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Abstract

The 1969 *Report of Task Force on Housing and Urban Development* marks a point of intersection between Canadian housing policy and the participatory democracy movement of the 1960s. While the Task Force was announced during Trudeaumania – a movement in participatory politics that swept Pierre Elliott Trudeau into office as the 15th Prime Minister of Canada – it sought to fix problems in Canadian housing policy that had existed for over three decades. Following an extensive Canada-wide public consultation, Transport Minister Paul Hellyer presented the Report to Cabinet where it faced inhibiting criticism, resulting in Hellyer’s resignation in April 1969. This thesis describes the recurring themes of Canadian housing policy from 1935-1969 and traces the growth of public engagement and participatory democracy within the same period. I propose a four-part breakdown of types of participatory democracy: liberal, deliberative, radical, and revolutionary participatory democracy. Following an archival analysis of Task Force submissions from Toronto and Winnipeg, I argue that Hellyer’s Task Force blended the liberal and deliberative types of participatory democracy. Identifying participatory democracy sub-types helps to identify differences in the political approaches of Paul Hellyer and Pierre Elliott Trudeau; in turn, Trudeau’s and Hellyer’s differences explain, in part, the negative response the Report received and Hellyer’s eventual resignation.
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Chapter One: Introduction

In July 1968, the Task Force on Housing and Urban Development began a nation-wide public consultation on the state of housing in Canada. Conducted by Paul Hellyer, Minister of Transport, its January 1969 Report of the Task Force on Housing and Urban Development called on the federal government to address a lack of consumer input in housing systems across Canada and implement new federal housing policies based on the Task Force’s series of recommendations.\(^1\) Hellyer failed to win Cabinet support following the release of the Report, though following his resignation from Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s Cabinet in April 1969, some measures were taken to address recommendations from the Report.\(^2\) The limited policy result from these broad consultations raises questions about how effective this method of policy making could be. Trends in Canadian housing policy reveal a history of delayed federal policy changes, conflict over social housing programs, and the promotion of home ownership. However, the rise of participation-based movements through the 1950s and 1960s shows a readiness in Canadians to engage with social questions. Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s 1968 election campaign, and the mainstreaming of “participatory democracy” was, from Hellyer’s perspective, a green light to personally take the Task Force on nation-wide consultations. The rejection of the Report by Trudeau and his Cabinet call into question Trudeau’s promotion of participatory democracy and his election platform of political change.

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Participatory democracy was a tool used by Trudeau in his 1967-1968 Liberal leadership and federal election campaigns. The Hellyer Task Force was launched in late 1968 to fulfill the only campaign promise made by Trudeau; his call to address housing issues in Canada was made in a speech given to the annual convention of the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities in Edmonton on June 4, 1968. Coincidentally, “Hellyer had been instrumental in having this speech given and it bore the mark of his thinking … he [Trudeau] promised to set up a Task Force on Housing and Urban Development and thus acknowledged that serious problems existed in the field of housing and urban development.”³ The Task Force was the newest in a long list of federal housing examinations conducted since the Second World War. It sought to challenge Canadian housing policies supported and implemented since the end of the war and aimed to achieve a greater level of public participation in its endeavors.⁴ The significance of the Task Force lies generally in its various efforts to engage Canadian publics and specifically in its extensive public consultations to contribute to the participatory democracy dialogue of the 1960s. Hellyer’s Task Force engaged multiple Canadian publics, as did other influential governmental inquiries like the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1963-1969) and the Royal Commission on the Status of Women (1967-1970). Distinctions between Trudeau’s and Hellyer’s visions of

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participatory democracy may, in part, help to explain the Task Force’s unfortunate ending.

The thesis is composed of four main chapters: the first two establish historical context, while the second two utilize primary source documents to analyze the Task Force and its Report. In discussing the history of housing policy in Canada, 1935-1968, chapter two establishes the repetitive nature of housing recommendations, the federal government’s continued support for home ownership, and the debate about social housing. In discussing both change and continuity in the period, this chapter identifies the issues Hellyer’s Task Force would later contend with. Housing is a difficult policy area because of the many actors that are represented, including financial, construction, and real estate sectors and at least three levels of government, not to mention the housing consumer. Chapter Three discusses the growth of participatory democracy and argues that participatory democracy is not a single political technique; rather, I argue that there are four sub-types of participatory democracy: liberal, deliberative, radical, and revolutionary. The perspectives of Pierre Elliott Trudeau and Paul Hellyer on participatory democracy are then sketched to explain the role of intra-party politics in the origins and fate of the Task Force. Chapters Four and Five utilize submissions made to the Task Force to gain a better understanding of the various actors that influenced the Report. While Chapter Four analyzes consensus in submission materials and areas where the Report aligns with this consensus, Chapter Five does the same for tensions in submission materials and discusses how these conflicting perspectives can be explained within the framework of participatory democracy outlined in Chapter Three.
Selection of Primary Sources: Toronto and Winnipeg

In the autumn of 1968, organizations across Canada submitted briefs to the Task Force, expressing their views on the housing issues facing Canadians, how these issues affected their organizations, and their propositions for how to remedy these issues. Some intervenors, like the Toronto Real Estate Board, submitted briefs upon request; others responded to general calls for submissions found in newspaper articles and various advertisements across the country. The broad array of submissions to the Task Force reflects a widespread response to the call for material. This reveals both the significance of housing issues in Canada at the time and the national visibility of the Task Force. In addition to the submissions it received, the Task Force held hearings across Canada in most major cities, where it heard briefings from roughly half the intervenors that made submissions. In Chapters Four and Five, I analyze the many submissions made to the Task Force during the public consultations held in Toronto and Winnipeg. I use these submissions to better understand what groups the Task Force consulted, how those groups interpreted the housing crisis in Canada, and how the Task Force addressed those interpretations.

While material from all the major cities visited by the Task Force does exist, it is beyond the scope of the thesis to compile an exhaustive analysis of all Task Force submissions. Every region of Canada has its own set of housing issues, and the Task Force heard from all regions. Choosing Toronto as one of my two focal cities is obvious.

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5 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), MG32-B33, vol. 200, file 5, “Brief to the Task Force on Housing and Urban Development by The Toronto Real Estate Board, September 20, 1968,” i. Here, Toronto Real Estate Board President, Brian R. B. Magee responds to a “formal invitation” from Paul Hellyer to submit a brief to the Task Force.
As a major centre for urban growth and development in Canada, Toronto was experiencing many issues that affected people in other large and growing cities across the country in the late 1960s. Between 1950 and 1970, Toronto had seen a constant demand for both residential and commercial land. This can be contrasted to Winnipeg which faced a loss of industry in the same period. While Richard White points out that Toronto’s uniquely prosperous nature sets it apart from other Canadian cities, Task Force submissions from national organizations echo some specifically Torontonian housing needs. Therefore, studying Toronto offers both a snapshot of national urban growth and development issues, as well as providing a unique example that differs from other Canadian cities.

While the submission files from Toronto are a substantial resource, studying the submission files from Winnipeg diversifies both the housing and political issues discussed. In his book, *Shrug: Trudeau in Power*, Walter Stewart discusses the political divisions between regions of Canada. One such division he identifies, western Canada, suffered from what he identified as ‘western discontent’ under Trudeau’s government. The relocation of Air Canada from Winnipeg to Montreal, conflicts over wheat prices and production, and the expensive and highly promoted Expo ’67 in Montreal are highlighted by Stewart as reasons for growing western Canadian discontent over eastern Canadian dominance in political life. This selection offers another angle to this thesis, as it introduces a western Canadian perspective and serves as a point of comparison to the Toronto case. Winnipeg faced different challenges than Toronto in the period under

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7 Ibid.
discussion. For example, in the 1960s Winnipeg faced de-industrialization and a dramatic rise in urban aboriginal populations.\(^9\) The deterioration of the core area of the city, beginning in the 1940s, led to the introduction of urban renewal programs in Winnipeg in the early 1960s.\(^10\) This can be contrasted to the development of public housing and promotion of urban renewal policies in Toronto from the late 1940s through the 1960s. The unique set of challenges in Winnipeg offers a useful comparison to the issues faced by Toronto.

There are many more submissions from Toronto than from my comparison case, Winnipeg. While this is understandable, given the vast difference in size of the cities, there was no bias towards Toronto material in this study. Any apparent over-emphasis on Toronto simply reflects the larger quantity of Toronto documents in the Task Force archives. By studying these two major urban centers, this thesis covers a broad range of material consulted by the Task Force, capturing both the overlapping concerns and one set of regionally specific issues.

**Introduction to Primary Sources**

This thesis conducts a detailed analysis of submissions made to the Task Force in the hearings it held in Toronto and Winnipeg in the autumn of 1968. The study of these archival sources develops an inside perspective on several factors, including: the sources


\(^10\) Ibid., 104.
of Task Force submissions, what these submissions identified as important, and how they influenced the final report of the Task Force. My final analysis distinguishes between the perspective of the Task Force and the intervenors that presented to it. This reveals the extent to which the participation of the intervenors influenced the Task Force in making its final report. Submissions to the Task Force come from several different publics, organized by my analysis into the following categories: Administrative, Construction and Planning, Financial, Real Estate, and Social Groups. The submissions make up the bulk of the primary source data consulted.

Minutes from Task Force hearings provide supportive evidence to the submissions. The minutes are an essential source that reveal how submissions were presented to the Task Force and how the Task Force responded to them. The minutes provide context to the submissions and briefing sources; furthermore, they provide first hand evidence as to how the members of the Task Force, including Paul Hellyer, responded to submissions and dealt with presenters. In turn, this offers insight into the processes of the Task Force and its relation to participatory democracy in the 1960s.

Another primary source that comes into play in this project is the complaint file archives of the CMHC and the Task Force. These files contain letters of complaint, recommendation, and support in relation to housing issues and the running of the Task Force. Complaint letters reveal a responsive public regularly engaging with various forms of media, such as newspaper and television. This reveals a strong level of public engagement in the participatory process promoted both by Trudeau’s government, and by the Task Force itself. These files also include both positive and negative reactions to Hellyer’s past political career, particularly his involvement in the controversial
unification of the armed forces in 1966. In turn, this affected popular perceptions of the Task Force and its objectives. Therefore, the public complaint files offer a multitude of perspectives to this thesis, showing the housing issues people identified with, as well as revealing communication processes and their influence on how people interpreted the work of the Task Force.

Along with the archival material, I consulted political memoirs, newspaper sources, and some contemporary reviews of the Report. Political memoirs offer different perspectives on the political tensions of the time and give firsthand details, personal opinions, and new angles to research and investigate. Some important resources include Walter Stewart’s Shrug: Trudeau in Power, Paul Hellyer’s Damn the Torpedoes: My Fight to Unify Canada’s Armed Forces, and Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s Memoirs. I look generally at the period of Trudeau’s election in mid-1968 to Hellyer’s resignation in mid-1969; however, some issues in particular, like the unification of the armed forces, offer an important opportunity to consult the papers. Several newspapers are consulted in this thesis, including the Winnipeg Free Press, the Ottawa Citizen, and the Globe and Mail. I look at both national and local news coverage by those newspapers’ own reporters as well as Canadian Press coverage and editorial pieces. Newspapers serve a dual evidentiary purpose. Newspaper articles offer background information on various issues, such as the debates surrounding housing policy and their public interpretations. Finally, newspapers published reviews of the Report by public housing advocate Albert Rose and community planning legal scholar J. B. Milner, both of the University of Toronto. These offer another angle to my analysis. These reviews aid in identifying where the Report aligns with consensus and tension in the submissions made to the Task Force.
Conclusion

By framing the Task Force within the context of post-war housing in Canada and the rise of participatory democracy in the 1960s, this master’s thesis studies consensus and tension in the Report and the hundreds of submissions made to the Task Force, analyzing the extent to which public perspectives were represented in the Report. The Task Force engaged citizens across the country in a liberal/deliberative participatory democracy initiative that was not accepted by Trudeau’s Cabinet in 1969. Differences between the interpretations of participatory democracy employed by Hellyer and Trudeau explain the failure of the Report to win approval. The political backgrounds of both politicians, discussed in Chapter Three, inform the types of participatory democracy (PD) they employed. Nothing in either politician’s background would suggest that they would support the radical and revolutionary PD types that had been gaining support in social movements of the left since the 1960s. But even within a more centrist range of political ideas, there was still room for a difference of opinion. On the one hand, Trudeau’s stream of participatory democracy can be described as electoral/strong-liberal PD – his election campaign strategies were innovative in the kinds of participation opportunities they offered voters, but in certain cases that Trudeau identified, such as constitutional issues, he adopted a strong-liberal form of PD, which essentially means a process of public consultation managed by an authority (the state). On the other hand, Hellyer’s stream of participatory democracy can be described as liberal/deliberative. He went into projects – like the unification of the armed forces and the Task Force – with pre-conceived notions of what the relevant groups wanted and how to direct policy changes, but did not always
prioritize the state or its interests, and also made space for the direct and influential input of extensive consultation processes. While the differences between these approaches were enough to cause Hellyer’s resignation and the perceived failure of the Report in 1969, the positive influence of Hellyer’s recommendations was felt in later housing legislation.

In sum, the Task Force made a real contribution to the participatory democracy movement of the 1960s. It marks an important moment in the history of Canadian housing policy in that it laid out the problems of over 30 years of neglectful housing policy and did so with a strong participatory contribution from a variety of Canadian publics.
For the majority of Canadians, “the purchase of a home is our single largest capital expenditure.”¹ The fundamental necessity of housing forms the baseline of an industry attempting to bring legislators, builders, and consumers to agreement over the best way to house widespread, diverse, and growing Canadian populations. The development of the welfare state in Canada throughout the 1940s and 1950s established the necessary framework for federal, provincial, and municipal level housing initiatives. Overall, the period 1935-1968 saw the rise of ground level initiatives that led to increased federal housing funding opportunities. Housing policy became a political battleground as the roles of private and public investment were debated, and the importance of mortgage accessibility to prospective home owners led to many policy changes in both the housing and banking sectors. Housing policy is a contentious policy area because of the many perspectives that intersect; for instance, the finance and construction industries and federal, provincial, or municipal governments need to agree on how to develop appropriate legislation.

In the early 1930s, “such modern devices as consumer credit, installment buying, and mortgage lending to individuals had just appeared. As cities grew, cheap urban land slowly disappeared, driving up the cost of housing.”² In the mid-1930s, municipalities took an interest in addressing the deteriorating housing stock and growing housing

shortages in Canada. Federal development of housing policies began more seriously after the Second World War as the national government became more active in social policy. Furthermore, increasing developments in social housing options – which include public and co-op housing initiatives – developed throughout the 1950s and 1960s.\footnote{3} To historically situate the Task Force’s housing recommendations, this chapter examines the history of housing policy in Canada, focusing on the period of 1935-1968. The federal government enacted several housing initiatives in this period, including: the Dominion Housing Act (1935), the National Housing Act (1938/1944/1954/1964), and the creation of the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC, 1946). This chapter reviews some other influential undertakings such as the Sub-Committee on Housing and Community Planning (1944), also known as the Curtis Report. The period under discussion exhibits continuity in housing policies and repetitive recommendations from various reports. For example, this includes calls for rehabilitation of housing and increasing housing for the low-income demographic. Major policy changes were in many cases delayed responses to problems that had persisted for years. When the CMHC urban renewal program was introduced in 1956 it delivered – in a major way – housing rehabilitation recommendations made since the early 1930s.

Dominion Housing Act (1935)

Many Canadians could not access adequate housing between the Great Depression and the start of the Second World War (1929-1939). Amid the economic chaos of the Great Depression, housing markets across the country were strongly affected. In Halifax, “slum conditions and the lack of affordable housing had already reached the critical stage by the 1930s, but no effective solution was found to deal with the crisis before the outbreak of [the Second World War].” 4 Such unacceptable conditions, found across Canada in all major cities, increased tension between federal and provincial governments and led to the questioning of any funding opportunities in the housing sector. During the Depression, shrinking tax revenues resulted in shortfalls in government revenue.

In response to growing housing problems – including widespread shortages, deteriorating quality of housing stock and inaccessibility of housing for low-income earners – several major cities across the country conducted significant housing surveys. These housing surveys occurred in Halifax (1931), Hamilton (1932), Winnipeg (1934), Toronto (1934), Montreal and Ottawa (1935). 5 Municipalities undertook these surveys to learn more about the problems in the housing market and provide supporting data to aid their requests for provincial and federal action. While no short-term construction occurred as a result of these initiatives, a parliamentary committee was established to

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investigate the housing situation. In April 1935, this committee reported on the
deporable state of housing, compiling a list of seventeen critical observations and four
specific recommendations for immediate implementation.\textsuperscript{6} These recommendations
called for the creation of a federal Housing Authority, empowered to work with both the
public and private sectors, to promote the construction and repair of dwellings, and to
coordinate municipal, provincial, federal, and private interests into a national housing
policy. It gave priority to the importance of repair and rehabilitation of current housing
stock.\textsuperscript{7} Oberlander and Fallick write, “like the Bruce Report and the other local surveys
of the 1930s, the Special Committee’s work urged sustained, systematic intervention in
the housing market to resolve both longstanding and more immediate residential
problems.”\textsuperscript{8}

Though the federal government enacted the 1935 Dominion Housing Act shortly
after the committee’s report, it did not completely address the recommendations of the
report. Its selective approach to the new legislation favored business interests – through
job creation in the construction industry – over housing consumers.\textsuperscript{9} For example, while
the first listed recommendation called for the creation of a federal housing authority, this
was not done in 1935, but was postponed until the first National Housing Act, in 1938.
The continuity of housing policy in the period under discussion can be seen in
suggestions that were made as early as 1935 to repair Canadian housing stock and similar

\textsuperscript{6} Canada, Parliament, \textit{House of Commons Journals}, 17\textsuperscript{th} Parliament, 6\textsuperscript{th} Session: vol. 73, 376, http://parl.canadiana.ca/
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{8} Oberlander and Fallick, \textit{Housing a Nation}, 15
recommendations that arose in Hellyer’s Task Force – and even later in the 1972 CMHC Task Force on Low Income Housing.\textsuperscript{10} The priority given to the restoration of Canadian housing stock was not addressed in the 1935 Dominion Housing Act, but the inaction on this issue was not an isolated incident. In fact, many of the criticisms and recommendations presented by the housing surveys of the early 1930s were not addressed. John Bacher quotes criticisms presented by CCF member Abram Heaps, who asserted that the new 1935 legislation “no more resembled the committee’s report, than a pig represents pig iron.”\textsuperscript{11} Francis Frisken argues that the 1935 Dominion Housing Act did “little more than commit the federal government to providing mortgage assistance as a way to stimulate the construction industry and generate employment.”\textsuperscript{12} However, this was an important objective of the legislation, as it had been in the committee’s recommendations. Much like the federal government’s first attempt at housing policy, most housing legislation enacted between 1935-1967 focused on the promotion of home ownership and the increased accessibility of mortgages – not on the renovating of existing homes and the greater provision of low-income housing opportunities.\textsuperscript{13}

The growing attempts to legislate housing policy in this period are reflective of a shift from a residual to an institutional concept of social welfare in Canada. As Denis Guest writes, the residual concept of social welfare, seen in the early 1900s through the 1920s and 1930s, exhibits a minimal level of last-resort social assistance from municipal


\textsuperscript{12} Frances Frisken, \textit{The Public Metropolis: The Political Dynamics of Urban Expansion in the Toronto Region, 1924-2003} (Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 2007), 62.

\textsuperscript{13} Miron, “Progress,” 10.
governments. For instance, a person in this period had to exhaust any potential avenues of support from family, friends, and creditors before municipal or charitable support could be pursued.\textsuperscript{14} The residual role for social security is reflective of laissez-faire style governments that were “supported by those values of an individualistic, free enterprise philosophy that stresses self reliance [and] the duty incumbent on families to care for their own.”\textsuperscript{15} The institutional concept refers to societal support for public programs of income protection and other types of social welfare that are now a common feature of modern society. It “considers social security programs to be the primary defence against adversity and rejects the argument that hard work, thrift, and foresight are virtues likely to be found wanting in the poor and dependent.”\textsuperscript{16} Guest states:

\begin{quote}
The idea of limiting social security organizations to a role residual to those of the private market and the family has gradually given way to the view that social security organizations must be designed as a first line of defence. This approach, referred to as an \textit{institutional} concept of welfare, has resulted from the growing recognition that because of the nature of social organization in an urban-industrial society, the risks to an individual’s social security are part of the social costs of operating a society that has provided higher standards of living for more people than ever before in our history.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

Guest marks 1940 as a general turning point in these concepts, although the seeds of institutionalized social welfare began in the 1930s. The Second World War and the necessary changes it brought to Canadian society contributed to the eventual societal switch from residual to institutional concepts of social welfare.

\textsuperscript{14} Guest, \textit{Social Security}, 3.  
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 4.  
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 5.  
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 4.
Housing During the Second World War

The first National Housing Act of 1938 was enacted to promote the production of new houses and the modernization and maintenance of pre-existing houses in Canada. It recognized many of the housing issues identified in the early 1930s housing surveys that the 1935 Dominion Housing Act did not address.\(^{18}\) For instance, it “made low-interest loans available to any local authority that undertook to provide low-cost housing, provided that the provincial government passed enabling legislation containing guarantees on principal and interest.”\(^{19}\) Thompson and Seager discuss a variety of public works projects and other attempts to stimulate the economy initiated by the federal government in 1938. This included highway construction and youth employment projects. One of the main objectives was to stimulate the construction industry through the Municipal Improvements Assistance Act and the National Housing Act (NHA). Though the NHA made federally backed mortgages technically easier to obtain, “not a single low-rental housing project was begun” because of the constitutional difficulty of providing federal money to provincially directed housing initiatives.\(^{20}\) This 1938 legislation was significant for its promotion of low-income housing, yet the disparity between federal, provincial, and municipal housing agendas made the legislation essentially unusable.\(^{21}\) While the 1935 and 1938 legislation were important steps in the growth of federal housing initiatives, they had little immediate effect on the housing

\(^{18}\) Oberlander and Fallick call the 1935 DHA a “disappointment.” Oberlander and Fallick, *Housing a Nation*, 17.

\(^{19}\) Frisken, *Public Metropolis*, 62.

\(^{20}\) Thompson and Seager, *Decades of Discord*, 301.

\(^{21}\) Oberlander and Fallick, *Housing a Nation*, 20.
situation in Canada, and “post-war policy and activity in these fields developed primarily from the National Housing Act of 1944.”

During the Second World War, the housing deficiencies of the Depression era, identifiable in both the quantity and quality of housing, became an “acute housing problem” that threatened to persist long into the post-war period and affect many Canadians. This housing sector crisis began during the war with the failures of Wartime Housing Limited (WHL), a crown corporation founded in 1941 that was in charge of veterans’ housing affairs. Jill Wade takes issue with the policies of WHL because,

The Advisory Committee on Reconstruction recommended a national, comprehensive housing program emphasizing low-rent housing, [but] the federal government initiated a post-war program promoting home ownership and private enterprise and, in the process, neglected long-range planning and low-income housing.”

In her discussion of post-war housing in Canada, Wade argues that the federal government took a “directly interventionist approach to housing problems” through the WHL, but actually overlooked the needs of Canadians and the future viability of the new housing policies. This is particularly related to the temporary nature of much of the housing produced by WHL, the overall shortage of housing during the later stages of the war, and the impending return home of hundreds of thousands of soldiers.

In 1942, deferred construction of residential units in Canada for the years 1926-1941 was estimated at 232,000 urban units; two years later, the Curtis Report of 1944

25 Ibid.
suggested that a *minimum* shortage of 114,000 units would still exist in 1945, with its recommendations at a much higher 606,000 urban units.\(^{26}\) In addition to deferred construction, another factor in the wartime housing problem was a decrease in home ownership between 1931 and 1941. This change resulted in a greater portion of the population living in forms of housing that were previously not subsidized by federal governments.\(^ {27}\) During the war, the WHL sought to alleviate housing shortages by “providing rental accommodation strictly for munitions workers.”\(^ {28}\) These accommodations were temporary and were specifically constructed in cities where wartime industries were located. This naturally led to geographical biases and continued housing shortages in regions that lacked wartime industries. Interestingly, the supposedly ‘low-rental’ housing developed by the WHL did not actually serve low-income people; the employees of wartime industries were better paid than low-income Canadians. In other words, housing produced by the WHL regularly went to medium-income Canadians, leaving low-income Canadians to fend for themselves in the search for affordable housing.\(^ {29}\) Wade writes that the “WHL had no intention of subsidizing its tenants,” which reveals the perspective of the federal government at the time. It sought to provide affordable housing for wartime industry employees, not develop affordable housing for the growing Canadian population that could benefit from low-income housing assistance.\(^ {30}\) The result was that Canada entered the post-war period with “a large stock of aging, substandard, crowded dwellings, with a substantial number of

\(^{26}\) Ibid., 42; Miron, “Progress,” 9; Bacher, “Canadian Housing,” 9.

\(^{27}\) Bacher, “Canadian Housing,” 9.

\(^{28}\) Ibid., 8; Wade, “Wartime Housing,” 44.

\(^{29}\) Wade, “Wartime Housing,” 49.

\(^{30}\) Ibid.
households paying unaffordable shelter costs.” Nonetheless, the WHL made an important contribution to the Canadian housing market during the war and in the early post-war years; it eased the housing shortage, which helped keep prices lower in the difficult financial times of the war and early post war years.

The King government’s Wartime Advisory Committee on Reconstruction appointed a Housing and Community Planning subcommittee led by Queen’s University economist C.A. Curtis. The Curtis Report of 1944 looked ahead to post-war Canada and the housing issues it faced. This group of social science experts called for many measures to aid in the provision of housing to low-income wage earners and the improvement of the Canadian housing stock. It recommended the introduction of a housing rehabilitation program, coupled with an increase in low-income and public housing. This report identified housing shortfalls and called for massive numbers of new housing starts.

Bacher writes,

The Curtis Report estimated the need for 606,000 units of new urban houses, 125,000 new units of farmhouses, and substantial improvements on 355,000 existing dwellings. Far more significant than such figures, however, was the Report's emphasis on the qualitative and distributive aspects of housing, and the need for regional planning to ensure a better living environment. The Report stressed the necessity for meeting the housing needs of all income groups.

This report also identified other important issues. For instance, “the Curtis Report found that much of the Canadian housing stock in communities of over 30,000 in 1941 was substandard.” However, the “substandard housing problem prior to 1945 was not just one of poor quality units; it was also one of poor quality neighbourhoods, crowding, and

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31 Oberlander and Fallick, Housing a Nation, 1.
34 Hannley, “Substandard Housing,” 204; See also: Miron, “Progress,” 9.
unsanitary conditions.”\textsuperscript{35} The report also called for a long-term building program for the development of social housing for low-income renters and continued rent control, despite the end of the war. According to Finkel, this strategy was supported by various housing related groups across Canada, but was opposed by industry as a socialist endeavor.\textsuperscript{36} Many aspects of the Curtis Report were ignored in the legislation that came after it in 1944.\textsuperscript{37} However, it became “the sole basis of government planning for post-war housing requirements.” The Curtis Report advocated for a dramatic increase in low-to-medium income level housing developments and established three main categories of income levels: (1) those who could afford to build their own homes without assistance; (2) those able to pay rent or afford mortgages; (3) those unable to afford mortgages or afford most rental rates. It recommended that this final group needed access to federally assisted public housing, but it stressed that some may even be too poor for this option.\textsuperscript{38} Overall, it concluded that the majority of Canadians were poorly housed. “Ten percent of all dwellings needed to be replaced while another twenty-five percent needed major repairs.”\textsuperscript{39} Furthermore, one in five households was overcrowded, and one third of Canadians were unable to pay an economic rent. The Curtis Report specifically called for an increase in research and development in housing and the following:

A Dominion Town Planning Agency, low interest long-term loans to municipalities for residential land assembly, federal funding of municipal planning efforts and of university courses in town planning, and making neighbourhood planning a condition of the extension of federally assisted mortgage loans in a given area … The Report also outlined steps for the federal government to encourage Provinces to undertake land-use planning on a

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 205.  
\textsuperscript{36} Finkel, \textit{Our Lives}, 42.  
\textsuperscript{37} Oberlander and Fallick, \textit{Housing a Nation}, 35.  
\textsuperscript{39} Finkel, \textit{Our Lives}, 41.
provincial basis to ensure the preservation of recreational, forest and agricultural land from premature subdivisions, scattered urban uses and ribbon developments. 40

This report set a precedent for some of the housing recommendations that were made multiple times between 1944-1968, such as programs jointly supported by federal and provincial governments, rehabilitation of housing, and low-income housing programs. Post-war housing policy was also directed at making adequate housing available to veterans, but the federal government’s general disregard of the Curtis Report “maintained its pre-war commitment to private enterprise and home ownership” rather than support its proposals for urban planning programs. 41

The legislation that came after the Curtis Report, the National Housing Act of 1944, consolidated previous housing statutes and accentuated governmental support for the business side of housing, such as the continued promotion of home ownership over other means of accommodation. In this period, reports that advocated measures such as the development of low-income housing were followed up by legislation authorizing the continued development of home ownership. Bacher characterizes the 1944 NHA amendments as “the promotion of home ownership, the revival of the real estate business, [and] the provision of profitable outlets for private investment.” 42 However, the amendments did take some advice from the Curtis Report; Oberlander and Fallick write that Part V of the 1944 NHA amendments “translated the Curtis Report’s recommendations for research and development into crisp legislation.” 43 By consolidating previous housing acts and continuing support for private housing

41 Wade, “Wartime Housing,” 56.
43 Oberlander and Fallick, Housing a Nation, 49.
initiatives, the new legislation allowed the federal government to take a leading role in the Canadian housing market.\footnote{Wade, “Wartime Housing,” 42; J. David Hulchanski, “New Forms of Owning and Renting,” In \textit{House, Home and Community: Progress in Housing Canadians, 1945-1986}, ed. John Miron (Kingston/Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993), 65.} Thus, the 1944 amendments to the original 1938 NHA foreshadowed the future direction of federal government housing initiatives.

