of its funding from government sources. This appears to be in line with the data presented in the report on the Non-Profit sector in Canada. CIVIX had the third greatest total revenue of all the organisations, though when the various activities of each organisation are taken into account, CIVIX had the largest operating fund. It should also be noted that in comparison to Samara, CIVIX's programs tended to generally target students in high school while Samara's appeared to target a wider range of persons. This could be one of the reasons that while it appears as if Samara works with the government more, it receives less money from them than CIVIX. One possible explanation for this is that CIVIX has such a narrow target group while Samara's appears broader, and so the government is prepared to give more money to CIVIX, because Elections Canada can see the actual value of its programs. Further, the report suggests that the majority of government funding to CIVIX came in the form of provincial grants which appears to still be the case, as CIVIX did not receive a significant portion of its government funding in the form of federal grants. In fact, federal grants only accounted for 19 per cent of CIVIX's total revenue from government sources, while provincial grants accounted for 64 per cent.

Additionally, among the five registered charities, Apathy is Boring spent the least amount of its revenue on fostering civic engagement, with only 66 per cent of its total revenue going to this area. The next closest registered charity was Springtide, which spent 77 per cent of its total revenue in this area. The Apathy is Boring Project was also contracted by the government to work for it, and in particular in the last general election. This is particularly interesting as it would be expected that organisations employed by the

government for this particular type of work would spend more of their resources in this area. Cooperation between the government and the non-profit sector appears to have certainly increased, at least with respect to the registered charities. However, when the not-for-profits are included, it is more difficult to see this cooperation.

The not-for-profits examined all revealed a similar trend, whereby they received none of their funding from government sources. Yet, the federal government and in particular Elections Canada, worked closely with the four not-for-profits examined, though in varying capacities during the 42nd Federal Election. Given that all of the not-for-profits examined were formal university associated student run organisations, cooperation between the government and these organisations was more clearly apparent in the 42nd general election. Seeking to further bolster the number of youth voters, Elections Canada with the help of these student associations set up polling stations at various university campuses across Canada. The aim was to “offer additional options for registering and voting in locations that may be more convenient to these [young] electors” (Elections Canada 2016). In total Elections Canada had 71 offices spanning 39 post-secondary campuses, 13 friendship centres and 2 community centres. This meant that Elections Canada would have had to work closely with these four organisations in order to ensure that these polling station functioned effectively and efficiently. Nevertheless, despite working with these organisations on this project, no additional funding from the government was reported by any of the four not-for-profits examined. This meant that despite being tasked with operating these polling stations, any monies received for these services were not counted as being used to foster civic engagement. For example, Elections Canada would have paid rent to venues, such as the Dalhousie Student Union Building, to use as a polling station. This means that any money received for this purpose was not counted as election related and

would have appeared in the Dalhousie Student Union financials as another revenue. As such, though they may have been contracted in a way, there was no record of the exchange of money between the two parties. This further explains why these organisations would have received the amounts of revenue they did.

Furthermore, of the four not-for-profits examined, only the Dalhousie Student Union, was linked directly to only one university. The other three though being student associations, were associated with more than one university. This may have explained why the Dalhousie Student Union was able to spend the most out of the four not-for-profits on fostering civic engagement. Being linked to only one university meant that the Dalhousie Student Union had less students or young persons to worry about as it only had to focus on the collective student body of one university. However, despite this fact and for reasons previously alluded to, the Dalhousie Student Union still spent less than a quarter of the percentage on civic engagement as the registered charity which spent the least proportion in this area. Subsequently this meant that the not-for-profits examined spent a substantially less portion than the registered charities on fostering civic engagement. To demonstrate this, the final order among all the organisations examined with regards to percentage invested in civic engagement was as follows.

Samara spent the largest proportion at 98 per cent, it was followed by CIVIX with 93 per cent, Engage Nova Scotia with 81 per cent, Springtide Collective with 77 per cent and the final registered charity of Apathy is Boring in fifth with 66 per cent. It is clear the registered charities invested far more into civic engagement programs meaning that they dominated the top positions among the organisation in this area. The not-for-profits brought up the rear in this area with the Dalhousie Student Union placing sixth in terms of proportion expended on civic engagement spending 14 per cent. It was followed by the

Canadian Federation of Students which spent 13 per cent. Students Nova Scotia was eighth having spent 10 per cent and the Canadian Alliance of Student Associations rounded out the list at 8 per cent.

