JUST THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG:  
SOUTHERN MEDIA DEPICTIONS OF CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY IN THE ARCTIC

by

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ABSTRACT

As climate change opens up the Arctic, Canada’s sovereignty in the region has received increasing attention in both federal politics and the media. Meanwhile, Inuit have lived in the Arctic since time immemorial. Many Southern Canadians – whose awareness may ultimately have policy implications – rely largely on mainstream media to learn about the region. Therefore, I examine Canadian news stories and seek to illuminate what discourses emerge about Arctic sovereignty. To provide a counter narrative, I also analyze media highlighted and produced by the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, an organization that speaks to Arctic sovereignty directly. Comparing discourses found in Southern news and ITK texts suggests where discrepancies might exist between Inuit and Southern views on sovereignty in the Arctic. I aim to show how unpacking and addressing these different perspectives is fundamental to ensuring that the impacts of colonialism in the Arctic are not exacerbated by sovereignty discourse.
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION

I can’t pinpoint exactly when or how I became enamoured with the Arctic or interested in the idea that, within what is now Canada, Inuit people had subsisted in the far north “since time immemorial” (Byers, 2009; Simon, 2011). But my decision to research Canada’s far north was undoubtedly made in a classroom, well below the Arctic Circle, and without consulting anyone who actually lived in the Arctic. Like many students of Anthropology, I’d been trained to think I had a role to play in examining other cultures and other places that are not my own.

Throughout my graduate studies though, I learned quickly the difficulty in researching the North as a Southerner due to time, cost and access. In my experience, a tumultuous history of exploitative research made even Inuit organizations based in the South wary of working with a non-Inuit (and inexperienced) researcher. Ultimately, my concern that I should not be writing about “Indigenous issues” as a Settler became overwhelming, so I’ve endeavoured not to. Instead, I write about “Settler issues” – a perspective I am better equipped to speak to. I write about “Canadian issues” from my position as a Canadian who is perplexed by injustice within our own borders. Moreover, I write as someone who is descended from a system in which structural violence, racism, and reinforced ignorance have allowed some to prosper on land that did not originally belong to them, while those who were here first suffer for their gain.

At this point, it is important to introduce a few semantic qualifications. Throughout my thesis, I often refer to the “Canadian Arctic”. I am referring to the area of the Arctic that is within the colonial boundaries of Canada. It is problematic to refer to these areas as “Canadian” because that definition does not necessarily speak to Inuit sovereignty in the region. In addition, some areas of the Arctic are still disputed at an international level. I also use the phrases “Settler” or “Settler Canadian” and “Southerner” or “Southern Canadian”. With these phrases, I
simply mean one who lives in Canada and is not indigenous to this land and one who lives in Canada but does not live in the Arctic, respectively. Following Inuit scholars and organizations, I’m using the term “Southern” broadly to describe non-Inuit peoples living outside the Arctic.

The difficulty I encountered in trying to find a way to genuinely learn about and experience the North is relevant because it means that I, like most Southern Canadians, rely heavily on the media to learn about the Arctic. Therefore, media plays a large (and sometimes singular) role in how Southern Canadians understand the Arctic. I argue that these understandings are important because they will ultimately influence the Federal Government’s approach to Arctic sovereignty, following the work of Asch (2014) and Noble (2015) who suggest that Canada’s government is more likely to work towards ameliorating Indigenous-Settler relations when pressured by the public to do so. Therefore, my thesis explores how the concept of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic is discussed in Southern media.

Some central questions I seek to answer in my thesis are: what messages are coming to Southerners about Canada’s Sovereignty in the Arctic? Who do these messages come from? How could discourses about sovereignty in the Arctic perpetuated by Southern media sources impact government action? What alternative discourses about Arctic sovereignty are offered by Inuit organizations? Where do these discourses come together and diverge?

National boundaries in the Arctic are still contested, leaving many northern nations navigating their relations with one another. With the opening up of Arctic waterways due to a changing climate and melting ice, how the Arctic is used and protected, monitored and policed, and who in fact should be making these decisions is more important than ever. During his time as Prime Minister, Stephen Harper made annual trips to the Arctic. Harper described the North as “a fundamental part of our [Canadian] heritage and national identity,” and cited the Conservative
Government of Canada as having “made significant progress on economic and social development, asserting our sovereignty, providing good governance, and protecting the Northern Environment” (Carter, 2011). He also referred to Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic as “non-negotiable”, despite disagreements over boundaries with the US and Denmark (Carter, 2011).

According to Michael Byers (2010), nothing is more important to Canada’s claim to Arctic sovereignty than the historic presence of Inuit. However, Harper repeatedly said that the “first principle of sovereignty [in the Arctic] is to ‘use it or lose it’” (Carter, 2011). This statement pays inadequate homage to Inuit peoples living in the Arctic now, implying that the region is not already being used.

In 2008, Mary Simon went on a national speaking tour of Canada entitled “Sovereignty Begins at Home”. Then president of the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, Simon explained how “Inuit in Canada’s Arctic find themselves at a point of convergence in their modern history”, as they “are at the forefront of sovereignty discussions and at the center of energy supply plans; they are the ‘canary in the coalmine’ for the global dialogue on climate change” (Simon, 2008, p. 250). In her speech, Simon explained that “a twenty-first century model for Arctic sovereignty must move beyond the out-dated model of infrastructure and military bases by including Inuit as partners in defining new goals for sovereignty that include ensuring that new investments are linked to improving the well-being of the Inuit” (Simon, 2008, p. 250).

My thesis aims to engage all of these issues and contribute to an emerging literature on Arctic sovereignty. Like Gordon Christie and Mary Simon, I have tried to write an account that shows the responsibility that Arctic nation-states have to genuinely include Inuit as equal (if not more authoritative) participants in discussions about Arctic sovereignty. Furthermore, my work brings together literature on sovereignty (Simon, Byers, Christie), Indigenous-Settler relations
(Asch, Alfred, Borrows, Coulthard) and Indigenous epistemology (Blaser, Cruikshank, De La Cadena, Povinelli). My research aims to offer an account that could be valuable for bridging communication between Inuit peoples and Southerners on how to address geographic and political changes in the Arctic resulting from climate change.

Westphalian sovereignty, as practiced in Canada today, is based on the notion that states have defined borders wherein only one nation can govern (Asch, 2014). Sovereignty from this perspective often refers to concepts such as ownership, legal claim and clearly set geographic boundaries (Christie, McNeil, Noble). However, an Inuit understanding of sovereignty is much more fluid, and relates to a more communal relationship to land and place and a reciprocal relationship with land and animals (Christie, Cruikshank, McNeil, Simon). I argue that understanding these variations in worldviews is important to building relationships between Inuit and Southerners that are both mutually understanding and just. Therefore, throughout my thesis, I take a more flexible approach to sovereignty that aims to bridge the intersection between Inuit definitions of sovereignty and a Westphalian definition – an approach that values both worldviews equally and does not presume one definition to be truer than the other. This is a fundamental theoretical and methodological choice that aims to create a thicker account as well as to work in a decolonizing fashion.

Even when I am not addressing it directly, my research is done within the milieu of discussions about climate change. Climate change is generated beyond the scope of any given sovereign. It affects others regardless of their sovereignty, while simultaneously demanding the autonomous engagement and political authority of peoples to respond. Once understood by Southerners, Inuit political practices may challenge non-Inuit existing conventions of
sovereignty. Bridging these understandings of sovereignty will be important in helping Inuit and non-Inuit Canadians address the problem of climate change effectively and collaboratively.

My work is also deeply influenced by both literature and a scholarly community that hopes to decolonize research. Anthropologists have historically profited and received recognition writing and teaching colonial depictions of others. However, the discipline has moved to decolonize. But this decolonizing move is not unproblematic. Anthropologists can now make their living lecturing and publishing “decolonizing research”, yet the voices of those who have been truly impacted by this colonialism are still sometimes absent. And like other scholars whose work has influenced mine, I am constantly aware of the complicit role that anthropologists historically played in colonialism in the first place. Throughout this thesis, I try to find my way through this uneasiness.

Finally, with this thesis I combine Media Studies (Macdonald, Rothenbuhler and Coman) with Anthropology and bring ideas about perception (Bourdieu) together with theories of epistemology (Povinelli, Cruikshank) and ontology (Ingold, De la Cadena), as well as Indigenous political theory (Alfred, Borrows, Coulthard, Tully).

My research focuses on Southern news articles and what discourses can be uncovered about Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic based on recurring stories in Southern media. In addition, and to provide another perspective, I analyzed media highlighted and produced by an Inuit organization which speaks to the concept of sovereignty directly, the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK). Finally, I compared discourses found in Southern news stories about Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic with discourses found in material highlighted by the ITK, with specific attention to the discursive interchange between the two sets of sources. I use “discourse” somewhat flexibly to refer to communication or patterns of communication observed in textual
analysis. However, I also follow Norman Fairclough’s (2010) approach to “discourse,” which he describes as “not simply an entity we can define independently: we can only arrive at an understanding of it by analyzing sets of relations” (p. 3), for example, “the dialectical relations between discourse and power” (p. 6).

I begin with my literature review, where I discuss how the concept of sovereignty relates to citizenship and self-determination. In addition, I situate the idea of Arctic sovereignty in a Canadian context, addressing, at a high level some of the region’s history. Finally, I address sovereignty as it relates to multiple ontologies, and discuss its (in)appropriateness as a concept in the Canadian Arctic.

In chapter three, I discuss my methods and theoretical framework. Media Anthropology (Rothenbuhler & Coman, 2005; Boyer, 2012; Spitulnik, 1993) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), as theorized by Norman Fairclough (2010), influenced my methodological approach.

In terms of my theoretical framework, I analyzed media to look for reoccurring themes around Arctic Sovereignty and Inuit peoples in Canada. When examining these themes, I utilized both Frank Sejersen’s (2004) contextualist position as well as Donna Haraway’s (1988) notion of situated knowledges. Moreover, Fairclough’s CDA not only provided methodological guidance, but also a theoretical lens through which to analyze media.

In my work, I tried to move away from the privileging of Western knowledge in conversations about the Arctic and move to a more contextualist position, as Sejersen suggests. Using Donna Haraway’s notion of situated knowledge to analyze themes apparent in media also helped me reach a contextualist position.

Recognizing the fact that the knowledge I am both studying and creating is situated helped me move to my work to a contextualist position, which acknowledges that discourses
around Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic are historically, politically and ontologically specific. Therefore, applying Haraway and Sejersen’s work to my project allowed me to recognize that “sovereignty” in the Arctic is not unitary in how it is conceived and practiced.

Finally, following the work of Brian Noble (2015), I continually situated my work in the colonial milieu in which it is done, aiming to both recognize and name coloniality when I came across it as well as responding in a way that follows a “decolonial ethic” by positioning myself as a researcher and Settler, acknowledging the (often unmet) obligations that exist between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian State and making recommendations for improvement in both the inter-cultural and inter-political registers (Noble, 2015).

In chapters four and five, I analyzed web-archived news stories about Arctic sovereignty from five Southern sources, the Toronto Star, The Globe and Mail, the National Post, the Canadian Broadcasting Company (CBC) and The Media Co-Op. I aimed to uncover what recurring discourses about sovereignty in the Arctic are found within these stories. The aforementioned sources were chosen based on readership, accessibility and diversity of ownership.

In order to keep the project to a workable size, I only focused on articles between 2011, when the Conservative Party won a majority government in Canada, and 2015, when the writ was dropped and the Conservatives began campaigning for the October 2015 election. I’ve chosen this parameter because Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic was a large part of Stephen Harper’s campaign platform and received a great deal of media attention during his time as Prime Minister (Humphreys, 2014; Rennie, 2014; Chase, 2014a). Therefore, Stephen Harper’s governance may have influenced dominant understandings of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic.
In my next substantive chapter, I focus on the ITK, which is an advocacy organization that serves as “a national voice protecting and advancing the rights and interests of Inuit in Canada” (ITK, Who We Are, 2016). The ITK, based in Ottawa, has a staff of approximately thirty people and is governed by a president and a board, with the president elected by the board for three-year terms (ITK, Who We Are, 2016). The organization relies on a combination of donations and federal funding. I specifically chose to focus on the ITK organization because it is broad (geographically, it reaches across multiple Inuit populations). Moreover, the ITK extensively highlights media (news stories, documentaries, and so on) produced by Inuit peoples. In addition, the ITK has produced a number of annual reports, strategic plans and declarations that speak to Arctic sovereignty. Analyzing media highlighted by the ITK provides powerful counter-narratives to discourses found in and created by Southern media sources about Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic.

In my final substantive chapter, I compare discourses found in Southern news stories with those found in ITK material, with attention to what myths (Lule, 2005) are emerging about the region.