Another equally important event in the history of Canadian housing policy was the creation of the CMHC.\footnote{It was first known as Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, but the name was changed to Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation in 1979. Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, “History of CMHC,” https://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/en/corp/about/hi/; See also: Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-7. Retrieved from the Minister of Justice. http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca} The 1946 legislation made the CMHC the “federal agency to administer the National Housing Act.”\footnote{Hellyer, \textit{Report}, 4.} Peter Oberlander and Arthur Fallick characterize national housing policy as “solely reactive until 1946 when CMHA came into operation.”\footnote{Oberlander and Fallick, \textit{Housing a Nation}, 2.} Furthermore, Christian Stoney and Katherine Graham characterize the CMHC as an essential component of the “federal-municipal machinery” because it sometimes helped bridge the gap between federal and municipal housing interests.\footnote{Christopher Stoney and Katherine Graham, “Federal Municipal Relations in Canada: The Changing Organizational Landscape” \textit{Canadian Public Administration}, 52, No. 3 (September 2009), 377.} The distinctive feature of the CMHC was its intervention in the financing of home buying. The Canadian housing industry was, and continues to be, driven by mortgages. Major mortgage financers include financial institutions such as “banks, trust and mortgage loan companies, credit unions and caisses populaires, life insurance companies and pension
funds, and several other smaller institutions.\textsuperscript{49} Other lending mortgagees include the government, individuals, and non-financial corporations. The ability to secure funding for the purchase and construction of housing affects consumers and contractors alike and influences job markets and the economy in general. The CMHC became an influential force in the mortgage market in the period of study. CMHC mortgage funding was contingent on homes meeting CMHC building standards. In addition, it pursued research in a variety of areas and worked closely with the National Research Council’s Division of Building Research.\textsuperscript{50} One result of that collaboration was a set of home building standards. As Canada moved towards the 1950s, federal housing policy now played a more substantial role with the establishment of the CMHC and extension of the NHA.

1949-1964: NHA and CMHC Amendments and Urban Renewal

Housing accessibility changed very little for low-income Canadians following the Second World War, even though various amendments were made to the 1944 NHA. The Canadian federal government was consistently negative towards social housing projects, like public and low-income housing, and generally reluctant to seriously endorse such polices. For example, Louis St. Laurent promoted the distrust of public housing when he


\textsuperscript{50} Oberlander and Fallick, \textit{Housing a Nation}, 39.
denounced it in a 1947 Liberal Party speech.\textsuperscript{51} The influence of the Toronto Citizen Housing Advisory Committee (TCHAC), of which Albert Rose was a member, is important to acknowledge here, because only a few years later in 1949, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent approved NHA amendments that supported public housing initiatives. Bacher argues that Toronto’s bold reformer mindset, influenced in part by the TCHAC, “caused a conversion of Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent as dramatic as St. Paul’s revelation on the road to Damascus. The new prime minister, who had vowed while campaigning for the Liberal leadership not to be part of any Cabinet that supported public housing suddenly reversed his position in time to open the new Regent Park housing project in Toronto.\textsuperscript{52} Usually, though, if there was one policy that Progressive Conservative and Liberal governments generally agreed on in this period, it was that promoting home ownership, not public housing, should be the direction of Canadian housing policies.\textsuperscript{53}

Major NHA amendments introduced in 1949 reflected the complexity of creating housing policy across jurisdictional levels. One in particular, was the beginning of the federal government’s first program for subsidized rental and public housing – the Federal-Provincial Public Housing Program.\textsuperscript{54} This joint program replaced the original CMHC veterans’ housing assistance program and followed a shared 75% and 25% cost

\textsuperscript{51} Bacher, “Canadian Housing,” 10; Oberlander and Fallick, \textit{Housing a Nation}, 42.
\textsuperscript{52} Bacher, \textit{Keeping to the Marketplace}, 11.
\textsuperscript{54} Miron, “Progress,” 17.
division between federal and municipal governments. Criticizing this housing policy, Bacher discusses the inefficient processes the program followed:

The 1949 program was not successful in creating much accommodation; it was a masterful political stroke. Under the 1949 legislation, a complicated federal, provincial, municipal formula was devised. Consequently, public housing projects had to go through an estimated eighty steps before actually being constructed. This ensured that only where political demands were strongest would any public housing actually be constructed.

The early public housing programs were designed to accommodate people on a temporary basis, not to compete with the private housing market. Slum clearance projects, such as Toronto’s Regent Park North – “Canada’s first public housing scheme” – bulldozed large areas of destitute housing and replaced them with new public housing complexes. Furthermore, complicated bureaucratic processes resulting from the federal and provincial cross-jurisdictional legislative boundaries slowed down housing projects. This complexity illustrates the reluctance of the federal government to promote or undertake the production of social housing programs, and represents the “growing gulf between the federal government and the advocates of a social housing policy” that characterizes the period.

Bacher points out that social housing was deliberately not promoted in the 1949 amendments because the federal government hoped to transfer social housing costs to municipalities. As a result, only about 11,000 public housing units were constructed nationwide between 1949-1964. The difficulty in creating lasting and

56 Bacher, “Canadian Housing,” 8.
58 Hannley, “Substandard Housing,” 207
60 Bacher, , Keeping to the Marketplace, 183.
publicly-supported social housing initiatives is seen throughout Canadian housing history. The proliferation of urban renewal is discussed in more detail below.

One of the most significant changes to the 1944 legislation occurred in 1954 with the release of a new National Housing Act. This 1954 legislation was greatly influenced by the 1949 amendments, in that the federal government continued to promote home ownership over low-income or social housing. Several significant changes were adopted in 1954; one of the most important was the introduction of chartered banks to the Canadian mortgage market. Before November 1950, Canadian financial institutions held imbalanced portfolios favoring government bonds. This was the result of a Bank of Canada price support program that guaranteed yields on the government bonds that had been so essential to war finance. This bond support enabled financial institutions to “make a virtually costless transfer of investments in any volume they wished … without absorbing capital losses.” By contrast, the mortgage market was less flexible because of the relationship between the financing and constructing aspects of the housing industry. Smith also notes that, before 1952, financial institutions had difficulty acquiring mortgage holdings because of construction industry restrictions. This included “shortages of building materials, skilled labor, and insufficient industrial capacity severely hampered the volume of residential construction and the creation of new mortgage debt.” In addition to the lack of bank involvement in the mortgage market, the early 1950s saw non-bank mortgage lending institutions nearing their optimum portfolio balances. This

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61 Barrow, “Federal Housing,” 45.
63 Ibid., 501.
resulted in diminished mortgage investment and decreased construction. The NHA amendments in 1954 sought to fix this issue by opening the mortgage market to the chartered banks. James Poapst argues,

Bringing the banks into NHA lending was a big, bold step. Big because the banking system was head, shoulders, and torso larger than each of the other types of lending institutions; and bold because of a strong tradition against mortgage lending in Canadian banking.\(^{64}\)

The introduction of the banks had an immediate effect – between 1954 and 1956, “banks supplied more than half the investment in NHA units.”\(^{65}\) This measure also continued the trend of federal support for home ownership that has been outlined in this chapter. By increasing mortgage opportunities, the NHA increased residential house construction.

In addition to this new legislation, big changes came to the CMHC. Barbara Carroll discusses how the federal government established the CMHC to develop various systems and created responsibilities that were eventually passed on to the private sector. For instance, the CMHC began as a direct financing initiative, but eventually passed the financial burden onto the private sector and only maintained an administrative role.\(^{66}\) This occurred in 1954 when the CMHC “introduced Mortgage Loan Insurance, taking on mortgage risks with a 25% down payment, making home ownership more accessible to Canadians” by making mortgage lending more secure to financial institutions.\(^{67}\) With the introduction of this new program, the earlier joint mortgage loans between the federal government and private lending institutions were no longer necessary. Instead, the

\(^{64}\) Poapst, “Financing,” 96.
\(^{65}\) Oberlander and Fallick, *Housing a Nation*, 53.
CMHC’s mortgage loan insurance offered security to lenders that had previously been excluded from joint lending activities and so stimulated private lending activities. These insured loans typically provided 90 to 95 per cent of lending value repayable over 25 to 35 years and were specifically designed to encourage chartered banks to offer mortgages. James McKellar points out that the combined introduction of chartered banks to the mortgage market and the new supplementary role of the CMHC as mortgage insurance intermediary, “made mortgages more available in many small and remote communities where banks had branches.” He notes that these changes reduced risks to home builders and promoted home production across Canada.68 Because of the mortgage insurance legislation, chartered bank involvement reached its post-war peak in the mid-to-late 1950s.69 This was a successful program and “from the perspective of developing the residential mortgage market, this was CMHC’s biggest step forward.”70 However, this new mortgage market was short lived, as rising demands for non-mortgage commercial loans led the chartered banks to precipitously reduce their mortgage lending, and finally to leave the mortgage market completely in late 1959.71

The residential mortgage market, designed to promote home ownership, reveals

69 Hellyer, Report, 5. The entry of banks to the mortgage market “greatly expanded the private pool of funds potentially available for mortgage lending, and temporarily freed the market from the constraint of gross flows of funds into nonbank intermediaries,” like life insurance and trust companies, which dominated the mortgage market prior to 1954. See: Smith, “Mortgage Market,” 502.
71 This was strongly influenced by NHA interest rates on mortgages. The NHA rate was raised “over the banks legal lending maximum,” which essentially forced banks from the mortgage market. This left a void that was quickly filled, once again, by life insurance companies and pension and trust funds. Smith, “Mortgage Market,” 502-503.
how social housing failed to gain momentum in the Canadian housing industry. Carroll discusses how the housing industry was focused on the production of standardized housing suited to the needs of new families in the post-war era.\textsuperscript{72} Under new NHA amendments in 1956, the CMHC was allowed to fund urban renewal projects. These, too, were aimed at producing new single-family home neighbourhoods to replace dilapidated slum housing neighbourhoods. These amendments provided “assistance not only for the clearance and reconstruction of blighted areas, but for the rehabilitation and conservation of areas threatened by blight as well.”\textsuperscript{73}

At this time, public housing programs were designed to make inner city developments available to low income Canadians and the middle class slowly migrated to subdivisions and housing developments outside of the inner city. While the Metro Toronto Housing Authority wanted public housing in the suburbs, where cheaper land was available, the Toronto City Council saw public housing as “an aid to urban renewal” and wanted it in the city center. Furthermore, the suburban governments wanted nothing to do with it, and even purposely delayed approval of public housing projects.\textsuperscript{74} According to Frisken, all public housing units built after 1959 in Toronto were in the suburbs, though this was a trend that started earlier with the growth of public housing projects, like Regent Park, in the late 1940s.\textsuperscript{75}

Contradictory images were created of the housing situation in the post war years. On one hand, the prosperity and cleanliness of suburban neighbourhoods were promoted

\textsuperscript{72} Carroll, “Post-War Trends,” 64.
\textsuperscript{73} Hellyer, \textit{Report}, 5. Note that this amendment implemented the suggestion to provide funding for rehabilitation of dilapidated housing, just as the Curtis Report recommended in 1941.
\textsuperscript{74} Frisken, \textit{Public Metropolis}, 95.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 96.
and idealized, while on the other hand, growing slum areas in the urban cores of Canadian cities were neglected and faced development led by the wrecking ball. Urban renewal and development programs became a quick fix solution to immediate housing problems. Unfortunately, “the result was often simply to create a greater housing shortage since social housing appeared only sporadically before the late sixties.” Federal policies roughly doubled Canadian housing stock from 1945-1968, but a price was paid in the urban cores of major cities across Canada, as a combination of urban renewal programs and subdivision development drew investment out of city centers. Civic building programs destroyed and replaced dilapidated housing because “money was available to tear down but not to fix.” Money was, in theory available to repair housing, but it was thought that it was better spend on building. Furthermore, “the means of securing those funds involved working through an application and approval process at both the federal and provincial levels of government that was Byzantine in its complexity.” Fifteen to twenty years after the construction of low-income housing projects like Regent Park, they were criticized for the way they segregated low wage earners, just like the slum housing they replaced. The unintended consequences of such projects included reproducing the old slum neighbourhoods that markets had produced, now called “ghettos.” This situation was worsened by the low-quality construction and design of many of these projects and the limited funding they received for upkeep.

Early urban renewal schemes had a devastating effect on low-income families across the country; however, as Bacher writes, there was “an undisguised zest for

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76 Finkel, Our Lives, 40.
77 Carroll, “Post-War Trends,” 65.
78 Frisken, Public Metropolis, 95.
destruction [that] was characteristic of most urban-renewal studies funded by CMHC.”

Many early ‘renewal’ schemes simply destroyed targeted areas of slum housing and made plans to start anew, rather than provide support to renovate and ‘renew’ as the name of the program suggests. This was seen in Toronto’s first public housing project, Regent Park North, which was, “essentially, old style, pre-war slum clearance – complete destruction of an extensive area of housing and the construction in its place of functional, but rather unimaginative housing.” Projects like this resulted in the forced removal and relocation of thousands of poor people from their homes into housing both beyond their means and outside of the neighbourhoods they lived and worked in. Regent Park “displaced about 3700 residents but provided new housing for nearly 5000” after it was completed in 1956, but many people identified as a higher priority than local residents moved in from other parts of Toronto, taking the places of the local residents. In reference to Regent Park North Sean Purdy notes, “by the time the project was fully constructed, more than half the apartments and houses were occupied by families who had not lived in the area before.”

Prior to 1956, federal renewal programs required the construction of low-income housing projects to replace any newly cleared urban land; however, amendments to the NHA in 1956 “provided federal support for locally originated urban renewal studies and [removed] the restrictions on the use of land acquired in a renewal area.”

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79 Bacher, Keeping to the Marketplace, 219.
81 Ibid., 10
and Fallick point out that 1957 saw an increase in urban renewal activities across the country. Urban renewal studies were completed in Halifax, Saint John, Winnipeg, and Vancouver, with other studies approved to be undertaken. In unison with the destruction of slum neighbourhoods resulting from urban renewal projects, the construction of large public housing projects was promoted to fill low-income housing voids – in particular, this was seen in Toronto. However, these large public housing projects faced unintended problems. For instance, Regent Park earned the reputation for being a “high-density ghetto” by the time the Task Force sought housing reform in 1968. Paul Hellyer criticized urban renewal programs in Canada, likening them to the blast of an atomic bomb.

In Winnipeg, the first urban renewal and corresponding public housing program began in 1961, which as Jim Silver and Owen Toews point out, was a full two decades after the Curtis Report of 1941 identified a shortage of housing and need for housing improvement in Winnipeg. Furthermore, in Winnipeg the urban renewal activities of the 1960s left much to be desired. Several large public housing complexes that were constructed created “a high concentration of poverty with few social supports.” Additionally, unfair relocation practices and a lack of citizen participation and input left

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84 Oberlander and Fallick, *Housing a Nation*, 56. For an in-depth overview of several urban renewal projects started in this period, see: Bacher, *Keeping to the Marketplace*, 213-227.
86 Bacher, “Canadian Housing,” 17.
88 Ibid., 105.
many citizens irate.\textsuperscript{89} These consequences to urban renewal, which also were seen in Toronto, are exemplary of the reasons why Hellyer sought to stop urban renewal following the finding of the Task Force. It is important to point out that urban renewal programs in cities across Canada grew from 1957-1964 under the federal Progressive Conservative government; however this was a result of the residual effect of the Liberal legislation seen in 1956.

Though some urban renewal programs were more successful than others, the 1968 Housing Task Force provides substantial criticisms of these urban renewal programs and brought about their eventual demise with its recommendations to end the practice. Furthermore, the criticisms of the Task Force are also directed at the public housing projects that replaced the old slum housing that was bulldozed. Because of what happened at places like Regent Park, the Task Force called for the cessation of large public housing building projects.

While the period 1949-1964 saw an increase in federal efforts to legislate in the field of housing, old problems lingered that would later be identified by the Task Force in 1968. Changes to the mortgage market and the role of the chartered banks provided only temporary relief to prospective homeowners. Problems with urban blight in Canada’s urban centers faced the temporary relief of urban renewal programs. Slum housing was replaced, yet these early efforts created further problems that attracted the interest of Hellyer and the Task Force.

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 105-106.
From 1964 to the Task Force on Housing and Urban Development

Oberlander and Fallick call the 1964 NHA amendments “a turning point in Canadian housing policy and in its administration.”

Support for social housing programs gained momentum in Canada following the Liberals return to power in mid-1963. It was in this decade that provincial programs parallel to the federal housing programs were created in order to take advantage of increased federal funding opportunities. This was particularly seen in Ontario with the creation of the Ontario Housing Corporation, in 1964.

In Canada, public housing looked very different in the 1960s than in earlier decades. Lynn Hannley identifies this difference as the result of federal policy shifts in the 1960s. This was particularly seen in 1964 with the amendments made to the National Housing Act. These shifts affected how public housing was funded and ultimately resulted in the housing industry changing direction from the previous decades. While public housing began as a federal program that directly funded public housing initiatives, one of the amendments in this 1964 legislation changed the direction of the funding. This resulted in low and moderate-income housing development by the federal government through subsidized non-profit organizations. The federal government did this by providing “loans on generous terms to organizations such as church and self-help groups, the YMCA and service clubs.” Similarly, the Report identified important 1964 amendments as “the provision of long-term, low-interest loans to non-profit organizations

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90 Oberlander and Fallick, *Housing a Nation*, 57.
92 Hannley, “Substandard Housing,” 207.
93 Ibid.
for the provision of low-income rental accommodation, especially for elderly persons.”

Perhaps the most significant changes saw the CMHC authorized to contribute 90 per cent loans to provinces and municipalities for the construction of public housing. Furthermore, provinces and municipalities were authorized to enter the low-rental field without approval from Ottawa – yet still be eligible for federal funding. The results of the growing support for public housing are clearly seen in the relevant housing statistics; from 1954-1963, only 11,000 units of public housing were produced, while from 1964-1972, 96,000 public housing units were produced. The 96,000 public housing units constructed may sound like a lot, but in reality, this represents only a small fraction of the Canadian housing market at the time. The number of regular residential units produced in the same eight-year period was substantially higher.

According to Sean Purdy, “housing and socio-economic issues were sometimes central in the growing spirit of questioning and revolt occurring in society at large.” The rebellious 1960s saw growing discontent over urban renewal and housing policy in the United States; the promotion of anti-urban renewal sentiments in Canada were influenced by a similar situation in the United States. In the mid-to-late 1960s, urban renewal and public housing projects faced unique challenges, particularly in Toronto, where growing citizen involvement contested projects that residents felt were unfair. Two examples of citizen-led bids to end municipal urban renewal programs include the Don Vale and Trefann Court communities in Toronto. White notes,

94 Hellyer, Report, 5.
95 Oberlander and Fallick, Housing a Nation, 58.
97 Ibid.
98 Purdy, “By the People, For the People,” 520.
99 Ibid.
In Don Vale … the residents essentially took over the planning process and brought it to a halt. They produced a new, slightly less disruptive, renewal plan in 1969 … but their plan was never implemented. No significant urban renewal would ever be carried out in Don Vale. Renewal in Trefann Court … was also taken over by residents but with a more productive outcome. The new citizen-led planning process took several years, but it yielded a new redevelopment plan in 1972 that was successfully implemented in the years that followed.  

Citizen groups at Regent Park also spoke out in this period; this has been written on extensively by Sean Purdy, and is discussed in Chapter Five. These examples reveal a deep level of dissatisfaction with urban renewal policies, something that Hellyer and the Task Force would confront in their Report as a problem to be addressed. Silver and Toews discuss a similar level of citizen dissatisfaction over urban renewal in Winnipeg. They point out that officials and “outside professionals” that directed an urban renewal program in the Salter-Jarvis community “assumed, from their removed vantage points, that there was nothing worth saving … and that the residents who lived there had nothing of value to contribute” to the discussion. This community did not have the success that Trefann Court did in Toronto. The Trefann Court case is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five, using submissions made to the Task Force by the Trefann Court Residents Association.

Another way that housing policy changed in the mid-1960s is exhibited in the growing interest in cooperative living arrangements. The first housing co-op in Canada, the “200-unit Willow Park Housing Cooperative,” was founded in Winnipeg in 1966. Willow Park set the standard for similar developments that arose across the country. As

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100 White, “Urban Renewal Revisited,” 17.
102 Hulchanski, “New Forms,” 68.
old solutions turned into new problems, new solutions were emerging from the spirit of innovation characteristic of the 1960s.

1967 was a busy year for housing policy in Canada; important amendments made to the NHA and policy conversations generated through major conferences foreshadowed the calls for change found well into the 1970s. One of the most important changes to federal housing policy was the return of chartered banks to the mortgage market. This return was possible because of combined amendments made to the NHA loan program and the Bank Act in 1967. Parallel changes to these acts established standardized interest rates and simultaneously stimulated the “provision of mortgage funds by the private market.”

The 1967 Bank Act “authorized conventional mortgage lending by banks, which enabled them to make loans on existing rental property and on other properties not covered by NHA.” Amendments designed to increase bank involvement in the mortgage market were necessary, not only to aid in mortgage accessibility, but to generally stimulate the Canadian economy. There is a symbiotic relationship between mortgage financing and the house construction industry. The new Bank Act “opened the door for wider and more continuous involvement of the banks in mortgage lending,” and with it sought to increase house production throughout Canada. The 1967 legislation also freed the NHA interest rate, an initiative also meant to stimulate lending by the

103 Ibid., 6.
105 Ibid.
chartered banks. This was a success, as “total private loans under the Act jumped 67.5% over the 1966 figure.”

The NHA and Bank Act changes were strongly influenced by broad international economic situations influencing Canada in general. Throughout the 1960s, debates raged over the direction of Canadian foreign policy. The focal point of this discussion was the Vietnam War, to which Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson (1963-1968) was fundamentally opposed. The divergent positions of the Canadians and Americans on the war led to the cooling of the economic relationship between the two countries. In turn, this was influenced by a rise of nationalism in Canada, further inspired by the Centennial in 1967. In particular, the economic result of these societal perspectives was the questioning of foreign investment, particularly from the United States. This became a major issue in Canada at the time and inspired a nationalistic direction in Canadian economic policies. This resulted in a greater involvement by the chartered banks in the Canadian mortgage market.

In the late 1960s, tension continued to be felt nationwide between federal, provincial, and municipal housing policymakers. The Federal-Provincial Conference on Housing and Urban Development, convened by Prime Minister Pearson on December 11 and 12, 1967, was held in response to this tension. It sought to tackle national issues in housing, including “rapid suburbanization, uneven regional development, and public funding of low- and middle-income housing.” Oberlander and Fallick call the

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106 Oberlander and Fallick, Housing a Nation, 59.
108 Oberlander and Fallick, Housing a Nation, 60.
109 Ibid.
conference a failure, pointing out that “Prime Minister Pearson’s manner of conducting debate generated confusion and brought the meeting to an inconclusive end. Not unexpectantly, public perception characterized the conference as a failure.” However, the conference brought housing issues to the forefront of Canadian political discussion and the effect was seen in 1968. For instance, the single promise Pierre Elliott Trudeau made in his 1968 federal election campaign, in a May 1968 speech to the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities in Edmonton, was to address housing issues in Canada after taking office. Oberlander and Fallick write:

The federal-provincial conference on urban affairs foreshadowed events of the next year. On 20 April 1968 Pearson decided to retire. Pierre Elliott Trudeau became the new leader of the Liberal Party and succeeded Pearson as Prime Minister. By July 1968, the new minister responsible for housing, Paul Hellyer, had established a Task Force on Housing and Urban Development.

Thus, the gathering of Canadian housing organizations seen in the 1967 conference precipitated the appointment of the 1968 Task Force on Housing and Urban Development. It also exemplifies the difficulty of legislating in the housing policy area – an area that crosses municipal, provincial, and federal jurisdictions, but is also of such direct importance to the Canadian public.

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110 Ibid.
111 This initiative was announced during Trudeau’s June 1968 election campaign as a means to tackle “serious problems [that] existed in the field of housing and urban development.” See; Lloyd Axworthy, “The Housing Task Force: A Case Study,” In The Structures of Policy-Making in Canada, edited by G. Bruce Doern &Peter Aucoin, (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1971), 8; See also, Oberlander and Fallick, Housing a Nation, 95.
112 Oberlander and Fallick, Housing a Nation, 60-61.
In Canada, federal involvement in housing policy did not seriously begin until the mid-1930s. Many Canadians were disillusioned with the state of housing in this period of economic uncertainty and local efforts to assess housing stock were made to address the public calls for action. Over time, both the Bennett Conservatives and the King Liberals legislated in this area, through the Dominion Housing Act and the National Housing Act in 1935 and 1938, respectively. The arrival of the Second World War brought its own housing problems, which led to the creation of Wartime Housing Limited in 1941, a body that was responsible for housing military and wartime industry employees and their families.

Many amendments were made to the NHA between its enactment in 1938 and the release of the Report in January 1969; NHA was revised in 1944, 1954, and 1964 to accommodate the changing perspectives on housing in Canada. For instance, amendments were made in 1944 because the federal government was concerned about implementing housing policies based on social need. The government feared such policies could lead to the “dangerous ‘socialization’ of the housing industry.” This fear drove the government’s continued promotion of home ownership, reflected in the CMHC legislation that came into effect on January 1, 1946.

The changes to the mortgage market discussed above were one of the primary concerns of the Report. The CMHC was founded in 1946 to address the financing of the housing industry in the post-war years, and many influential amendments were made to

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the way mortgages were granted over the next twenty-five years. Some of the most important amendments concerned the relationship between the federal government and the chartered banks. Legislation released in 1954 introduced chartered banks and insured CMHC mortgage loan insurance to the market, while in 1967, a renewed federal effort to encourage private investors brought changes to the Bank Act that permanently opened the Canadian mortgage market to the chartered banks.

This chapter outlined a variety of influential federal housing policies that developed between 1935 and 1968. In many ways, the Report reflects the history of the period discussed above, in part because the Task Force is critical of many of these policies. For example, the Task Force sees the urban renewal campaigns that raged through the 1950s as self-defeating. Rather than ‘renewing’ housing, many of these projects simply destroyed and replaced unappealing neighborhoods with large apartment complexes. Social housing that replaced the distraught housing of slum neighbourhoods, seen particularly in Toronto’s Regent Park, faced its own problems over time and became a key issue in the Report.

This chapter established the historical framework of housing in Canada in order to contextualize the Report of 1969. The Report arose from a long period of growing conflict encompassing housing shortages and the resulting rise in housing costs, the continued promotion of home ownership, and the general federal resistance to change. Over the course of the 1950s, old solutions (to improve the quality of housing or make housing more affordable) turned into new problems, as the methods adopted were controversial. The old emphasis on home ownership and access to mortgage finance clashed with the growth of social housing and rising social consciousness exemplified in
participatory democracy initiatives. The Task Force faced a daunting choice – to follow in the historical record as another federal initiative long forgotten, or to pursue federal policy changes that Canadians had called for as early as the mid-1930s.
During the 1968 election campaign, the new Liberal leader, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, spoke of a Just Society, urged national unity and citizen participation, and promised to address housing issues in Canada. This chapter explores participatory democracy and the role it played in Trudeau’s election campaign and first government. It seeks to understand Pierre Elliot Trudeau and Paul Hellyer’s political perspectives and establish a baseline to judge the 1968 Federal Task Force on Housing and Urban Development. Did the Task Force represent the vision of participatory democracy promoted by Trudeau? Was Trudeau’s ‘participatory democracy’ an actual objective, or was it only an election campaign tool?

In this chapter, I propose that participatory democracy – regularly used as a general term – is composed of four sub-types: liberal, deliberative, radical, and revolutionary. Following an explanation of this framework, the participatory democracy (PD) movement is defined and briefly discussed. While some examples of citizen participation were discussed in the previous chapter in reference to housing, this chapter looks at the growth of local recreation movements in Ontario and the use of royal commissions and task forces in the Canadian context. This includes the Royal Commissions on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and on the Status of Women. Influential community developers are introduced, along with the role of the Port Huron Statement on youth movements and PD in the 1960s. Trudeau’s PD ideology, the role of the media in his leadership and election campaigns, and the role of PD in his campaign and government is highlighted. Finally, Paul Hellyer and his relationship to PD is discussed, with examples of his political experience illustrated. This includes his involvement in the
unification of the armed forces in the mid-1960s. By focusing on PD and the politics of Trudeau and Hellyer, this chapter establishes a framework by which to assess the Task Force in chapters four and five and determine if it represents a valid attempt at PD.

**Liberal, Deliberative, Radical, and Revolutionary Participatory Democracy**

In researching this thesis, it became clear that when historians discuss PD, it is rarely defined or explained past the most general possible description. While conceivable that Pierre Elliott Trudeau and renowned community organizer Saul Alinsky have some similar political beliefs, it is also abundantly clear that their styles of political engagement were substantially different. Yet, how can it be that both appear in discussions of PD and citizen engagement? In the following section, I look at some examples of citizen engagement and PD, in the general period of 1935-1969. The term “participatory democracy” may have been coined in the early 1960s, but the period under discussion saw more generally and over a longer timeframe a building of community and citizen engagement that reached their strongest point in the mid-to-late 1960s.

In order to more accurately explain and compare movements and political points of view, I have created a four-part breakdown of sub-types of PD. This includes: liberal, deliberative, radical, and revolutionary PD. These labels are by no means rigid, or incompatible with one another; rather, they represent four traits of varying dominance found in PD. A group or individual could exhibit aspects of all four traits, or only one, just as they could exhibit a strong or weak variation of that trait. These sub-types have
different traits. While liberal PD tends to favor strong leadership, radical and revolutionary PD is inherently anti-leader, while deliberative PD accepts leadership that promotes transparent and informed decision-making processes. Liberal PD is seen particularly through state-led initiatives, such as task forces or royal commissions. It assumes the authority of the state (or the body in control, generally), and typically reaches out to citizens through public engagement initiatives. Deliberative PD is what may be imagined as “true” PD. It would resemble an authority that used its power to engage with a citizen-body or group to determine, through debate and information sharing, the exact needs of that group and the best way for both the group, and the authority, to achieve those needs. Lastly, radical and revolutionary PD types are inherently anti-authority and promote self-organization efforts. This is the ‘radical’ sub-type; ‘revolutionary’ refers to an undercurrent within this sub-type to oppose authority, sometimes in a violent manner. While I have identified a four-part breakdown of PD, the radical and revolutionary sub-types are directly related; revolutionary PD is actually a sub-type of the radical PD sub-type.