Despite the proportions being invested by the not-for-profits being considerably lower than the registered charities, it is clear to see why they may have struggled to invest more in fostering civic engagement. It must be noted however, that unlike the registered charities, the main purpose of the not-for-profits is not to foster civic engagement.

Therefore, these organisations should not be too harshly judged for the amounts they spent in this area. The organisations which should be held more accountable are the registered charities as the act of fostering civic engagement is what they were established to do.

Ultimately, the burden of increasing civic engagement should fall on the shoulders of those organisations (registered charities) that were established to perform this type of work.

These organisations routinely seek monies from various sources to fulfill this purpose and as such are the ones that should be held most accountable when they fail to invest substantial portions of their revenue in this area. To further demonstrate the manner in which these organisations have adapted in order to attract more investors or money, we will now turn briefly to the story of one of the registered charities examined, Engage Nova Scotia.

5.4 Grantseeking The Engage Story

Another facet of these organisations is their adaptation in order to attract more funds and in particular government funds. These Get-Out-the-Vote organisations especially the registered charities are heavily reliant on government funds. This has led some of them to engage in what I term 'grantseeking'. To demonstrate this, we will briefly turn to the story of the Engage Nova Scotia Civic Democracy group.

Originally established following the Ivany Report, Engage Nova Scotia was meant to further foster civic engagement, and to pursue the best possible means to implement the Ivany Report's recommendations. The Ivany Report was an evaluation of Nova Scotia's economic ills, conducted by the Ivany Commission chaired by Ray Ivany (Lightstone 2015). Engage Nova Scotia has been lauded as a "catalyst for change following up on the recommendations of the Ivany Report which issued an urgent call to action on the part of all Nova Scotians" (deGannes 2017). However, in recent months, the organisation has been under intense media scrutiny over what some have been calling patronage. The accusations were leveled by both the Canadian Taxpayers Federation and the Progressive Conservatives of Nova Scotia. Nonetheless, the validity of these claims is not the topic of discussion, but rather, the impact a well-known and connected leader can have on program funding.

Throughout the scope of this project, three organisations were always more apparent than the others given the source of their revenue and their close working relationships with governments. These three organisations Samara, Engage Nova Scotia and Springtide Collective, all had one commonality: their leaders. The respective leaders of these organisations all enjoyed close relationships with either a provincial or the federal government and in some cases, both. Yet, would these organisations have been able to tap into government resources without the help of their leaders? In the lit review, operational and financial barriers were identified as two of the main challenges the voluntary sector faced. Yet these three organisations appeared not to be beset by these issues. In particular, Engage Nova Scotia appears to have been able to adapt and expand its mandate in order to attain more funding. After being initially founded to pursue the best possible means to implement the Ivany Report, Engage Nova Scotia has since broadened its mandate to include seeking to foster civic engagement.

Originally founded in 2010 under the name Envision Halifax, the organisation officially changed its name to Engage Nova Scotia in 2012. This change in name brought with it a change in approach. Engage Nova Scotia became involved in seeking to foster civic engagement. Though this change could be attributed to trying to attract more funds, it should also be attributed to the leadership of Danny Graham. Danny Graham is well known in Nova Scotia for being a former leader of the Nova Scotian Liberal party. However, Graham has been more than a politician. According to McInnes Cooper (2017) “over a twenty year period, Danny Graham has held senior positions in business, law, government and politics.” It is this varied background that has enabled Engage Nova Scotia to benefit from Graham’s connections. These connections have led to easier access to government funds for the organisation, as Graham has been able to use his government contacts to access additional funds. This was apparent by the fact that government funds accounted for 76 per cent of Engage’s total revenue. Had Graham not been affiliated with the Nova Scotian Liberal Party, would Engage have been able to attract such a large percentage of government funds? It is difficult to envision this level of government support especially in a sector where government funding has been systematically decreasing. This highlights one way in which a leader can have a significant impact on an organisation.

Graham’s connections to the Liberal Party of Nova Scotia enabled his organisations to gain access to over \$300,000 from the provincial government along with an additional three government workers at a cost of \$250,542 for their salaries (Chronicle Herald, 2016). Though this has been viewed by some as yet another instance of political patronage, it demonstrates the importance a leader can have for the success or failure of an organisation. The connections of Graham enabled the organisation to tap into his network and access

more resources. This was also seen in the impact yet another well know leader Michael MacMillan had on his organisation Samara Canada.