Finally, in my conclusion, I summarize my research findings and provide final insights. I discuss the mantra often used in media studies and public relations: “perception is reality”. But in the Arctic, whose perception is deciding whose reality? And what happens when there are potentially multiple realities to begin with? How has media created perceptions about Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, and how have these perceptions impacted reality, for both Southerners and Inuit peoples?

Overall, the Southern news sources I analyzed painted an incomplete picture of Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic, one that often excluded and sometimes altogether erased Inuit and
Inuit perspectives from mainstream Arctic sovereignty discourse. Southern news assumed a Westphalian definition of sovereignty and failed to include Inuit perspectives on sovereignty, even though these perspectives are well documented by organizations like the ITK. While a lack of depth and context in news stories is of course not unique to Arctic sovereignty discussions, the Arctic example is unique in that multiple worldviews and worlds overlap in an area where melting ice is rapidly changing the political and literal landscape. My goal is to unpack how the convergence of this liminal landscape, a history of colonialism in the region and the exclusion of Inuit from mainstream news is both symptomatic of and simultaneously furthers colonialism in Canada.
CHAPTER 2   LITERATURE REVIEW

Gordon Christie, a University of British Columbia-based legal scholar warns, “the new threat of massive intrusions by the Canadian government—fuelled by powerful desires for the store of resource wealth formerly safe in the far northern vault—is only now building, as the second stage of colonization looms” (2011, p. 331). The concern of impending and already occurring moves for “Arctic sovereignty” by the Canadian State, the linkages between these state-enacted efforts and the well-being of the Inuit and global climate change are the milieu in which my thesis is written.

I argue the question of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic cannot be conceptualized without considering Inuit sovereignty, autonomy, authority and the political relationship between Inuit peoples and the Canadian state. While some authors discuss how the historic presence of Inuit in the Arctic can be used as an argument for Canadian sovereignty, others look critically at what sovereignty narratives mean to and for Inuit.

Moreover, Inuit epistemology and ontology are fundamentally different from the dominant Southern Canadian (and Western) worldview. It is critical to remember this in discussions of Arctic sovereignty and autonomy, as concepts that come up like ownership and jurisdiction might not have an equivalent in Inuit culture. Alain Pottage (2004) writes, “according to popular perception, legal institutions are supposed to be based on a natural division between persons and things” (p. 5), and the concept of “ownership “is central to the treatment of personification and reification” (p. 6). Nature and land are often treated more like “things” in Western practice in the sense that they can be legally owned; however, Indigenous peoples may see the land as being inextricable linked to spiritual beings and part of a larger holistic culture.
and tradition, which makes the concept of ownership difficult (De La Cadena, 2010; Bennett and Rowley, 2004).

In this chapter, I have addressed two areas of scholarship that have been pivotal to my thesis. Broadly, I am referring to literature that discusses sovereignty and literature that discusses ontology. While I bring in a variety of other literature and case material to support my thinking in other chapters, reviewing literature that discusses sovereignty and ontology specifically in this chapter was the most focused way to set up for my analysis. My section on ontology includes a discussion of the nature/culture divide that has been imposed on Indigenous peoples by the Western world. In addition, I present an argument for addressing relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples as adversarial relations among worlds rather than epistemological differences rooted in culture or belief systems. In my discussion of sovereignty, I focus on literature that addresses concepts of sovereignty, citizenship and self-determination in Indigenous-Settler contexts. In addition, I touch on literature that puts Arctic sovereignty discussions in the context of climate change. Then, I examine the appropriateness of sovereignty as a concept in the Canadian Arctic.

**Background**

Before I consider contemporary politics in the Arctic, a brief discussion of the region’s history is useful. Europeans came to the Arctic in three waves beginning with the Norse and the English searching for resources and a route to the Orient (Henderson, 2007). Next came Scottish, Norse and Dutch whalers, and simultaneously the Hudson’s Bay company began operating an extensive trading post network (Henderson, 2007) in the Arctic. Finally, Roman
Catholic and Anglican missionaries arrived, aiming to bring Christianity to Inuit (Henderson, 2007).

Inuit were not included in the first Indian Act of 1876, and Canada only became federally “responsible” for Inuit after a Supreme Court decision in 1939 (Henderson, 2007). Between 1953 and 1955, fifteen Inuit families were relocated from Northern Quebec to the High Arctic, supposedly to alleviate starvation in their communities by going somewhere with more available animals to hunt (Henderson, 2007). However, Resolute and Grise Fiord, where they were moved to, had very different environments than Northern Quebec, so this was not an easy transition (Henderson, 2007). Ailsa Henderson (2007) suggests that instead they were moved there as part of a Canadian sovereignty claim to the High Arctic. Between 1955 and 1957, in response to fears that the Soviet Union could use the Arctic to dispatch weapons, the Distant Early Warning Line (DEW) was constructed by Canada and the United States (Henderson, 2007). It brought 20,000 workers to the Arctic, and it marked the beginning of the transition to large-scale wage labour (Henderson, 2007) in the region. According to Henderson (2007), the relocation of Inuit families to the High Arctic and the construction of the DEW line show first “that the federal government viewed the Arctic environment as something that could be owned and, later, something that could be controlled” (p. 22). Second, these events showed that Inuit received “federal attention first as objects of policy and second as incidental participants in megaprojects that would mark a profound transformation in their way of life” (Henderson, 2007, p. 22). The relocation of Inuit peoples fell out of line with the fundamental importance of place and memory for Inuit peoples. In addition, viewing the land in the Arctic as something that could be controlled disagrees with the Inuit belief in a reciprocal and mutually dependent relationship with the land.
Canadian Sovereignty Today

Michael Byers (2009) contends that Inuit in Canada have already been exercising their self-determination in the Arctic, which strengthens Canada’s claim to sovereignty on an international stage. Byers (2009) also cites the importance of Arctic sovereignty in terms of controlling resource extraction and commercial activity in the Arctic and having the ability to control shipping traffic in newly-melted routes, like the Northwest Passage, both of which would greatly impact the lives of Inuit peoples living in the area. However, Byers (2009) claims by signing the 1993 Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, Inuit peoples living in this area “explicitly assigned to Canada any sovereign rights that the Inuit and their ancestors had acquired through thousand of years of use and occupancy of both land and sea-ice” (p. 8). Therefore, while providing an excellent source for understanding international sovereignty disputes in the Arctic on a broad and general level, other scholars provide more robust accounts of how Arctic sovereignty is linked to Inuit-State relations in Canada.

For example, Terry Fenge (2008) and Terry Fenge and Tony Penikett (2009) also discuss how the Inuit presence in the Arctic can be used as an argument for Canadian sovereignty. Both Fenge and Penikett have extensive experience working with Northern Indigenous peoples. Terry Fenge sat on the Inuit Circumpolar Council and Tony Penikett is the former Premier of the Yukon Territories. Fenge (2008) discusses how Ottawa should use Inuit to shore up Canadian sovereignty. But he also argues that the Canadian government should involve Inuit in decisions about the Arctic. Similarly, Fenge and Penikett (2009) argue that the creation of the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental organization which addresses issues faced by both Indigenous
peoples and governing bodies in the Arctic, was one of Canada’s best foreign policy moves around Arctic sovereignty.

Jessica Shadian (2009) takes the argument made by Fenge and Penikett one step further. She writes, “the ultimate authorities over the future course and direction of Arctic development should be the Arctic players themselves: the Arctic nations and the Arctic’s indigenous peoples, who make up a great proportion of the High North’s population” (Shadian, 2007, p. 72). She suggests the creation of a single Arctic management plan “from an Arctic perspective, or else [Arctic residents] run the risk of being subject to a host of policy efforts ranging from the EU to China, who may or may not take into account what is best for the Arctic’s residents” (p. 72).

Shadian (2009), like Fenge and Penikett, also points to the Arctic Council as a good solution, especially because it gives equal voice to Arctic Indigenous peoples. Like Byers, Shadian (2009) conveys the importance of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. Increased shipping could cause severe environmental degradation in the region if it is not properly managed, and Shadian (2009) posits that once the Northwest Passage opens completely, the number of tourists who visit the Arctic will only increase. However, she still envisions the Indigenous populations of the Arctic as justifications for the sovereignty of their respective countries, and does not attempt to unpack what sovereignty discourse may actually mean to Inuit.

**Ontology, Science and Politics**

Understanding different concepts of ownership and relationship to the land are crucial to understanding contemporary sovereignty discussions in the Arctic. First, Western notions of the nature/culture divide are not necessarily present among Northern peoples. According to Tim Ingold (2006), people in the circumpolar North have often been described as animists due to their
supposed imputation of life into objects that Western science describes as inert. But according to Ingold, this difference in ontology is about more than what’s alive and what isn’t. Ingold writes, “life in the animic ontology is not an emanation but a generation of being, in a world that is not pre-ordained but incipient, forever on the verge of the actual” (pp. 11-12). In animic ontology, organisms don’t just act in relation to the environment, but they are intertwined with it. Ingold argues that science, rather than allowing itself to be astonished by this interacting web of relations, stands “above and beyond the very world it claims to understand”, thus “science rests upon an impossible foundation” (p. 19).

Elizabeth Povinelli (1995) similarly writes about how once Western society categorizes something as “cultural” or a “belief system”, it comes into question what weight they should be given in politics or the economy. Povinelli incisively questions, “if culture is a lens through which the local group mediates the practices and policies of the large system, then what of the lens of the larger system and its practices of knowing?” (p. 506). In other words, Povinelli points out the hypocrisy in viewing the beliefs of Indigenous people as “a lens” without recognizing the situated, culturally constructed nature of Western bureaucracy, government and institutions. Therefore, the difference between whether something is envisioned as epistemological or ontological in the political sphere is crucial, especially when it comes to discussions of sovereignty. Acknowledging co-existing worlds lends itself to a relationship of respect far more so than saying that there is one world, and only different ways of understanding it, which of course lends itself to believing that certain ways of understanding it are wrong. Povinelli points out that “the evaluative apparatus of national and international economic policy has been little influenced by non-Western understandings of human-environmental relations” (p. 515) and that until it is, Indigenous perspectives will “lose the war of need” as “some wider perspective will
always be generated that puts their lives ‘in context’” (p. 515).

Arguably, Southern media takes Western knowledge and science for granted. Journalists (and media outlets) present their stories as objective fact, rather than positioned accounts created from specific, constructed knowledge. Therefore, it is beneficial to bring the concepts of epistemology and ontology into a study of mainstream media.

Marisol de la Cadena (2010) points out that “the presence of earth-beings in social protests invites us to slow down reasoning because it may evince an intriguing moment of epistemic rupture with this theory of politics” (p. 343). In her article, “Indigenous Cosmopolitics in the Andes: Conceptual Reflections beyond ‘Politics,’” de la Cadena discusses how earth-beings (in this case, a mountain) are appearing as actors in social protests in Latin America. She writes that this intrusions of what is thought of (in Western ontology) as nature into the social “may evince a moment of rupture of modern politics and an emergent Indigeneity [and]… an insurgence of indigenous forces and practices with the capacity to significantly disrupt prevalent political formations” (p. 336). Her suggestion to slow down reasoning relates to the work of Isabelle Stengers (2005), who suggests that academics must slow down science in order to take seriously, if not literally, the presence of these non-human actors in politics. Stengers’ suggestion to slow down knowledge production though, is in stark contrast to the fast-paced, deadline driven world of journalism. In Southern news stories, perhaps Western ways of knowing the world are continuously taken for granted, partially at least, due to the lack of time journalists have to produce stories.

De la Cadena also discusses Eduardo Viveiros de Castro’s concept of equivocation. Equivocation is not the inability to understand, rather, it is failing to comprehend that different understandings are not due to different worldviews, they are due to actual different worlds being...
viewed. De la Cadena discusses how there can be specific sites of equivocation. I suggest that the Arctic is a high-profile site of equivocation.

Julie Cruikshank (2005) similarly writes about how glacial landscapes in Alaska act as social spaces “that include relationships with non-human beings (like glaciers and features of landscape) sharing characteristics of personhood” (p. 2005). This is an example of “traditional knowledge” that is often cited in research of the area, but it’s “hermetically sealed within categories like ‘indigenous’ in ways that reinforces the coloniality of the concept” (p. 370). Reinforced here is the idea that glacial landscapes being social is something that’s confined to the culture of indigenous peoples, a (lesser) epistemological difference rather than an example of a site of equivocation or a reason to believe that we live in a pluriverse.

However, De la Cadena sees sites of equivocation as an opportunity to force “the ontological pluralisation of politics” (p. 360). This would mean “the possibility of adversarial relations among worlds” in the political sphere. The Arctic could be a place this type of ontological politics could occur.