As an example of the possible combination of these types, from a case discussed below, I argue that Jean Legassé, a Manitoba social worker, exhibits both liberal and deliberative PD styles of organization. He promoted the leadership of the state, but encouraged citizen and community engagement within existing state power; thus, Legassé exhibits strong-liberal/deliberative PD.
Participatory Democracy: An Introduction

“Participatory democracy” was a popular catchphrase during Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s successful 1968 Liberal leadership campaign and the following federal election. While Trudeau’s trendy campaigns took Canadians by storm, the campaign language he used was not actually new – it had existed for nearly a decade, and the organizational precepts were introduced at the end of the Second World War. In its earlier form, it was more often called citizen participation. Attempts to broaden and deepen citizen participation found support in the 1930s and post WWII years as changing political climates saw revolutionary ideas and a rise of liberal democratic idealism in Canada.¹ According to Shirley Tillotson, author of The Public At Play: Gender and the Politics of Recreation in Post-War Ontario, “The crisis of those years had helped generate a vision of participatory democracy and social liberalism” in Canadians.²

For Tillotson, a participatory vision of democratic politics manifested itself in the development of a recreation movement in Ontario that grew throughout the 1940s and 1950s.³ This was a bottom-up political movement, and the localism of such developments offers a good example of how new participatory ideologies developed and gained

³ Tillotson argues that the recreation movement in Ontario is a story of political atrophy resulting from the bureaucratization of the movement over time.
popularity. However, by the time this recreation movement became widespread, the energetic spark that began it was lost, resulting in the bureaucratization of what originally was an anti-establishment movement. In terms of the sub-types of PD introduced above, this basically would look like a movement from radical (though not revolutionary) to deliberative PD, strong-liberal PD, and then – likely – not PD at all. Whereas the development of inter-war recreation programs “implied that recreation was for the working class,” changing political attitudes in the post-war years resulted in a different approach to community recreation programs. With the social problems of the 1930s left to the past, recreation movements sought to provide services to ‘all the people,’ with each person considered an individual and a citizen. This new project “gave recreationists a language by which they could claim a place for their programs in a liberal democratic state.” This new language and perspective included democracy’s “grand themes: the rights and freedoms of citizens, political legitimacy, and the public interest.” The recreation movement can be seen as a stepping-stone towards further participatory developments because “Liberal governments, to be democratic, required an electorate whose organizational community bonds were sufficiently well developed to enable ‘public opinion’ to represent broadly and inclusively the interests of ‘the people’.”

In a similar vein as Tillotson, Jason Vick identifies PD as a theory “emerging out of the popular struggles of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s [that] was defined first and

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5 Ibid., 33.
6 Ibid., 4.
7 Tillotson, 4.
foremost as an alternative to more minimal concepts of democratic participation.” Rather than limit the role of the electorate to voting in regularly spaced elections, PD seeks to engage citizens beyond traditional leadership competitions. As discussed above, the recreation movement is a good example of these early participatory efforts, which were not connected to traditional political agendas. Vick argues that PD can be identified by six major themes: “a strong emphasis on citizen participation, an egalitarian sensibility, an expansive notion of the political, a concern for individual development, and a critique of existing democratic practices and capitalist economic practices.” Specifically, Vick identifies an intrinsic connection between radical and participatory democratic thought, proposing a union between the two perspectives if PD is to remain relevant. Vick also identifies several important scholars including Carole Pateman, Jacques Rancière and Sheldon Wolin, as foundational to the PD movement of the mid-twentieth century and its development to the present day.

Carole Pateman is an influential philosopher whose work offers an important perspective on PD because it intersects with several related issues. As a prominent feminist thinker, Pateman discusses how PD can help to create societies that are more equal. For Pateman, “civic culture is systematically divided along lines of class and sex,” even though our current minimal democratic societies are technically equal in a legal

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9 Ibid., 35.

10 Ibid., 4. Vick also has two main points related to this idea: 1. Participatory and radical democratic thought share a distinct lineage; 2. Though radical democracy evolved from PD, it should be considered distinct from PD (yet still under a participatory-radical democracy umbrella). See Ibid., 36.
sense. She argues that a societal movement towards PD would necessitate dramatic changes to current institutions, and in turn allow for greater structural changes within society. For instance, this would enable a restructuring of gender relations, power dynamics, and the redistribution of labour. Thus, Pateman’s writing provides many justifications for the use of PD, highlighting its empowering qualities – not only for women, but for society as a whole. As Tillotson, Vick, and Pateman identify, community engagement is central to PD. In order to better understand the development of participatory democratic thought in the 1950s and 1960s, it is necessary to briefly discuss the development of community engagement techniques.

Saul Alinsky was a community organizer from Chicago; according to Vijay Phulwani, by the “time of his death in 1972, Saul Alinsky was the most celebrated and the most reviled community organizer in the United States.” Alinsky offers a connection between the example of the Ontario recreation movement, and the broader PD movement. Alinsky’s influence also touched The Port Huron Statement, the founding document of the student and youth movements of the 1960s. Alinsky, through his

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11 Carole Pateman, *The Disorder of Women* (Stanford University Press, 1989), 143. Jason Vick critiques this so-called equality: “Minimalist democratic theories, with their focus on voting rights and competitive elections, cannot account for these feelings of powerlessness and distance on the part of ordinary citizens, who are in most cases juridically equal.” See Vick, “Participatory Democracy, Radical Democracy,” 28.

12 Pateman argues that the creation of participatory bodies within current institutions will simply reproduce inequalities that already exist. Thus for Pateman, members of a participatory group must be both equal in power, and in possession of decision making power – in other words, not just part of a deliberative group, but part of a group tasked with making a decision on an issue. Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 71.

promotion of grass-roots citizen participation and general defiance of authority, exhibits radical/revolutionary PD.

Mike Miller labels Alinsky as a product of his times, having lived his formative years during the Great Depression of the 1930s;

Opposition to the growth of fascism in Europe was growing. Support for racial equality and other causes began to simmer. His understanding of how the world worked, and how to change it, was born of these experiences and his doctoral sociological studies at the University of Chicago and his experiences as a researcher and criminal sociologist with juvenile delinquency and crime.¹⁴

Alinsky sought to better integrate the individual into the workings of the community. Perhaps what Alinsky is best known for is his community organizing initiative in the Back of the Yards, “the slum neighborhood adjoining the Chicago stockyards,” where he began working in 1939.¹⁵ Here, Alinsky helped found the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council, where he was able to bring together the opposing factions in the community.¹⁶ Alinsky was so successful in turning the community around that it eventually became a prosperous neighbourhood. Phulwani points out that Alinsky’s work in this area eventually became a dark spot on his record; the community used its newfound

...power to enforce segregation and maintain itself as an all-white neighborhood. At first, he tried to convince the leaders to let in a few black families on a very limited scale, but to no avail ... instead, Alinsky started to organize new communities in Chicago to counter the racist policies of his first organization.¹⁷

One of Alinsky’s main projects was the improvement of living conditions for the poor,

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¹⁶ Phulwani, “The Poor Man’s Machiavelli,” 866.
¹⁷ Ibid., 874.
but the basis of the ‘Alinsky formula’ “was to generate in city neighbourhoods a form of popular organization that would bring people together and empower them in relationship to government, large property owners, powerful merchants, and big business.”\textsuperscript{18} Thus, a strong similarity exists between Alinsky’s efforts and the visions of the recreation movement discussed above.

Alinsky scholars emphasize both the unsettling of power and the reform of institutions as key elements in his conception of PD. Sociologist John Glass grew up in the Chicago neighbourhood that Alinsky made his political battleground from the 1940s to the 1960s.\textsuperscript{19} Based on Glass’ own experience, he attributes Alinsky’s point of view to the belief that social change only occurred through power. As Glass writes, Alinsky defined power:

\begin{quote}
… simply as the \textit{ability to act}: for the powerless that means organization. He saw that people do not receive opportunities, freedom, or dignity as a gift of charity. These come about only when people take them through their own efforts. Consensus can come only after conflict.\textsuperscript{20}
\end{quote}

Similarly, Vijay Phulwani identifies Alinsky’s “guiding question” as his concern with “how power can be acquired and exercised by as many people as possible, starting from conditions of widespread inequality and popular disempowerment.”\textsuperscript{21} Furthermore, Alinsky depicted the “dynamics of political action as a continuous back-and-forth between the necessary creation of conflict and the eventuality of compromise.”\textsuperscript{22}

However, even with his rabble-rousing language and objectives, “Alinsky sought to make [institutions] more democratic and responsive to people’s needs” rather than completely

\textsuperscript{18} Tillotson, \textit{Public}, 107.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 106.
\textsuperscript{20} Glass, “Alinsky,” 36.
\textsuperscript{21} Phulwani, “The Poor Man’s Machiavelli,” 863-864.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 864.
do away with existing institutions." He “saw organizing as a form of political education that involves learning to use both conflict and compromise to build power and advance the people’s goals.” According to Janet Billson, Alinsky “saw the formation of umbrella community organizations as an antidote to the alienation, apathy, and isolation predicted by many urban theorists.” Tillotson writes, “Alinsky was already arguing in the 1940s that democratic government began with citizen participation in local affairs, where popular organization could effectively counter the strength of the local state.” By the 1960s, he was famous as a local-level community organizer.

While Alinsky’s work was influential in community development, his politics stand apart from the student and youth movements and New Left organizations that promoted PD in the 1960s. These groups, centered primarily around Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) did not directly identify with many of Alinsky’s political views. For example, Alinsky was opposed to the anti-Vietnam-war movement, was not involved in feminism (he did not even employ women in his projects), and, of the New Left organizations, “he was most sympathetic to the black power movement.” In all of these positions, he departed from The Port Huron Statement and the founding principles of the American New Left, which resemble radical PD. For example, while some

26 Tillotson, Public, 5.
27 Phulwani, “The Poor Man’s Machiavelli,” 866; Tom Hayden, “Crafting the Port Huron Statement: Measuring Its Impact in the 1960s and After,” in The Port Huron Statement: Sources and Legacies of the New Left’s Founding Manifesto, ed. Richard Flacks and Nelson Lichenstein (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 28-30. On Alinsky’s employment record, Mike Miller and Aaron Schutz write: “Alinsky didn’t hire women, and all the major organizers he hired were white … the attitudes of
aspects of the black power movement embraced violence, the *Statement* holds, “in social change or interchange, we find violence to be abhorrent.”

Thus, Alinsky’s methods of citizen engagement can be described with the radical PD label.

Another relevant example of an important contributor to community development is Jean Lagassé, a social worker who worked with Manitoban Indigenous peoples in the late 1950s. Helen Buckley writes that Lagassé identified the central problem of the reserves – the lack of resources to tackle problems – in his “pioneering study” from this period. In contrast to Alinsky – who promoted antagonistic action through radical/revolutionary PD as he sought to empower communities to break away from the oppression of state authority – Lagassé promoted the structure and authority of the state. Lagassé’s techniques align with strong-liberal/deliberative PD through their promotion of the development of dialogue between the state and its citizens. Will Langford points out how Lagassé, who pioneered influential community development techniques, “explicitly rejected an Alinsky-style antagonism toward the establishment and held to an idea of conflict-less change marshaled by principles of self-help and coordination with government.”

Lagassé directed Canada’s first community development initiative, a

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28 Students for a Democratic Society, *The Port Huron Statement* (New York: Students for a Democratic Society, 1964), 8. It should be noted that the SDS became more radical in the later 1960s and less adherent to this principle of non-violence.


postwar response to growing Indigenous poverty in Northern Manitoba. Langford articulately defines community development in the following:

Community development was an applied social science whose pedagogy presumed that once people learned about their common problems and identified their ‘felt needs,’ they could use small scale community organization and the decision-making mechanism of deliberative, consensus based democracy to undertake planned, rational, and cooperative solutions. Community action, as an exercise in participation and self-government, was thought to have an integrative effect that could result in material improvement and impart a liberal, possessive individualism.

This high modernist attempt by the First World to liberate the Third World was “intended by Lagassé to catalyze the integration of First Peoples and Métis into liberal democracy and the capitalist economy.” However, Lagassé’s case is fascinating because, as Langford identifies;

He made a series of recommendations for what he termed the ‘rehabilitation’ of ‘people of Indian ancestry,’ particularly calling for improvements to provincial government programs. Yet Lagassé also invoked the failure of traditional social services and called for a new approach to the ‘Indian and Métis problem’: community development.

As seen in Lagassé’s example, community development began in Manitoba as a “government program directed at people deemed socially and culturally marginal.” However anachronistic or racially-charged Lagassé’s motivation was, his program had a positive effect on Indigenous groups in Northern Manitoba, particularly in their opposition to hydroelectricity and other natural resource projects pursued by the Manitoba provincial

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31 Ibid., 349. “Lagassé was among the earliest Canadians to pick up the idea and put it to use.” Ibid., 353.
32 Ibid., 352-353.
33 Ibid., 348. Lagassé was influenced by modernist theory, which saw modernity as the pursuit of development, which community development fit hand in hand with. Ibid., 357.
34 Ibid., 352. Lagassé believed that traditional services maintained people, while community development increased peoples’ productivity. Ibid., 357-358.
35 Ibid., 371.
government, and in their formation of cooperative organizations. Lagassé also played another important role in community development later in his career as a member of the organizing committee of the Company of Young Canadians – a youth organization drawing inspiration from the contemporary groups in the United States and the Port Huron Statement.\(^\text{37}\)

The Port Huron Statement was a highly influential document released by the Students for a Democratic Society in June 1962. It is representative of radical PD, though aligned more strongly with radical/deliberative PD in the early 1960s, and radical/revolutionary in later 1960s. The SDS was an American New Left student organization that grew in influence throughout the 1960s. By the late 1960s, it was considered a national security threat by the US Government as the organization took a more oppositional approach to state authority – hence its label as radical/revolutionary in this period.\(^\text{38}\) The Statement actually coined the term ‘participatory democracy’ and is labeled by historian Michael Kazin as the “the most ambitious, the most specific, and the most eloquent manifesto in the American Left.”\(^\text{39}\) The Statement was the founding document of the SDS, and served as a New Left rallying cry “against bureaucracy, technology, racial discrimination, the nuclear arms race, poverty, economic inequality,

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\(^\text{36}\) Ibid., 365-370. Cooperatives allowed for participatory decision-making and “were one possible site for the emergence of Indigenous community leaders who would participate in mainstream liberal democracy and ensure that the provincial government extended services where they were needed.” Ibid., 368.

\(^\text{37}\) Ibid., 373.


colonial domination of the developing world, and much more.”40 As radical and forward thinking as the Statement can be, the SDS “understood the need to straddle the line between imagining a radically new society and improving the lives of the people who had to live in the deeply flawed old one.”41 The SDS inspired student and youth activist groups in Canada as well, such as Canadian Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Student Union for Peace Action, and the Company of Young Canadians, discussed later in this section.

In the late 1950s, universities across Canada and the United States experienced a rapid growth in enrolment. In Canada, university student numbers grew by 50 per cent from 1956 to 1961, to approximately 113,000 students.42 Lisa McGirr places the Statement within a global context, stating, “the Port Huron Statement and the student movement in the United States that it helped inspire was part of a worldwide international movement of left-oriented youth rebellion that spread around the world during the 1960s.”43 Discussing the growth of student radicalism in the period, Bryan Palmer notes that university campuses were “transformed and long-entrenched practices of treating students as dependent children were either jettisoned or softened considerably.”44 The SDS sought to mobilize the student youth that was flocking to the growing universities across the United States. The Port Huron Statement “reflected early SDS optimism that a

41 Kazin, “The Port Huron Statement at Fifty,” 85.
42 Bothwell, Dummond, and English, Canada, 243.
44 Palmer, “Revolting Youth,” 29.
transformed university could help transform American society."  

David Churchill points out that while the SDS was the most influential student-based movement in this period, in Canada, the Student Union for Peace Action (SUPA) “was at the forefront of the student movement, yet it also brought its activism and energy off-campus and to involve itself in local community-based projects.”  

SUPA’s parent organization, Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CUCND) shifted to a student and university focused approach in late 1962 in response to growing student activism. This shift “was predicated on a conceptualization of students as political agents playing a catalytic role as a group in the struggle for peace.”

In a 1968 presentation to the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association, Richard Flacks, a researcher at the University of Chicago, identified several factors that united student activists in the 1960s. This included the advanced levels of education reached by student activists and their parents; they came, predominantly, from the upper middle class; the general academic quality or competency of the activists; and an interest amongst student activists to pursue non-conventional careers. Bothwell, Dummond, and English also note that in Canada, university students came predominantly from the upper middle class. They point out that student radicalism was scarce in Canada before 1963, but that “the founding of the Students for a Democratic Society in

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47 Ibid., 38.


49 Bothwell, Dummond, and English, *Canada*, 245.
1962, at Port Huron, just across the Bridge from Sarnia” was a major influence on the growth of student movements in Canada. The Statement and the SDS had a strong effect on Canadian organizations like CUCND. The pre-SUPA CUCND members turned more and more to the influence of the SDS throughout 1964 and 1965. Churchill notes,

As a predominantly student organization, CUCND was very conscious of the SDS’s intellectual vibrancy, as well as the US group’s commitment to local and forms of community based organizing. SDS’s sociological analysis and its attempts to implement participatory democracy … were models that many members of CUCND and an assortment of other politically active Canadian youth wished to emulate.

For example, in an SDS-inspired stance, CUCND members launched an anti-nuclear campaign in North Bay, Ontario at the site of a BOMARC missile. This shows a clear connection between the American and Canadian student movements as well as the passing of PD ideology from The Port Huron Statement across the border into Canada. Churchill writes: “by matching their own political aspirations with those of the US New Left, these activists participated in a larger transaction of political ideas, strategies, protest tactics, and sites for involvement and organizing.” As a result, Canadian university students began to pursue “resistant political practices designed to establish more equitable and democratic relations of power within the walls of universities, among the country’s rural poor, in the inner cities, and on the First Nations reserves.

A look at the original interpretation of PD will further enlighten this discussion. Michael Kazin writes, “it was the promise of ‘participatory democracy’ to utterly transform the society of overmanaged, bureaucratic, formally representative institutions

50 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., 34.
54 Ibid., 35.
they believed were stifling their independence of thought and action.” In a recent piece, Tom Hayden, who wrote the original draft of the Statement, reflects on what PD meant when the SDS drafted the Statement:

What did we mean by participatory democracy? Obviously the concept arose from our common desire to participate in making our own destiny, and in response to the severe limitations of an undemocratic system that we saw as representing an oligarchy. At its most basic, it meant the right to vote, as Henry David Thoreau once wrote, “not with a mere strip of paper but with one’s whole life.” It meant simplicity in registration and voting, unfettered from the dominance of wealth, property requirements, literacy tests, and poll taxes. It meant exercising the right to popular initiatives, referendums, and recalls, as achieved by Progressives in the early twentieth century. And it meant widening participation to include the economic sphere (workplace democracy and consumer watchdogs), neighborhood assemblies, and family life itself, where women and children were subordinates. It meant a greater role for citizens in the ultimate questions of war and peace, then considered the unquestioned realm of experts.

It is clear that defining PD did not follow an exact science; some things may clearly be an example of PD and others clearly not, but the lines can also be blurred in some cases. James Miller, author of Democracy is in the Streets: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago, points out that PD meant different things to different people. In 1962, when the term PD first appeared in the Statement, it was not meant to promote the replacement of “traditional representative institutions” with new forms of individual participation – this is also seen in Hayden’s explanation above. Originally, PD was meant to supplement representative democracy as a concept that promoted social change. Miller identifies two political visions promoted by early PD ideology: “the first is a face to face community of

56 Hayden, “Crafting the Port Huron Statement,” 21.
friends sharing interests in common; the second is of an experimental collective, embarked on a high-risk effort to test the limits of democracy in modern life.”

Like Miller, Flacks and Lichenstein point out:

The concept of participatory democracy has had at least two distinct meanings. They are not mutually exclusive, but one historicizes the concept as a mode of movement building and political engagement that was largely a product of the late 1950s and the first several years of the 1960s; the other sees participatory democracy as a set of ideas and practices that have roots deep in American political culture and which remain available and valuable to activists on the left, even in the twenty-first century.

Having explored the rise of student activism in Canada and the US, The Port Huron Statement, and PD, it is now time to look at some more-specifically Canadian developments in PD initiatives, including the Company of Young Canadians, and the use of royal commissions and task forces by the Canadian federal government.

A discussion of the Company of Young Canadians (CYC) offers an avenue to briefly explore PD and community development in the 1960s in Canada. Scholars agree that America saw the rise of a “disaffected baby boom generation [that] rebelled and attempted to create an alternative society through protest, drug use, communes, and enclaves” in the 1960s. However, Carrie A. Dickenson and William J. Campbell argue that the situation was very different in Canada, where leading young activists “formed important working relationships with government officials, community representatives, medical professionals, and social workers.” These activists “entertained a notion of cooperation as they pursued a social agenda by challenging and working within the space

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58 Ibid., 146.
61 Ibid., 3.
provided to them by federal authorities. In fact, in an attempt to further their twin goals of community development and social change, the leaders of Canada’s activist scene engaged authority in an often uncomfortable, but nevertheless cooperative relationship.”\textsuperscript{62}

To some extent, this parallels the Lagassé example illustrated above, though the CYC was influenced by the radical undercurrents of the SDS. Therefore, it actually exhibits all four sub-types of PD in a way, though a liberal/radical PD distinction serves the purpose of identifying its ties to state authority and radical influences.

Dickenson and Campbell discuss participation-geared movements in the 1960s, arguing that the Canadian federal government played an important role in their development. Rather than being an oppressive conservative force, as seen in the case of the United States federal government and American radical student organizations, like the SDS, the Canadian federal government had a stronger working relationship with youth activist groups, such as the CYC, which it founded.\textsuperscript{63} The CYC exemplifies the cooperative phenomenon seen in Canada during the mid-1960s. This organization was created in April, 1965 by Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson’s Liberal government as a way to enlist young Canadians to address causes of hardship, inequality, and poverty found throughout the country.\textsuperscript{64} The CYC was formed after the Leddy Committee, a federally organized body, was established to consult with different voluntary and non-voluntary organizations to try to establish a directive for a proposed volunteer youth group that became the CYC. One prominent group the Leddy Committee met with was the Student Union for Peace Action. SUPA itself was “formed out of the Combined

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 1964 annual meeting,” which resulted in the disbanding and replacement of CUCND by SUPA. The Leddy-proposed program quickly found greater federal support, and in 1966, “backed by millions of dollars of federal funds, the Company of Young Canadians Act outlined the operation of the organization as an independent Crown corporation. According to the twelve operational principles, the primary purpose of the CYC was to address the economic, social, and cultural needs of communities through subsidized volunteer placements.” With the early help of SUPA involvement, the CYC quickly became popular amongst motivated youth because it offered an immersive experience on the federal government’s dollar. While volunteers were paid to live and volunteer in disadvantaged communities during their time with the CYC, private organizations with similar volunteer opportunities limited volunteers’ community involvement and the monetary support available to the volunteers.

One reason why the CYC stands out in importance is that it was highly influenced by pre-existing participation-based movements in the United States. This includes the previously discussed SDS, the group that authored the *Port Huron Statement*, and was host to many ambitious young Canadian volunteers during the summer months. The ideas of the *Port Huron Statement* united many Canadian and American youth volunteer and student-based organizations. The founding of SUPA was one of the most important

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65 Ibid., 4. SUPA was formed over the 1964-1965 New Year’s holiday. See: Ibid., 33. The ideology behind SUPA was, according to Churchill, the “weaving together of intellectual strands of their older peace constituency with the SDS-infected commitment to PD…” See: Ibid., 40. SUPA’s parent organization, CUCND, had gone through several organizational changes itself. It was founded in 1959 after Prime Minister John Diefenbaker announced the installation of US BOMARC nuclear missiles on Canadian soil. See: Churchill, “SUPA,” 36.


67 Some members of SUPA joined the CYC, likely because of the increased funding. Palmer, “Revolting Youth,” 30.
developments in the rise of the Canadian New Left – just as SDS was in the American New Left, which then influenced Canada.\textsuperscript{68}

The influence of PD on the CYC is primarily found in its early years, between 1965 and 1969, and in its predecessor organization, SUPA. Palmer explains how SUPA operated, which also provides insight into the CYC early years:

Student radicals affiliated with [SUPA] worked on inner-city anti-poverty campaigns, lived on aboriginal reserves in order to build relations and contribute to the capacities of native people to resist colonization and its oppressions, camped out at nuclear arms sites to advocate disarmament, aided draft resisters coming to Canada from the United States, and organized teach-ins about imperialism and other controversial subjects. Many SUPA members had close connections with American civil rights movements.\textsuperscript{69}

From 1965-1969, the loosely organized groups of the CYC cooperated well with the government and followed in the footsteps of SUPA in how they integrated with communities. They were able to fully integrate with needy communities in ways that other volunteer groups or traditional government organizations couldn’t; this was a direct result of the government funding the CYC received, allowing its members to work and live within communities, rather than simply volunteer time within a given community.\textsuperscript{70}

The CYC also enjoyed a good working relationship with the public service, which saw the CYC as a way to “broaden and deepen what the government did” without some of the restrictions found in other federal programs.\textsuperscript{71}

Cooperation between the CYC and the government was the result of reliable federal funding and little direct supervision or intervention by the government itself. This

\textsuperscript{68} Churchill, “SUPA,” 33.
\textsuperscript{69} Palmer, “Revolting Youth,” 30.
\textsuperscript{70} Dickenson and Campbell, “Strange Bedfellows,” 5. For volunteer leaders, the CYC “symbolized an opportunity to continue community development work with proper funds, training, and research. Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 5.
changed at the end of 1969 when the Trudeau government stepped in to direct the CYC by appointing a new director and altering its power structure to give greater federal control of CYC initiatives. The successful, if brief, period of the CYC was replaced by a federally restricted and monetarily deprived organization from 1969-1976, when Trudeau officially cut federal support and effectively destroyed the organization.

Interestingly, the fate of the CYC resembled what had befallen the recreation movements of Ontario, as discussed by Tillotson. The CYC collapsed when the federal government took control and ended the volunteer-driven nature of the organization pre-1970. For the recreation movement, “what languished in the late 1950s was the attempt by public recreationists to construct an innovative articulation of public and private in which freedom and community were equally combined.” This resulted in the (perhaps) unnecessary bureaucratization of the recreation movement. Numerous recreation departments were created through Ontario as recreation became an accepted state function. However, “by the 1960s volunteer leadership in policy making had given way to professional administration.” The bureaucratization of the recreation movement eventually eliminated original liberal-oriented motivation for new participatory community endeavors.

While the CYC exhibits important elements of the Port Huron Statement’s influence, along with elements of PD and community development, PD in Canada also

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72 This intervention occurred because several key members of the CYC leadership were seen at an anti-Vietnam War rally. Though not an official CYC sponsored event, their involvement quickly gave the CYC the appearance of a radical organization and called into question their federal support. What could have ended as an innocent mix up resulted in a media fiasco that necessitated a government response. See Ibid., 14-15.
73 Ibid., 15.
74 Tillotson, Public, 143.
75 Ibid., 5.
has a significant history in federal initiatives such as royal commissions and task forces. Frank Schindler and C. Michael Lanphier also discuss the emergence of PD in the 1950s and 1960s, but with an emphasis on the incorporation of participatory methods into public administration. Like Tillotson, they argue that the fallout of the Second World War and the Great Depression led to “the slow emergence of a new social philosophy more conducive to collective action” [76]. Schindler and Lanphier look towards changes in the government itself and the way it operated. One example of collective action in Canada can be found in the rising popularity of royal commissions following the end of the Second World War. Furthermore, the introduction of more flexible governmental task forces, like the Hellyer task force, became a popular way to address growing social concerns, in part by engaging citizens in policy debate. In this way similar to royal commissions, task forces, the authors argue, have several advantages over royal commissions.

For starters, royal commissions are, by convention, required to publish results of their findings. This results in reports that are frequently “more concerned with images than with information.” [77] In contrast, task forces are not required to publish their findings, thus their approach can “assume a more critical if less diplomatic posture than would be the case if the report were to become a public document.” [78] A second advantage of the task force to the royal commission is that task forces have pre-determined lengths of deliberation and scope of budgets. This results in a more focused approach. The third

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[77] Ibid., 486
[78] Ibid.
advantage for task forces, as identified by Schindler and Lanphier, is that while royal commissions are necessarily run by the internal governmental structure, task forces do not have such requirements. They are more flexible in their appointments because they can include “a mixture of personnel from outside government, public service employees and even, at their peril, cabinet ministers.”\textsuperscript{79} Given the publishing date of this article, it is likely that this last point bears a strong relation to Paul Hellyer’s April, 1969 resignation from cabinet. Two major federal endeavors, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (RCBB) and the Royal Commission on the Status of Women (RCSW), will now be discussed.

The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, which took place between 1963-1969, “was a response to the growing unrest among French Canadians in Quebec.”\textsuperscript{80} The RCBB was launched to address a campaign promise made by Pearson and the Liberals.\textsuperscript{81} One of the main political issues in Canada at the time was “the split between English Canada and Quebec over the meaning of nationalism, which, with the birth of the separatist radical group Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ)” in early 1963, reached a new level of intensity.\textsuperscript{82} The role of the French language in Canada and Quebec’s political and economic influence were key issues that strained Quebec’s relationship with the other Canadian provinces. The RCBB sought to better understand

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.
the French Canadian perspective and make recommendations about how to maintain strong provincial relationships and increase visibility of the French culture in Canada.

The RCBB was a massive undertaking led by ten commissioners representing Canada’s diverse cultural-linguistic composition. Provincial premiers also played an important role, as education in Canada is a provincial prerogative. The RCBB had three main research objectives: determine the “extent of bilingualism in the federal government, the role of public and private organizations in promoting better cultural relations, and the opportunities for Canadians to become bilingual in English and French.”

The RCBB sought to engage Canadians in their research, and new governmental policies with a different approach to social science and participatory endeavors resulted in the preparation of “29 reports based upon data garnered through 27 separate studies.” Schindler and Lanphier identify three groups that the commissions’ studies can be arranged in. The first took a national perspective and helped provide regional data on French-English relations. The second group looked at problems on smaller, regional scales, or within different industries or governmental groups. Finally, the third group helped the Commission see what kinds of opportunities were available to Francophones in both public and private sectors across Canada.