In 2007, MacMillan along with Alison Loat founded Samara Canada. MacMillan like Graham also has an extensive network, having founded and run at least three other companies. As such, MacMillan has connections in the media, film and wine industry. Added to that, he is also a member of the Order of Canada. This extensive network enabled Samara to generate 76 per cent of its total revenue from other registered charities and individual persons. It has also allowed the organisation to have a close working relationship with governments, evidenced in the numerous government contracts the organisation has received, in addition to being one of Elections Canada's main partners during the 42nd federal election. Like these two leaders, another organisation (Springtide Collective) has benefitted from having an influential leader.

In 2012, Mark Coffin founded the Springtide Collective for Democracy Society. Coffin like the previous two leaders has an extensive network. Having chaired one of the organisations examined in this paper (Students Nova Scotia), Coffin would have spent time lobbying on behalf of students in Nova Scotia. This lobbying would have allowed him to interact with persons in the government as well as the private sector. It was his experience with this organisation that prompted him to found the Springtide Collective for Democracy Society. According to Coffin, it was his experience with this organisation, especially the organisation's experience working with the government.

I was working for a group that is now called Students Nova Scotia. ... We were asking for various things, like all groups do. ... But if we got it, we were happy, obviously. But sometimes, we didn't really know why we got it. And, if we were asking for something and we didn't get it, we didn't really know why. ... It's was more like we were playing a lottery than participating in a fair and democratic process and I think a lot of people in advocacy groups have that sentiment these days. (Jeffrey, 2014)

Additionally, Coffin was nominated for and subsequently won Samara's Everyday Political Citizen contest in 2013. This award exposed Coffin to other influential political commentators such as Rick Mercer, Preston Manning and Danny Graham. This exposure has borne fruit as Springtide Collective has worked in conjunction with Engage Nova Scotia since Coffin's award. It is this network that has allowed Springtide Collective to work with Elections Canada and raise funds. These three leaders have had significant impacts on their respective organisations, however, their impact also highlights how attitudinal barriers can have an impact on an organisation's success or failure.

Attitudinal barriers were briefly discussed, where these barriers were seen as being negative. In the cases of both these organisations, attitudinal barriers appeared to not have a negative impact on these organisations. In particular, Engage Nova Scotia with its name change demonstrated that attitudinal barriers do not always prevent a renewal of the organisation. In Engage Nova Scotia's case, this renewal was a change of the name of the organisation along with a change in the focus of the organisation. Though it could be argued that this change would have occurred in order to have access to more funds or what I term grantseeking, the contribution of Engage's leader cannot be overlooked. Graham would obviously have been instrumental in facilitating this change and while the underlying question of why they changed is still to be addressed, Graham's role should not be overlooked. Similarly, MacMillan's role in shaping Samara into the organisation it is today, must also not be overlooked as it would have been his network that allowed him to build Samara into a registered charity with a national reach, rather than simply having a local reach. The influence of these two leaders on their respective organisations is apparent and demonstrates that attitudinal barriers do not always afflict organisations in the voluntary sector. Nonetheless, while the leaders can have a positive impact on their organisations,

sometimes the organisation can engage in practices to further bolster their chances of attracting funds.

The argument can be made that this was the case with Engage Nova Scotia, whereby it changed its name and focus. This was particularly interesting given that the organisation received a contract from the provincial government which could be valued at \$400,000, after it changed its name and focus. This is a result of an agreement between the Nova Scotian provincial government and the organisation. Under the agreement, Engage Nova Scotia will receive \$200,000 from the government, along with a promise to match private sector funding up to \$200,000. Given that the voluntary sector faces a financial barrier, as government funding has decreased, this award should highlight how some organisations can be crowded out in the voluntary sector. Operating in such a competitive sector, it is impressive that one organisation could attract so much government funds. As was stated earlier, this has led some to level accusations of political patronage, yet in my opinion a more practical explanation has to deal with organisations engaging in grantsmanship.