Ingold writes, “in the animic ontology, beings do not simply occupy the world, they *inhabit* [sic] it, and in so doing… they contribute to its ever-evolving weave” (p. 14). Ingold discusses how in an animic ontology, a tree might be seen as alive because of its upward movement from the ground, whereas in scientific ontology a tree is seen as alive because it is “a cellular organism whose growth is fuelled by photosynthetic reactions and regulated by DNA in the cell nucleus” (p. 15). This points to a troubling incommensurability between worlds. In other words, once we acknowledge that Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples might actually occupy different ontological worlds, we are still sharing geographic and political spaces, and ontology aside, impacting one another.
Perhaps the way we can avoid the problem of how incommensurability undoes the possibility of making relations is by acknowledging not just different epistemologies, but also different ontologies, but then looking for common ground within ontologies. Ultimately, the distinction between ontology and epistemology is only symbolic and semantic when written about in literature. In order for it to matter, those in positions of power (especially in Western politics and bureaucracy) need to acknowledge and believe that their world is not the only relevant one. They need to actually be interested in a relationship between two equally significant worlds, and not just accommodate different (hierarchical) ways of knowing the same world into their system. Neither should one world impose itself upon another. Or perhaps the distinction is not as philosophically important as we think it is, but we need to question how politics are shaped around the constructs of ontology and epistemology. As de la Cadena writes, the first step is for us Westerners to “unlearn the single ontology of politics” (p. 361).

Considering the educative work done by the ITK is one good place for Southerners and Southern media to begin considering different worlds, worldviews and possibilities for relation making.

Reclaiming Sovereignty?

Barret Weber and Rob Shield (2011) consider how sovereignty is virtualized in the Arctic. They discuss how sovereignty is typically understood as “the legitimate control over a definable territory” and point out that although the concept of sovereignty has a long history, “recently it has primarily been seen as a construct that expresses struggle and disagreement over general questions of so-called human nature, the social contract and ‘realist’ relation between states and the theory of [International Relations]” (p. 104). According to Weber and Shields, in the Arctic, “claims of absolute or undivided sovereignty” (p. 104) have come into question.
They define sovereignty as “a form of power and order-making that is always already caught up in practices of socio-political resistance” (p. 104). For example, “not only rival states but also many contending claimants inside Canada assert different forms of sovereignty and pseudo-sovereignty that generally range from rights to limited self-governance to assertion of full governance” (p. 106). In addition, “Indigenous communities often occupy geographic areas that transect (and in some ways, puts into question) state territory” (p. 106). Weber and Shields argue that the north is often envisioned as “up there”, someplace remote, but having no actual “consensual referent” because “the very stakes of what is most important in the north is precisely a debate about what the north properly is in an ontological sense” (p. 110). In the Arctic, there is what Weber and Shields refer to as “intangible property,” Indigenous knowledge and multiple political perspectives, and thus it is far from Hobbes’ *Leviathan* that neutralizes politics (pp. 110-111). Weber and Shields argue that sovereignty never neutralizes politics, yet the perception of the decline of “state sovereignty and control over the region is usually represented as a crisis in all sorts of ways, politically, socially, and in terms of ‘security’” (p.111).

Webber and Shields also discuss how science has been a key element in claiming sovereignty in the Arctic and exerting colonial control in the post World War II Era. For example, they discuss how “places and regions… are often reduced to abstract latitude and longitude coordinates constructed from the ‘god’s eye view’, which are supposed to be value-neutral representations rather than the space of other symbolic and topologies or mythical spacializations” (p. 113). They suggest we look at the Inuit Circumpolar Council’s Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic as a document that reveals “an alternate sense of those terms compared to that promulgated by the Government of Canada” (p. 117).
Michelle Raheja (2007) also calls the dominant understanding of sovereignty as “the legitimate control over a definable territory” (*ibid*) into question with her exploration of the concept of “visual sovereignty”. Raheja discusses how in Robert Flaherty’s iconic 1922 documentary about an Inuk family living in the Arctic, *Nanook of the North*, Nanook’s smiling at the camera could be seen as a type of resistance to the then-inexperienced white filmmaker. Raheja’s work follows suit with analyses of *Nanook* that suggest the characters were actually laughing at Flaherty rather than passively complying with their filming. In her article, Raheja explores “what it means for indigenous people to ‘laugh at the Camera’ as a tactic of what [she calls] ‘visual sovereignty’” (p. 1160). In contrast to *Nanook*, Raheja discusses Inuit director Zacharias Kunuk’s *Atanarjuat (The Fast Runner)* as an example she thinks is “between resistance and compliance wherein indigenous filmmakers and actors revisit, contribute to, borrow from, critique, and reconfigure ethnographic film conventions, at the same time operating within and stretching the boundaries created by these conventions” (p. 1161). Raheja also categorizes this approach as “visual sovereignty”. Raheja’s article reminds readers of the way Inuit have resisted sovereignty as imposed by others.

Raheja writes, “sovereignty is an ontological and philosophical concept with very real practical, political and cultural ramifications that unites the experiences of Native Americans, but it is a difficult idea to define because it is always in motion and is inherently contradictory” (p. 1163). Raheja suggests that “visual sovereignty” can be a way of “reimagining Native-centered articulations of self-representation and autonomy that engage the powerful ideologies of mass media, but that do not rely solely on the texts and contexts of Western jurisprudence” (p. 1163). Raheja argues that Native nations conceptualized sovereignty even prior to European contact even if they didn’t conceptualize it as “nation-to-nation political sovereignty” (p. 1164). For
example, the Iroquois Two Row Wampum Belt Treaty acts as a visual representation of sovereignty. Raheja argues, “the English word *sovereignty*… [became] a placeholder for the multitude of indigenous designations that also [took] into account the European origins of the idea” (p. 1164). Therefore, visual sovereignty can be a good way to change the game of what sovereignty is, and bring in narrative understandings of sovereignty (as opposed to just legal discourse which is more rigid and less open to interpretation).

Taiaiake Alfred (1999), however, offers a much more critical perspective of reclamations of sovereignty. He argues that until recently, sovereignty has been a useful critique for Indigenous peoples because it forces the state to recognize “major inconsistencies between its own principles and its treatment of Native people, it has pointed to the racism and contradiction inherent in settler states’ claimed authority over non-consenting peoples” and has provided Native people grounds for greater assertion of the right to self-government (1999, p. 55). However, he writes that sovereignty should not be the primary political goal of indigenous people because sovereignty, “as Native leaders have constructed it thus far, is incompatible with traditional indigenous notions of power” (p. 55). Furthermore, he believes that “non-indigenous politicians recognize the inherent weakness of assertions of a sovereign right for peoples who have neither the cultural framework nor the institutional capacity to sustain it” (p. 57). Furthermore, for Alfred, for the state to *accept* Native sovereignty *within the context of the sovereignty of the state* “represents the culmination of white society’s efforts to assimilate indigenous peoples” (p. 59).

Alfred (1999) especially lambasts Native leaders who have adopted the ideology of sovereignty because it props up the existing structure of the colonial authority. Alfred (1999) suggests these Native leaders “don’t really believe in a sovereign right for indigenous peoples; it
is simply a bargaining chip, a lever for concession with the established constitutional framework” (p. 56). Furthermore, “in making a claim to sovereignty, even if they don’t really mean it- they are making a choice to accept the state as their model and to allow indigenous political goals to be framed and evaluated according to a ‘statist’ pattern” (p. 56).

**Sovereignty and Self-Determination**

ITK sources, which I elaborate upon in Chapter Five, often speak to Inuit self-determination in Arctic sovereignty discussions. However, Glen Coulthard (2002) critiques self-determination discourse. He discusses the Canadian state’s refusal to “recognize Aboriginal peoples’ equal and self-determining status based on its adherence to legal precedent founded on the white supremacist myth that Indigenous societies were too primitive to bear political rights when they first encountered European powers” (p. 451). Therefore, even though the Supreme Court of Canada may have secured many cultural rights for Indigenous peoples, “it has nonetheless repeatedly refused to challenge the racist origin of Canada’s assumed sovereignty authority over Indigenous peoples and their territories” (p. 451). Therefore, Coulthard argues, “those struggling against colonialism must ‘turn away’ from the colonial state and society and find in their own transformative praxis (sic) the source of their liberation” (p. 456).

Glen Coulthard (2007) writes, “over the last 30 years, the self-determination efforts and objectives of Indigenous peoples in Canada have increasingly been cast in the language of ‘recognition’” (p. 437). He does not believe that “the colonial relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state can be significantly transformed via a politics of recognition” (p. 438) because it seeks to bring Indigenous peoples under state sovereignty rather than recognizing a nation-to-nation relationship with them. Coulthard writes, “that the reproduction of a colonial
structure of dominance like Canada’s rests on its ability to entice Indigenous peoples to come to identify, either implicitly or explicitly, with the profound asymmetrical and non-reciprocal (sic) forms of recognition either imposed on or granted to them by the colonial state and society” (p. 439). Coulthard draws on the work of Charles Taylor to critique what he sees as liberalism in Canada and the United States that fails to recognize difference and that people do not develop their identities in isolation. According to Taylor, as cited in Coulthard, “asymmetrical relations of recognition can impede human freedom and flourishing by ‘imprisoning’ someone in a distorted relation-to-self” (p. 442). Coulthard takes Taylor’s argument even further and suggests that conceiving of recognition as something that is able to be granted “to a subaltern group or entity by a dominant group or entity… prefigures its failure to significantly modify, let alone transcend, the breadth of power at play in colonial relationships” (p. 443). Coulthard draws on Franz Fanon’s insight “into the interdependent yet semi-autonomous nature of the two facets of colonial power” (p. 448): the actual structural and objective conditions as well as the subjective personal attitudes of people.

As I’ll discuss later in my thesis, the ITK vacillates between using language of recognition within the existing colonial system (for example, repeatedly requesting to be at the table with government decision-makers) and demanding a nation-to-nation relationship with the State (for example, through engaging international organizations, like the Arctic Council, as autonomous actors).

**Sovereignty and Citizenship**

The ITK also uses the language of “citizenship” in Arctic sovereignty discourse. In *Drawing Out Law*, Borrows (2010) describes the 1999 creation of Nunavut as an example of
how Inuit peoples in Canada are “continu[ing] to use their stories and exercise their agency in response to their ever-changing circumstances” (p. 63). The Inuit secured “title to wide expanses of land, exclusive harvesting rights on lands and waters throughout the Arctic, control and participation on land use boards throughout the region, royalty payments for non-Inuit use, preferential employment status for government jobs in the territory, and a strong place in Canada’s federal structure” with the creation of Nunavut (Borrows, 2010, p. 64). The creation of Nunavut is as an example of Inuit peoples being genuinely “negotiated in” as Canadian citizens without sacrificing their culture. In other words, it was an example of a change in what it meant to be a Canadian citizen.

In contrast though, Borrows (2002) also suggests that Southerners must be cautious in how they use the language of citizenship. If one believes that the Canadian state has a valid claim to Arctic sovereignty based on the historic presence of the Inuit, then this implies that Inuit living in certain geographic regions in fact identify as Canadian citizens. However, the concept of citizenship, as associated with certain geographic boundaries, might be in opposition to Inuit understandings of what is means to be an Inuk, who was traditionally nomadic.

Alfred (2005), however is much less hopeful than Borrows when it comes to discussions around Inuit, sovereignty and citizenship within Canada. He describes Inuit politics as “a loser’s game” despite what Borrows would argue are positive moves, like the creation of Nunavut (p. 196). In fact, Alfred would likely not see the creation of Nunavut as a move in the right direction at all, as its creation was situated within the dominant colonial state-system.

Alfred may fundamentally disagree with both Borrows’ use of a language of citizenship as well as the notion that non-Aboriginal people could become Aboriginal citizens by adhering to certain values. However, although Borrows does not state it explicitly, there are undertones of
an understanding of citizenship based on collectivity in his work as well. The juxtaposition of beliefs expressed by Borrows and Alfred is relatively representative of a larger question about Indigenous-Settler and Indigenous-State relations in Canada. Can we work within the system to better this relationship, or is the system inherently colonial in nature and therefore unable to offer us anything?