The RCBB had a lasting impact on Canada, perhaps most clearly seen in the 1969 Official Languages Act, which recognized English and French as the official languages of Canada and gave equal standing to these languages in all national institutions, including the federal government.

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83 Laing, “Royal Commission.”
84 Schindler and Lanphier, “Social Science,” 495.
85 Ibid., 496.
and the military.\textsuperscript{86} The inherent state-granted authority of the commission and its expectation for results places it under the category of strong-liberal PD.

In addition to bilingualism, the status of women was another question that led to an even more highly participatory royal commission. Prime Minister Pearson launched a commission in response to a months-long campaign by a coalition of 32 Canadian women’s groups. The Royal Commission on the Status of Women, which took place from 1967-1970, was launched to “listen to complaints and suggestions regarding the systematic legal, economic and social inequalities that were making the lives of Canadian women difficult.”\textsuperscript{87} It sought “to make specific recommendations to the federal government to ensure equality for women in all aspects of society.”\textsuperscript{88} An extensive six-month public consultation, lasting from April to October 1968, saw 468 briefs and over 1,000 letters submitted to the committee – “all of which confirmed the widespread problems faced by women in Canadian society.”\textsuperscript{89} The commissioners held hearings across the country and met with, or received briefs from, many women’s groups, organizations, and concerned individuals.\textsuperscript{90} Freeman points out several factors that influenced both the women’s groups to pressure the government for action and the government to give in and grant the RCSW. These include the rise of women’s activist movements in the United States, which prompted President John F. Kennedy to appoint a commission in 1961; the United Nations “Declaration on the Elimination of

\textsuperscript{86} Hillmer, “The B and B’s Grand Inquest.”
\textsuperscript{87} Freeman, \textit{The Satellite Sex}, 3.
\textsuperscript{89} Morris, “Royal Commission on the Status of Women.”
\textsuperscript{90} Freeman, \textit{The Satellite Sex}, 3.
Discrimination Against Women,” passed November 7, 1967; the Canadian government’s precedent under Pearson to appoint royal commissions, like the RCBB; and the likelihood that Pearson’s minority Liberal government faced an election in 1968.  

The Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada was tabled in the House of Commons on December 7, 1970. The report made 167 recommendations that “highlighted the obstacles faced by women and recommended changes to eliminate gender inequality by means of social policy.” In response to the commission report, the federal government created a position for a Minister responsible for the Status of Women in 1971; accordingly, provincial governments across the country created a similar position over time. Freeman calls the commission report a “watershed for Canadian women, a historical first that allowed issues previously deemed part of the private or domestic sphere to become the focus of intense discussion in the public sphere.”

While an influential endeavor, both as a royal commission and as an acknowledgement of the disadvantaged place of women in society, the RCSW was certainly not without controversy. Perhaps the biggest controversy came at the end of the commission, which saw the commissioners divided on their conclusions. Barbara Freeman, whose research focused on how the media interpreted the RCSW, wrote:

Journalists were particularly intrigued that John Humphrey had refused to sign the Report and had issued a 17-page minority document of his own. He charged that the commission was not committed to equality but ‘special treatment’ for certain classes of women over both men and other women in hiring and promotion, and

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91 Ibid., 24-25.
92 Morris, “Royal Commission;” Freeman, The Satellite Sex, 3-4.
93 Ibid., 3.
that it favoured women in the labour force over women at home.\textsuperscript{94}

Predictably, the media exploited the gender divisions within the commission itself. As with the RCBB, the RCSW was a strong-liberal PD initiative.

**Pierre Elliott Trudeau**

In his memoirs, Trudeau attributes the ‘Trudeaumania’ of the 1968 national election to a combination of two things: the popularity of a new politician making a splash as the new head of the political party currently in power and the residual effects of Expo 1967, the Canadian Centennial, and the excitement of the time.\textsuperscript{95} These observations identify the unique political circumstances of the period, but most political commentators agree there is more to the situation than Trudeau lets on. According to Ramsay Cook, Trudeau had an “intriguing and unusual personality combined with a great capacity to communicate, especially on television. At the Liberal Convention in April 1968, Trudeau, who fewer than three years before had not even been a member of the Liberal party, was elected the party’s leader.”\textsuperscript{96} Not only had Trudeau not been in the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{94} Ibid., 213. On the same page, Freeman also points out that Jacques Henripin, Elise Gregory MacGill, and Doris Ogilvie signed the *Report*, but also issued their own separate statements like Humphrey did.
  \item \textsuperscript{95} Pierre Elliott Trudeau, *Memoirs*, (Toronto: M&S, 1993), 100-102.
  \item \textsuperscript{96} Cook, *Canada*, 308. Trudeau’s decision to run for Liberal leadership was very late in the game; he announced on Friday, February 16, 1968, just before the deadline. Only a few short months later, Trudeau was elected leader of the Liberals and therefore became the next Prime Minister of Canada. See: Trudeau, *Memoirs*, 85. Note: Adding to the romanticism of Trudeau, Bothwell, Dummond, and English write that Trudeau announced his candidacy for leadership on Valentine’s Day, February 14. See: *Canada*, 317.
\end{itemize}
Liberal Party, but a few years earlier, in 1963, Trudeau had strongly opposed and
ridiculed the Liberal Party. For example, in the April 1963 edition of *Cité Libre*, Trudeau
wrote: “I would have to point out in the strongest terms the autocracy of the liberal
structure and the cowardice of its members. I have never seen in all my examination of
politics so degrading a spectacle as that of all these Liberals turning their coats in unison
with their Chief, when they saw a chance to take power.”97 Trudeau’s impressive rise to
power within the Liberal party was not just a result of the times, as Trudeau states, but
also the result of the well-calculated exploitation of Trudeau’s charisma – partly
exhibited through his television appeal.98 John English points out some specific
characteristics Trudeau possessed that led to his successful use of television media:
“Television embraced Trudeau: the dramatic high cheekbones; the intense blue eyes; the
quick change of moods from caustic to shy to affectionate; the striking retort; and the
“cool” presence. Somehow the camera missed his pock-marked cheeks, the faintly yellow
tinge to his complexion, and his less than average height.”99 Television was still a
relatively new medium in 1968, and while many politicians understood its growing
importance, few were able to use it as effectively as Trudeau did. This section considers
how Trudeau’s political philosophies, election techniques, and the changes he brought to

97 Stewart, *Shrug*, 11. Here Stewart points out the irony in Trudeau’s position in
1963 and how he ran his own government from 1968-1971 when Stewart wrote *Shrug.*
98 Trudeau’s increasing popularity made for a perfect storm when matched with
the increasing use of television. According to journalist John English, “seventeen million
Canadians watched the Liberal convention, and almost as many watched the leaders’
99 Ibid., 19. Walter Stewart provides a similar description: “Trudeau was quick,
cool, detached, articulate, shrewd, a man whose drifting past seemed romantic, whose
lack of involvement suited a nation sick to death of the screams and whines of its
politicians. Above all, he looked superb; whatever quality it is that makes TV work for
one man and not another, Trudeau had it.” Stewart, *Shrug*, 12.
government in the first year of his first term as Prime Minister inform how Trudeau used PD and what that meant for the Task Force on Housing and Urban Development.

In the Liberal leadership race of 1968, Trudeau used charisma to his advantage to beat out established candidates like Robert Winters, Paul Martin, and Paul Hellyer who had been considered favourites for the nomination before Trudeau’s last minute entry.\(^{100}\)

In *Just Watch Me*, John English explains how “his style and stance were unique in the history of Canada: an erstwhile socialist who cared what French intellectuals wrote, wore shoes without socks and jackets without ties and still looked elegant, drove the perfect Mercedes 300SL convertible, and flirted boldly with women a generation younger.”\(^{101}\) In other words, Trudeau’s style, charisma, and youthful appearance were attractive to voters and set him apart from his colleagues in the Liberal Party.

Along with appearance, both projected and perceived, another factor in Trudeau’s rapid rise in popularity was that with his limited time in politics, he was enough of an unknown quantity that any potential voter uncertainty drew attention to him.\(^{102}\) This meant that his charisma made a stronger impact on the leadership race than if he had already been a well-known candidate. Furthermore, by waiting until the last minute to join the race, Trudeau was able to build up suspense and intrigue regarding his entry; however, he was not alone in this respect, as he had the willing help of the press covering his every move. Walter Stewart recalls how the press followed Trudeau around “like

\(^{100}\) In 1966 and 1967 Hellyer was a favourite for the Liberal leadership, sometimes even considered the favourite. In his memoir, Hellyer points out that some newspaper articles written about him were a “public-relations person’s dream.” He also point out that this may have been detrimental to his chances because it drew attention and made him a target. See: Hellyer, *Torpedoes*, 154.

\(^{101}\) English, *Just Watch Me*, 2.

\(^{102}\) Bothwell, Dummond, and English, *Canada*, 319.
moon-struck lovers … pouring bile on his enemies and scorn on his competitors.”

Stewart draws attention to the day Trudeau announced his candidacy for Liberal Leadership and the speech he made to the press:

If I try to assess what happened in the past two months, I have a suspicion you people had a lot to do with it … I think it started out like a practical joke on the Liberal Party. I mean that, because, in some sense, the decision that I made this morning and last night is in some ways similar to that I arrived at when I entered the Liberal Party. It seemed to me, reading the press in the early stages a couple of months ago, it seemed to me as though many of you were saying, you know, ‘We dare the Liberal Party to choose a guy like Trudeau.’

For Stewart, it was no surprise Trudeau won the Liberal Leadership, and he points out the pride the media felt after this victory, because they felt they were responsible for his victory. However, Stewart clarifies his position by stating: “We didn’t make Trudeau. Television made him, organization made him, moxie made him, his own particular brand of charisma made him.”

Trudeau’s popularity, which rose as the leadership convention approached, also was the result of his work on the Divorce Reform Bill as Minister of Justice and some well-timed appearances in the media. For example, in early February 1968 at a constitutional conference, Trudeau made a fortunate television appearance “when he

103 Stewart, _Shrug_, 204.
104 Ibid., 205.
105 Ibid., 206. Even these factors fail to fully explain the situation, as intergovernmental politics provided much of the potential for Trudeau’s success. Upon his retirement from politics, Prime Minister Pearson sought a Francophone candidate to replace him as head of the Liberal Party. His first choice was Jean Marchand, who declined the offer; “Pearson then turned to Pierre Trudeau, who had in his brief tenure as justice minister attracted the attention of the liberal media with his divorce reform as well as his articulateness in both languages.” See: Bothwell, Dummond, and English, _Canada_, 317.

106 Trudeau became Minister of Justice on April 4, 1967. Stewart criticizes the Divorce Reform Bill and points out that it ignored the recommendations of a Parliamentary committee, and instead instituted a complicated system for granting divorces. See: Stewart, _Shrug_, 11.
debated with Daniel Johnson [the Premier of Quebec] and made all the put-downs English Canada was longing to hear.” ¹⁰⁷ Paul Litt discusses how Trudeau attacked Johnson on his proposals for the granting of special status to Quebec, “arguing instead for the accommodation of the French language and culture in Canada. His firm position on national unity provided reassurance that there was substance beneath his style.” ¹⁰⁸ For Litt, Trudeau’s strong stance against Johnson appealed to English Canadians because “they were left with the image of a strong Trudeau standing up to Quebec and all the troublesome changes to the status quo it had come to represent.” ¹⁰⁹ Therefore, moving into the Liberal leadership race, Trudeau set himself up a “champion of strong federalism” and the enemy of special considerations for Quebec. ¹¹⁰ Bothwell, Drummond, and English argue that Trudeau also had a younger support base in the Liberal Party than other leadership candidates. This included both younger voters as well as voters new to the Liberal circles. They point out: “throughout the country, the meetings to choose delegates were filled with the faces of those new to Liberal gatherings. Most of them were young; many were at universities or taught there. Trudeau offered a chance that could not be missed.” ¹¹¹ In his memoir, Mitchell Sharp wrote that Trudeau’s popularity may have resulted from “his determination not to be satisfied with the conventional wisdom and to shake-up the establishment.” ¹¹² These qualities resonated

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 13.
¹⁰⁹ Ibid.
¹¹⁰ Stewart, Shrug, 11.
¹¹¹ Bothwell, Dummond, and English, Canada, 317. Paul Litt points out that Trudeau also had a large base of support in Quebec as well as from the Canadian academic community. See: Litt, “Trudeaumania,” 37.
¹¹² Sharp, Memoir, 174.
with younger voters especially. As discussed above, Trudeau aided his perception as a newcomer and bringer of change simply by standing out from his peers by acting and dressing in an unconventional manner.

In order to assess the outcome of the Task Force Report and Hellyer’s resignation from Cabinet, it is important to consider his relationship with Trudeau. As popular as Trudeau was, English makes a point of discussing just how close the leadership race could have been between Hellyer and Trudeau:

Had Hellyer spoken better on Friday evening, had [Minister of Finance Mitchell] Sharp not endorsed Trudeau, Paul Hellyer probably would have become Liberal leader. These are the “what ifs” of history, which intrigue but remain wistful dreams for losers. Hellyer did keep his promise to Winters that he would endorse him if Winters moved ahead on the third ballot. Enthusiastically waving a Winters banner, he began to chant “Go, Bob, go.” 113

Hellyer’s support for Winters came too late to change the tide of support for Trudeau, but is at the very least indicative of where his loyalties lay. Rather than support the charismatic newcomer, Hellyer sided with the old guard in supporting Winter. Paul Stevens and John Saywell express a similar view in the Canadian Annual Review for 1968. Although the 1968 Liberal Convention gave Trudeau majority support, it was a tough result for many Liberals because most of the other candidates, like Hellyer, Martin, and Winters, did not support Trudeau. The strong Liberal candidates that were favored months before Trudeau announced his candidacy formed the backbone of the established

113 English, Citizen of the World, 478. Trudeau claims that he tried to spread around the success of his leadership win in order to appease the old guard of the Liberal party. In his memoir he writes: “When forming my first Cabinet I invited everyone who had been a candidate for the leadership to be part of it.” Looking back at this decision, his first few years of as Prime Minister may have passed more smoothly had he not included these individuals, as several left the Cabinet. Trudeau’s Cabinet decisions are better explained by the closeness of the leadership race leading up to the convention and the division of the party over his own success; he had no choice but to include rivals, or decimate the party. See: Trudeau, Memoirs, 95.
Liberal Party and were unhappy to see the leadership go to Trudeau.\textsuperscript{114} Had they been fully aware of the threat Trudeau posed for the leadership, they might have united at an earlier time and potentially defeated Trudeau. The tussle for Liberal leadership sharply divides Hellyer and Trudeau and serves as a basis for judging their relationship leading up to the 1968 federal election and the appointment of the Task Force.

Following his successful Liberal leadership campaign, Trudeau promised not to call a federal election; at the time, the Liberals held a minority government. However, as Cook points out, “in virtually his first action as Prime Minister” Trudeau capitalized “on the popularity and interest that his campaign for the party leadership had stimulated” and called a general election on April 23, 1968.\textsuperscript{115} Trudeau “made national unity his central campaign issue, promising to continue the process of constitutional revision and asserting his determination to establish bilingualism as a central foundation in the Canadian federal system and to treat all provinces as equals.”\textsuperscript{116} As Trudeau himself stated, the Canadian Centennial played an important role in Trudeaumania and his successful federal election; however, Trudeau clearly played to these themes in his choice to make national unity one of his central campaign platforms. Trudeau was again able to utilize television to his advantage in the build up to the Federal election. Here, Trudeau was portrayed as youthful and energetic against his less photogenic opponents, such as Conservative leader


\textsuperscript{115} Cook, \textit{Canada}, 308. Litt writes: “three days after Trudeau was sworn in as prime minister on April 20 1968, he dissolved Parliament and called a June election.” See: Litt, Trudeaumania, 43.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
Robert Stanfield. English recalls: “There was certainly spontaneous excitement during the campaign, but there was also careful staging as the Liberal strategists focused on their leader in a way that only the new media made possible. For the TV cameras, they even staged a fake fall down the stairs by the athletic Trudeau.”

Trudeau promoted democracy and national unity throughout his election campaign in a package he called the ‘Just Society.’ This was made clear at the start of his federal campaign, opened in his home riding of Mount Royal on May 22, 1968, where he declared: “We believe in one Canada. We believe in one nation. I said it in French last week and I say it again in English.” In his coverage of the event, Globe and Mail reporter Ronald Lebel wrote that Trudeau “stressed the need for a participatory democracy in which all citizens would get involved in federal politics and help the senior Government to reshape the constitution.” Trudeau’s constitutional project was part of his very specific use for PD. He spoke of proposals to implement the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Biligualism and Biculturalism and called for an increase from 80,000 to 300,000 Liberal Party members in Quebec. Trudeau made his support of Quebec heard through campaign materials where he argued, “in a democracy it is all too easy for the majority to forget the rights of the minority, and for a remote and powerful government to ignore its protests … We must never forget that, in the long run, a democracy is judged by the way the majority treats the minority.”

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117 English, Just Watch Me, 18-19.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
121 Trudeau, Conversations, 46.
united Canada, Trudeau became a candidate that voters in both English and French-speaking Canada turned to; to English Canada, a vote for Trudeau was seen as a potential way to stop Quebec secession; to French Canada, a vote for Trudeau meant an increased likelihood that French culture and language rights would be respected in Canada.122

In his campaign speeches, Trudeau’s elegant language turned heads and attracted voters; however, his speeches suspiciously lacked specific proposals. As English recalls, “at the convention he’d talked about the ‘Just Society’ he intended to construct, but its contours were thinly sketched and its foundations, apart from a commitment to the rights of individuals to make their own decisions, were barely visible.”123 Interestingly, Trudeau acknowledges his tactic of avoiding making specific proposals during the election campaign. In his own words, Trudeau says:

In answering reporters who asked about my political goals if I became Prime Minister, I tried to express simple and widely understandable ideas, because I knew that if I became the leader those ideas would be the party platform in the general election that would follow. And so, I based my campaign on the central theme of the Just Society. Achieving such a society would require promoting equality of opportunity and giving the most help to those who were the most disadvantaged.124

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122 Walter Stewart writes that Trudeau “owed much of his swift rise to two factors – a hunger among English Canadians for a strong man to ‘put Quebec in its place’ and his discovery by the one medium to which he is perfectly suited –television.” Stewart, Shrug, 12. Though he did not support Quebec nationalism, “the strongest vote for Trudeau … came from his native province … Trudeau during the campaign had spoken French from the Kootenays to Halifax; every single speech was punctuated by sentences in French.” See: Bothwell, Dummond, and English, Canada, 319. Trudeau promoted his use of French in his federal campaign opening speech: “I have spoken French in the Orange Belt of Ontario, in Alberta, in the Yukon, right across Canada. I saw French Canadians everywhere and they felt they belonged in Canada.” See: Lebel, “Trudeau Would Recognize 2 Language Communities,” The Globe and Mail, May 23, 1968, 10.
123 English, Just Watch Me, 4.
124 Trudeau, Memoirs, 87.
The pursuit of an ideal society may have attracted voters, but it did not leave everyone happy in the end. Furthermore, though Trudeau’s political writing was eloquent, it does not indicate a commitment to anything more than a functioning electoral democracy. For instance, in his 1970 *Approaches To Politics*, Trudeau wrote:

> It must be recognized that democracy is the form of government we are looking for. It is the system in which popular consent is most methodically sought; it is the one that allows the people to choose and dismiss their rulers as peacefully as possible.¹²⁵

While Trudeau’s idealistic projections for a stronger, united Canada left many Canadian voters divided, the over-exuberant rise of “Trudeaumania” inspired crowds and gave the surface impression that Trudeau was universally supported. Cook also identifies how Trudeau took advantage of his divided popularity:

> In the election campaign Trudeau’s personality often seemed more important than issues. Everywhere he went, criss-crossing the country by jet, the crowds flowed around him exhibiting a phenomenon which the newspapers quickly dubbed ‘Trudeaumania.’ In their growing frustration, the opposition parties charged that he refused to debate issues.¹²⁶

In other words, Trudeau took advantage of his polarizing popularity by making a spectacle of the election campaign. Rather than making his governmental policies the focus of discussion, he shifted the focus, making himself the center of attention. His encouragement of PD, calls for change, and visions of a ‘Just Society’ attracted segments of the voting population that were eager to participate in his election campaign. This included people unhappy with government policy, people drawn to Trudeau’s charismatic figure, and people drawn in by the wave of support and media attention. Paul Litt takes a

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¹²⁶ Cook, *Canada*, 308.
critical look at Trudeau’s popularity and its effect on the Canadian voting public. As Litt puts it,

An influential segment of the electorate responded enthusiastically. Some hit the pavement to engage in a ‘participatory democracy’ that simulated an unmediated political experience, staging a performance ideally suited for television, through which many more participated vicariously.\textsuperscript{127}

Trudeau was able to use the media, and especially television, to his advantage as he essentially convinced the public that they were making a meaningful political contribution. Litt ends his article by describing the influence of mass media on the public during Trudeau’s successful election campaign, writing: “the truly enfranchised were media-savvy. Whether they got what they expected, or what they deserved, remained to be seen.”\textsuperscript{128} In the rise of mass media and the growing public exposure of Canadian politicians, Trudeau paved the way with a new style of popular politics.

After using the popular support of Trudeaumania to his advantage, Trudeau was able to bring the Liberals their first majority government in many years. With this solid majority behind him and support drawn from every section of the country, Trudeau now had an opportunity to turn his government’s attention to the many difficult problems that had plagued the country during the 1960’s and demanded solutions if the nation was to survive the ‘seventies. He had spoken of his desire to work towards the building of a ‘Just Society.’\textsuperscript{129}

One such problem was housing, which coincidentally was one of the few issues Trudeau promised to address should his government take the election. An interesting detail regarding this election promise is that Paul Hellyer wrote the draft of the speech where he

\textsuperscript{127} Litt, Trudeaumania, 53.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid. On the ‘Just Society’, Stewart stresses, “under Trudeau, we are more than ever distant from anything that could be called a Just Society.” Stewart, Shrug, 2. Stewart also states that given Trudeau’s non-political background, he gives him “full marks, in the circumstances, for doing his best.” However, Stewart’s true position is that, “measured against the goals Trudeau set himself, and against the normal standards of political judgment in Canada … I think he has done a bad job, and should be replaced.” Ibid., 14.
\textsuperscript{129} Cook, Canada, 309; English, Just Watch Me, 42.
discussed housing.

Once established as the 15th Prime Minister of Canada, Trudeau set to work organizing the new government. One of his top priorities was strengthening the authority of the Prime Minister’s Office, which included the strengthening of Cabinet committees. English describes how in the Cabinet’s first meeting on July 8, Trudeau explained how it would operate on an efficient and structured basis, with a policy of solidarity within the cabinet on new policies. For Trudeau, Cabinet solidarity meant, “if a Minister did not agree with a decision taken he had a right, and indeed a duty, to resign.” The cabinet was meant to act as a unified body under Trudeau, with input on topics specific to the various ministries generated from the cabinet as a whole. Also, for Trudeau “the Cabinet atmosphere was not unlike a high-quality academic seminar where one’s weaknesses were continuously probed. A minister knew that neither political weight nor personal charm could excuse a weak brief.” This radical new approach to the structure of the Cabinet may have promoted consensus, but it sometimes did so to the detriment of programs or ideas requiring specialized decision-making processes. While Trudeau’s election dialogue heralded participatory democracy as a political method of the future, the changes made under Trudeau’s regime carried an autocratic theme that faced mixed reviews. English writes: “Trudeau’s reforms of Cabinet and caucus, along with

130 Bothwell, Dummond, and English, Canada, 320.
131 English, Just Watch Me, 40.
132 Bothwell, Dummond, and English, Canada, 320.
133 In a November 13, 1968 article in the Globe and Mail, George Bain criticizes Trudeau’s PD. Highlighting a question and answer Trudeau held at Queen’s University with 1,200 students, Bain points out that students were primed in advance about what questions to ask Trudeau. Pointing out how this event clearly meant to fulfill Trudeau’s promises of PD, Bain concluded, ironically: “Participatory democracy, it’s wonderful.” George Bain, “Not Without Flaws,” The Globe and Mail, November 13, 1968, 6.
the many task forces, white papers, and discussion groups packaged as “participatory democracy,” attempted to reinvigorate public space and citizen involvement.”

However, he points out that “expectations were not met and that achievements fell far short of what had been promised when the spirited band around Trudeau set out to remake Canadian government.” Schindler and Lanphier discuss Trudeau’s realignment of the Privy Council in February 1969. They argue that the new set up in the office of the Prime Minister and the Privy Council created a strong, centralized authority. This authority could drastically grow, and through the growing utilization of new survey methods could even rival Parliament.

In an October 1967 article heavily critical of Hellyer’s Task Force and Trudeau’s participatory democracy, Scott Young of The Globe and Mail questioned the influence that an “average man” could have on the state and argued that “Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau made it to Sussex Drive at least partly on the promise of participatory democracy.” Furthermore, citing Trudeaumania, and Trudeau’s popularity amongst young women in particular, Scott wrote the following about Trudeau’s participatory democracy:

Under this slogan, the party doctrine is that ordinary citizens must help run the country, including making policy. That this is an outdated concept and impossible in modern government has not yet invalidated the illusion, and one can understand why the Liberals cling to it. It is a good gag. For one thing, how are you going to hang onto all those miniskirts as they grow up if you let them know the minute they stopped screaming (their man being elected), their political influence was at an end?

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134 English, Just Watch Me, 43.

135 Ibid.

136 Schindler and Lanphier, “Social Science,” 491. English also identifies the centralization of authority: English, Just Watch Me, 42.

137 Scott Young, “The Question In This Game Is: Do the Answers Score Any Points?,” The Globe and Mail, October 7, 1968, 7.

138 Ibid.
As early as a few months after Trudeau’s majority government came into power, the fairy tale of Trudeaumania did not sit well with some Canadians and Trudeau’s commitment to participatory democracy was questioned.

While I have presented a critical view of Trudeau’s PD, it is important to acknowledge the influence of other political actors in the decision making processes of Trudeau’s government. For example, as English identifies, the Liberal Party itself may have been an impediment to Trudeau pursuing a more extensive participatory political program. He points to the Cabinet itself as being skeptical of PD and that while Trudeau may have believed that a “broader political process was essential for Canadian democracy to flourish,” this was a minority view in the Liberal Party. This is an interesting observation that contributes to an explanation for the strong Cabinet opposition that Hellyer’s Report faced. English attributes this to “a trend in the modern state toward the centralization of decision making.” Having briefly overviewed Trudeau’s rise to power and his political methods, it is now time to introduce Paul Hellyer and his political background.

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139 English, Just Watch Me, 151.
140 Ibid.
Paul Hellyer

At the time of the creation of the Task Force in 1968, Paul Hellyer was an experienced and successful politician. He was part of an established group of Liberals that Trudeau had sought to set himself apart from in the 1968 Liberal leadership race; John English describes Hellyer as one of the primary contenders to take over the reins of the Liberal Party that year. He writes that Hellyer was “at forty-four a multi-millionaire and a seasoned political veteran. Through his historic and controversial unification of the defense forces during the Pearson government, he had stood up to the generals and never retreated.”

Having already discussed Trudeau’s approach to politics and PD, in this section I will establish Hellyer’s perspective and how it clashed with Trudeau’s.

An early look at Hellyer’s leadership style can be found in the 1961 National Rally of the Liberal Party, held January 9th to 11th in Ottawa, and chaired by Paul Hellyer. Hellyer was appointed by Liberal leader Lester B. Pearson to organize this rally, the first of its kind held by the Liberal Party since the turn of the century. In his memoirs, Hellyer recalls his reluctance to head the Rally. The main reason for this reluctance was that there was no leadership contest to attract Liberal Party delegates and

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141 English, Citizen of the World, 459.
142 In their discussion of the Liberal leadership race, Clarkson and McCall introduce the various candidates. Interestingly, they portray Hellyer as an almost mirror image to Trudeau: “a Torontonian whose reputation had been made as the cabinet minister who championed the controversial integration of Canada’s armed forces, whose command of French was minimal, and whose interest in the national unity question was peripheral.” See: Clarkson and McCall, 205. Trudeau, on the other hand, had just introduced a popular divorce reform bill as standing Minister of Justice and was a Quebec born federalist that went on to make Canadian unity the basis of his platform in the federal election.
144 Hellyer, Torpedoes, 20.
the thought surrounding the Rally was that it was unlikely to attract people who had to pay their own way.\textsuperscript{145} Furthermore, the Kingston Conference, a major gathering of influential Liberal thinkers, had just been held in September 1960.\textsuperscript{146} Realizing the potential political risks involved, Hellyer accepted the organizational challenge head on and adopted several new techniques that resulted in a highly successful Rally. A brief overview offers some insight into how Hellyer’s past organizational experience might have influenced his approach to the organization of the Task Force in 1968.

The Liberal Rally was a large undertaking that drew 2,500 delegates to Ottawa.\textsuperscript{147} Hellyer introduced several techniques in the organization of this successful rally. This included pre-registration to save time and shorten lines; simultaneous translation of languages; and the subsidization of travel costs for delegates from further away provinces by the delegates from central provinces. The most important aspect of the Rally to this thesis was its use of participation-based policy discussions. Hellyer recalls:

> The use of a whole series of small policy groups made it possible to give everyone a sense of participation and the chance to be heard. This technique had been used successfully at Kingston, but there was a great uneasiness about transplanting it to a mass convention, which tends to be unmanageable. It worked like a charm, however, and by the time a protracted policy session ended, party members had become personally involved with the new direction that was being set.\textsuperscript{148}

Walter Gordon also identifies the unprecedented format the Rally followed. According to Gordon,

> Hellyer had suggested that all the policy discussions should be held in public and open to the press, something no political party had ever done before. This was an excellent idea and one that was to give us a maximum amount of publicity. But

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{146} Bothwell, Drummond, English, \textit{Canada}, 240.
\textsuperscript{147} Hellyer, \textit{Torpedoes}, 22.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
it called for a great deal of organizing and careful handling if approval of ill-
considered or silly resolutions was to be avoided.\textsuperscript{149}

The Rally was a big success, primarily because it helped achieve a new sense of unity
within the Liberal Party. The party had met defeat twice already under Lester B. Pearson,
but he gained renewed support at the rally, and went on to victory in the 1963 federal
election.\textsuperscript{150} The 1961 National Rally of the Liberal Party marks an important step in
public consultation and participatory politics. It shows that Paul Hellyer was not afraid to
shake things up and promote public engagement, which establishes a precedent for his
later work with the Task Force on Housing and Urban Development. Another essential
event in Hellyer’s political repertoire to discuss is the work he did with the unification of
the armed forces.