A standard textbook definition of grantsmanship is the skill or practice of obtaining grants in aid especially for research. In the case of Engage Nova Scotia, they simply played the grantsmanship game. Knowing what was necessary to attract funds, the organisations redefined and positioned itself in a manner that enabled it to maximise its chances of attracting funds. It is difficult to see how the leadership of Danny Graham would not have influenced this change. As Nothwehr, Ericson and Schultz (2012) postulate there is often a lack of skills to develop proposals suited to the complex world of grant applications. Graham's background in politics would have given him an insight into the inner workings of this world, which he more than likely would have passed on to the organisation. As such,

this is yet another instance of how a leader could have a significant impact on the success or failure of an organisation.

While it is clear that Engage Nova Scotia has benefited from significant portions of government money, whether or not it intentionally sought to redefine itself in order to attract more government funds is not entirely clear, and may never be determined. What is clear though is that it benefitted from the knowledge and expertise of Danny Graham. What this has revealed is that while limited human resources can be a barrier, having the right human resources can also be tremendously beneficial. Indeed, there is no doubt that Graham's influence would have put Engage Nova Scotia in a better position to achieve its goals or at the very least generate enough funds to give the organisation a better chance of achieving its goals. Grantseeking may result in some organisations being crowded out but in order to effectively grant seek, an organisation must have the competent staff to properly achieve this. There is no doubt that a well connected and respected leader could place an organisation in such a position and it is doubtful that Engage Nova Scotia would have been able to generate as much government funds had it not been for the work of Graham with the organisation.

Civic engagement organisations have the potential to increase youth voter turnout, yet, these organisations currently operate in an area that is not well regulated. These organisations all appear to suffer from the same faults, where there is no oversight of their activities, as a lot of money is being turned over to these organisations; the organisations need more money to be effective; the organisations do not know what they are doing; and the organisations are targeting the group of youth who are already voting, university students. These issues have left these organisations unable to effectively attract and retain staff, which has, in turn, led to other issues, such as being unable to attract funding due to a lack of qualified staff. Furthermore, these organisations consistently struggle with how to get funded, as the staff turnover rate is high, leaving the job of the complicated grant application process to underqualified staff. This results in those organisations which are able to secure funding, focusing on the group of youth who are likely to take part, as it presents an immediate example of the organisation using its funds correctly. Despite receiving large sums of money from both the federal and provincial governments, these organisations continue to operate without any real oversight.

Funding for these organisations is very important, as it enables them to operate and achieve their aims. These organisations cannot run their initiatives without funding, yet the rules pertaining to seeking and obtaining funds are inconsistent and difficult to understand on their own and become even more difficult without the right staff. As it stands, oversight of these organisations' expenditure is in the grant-seeking process. Government funds only one project at a time, and if an organisation fails or absconds with the money it simply doesn't get re-funded. This particular model has created unintended consequences as organisations are given no real guidance once they have received their funding. Obtaining

funding is also a very complicated process which requires qualified staff to complete the applications. Yet, because these organisations cannot properly attract funds, they also find it difficult to retain staff. This brings the issue of funding and grant applications to the forefront, as funds are needed to retain staff, yet, these organisations are unable to raise the required funds. Volunteers are the lifeblood of these organisations, yet, due to an inability to attract funds these organisations cannot properly retain staff and volunteers. This has resulted in a sector where these organisations are unable to retain enough staff to achieve their aims. A vicious circle is thereby created where organisations need money to attract and retain staff, while they need staff to compile and complete their funding applications. This funding model has thus created perverse and unintended consequences, as the money given to these organisations is not free of stipulations, but it also does not come with many instructions.

One such unintended consequence is the organisations are only being held to any standard when applying for the funding. Coupled with the inability of some organisations to attract adequate staff and volunteers due to an inability to attract funds, these organisations are sometimes operating with no real idea of how to effectively and efficiently achieve their aims. As such, these organisations operate and devise programs without any guidance on what makes a good program or which groups they should be targeting with said programs. For example, both the Apathy is Boring Project and CIVIX, receive significant portions of their revenue from government sources, both have had multiple contracts with Elections Canada and both target the same youth cohort. These two organisations actively target high school students with their programs. Similarly, both organisations run programs that are election based and revolve around the act of voting, as these are generally the projects funded by Elections Canada. This funding model of decentralized voluntary civic

engagement organisations seeking grants appears to have perverse, and unintended consequences. One such consequence is that these organisations are forced to develop programs that revolve around the act of voting. This has resulted in fewer programs aimed at actually increasing civic engagement, and more programs aimed at increasing the youth voting rate, as is evident in the programs offered by both CIVIX and Apathy is Boring. This funding model can be seen as creating organisations where the sole purpose is to propose programs that will be funded. This may have been the intention of government agencies when developing this funding model, but it has resulted in a sector where organisations are not working to their full potential.