**Sovereignty and Climate Change**

The very idea of sovereignty in the Arctic is also being called into question by a changing climate. Hannes Gerhardt, Philip E. Steinberg, Jeremy Tasch, Sandra Fabiano and Rob Shields (2010) argue that the unstable physical nature of the Arctic challenges the “territorial imaginaries around which notions of sovereignty historically have been passed” (p. 992). In other words, “at the most basic level, the binary division of Earth into land and water is confounded in the Arctic by the presence of ice, a liminal substance that combines and confuses properties of the two” (p. 994). A changing climate is altering the predictability of the ice, and therefore the geophysical landscape and how people are using the land. Although the situation could cause conflict, Gerhardt et. al. also look to the Arctic Council and the Inuit Circumpolar Council for “opportunities for cooperation and *rethinking* the sovereign system of mutually exclusive territorial polities” (p. 999). They argue that Inuit use of the land, ice and water “certainly has to be one of the foremost factors for retaining sovereignty” (p. 998). This sentiment provides a counter-narrative to Stephen Harper’s infamous “use it or lose it comment”, which inadequately addresses the fact that Inuit people *are already and since time immemorial have been* using the Arctic.
Byers (2009) also speaks to climate change and the Arctic, writing that climate change represents a “tragedy of the commons” situation, with the global economy relying largely on the use of fossil fuels, yet “no Plan B, no alternative planet to which we can collectively decamp” if we destroy this one (p. 128). Therefore, not only does the Arctic represent an example of a place where traditional Western notions of sovereignty can be questioned, climate change necessitates that Arctic politics should actually act as template for how we might cooperate internationally in the face of climate change. This in itself could change how we all, Indigenous and non-Indigenous alike, envision sovereignty.

Finally, Alfred (1999) writes “in a world economy dependent on ‘resource’ exploitation and structured so that such exploitation seems the only means of survival, what are indigenous peoples committed to traditional values to do?” (p. 61). According to Alfred,

The only position on development compatible with a traditional frame of mind is a balanced one, committed at once to using the land in ways that respect the spiritual and cultural connections indigenous peoples have with it and to managing the process so as to ensure a primary benefit for its natural indigenous stewards. The primary goals of an indigenous economy are to sustain the earth and to ensure the health and well-being of the people. Any derogation of that principle—whether in qualitative terms or with reference to the intensity of activity on the land—should be seen as upsetting the balanced ideal that lies at the heart of Native societies (1999, p. 62).

Alfred’s position relates directly to climate change and to Mary Simon’s work, which urges the Canadian Government to make a far more exerted effort in both halting future climate change in the Arctic as well as ameliorating issues that have already emerged from climatic changes there.

Beyond Sovereignty
James Tully (2008) aptly describes how modern state sovereignty is inseparably implicated in a history of Western imperialism. According to Tully, “the modern European constitutional state form was dependent for its peculiar historical formation on the legal incorporation and exploitation of its colonies” (p. 468). In the process of imperialist colonization, Tully (2008) writes,

The rudimentary colonial structures of modern constitutional forms and constituent powers were imposed over the legal and political systems of the Indigenous peoples, dispossessing them of their territories and usurping their governments, by force or dishonored treaties…. When the colonies freed themselves from the…empires, they retained the legal structures of the colonial period and continued to exert and extend imperial sovereignty over indigenous peoples and their territories (p. 481).

According to Tully, imperialist states did this by imposing Western law and governance over Indigenous populations under the guise of “civilizing” peoples they deemed as “backward” or “underdeveloped” (p. 484).

Tully offers recommendations for moving beyond imperialism. First, he suggests that subaltern groups might organize “non-imperially to contest, negotiate, modify, and perhaps transform the imperial dimensions of modern constitutional democracy from within” (p. 489). Second, he suggests “turning to alternative legal and political associations,” which he calls “acting otherwise” or “legal and political pluralism” (p. 489). I suggest that the ITK, and Inuit groups the organization partners with, work toward both of Tully’s aforementioned recommendations for anti-imperialism.

Following scholars like Tully and Borrows, I’ve shown that the accuracy of using the word sovereignty, or the legitimacy of the very concept of sovereignty, in the Arctic can and should be interrogated. I argue that more literature is needed which questions this notion of sovereignty; this would fall into the same realm of literature that scholars like Michael Asch and
Brian Noble have written which examines dominant explanations of ownership. Both Asch and Noble have explained the concept of ownership in ways that are more in line with indigenous thinking. For example, Asch (1989) examines the accuracy of using the word “wildlife” in land claims agreements with the Dene. He writes that the public policy intent of his paper is “to show that the idea that animals hunted by the Dene are ‘wildlife’ as this term is defined within Euro-Canadian fold ideology is inaccurate and that alternatives exist” (p. 206). Asch (1989) argues that Dene have a relationship with animals where the land is similar to a “store house” or a “deep freeze” and they strongly link concepts of ownership “directly to the animal populations on their land”, which is incompatible with the term “wildlife” as defined by Southern discourse and perpetuated by a breadth of literature that ranges from government policy documents to the *Oxford English Dictionary*. Brian Noble (2008) elaborates with a similar concept. He differentiates between

“Owning as property” and “owning as belonging” – a contrast that goes to the heart of social and political formation. The phrase “owning as property” describes a system that emphasizes property as a commodity capable of individual ownership and alienation for the purposes of resource use and wealth maximization. In contrast, “owning as belonging” places greater emphasis on transactions that strengthen relationships of respect and responsibility between people and what they regard as “cultural property.” It assumes a largely inextricable connection and continuity between people and the material and intangible world (p. 465).

While neither Asch nor Noble explicitly discuss Inuit in these examples, understanding these two pieces is helpful in envisioning understandings of sovereignty and authority in the Arctic that the Inuit might exercise which differentiate from dominant narratives of sovereignty. As Asch suggests that “domesticates” might be a better word to use than “wildlife” and Noble suggests that owning can be about a sense of “belonging” rather than ownership of property, I
believe that sovereignty and citizenship need to be reimagined. Based on these accounts, as well as a body of literature such as Simon and Christie’s that focuses on Inuit, I believe that we should move to envision sovereignty in the Arctic as something that relates to time, history, memory and a reciprocal relationship with the land. Citizenship, in the Arctic context, should entail mutual obligation with the Canadian state. In other words, if the presence of Inuit in the Arctic as Canadian citizens is propping up Canada’s Northern sovereignty, then the Federal Government ought to recognize the strong obligation it has to the Inuit.

Furthermore, in his (2014) book, On Being Here to Stay, Asch describes how the Eurocentric notion of sovereignty practiced in Canada today is based on Westphalian sovereignty, “in which states with recognized borders became foundational in political organization,” as did “the proposition that two nations (that have sovereignty) cannot occupy the same territory” (p. 119). Asch describes how Hobbes’s Leviathan further entrenched the notion that treaty agreements and nation-to-nation partnerships could not be trusted. But Westphalian sovereignty as practiced today is no more “true” than the way Indigenous peoples related to the land and other nations upon first contact with Europeans. The difference is that a history of colonialism has subordinated Indigenous political organization in favor of Western political practice.

In another move away from problematic Westphalian sovereignty, Asch (2014) offers a linking principle instead, “as a principle [to] help us to better understand that the treaty relationship we established…is an enduring one” (p. 130) where Indigenous and Settler polities “join together and yet remain distinct” (p. 131), and where Indigenous peoples and Settlers can “build a house together,” rather than forcing Indigenous nations into a “pre-configured [Western]
shape” (p. 132). While Inuit are under land claims agreements rather than treaties, I suggest the overarching sentiments offered by Asch still apply.

Gordon Christie (2011) writes that while early European scholars developed a discourse of international law, the Inuit were living in the Arctic as they had since time immemorial. Moreover, according to Christie, the Inuit were living in a “separate normative universe” (p. 341). In this Inuit universe, which Christie describes, “stories did not exist embedded in larger understandings of ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘sovereign authority over land’ but rather within accounts of land and people interrelations predicated on concepts of responsibility and respect” (p. 341). Christie clarifies that it was not as if no notion of “territory” existed; different Inuit groups did inhabit different areas, and these boundaries were respected. Furthermore, as the South continued to intrude, Christie writes that Inuit still maintained their narratives about the Arctic as well as their authority “to tell, retell, modify, and reconstruct such narratives” (p. 342). Therefore, Asch, Noble and Christie’s work, it is clear that, in the Arctic, the Canadian State and the Inuit are “two independent worlds of meaning” which could “come to interact” (Christie, 2011, p. 342).
CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODS

On a brisk late-October day, I trudged unconsciously down Ottawa’s Albert Street, adrift in my own thoughts. Mildly dejected and thoroughly perplexed, I wondered of my thesis project: what now?

After several unanswered emails to the ITK’s office, through which I’d made several requests to interview members of the organization, I’d decided to make the trip to Ottawa and introduce myself in person. I understood the potential apprehension of the organization to engage with me. A history of colonial practices had left Western researchers with a “heinous reputation…in Indigenous communities” (Kovach, 2009, p.13). Nevertheless, I thought, if I just introduced myself, if ITK members could just see me in person, just talk to me, they’d know that I was one of the good researchers.

After waiting in uncomfortable silence with a receptionist in the lobby, an ITK staff member emerged from the offices. She informed me that yes, they’d been receiving my emails. Nobody could talk to me that week, but I could continue to email, she suggested – with no assurance as to whether or not I could eventually expect a response. And that was the end of the brief interaction.

I’d said that I’d come all the way from Halifax, right? That I’d taken a plane to speak to someone that week. I had my own timelines to think about. I couldn’t just keep waiting for a response. Maybe if I just went back…

Startled out of my pensive state, I stopped. Standing in front of me, out of place in Ottawa’s glass-high-rise-lined financial district was a young white women dressed in an ill-fitting, bastardization of Indigenous regalia, waving a flyer.
“We’re having a sale until Wednesday!” she exclaimed.

“Excuse me,” I managed.

“We’re having a sale until Wednesday.”

Right. In two days it would be Halloween. And many, many more would dress up in mass-produced “Indian” costumes like this one. A symptom of a lasting colonialism that exists in Canada, a symptom that is perhaps one of the most visible, but unfortunately, not the most tragic. This troubling, inescapable context was perhaps even more pervasive than I had appreciated.

This shift from thinking about the ITK to thinking about day-to-day interactions in Southern Canada was jarring. For me, admittedly, examining and critiquing colonialism in Canada was part of a Master’s project – an important and meaningful one, approached genuinely and seriously, but ultimately indivisible from my own position of Settler privilege and the credentials I’d receive for completing the project. But what could I offer in return? In an illuminating moment, it was easy to see why an organization that lives in and fights against this colonial context each day might choose not to engage with an unknown and novice researcher.

The farther down the road I go with my anthropological training, and the more versed I’ve become in ways anthropologists are working within, and against, a colonial milieu (Noble, 2015; Asch 2001, Asch 2014), the more wary I am of research and methodological practice that relies on the clear distinction between self and other or aspires to omniscient vision and un-situated objectivity (Haraway, 1988).

As mentioned, my research has allowed me to reflect on Southern media representations of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic from my position as a Southern, Settler Canadian. In addition, following the lead of Nader (1972), who encourages anthropologists to study
institutions, I examined what narratives the ITK as an organization brings to the discussion of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. Rather than undertaking participant observation within the organization, I examined the ITK’s web presence, including a review of its website and the press releases, policy documents and other media (editorial cartoons) the ITK houses there to provide a counter-narrative to Southern news discourse.

Through my “partial perspective” (Haraway, 1988, p. 583) as a Southern Canadian who learns about the Arctic largely through media, I am simultaneously the research subject and object. And while I would not go so far as to say this project is auto-ethnographic (Ellis, 2000), acknowledging my “position” (Haraway, 1988, p. 584) throughout this work is important. While the focus of my research is on media texts themselves, situating both my research material and myself are fundamental to my research design and my commitment to do contextual, political anthropology.

At this point, a few definitions are in order. I follow Mark Allen Peterson’s (2003) definition of “texts”. He defines “text” as “any discourse fixed by some mode of representation”, citing mediums as diverse as writing, photography, video and [audio recording] and arguing that “text should not be understood… as an exclusively linguistic phenomenon but also a visual and auditory one” (p. 60).

Barthes (1972) similarly defines speech, writing that it is “by no means confined to oral speech. It can consist of modes of writing or of representations; not only written discourse, but also photography, cinema, reporting, sport, shows publicity, all these can serve as a support to mythical speech” (p. 110).

Using these broad definitions of text and speech allow me to analyze a wider array of types of media, like news stories, websites, press releases and social media, allowing me to gain
a richer understanding of recurring discourses and myths about Canadian sovereignty in the
Arctic.

Jack Lule’s (2005) definition of myth has also been very useful to my thinking about my research. Lule studies news stories from an anthropological perspective with attention to the way myths are produced in the news. He is careful to make the distinction that myth is neither “a false belief” nor an “untrue story”, neither is it something ancient or unreal (p. 102). Rather, he defines myth as “a societal story that expresses prevailing ideas, ideologies, values and beliefs” (p. 102). Lule notes that, like myth, “the news offers the steady repetition of stories” (p. 104), and while not every repeated story becomes a myth, “once the fundamental stories are in place, they cast their influence on storytelling” (p. 107). Therefore, Lule hypothesizes that “reporters, editors, sources, and readers draw from a large, though limited, range of fundamental stories to portray and understand events” and “news most often tells stories that support social order and sustain the current state of things” (p. 107).