Paul Hellyer’s involvement in the unification of the armed forces illustrates the
organizational methods he followed. This case, as with the Task Force that came a few
years later, reveals that Hellyer went into these projects with a strong idea of what he
thought was the right direction to take. The case of unification is representative of liberal
PD in that he was in a position of authority and made extensive consultations, but in the
end was prepared to make a strong stance on what he thought was right to do, even with
the consultations. However, it is also exemplary in some ways of deliberative PD because
he sometimes went against engrained policies of the government against the wishes of the

\textsuperscript{149} Walter Gordon, \textit{A Political Memoir}, (Toronto: M&S, 1977), 86-87. Walter
Gordon was the Minister of Finance in Lester B. Pearson’s Liberal government, from
1963-1965. Hellyer also recalls how Gordon sent him a congratulatory letter following
the convention. See: Hellyer, \textit{Torpedoes}, 22-23.

\textsuperscript{150} Hellyer, \textit{Torpedoes}, 22. Hellyer writes that many Liberals had considered
dumping Pearson before the Rally. Former Prime Minister Louis St. Laurant praised
Pearson at the conference and Pearson received a six-minute standing ovation following
his closing speech.
established authority and in alignment with perspectives he picked up through consultations. Therefore, I categorize his concept of PD as liberal/deliberative PD.

As Minister of Defense in Pearson’s Liberal minority government from April 1963-September 1967, Paul Hellyer was directly involved in the growing concerns over Canada’s foreign policy relationships seen in the 1960s. Hellyer had a strong background as a critic of defense policy and his own history of involvement in both the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and the Canadian Army, in which he served during the Second World War. Hellyer’s experience in 1962 talking with General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, also influenced his approach. At the time, Canada’s reluctance to be involved with nuclear weapons contradicted NATO objectives. Bothwell, Drummond, and English write that when Hellyer “assumed office in 1963 [he was] a staunch supporter of the American and NATO alliances, of nuclear weapons for Canada, and of modernization of the Canadian armed forces.” He also had a vision for how to modernize the armed forces and a plan for how to do this while maintaining a strong foreign policy, independent of American influences. In 1964, in the White Paper on Defense, Hellyer proposed that the unification of the armed forces in Canada (Army, Navy, and Air Force) would modernize the Canadian armed forces and

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151 Hellyer was named to the Defense portfolio following the 1963 federal election. See: Ibid., 27.
152 Hellyer writes how a defense policy that called for large numbers of air force recruits was reversed and masses of recruited men sat stagnate at home. At the same time, the Canadian Army was desperate for recruits; Hellyer joined as soon as his RCAF discharge went through. Hellyer, *Torpedoes*, 3-4.
153 Ibid., 25.
strengthen an independently oriented Canadian foreign policy, resulting in a lessening of Canada’s dependence on the American armed forces. The first stage of unification progressed quickly with the headquarters of the Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Navy, and the Royal Canadian Air Force merging in March 1964.\(^{155}\)

While Hellyer had the support of Prime Minister Pearson, some of the greatest opposition to unification came from admirals and generals of the various service branches.\(^{156}\) In particular, the admirals of the Royal Canadian Navy displayed the least amount of support for unification, to such an extent that legal action was nearly sought against them.\(^{157}\) The primary example of strong opposition to unification involved Rear-Admiral William Landymore, Chief of the Integrated Atlantic Command and Commander of the Atlantic fleet. Landymore held a public conference in July 1966 criticizing the government’s plan to unify the armed forces.\(^{158}\) When he was fired by Hellyer for his outspoken opposition, which disregarded federal policies against public opposition while in office, Landymore attracted even more media coverage. Along with Landymore, a group of his supporters resigned because they did not support unification.\(^{159}\) One of Hellyer’s main concerns over Landymore was that his opposition

\(^{155}\) Ken Kelly, “Unification’s Final Stage Sparks Dispute,” \textit{Ottawa Citizen}, July 20, 1966, 37


\(^{157}\) English discusses the “huge controversy” Hellyer created when he unified Canada’s armed forces; however, the controversy seemed worse than it was because of outdated policy, a small group of very vocal opponents, and the extensive coverage unification received in the press. See: English, \textit{Just Watch Me}, vol. 2, 12.

\(^{158}\) Hellyer, \textit{Torpedoes}, 164.

\(^{159}\) This included: Rear Admiral M. C. Stirling, deputy commander, maritime command, and Rear-Admiral R. P. Welland, deputy chief of operations, Rear-Admiral R. C. Birchall, deputy chief of technical services, and Vice-Admiral Kenneth Dryer, chief of
would inspire others; his concerns were justified, and he faced more opposition, particularly amongst retired officers, as he tried to wrap up the unification process.\(^{160}\)

While the process towards unification certainly lacked no drama, armed forces unification was finally approved on April 25, 1967, on schedule for Hellyer’s timeline.\(^{161}\)

One of the main opposing views to unification was related to sentimentality and a general resistance to change. It could be argued that the various military officials who opposed the change did so for sentimental rather than rational reasons. There is support for this argument in Hellyer’s archived complaint letter files and even letters to the editor, which reveal that many angry veterans were offended by the unification. Such letters typically revolve around the pride servicemen had with their various branches of the armed forces, and how they would lose this pride with unification.\(^{162}\) For example, Marjorie Reigh, who identifies herself as part of a group of “grannies with a flock of stalwart grandchildren,” wrote a very critical letter to Hellyer about unification prior to the Liberal leadership race. Marjorie wrote: “Though tall in stature, you will be short on the thousands of votes from Service men and women who resented – and still do, being personnel. See; Gregg Connolly, “Hellyer Order After Admirals Revolt: ‘Full Speed Ahead,’” *Ottawa Citizen*, July 20, 1966, 37.

\(^{160}\) Hellyer, *Topedoes*, 175.


\(^{162}\) Ottawa Citizen, “The Integration Argument: Mr. Hellyer is Criticized,” Letters to the Editor, *Ottawa Citizen*, July 20, 1966, 6. To point out the division of support over the issue, an editorial on the same page as the letters to the editor was highly supportive of Hellyer. It points out that Hellyer’s 1964 White Paper on Defense laid out the structure of unification and that “the naval officers who have been arguing that the unification plan is too sudden and too loosely thought out have not been very convincing, since unification has been discussed for more than two years.” See: Ottawa Citizen, “Armed Forced Unification,” Editorial, *Ottawa Citizen*, July 20, 1966, 6.
lumped arbitrarily into one fighting (or defense) Force with a common uniform despite
their association with Navy, Army, or Air Force.”¹⁶³ These complaints did not deal with
the actual reasons for unification, such as the modernization of Canada’s armed forces
and the potential increase in productivity.

While few complainants addressed the policy advantages of unification, this by
itself does not necessarily justify Hellyer’s decision to move forward with unification
against their opposition. Thus, it is critical to point out the many decisions Hellyer had to
make and to note that he did in fact appreciate the sentimentality of the army, navy, and
air force. For example, Hellyer discusses in his memoir the difficulty he had assessing
how best to streamline the reserves and decide which units to cut and which to keep.¹⁶⁴
The difficulty in this decision-making process partly came from Hellyer’s appreciation of
the history many reserve regiments possessed and their inherent value to Canadians.¹⁶⁵

Furthermore, in the controversy over Rear-Admiral Landymore, Hellyer decided not to

¹⁶³ LAC, MG32 B33 216-5, “Letter from Marjorie C. Reigh to Mr. Hellyer,”
March 1, 1968.

¹⁶⁴ Hellyer records the reserve cuts as follows: “the militia would be cut from
51,000 to approximately 30,000; the RCN reserve strength would be reduced from 4,000
to 2,700; and the RCAF part-time flyers would be pruned even more drastically, from
2,200 to 800.” Hellyer points out, however, that these cuts were not the direct result of his
defense policy; “the reductions were simply part of a long list of cost-saving measures
proposed by the Chiefs of Staff in the face of a drastic curtailment of defense
expenditures, ordered by Finance Minister Walter Gordon with the full backing of the

¹⁶⁵ A particularly difficult example Hellyer provides concerned the Toronto-based
Irish Regiment of Canada which had a broad support base and a deep history in the
city. Unfortunately, this reserve regiment was last on a list that the Department of
Defense developed to rank the regiments; the decision to decommission the Irish was
strictly according to the protocol set out beforehand. Hellyer points out that the
committee held at least 22 meetings of three hours duration trying to make the decisions
about the reserve cuts and that it was no easy task as famous regiments from all major
cities in Canada were cut. In the end, to make as many happy as possible and preserve
history, a reserve regiment based out of Sudbury was renamed the Second Battalion, Irish
Regiment of Canada (Sudbury). See: Ibid., 102-105.
pursue legal action. According to Hellyer, because of Landymore’s “long and distinguished service” in the navy, he fired him to avoid a court-martial.166 While the court-martial was something all wanted to avoid, Landymore was a popular figure in the navy; a court-martial of Landymore would have drawn negative attention to unification and the loss of tradition that many people were concerned about. In a way, Hellyer preserved both their reputations by not choosing to court-martial. Therefore, the example of unification also serves the purpose of illuminating the way Paul Hellyer worked and offers insight into how he may have approached his leadership of the Task Force on Housing and Urban Development. Had Hellyer readily ignored the perspective of the service branches in the armed forces unification process, then his conduct of the Task Force several years later could also have disregarded important perspectives.167

Having briefly looked at Hellyer’s political background leading up to the Task Force, it comes as no surprise that he conducted the Task Force the way he did. Just as Hellyer used his personal experiences in the air force and army as a preliminary basis for his campaign for armed forces unification, Hellyer’s interest in housing policy stemmed from personal housing-related experiences. In the fall of 1945, after Hellyer was discharged from the Canadian Army and moved to Toronto with his new bride, Ellen, to pursue further education at the University of Toronto. In his memoirs, he recalls that

167 Even if Hellyer had ignored the sentimentality of unification, the unification of the armed forces could not necessarily be viewed as a bad policy decision from that perspective alone as the whole point of unification was to modernize the forces and reduce inefficiency; this is not acknowledged by those that criticize it on the grounds of sentimentality.
“affordable housing was virtually non-existent” at this time in the city. As discussed in the housing chapter above, Hellyer points out the difficulty veterans had finding appropriate accommodations at the end of the Second World War. The state of housing in Toronto left its mark on Hellyer and inspired him to try to do something about the issue. Hellyer writes: “as Ellen and I had discovered, the early post-war housing shortage was desperate”; his motivation to pursue elected office as a Member of Parliament was directly tied to the two issues he considered his primary concerns – housing and the economy. Interestingly, Hellyer’s decision to lead the Task Force across the country is similar to his very first election campaign in 1949. His victory in the historically conservative Davenport riding saw him conduct extensive door-to-door canvassing and included a strong emotional appeal letter – from the perspective of his daughter – on the issue of adequate housing for families. Hellyer’s interest in housing later manifested itself in his involvement with a housing company, Curran Hall Limited. Hellyer began as an investor who made the mistake of investing in a failing business; when he stepped down from his position as President of Curran Hall at the end of 1962, he left behind a successful and award-winning housing company. Hellyer developed a perspective on housing in these years that later influenced the Task Force; this is seen in the continued promotion of single-family homes and a call for more inventive housing designs.

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169 Ibid., 5.
170 Ibid., 6-7.
Conclusion

The PD moment had roots in the early post war years and developed in various shapes and forms until August 1962 when the Students for a Democratic Society published *The Port Huron Statement*, the manifesto of the New Left student movement. Tillotson introduces an early example of PD in the Ontario recreation movement, a bottom-up movement seeking to employ liberal democratic values for the betterment of local communities. Seen through the writing of Jason Vick and Carole Pateman, PD is identified as a democratic practice that appreciates the value of the individual and promotes egalitarianism, democratic participation, and increased community development through changes to the power structure.

I propose a four-part breakdown of PD sub-types. This includes: liberal, deliberative, radical, and revolutionary PD. The development of community engagement techniques, exemplified in the case of Saul Alinsky’s radical/revolutionary PD and Jean Legassé’s strong-liberal/deliberative PD, reveal some of the inspiration for the later student-based community development initiatives of the 1960s and the growth of PD. Both these community developers sought to empower individuals, to bring them together and give them the power to act for what they wanted – Alinsky promoted antagonistic action against authority, while Legassé promoted action through the utilization and development of existing processes and coordination with authority.

The defining document of the PD moment, *The Port Huron Statement* exemplifies the development of theory inspired by the post war years. The radical PD of the *Statement* was a reaction against the Cold War, the bureaucratization of the university
system, and a challenge to governments to address the needs of their citizens. It called for increased citizen participation in everything from community life to the wider economic sphere, essentially giving each and every citizen a larger role in society – the introduction of a participatory aspect of society to supplement representative democratic institutions.

In the 1960s the Canadian federal government invested in strong-liberal PD initiatives through its use of royal commissions and task forces. Two defining examples are the Royal Commissions on Biculturalism and Bilingualism (RCBB) and on the Status of Women (RCSW), both of which were launched by Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson. Both royal commissions launched extensive countrywide hearings that engaged the citizens of the country in an effort to draw representative conclusions.

This study of PD and its manifestation in Canada informs the campaign and eventual government of Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Trudeau’s success in the 1968 Liberal leadership race generated popularity that he capitalized on in the following federal election campaign, where the Liberals won a majority government. Trudeau’s goofy antics, relationship with the media, and calls for a Just Society and increased citizen participation proved effective. As Litt identifies, the Trudeaumania of his election campaign was a simulated political experience designed to result in an election win. His dedication to PD is tested with the example of the Task Force on Housing and Urban Development. Trudeau’s failure to support the Report indicates his personal political agendas may have held priority over other initiatives. Therefore, electoral/strong-liberal PD can be attributed to Trudeau.

Through his innovative direction of the 1961 Liberal Rally, the process of the unification of the armed forces and his experience and interest in housing issues in
Canada, Paul Hellyer’s politics align with the liberal/deliberative PD sub-type. Hellyer displays a very different approach to politics than Pierre Elliott Trudeau. His career displays as much commitment to methods of PD as Trudeau’s does, though he didn’t discuss PD like Trudeau did. It is no surprise that they opposed each other in the 1968 Liberal leadership race; nor is it a surprise that Hellyer resigned from his position as the Minister of Transport over the lackluster reception of the Task Force Report.
Chapter 4: The Task Force Report – Consensus in the Task Force Report

We have come here to get ideas from the people, and once we have them we will study their practicality … it’s not our plan to go into a city and make recommendations. These must come from the people.¹

– Paul Hellyer, October 1968

The quotation above, an illustrative example of Hellyer’s portrayal of the Task Force, is from a *Globe and Mail* article by Scott Young, who argued Hellyer’s Task Force was insincere in their country-wide consultative processes. For Young, Hellyer’s initiative in participatory democracy was a sham. On participatory democracy, Young wrote: “that this is an outdated concept and impossible in modern government has not yet invalidated the illusion, and one can understand why the Liberals cling to it: it is a good gag.”² This chapter and the following one compares submissions made to the Task Force with the conclusions of the final Report to identify aspects of consensus and tension between them and provide a greater understanding of the Task Force as an exercise in liberal/deliberative participatory democracy.

This analysis studies consensus and tension in the Report to weigh the influence of the submissions on the final recommendations the Task Force made. The way the Report aligns with the consensus and tension of the submissions positions the Report in different variations of PD. My final conclusion, that the Report reflects liberal/deliberative PD, takes into consideration the Report as a whole and the different elements of liberal, deliberative, and radical PD that it is composed of. The liberal/deliberative label signifies that it is more liberal than deliberative PD, but that it

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¹ Scott Young, “The Question In This Game Is: Do the Answers Score Any Points?” *Globe and Mail*, October 7, 1968, 7.
² Ibid.
still reflects the deliberative PD sub-type. The Task Force took an authoritative role through its deliberations, bringing some pre-conceived biases to the table that went unchanged. This includes their opposition to multi-unit housing and their promotion of the home building industry in regards to financing, land, and construction recommendations. While the consultation process of the Task Force, and most of its recommendations, is representative of liberal PD, some instances of deliberative PD reflect a higher level of public input into the Task Force recommendations. This includes some regionally specific recommendations relevant to Winnipeg. In these two chapters, I take the final steps in analyzing the place of the Task Force in the history of Canadian housing policy and the role of participatory democracy in its work.

Introduction to Sources and Consensus

This chapter identifies key recommendations in the Report that echo points of consensus within the material presented to the Task Force in the Toronto and Winnipeg hearings. It is important to point out that the Task Force received a large volume of materials, and that even the submissions from Toronto and Winnipeg, the focus of my analysis, cannot be discussed in full. I have chosen to refer repeatedly to a selection of submissions in this chapter and the next. These sources represent a variety of positions taken in the dozens, and perhaps hundreds, of different submissions that reflect similar points of view. Therefore, this analysis provides a variety of sources, yet utilizes some sources multiple times for the sake of recognition. The Task Force submissions I selected for use in this
thesis give a sample range of various sectors of Canadian society and have been organized into five sections: Administrative, Construction and Planning, Financial, Real Estate, and Social Groups.

The Administrative sector includes local level submissions from Winnipeg and Toronto. The Manitoba Metis Federation represents the regional level of administrative submissions. Other organizations, such as the National Research Council of Canada and the Department of Indian Affairs round out the national level perspective. The Construction and Planning sector includes architectural firms from both Toronto and Winnipeg. Kennedy, Li, Simonsen, Smith Architects Consortium of Winnipeg make a regional-specific recommendation for the creation of transitional housing for the Aboriginal population migrating from rural reserves to urban centers like Winnipeg. Greenwin Construction of Toronto makes a strong case for the development of condominium housing in Toronto in order to maximize land use. Alcan Design Homes provide a general submission promoting the home building industry. The Financial sector includes an insightful submission from Victoria and Grey Trust Company of Toronto, which reveals the complicated relationship between big banking institutions and smaller organizations with specialized markets. The Real Estate sector, which includes the Galt-Preston Real Estate Board and the Society of Real Estate Appraisers, calls for greater representation in the planning of housing affairs in Canada. Finally, the Social Groups sector includes submissions from various organizations. The United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE) present a lengthy and detailed submission to the Task Force. The UE, a left wing labour organization, was founded in 1936 in the United States and 1937 in Canada. As a result of its affiliations with the Communist Party, it faced
difficulties in both countries in the 1940s and 1950s but maintained large membership through the 1960s and 70s. In their own words, the UE was “an industrial union that represents the bulk of the organized workers in the electrical manufacturing industry in Canada,” including Canadian General Electric and Canadian Westinghouse. A submission from the Trefann Court Residents Association reflects the perspective of a well-known and successful resistance to a municipal urban renewal scheme.

In addition to the Task Force submission archival material, I also consult two key reviews of the Report. These include a two-part review by Albert Rose that appeared in the February 4 and 5, 1969 editions of the Globe and Mail and a review by J. B. Milner from the summer 1969 edition of the University of Toronto Law Journal. Because these reviews were both critical of the Report, they are useful tools to help determine positions of consensus in the Report. Places where Rose and Milner agree with the Task Force reflect true areas of consensus where the views of the Report and the Task Force submissions align.

Albert Rose was a vocal social housing advocate and Professor of Social Work at the University of Toronto. Rose was part of the Citizens’ Housing and Planning Association that prompted the city to undertake the development of the Regent Park public housing complex in the late 1940s and he led a special committee on housing that

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reported to the city in 1966.\textsuperscript{5} He also regularly appeared in the \textit{Globe and Mail} as consultant on housing matters and was portrayed in a very positive manner by this newspaper in various articles and editorials.\textsuperscript{6} Furthermore, Rose submitted a brief to the Task Force and presented it at their Toronto hearing.\textsuperscript{7} He opposed the Task Force in \textit{Globe and Mail} articles after the release of the \textit{Report} and long after Hellyer’s resignation. Rose’s conflict with Hellyer and the Task Force is seen in the Toronto Task Force hearings. After reporting Rose’s condemnation of the government’s promotion of single-family homes and his arguments for multi-unit housing, Task Force minutes reveal that, “under questioning by Mr. Hellyer, Dr. Rose admitted that he himself lives in a single-family dwelling and that he preferred it.”\textsuperscript{8} Rose claimed presenters to the Task Force were poorly treated and perhaps it was his own experience that fueled this observation. Nonetheless, the treatment of Rose by the Task Force, and Hellyer, calls into question the transparency of the Task Force and leads to questions of how their biases and pre-conceived notions and agendas influenced the final \textit{Report}.

J. B. Milner was a Professor of Law at the University of Toronto and an expert in town planning and the legal issues surrounding it, such as zoning bylaws. Milner wrote a

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book on community planning in Canada, called, *Community Planning: A Casebook on Law and Administration* (1963); he also chaired a committee of architects and town planners in 1963 that studied “zoning bylaws to determine their effect on Canadian development.”9 Milner was the President of the Town Planning Institute of Canada (1965-1966) and the chair of the Centre for Urban Studies at the University of Toronto (1966).10

A complete list of the Task Force submissions I consulted in Chapters Four and Five appears in the Appendix to this thesis. The recommendations of the Report are grouped into seven sections. I present my material and arguments in Chapters Four and Five in the same order as these topics appear in the Report.

**Introduction to the Task Force**

The Task Force was led by Paul Hellyer, Minister of Transport, and Minister responsible for housing, and consisted of six other members from various backgrounds of academic and professional experience. The Task Force included: Dr. Doris Boyle, a professor of economics at Xavier College in Sydney, NS; W. Peter Carter, a mortgage controller of the Royal Bank of Canada and member of the Mortgage Advisory Board to the Ontario Government; Dr. Pierre Dansereau, an ecologist with teaching experience at universities

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10 York University, Clara Thomas Archives, inventory of the James B. Milner fonds, F0357, “Biographical Sketch,” last revision December 12, 2003, 2.
across the world; Robert Campeau, “the President of Campeau Corporation Limited, a major Ottawa construction-development firm”; Dr. James Gillies, an economist and Dean of the Faculty of Administrative Studies at York University; C. E. Pratt, Fellow of the Royal Architectural Institute of Canada.  

The members of the task force seem to have been chosen for representative expertise, not regional diversity. Hellyer, Campeau, and Gillies hailed from southern Ontario, and Carter and Dansereau were from Montreal. Boyle was originally from Baltimore, MD, but was living in Sydney, NS at the time of the Task Force. Lastly, Pratt was from Vancouver. While the backgrounds of the members were generally related to housing and its associated fields, such as finance, the selection of members highlights a clear central-Canadian bias. With token eastern and western Canadian participants, the prairie provinces and the northern territories were left unrepresented.

What it lacked in regional representation amongst its members, the Task Force made up for in the places it visited. Between September 16 and December 3, 1968, the Task Force managed to visit all major urban centres in Canada, including two visits to Toronto and Ottawa.

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11 Hellyer, Report, 78-79.
Financing

The Task Force Report begins with a discussion of financing recommendations, many of which closely reflect a consensus among Task Force intervenors and contributors. These include their recommendations to encourage Canadian lending institutions to invest in the residential mortgage market, a call for the federal government to amend mortgage guidelines to make mortgages a more attractive investment, and proposals to increase the NHA mortgage loan ceiling. This set of recommendations, which sought to make it easier for financial institutions to grant mortgages and to make mortgages more affordable, generally satisfied the needs of both mortgagors and mortgagees.

As discussed in Chapter Two, the Canadian mortgage market changed several times in the post-war period. A notable example of changes was the role of banks in the mortgage market, which entered, exited, and then entered the market again in the period. A submission from the Victoria and Grey Trust Company discusses how the re-introduction of banks into the mortgage market affected other mortgage-lending organizations. A letter was sent by R. R. Merifield, Vice President and General Manager of the Victoria and Grey Trust Company, to Paul Hellyer, in response to a series of meetings Hellyer held in July 1968 “with senior officers of the chartered banks and trust, loan, and insurance companies active in the housing field.”

12 The purpose of these meetings was to increase the flow of mortgage funds for single-family dwellings throughout Canada. Merifield’s letter specifically points out the negative effect of the

1967 Bank Act on trust companies.\textsuperscript{13} For instance, Merifield stated on behalf of his company:

We could obtain substantially more savings funds and in turn generate more mortgage funds were it not for the banks. The banks, having secured under the new Bank Act, the greatest possible freedom of operation … have proceeded relentlessly to siphon off all available funds to such an extent that the existence of many savings, loan and mortgage businesses are in jeopardy.\textsuperscript{14}

Merifield’s first suggestion to Hellyer was to limit banks in the mortgage market, potentially by limiting their interest rates. However, a subsequent recommendation provided another way to ensure security for loan companies – by changing restrictions on their maximum asset liquidity to allow trust companies to invest larger sums into the mortgage market.\textsuperscript{15} Showing consensus with Merifield’s second recommendation above, the Report argues that “trust and loan companies might respond more effectively to mortgage requirements if they were permitted to increase their borrowing rates.”\textsuperscript{16} While the Report does not seek to limit banks as Merifield did, on January 30, 1969, the Globe and Mail quoted Hellyer saying “Perhaps the banks should stop their promotions of ‘red convertible’ loans encouraging people to go into debt and make up their minds to use the money for mortgages instead.”\textsuperscript{17}

In addition to the Victoria and Grey Trust Company’s suggestions, many submissions indicated that Canadian lending organizations, other than banks, needed to give greater consideration to investing in the mortgage market. A submission from the

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 3-4.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 5-6.
\textsuperscript{16} Hellyer, Report, 26.
\textsuperscript{17} Ottawa Bureau, “Hellyer to Discuss Report Informally With Provinces,” Globe and Mail, January 30, 1969, 9.
Toronto branch of the Society of Real Estate Appraisers points out the need for lending institutions in Canada to reconsider mortgages as an important source of investment.\textsuperscript{18} They claim that insufficient mortgage funds limited the building of single-family dwellings in Canada. Another proposal, this one from the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE), suggested that provincial governments amend their pension fund acts so that workers’ pension funds could be directed towards investment in their members’ home mortgages.\textsuperscript{19} This approach to the use of pension funds in the mortgage market is common in Task Force submissions. A similar proposal from the Manitoba Association of Social Workers takes a more interventionist approach and calls for the federal government to “consider law requiring pension funds and such corporations as insurance companies to put some percentage of their funds into low-cost housing.”\textsuperscript{20}

The \textit{Report} specifically addresses the issues brought up by Merifield and the other submissions. It realized that there were “some legal impediments in the way” of private lending institutions increasing their investments in the mortgage market, and urged provincial and federal governments “wherever and whenever possible to remove such impediments.”\textsuperscript{21} The Task Force also recognized the potential financial power of Canada’s pension funds, calling them “one of the nation’s largest sources of savings

dollars.”\(^{22}\) In accordance with the UE’s suggestion, the Task Force recommended, “to enlist the participation of Canada’s rapidly growing pension funds in the field of residential mortgage financing.”\(^{23}\) They pointed out that pension funds had only nine per cent of their funds allocated to mortgages in 1967 and urged pension funds to diversify their investments by expanding their mortgage holdings. They also made note of legislation that impeded pension fund investment in residential mortgages and called for the removal of these laws in order to help alleviate the housing crisis in Canada.\(^{24}\) It is important to note that the Report’s stance on pension fund regulation was much more conservative than the Manitoba Association of Social Workers’. However, Hellyer’s strong stance in the recommendations made in relation to pension and trust funds showed following the release of the Report. A January 30, 1969 news story states, “Mr. Hellyer expressed optimism that private lending institutions, such as pension funds and insurance companies, will pour more money into the mortgage field.”\(^{25}\) In other words, the Task Force was confident changes to the mortgage market could be made without legislating pension funds to increase their mortgage portfolios.

Proposals had been made at the December 1967 Federal-Provincial housing conference to allow mortgages to be re-negotiated every few years. Ontario’s Minister of Economics and Development, Stanley Randall, argued that this would draw lenders into the mortgage market.\(^{26}\) At the time, long-term mortgages were locked in at the interest rate they were signed at. By re-negotiating every few years, the promise of changing

\(^{22}\) Ibid., 25.  
\(^{23}\) Ibid., 26.  
\(^{24}\) Ibid., 26.  
interest rates could attract more investors to the market. The Galt-Preston-Hespeler Real Estate Board identified the lengthening of the amortization period of mortgages “as a means of lessening the burden on homeowners” and making mortgages more accessible to Canadians.²⁷ The Task Force took up these lines of reasoning in their Report in several mortgage recommendations. They proposed that NHA mortgages be made more flexible by shortening the mortgage term to five years. In part, this was meant to make mortgages more appealing to trust and loan companies, which preferred shorter-term loans. The Report also proposed the introduction of long-term mortgages with variable interest rates and lengthening the amortization period of mortgages in order to reduce the monthly expenditures of prospective homeowners.²⁸ This recommendation had been made as early as 1935.²⁹ These recommendations were integral to the Report and were promoted by Hellyer at the National House Builders Convention that was held in February 1969 after the release of the Report.³⁰ Furthermore, a successful result of the Report was the amendment of NHA mortgage interest rates to five year fixed terms – this change came with new NHA amendments made later in 1969, after Hellyer had resigned from Cabinet.³¹

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²⁸ Hellyer, Report, 30-32.
³¹ Canadian Press, “NHA Mortgages Get New Look,” Ottawa Citizen, April 24, 1969, 8. This is discussed in the concluding chapter of the thesis.
Another financing recommendation made by the Task Force entailed a substantial increase in the NHA maximum loan ceiling. The submission from the UE drew attention to the maximum NHA mortgage allotments and argued that they were unfavourable and restrictive to prospective homeowners. Citing the president of the Toronto Real Estate Board, who in January 1968 said that no homes were being built in Toronto for under $30,000, the UE pointed out that the then current NHA mortgage ceiling on the construction of new homes was only $18,000. The discrepancy between the amount of available NHA funding and the cost of available housing in Toronto was an important factor in the growing mortgage needs of prospective homeowners. Where funding levels failed to adequately cover homebuilding costs, further sources of debt, like secondary mortgages, were necessary and ultimately limited who was able to purchase or build new homes. Thus, the UE called for a substantial raise in NHA mortgage maximums.