Consequently, those persons in charge of delegating the funding, should do a more systematic analysis of these organisations and what incremental changes they are having. A standard operating procedure should be available to all organisations, so that they know the exact steps to take to secure funding. This could be achieved by appointing a person or persons to monitor these organisations and how they use the money they receive. This could potentially result in better planned and thought out programs. It could also allow organisations to attract more qualified staff as they may be able to better manage and train their staff as they would have standard guidelines on how to properly apply for and use their funds. Changing the funding model could also result in more innovative programs and may facilitate a move away from programs strictly aimed towards increasing the youth vote.

Another unintended consequence of this funding model is that organisations are left to their own devices once they receive their funding, which results in overlap and duplication of programs. All the organisations examined pushed at least one program aimed at increasing the youth vote. While increasing the youth vote is important, these organisations by virtue of focussing on this particular activity have ended up producing

programs that mimic each other. In an attempt to increase youth voter rates, these organisations have drifted away from attempting to increase civic engagement all together. Though some organisations do run alternative programs aimed at this, the majority appear to be more concerned with increasing youth voter turnout rates. In order to combat this, there should be more collaboration between the organisations, to avoid running similar programs. To ensure this happens the funding model should be changed to a competitive funding model, where there is more competition among the organisations. Inevitably, some organisations will fail while others will flourish, but it would create more innovative solutions. This could potentially avoid yet another unintended consequence of the current funding model, where the organisations appear to target the segment of the youth population that is already voting.

Due to the current funding model, these organisations appear to be targeting the segment of the youth population that is already voting, being university students. The aforementioned problems have left these organisations with the question of how to get funded repeatedly and securely. The organisations have responded by working with student organisations and university students. This is particularly alarming because it is acknowledged that the segment of the youth population that appears to be not voting with regularity, are those with no post-secondary education, yet, civic engagement organizations and their initiatives continue to target the segment of the youth population that is most likely to vote. It is my belief that these organisations should target those young persons who are not voting. Yes, it would be more difficult to find these persons, but the long-term effect could lead to an increase in the youth voter rate. Again, changing the funding model to be more competitive and appointing a dedicated person to monitor these organisations could help to prevent them from targeting the wrong youth segment. By virtue of having more

competition organisations may be more inclined to pursue projects that differentiate them from other organisations. This could result in fewer programs geared towards university students and student associations and more programs geared towards the youth who really need them.

Additionally, the lack of variety among the programs and the tendency to target university students could also be addressed by changing the funding model. It has been demonstrated how a well-connected and known leader can increase the chances of an organisation attracting more funds or better qualified staff and volunteers. Yet, all organisations do not have the privilege of having such a leader. This has resulted in some organisations being unable to fully address their modus operandi because they are busy trying to get funding or qualified staff. By changing the funding model, more collaboration could occur between the organisations, which may result in those organisations with well-connected leaders being able to share that knowledge with other organisations. Ultimately, this will only result in more efficient and effective programs and organisations.

All in all, the problems these organisations face relate to funding. The current funding model has resulted in perverse and unintended consequences. While these consequences can be easily addressed, they have resulted in a group of organisations which are operating with no real oversight, or idea of how to properly achieve their aims. The organisations that have been able to secure funding have gone on to produce programs that will ensure they receive funding again. This has resulted in programs that habitually target the youth segment that is already taking part. By changing the funding model to a more competitive one, these issues can be fixed. This would mean creating a more centralised model of grantseeking, whereby the strongest will survive.

While it may be argued that this will result in the smaller organisations being crowded out, it is unlikely to happen. These organisations tend to be run by persons extremely dedicated to the cause. As such, it is more likely to breed an environment of more collaboration and more efficient and effective programs. Civic engagement organisations have the ability to dramatically change youth engagement if properly utilised. It is not that these civic engagement organisations need to be regulated, it is that there needs to be a better regulated funding model. The ability to seek out and renew grants may not be corrupt, but, more importantly, it may not be the most effective way to achieve goals. Until the funding model is better regulated, organisations will continue to produce the same programs that target the same segment and ultimately effect little change, while potentially breeding even more disenfranchisement among youth.

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Appendix A: Recruitment Materials

CONSENT FORM

Project title: Get-out-the-Vote Initiatives: What are they, do they work?