Similarly, Lule writes, “when studied carefully…news stories are shown to seldom challenge core values. They rarely question the very structure of society. They do not dispute the system of governance, apportionment of power, distribution of wealth, or other central features” (p. 108). However, Lule simultaneously acknowledges that “news is messy and complicated, and each news story is a site of personal, social, and political struggle, from its conception by a reporter to its understanding by a reader” (p. 108).

Of the aforementioned scholars, while only Nader and Peterson are anthropologists, bringing in science and technology studies (Haraway) and journalism and communication studies (Lule, Peterson) add nuance to my work. Haraway’s (1988) commentary bolsters my analysis of epistemology and ontology, offering a powerful reminder that all knowledge, even Western
science, is constructed rather than “real”. This is important to the decolonial aspect of my project, in which I aim to unlearn unchallenged acceptance of Western science and view Inuit and Settler knowledge on level playing fields. Communication Studies was useful in suggesting how I might alter my approach to my project, from a more traditional anthropological approach (participant observation) to examining mass media as a vehicle of culture.

Following Lule, I looked for repeated stories, and suggested where certain recurring stories about Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic might have become myth. In addition, Lule’s understanding of the messy and complicated nature of news stories speaks well to other theoretical influences on my project, namely the work of Sejersen, Haraway and Bourdieu, who call for context, situation and attention to the field, as I discuss below.

In terms of my theoretical framework, I use Norman Fairclough’s (2010) Critical Discourse Analysis to analyze texts. In addition, I examine the discourses I discovered through the lens of Frank Sejersen’s (2004) contextualist position, Donna Haraway’s (1988) notion of situated knowledges, and Brian Noble’s (2015) concepts of “coloniality as oppositional encounter of Self and Other” (p. 429) and “coloniality as apparatus and milieu” (p. 430). These theoretical approaches helped me situate myself and my project within the “colonial milieu” (Noble, 2015) I navigated as a researcher as well as helped me avoid the privileging of western knowledge.

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) aims to “develop ways of analyzing language which address its involvement in the workings of contemporary capitalist society” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 1). Fairclough focuses on capitalist societies “not only because capitalism is the dominant system internationally”, but because “the character of the economic system affects all aspects of social life” (p. 1). Fairclough’s works aims to understand why and how capitalism can limit
“human well-being and flourishing” (p. 1).

CDA also focuses on social relations rather than individuals and can encompass everything from interpersonal communications to “concrete communicative events”, like news stories; to discursive “objects”, like language (Fairclough, 2010, p. 3). As touched on in my introduction, CDA does not analyze discourse on its own; rather it examines the relationship between discourse and events or objects (Fairclough, 2010). Consequently, when I used CDA to understand how Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic is portrayed in media, I looked not only at reoccurring themes in the stories I read, but also how stories – and understandings produced by those stories – might interact with people and events. This is an important aspect of my methodological approach: it moves my project from a discourse study to a more anthropological approach, as it emphasizes the relationship between media portrayals and lived action. The acknowledgement of CDA that discourse does not exists alone, but rather in relation to specific moments, also compliments Sejersen (2004) and Haraway’s (1988) work, which I mention shortly.

Fairclough suggests that CDA should be done with a specific objective. According to Fairclough (2010), as mentioned, CDA should pay direct attention to modern capitalism’s role in creating human suffering. Moreover, Fairclough argues, it should provide positive critique “which seeks possibilities for transformations which can overcome or mitigate limits on human well-being” (p. 14). This approach is especially relevant when studying the Canadian Arctic, where the need to mitigate climate change becomes greater everyday, where Inuit peoples still struggle to access the same infrastructure and healthcare that other Canadians do, and where accelerating resource extraction has a profound impact on communities that are still suffering as a result of the lasting impacts of a history of colonialism and forced relocation, to name a few
examples (Simon, 2009). Fairclough defines his call for positive critique as CDA’s “manifesto” (p. 14).

If I consider Lule’s belief that media rarely challenges the status quo with Fairclough’s belief that CDA research must challenge the status quo, I believe it highlights why a project that looks at myths produced by the media and then, when they might impede human well-being, challenges these myths, might contribute to knowledge.

I also apply Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of media and cultural production to my work. Bourdieu’s work is concerned with how social structures are reproduced by culture and how unequal power relations are deeply entrenched in the way we classify, organize and discuss day-to-day life. According to Bourdieu (1993), these unequal power relations are taken for granted and thus uncritically accepted as members of society assume their perceptions of reality are accurate.

Similarly, Bourdieu’s (1993) habitus is a series of views or schemata, learned since childhood and deeply engrained, which control how people perceive the world. According to Bourdieu, habitus causes members of society to react to certain situations in specific ways.

Bourdieu’s (1993) concept of field is the setting where agents are located and act, each field governed by tangible social norms and structures. Useful to my analysis will be Bourdieu’s field of cultural production. The field of cultural production considers works themselves, but also the relationship between the work and the producer of the work, based on the agent’s habitus and location in the field. Therefore, with my project, I analyze media as cultural works, not only looking for themes and discourses, but with attention to the fact that media is created by agents, who occupy their own cultural fields, which exist within broader structures of power.
Bourdieu’s attention to structures of power compliment Fairclough’s suggested approach of questioning power that is structural and taken for granted, especially when it causes harm to peoples. As well, Bourdieu’s recognition that power allows people to take their perception for granted provides important context to my project; it serves as an important reminder that Southerners and Northerners, as well as different news sources and institutions, might have different perceptions of reality to begin with. Finally, Bourdieu’s notion of agents producing art – or, in my analysis, media – within a larger field can work in compliment with the work of Frank Sejersen and Donna Haraway, who discuss the importance of context and situating knowledge, respectively.

Frank Sejersen (2004) challenges his readers to recognize that the era where science, truth and rationality is associated with the west and magic, superstition and mysticism is associated with “the rest” is far from over. Sejersen (2004) also warns that it can be tempting to incorporate traditional or indigenous knowledge into policymaking and research because it can improve a research project’s image to do so. However, scientists have often only used portions of local knowledge- what they deem relevant- and this has had the affect of decontextualizing the knowledge. Sejersen (2004) suggests that researchers take a contextualist position instead- recognizing that all knowledge comes out of a specific social construct. According to Sejersen (2004), this approach levels the playing field because it also acknowledges that western science is culturally specific, constructed, ontological and perhaps not relevant in all situations.

In my work, I move away from the privileging of Western knowledge in conversations about the Arctic, and move to a more contextualist position, as Sejersen suggests. Using Donna Haraway’s notion of situated knowledge to analyze themes apparent in textual analysis will help me come to a contextualist position.
Haraway (1988) argues that all knowledge is situated and embodied, coming from a specific perspective. In the context of my project, using Haraway helps me to realise a robust understanding of the idea of sovereignty. In other words, it helps me recognize that the media sources I analyze display different “visions” (Haraway, 1988, p. 581). All of the stories I examine are only be “partial perspectives” (Haraway, 1988, p. 583), and even the conclusions I draw come from my own embodied perspective (Haraway, 1988). Recognizing the fact that the knowledge I am both studying and creating is situated helps me move my work to a contextualist position, one which acknowledges that discourses I uncover about Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic are historically, politically and ontologically specific. Therefore, utilizing Haraway and Sejersen allows me to recognize that sovereignty in the Arctic is not unitary in how it is conceived, practiced or portrayed.

Noble (2015) discusses the “all-encompassing political milieu” in Canada, wherein “colonialism impinge[s] over and over how we [can] relate to one another as Indigenous and settler-descendent persons and peoples,” and the implications this has for researchers (p. 428). While Noble (2015) suggests researchers working with Indigenous peoples can be “tripped up by coloniality” (p. 427), he makes recommendations for how scholars can use “honorable relations envisaged through treaty” (p. 436) to ensure their research practices do not perpetuate coloniality. Noble’s work helps me situate myself as a Settler Canadian, reminding me of the political obligations that I must bring to my project.

Methods

I use a methodological approach that is influenced by Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Media Anthropology. These approaches share a flexible approach to methodological
practice over strict methodology, a questioning of a more traditional subject-object divide and specific attention to power and privilege (Fairclough, 2010; Spitulnik, 1993).

Fairclough (2010) defines discourse not as a research object, but rather as part of a “complex set of relations” which includes “relations of communication between people” as well as relations between “communicative events”, like newspaper articles, and “more abstract and enduring complex discursive ‘objects’, like language (p. 3). He also sites “relations between discourse and other such complex ‘objects’, including objects in the physical world, persons, power relations and institutions, which are interconnected elements in social activity or praxis” (p. 3). Therefore, Fairclough argues, “discourse is not simply an entity we can define independently: we can only arrive at an understanding of it by analyzing sets of relations” (p. 3). CDA, as outlined by Fairclough (2010) is a methodology rather than a method. In addition, Fairclough writes that, with CDA, “one cannot neatly separate and oppose theory and method in the conventional way” (p. 225).

Although Fairclough (2010) does not categorize CDA as a method, he does outline three characteristics that CDA should have. First, he writes that CDA “is not just analysis of discourse (or more concretely texts), it is part of some form of systematic transdisciplinary analysis of relations between discourse and other elements of the social process” (p. 10). In addition, Fairclough believes CDA is “not just general commentary on discourse, it includes some form of systematic analysis of texts” (p. 10). Thirdly, he writes that CDA should be normative rather than simply descriptive. In other words, according to Fairclough (2010), CDA should address “social wrongs in their discursive aspects and possible ways of righting or mitigating them” (p. 11). More specifically, CDA uses text analysis as a “point of entry” to explore obstacles that are
“partly semiotic in character”, and then “focuses on how people actually deal or might deal with the obstacles in part by contesting and changing discourse” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 227).

The field of Media Anthropology has also informed my methodological approach. Media Anthropology, broadly, refers to the “rapidly expanding subfield of anthropological research” which has generally focused on “communicational media practices, technologies and institutions” (Boyer, 2012, p. 383). It has involved anthropologists integrating “mass communication studies into the discipline” (p. 18). While some media anthropologists have focused on bringing ethnographic practices to media studies, placing a great emphasis on the importance of participant observation, others have focused on the discursive elements of media texts (Rothenbuhler & Coman, 2005). Debra Spitulnik (1993) acknowledges the “hot contested and fragmented terrain” of Media Anthropology” but urges anthropologists not to become hung up in methodological debates (p. 294). She writes, “if there is any point of general consensus, it lies more in an acceptance of a common set of focal issues than in the theoretical frameworks or methodological techniques themselves” (p. 294). She argues that anthropologists should instead be concerned with the power that mass media has, especially in its role as a “vehicle of culture” (p. 294). This attention to power compliments Fairclough’s approach to CDA.

I examined web-archived stories available on the websites of the Toronto Star, The Globe and Mail, the National Post, the Canadian Broadcasting Company (CBC) and The Media Co-Op that address Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. Deciding which sources to use was challenging, but necessary in order to keep my project to a workable size. Collecting stories from these five sources met several important criteria. First, different companies own all of these publications, so they may display a broader array of opinions. In addition, I do not speak French, which
necessitated that all sources I chose published exclusively or at least equally in English. My reliance on English news sources means that any claims I make are limited to English Canada.

*The Toronto Star, The Globe and Mail* and *the National Post* are consistently cited to have among the highest daily readership in Canada as stand-alone publications (Newspapers Canada, 2015). Therefore, they are arguably well-established, trusted and influential sources. *CBC* was similarly chosen due to its influence, but also because of its unique position as a Crown Corporation. *CBC* is also the only one of the aforementioned four sources that does not require a paid subscription to access its online content – thus making it available to a much wider audience.

Choosing sources with different ownership was also an important methodological choice. Overall, the media landscape in Canada is corporate and monopolistic, with relatively few large conglomerates owning the great majority of broadcasting services, networks and daily papers (see Canadian Media Concentration Research Project, 2016). By choosing sources with different ownership, I mean to bring in the widest spectrum of perspectives, politics and voices as possible.

On the other hand, *The Media Co-Op* was chosen as a means to a different approach to Southern journalistic coverage of Canada’s Arctic. *The Media Co-Op* is a multi-stakeholder media co-operative with a presence in Vancouver, Montreal, Halifax, and Toronto. It relies on funding from members, who are able to read, edit or submit articles. The organization defines itself as “dedicated to providing grassroots, democratic coverage of [its] communities and of Canada” (The Media Co-Op, 2015). *The Media Co-Op*’s coverage of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic may differ from the other four news sources I’m analyzing when it comes to tone, voice, political approach and agenda.
In order to be as inductive as possible, I searched all five sites using the keyword search “Arctic + Sovereignty.” My research focused exclusively on articles published between May 2, 2011 – the day Harper won a majority government – up to August 2, 2015, when the writ was dropped, beginning the campaign for an October 2015 election. Rhetoric about Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic was a large part of Harper’s election campaign and has continued to be important to his leadership (Humphreys, 2014; Rennie, 2014; Chase, 2014). Therefore, I argue that Stephen Harper’s time as Prime Minister has actually impacted broader Canadian discourses about the country’s sovereignty in the Arctic.