The Task Force recognized the difficulty many Canadians faced procuring mortgages through the NHA. The Report parallels the suggestion of the UE, writing,

In some centres visited by the Task Force – Toronto and Thompson are two diverse examples – this maximum is patently unrealistic even where incomes are high enough to meet the normal mortgage requirements. In these markets, basic single-family dwellings are selling for $25,000 and up, leaving the purchaser under the present NHA maximum to raise $7,000 by way of downpayment or to undergo the high-interest cost of secondary financing.

The Report calls for the increase of NHA loans to the “$30,000 range” to address the difficulties many faced securing funding.

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32 Hellyer, Report, 32.
33 “Submission to the Task Force,” UER & MWA, 7.
This recommendation was challenged in several ways. In his critical review of the Task Force Report J. B. Milner wrote that this recommendation did nothing to alleviate housing conditions for low-income Canadians. He argued that, at best, it only provided for a trickle-down process in which lower-income Canadians would be forced to purchase older housing. He complained, “no explanation whatever is offered” by the Task Force as to their reasoning.\(^35\) However, it is important to point out that the Report did not pretend to attempt to provide brand new housing for all Canadians or even all low-income Canadians. It calls for a massive increase in housing stock over a five-year period and establishes that Canadians have a basic human right “to clean, warm shelter.”\(^36\) In addition, the Report is based on the inter-relations of all the recommendations it makes; therefore, individual recommendations have to be taken in the overall context. For instance, this includes recommendations to increase public housing, encourage renewal rather than the destruction of old housing, make more money available for Canadians from both public and private sources, and make land more affordable through land assembly programs. In response to similar concerns as those raised by Milner, the Report claimed that the proposed increase in NHA mortgage allowances did not “subsidize the rich at the expense of the poor” because NHA loans were inherently not subsidies – the NHA simply provides the mortgage-lender with insurance, for which the borrower pays the government a two per cent fee.\(^37\) They also countered an argument that higher NHA


\(^{36}\) Hellyer, Report, 22.

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 31. The Galt-Preston-Hespeler Real Estate Board called for the removal of the 2 per cent insurance fee on NHA loans, though the Task Force did not address this in the Report. However, removal of this fee makes no sense, as the insurance is what allows for lower interest rates on mortgages and the granting of the mortgage itself in...
loans would result in more large loans for large homes and take funds away from those who needed it most. Instead, the *Report* argued, “the prime impact of a higher ceiling should be to reduce mortgage costs by eliminating in most cases the need for second mortgages.”

**Land Cost and Utilization**

The cost of serviced land in Canada was one of the biggest issues the Task Force addressed in the *Report*. The price of serviced lots increased dramatically in Canada between 1951 and 1968 – according to the Task Force, this amounted to nearly a 240 per cent increase. To address this issue, they drafted a set of land-related proposals, including the creation of a municipal land assembly that is a cornerstone of the *Report*. For example, the introduction of the Urban Development section of the *Report* states, “in stating its recommendations in regard to the assembly and servicing of land, the Task Force attempted to make clear its view that urban planning and development are dependent on control of the land itself.” Thus, the proposals made by the Task Force regarding Land Cost and Utilization were integral to the *Report* and the overall changes they sought to promote in Canada. The Task Force recommendations that exhibit consensus include their calls for an end to land speculation in Canada, the creation of

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situations where the borrower is limited in the size of their down payment. See: “Brief to the Hon. Paul Hellyer,” GPH Real Estate Board Inc., 5.

39 Ibid., 37.
40 Ibid., 62.
municipal land assemblies, and the reform of education taxes by placing a greater portion of public education costs under provincial, rather than municipal, responsibility.

The Task Force begins its land recommendations with the identification of land speculation in Canada as a leading cause in the dramatic growth of land values. Land speculation involves both the purchase and under-use of land over a period of time. As the value of the land increases from the influence of communities growing around it, the owner can then sell the land at greatly inflated prices. The Galt-Preston-Hespeler Real Estate Board wrote they “abhor growing evidence of speculation on the part of large land holders,” and called on the federal government to take remedial action to curb such practices.41 A similar suggestion came from the Kensington Area Residents’ Association, which identified land speculation as a major factor in the rising cost of land in Canada, and went on to accuse provinces of encouraging these practices.42 James Gillies of the Task Force called for the immediate implementation of a transfer tax on undeveloped land being sold through speculation practices.43 The Task Force “believes undue speculation has contributed both to rising land costs and uneconomic and wasteful urban development patterns,” and recommends that “all profits from the sale of land should be treated as taxable income,” and that “property assessment procedures encourage and not discourage the use of land to its maximum planning potential.”44 The Task Force’s discussion of land speculation sets up its other land-related proposals.

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41 “Brief to the Hon. Paul Hellyer,” GPH Real Estate Board, 3.
44 Hellyer, Report, 39.
One of the major proposals made by the Task Force is their call for the creation of municipal land assemblies in order to better regulate the cost of serviced land in Canada. Hellyer had recommended land assembly as a way to reduce housing costs at the 1967 provincial housing conference. He also brought up the issue at the Ottawa Task Force hearings, where he asked the city why they bought and serviced industrial land to attract industry and business but would not consider doing the same thing for housing in order to lower housing construction costs.\(^4^5\) The Galt-Preston-Hespeler Real Estate Board brought up this issue in their submission. They argued: “the rising cost of serviced land is a major factor in the high price of housing in Canada.” They made the recommendation that federal, provincial and municipal governments should amend legislation “to permit municipal governments … to purchase, to service and provide land for residential purposes as they now can do in the case of industry.” They felt that amending legislation to give municipalities more control over land would also help to eliminate land speculation and allow prospective homeowners to acquire land at the lowest possible cost.\(^4^6\) This recommendation had been made as recently as November 1967, before the Federal-Provincial Conference on Housing, by Angus McClaskey, president of Don Mills Developments Ltd. He argued for municipal and federal governments to cooperate in the better use of land, including the revamping of land assembly policies, in November 1967.\(^4^7\)


\(^{46}\) “Brief to the Hon. Paul Hellyer,” GPH Real Estate Board, 3.

The Manitoba Association of Social Workers also supported the implementation of a land assembly program and mentioned it in their submission to the Task Force. The archival record shows that Hellyer underlined their short recommendation which read: “since land costs are a high proportion of housing costs it is essential that governments aim at acquiring large tracts for future housing purposes.” Even small recommendations like this one from the social work group, which gave no specific details or suggestions, were part of the consensus-building process. It was not only construction companies or groups that potentially had something to gain that made this recommendation. Hellyer’s underlining of this specific point is an indication of its importance and highlights its relation to the many other submissions calling for a land assembly program.

Finally, proposals from the UE and the Manitoba Urban Association discuss the implementation of a land assembly, but offer a radical perspective on the issue. The UE suggest the implementation of a nationalized land lease policy whereby municipalities would own residential land and lease it to prospective homeowners. They argue that the smaller taxes and lease payments made on leased land by the leaser would make a positive contribution towards minimizing homeowner indebtedness. The Manitoba Urban Association, which represented 72 Manitoban communities, argued that the creation of municipal land assemblies would be a beneficial way to attract industry to the many smaller rural towns scattered across the province. Communities that had difficulty keeping or attracting industry might be better equipped to compete with large urban

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centres like Winnipeg if they owned their land and could service and distribute it as needed.  

The consensus within the Task Force submissions resulted in the Report’s municipal land assembly recommendation, which read:

Municipalities or regional governments, as a matter of continuing policy, should acquire, service and sell all or a substantial portion of the land required for urban growth within their boundaries.

The federal government should make direct loans to municipalities or regional governments to assist them in assembling and servicing land for urban growth.  

It is interesting to note the distinction between the radical suggestion of the UE – to lease land to homeowners – and the recommendation of the Task Force, which is much less radical, and less socialist than the UE’s.

The Task Force gives two major examples in the Report to support its recommendation. The first involves the City of Saskatoon, which amassed a large collection of municipal land following the Great Depression and was able to successfully maintain a large bank of land, or land assembly. The second example involved a private development in Kanata launched by developer William Teron, who purchased 3000 acres of land to create a massive development. This allowed for greater savings in the long run as costs associated with servicing land, for example, are lower if done on a larger scale.  

In his review of the Report, Milner calls the land assembly recommendation “the closest thing to a fresh proposal,” and concludes that it is “a vitally important proposal.” He points out that this measure would bring big long-term advantages to municipalities

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51 Hellyer, Report, 43.
52 Ibid., 40-42.
because, “when urban renewal is necessary, the land does not have to be expropriated at
great cost.”53 This was explicitly seen in the Saskatoon case. Milner’s agreement, in
addition to the calls for ending land speculation, underscores the consensus on which the
Task Force recommendations in this area is based – as does his support for the final
recommendation on education.

In addition to the measures discussed above, the Task Force proposed changes to
municipal regulations and provincial funding structures in order to change the tax burden
on homeowners. These measures were proposed to aid in making serviced land more
affordable, the overall goal of the “Land Cost and Utilization” section of proposals. The
high cost of public education was an issue found in many Task Force submissions, such
as the brief from the Urban Development Institute – Ontario Division.54 The
acknowledgement of this issue in the Report exemplifies the deliberative participatory
democracy – though the recommendations made by the Task Force in this example justify
my categorization of the Task Force as a liberal/deliberative PD initiative.

The Toronto branch of the Society of Real Estate Appraisers discusses in their
submission to the Task Force how the high price of serviced land in most municipalities
could be lessened “by lifting the cost of Education from the Municipality and making it a
Provincial responsibility.”55 Similarly, the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg
called for the creation of a “national ‘foundation’ program for education under which
financing for education would be removed from the local level and given entirely to the

54 LAC, MG32-B33, vol. 198, file 6, “Brief to the Task Force on Housing and
Urban Development,” Urban Development Institute – Ontario Division, September 1968, 1.
provincial and Federal Governments.”56 The minutes from the Task Force hearing in Winnipeg reveal that this recommendation drew some questions from the Task Force. In response to these questions, the Metro presenters clarified their proposals. They confirmed that, “whilst it was proposed that education costs should be borne by the Federal and Provincial governments, it was not intended that the responsibility for education should be removed from the local level.” In regards to the source of federal funding for education, they “suggested that the concept of education should be similar to medicare where the costs were borne by the nation as a whole.”57 In a different vein, Alcan Design Homes Limited recommended:

Without in any way questioning fields of jurisdiction … low interest, long term loans should be available to municipalities for school building – without a strict tie in to municipal real estate assessment levels – and consideration should also be given to a running per capita assistance to all communities to apply to school operating costs, the money to come out of general tax funds.58

They believed that these provisions would aid in lowering the cost of the land and the burden of education on municipalities. The submissions to the Task Force reveal consensus among many different organizations in Toronto and Winnipeg over the necessity of changing how education was funded in Canada. This was just one way to help make housing more affordable to Canadians.

In the Report, the Task Force argues that provincial governments should be responsible for a larger share of education costs. Milner argues that the Task Force’s

education recommendations are unfounded. The Ontario Committee on Taxation, which
published a report in 1967, thought otherwise on increasing the provincial education
burden and Milner questions why “no attempt is made to discuss [this] earlier and more
elaborate Report” in the Task Force Report.\textsuperscript{59} Here Milner presents a strong argument
against the Task Force. The way they failed to engage with the Ontario Committee on
Taxation report may indicate a certain level of pre-determined positions or negligence on
the part of the Task Force to adequately research points of consensus that Task Force
submissions established. However, it is not surprising that a study funded by the Ontario
provincial government recommended that the Ontario provincial government not
shoulder more of the education burden. Their committee report may not be an unbiased
source by which to judge the Task Force education tax recommendation. With the
hindsight of history, my research reveals that many submissions identified education tax
reform as a priority. However Milner did not have the submissions of the Task Force at
his disposal to draw a line between the calls for action in the submissions and the positive
response in the Report.

It is also important to point out that the Task Force acknowledges the difficulty in
making changes in this policy area. For example, the Report points out that “several
municipalities indicated they would wish to retain at least a minority participation in
education financing in order to ensure a continuing role for local school boards in the
selection of sites and teachers and the like.”\textsuperscript{60} The Task Force recommendation, which
states, “provincial governments should assume a much larger share of education costs,”
does not make any specific proposals or argue for any radical changes to the financing of

\textsuperscript{59} Milner “Task Force,” 439.
\textsuperscript{60} Hellyer, Report, 46.
public education. Instead, it simply addresses an issue that was clearly important to Canadians and was brought to its attention through the consensus-building processes of the Task Force. In making this recommendation, the Task Force was not engaging in radical or revolutionary PD: the recommendation involves no big promises or radical propositions. Nor did the recommendation to adjust the burden of education funding represent deliberative PD, because the recommendation was open-ended. It simply left the decision open to further deliberation through the institutions of representative democracy.

Construction Costs and Techniques

The Task Force Report made seven recommendations in relation to construction costs and techniques. Some of these recommendations align closely with the submissions made to the Task Force. They include recommendations to reduce and remove federal and provincial building materials sales taxes, to research and to finance industrialized building, and to amend municipal by-laws and the NHA to better accommodate mobile homes.

The particular focus of this section is on the many calls for the abolition of the 11 per cent federal building materials sales tax and its provincial tax counterparts. The federal tax had existed in July 1963 when Walter Gordon’s budget imposed new taxes in

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61 Ibid.
an attempt to reduce the budget deficit.\textsuperscript{62} Proposals to abolish the tax were common in Task Force submissions and were also found in complaint letters from the public. Hellyer brought attention to the issue at the provincial housing conference held in December 1967, before he was Minister responsible for housing.\textsuperscript{63} The \textit{Report} addresses the consensus on the matter stating, “if there was a single theme encompassing virtually every submission received by the Task Force, it was a demand for the removal of federal and provincial sales taxes on building materials.”\textsuperscript{64} This issue was brought up by a wide variety of sources, including house building companies, unions, and individual citizens; however, the issue at hand was more complicated than many thought, and the building materials tax is a good example of the difficulty in assessing Task Force recommendations. While the Task Force identifies consensus within the submissions it received and acknowledges the validity of their concerns, this issue also reveals tensions between different departments of the federal government. I have included this topic in the consensus chapter because the Task Force clearly presents the consensus of the submissions to the \textit{Report} and was successful in obtaining this public perspective, even though the \textit{Report} was not successful in changing the tax.

The brief from the Urban Development Institute – Ontario Division recommends the removal of federal and provincial building materials sales taxes.\textsuperscript{65} The first recommendation made by Alcan Design Homes Limited called for the repeal or revision of the federal building materials sales tax in order to improve the supply of lower priced

\textsuperscript{62} Bothwell, Dummond, and English, \textit{Canada}, 303.
\textsuperscript{63} Globe and Mail, “Provinces Doubt Higher NHA Rate Will Help Attract More Private Funds Into Mortgages,” B6.
\textsuperscript{64} Hellyer, \textit{Report}, 47.
\textsuperscript{65} “Brief,” Urban Development Institute – Ontario Division, 2.
housing. They argue that because tax exemptions can be used to stimulate specific areas of the economy, the removal or exemption of the building material tax for less expensive housing could stimulate this type of construction.\textsuperscript{66} Another submission, from the H.O.P.E. (Housing Ontario People Economically) organization argues against the building materials tax. They state:

The imposition of a sales tax on any of the three basic requirements of human existence (food, shelter, clothing) at anytime is onerous. At a time when shelter is so urgently needed and costs are so high such impositions are untenable and unjustifiable.

This industry and just about every other authority on the subject including the Economic Council of Canada in its latest report have made unfavourable comment on the taxing of building materials as applied to those used in residential construction.\textsuperscript{67}

As an aside, their identification of the Economic Council of Canada’s recommendation is important to highlight because it shows how different organizations were interacting at the time. Specifically, it shows consensus on the building materials tax issue.

Finally, in a previously discussed submission, the UE state: “the 11 per cent federal sales tax on building materials should be repealed” as a way of passing savings on to housing consumers. They also claim that prospective homeowners are generally not aware of how much this tax actually adds to the costs of their homes.\textsuperscript{68} Also, many submissions give examples of the additional costs this tax created. The Task Force state that the federal and provincial taxes “can add up to $950 to the final price of a modest three-bedroom bungalow,” statistics that they likely borrowed from the HOPE submission, which based its assessment of fees on the cost of a $15,000 home.

\textsuperscript{66} “Brief to the Federal Task Force,” Alcan Design Homes, 1.
\textsuperscript{68} “Submission to the Task Force,” UER & MWA, 39-40.
Furthermore, another noteworthy point made by the HOPE submission is that the provincial sales tax is charged on the cost of the building materials and the cost of the federal tax together, meaning the provincial tax was a tax on a tax.\footnote{“H.O.P.E.,” H.O.P.E., 21.}

In addition to the submissions from various organizations and the proposals heard by the Task Force in their public hearings, individuals wrote in about the sales tax. For example, on May 3, 1968, Hellyer received a letter from Mr. A. B. Anderson of Sutton West, Ontario about the tax. Anderson questioned why there was a building tax and pointed out that “it cost[s] money to collect this tax.”\footnote{LAC, MG32-B33, vol. 171, file 5, Letter from A. B. Anderson to Paul Hellyer, May 8, 1968.} This letter came shortly after Hellyer became the minister in charge of housing, so Anderson’s participation in the housing discussion reveals that everyday Canadians cared enough about housing to contact the new minister in charge of housing and voice a recommendation – even before the Task Force was officially announced.\footnote{The Task Force was announced on July 7, 1968 and appointed on August 29, 1968. See Chapter Two of this thesis.}

The announcement of the Task Force also attracted more responses from the public. As discussed previously, the Task Force put ads out in newspapers across Canada calling for public participation, and these ads generated a fair number of responses. A letter from Jean Amen, of St. Jérôme, Quebec, in response to a Task Force ad in the August 20\textsuperscript{th}, 1968 edition of \textit{Le Devoir} also draws attention to the federal building materials sales tax. Amen, who had just gone through a difficult and unsuccessful process trying to get approval to build a home, questioned Hellyer on whether the “tax on building materials will be reduced or abolished” in the near future. The addition of the
building taxes onto the cost of the home he was trying to build contributed to his failure to secure financing through CMHC.  

The strong response to this tax, seen in individual and group submissions to the Task Force and in letters to Hellyer, should not have been a surprise to Hellyer, who faced public questions about the tax early in his time as the minister responsible for housing. For example, in an interview that appeared in the May 1968 issue of Building Management, Hellyer responded to a question on the building materials tax with the following indirect answer: “Well my colleague, the Minister of Finance, has dealt with this question on a number of occasions, and has indicated that relief would be provided at the opportune time. In the present circumstances I’m afraid there is little which I could add to this.” Hellyer’s response reveals the complexity of the issue at hand, because the federal building materials sales tax was set by the Department of Finance and was out of Hellyer’s jurisdiction as Minister of Transport. Milner highlighted this mandate issue in his review of the Report, where he pointed out that this proposal “may fall on deaf ears in the Treasury.” However, as we see in the final recommendations of the Task Force Report, the Task Force did attempt to address the issue because abolishing the building materials tax was a clear point of consensus.

The calls for the abolition of the tax left their mark on the Task Force, which recommended the eventual removal of the federal and provincial building materials sales taxes in the Report, beginning, if necessary, with a program targeted at certain levels of

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housing before progressing to the complete removal of the tax. Specifically, they recommended rebates on building materials taxes for houses costing $20,000 or less as a prudent starting point.\textsuperscript{75} This recommendation shows the usefulness of participatory democracy in finding consensus on a specific policy point; however, it also exemplifies the barriers to implementation that were presented by both inter-departmental and cross-jurisdictional relations. The Task Force acknowledged both consensus and the challenges of implementation. The \textit{Report} notes the impact on government revenues, and the likely increase in other taxes, such as income tax, that might follow the removal of building materials from the sales tax. The \textit{Report} also proposes that the tax has more of a psychological than monetary effect on Canadians, arguing “in the eyes of many Canadians, removal of the sales taxes appears to be virtually a matter of faith in the professed good intentions of their governments.”\textsuperscript{76} It goes on to point out the “severe financial strains facing the government at all levels,” the “more than $300 million a year in much-needed revenue” the tax provided, and the difficulty in arguing for the stabilization in overall government spending while at the same time removing an important income source.\textsuperscript{77} However strong the psychological effect, there was still a strong monetary effect from the tax, as pointed out by Milner, who concluded that “the taxing policy should certainly be reviewed.”\textsuperscript{78}

In all, the Task Force’s handling of the public demand to remove the federal and provincial building materials sales taxes is a clear compromise between the interests of the voting public and the federal government. Limiting the proposed rebate program to

\textsuperscript{75} Hellyer, \textit{Report}, 47.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} Milner “Task Force,” 439.
less-expensive housing is in line with the Task Force commitment to providing more affordable housing to lower-income groups. Furthermore, the lack of a solid commitment on the removal of the tax draws a line back to Hellyer’s interview with *Building Management* in May 1968, when he indicated the federal tax was not directly in his department’s area of authority. While this recommendation is a compromise, it is still a strong example of the Task Force Report’s success in responding to a consensus of opinion. This example illustrates liberal/deliberative PD because it makes clear the government has authority and that doing away with the tax could be unwise in the long run (liberal PD); it also acknowledges the consensus of the submissions (deliberative PD) and makes a compromise between the two.

In addition to the requests to abolish building materials sales taxes, the Task Force identifies the use and development of industrialized building techniques as a popular topic in submissions. Their response to this request again reveals the success of the Task Force as an exercise in participatory democracy. Several submissions identify the industrialization of building techniques as a housing priority in Canada. The Manitoba Association of Social Workers argues that some economies in Canada could be strengthened by the adoption of pre-fabricated building techniques. Specifically, they recommend the production of pre-fabricated systems that “would be capable of expansion or adaptation in accord with changing size and need of families.”

Mr. A. Kenneth Chipindale included the industrialization of building techniques in the late submission he sent to Hellyer on January 12, 1969. Chipindale called on the federal government to “encourage the use of rationalized systems of factory produced housing units to help

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reduce costs, and curb the tendency to bigger and more expensive houses.” Finally, the submission of the National Research Council of Canada, Division of Building Research, discusses how they undertook a study in Europe on the industrialization of residential building techniques and then publicized the results for the benefit of the Canadian building industry. This is evidence of growing interest in the development of new building techniques in Canada. The Task Force points out that “the modern builder working on a major scale already operates on a basis of ‘industrialization’ far greater than might be generally evident to the casual observer;” however, they address the widespread interest in industrialization of building techniques in their call for further research in the area and the implementation of pilot projects. In order for a recommendation like this to be radical PD, it would have had to propose the legislated adoption of industrialized building and increased funding to such programs. This recommendation is more liberal PD, in that a consensus was reached and a general, if moderate, concession to this consensus was granted.

Social Housing and Special Programs

The policy area that may have generated the most debate, both during the Task Force and following the release of the Report, was what the Report calls “Social Housing and

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82 Hellyer, Report, 49.
Special Programs.” Recommendations in this category are made in regards to public housing, the housing of low-income groups and minorities such as “Canada’s Indian, Eskimo and Metis peoples,” rural funding through CMHC, and the care and housing of the elderly. Several of these topics, and the tensions they exhibit between the Report, the submissions, and the response to the recommendations, are addressed in Chapter Five.

However, there were points of consensus in this area, too.

One of these points was the value of rental subsidies. Rental subsidy programs are a way to reduce the costs of housing for low-income families. They make an appearance in several Task Force submissions, such as the proposal from the City of Winnipeg.\textsuperscript{83} The City calls for

\begin{quote}
[t]he introduction of a system of rent supplements for families in the low-middle income category which would enable these families to secure for themselves a decent standard of living accommodation in the rental market. This would have the additional benefit of rendering more anonymous those families in receipt of public housing assistance.\textsuperscript{84}
\end{quote}

James Gillies of the Task Force also argued that income supplements for qualifying Canadians could be used to supplement public housing in Canada in a November 29, 1968 letter to Hellyer.\textsuperscript{85} Gillies makes his views heard in a letter where he responded to a confidential questionnaire sent by Hellyer. He writes,

\begin{quote}
Perhaps it ought to be policy that qualified public housing applicants have their incomes supplemented by the same amount as they would receive as a subsidy if, in fact, they were in a public housing project
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
In short, it may mean that we should move to a policy whereby we don’t build any more public housing units but supplement the income of qualified applicants so they can find housing in other areas.\(^{86}\)

He later points out that under this system, “anyone that qualifies is entitled to an equal amount of subsidy whether they can get in the public housing unit or not.”\(^{87}\) Given the shortage of housing for low-income Canadians, a wage or rental subsidy for the low-income group could be a difference maker in ensuring the provision of affordable housing, and this correspondence between Hellyer and Gillies reveals another level of the Task Force and the input Hellyer wanted from the members.

In a particularly difficult policy area, the Task Force addresses the problems faced by Canada’s Indigenous and Metis population. Several submissions drew attention to the difficult living conditions that many Canadian Indigenous peoples endured, and the Task Force considered these issues in the Report. The appearance of these submissions in the Report is a good example of why my analysis of the Report benefitted from including Winnipeg submissions, in addition to Toronto. The prairie cities, and Winnipeg in particular, have historically had a disproportionately larger Indigenous population than Toronto. Additionally, during the 1960s, Winnipeg saw an influx in its Indigenous population. Helen Buckley writes,

> Prior to 1960, people of the western reserves had little experience with cities … [b]arely ten percent of Manitoba’s treaty population was living off reserve, less than that in the other two [prairie] provinces. But, as farm and other rural jobs evaporated and reserve conditions worsened, the cities were the last hope and the exodus began.\(^{88}\)

\(^{86}\) Letter from James Gillies to the Honourable Paul T. Hellyer, 1-2.  
\(^{87}\) Ibid., 3.  
\(^{88}\) Buckley, From wooden Plows to Welfare, 93.
The submissions from Winnipeg show that the Task Force appreciated the input it received regarding recommendations for Aboriginal housing.

The Manitoba Metis Federation brief made several strong arguments. One in particular was,

Most Metis are in desperate need of adequate housing, and do not share in the Federal programs legally belonging to the Treaty Indians. The Metis Federation is deeply concerned about the need for a visible Federal-Provincial Housing Program to begin the arduous task of erasing this blight of substandard – and in many stances, sub-human conditions – from the face of our Province and our country.\(^{89}\)

The first sentence of the above quotation is underlined in pen by Hellyer. Subsequently, it is directly addressed in the Report – the corresponding sentence reading: “Barred by present legislation from participating in special Indian-Eskimo housing programs, the Metis are anything but barred from the problems of poverty and discrimination which afflict these groups.”\(^{90}\) A submission from Winnipeg’s Kennedy, Li, Simonsen, Smith Architects Consortium draws specific attention to the need for greater development of transitional housing. They argue, “of approximately 60,000 Indians and Metis in Manitoba, it is fair to estimate that the majority live in areas with little or no economic base.” They also identify that between 1961 and 1966, approximately “10,000 people of native ancestry moved into Winnipeg,” the large percentage of which funneled “through the slum near Logan and Main, suffering at the hands of the slum lords while attempting to adapt to an urban situation.”\(^{91}\) Therefore, they call for the development of transitional

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\(^{90}\) Hellyer, Report, 58.
\(^{91}\) LAC, MG32-B33, vol. 201, file 1, “Brief to the Federal Government Task Force on Housing,” Kennedy, Li, Simonsen, Smith Architects Consortium, September
housing to support Indigenous populations moving from reserves to urban areas in the Prairie Provinces. The recommendations in this submission are directly used in the Report, which states that the Task Force “members were sufficiently impressed with this proposal to suggest that further research effort, including possibly the provision of funds for pilot projects, be undertaken.”

Another key document drawn on by the Task Force was “Housing and Community Improvement for Indians,” a brief to the Task Force from the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. The Task Force’s discussion of Indigenous housing begins with a quotation taken directly from this document, which stated that in 1965, “at least 90% of Indian housing was substandard by any reasonable criteria and well below the standard set by the National Housing Act.” The Report bases its discussion of the housing subsidy programs available to Indigenous peoples on the material in this document.

Following the recommendations found in these, and other submissions, the Task Force recommended that:

Special housing programs and pilot projects for Canada’s Indian, Eskimo and Metis peoples be carefully evaluated after a fair trial period and, if found successful, be vigorously pursued to meet the special needs of these groups.

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93 Hellyer, Report, 58.
95 Hellyer, Report, 58; “Housing and Community Improvement for Indians,” Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 3.
96 Hellyer, Report, 59.
This clearly addresses the issues presented to the Task Force. Even Milner, critical of many aspects of the Report, called this recommendation “perhaps the most striking recommendation in the whole report” and notes, “this recommendation for direct action is to be applauded.”97 This set of recommendations is exemplary of deliberative PD. Groups, acting on behalf of affected citizens, made submissions to the Task Force to promote a change in housing policies. The Task Force acknowledged the importance of their suggestions and used them to create their own set of recommendations, which closely reflect the consensus of the submissions, with little to no changes.

Administrative Structure and Research

The final two sections of the Report deal with Administrative Structure and Research, respectively. These sections are not lengthy and have been grouped together in this part of Chapter Four because their recommendations are highly interconnected. Some of the recommendations from this section of the Report reflect the high degree of consensus among the Task Force submissions. One such recommendation is to create a federal Department of Housing and Urban Affairs.