Lead researcher:

Kirt Goodridge, Master of Arts in Political Science student at Dalhousie University.

Email: kr409251@dal.ca.

Telephone: (902) 9995399

Other researchers

Supervisor: Dr. Louise Carbert, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science Dalhousie University.

Email: louise.carbert@dal.ca

Phone: (902) 494-6628

I invite you to take part in a research study being conducted by me, Kirt Goodridge, a Masters student, at Dalhousie University as part of my Masters of Arts in Political Science. Choosing whether or not to take part in this research is entirely your choice. The information below tells you about what is involved in the research, what you will be asked to do and about any benefit, risk, inconvenience or discomfort that you might experience.

You should discuss any questions you have about this study with Kirt Goodridge. Please ask as many questions as you like. If you have questions later, please contact the lead researcher.

As you are aware, youth voter turnout has been in steady decline in recent years. Your organization is one of many throughout Canada that seeks to remedy this issue by engaging in various get out the vote initiatives for youth. A recent report commissioned by the Canadian Alliance of Student Associations indicated that organizations such as yours may have played a part in the recent increase in voter turnout among youth at the federal election held in October 2015. My study will examine if get out the vote initiatives are an effective way to engage youth in the democratic process, and in increasing youth voter turnout, by analyzing their budgets, partisan affiliations, donors, as well as speaking with members of these initiatives in Nova Scotia.

I'd like to speak to you about your experiences with your organization and in facilitating activities to increase youth engagement in your community. In effect, I want to know if [GROUP NAME] helped youth to become more engaged, and if its activities have led to an increase in youth voter turnout in your community. Generally, I am looking for insights as to the benefits and challenges your organization faces in attempting to increase youth engagement.

I am the only researcher working on this project, aside from my supervisor who may review my notes and drafts. My study consists of two components. The first part comprises interviews with yourself and other members from similar organizations. The interview takes just under an hour. I will audio record the interview to ensure accuracy. The audio recording will not be downloaded to a computer or published. No research assistant is engaged to hear a recording. The digital recorder (and any notes arising from the interviews) will be kept confidential, handled carefully, and destroyed immediately following the completion of the research.

The second component of the study is a catalogue of the various organizations similar to yours that operate in Nova Scotia. It will detail their management structure, whether or not the organization is

a charitable organization, as well as its main sponsors and donors, in an effort to determine whether or not the organization is able to operate effectively given its resources.

The risk of potential adverse effects from your participation in this study is minimal. My questions relate to the organization itself and your reflections on the work that it has done. However, given that you were recommended to me by your organization, it is difficult to guarantee that your participation and any comments made by yourself will not be attributed to you. Further, your name was provided as a suggestion and you are not required to participate in the study and do not have to agree if you do not feel comfortable. You may also at anytime leave the study or refuse participation. In such an event, all information you have already provided will be immediately destroyed unless stated otherwise by yourself and your withdrawal or refusal to participate will not be noted or shared with your organization. Staff participants will not be named in my final thesis. The names and job titles of staff members of each initiative are public information, therefore, if I indicate that I have spoken to a staff member from a specific initiative, it will be easy to discern who participated in my project. However, by not attributing specific names to comments made by staff members, readers will not be able to discern who said what, thus providing a degree of protection to staff participants. I will use direct quotes when appropriate, but they will not be attributed to you by name. If there are comments or points of view that you prefer to be confidential, inform me during the interview. They will be used as background information only.

Data will be collected via notes and an audio recording. A low-end tape recorder with no data capability will be used to record the interviews, and each individual interview will be transcribed once completed. As such, all recordings will be destroyed immediately once they have been transcribed. All data (transcriptions, names and contact information of persons interviewed will be saved to a designated folder on the hard drive of my personal computer which is password protected and will not be uploaded to any file sharing services. No other persons besides myself will have access to this laptop. Data will be destroyed immediately following my convocation. This will be done by shredding and burning all hand-written notes and deleting all files stored in the folder on my hard drive.

Your participation will provide facilitators, like yourself, with useful research that can be used to evaluate practices going forward. I will also be able to provide you with the results from your specific group's past participants, which can be used for internal program evaluation as well as the final version of my thesis.