In addition, I reviewed the media that the ITK highlights on its website that pertains to sovereignty in the Arctic, also using the keyword search “Arctic + Sovereignty”. I also did a keyword search for just the word “Sovereignty,” as almost all material on the ITK site speaks to Inuit and the Arctic. The ITK website also uses tags to identify several subject areas, and I reviewed all material where the organization had used the “Arctic Sovereignty” tag. The ITK website houses media releases, editorials and videos that speak to sovereignty directly and from the perspective of Inuit. The ITK has also created, on its own and in collaboration with other organizations, several sovereignty related documents, which are housed on its website. Finally, the ITK uses its website to highlight news stories every day. As mentioned previously, reviewing ITK texts will help me situate Inuit and Southern news discourse in relation to one another.

Analyzing documents and news stories the ITK is publishing and emphasizing on their website allows me to better understand how the ITK approaches Arctic sovereignty. I’ve chosen the ITK because it speaks to sovereignty directly and from the perspective of Inuit. Therefore,

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1 Since the time of collecting ITK material, the organization created a new website, changing the search bar and tagging system, as well as revamping the site content. However, I captured screenshots of all the ITK webpages cited in this project.
analyzing discourses found in ITK media provides a powerful counter-narrative to discourses found in sources written by Southerners for Southerners. That said, the ITK, like any advocacy organization, does not speak for all Inuit. In addition, the fact that the organization receives federal funding may impact the organization’s position on certain issues or even impede the organization from expressing more radical anti-government sentiment.

In the third substantive section of my thesis, I compare the discourses I uncovered about Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic in the Southern sources I reviewed with discourses I gleaned from the ITK material. Comparing these discourses helped me identify what myths have emerged about Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic.

There are several limitations to way I approached data collection. Using a different approach to collect news articles, for example, using a news index, would have returned different results. However, the goal of this research was not track news stories quantitatively, rather it was an iterative approach aiming to draw out dominant narratives. While this approach did highlight recurring themes in media, it also prompted further lines of inquiry.

For example, using the keyword search “Arctic + Sovereignty” in both news and the ITK websites means that I didn’t pull in content that might relate to Arctic sovereignty but not include those specific words. For example, as I discuss later in my thesis, ITK texts often speak to security in the Arctic rather than sovereignty. However, this was partially ameliorated by the fact that that ITK catalogued content under an “Arctic sovereignty” tag – indicative of what the organization itself categorizes as related to Arctic sovereignty. Ultimately though, applying this keyword search was a necessary parameter to keep the project to a doable size. Between ITK material and Southern news sources, over 300 texts were included in my research, providing a sample large enough for me to identify patterns and recurring stories and themes.
I also encountered some difficulty around language. The ITK uses English, French and Inuktitut, but I only speak English. Therefore, I was not able to analyze some media and documents produced and highlighted by the ITK. As mentioned above, this limits claims made in my thesis. There is also the possibility that meaning was lost in translation when I examined media where translation was already done. For example, the word “sovereignty” itself does not have an Inuktitut equivalent (*Nilliajut*, Inuit Knowledge Centre). However, I conducted my research with an awareness of this potential discrepancy. Furthermore, unpacking these different meanings stemming from language may actually make my account more rigorous, since language can be a valuable insight into worldview.

In addition, there is the possibility that my interpretation of documents and news stories was different from what the authors and site administrators intended, especially since I bring my own theoretical biases and understandings of sovereignty into my reading of these. My use of both Haraway’s situated knowledge and Sejersen’s contextualist position helped mitigate this though, as they help me view these documents in the context in which they were written and without the influence of a rigid theoretical lens.

Although I show linkages between the Harper Government’s Arctic policy and textual discourse, as well as make suggestions for the broader implications of these discourses, in order to maintain a feasible scope of work on this project, I analyzed *media texts* rather than *media reception*, which would have required a different approach. Similarly, I am only speaking to the Government’s approach to Arctic sovereignty *as portrayed by the media*. As mentioned in my introduction though, a project that looks at media specifically has significance, as it is where most Southerners may learn about the Arctic. However, further studies that analyzed how Arctic
sovereignty news stories are received or government policy documents that speak to Arctic sovereignty, for example, would be valuable.

Fundamental to my research is the belief that mass media not only communicates cultural discourses, but also works to create them. This is supported by the work of Fransisco Osorio (2005), who writes, “the object of study of mass media anthropology is the system of cultural transmission through mass media” (p. 36). Moreover, Osorio argues, “mass media is the current mechanism through which culture diffuses. People know their particular way of being through exposure to…mass media. This contemporary phenomenon should be the primary subject matter of mass media anthropology” (p. 36). Osorio calls mass media “the primary vehicle for the transmission of culture,” through which those consuming it learn rituals and myths.

My position is that these myths influence the way Southerners think and therefore the way policy decisions about Canada’s North are made. In other words, discourses about the North are often created by mainstream media sources, based out of large Canadian metropolises. Stories about Arctic sovereignty produced by Inuit organizations, like the ITK, have far less reach. Thus, the prevailing voices in stories about the Arctic may be Southern and non-Indigenous. This status quo often goes unquestioned, at least by those living in Southern Canada. Horst and Miller (2012) argue that “dominant groups often fail to engage with the very concept of voice” at all (Horst and Miller, 2012, p. 20). Therefore, with my thesis, I endeavor to analyze media with particular attention to not only what myths it creates but to who is actually creating these myths, in what context, and how the proliferation of these myths may interact with the Federal Government’s orientation toward the Canadian Arctic.
CHAPTER 4  DOMINANT MEDIA NARRATIVES

In order to find out what myths are being produced about Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, I analyzed 214 “Southern” and English Canadian articles from the Toronto Star, The Globe and Mail, the National Post, CBC and The Media Co-Op. I searched web-archived news stories between May 2011, when Harper won a majority government, and August 2015, when the writ was dropped. As mentioned before, this timeline was chosen to keep the project to a workable size, but also because Harper has focussed a considerable amount of attention under his leadership on Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, which has indisputably impacted the way stories about Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic have been framed in the media (Humphreys, 2014; Rennie, 2014; Chase, 2014e).

In order to collect stories, I searched the websites of each of the newspapers with the keywords “Arctic + sovereignty”. For each source, I reviewed all available web-archived news stories returned with the keyword search. It is important to note that while the Toronto Star, the National Post, CBC and The Media Co-Op had stories as far back as May 2011 available on their websites, The Globe and Mail only had articles published since October 2013 available, so the sources I collected from The Globe and Mail are only inclusive of October 2014-August 2015. In addition, CBC automatically filters multiple stories on the same subject. I collected a total of 45 stories from CBC, 58 stories from The Globe and Mail, three stories from The Media Co-Op, 81 stories from the National Post and 27 stories from the Toronto Star.

I created a spreadsheet (see Appendix C) where I captured each story’s title, source, date published, date accessed, URL, as well as a summary and key insights, based on my reading of the story. I then coded the stories by theme, also determined by my reading of the story. Organizing the news stories this way allowed me not only to keep a record of the stories I read,
but also easily sort them by theme, source, chronologically or do a keyword search within the spreadsheet, allowing me to easily look at the data from different angles and garner deeper insights. The way I approached collecting these news stories is in line with Fairclough’s recommendation that CDA should not just interpret discourse, but rather it should systematically analyze texts.

In addition, sorting and coding the news stories allowed me to see which stories were recurring. Looking for recurring stories helped me to identify “myths” (Lule, 2005; Barthes, 1972). Lule (2005) understands myths as “archetypal stories, which “represent important social issues or ideals” (p. 103). Lule (2005) notes that, like myth, “news offers the steady repetition of stories” (p. 104). He argues that news is not always “new”; rather it thrives on “ritual repetition” (p. 105). According to Lule, news doesn’t become myth; it falls in line with fundamental stories. Following Lule, the stories I read not only reveal mainstream discourses about Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, they provide insight into what longstanding myths might already be intertwined with these stories.

The recurring stories that I’ve identified, and ultimately the myths I’ve linked them with, come from my unique reading of the stories and the way I ultimately chose to group them together. In fact, another researcher may not have drawn the same conclusions at all, and I have tried to keep this reflexivity in mind throughout my analysis. Moreover, the way I’ve interpreted these news stories is specific to my situated knowledge (Haraway, 1988).

Several key themes and narratives emerged as I reviewed the news stories: Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s annual trips to the Arctic; military and infrastructure capacity in the Arctic; threats to Canada in the Arctic; the dispute over who owns the North Pole; the search for the Franklin expedition remains; climate change, shipping and the environment; boundary
disputes, the Rangers and, finally, challenges facing Northern peoples. At a high level, these mainstream news stories illustrated dominant narratives and myths about Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. As well, they often ignored, or even erased, Inuit and Canada’s history of colonialism in the region from Arctic sovereignty discussions. In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss stories that highlight and shore-up Arctic sovereignty myths, and my next substantive chapter will focus on stories that leave Inuit and/ or historical context out.

**Harper’s Annual Trips**

Of the 214 stories analyzed, twenty-four were about Harper’s annual trips to the Arctic in conjunction with Operation Nanook, which he undertook each year between 2006 and 2014 (McDiarmid, 2014a). Although Harper did make a trip up North in the summer of 2015, it was part of his federal election campaign instead (‘Harper heads north’, 2015). According to the Government of Canada’s website, Operation Nanook is the “largest sovereignty operation in Canada’s North” (Government of Canada, 2015, para. 1). It’s objectives include “assert[ing] Canada’s sovereignty over its northernmost regions,” “enhancing the Canadian Armed Forces’ ability to operate in Arctic conditions,” “improv[ing] the coordination in whole-of-government operations” and “maintain[ing] interoperability with mission partners for maximum effectiveness in response to safety and security issues in the North” (Government of Canada, 2015, para. 2).

The *Toronto Star, The Globe and Mail, the National Post* and *CBC* covered operation Nanook and Harper’s annual trips to the North. *CBC*’s coverage of Harper’s annual trips tended to be very matter-of-fact, outlining Harper’s activities in the North, or highlighting Government of Canada press releases with little to no additional commentary (Barker and Windeyer, 2012; McDiarmid, 2014a; Carter, 2011). *The Globe and Mail* largely focussed on infrastructure as
well as how Arctic sovereignty fits into Harper’s broader political platform (Chase, 2015; Chase 2014c; Fraimen, 2015). The National Post gave more nuanced coverage to Harper’s annual pilgrimages to the North, with stories that outlined how Harper has made the North part of his broader political strategy, but often failed to deliver on what he’s promised (Den Tandt, 2014d; Den Tandt 2013; Kline, 2011; Levitz, 2012). Finally, the Toronto Star was the only source that paid much attention to Northern peoples in the context of Harper’s annual trips North. Its stories highlighted the role of the Canadian Rangers in protecting Canada’s Arctic sovereignty, as well as social issues in the North, like lack of adequate housing, high suicide rates and violence (McCharles, 2013, “Numbers,” 2013; McCharles, 2013, “Target Shooting”; McCharles, 2013, “Social Issues”). However, the same journalist wrote most of these Toronto Star stories over just a few days.

The vast majority of these stories follow Harper, and his experience in the North. For example, several stories outline Harper’s experience target shooting with the Rangers (MacCharles, 2013a; MacCharles, 2013b; MacCharles, 2013d; Brewster, 2013d). Several stories postulated how Harper’s trips North might impact his overall image, and more recently, his 2015 election campaign (Chase, 2015; Fraimen, 2015; Wattie, 2013). One National Post story was similarly written by then Minister of National Defence, Peter MacKay, where he shares a personal anecdote about spending two summers working on merchant supply vessels in the “pristine” Arctic, where he writes he’s “felt an enormous attachment to the region ever since” (MacKay, 2012, para. 6).

In addition, these trips to the North provided Harper opportunities to make announcements and provide quotes and sound bites to media to justify his military spending in the region and further his Northern sovereignty agenda. In his 2012 trip, for example, Harper
told press that despite budget overages, military spending in the Arctic would continue. Harper told reporters covering his trip to Churchill, Manitoba, “We are taking the time to make sure we get this right, that we spend the right amount of money and we develop this kind of shipbuilding expertise in Canada in the long-term, not just for the Arctic offshore patrol vessels, but also for the polar-class icebreaker” (Press and Boswell, 2012b).