Many submissions to the Task Force called for greater coordination between municipal, provincial, and federal governments in Canada. The Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities set out the case:

97 Milner “Task Force,” 441. It should be noted that even this praise bears the pessimism seen throughout his review – he sarcastically questions why Canada’s “white, black, and yellow poor” don’t receive the same treatment as the Aboriginal populations.
No one level of government can come fully to grips with housing; all three levels must bring their combined and respective resources to bear not just on housing, but on the social and physical fabric of the community which includes housing; the Task Force can make an inestimable contribution to community building by devising and proposing the ways and means by which such an intimate partnership can be obtained.98

In calling for “an agency with a comprehensive view,” the brief from Toronto’s Jack Klein and Henry Sears Architects suggests the appointment of regional agencies to coordinate all housing-related activities between all levels of government and both the public and private sides of the housing industry.99 Several recommendations in the Report sought to combat “the myriad of government regulation and restriction … and the difficulty, confusion and cost inefficiency resulting from so much of it.”100 Thus, the Task Force called on all governments in Canada to “make every possible effort to streamline and simplify their administrative procedures for dealing with housing and urban development.”101

Following in the line of reasoning expressed above, the Task Force took an additional step to recommend the creation of a federal Department of Housing and Urban Affairs. The Report acknowledges that “many submissions to the Task Force argued strongly for the creation of a separate federal department dedicated specifically and entirely to the problems of housing and urban development” in Canada.102 One such group that made this recommendation was the Urban Development Institute – Ontario Division.103 The Task Force also points out,

98 CFMM, Submission, 7-8.
100 Hellyer, Report, 70.
101 Ibid., 71.
102 Hellyer, Report, 71.
103 “Brief,” Urban Development Institute – Ontario Division, 2.
In the view of these groups and individuals, it was illogical, if not inconceivable, that the Government of Canada could have ministries dealing with fisheries, forestry, veterans affairs, and other matters which involve a minority of the population, but none to deal on a full-time basis with the urban problems which involve more than 70 per cent of the population, not to mention housing which involves virtually everyone.\textsuperscript{104}

Arguably, this was one of the most important recommendations made by the Task Force, because this department would provide security for the eventual adoption of the other recommendations made throughout the \textit{Report}. This recommendation was supported after the release of the \textit{Report} as well. For instance, Ralph Scurfield, President of the National Home Builders Association, agreed with the recommendation to create a separate ministry for housing in Canada.\textsuperscript{105}

Public housing professional Albert Rose also supported the Task Force recommendation to create a federal Department of Housing and Urban Development, pointing out that “if Ottawa is to pursue a strong and appropriate role in urban development, the full-time efforts of a separate ministry are required."\textsuperscript{106} Of great importance to this thesis is Rose’s revelation that “it is gratifying to be among those who made this proposal to the task force.”\textsuperscript{107} It is amusing in a cynical way to note that one of the only things that Rose liked about the \textit{Report} was something that he had recommended to the Task Force.\textsuperscript{108} However, the true value of this statement is that it shows the success

\textsuperscript{104} Hellyer, \textit{Report}, 71; The line concerning fisheries, etc. is taken from Dr. Albert Rose’s submission to the Task Force. Rose also used this line in his public presentation to the Task Force, as revealed in the See; “Brief,” Dr. Albert Rose, 1; “Minutes, Toronto, October 1,” Task Force, 2.
\textsuperscript{106} Rose, “Paul Hellyer on Housing,” 7.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{108} Rose also criticizes Hellyer and his decision to seek testimony from the Canadian public, rather than relying exclusively on experts and academics. He points out
of the Task Force in using participatory democracy to determine policy objectives: even someone who did not support the majority of the Task Force’s recommendations was able to take satisfaction in having recommended something that appeared in the Report. Rose may not have agreed with the Task Force, but his admission may reveal an intuitive recognition of the value of participatory democracy. It is also telling that this recommendation for a federal Department of Housing and Urban Development survived the Cabinet’s rejection of the Report and Hellyer’s resignation, one of the few to do so. 109 Planning expert J.B. Milner did not disagree with the proposed federal ministry of housing, but he does suggest it be a “Department of Housing and Regional Affairs, before the quite reasonable ambitions of two ministers result in separate departments, with less chance of coordinated planning.” 110 Therefore, as explained in the introduction to this chapter, policy areas where Milner and Rose generally agree with the Report and the Task Force submissions illustrate the strong alignment between the report and those submissions.

One final area of consensus in this set of recommendations entails calls for more research in housing and urban development. Nearly all submissions to the Task Force make this request. For instance, Jack Klein and Henry Sears Architects call for research into the housing needs of “the contemporary urban dweller,” and the various forms of

that most Task Force members are experts and academics. Considering the contradiction explained above, Rose’s bitter tone may indicate disappointment over not playing a role in the Task Force himself, rather than an actual criticism of the Task Force’s audience. Furthermore, the archival record does not agree with Rose’s statements. A large proportion, and probably the majority, of briefs submitted to the Task Force came from people, or organizations, that could be considered experts in their fields.

109 Walter Stewart notes that, “Robert Andras was given a new Urban Affairs ministry (though precious little money)” as a result of this Task Force recommendation. Stewart, Shrug, 33.

housing that can satisfy those needs. The Task Force addresses these requests by calling on the proposed Department of Housing and Urban Affairs to undertake extensive research into housing and urban development as a primary function of its creation.

Conclusion

The Task Force and the Report it produced provide an example of liberal/deliberative participatory democracy at work. This chapter has highlighted consensus between the Report and the Task Force submissions to develop a greater understanding of the Report and identify Hellyer’s successful use of participatory democracy to pursue changes in Canadian housing policy. Some measures, such as the raising of NHA loan maximums and the creation of a federal Department of Housing, were strongly supported in submissions and were later adopted. Others, such as the removal of federal and provincial building materials taxes, reveal the limits of a participatory democracy process in compelling action, even when nation-wide consensus on a matter was apparent. Having studied the submissions from Toronto and Winnipeg, it is clear that regional issues were strong enough in Canada to limit the ability of participatory democracy to develop a specific national perspective in the Report. For example, the Report’s discussion of Aboriginal housing programs is traceable directly to submissions made during the Winnipeg Task Force hearings; had I studied the Halifax submissions, rather than Winnipeg, a different perspective would have been gained – though at the cost of the

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111 “A Submission to the Task Force,” Jack Klein and Henry Sears Architects, 11.  
112 Hellyer, Report, 73-74.
Winnipeg perspective. The limit of participatory democracy, in this case, is that while the Task Force was able to discern areas of consensus in various Canadian publics, it had to prioritize and balance recommendations in order to create a national perspective.

Having established the sense of consensus between the *Report* and the Task Force submissions and portrayed its success as a liberal/deliberative participatory democracy initiative, I will now address the tensions found in the *Report* between the submissions made to the Task Force and its eventual recommendations.
Having established the extent to which the Report reflected points of consensus among the submissions the Task Force received, Chapter Five examines areas of tension that the Task Force had to confront. In Chapter Four I argued that the Report’s reflecting consensus establishes the Task Force as an exercise in liberal participatory democracy. The tensions I identify in this chapter do not take away from this conclusion; rather, they reinforce it, by revealing how the liberal/deliberative participatory democracy of the Task Force process differed from deliberative and radical forms of participatory democracy.

Although most submissions stress the reality of the housing crisis in Canada in the late 1960s, not every one agreed. One source of disagreement came from Gardiner English, the president of the Mortgage Insurance Company of Canada. In this submission English wrote, “housing in Canada is not a crisis situation,” although he admitted it was a serious problem “for many in the lower income groups.” He also argued “that the present financial structure for housing is sound; that the role being performed by the Federal Government is appropriate and that drastic changes should not be made at this time in the present framework.” While parts of this statement, including the reference to the housing issues faced by lower income groups, align with the Report and the other submissions, some of it does not. Appropriately, the document bears Hellyer’s highlighting scrawl in margin: “Pretty Conservative View?”

This chapter discusses a variety of submissions, like that of Gardiner English, that take a contrary perspective to the Task Force on several different issues. Some of these

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submissions have been previously discussed in relation to the consensus they showed on different issues. I argue that although tensions do exist in the Report, they do not take away from the validity of the Task Force as an exercise in liberal/deliberative participatory democracy, or diminish the quality of their Report as an accurate representation of the housing situation in Canada in the late 1960s.

**Financing**

The Financing section of the Report reveals some tensions between Task Force submissions and the final recommendations it made. This is seen in calls for legislation forcing private lending institutions to invest in mortgages and the creation of a new mortgage-financing institution in Canada.

The role of mortgage interest subsidies was a source of disagreement in the Report. The Task Force draws attention to “a relatively large number of submissions” recommending “unless or until interest rates were reduced, the federal government as a matter of national policy should subsidize [interest] rates to varying degrees on mortgages for lower income groups.”

However, in my study of the Winnipeg and Toronto Task Force submissions, very little of this perspective is represented. Only a few of these submissions advocated mortgage subsidies for the poor. For instance, the Urban Development Institute – Ontario Division called for subsidized mortgage interest rates to be made available for “young wage earners” in the early stages of their mortgages, and a

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2 Hellyer, Report, 29.
similar proposal was made by the Galt-Preston-Hespeler Real Estate Board. However, from a totally different perspective, Gillies of the Task Force noted in a November 29, 1968 letter to Hellyer, “by and large, interest rates should not be subsidized. The way to lower interest rates is to increase the supply of capital flowing into the market.” Gillies’ suggestion aligns with the Report’s final proposals in that it seeks to address the root of the issue—the fundamental conditions of the housing market. Even where the Report and its submissions agree that a problem existed, conflicts over the causes of these problems and potential solutions could and did arise.

The calls for mortgage interest subsidies reveal an area of tension in the Report, because the Task Force argued that the “prime thrust of public effort be directed toward reducing housing costs rather than supporting them at their currently high level.” In his letter to Hellyer, Gillies notes “the object of subsidization is to allow people with incomes less than sufficient to supply the necessities of life to acquire shelter.” He also stresses, “it must be set up in such a way that people are able to improve their position so they are removed from the necessity of having a subsidy.” The reduction of housing costs in Canada is, perhaps, the key objective of the Report, though this is not to say the Task Force was opposed to subsidy programs in general. In fact, later on in the Social Housing and Special Programs section of the Report, it argues for municipally-financed “income supplements to permit low-income families to rent or even purchase housing according to

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3 “Brief,” Urban Development Institute – Ontario Division, 1; “Brief to the Hon. Paul Hellyer,” GPH Real Estate Board Inc.,
4 Letter from James Gillies to the Honourable Paul T. Hellyer, 7.
5 Hellyer, Report, 29.
6 Letter from James Gillies to the Honourable Paul T. Hellyer, 8.
their own needs in the private market.”\textsuperscript{7} The tension between the \textit{Report} and the submissions about interest subsidies was over where subsidy money specifically should go – to making interest rates lower, or to making housing costs lower. For the Task Force, housing costs were high due to an inadequate supply of housing; therefore, the proper way to address the issue was to increase the supply of housing, while offering income supplements to lower-income groups to assist until more housing could be constructed to deflate the market. Even when recommending subsidies, the Task Force proposed only temporary subsidies and emphasized increased supply as the means of lowering the cost of the actual housing.

\textbf{Land Cost and Utilization}

As discussed in Chapter Four, land-related recommendations in the \textit{Report} reflect a consensus in Task Force submissions. This section is difficult to analyze because while many, many submissions call for federally subsidized land acquisition for municipalities, this actually went against federal policy at the time. Hellyer’s land recommendations went on to become a major negative factor in the failure of the \textit{Report} to win Cabinet support. Trudeau and the Cabinet felt that the recommendations impeded provincial jurisdiction and violated provincial constitutional rights, while Hellyer argued that in a matter like housing, which affects all Canadians, constitutional issues should not be the highlight – providing adequate and affordable housing to Canadians should be the

\textsuperscript{7} Hellyer, \textit{Report}, 57.
priority. I kept my analysis of Hellyer’s Land Cost and Utilization recommendations in
the consensus chapter because they align with a true consensus that believed the federal

government should undertake land assembly programs to lower the cost of housing.

Construction Costs and Techniques

A key recommendation found in the Construction Costs and Techniques section of the
Task Force Report concerns the regulation of the National Building Code (NBC). A
deeper reading of this recommendation reveals tension between the Task Force
submissions and the Report, as well as the difficulty of legislating in an area of
overlapping municipal, provincial, and federal jurisdictions. The resulting
recommendation for the future of the NBC does not satisfy the consensus on the matter as
revealed by Task Force submissions. It is important to note, however, that the Task Force
did acknowledge this consensus, but chose not to act on it.

Proposals to make compulsory the adoption of the NBC were discussed in many
submissions, such as the brief from the Urban Development Institute – Ontario Division.8
However, this was not an easy issue to solve, as municipal, provincial, and national
regulations did not align across the country. While the Task Force did recommend
voluntary adoption of the NBC in its Report, their recommendation was not a forceful
one, as they did not call for it to be mandatorily adopted.9 Furthermore, under the policies
of the National Research Council of Canada, the body that administers the NBC, the
NBC was not enforced, but instead regulated under a voluntary adoption program.

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8 “Brief,” Urban Development Institute – Ontario Division, 2.
9 Hellyer, Report, 47. This is discussed below.
Therefore, the Task Force recommendation did not seek to change the existing policy, and failed to address the requests made in dozens of submissions. This issue represents the difficulties in pursuing nationally applicable policies. This section first discusses requests to make mandatory the adoption of the building code and then discusses a specific example, from the City of Toronto, of the difficulty in creating a National Building Code and having it nationally adopted.

Some organizations, such as the Manitoba Association of Architects, called for a more flexible and inventive NBC that would promote more research.¹⁰ In contrast, the UE called for all provinces to adopt the existing National Building Code to “promote standardization of materials and fixtures.” They claimed this would reduce construction time and save up to $500 per dwelling built.¹¹ Likewise, the Toronto branch of the Society of Real Estate Appraisers called for the NBC to be adopted nationwide in order to save costs and time for builders. They pointed out that some builders were working with different building standards across up to 20 different municipalities in the Toronto area, a clear inconvenience that affected budgets of both time and money.¹² The Winnipeg House Builders Association make a similar point in reference to beam-ply regulations in Winnipeg and the necessity of applying the NBC across the country.¹³

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¹⁰ They objected to central Canadian dominance in this field of research, saying that Federal government “may discover that all superior intelligence and experience does not flow from Ottawa’s drafting boards and laboratories.” LAC, MG32-B33, vol. 200, file 9, “A Brief to the Honourable Paul Hellyer and His Task Force on Housing and Urban Development,” October 15, 1968, 9.

¹¹ “Submission to the Task Force,” UER & MWA, 40.


While the request for the adoption of the NBC is clear, other archival evidence helps to contextualize the Task Force’s recommendation. Correspondence between the Task Force and the Toronto City Clerk reveal how the Task Force handled the question of adopting a local rather than a national building code. The Task Force asked Toronto City Clerk, C. E. Norris, to explain why Toronto enacted a new building code on October 9, 1968 and adopted it on November 1, 1968 – during the period the Task Force was undertaking their consultation processes.\textsuperscript{14} Norris provided the Task Force with a statement from S. E. Wellwood, Commissioner of Buildings, City of Toronto, which analyzes the differences between the new Toronto building code and the NBC and justifies Toronto’s initiative in creating a separate code.\textsuperscript{15}

Wellwood’s letter points to building code and jurisdictional issues found across the country. Wellwood and the Toronto Area Building Code Committee (TABCC) “found that most of the principles of the Code could be adopted but found serious objections to adopting certain parts of the Code.”\textsuperscript{16} These issues are divided into three main categories: Conflict with Existing Legislation, Legal Difficulties in Enforcement, and Inadequacies of the National Building Code.

\textsuperscript{14} LAC, MG32-B33, vol. 198, file 5, Letter from C. E. Norris, Toronto City Clerk, to Paul T. Hellyer, Minister of Transport, November 13, 1968, 1. The Task Force requested that Norris provide a written explanation for why Toronto adopted a new building code rather than the current NBC. This was sent in Norris’s letter to Hellyer after council approved the move on November 6, 1968.

\textsuperscript{15} LAC, MG32-B33, vol. 198, file 5, “Comments of S. E. Wellwood, Commissioner of Buildings, City of Toronto, on the basic differences between the National Building Code and City of Toronto Building By-law No. 300-68, enacted by City Council at its meeting held October 9, 1968 and made effective November 1, 1968,” S. E. Wellwood, October 9, 1968, 1-3.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 1.
In the first category, Wellwood points out that when the Province of Ontario delegated power to pass building by-laws to municipalities, it “reserved certain fields for regulation by provincial departments or agencies.” This includes the regulation of various building owned by the province or affected by certain provincial acts that “take precedence over the National Building Code necessitating amendments to the latter before it can be adopted by a municipality.”¹⁷ When considering the dynamics of municipal, provincial and federal governments, it is no surprise to see the difficulty in applying a federal building code to a municipality.

In the second category, Wellwood discusses how unspecific language and irregularities in the NBC make it hard to enforce. For instance, he points out that “many important regulations are referred to ‘good practice’ and a reference document is listed which may be used as a guide in establishing what good practice is.”¹⁸ However, Wellwood argues that the TABCC found that these “good practice” standards should be incorporated within the By-laws themselves in order to aid enforcement of the standards. Furthermore, Wellwood points out several examples where conflicting uses of language in different parts of the NBC could make difficult the enforcing of the code in cases brought before the court.

The third category discusses the inadequate regulation of specific materials in the NBC that do not meet standards already set in the Toronto Building By-law. The

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¹⁷ Ibid. The provincial regulations include: “buildings owned or endowed by the Province which are subject to the approval of the Ontario Fire Marshal; factories shops and offices, subject to the requirements of the Industrial Safety Act; hotels, subject to the Hotel Fire Safety Act. In addition, the Elevators and Lifts Act, The Ontario Water Resources Commission Act, The Air Pollution Control Act, The Energy Act and the Regulations of the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario.” Ibid., 1.

¹⁸ Ibid., 1.
criticism of Wellwood and the TABCC is specifically directed toward the use and management of combustible materials in building construction. The necessity for large buildings and the closer proximity of some buildings in Toronto are cited as examples of a greater need for fire safety that is unrecognized in the NBC. Wellwood goes on to explain:

Apart from the above all the basic principles of the National Building Code have been incorporated in the Toronto Code and we hope that all lesser differences between the codes will be eliminated in future editions due to the interlocking memberships of the two committees responsible. However, we believe the major differences will always remain so long as it is attempted, in the National Building Code, to meet the needs of large cities and rural municipalities in a single code.\(^\text{19}\)

This presents the difficulty the Task Force faced in assessing nationwide housing issues, when cross-jurisdictional legislation comes into play.

Wellwood’s brief concludes with a short, but sharp criticism of how the NBC and the National Building Code Committee (NBCC) present materials that are better able to endure fires. Wellwood calls into question the idea that these materials are more expensive, pointing out that the fire resistant materials promoted under the new Toronto Area Building Code are in some cases cheaper than more hazardous materials promoted under the NBC. He then calls into question the judgment of the NBCC, writing: “It would appear that the National Building Code Committees are unduly influenced by the representations of materials manufactures and are reluctant to restrict the use of any material. However, there can be no justification for this approach where life safety is concerned especially where the increased cost is negligible.”\(^\text{20}\)

\(^{19}\) Ibid., 3.
\(^{20}\) Ibid.
criticism, Wellwood draws his conclusion back to promoting the principle of uniform building regulations in Canada and the improvement of the NBC, writing:

There are shortcomings in the present edition of the National Building Code but most of these can be eliminated through the revision procedures being adopted. Some additional restrictions will be always needed to provide the safeguards necessary for large cities. Improved fire safety measures do no necessarily add to the construction costs of buildings.\textsuperscript{21}

The insights provided by Wellwood, seen in light of the Task Force specifically questioning why Toronto adopted a new code other than the NBC, allow for a more complete view of the situation at hand. The next submission takes a look at the situation from another perspective in order to make a more complete analysis of the final recommendation made in the Task Force Report.

Given the above dialogue, it is perhaps lucky that a submission from the National Research Council of Canada (NRCC) exists in the Task Force archives. The NRCC is the body responsible for developing and updating the NBC and their submission presents a very different perspective on the situation described above. The NRCC writes that adoption of the NBC of Canada is strictly voluntary, and proudly points out that the NBC is “mentioned in six provincial Municipal Acts” and used in “over three-quarters of the urban population of Canada.” They also claim that Canada was “within sight of having uniform building regulations from coast to coast achieved by voluntary effort based on the NBC of Canada.”\textsuperscript{22} Given that the NRCC is the body that publishes the NBC every year, their claims of the success of the code are not surprising. However, given the body of evidence present in Task Force submissions that calls for the NBC to be mandated

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{22} “Task Force,” Legget, 1. The Task Force Report states that the NBC “still is not used in 25 per cent of urban Canada, while in other regions its application is accompanied by major locally-affiliated amendments.” See: Hellyer, \textit{Report}, 47.
across the country, the claims of the widespread usage of the NBC by the NRCC appear perhaps slightly exaggerated.

Furthermore, while they draw attention to how successful the NBC is due to its voluntary adoption policy, the Toronto example discussed above makes very clear just how logistically difficult it would have been for many parts of Canada to actually adopt the NBC as a standalone building code. Toronto technically adopted the majority of the NBC, but because of its own regional concerns, ended up creating its own separate code. Having said this, Winnipeg voluntarily adopted the NBC, as Mayor Steven Juba confirmed to the Task Force in the Winnipeg hearings of the Task Force.  

This difference between Winnipeg and Toronto is a good example of the necessity to study more than one city for this thesis. Many of the issues identified above by the TABCC, such as concerns over fire-resistant materials due to crowding of buildings in Toronto, did not apply to Winnipeg. In sum, the adoption of the NBC was voluntary because the inevitable mess made by making it mandatory was well beyond any benefit adopting the code actually brought. If anything, this is affirmed in the Task Force Report.

The difficulty in creating a mandatory NBC is seen more clearly after the brief analysis of the sources discussed above. In response, the Task Force Report offers a recommendation – that “every possible effort be made to encourage universal adoption of the 1970 National Building Code on a voluntary basis.”  

Milner called the recommendation “a good suggestion and hardly radical.” He pointed out that “many provinces already have permissive provisions in their municipal legislation to allow municipalities to adopt the existing Code,” which means if municipalities have not

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24 Hellyer, Report, 47.
already adopted it, they will need stronger convincing than a voluntary recommendation to do so.\textsuperscript{25} This recommendation clearly does not satisfy the requests for the creation of a mandatory code. The Report also does not hesitate to ruffle feathers. It begins by describing “an unwarranted multiplicity of building codes” as “one of the crosses which the building and building materials industry has had to bear” in order to “satisfy the whims of local ‘planners.’”\textsuperscript{26} The Report goes on to give a lackluster description of the NBC, but points out that the Director of the Division of Building Research “expressed confidence … that virtually universal adoption of the 1970 edition [of the NBC] can be achieved by voluntary means.”\textsuperscript{27} Having discussed the Toronto example above, one cannot help but connect the Task Force criticisms to the TABCC and their efforts to integrate a new building code.

In other words, the Task Force skirted the difficulty of addressing a cross-governmental policy issue by sympathizing with Canadian builders and criticizing municipalities for adopting localized standards. They then dismissed the urge for the mandatory adoption of the NBC by placing their faith in the success of the next edition of the NBC. Unlike other recommendations in the Task Force Report, this one clearly ‘passed the buck’ and did nothing to address the requests made to the Task Force. Although legislating the mandatory adoption of the NBC was a steep request, this example shows the limitations faced by participatory democracy initiatives within the

\textsuperscript{25} Milner “Task Force,” 439.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid. It is interesting to note that the NRCC submission cited above was essentially directly quoted by the Task Force in its description of the success of the NBC. The statement of Robert F. Legget, NRCC Director of the Division of Building Research, wrote that Canada was “within sight of having uniform building regulations from coast to coast achieved by voluntary effort based on the National Building Code of Canada.” See: “Task Force,” Legget, 1.
confines of electoral and federally organized democracies. The Task Force had to decide how best to address the consensus of the submissions calling for a mandatory NBC, but it also had to make recommendations it could stand by. As mentioned above, it is likely that the headache caused by attempting to legislate the NBC at the federal level was not worth the benefit that having it would make. This point was brought up by the President of the Urban Development Institute in the Toronto hearings. He argued Canadian cities “have no real incentive” to adopt the NBC because of the fragmented nature of the Canadian population, the large difference in opinion within each city, and the nuisance of trying to find agreement.28

Hellyer faced immediate backlash upon release of the Report when the National House Builders Association read its Building Code recommendation. They thought “its suggestion of universal adoption through persuasion” was unrealistic, and argued that “provincial legislation should make it mandatory on all municipalities” to adopt the NBC.29 Nonetheless, it is likely such a recommendation would only have delegitimized the Report in the eyes of the federal Cabinet even further. The mandatory route for the NBC faced too many challenges from municipal governments to justify appeasing the construction industry.

28 “Minutes, Toronto, October 1,” Task Force, 5.
**Social Housing and Special Programs**

Perhaps the greatest tension in the *Report* is found in its recommendations for social housing. To the fury of many, the Report called for all large public housing initiatives to be stopped until further research was done.\(^{30}\) In part, this recommendation stems from the strong association between the large public housing projects and urban renewal, which the Task Force proposed to end in the recommendations that are discussed in the next section below.

The UE identified public housing as the key to the housing problems in Canada, arguing that “low and middle income people have long been priced out of the housing market, both as tenants and owners.”\(^{31}\) In their analysis of several studies published between 1964 and 1967, the UE argued that average rental costs in Canada were debilitating to families. In the manufacturing and electrical sectors alone, families with more than one wage earner reported paying over a quarter of their monthly income to rental costs. Therefore, the UE recommended that the federal government initiate a larger scale public housing program with money available for those “who want to acquire their own home, but now have insufficient incomes to do so without subjecting themselves to excessive debt and privations in other aspects of living.”\(^{32}\) In a similar vein, the brief from the federal and provincial members of parliament from the Eastend area of the City

\(^{31}\) “Submission to the Task Force,” UER & MWA, 18.
\(^{32}\) Ibid., 20, 26.
of Toronto proposed that federal government housing initiatives “should be directed largely at providing public housing within the capacity to pay of the average Canadian.”

Following the release of the Report, the National House Builders Association gave its support to the recommendation to halt any further large public housing projects. However, they were mostly alone in this view. The moratorium on large public housing faced a barrage of criticism. In particular, Albert Rose sharply criticized the Report in two feature articles in the Globe and Mail on February 4 and 5, 1969. Rose targeted the Task Force’s position on public housing, including their proposal to stop all large public housing projects. However, his point is lost in contradiction, as he also notes that provincial housing organizations already had decided to stop building large public housing projects, and characterized the Task Force recommendation as a slow response by the federal government. While unclear from his first article if it was the end of large public housing projects, or if it was a slow federal response to provincial initiative that Rose disliked, his true position on the matter is clarified in his second article on the Report, where he states that public housing is the only way to house the poor:

At this time in the history of mankind when almost every nation has come to the conclusion that it is only through vast public housing programs that the shelter needs of the least affluent or most disadvantaged individuals and families in the community can be met, it is most disheartening to learn that the task force thinks that home ownership “within a few years” is the most appropriate solution for every Canadian.

The Task Force does not explicitly condemn public housing in particular, or social housing in general. It condemns large public housing projects – that Rose supported when they were created – and offers recommendations for the promotion of other types of social housing, such as co-op housing, that could provide low-income households with viable housing options. The Task Force does promote home ownership, but does not attempt to hide the high costs associated; on the contrary, the entire Report is geared toward lowering the costs of home ownership in Canada.

Rose’s criticism of the Report’s social housing recommendations includes claims that the Task Force used “grossly inaccurate” numbers when describing the costs of public housing projects. Unfortunately, the Report generally does not identify the sources it used, something Milner rightly points out as a “curious deficiency.”37 For example, an independent study by Martin Goldfarb Consultants Limited that the Task Force commissioned on public housing in Toronto was not publicized, much to Milner’s dismay.38 From my own research on the Toronto and Winnipeg Task Force submissions, a lot of the Report uses either data or claims directly from submissions. However, this does not justify the lack of transparency. In addition to Rose’s criticism of inaccurate public housing statistics he also states:

It is too bad the report didn’t make a comparison between modern public housing, despite its weaknesses, and some of the appalling slum conditions which existed before the introduction of urban renewal and development.39

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37 Milner, Report, 437.
38 Ibid., 440.
Public housing projects, such as Regent Park, did replace slum housing neighbourhoods, after urban renewal projects cleared out the slums, but in Regent Park this occurred two decades before the Task Force made their observations.

By the time Hellyer visited Regent Park in 1968, it was no longer a nice, new public housing initiative, but a neighbourhood with growing crime rates that was falling into disrepair. Only a decade after Rose had, in his 1959 book, declared Regent Park a success, “monolithic public housing complexes in many North American cities had fallen into the grip of crime and entrenched poverty” – casting real doubt on Rose’s statement that public housing is the best way to meet “the shelter needs” of the poor.40 At Regent Park,

The initially lauded design – apartments in a park setting – proved to be highly problematic. Because the city had erased the old block network during construction, Regent Park lacked so-called ‘eyes on the street’; with its many blind spots, the Park became a haven for gangs.41

Journalist John Lorinc describes the situation perfectly, writing: “Rose’s optimism, while justifiable at the time, [ie. 1959] eventually missed the mark. What initially appeared to be a successful approach to social housing gradually morphed into a poverty trap for generations of low-income Torontonians.42 Therefore, the criticisms Rose made of the Task Force in February 1969 have to be read with a grain of salt, especially considering, as he pointed out in his review, that large public housing projects were already being phased out by provincial housing authorities.