Information that you provide to us will be kept private. Only myself and supervisor will have access to this information. My findings will be described and shared in my final thesis. I will be very careful to only talk about organizational results so that no one will be identified. This means that ***you will not be identified in any way in my thesis***. All your identifying information will be securely stored. All electronic records will be kept secure in an encrypted file on the researcher's password-protected computer.

You are free to leave the study at any time. If you decide to stop participating at any point in the study, you can also decide whether you want any of the information that you have contributed up to that point to be removed or if you will allow us to use that information. You can also decide for up to six months if you want us to remove your data. After that time, it will become impossible for us to remove it because it will already be analyzed and used in my thesis.

I am happy to talk with you about any questions or concerns you may have about your participation in this research study. Please contact Kirt Goodridge (at 902 999-5399 or kr409251@dal.ca) at any time with questions, comments, or concerns about the research study. I will also inform you if any new information comes up that could affect your decision to participate.

If you have any ethical concerns about your participation in this research, you may also contact Research Ethics, Dalhousie University at (902) 494-1462, or email: ethics@dal.ca (and reference REB file #2016-3881).

Regards,
Kirt Goodridge
MA student
Dalhousie University

Study: Get-out-the-Vote Initiatives: What are they, do they work?
INFORMED CONSENT - SIGNATURE PAGE

I, _____ have read the explanation about this study. I have been given the opportunity to discuss it and my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I hereby consent to take part in this study. However, I realize that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time.

Signature of Participant

Date

I, _____ hereby consent to my remarks being audio recorded for use by the researcher, as per the terms laid out in the informed consent letter.

Signature of Participant

Date

Signature of Researcher

Date

Apendix B: Interview Script

Good afternoon [NAME], thank you for taking time out of your busy schedule to meet with me. As was discussed prior to our meeting, this should not take longer than an hour.

Before we begin, I would like to go through the consent form without to ensure that you completely understand it and to address any concerns you may potentially have before you sign it. I would also like to remind you once again that this interview will be recorded and ensure you that any information collected today will be kept in the strictest of confidence. Do you have any questions before we begin?

As you already know, I am conducting research on youth get out the vote initiatives and your organisation happens to be one of these initiatives. Now while this interview is about your organisation and its work, it is also about you, so I'd like to begin with a few questions about yourself, in order to gauge your motivations and aspirations with regards to this initiative.

Interview Questions

1. Can you tell me what makes your organisation unique?
2. Your organisation clearly does a great deal of work with youth, but as several publications from Elections Canada indicate youth engagement is in severe decline. What would you say then is your organisation's most worthwhile accomplishment while you have been working for this initiative?
3. Now we know as is the norm in life every success or accomplishment has a downside and given that the job of youth engagement and in particular youth voter turnout traditionally has been a very difficult task to accomplish up to now, what would you say is the most frustrating part of your job?
 - a. More specifically, can you tell me a bit about the difficulties in getting youth engaged?
 - b. Could you tell me about a specific instance or episode that was particularly disappointing?
4. I've been very engaged with your website and looking at the various outreach programs in particular [insert program or document specific to organisation/initiative]. Do you have any additional documents that haven't been posted to your website?
5. Going back to the previous [insert program or document specific to organisation/initiative], it is apparent that to undertake such an endeavour requires an array of resources, apart from money, are there other resources that would be helpful to your organisation in achieving its goals?
6. I mentioned funds earlier and it's obvious that every organisation requires sufficient funds to adequately run its projects. Can you tell me about the challenges of fund raising?

7. Can you tell me anything about working with youth voter initiatives in Nova Scotia that make it distinct from other initiatives in other provinces? In other words, what is distinct about working in Nova Scotia?
8. Does your organisation work closely with any other organisations?
 - a. Do you share information with other organisations?
 - b. Apart from these organisations are there any particular persons that your organisation cooperates with?
9. Do you believe that organisations such as your own are better suited to the task of engaging youth than political parties?
 - a. Should more political parties be involved in youth engagement or is it best if non-partisan groups do this work?
10. What would you say is the biggest challenge your organisation might face going forward?
11. Do you think that your organisation will have a significant impact on youth engagement and voter turnout going forward?
12. If you had the opportunity to speak to the federal, provincial or even municipal government to make a case for why youth get out the vote initiatives should be utilised more in the future, what would you say to them?

Once again thank you very much for your time, this has been a very enlightening interview. I will contact you if I have any further questions and be on the lookout for my final research project as I will be passing it on to you and your initiative.

Thank you once again for your time.