In many of the aforementioned stories, the Arctic is described as an “unforgiving” place where “survival skills” are a necessity (MacCharles, 2013b). It is described as “remote” (Clarke, 2014) and the word “trek” is used to describe Harper’s visits there more than once (De Souza, 2011; MacCharles, 2013b). One National Post article calls Harper’s trip to the Arctic a chance to “share the rigours of northern life” with Southern Canadians, while a CBC story touts Harper for being the only Prime Minister to go the Arctic and “reminding us that the North exists” (McDiarmid, 2014a).

In an article titled “From Terra Nullius to Affirmation: Reconciling Aboriginal Rights with the Canadian Constitution”, Asch (2002) describes the inherent problem with the “the manner in which Canada explains its acquisition of sovereignty and underlying title with respect to Indigenous peoples” (p. 23). According to Asch,

Canada relies on the ‘settlement’ thesis to justify its acquisition of sovereignty. This thesis rests on the concept that the territory claimed by the colonists was previously a terra nullius: a territory without people… one that was either previously unoccupied or not recognized as belonging to another political entity (p. 24).

Asch (2002) uses his piece to outline several problems with applying a terra nullius doctrine, arguing, instead, “Canada needs to adopt an understanding that our legitimacy flows out of resolving issues with Indigenous nations in a just manner; one that enables growth beyond a colonial vision of Canadian history” (p. 38). However, the lack of recognition of Indigenous
sovereignty runs deep in Canadian history, legal precedent and mythology. Continual media portrayals of the Arctic as empty and unused further entrench the idea that the Arctic is terra nullius in Southern discourse. Depicting the Arctic without reference to the historic use of the region by Inuit certainly does not encourage settler Canadians relying on mainstream media for information about the Arctic to, as Asch might suggest, recognize that Canada’s legitimacy in the Arctic rests on justly resolving issues with Inuit.

Bourdieu (1993) suggests that researchers should consider not only works – in this case, news stories – but those who produce the work as well – in this case, journalists. For the most part, Southerners wrote these stories about Harper’s trip to the North. A quick search of a few repeat commentators revealed journalists based in Ottawa and Toronto, with interests in Parliament and defence (The Globe and Mail, 2016, Chase; National Post, 2016, Clarke; Toronto Star, 2016, MacCharles), with only CBC featuring stories by journalists based in the Yukon and Northwest Territories (Barker, 2015; Windeyer, 2015). In other words, the stories I collected are largely about a prominent Southerner (Harper), by Southern agents (journalists) for the consumption of other Southerners. Only one story of the twenty-four discussing Operation Nanook actually quotes an Inuit person: ITK President Terry Audla. As a result, the Arctic is presented as a remote, uninhabited wilderness to be conquered or protected, furthering a nature / culture divide that generally doesn’t fit with an Inuit worldview (Bennett and Rowley, 2004), while the aforementioned myths go largely unchallenged.

**Military and Infrastructure**

Of the articles I collected, fifty-seven spoke to military capacity and infrastructure in the Arctic as they relate to Canadian sovereignty there. I’ve included articles on defence,
transportation and science and technology in this category from *The Globe and Mail*, the *National Post*, *CBC*, the *Toronto Star* and *The Media Co-Op*.

The majority of the articles covered, twenty-nine in total, focussed on Arctic sovereignty and national defense – mainly what Canada’s military, air force and navy are doing (or not doing) to shore up Canada’s claim to sovereignty. Much less coverage was given to the Rangers’ presence and ongoing work in the region, with just four stories focused exclusively on the Rangers. Ten stories focussed primarily on the inherently political nature of sovereignty claims to the Arctic, specifically on how the Harper administration politicized the North. Just seven of the articles I gathered spoke to day-to-day transportation and services in the North in the context of Canada’s sovereignty claim and similarly only six articles spoke to what I’ve defined broadly as science and technology.

I do not intend to downplay the importance of military engagement or defence in the North. However, speculating about the extent of military threats and risks posed by other countries to Canada is outside the scope of this project. What I aim to show instead is how the Inuit presence in the Arctic is often ignored in these stories, as well as how Southern news sources present sovereignty as the ability to monitor and protect the region, rather than a more nuanced view of sovereignty held by Inuit that has to do with things like sharing, using the land and day-to-day security. While I’ll further unpack ITK and Inuit discourses on sovereignty in later chapters, it is important to note that Southern sovereignty discourse repeatedly privileges a Western worldview.

Of the articles that spoke to defence and Canada’s claim to Arctic sovereignty, many centered on Canada’s Navy and its ability to operate in the Arctic. These articles highlighted the way the Federal Government, and in turn Canadian media, equated sovereignty in the Arctic with
the ability to protect and monitor the region. In August and September of 2013, the *National Post* reported on delays to naval facility in Nanisivik, Nunavut (Bethiaume, 2013; Brewster, 2013b). Announced in 2007 by Stephen Harper, in August 2013 the facility was still not up and running due to budget and regulatory issues (Bethiaume, 2013). More than a year later, in January 2014, *The Globe and Mail* reported that the Nanisivik wharf was actually sinking due to its position on a layer of clay (Chase, 2014d). By March 2015, the facility had been delayed until 2018 (“Completion delayed to 2018”, 2015). Originally, the Nanisivik facility was supposed to include year-round Navy housing for fifteen people, as well as an upgrade to the dock and nearby airstrip (“Naval facility breaks ground,” 2015). As of July 2015, the airstrip had been abandoned, the plan for the facilities had been changed to only operate in the summer months and the project budget had been reduced from $258 million to $116 million (“Naval facility breaks ground,” 2015).

Another string of stories found in *The Media-Co-Op*, the *National Post*, *CBC* and *The Globe and Mail* covered the $25 billion and $8 billion shipbuilding contracts awarded by the Federal Government to shipyards in Halifax and Vancouver, respectively (Lindsay, 2013). This contract included six to eight Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) for the Navy as well as a polar icebreaker for the Coast Guard (Berthiaume, 2013). In addition to being one of the Harper Government’s Northern sovereignty initiatives, especially in Halifax, this shipbuilding contract was vaunted as massive job creator in the region. Like the Nanisivik wharf stories, news coverage of the AOPS focussed on the Canadian State’s ability to monitor and protect the Arctic, equating sovereignty with military capacity and echoing Harper’s “use it or lose it” statement.

In April 2013, the *National Post* discussed a report co-written by the Centre for Policy Alternatives and the Rideau Institute recommending that the Harper Government abandon the
AOPS project altogether. According to the report, the project has already been “watered down to the point that it not longer makes much sense” (Brewster, 2013c, para. 2), citing that to keep the project within budget, the ships would be “too slow, too unstable and too lightly armoured” (Brewster, 2013c, para. 6) to be effective.

By October 2014, CBC reported that the government would be “trimming” the Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship offer and that, at that time, the shipbuilding strategy had “yet to deliver a single vessel” (Brewster, 2014a, para. 2). In March 2015, The Globe and Mail published an article identifying September 2015 as the start date of construction at the Irving Shipyard in Halifax (Bird, 2015). Instead of eight, The Globe and Mail reported only five to six AOPS would be constructed, and these ships would be “slushbreakers” rather than icebreakers – needing to be accompanied by Coast Guard icebreakers when in heavier ice (Bird, 2015).

In a January 2013 article, The Media Co-Op covered the “Wednesdays Against Warships” protests happening at the time: peace activists stood near the site protesting the $25 billion spend on warships, and trying to raise awareness of other things the money could be used for, like climate action or homelessness (Lindsay, 2013). While several stories discussed the progress on and quality of the Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships, The Media Co-Op was the only news source to directly suggest that funds for these ships could be better used elsewhere – outside of national defence. This break in discourse was likely made possible by the grassroots nature of The Media Co-Op, which operates from a different political position than the other Southern sources I included. Overall though, stories about the Arctic/Offshore Patrols Ships lacked critique – or even acknowledgement – of the almost unquestioned myth, shored up by government action and then amplified by the media, of sovereignty as the ability to monitor and defend.
The National Post ran a series of opinion pieces on Canada’s national defence and its claim to sovereignty in the Arctic. The opinion pieces gathered were written either by long-established journalists or high-profile political commentators. For example, Lorne Gunter, a long-time political commentator and former staff member in the first Trudeau government, whose politics now run right-of-center (National Post, 2016), wrote an opinion piece arguing that Canada should purchase nuclear submarines for Arctic sovereignty patrols (Gunter, 2011). Canadian Senator and regular National Post contributor Colin Kenny wrote two articles critiquing the Harper Government’s choice to build AOPS (Kenny, 2012; Kenny, 2013). Instead, Kenny argues, this money should be used for real icebreakers for the Coast Guard, or other Navy vessels that could protect Canada’s seaways and ports (Kenny, 2012). Former newspaper baron, historically conservative Conrad Black also contributes regularly to the National Post, and in a piece titled, “A Navy rebuilt, at last,” he gives the Harper government credit for at least planning to “regenerate” the Navy (Black, 2015, para. 1), citing the increased threat from Russia (to be discussed later in this chapter) and the receding polar ice cap as justifications for construction of the warships.

Opinion pieces that discussed Canada’s ability (or lack of ability) to operate in the Arctic, as with stories about Canada’s Navy and the Arctic Offshore Patrol vessels, perpetuated the discourse that sovereignty is exclusively based on Canada’s ability to defend an Arctic that is under threat from other countries. Furthermore, either political commentators or military personnel, whose viewpoints and perspectives would be formed by work within their specific fields provided most of the expert opinions. On the other hand, Inuit perspectives, which would have likely provided different sovereignty discourses, were excluded.

The only outlet that gave significant coverage to the role of the Royal Canadian Air Force
in the context of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic was the *National Post* (Pugliese, 2011; Gurney, 2012b; Macnamara & Segal, 2012; Fergusson, 2013; Byers & Franks, 2015). Articles covered a proposed expansion to an air base in Resolute Bay, Nunavut, which would support search and rescue efforts as well as provide a base for planes to refuel as well as be seen as a “key Arctic regional development and sovereignty centerpiece” (Pugliese, 2011). The *National Post* also published articles debating the need for unmanned aerial vehicles – or drones – for additional monitoring capability in the Arctic. The *National Post* staff columnist Matt Gurney argued for using drones in the Arctic, while an article by author, University of British Columbia professor and Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law, Michael Byers (UBC, 2016) argues that the Arctic surveillance Canada already has in place, include the Air Force and Canada’s satellite program, Transport Canada and the Coast Guard are sufficient (Byers & Franks, 2015). Rather, Byers argues the drones might be something the Air Force may have wanted to procure under Harper’s Arctic sovereignty agenda to eventually use in overseas missions.

Opinion pieces by staff columnists and regular academic commentators, like Matt Gurney and Michael Byers, offer a couple more perspectives to the *National Post’s* coverage of defence in the Arctic, but their opinion pieces still reinforced the idea that sovereignty equals defence in the Arctic.

The *National Post* published two stories with different viewpoints when it came to F-35 stealth fighter jets as well. An article authored by Don Macnamara and Hugh Segal, who are former chair to the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies and former Senate Foreign Affairs Committee Chair respectively, argues that F-35s are crucial to having control of the air in Canada’s North, which is fundamental to sovereignty (2012). However, earlier in 2012, the
National Post had published an article centered on retired Air Force colonel Paul Maillet’s argument that F-35s would be a “serious strategic mismatch” and not operate well in the region (Davis, 2012). Finally, in 2013, James Fergusson, a Research Fellow with the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute penned an article stating that the opening up of the Arctic will strain the Air Force, as it will require greater efforts in both monitoring and search and rescue.

The only other publication that discussed the Air Force in the context Arctic sovereignty was the Toronto Star, which published one article in 2012 citing an Air Force study suggesting that “the military’s response to search-and-rescue calls could be improved by moving aircraft out of Canada’s largest East Coast base”, but that a "dedicated Arctic rescue team” is unnecessary (Woods, 2012, para. 1).

Other articles that discussed defence in the Arctic touched on work the Canadian Forces could do to add more hubs for personnel and equipment throughout the Arctic to improve response times in case of emergency (Weber, 2011; Pugliese, 2014). CBC covered a 2015 joint patrol of the Mackenzie River by the Armed Forces, RCMP, Department of Fisheries and Oceans and Environment Canada, the purpose of which is to “show northern sovereignty and practise dealing with emergencies along the way” (“Mackenzie River Patrol”, 2015). Finally, the Toronto Star pokes fun at the stealth snowmobile Canadian Forces were secretly testing in 2013. According to the author, Harper did because “he understands the importance of Canada’s satire industry” – because a $620,000 silent snowmobile couldn’t possibly have practical implications for Canada’s sovereignty in the region (Walkom, 2013). Conversely, one Toronto Star article titled “Canada’s military doing better job in Arctic than people believe, report says” cites a think-tank report by the Canadian Defence and the Foreign Affairs Institute wherein the author argues that the role of the military in the Arctic is less about force and more about
“control over day-to-day activities” (Weber, 2015, para. 5) – which he author suggests Canada already has through controlling foreign shipping and providing services in the North.