To add to the tensions surrounding Rose’s testimony is his claim that the Task Force mistreated and rejected the advice of ‘experts and academics.’ In his own brief to

41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., 46.
the Task Force he was questioned by Doris Boyle on the way he “heavily accented” Toronto and Montreal over less urban areas like the Maritimes. She also questioned his support of multiple unit accommodations. Then, as mentioned previously, “under questioning by Mr. Hellyer, Dr. Rose admitted that he himself lived in a single-family dwelling and that he preferred it.”43 The way Rose’s brief was received by the Task Force gives some indication as to why Rose “came away with the feeling that it was a grand experience in put-down.”44

Tensions can be found between the Task Force’s call to end large-scale public housing and the testimony of Task Force submissions. Characterizing the Task Force’s public housing recommendations in their relation to participatory democracy is difficult. The Task Force argued in the Report that it saw the disadvantages to public housing after hearing the complaints of the people living in it. For example, the Task Force held a public hearing at the Regent Park United Church on September 30th when visiting Toronto, and faced a barrage of questions from residents. A Mrs. Ena Coll of Regent Park, who had been at the meeting, later wrote in to Hellyer to express her views. Coll painted a bleak picture of the public housing complex and complained about the lack of order and respect on the part of the residents. She suggested people be grouped in the building in accordance to their lifestyles so that quiet people could have peace and quiet together.45

In Winnipeg, a similar situation unfolded when the Task Force concluded the hearings and “Canada’s Transport Minister climbed aboard a Metro transit bus and ... took a first hand look at some of Winnipeg’s seedier areas.”46 A public meeting at Winnipeg’s Lord Selkirk Park public housing project brought a unanimous negative response to the question of whether it was a good approach to housing. One man questioned the point in moving families “wracked with social problems from an old house to a new.”47 The Task Force came away from the September Regent Park meeting, the October Lord Selkirk Park meeting, and others, and called these projects “ghettos of the poor,” arguing that they were inappropriate places to raise a family.48 The Task Force turned down the advice of the experts like Albert Rose who made submissions, and preferred to base their views on first hand experience visiting public housing projects across Canada. Did prioritizing the views of residents of housing projects over the submission testimony from organizations and experts make the Task Force bad, or ineffective, or not an example of liberal participatory democracy? No; however, I argue that this decision by the Task Force is an example of the radical sub-type of participatory democracy because, unlike the other Task Force recommendations, it is based in face-to-face meetings with housing consumers, rather than submissions. Furthermore, in this case, the Task Force is seeking out and siding with the views of the housing consumers in both Toronto and Winnipeg rather than the established views of housing experts like Rose; these views indicated that large social housing projects were not tackling the root of poverty problems and were in some cases leading to the ghettoization of populations.

47 Ibid.
48 Hellyer, Report, 19.
Urban Development

Urban development was another major topic in the Task Force hearings and it found a place early on in the *Report* where the Task Force made its pessimistic views of the subject heard in statements like the following:

To the Task Force, it seemed urban renewal, with its standing offer of federal dollar bills for locally-raised quarters, was becoming as much a matter of municipal financing as municipal planning. Certainly in most schemes witnessed by the Task Force the accent seemed as much on altering assessment ratios as on renewing or adding to existing housing stock. In the best of circumstances, it was a process of physical renewal without sufficient accent on new social or cultural factors.\(^49\)

The discussion of “Urban Development” in the Task Force *Report* broadly encompasses several related topics, such as urban and regional planning, land use, transportation, and urban renewal. The Task Force felt these issues were all intrinsically connected. Specifically, it indicates that its “Urban Development” recommendations were heavily reliant upon the “Land Cost and Utilization” recommendations, some of which were discussed above. Of particular importance to this thesis are the recommendations regarding urban renewal, which reveal tensions between the *Report* and the submissions to the Task Force. Furthermore, a direct result of the *Report* was the termination of federal funding for urban renewal across Canada in November 1969.\(^50\)

Urban renewal and development policies generated conflict and debate in Canada well before the appointment of the Task Force. An example contemporary to the Task Force can be found in the Trefann Court urban renewal project in Toronto. As mentioned

\(^{49}\text{Ibid.}, 13.\)

\(^{50}\text{White, “Urban Renewal Revisited,” 20; Fillion, “The Neighbourhood Improvement Plan,” 17.}\)
in Chapter Two, Trefann Court was a housing area in Toronto that was under consideration for urban renewal as early as 1966 and faced expropriation by the City of Toronto. White writes that Trefann Court “was to be substantially cleared since most of the housing there was deemed beyond repair.”⁵¹ Ray Tomlinson, President of the Trefann Court Residents Association, provides an insightful account of the project in his March 1968 letter to Edgar Benson, who was then President of the Treasury Board and responsible for CMHC. In describing the plight of Trefann Court residents, Tomlinson writes, “for over eighteen months now the residents of the Trefann Court urban renewal area in the City of Toronto have resisted a basically unjust and injurious urban renewal scheme.”⁵² Tomlinson’s letter outlines the Trefann Court stance against the urban renewal project. Beginning with their refusal of inadequate expropriation compensation – “the deflated market value of the property which has been under the threat of expropriation for over ten years” – Tomlinson goes on to mention the “numerous briefs” submitted to City Hall since August 1966.⁵³ Speaking for the Trefann Court Residents Association, Tomlinson explains,

> We have nothing to gain by urban renewal and nothing to lose by being left alone … we want to be able to improve the conditions in this area on our own, within the financial means of the individual owners. We want the City to participate only in doing the job it has neglected over the years: repairing of streets and sidewalks and enforcing of the housing standards on the absentee owners who made the area into a slum in the first place.⁵⁴

His letter goes on to recommend that the federal government stop urban renewal initiatives and institute a research program to investigate them. The residents of Trefann

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⁵³ Ibid., 1-2.
⁵⁴ Ibid., 2.
Court voted to remove themselves from the urban renewal program and the signatures of the disgruntled residents were included in the letter. Trefann Court was successful in their bid to resist expropriation; their “citizen-led planning process took several years, but it yielded a new redevelopment plan in 1972 that was successfully implemented in the years that followed.”

Bacher singles out the success of the citizen participation used at Trefann Court. He identifies the influence of Saul Alinsky’s radical participatory democracy in the Residents Association’s methods, and points out, “the publicity such protests engendered caused Paul Hellyer … and the federal task force on urban renewal to visit Trefann Court on 1 October 1968.”

On the other hand, the Downtown Business Association of Winnipeg (DBAW) saw urban renewal as a potential way to make better use of expensive downtown land in Winnipeg. A further submission supporting urban renewal in Winnipeg came from the Province of Manitoba. The provincial submission argued, “there are large areas of central Winnipeg that can benefit from urban renewal,” and stressed the need for a massive increase in multiple-unit dwellings in the area to attract a larger downtown population base.

The Report identifies the importance of urban renewal to Canadians, stating that after issues surrounding public housing, urban renewal generated the most discussion in

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56 Bacher, Keeping to the Marketplace, 226.
Task Force hearings and submissions. In describing the debate over urban renewal, the Report contends that

The argument revolved in the final analysis around the relative place and merits of demolition versus rehabilitation. One group of submissions leaned to the view that the only effective means to erase urban blight was to level it with a bull-dozer and start over again. Others took the opposite line, going as far, in some cases, as to argue that almost no dwelling was so bad as to require demolition, at least without the willing consent of its owner and/or occupant.  

The Report acknowledges debate among interested parties, and the submissions do show tension over the use and direction of urban renewal programs. Jack Klein and Henry Sears Architects state: “a significant improvement in housing stock could take place if a means were found to enable people living in depressed housing to rehabilitate in an economically feasible manner.” They recommend federal, provincial, and municipal cooperation in the reduction in taxes and the provision of low-interest loans to accomplish this task. The Report does align with most submissions with their recommendation for “municipalities [to] revise property assessment practices to encourage, rather than penalize, the maintenance and improvement of residential properties by their private owners.” Nonetheless, the conflict over urban renewal is a clear source of tension in the Report.

It is also essential to identify what appears to be a regional bias between Winnipeg and Toronto. Whereas organizations in Winnipeg generally favoured urban renewal, submissions from Toronto appeared to have a greater understanding of its disadvantages. This likely relates to the historical use of urban renewal in Canada;

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59 Hellyer, Report, 64.
61 Hellyer, Report, 66.
Toronto already had much experience with urban renewal by 1961, when the first urban renewal program was started in Winnipeg. Even by 1968, it would have been a relatively new concept in Winnipeg, whereas in Toronto, the first public housing that had been put in following slum clearances and urban renewal schemes was already beginning to show its age.

An Unaddressed Option: Condominium Housing

The Report states:

It was enlightening, if not humorous, for the Members to hear a continuous flow of “expert” testimony that future housing policies must be directed to the provision of multiple-unit accommodation, largely on a rental basis, while group after group of ordinary citizens voiced a deep yearning to own a single-family dwelling of their own.62

The Winnipeg and Toronto submissions to the Task Force confirm the above observation, but it is noteworthy that the Report does not address condominium housing. It merits only a brief mention in the “impressions” section of the Report: “And condominium arrangements, under which families can acquire ownership of such multiple units, [such as high rise apartments or row housing] have been introduced only very recently into the Canadian housing market. They are not even generally known, less accepted at this point.”63

In Toronto, interest in condo development was on the rise in the late 1960s. This interest is clearly exhibited in the submission that Greenwin Construction made to the

62 Hellyer, Report, 15.
63 Ibid., 17.
Task Force. While many submissions sought to address a broad range of housing problems in Canada, Greenwin Construction, “one of the major residential builders of highrise and townhouse complexes in Metropolitan Toronto,” focused their submission on highrise condominium housing in particular, and did not even bother making construction-related recommendations.\(^{64}\) Other submissions, such as the brief from the Galt-Preston-Hespeler Real Estate Board Inc. (GPH), also supported such developments. The Toronto-based GPH state: “in areas where higher density or an economical type of housing unit is required, we endorse the encouragement of condominium housing as desirable. We believe this type of accommodation is preferable to tenancy in multi-unit apartments.”\(^{65}\) GPH’s support of condominium housing instead of apartment tenancy is in line with their support of home ownership against “the alarming trend in Canada from home ownership to tenancy” and their claim that “the security of home ownership make for happier and more stable law-abiding citizens.”\(^{66}\) Though the Task Force supported home ownership in general, their failure to address condominium housing in the \textit{Report} stems from their support of single-unit, rather than multi-unit housing.

In Winnipeg, the Downtown Business Association of Winnipeg argued that high-rise condo development in Winnipeg could revitalize the downtown area, make greater use of downtown services, and take pressure off of surrounding communities.\(^{67}\) Also, a submission from the Manitoba Association of Social Workers saw a recommendation “to

\(^{64}\) LAC, MG32-B33, vol. 200, file 6, “RE: Public Enquiry into Housing,” Greenwin Construction, September 26, 1968, 1. It is interesting to note that their submission did not even mention the 11 per cent federal building materials sales tax, even though it directly affected them as builders.


\(^{66}\) Ibid., 1.

\(^{67}\) “Submission to the Task Force on Housing,” Downtown Business Association of Winnipeg, 3.
provide home-ownership either in individual or condominium programs.” MASW went on to say, “as social workers, we are directly aware of the beneficial consequences of home-ownership upon all family functioning.” Both these lines were underlined by Hellyer, though the Task Force’s stance against multiple-unit accommodations clearly took precedence over recommending condominiums as a potential source of single-family home ownership options. An even more clear-cut piece of evidence is found in the submission from the City of Winnipeg, which recommended, “greater emphasis on vertical development (i.e.) multiple storey residential accommodation.” This was underlined by Hellyer, who wrote in the margin, “Not what people want for family accommodation.” They also wrote, “we incline to a favoured position for condominiums. If it becomes public policy, as we think it should, to encourage urban apartment living, then there is much to recommend…” In turn, this was also highlighted by Hellyer, who wrote in the margin, “Check with citizens!” This indicates that Hellyer had a strong pre-Task Force opinion on what Canadians were looking for in terms of housing and again looks like he was framing the issue as a citizen versus expert issue.

The Greenwin submission, in particular, lays out the advantages for condominium housing arrangements. It has four main sections of recommendations; these recommendations are made from the perspective of “THE LENDER”, “THE BUILDER”, “THE PURCHASER”, and “THE GOVERNMENT” in relation to how the proposed change will positively affect the growth of condominium housing units. Greenwin begins by identifying “interest rates for building loans insured under the National Housing Act”

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69 “Submission to the Federal Task Force on Housing and Urban Development,” City of Winnipeg, 4.  
70 Ibid., 5.
as an area of improvement necessary for increased investment in condominiums.\textsuperscript{71} They go on to describe how to make condominiums a viable construction option for builders, and point out, “because the value of real estate increases each year, there must be a strong stimulus to the builder to construct and sell condominiums rather than to build for rent and retain as investments.”\textsuperscript{72} To encourage the construction of condominiums, the federal government should “consider the granting of higher loan amounts on condominium housing for loans insured under the National Housing Act.”\textsuperscript{73} When discussing the value of condominiums to purchasers, Greenwin point out a growing trend in Toronto towards apartment accommodations that started in 1958. They argue that the growing trend away from home ownership is dangerous to Canadians, especially as they reach retirement age; many people are stuck with no option but to spend their retirement savings on rent, and many also receive support and benefits from the government to do so. Their solution to this problem is condominiums, which provide the equity of a home and the potential capital gains not found with apartment rentals. Finally, Greenwin Construction discusses their own experience trying to secure funding for the construction of condominium housing in Toronto; this amounts to several failed attempts to secure loans from private lenders and a pending request to the Ontario Housing Corporation. They call on the federal government to support their request through CMHC and help them establish highrise condominium housing in Toronto.\textsuperscript{74}

All in all, Greenwin Construction had some useful insights into the housing problems faced by Canadians. This submission is valuable because it shows a different

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{71} “Public Enquiry,” Greenwin Construction, 1.
\item \textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 4.
\item \textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 5.
\end{itemize}
side to housing in Canada; the growth of condominiums to their current popularity started somewhere, and it was Companies like Greenwin Construction that saw the advantages to this type of accommodation in the ‘rise’ of their popularity. Multiple submissions from Toronto and Winnipeg identified condominium housing as a potential future form of housing. The Report discusses the “philosophy of homeownership” amongst Canadians, though discredits multi-unit housing in general in favour of traditional, single-unit housing. This is mainly due to the Task Force’s belief that the multiple unit housing of the time was wholly inadequate for family living, a belief which did not address the Canadian population without young families who could have benefited from condominium living. Their failure to address condominiums also exhibits tension between Task Force submissions and the Report because both the submissions and the report acknowledge the growing popularity of other, newer forms of housing, such as co-op housing and mobile homes.

Conclusion

The Report reveals the difficulty of using participatory democracy methods to develop consensus in a policy area as universally relevant as housing. The Report is not a perfect representation of what Canadians wanted; tensions exist between some examples of consensus found in the Report and its recommendations. Furthermore, with areas of

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75 Hellyer, Report, 17, 51.
76 Ibid., 51.
77 Co-op housing is supported on Ibid., 36-37; mobile homes on Ibid., 49-50.
tension in the submissions the Task Force received, the Report necessarily had to take sides and leave one party (or more) disappointed. This chapter has discussed some of the main sources of tension in the Report and attempted to explain why these tensions existed.

The limitations of the Task Force as a vehicle for participatory democracy are made apparent by this discussion. Some recommendations, such as the implementation of a mandatory National Building Code, were essentially futile. It is likely that Hellyer realized that not even a Task Force run by a Cabinet Minister could unite Canada’s far-flung municipalities and the federal government to agree upon adopting the Code. The Task Force exemplifies liberal-deliberative participatory democracy. If it had made different recommendations – for example, calling for immediate legislation to force private financial institutions to invest a certain amount into the mortgage market, or recommending the immediate implementation of a NBC – then it would not be liberal/deliberative participatory democracy. It might have been radical participatory democracy, but these were unlikely events to occur. It also would have been radical for the Task Force to promote condominium housing, when the Canadian housing industry and federal housing policy since the Second World War had supported the production of single-family homes. This analysis has revealed that the Task Force sought to promote the continued production of single-family homes in Canada, and geared its policy to make housing as affordable as it could for Canadians. The points of consensus and tension in the Report are what make it what it was: an exercise in liberal/deliberative participatory democracy.
Chapter Six: Conclusion

The Task Force on Housing and Urban Development believed that housing was a nationwide effort, a collaboration between various levels of government as well as private enterprise: "It means governments at all levels. It means industrialists and academics and professionals in various fields. And, far from last, it means the people of Canada themselves who in the end will decide the kind of country and society this is to be."¹ My analysis has revealed that while the Task Force did consult with all of these groups, it brought some pre-conceived notions to the table that the Task Force consultations did not influence. This included an inherent opposition towards multi-unit housing of any description as well as a publicized aversion to “academics and experts” – though every member of the Task Force could fall under this description.

As an exercise in liberal-deliberative participatory democracy, the Task Force did an impressive job of surveying opinions on housing across Canada. The research I conducted shows a strong and direct correlation between much of the specific content found in the Report and the writing in the submissions. For example, this is seen in the regionally specific recommendations directed towards improving housing for Canada’s Indigenous populations; these recommendations can be directly traced to submissions from Winnipeg. Liberal PD allows an authority to act on its own analysis of what is best in situations of tension between publics, while in situations of clear public consensus, liberal PD must acknowledge and act upon it. Deliberative PD limits the role of an authority; instead, the decision-making process, conducted between the authority and the

¹ Hellyer, Report, 13.
public, aligns the perspectives of the public consensus and the authority. The Task Force exhibits a combination of these two sub-types of participatory democracy.

The Task Force found that rising housing costs in Canada was not specifically the result of any of the three major factors they identify as influencing a home’s cost – that being “the land it is built on, the structure itself and the loan on which it is financed.”\(^2\) Instead, the Task Force concluded that these three basic factors were exacerbated by what it termed a “basic shortage” of housing stock.\(^3\) Much like Canadian housing policy throughout 1935-1969, the Report promotes home ownership as the most desirable form of housing accommodation, though the main drive of the Report is to lower the cost of housing for Canadians. It does so by making recommendations that seek to lower the high costs of the land, the physical structure, and loan – the three factors identified above. In doing so, they aimed to increase house production in order to increase the available housing stock, and therefore reduce the price of housing.

**Reaction to the Report and Tension between Hellyer and Trudeau**

In 1970, Donald Forster wrote about the Task Force Report: “Reaction from the industry to the report was generally favourable, even enthusiastic. Reaction in the press was more mixed.” He identified Conservative party opposition, which focused on disagreements between the federal and provincial governments, and “attempted to exploit emerging differences between Prime Minister Trudeau and Mr. Hellyer on the proper constitutional

\(^2\) Ibid., 14.  
\(^3\) Ibid.
boundary between federal and provincial jurisdiction in the housing and urban affairs field.” The Hansard records of the House of Commons Debates from April 25, 1969 reveal a divided House facing a bitter disagreement over the handling of housing issues by Trudeau’s government. Foster was correct in identifying the focal point of the discussion as the constitutional issues Trudeau claimed were an impediment to federal action. Leader of the Opposition, Robert Stanfield, delivered a scathing attack against Trudeau, criticizing his promotion and interpretation of federalism, his poor handling of the Hellyer report and resignation, and called him out on contradictory comments from previous sessions. For example, Stanfield pointed out Trudeau’s non-committed stance over constitutional issues related to the housing crisis:

A month or so ago the Prime Minister said it was virtually impossible to solve these problems under the existing constitution. Yesterday, he said that most of the fundamental issues could be solved under the present constitution through cooperation. If the Prime Minister believes what he said yesterday, Mr. Speaker, and the Minister of Transport believed that the Prime Minister believed it, he would not have submitted his resignation.  

Stanfield, with the support of much of the opposition, derided Trudeau on his handling of Hellyer and his report, and thanked Hellyer for his many years of service to the country.  

Bacher also points out the inconsistencies in Trudeau’s constitutional arguments against Hellyer’s proposed land assembly policies. He argues that Trudeau’s appeal to provincial rights, which conflicted with his strong-federalist political approach, may have masked economic interests. Likewise, the Dennis-Fish report of 1972 found that six major land developers owned nearly all land slated for residential development in most of

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5 Debates, April 25, 1969, 7983  
6 Ibid., 7984.  
7 Bacher, *Keeping to the Marketplace*, 238.
Canada’s major cities. Thus, Hellyer’s proposals for land assembly programs – that would put land into municipal control – posed a threat to the revenues of financial institutions, development companies, and real estate interests.

In addition to the debate over land assembly programs and the financial priorities of the Trudeau government, there are other potential reasons for the conflict between Hellyer and Trudeau. Stewart proposes one possible explanation for the failure of the task force – favoritism on the part of Trudeau. He claims, “in the Trudeau government, proximity is the key to power,” and illustrates with the following example:

Consider Paul Hellyer and Jean Marchand. Hellyer, as the minister responsible for housing, proposed reforms that the Prime Minister could not accept, he said, because they would invade provincial jurisdiction. But Marchand, in establishing the Department of Regional Economic Expansion, set up a body which, almost by definition, invades provincial jurisdiction regularly and with impunity. Marchand flourished, Hellyer withered; Marchand is of the Supergroup, and Hellyer was not.

An April 25, 1969 article in the *Winnipeg Free Press* points out that

The report also angered academics and social workers who had helped develop the conventional wisdom about public housing and resented Mr. Hellyer’s brash assertion that they were all wrong. They mounted an effective campaign against the task force proposals and found their champions in the cabinet – including Jean Marchand ... these interests formed an effective coalition in the cabinet that succeeded in bottling up Mr. Hellyer’s legislation without ever specifically rejecting it.”

Whether or not the history of competition between Trudeau and Hellyer – as seen in their rivalry for Liberal leadership – could warrant Stewart’s favouritism explanation, there is

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little doubt Hellyer knew his recommendations faced an uphill climb upon the release of the Report; Trudeau told Hellyer as much after the release of the Report. Stewart writes,

The afternoon Hellyer tabled his report, Prime Minister Trudeau came to the Transport Minister’s office for the celebratory party. He accepted a drink, sat down and said, ‘I hope you won’t be too unhappy if not much happens to this.’ In the stunned silence, he added, ‘What kind of priority do you people think this ought to get? Nineteenth?’

This gave Hellyer some pause, but was only the first sign of “storm clouds” on the horizon for the Report.

Finally, Lloyd Axworthy discusses personal reactions against Hellyer. He points out that one aspect of Cabinet opposition to Hellyer was the result of the reputation he earned following his hard line stance during the unification of the Armed Forces. According to Axworthy, “newer ministers reacted to the image of Hellyer as the tough, uncompromising minister of the unification days.” Ralph Hyman of the Globe and Mail supports this point; he quotes an unnamed colleague of Hellyer as saying “those who hated his guts said he was ruthless and arrogant in pushing through the [unification] reforms. Maybe he was, but that’s Paul Hellyer. When he believes in something, he goes all the way.” As with the Unification of the Armed Forces, Hellyer believed in the housing policy he developed in the Report. Whereas Hellyer threatened to resign over Unification, he actually went through with this over housing policy reform.

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15 Ibid.
Paul Hellyer submitted his resignation from Trudeau’s Cabinet as Minister of Transportation on April 25, 1969, effective April 30.17 Hellyer identified Trudeau’s “legalistic or classroom approach” to federalism and the Canadian Constitution as impractical and “unworkable” in light of the housing situation in Canada; he wrote, “of course, people are interested in institutions and languages and rights but so too are they interested in bread and butter issues affecting each of them directly.”18 Hellyer “tied his frustrations over housing policy” directly to Trudeau’s brand of federalism and interpretation of the Constitution, which according to Hellyer, demonstrated that “housing and urban affairs are primarily the concern of the provinces.”19 In disagreeing with this perspective, Hellyer argued that Trudeau “did not regard housing as a primary concern of the federal government but as a chief concern of the provinces.”20 In interviews following his resignation, Hellyer stated,

I would like to be a devil’s advocate for people who don’t care which level of government undertakes something as long as it is done in the most efficient manner and in a way that meets needs.21

Call it functionalism if you like. I call it making the government the servant of the people.22

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17 LAC, MG26-O11, file 12, Letter from Paul Hellyer to the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, April 24, 1969, 1.
18 Ibid., 3.
These quotes highlight the liberal/deliberative PD undercurrent in Hellyer’s political approach and after considering the constitutional argument, reveal why Trudeau and the Cabinet took issue with his recommendations.

Notwithstanding the drama and negativity surrounding Hellyer’s resignation, it was a strong statement that forced the Trudeau government to act on the Report’s housing policies. Donald Forster writes that the day following Hellyer’s resignation,

An order-in-council increased the maximum size of loans insured under the National Housing Act from $18,000 to $25,000. This step was announced, virtually simultaneously, by the Prime Minister during an emergency debate on the government’s housing policy and by Mr. Hellyer in a CMHC press release. \(^{23}\)

In addition to the immediate step to increase NHA loan maximums, 1969 saw the release of NHA amendments heavily influenced by the Report. Unfortunately, the consequences of the Trudeau government’s piece-meal response to the Report were passed on to housing consumers. Bacher writes,

The impact of the government response to the Hellyer task force was to fuel housing-price inflation. Its recommendations for stimulating home ownership were adopted, while proposals for curbing costs by streamlining the land-banking program were rejected. From [1969] to 1975, residential lot prices would increase on average by 40 per cent in Canada. \(^{24}\)

An expanded land banking program, largely inspired by the Report, was introduced in 1973’s NHA amendments, which successfully increased public revenues and provided lower cost housing to Canadians. \(^{25}\) This program was created during Trudeau’s minority government of 1972-1974 and was strongly influenced by the NDP. However, once Trudeau returned to majority leadership, the land-banking program, which had existed in


\(^{25}\) Ibid.
some capacity since 1949, was completely terminated. The *Globe and Mail* identified federal funding for municipal land banks, one of Hellyer’s most integral proposals, as one that Trudeau and the Cabinet had the most difficulty accepting in the spring of 1969.

As discussed, the *Report* called for the immediate founding of a Ministry of Housing and Urban Development. This recommendation was meant to create a body that would standardize and coordinate urban development policies between the federal, provincial, and municipal governments in Canada. Though this recommendation aligned with the consensus of the Task Force’s hearings, Frisken writes that instead, “the federal government commissioned Harvey Lithwick, an economist, to conduct Canada’s first major study of urban development with a view to helping it ‘determine what, if any, role it should play in urban affairs and the likely consequences of such a role.’” Lithwick reported in 1970, and the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs (MSUA) was finally created in 1971, with Robert Andras appointed as Minister. As Frisken points out, “the MSUA lacked the broad policy-making mandate that Hellyer, Lithwick, and others had recommended.” As a result, it was highly ineffective and suffered financial and organizational mismanagement before it was prematurely shut down before the end of the 1970s.

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26 Ibid., 242.
29 Stewart, *Shrug*, 33. Stewart points out that the new Ministry was given little money to work with.
Conclusion

The Federal Task Force on Housing and Urban Development was an undertaking in liberal/deliberative participatory democracy. Areas of public consensus and tension were identified through an extensive consultation program that informed the final recommendations of the Report. My research has indicated that while the Report was strongly influenced by issues that held a public consensus, it suffers from clear bias in other areas. The Task Force was predisposed to several points of view that affected its recommendations. Multi-unit housing was written off before the Task Force began its deliberations; large-scale public housing projects were looked down upon, and the views of its prominent promoters faced Task Force opposition; finally, even though they heeded points of consensus in the submissions, the tone of the Report and the hearings was that the Task Force already knew the right thing to do. Notwithstanding these criticisms, the Report displays a high degree of consensus with Task Force submissions and generally a high degree of interaction with that material to come to the conclusions and recommendations that it did. The Task Force realized it was part of a long string of housing initiatives in the Canadian post-war period, and its aim was to be a difference-maker in a policy field that had seen little improvement over 35 years.

The 1972 Denis-Fish report points out that its recommendations reinforce those the Task Force made in 1969; they wrote, “real progress has not been retarded by an absence of ideas or understanding but by an unwillingness to act, to come to grips with the problem and attack it systematically and comprehensively.”

32 Dennis and Fish, *Low-Income Housing*, 15.
the immediate adoption of a comprehensive housing program that targeted the costs of
land, financing, and construction in order to make homes more affordable to Canadians.
The *Report* was informed by a liberal/deliberative PD consultation process; deficiencies
and biases found within it, such as the promotion of the house construction industry
through the promotion of home ownership, were part of a pre-conceived framework that
the Task Force held. When taken into account as a whole, Hellyer’s program could have
been a difference maker in the history of housing policy in Canada. In the end, the study
of the Task Force on Housing and Urban Development reveals the limits of participatory
democracy in policy initiatives; no matter how well the Task Force embodied
liberal/deliberative democracy, its recommendations were tied to the larger government
policies and party politics of Canada’s representative democracy.
List of Task Force intervenors by category with location of submission origin in parentheses. Source location is provided. Letters from unaffiliated citizens are not included below.

Administrative

City of Winnipeg (Winnipeg):

Commissioner of Buildings, City of Toronto (Toronto):
LAC, MG32-B33, vol. 198, file 5. “Comments of S. E. Wellwood, Commissioner of Buildings, City of Toronto, on the basic differences between the National Building Code and City of Toronto Building By-law No. 300-68, enacted by City Council at its meeting held October 9, 1968 and made effective November 1, 1968.” S. E. Wellwood. October 9, 1968.

Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (Ottawa):

Downtown Business Association of Winnipeg (Winnipeg):


Government of Manitoba (Winnipeg):

Manitoba Metis Federation (Winnipeg):
Manitoba Urban Association (Winnipeg):

Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg (Winnipeg):

National Research Council of Canada (Ottawa):

Office of the Toronto City Clerk (Toronto):

Construction and Planning

Alcan Design Homes Limited (Toronto):

Greenwin Construction (Toronto):

Jack Klein and Henry Sears Architects (Toronto):

Kennedy, Li, Simonsen, Smith Architects Consortium (Winnipeg):

Manitoba Association of Architects (Winnipeg):

Urban Development Institute – Ontario Division (Toronto):
Winnipeg House Builders Association (Winnipeg):

Financial

Mortgage Insurance Company of Canada (Toronto):

Victoria and Grey Trust Company (Toronto):

Real Estate

Gault-Preston Real Estate Board Inc. (Toronto):

Society of Real Estate Appraisers (Toronto):

Social Groups

Dr. Albert Rose, School of Social Work, University of Toronto (Toronto):

H. O. P. E. Housing Ontario People Economically (Toronto):

Kensington Area Residents’ Association (Toronto):
Manitoba Association of Social Workers (Winnipeg):

Trefann Court Residents Association (Toronto):

United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (Toronto):
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Paul Hellyer Fonds. MG32-B33
Department of Transport MG32-B33
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Pierre Elliott Trudeau Fonds. MG26-O/R11629-0-8-E.

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http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca

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_____.*Conversations with Canadians.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972.


**Newspapers**

*The Globe and Mail.*

*The Ottawa Citizen.*

*Winnipeg Free Press.*

**Reports**


**Secondary Sources**


Schindler, Frank and C. Michael Lanphier. “Social Science Research and Participatory Democracy In Canada.” Canadian Public Administration 12, No.4 (December 1969): 481-498


**Conference Presentation**


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