The spectrum of different opinions highlighted about Canada’s defence needs in the Arctic was striking. Clearly, even amid defence discourse, there is no consensus on what kind of or how much protection the Arctic needs. However, whether defence was in fact the foremost sovereignty concern – versus sovereignty as security for Northerners, which I’ll elaborate on in further chapters – was rarely questioned in Southern media. This is indicative of the Harper Government’s position on both Arctic sovereignty and Inuit-State relations: sovereignty discourse centered on defence, infrastructure and military capacity, which is much easier to execute and package for the consumption of Southern voters than approaching sovereignty as Canada’s ability to take care of Northerners and honor agreements with Inuit, like the NLCA.

Several stories that spoke to the military and infrastructure in the context of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic showed the political nature, and possibly further politicized, the government’s defence decisions in the Arctic, usually postulating on whether the Harper Government was “doing enough” to assert and protect Canadian sovereignty. Articles that articulated the political nature of defending Canada’s sovereignty claims in the Arctic were more evenly spread between The Globe and Mail, the Toronto Star and the National Post.

For example, the Toronto Star covered the leak of a United States diplomatic cable via WikiLeaks in May 2011 (Campion-Smith, 2011). According to the leaked memo, U.S. diplomats working at the Ottawa embassy wrote that Harper had “endeavoured to make concern for the Arctic a prime feature of the Conservative political brand” (Campion-Smith, 2011, para. 2) but that “while Arctic sovereignty is tried and tested as an election issue, the promises made are seldom implemented” (Campion-Smith, 2011, para. 4). When Canada took the helm of the
Arctic Council in May 2013, a *Toronto Star* article similarly notes, “the vast gap between Ottawa’s Arctic ambitions and reality” (Watson, 2013a, para. 1) and that “Inuit and southern experts hope the spotlight will move Prime Minister Stephen Harper to match talk of responsible development and stricter security with more leadership in Canada’s Arctic” (Watson, 2013a, para. 3), specifically citing issues with infrastructure, search and rescue and security.

In May 2012, the *National Post* published an opinion piece by political commentator John Ivison titled “Stephen Harper’s Arctic sovereignty legacy starting to cool off”. Ivison cites the lack of progress and ever-mounting cost of the government’s proposed Radarsat satellite program, which Harper promised would help Canada defend the Arctic. Ivison quotes an unnamed Hill veteran “who has seen many Arctic initiatives come and go” pointing out that, ultimately, “there aren’t many votes up there” (Ivison, 2012, para. 13). Another *National Post* piece by Michael Byers calls Harper’s commitment to the Arctic, “thinner than a t-shirt in an ice storm” (Byers, 2013, para. 1). Byers cites design compromises, delays and reductions to the number of AOPS; problems with the Nanisivik port; ill-equipped Rangers and failure to begin constructing the promised Coast Guard icebreaker. Another *National Post* columnist (and editor of their “Comment” section), Matt Gurney (2015) writes about then Minister Julian Fantino’s removal from his position as Veteran’s Affairs Minister and demotion to Associate Minister of National Defence – the minister responsible for protecting Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic. According to Gurney (2015), given Fantino’s record of being a “disaster as a cabinet minister… there is simply no way anyone of sound mind and judgement would let him near anything even remotely important” (para. 8). According to Gurney, this move clearly illustrates Harper’s lack of real commitment in the Arctic. Finally, the *National Post* published a piece in May 2015 naming several of the Harper Government’s failures when it comes to procuring equipment for
the military – specifically citing delays in the John G. Diefenbaker Coast Guard icebreaker ("Equip the troops", 2015).

In the aforementioned articles, sovereignty was presented on something that rested on the Harper Government’s ability to have a specific type of presence and capacity in the region – as if the procurement of certain equipment or construction of specific infrastructure would solidify Canada’s claim to the region. However, ITK source material will suggest that Canada’s legitimacy in the Arctic rests on the workaday relations between Inuit and the State. What the above articles do undoubtedly illustrate though, is the way Arctic sovereignty as military might became a trademark of the Harper Conservatives, which worked to steer mainstream news narratives into this discourse as well.

In The Globe and Mail, another piece by Michael Byers (2014a) calls Canada’s failed attempts at building new Arctic icebreakers an embarrassment, calling Harper’s approach to Arctic sovereignty “all-talk, no-action” (para. 3). Also, The Globe and Mail reported on then Foreign Minister John Baird speaking at the 2014 World Economic forum in Davos, Switzerland (Stackhouse, 2014b). Baird called Canada’s first priority in the Arctic protecting its sovereignty, followed by economic development and environmental protection (Stackhouse, 2014b). But “academics and environmentalists in the audience suggested Arctic nations have a duty to do more to protect the region by reducing their own carbon emissions, which are the major cause of rapid melting in the Far North” (Stackhouse, 2014b, para. 7), specifically noting their surprise that Canada had stepped back from the Kyoto Protocol under the Conservative Government. The documentation of questions from academics and environmentalists regarding whether Arctic nations could achieve their sovereign obligations while failing to reduce carbon emissions
presented a welcome disruption in Southern news discourse, gesturing, if briefly, to the notion that sovereignty is about more than satellites, ships and ports.

Of the articles that spoke to military and infrastructure in the context of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, only six discussed what I’ve classified loosely as “day-to-day life” in the Arctic, with two of these articles coming from the National Post (Sturgeon, 2013; Coates & Poelzer, 2014) and the remaining four coming from The Globe and Mail (Jones, 2013; “Prosperity or exploitation,” 2014; Panetta, 2014; Lackenbauer & Lajeunesse, 2015).

In January 2013, the National Post reported on a $233 million plan by telecommunications company NorthwesTel to improve telephone and internet services in the Arctic (Sturgeon, 2013). According to the article, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission “spurred by Ottawa’s aims to increase economic development across the region and guard the country’s sovereignty in the Arctic… has made modernizing the North a priority” (para. 6). A December 2013 article in The Globe and Mail similarly suggests that the construction of a road from Inuvik to Tuktoyaktuk, Northwest Territories, as well as benefiting tourism and cutting down the cost of living in Tuktoyaktuk, “would contribute to Ottawa’s push for Arctic sovereignty” (Jones, 2013, para. 14).

ITK texts discuss how basic service provision and infrastructure in the Arctic is not on par with the rest of Canada. However, Southern news sources rarely brought this into sovereignty discussions. While it is a step in the right direction to make the above link between Canada’s sovereignty in the North and infrastructure that would benefit Northerners day-to-day, the language of “modernizing,” “guarding” and “increasing economic development” to “contribute to Ottawa’s push for Arctic sovereignty” is still problematic. Those living in the North – especially Inuit, who preceded settlers there – should neither be framed as passive
recipients nor pawns in the State’s sovereignty claims in the North. Rather, ITK texts show that
Arctic sovereignty discussions need to be framed in terms of partnership with Northerners.

A few articles also discussed what increased Arctic shipping would mean for day-to-day
life in the Arctic. In March 2014, *The Globe and Mail* covered then Transport Minister Lisa Raitt
downplaying the probability of the Northwest Passage becoming a regular shipping route in the
near future. Raitt outlined difficulties like shallow passes of water, the prospect of ships getting
stuck in the ice, the lack of navigational indicators and the prospect of oils spills (Panetta, 2014,
para. 2). According to the article, “there have even been differences of opinion with other
countries, including the U.S., about who would have sovereignty over the bustling new shipping
routes” (Panetta, 2014, para. 13). In January 2015, *The Globe and Mail* published an article by
two academics focused on Canadian defence and military affairs, Whitney Lackenbauer and
Adam Lajeunesse saying that “behind sensationalist headlines and some over-zealous punditry”
(para. 2), regular shipping in the Arctic is an “uncertain proposition” (para. 5). Lackenbauer and
Lajeunesse (2015) point to similar concerns raised by Raitt, suggesting that rather than focusing
on sovereignty in the Arctic, Canada should instead focus on safety and security in the region by
“developing and maintaining safe sea routes” (para. 8). According to the authors, “investments
in these areas will help to ensure that future shipping is safe and beneficial for Inuit, whose
traditional hunting grounds and highways will have to double as transit routes for resource
carriers and cruise liners” (para. 9). Lackenbauer and Lajeunesse (2015) also cite the jobs that
might be created by the opening up of Arctic shipping.

Ken Coates, the Canada Research Chair in Regional Innovation, and Greg Poelzer, a
Political Studies Professor at the University of Saskatchewan sum up the realities of day-to-day
life in the Arctic as they relate to Canadian sovereignty there eloquently in a *National Post*
article. They write,

Canadians as a whole seem energized by threats, real and imagined, to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty….

Occasional crises — typically involving community-level violence or indigenous deaths — attract media attention, but real concern is fleeting and unsystematic. By the standards of the rest of the country, many of the basic government services, from housing, education and health care to roads and energy systems in the Far North are seriously inadequate…. At present, northerners make do with fewer services, poorer infrastructure and serious deficiencies in government programs. Canada’s challenge… is to bring the North fully into the country, with the political and legal power needed to determine the region’s future (para. 6, 2014).

Coates and Poelzer capture eloquently what is largely missing from mainstream media discourse on Arctic sovereignty. Mainstream news discourse too often downplays the everyday life of Northerners and excludes reference to the colonial milieu (Noble, 2015), historical context and challenges faced by Inuit in the Arctic. Instead, many stories, echoing a Harper Government narrative, focussed on the importance of securing the Arctic through shows of military strength for the eventual economic benefit of the Canadian State. But framing Arctic sovereignty discourse with undue focus on defence and economic exploitation, at best, ignores Inuit perspectives and more nuanced descriptions of sovereignty in the Arctic. At worst, it erases Inuit from the Southern mythology altogether, and sets the stage for a new wave of colonialism in a melting Arctic.

Articles in the Toronto Star, The Globe and Mail and CBC also spoke to how Canada is collaborating with other countries in terms of science and technology in the Arctic. For example, in November 2013, the Toronto Star reported that the federal government was looking to collaborate with other Arctic nations on a Polar Communications and Weather project: “a massive satellite program to improve its weather forecasting abilities in the Arctic” (Boutilier, 2014c, para. 1). While the program was originally meant to be a partnership between the
Department of National Defence, the Canadian Space Agency and Environment Canada, in an attempt to cut back on spending, bureaucrats began “discussing the possibility of a ‘Canadian led’ mission with buy-in from other governments and companies with a stake in the North” (Boutilier, 2014c, para. 3). Similarly, The Globe and Mail reported that China had shown interest in financing a research outpost in Tuktoyaktuk. According to this article, “the Chinese interest [was] certainly welcome – as is almost any interest, since the territorial government is desperate to boost the region’s population” (Marlow, 2015, para. 11). These stories about collaboration in the Arctic may indicate that the threat to the Arctic is not as imminent as more sensationalized news stories might suggest: the fact that other countries are cooperative in Canadian-led missions in the Arctic may show that they in fact respect Canada’s authority in the region.

In July 2015, just days before the writ was expected to drop, beginning a new federal election campaign, several new science and technology projects were announced in the Arctic, as reported by CBC. First, CBC reported that the Defence department had announced a new project in collaboration with a global communications company, the National Research Council, the Coast Guard, Environment Canada, the armed forces, Transport Canada and the RCMP that would better its capacity to “detect and track small ships, predict routes and destinations, and identify suspicious vessels, oil spills and illegal oil dumps” (“Arctic monitoring project”, para. 1). Then, just a few days later, CBC reported a “frenzy” of government funding announcements in the Arctic, including $4.4 million by Natural Resources Canada to upgrade the Polar Continental Shelf Program located in Resolute, Nunavut; $22 million for marine transportation safety improvements and new sonar systems for the Coast Guard icebreakers; $3.7 million to build and upgrade roads leading to the Inuvik Satellite Station located in the Northwest
Territories and $2.1 million for the Arctic Research Foundation to procure mobile science laboratories to be used in six communities across Nunavut (“Federal science, tech announcements, 2015).

Fairclough (2010) writes that CDA should not just analyze texts; rather, it should analyze “relations between discourse and other elements of the social process” (p. 10). In addition, he writes that it should address “social wrongs in their discursive aspects and possible ways of righting or mitigating them” (p. 11). Overall, discourses around defence in the Arctic seem to focus largely on the militarization of the North, with a board spectrum of opinions on whether the Harper government did enough to ensure Canadian sovereignty in the region. What I fear is lost in these stories is the nuance that what happens in the Arctic day-to-day is arguably more important than highly politicized, large scale, chest-thumping gestures of military might that are, according to many of the aforementioned articles, insufficient anyway. Following Fairclough, I believe part of the reason these discourses around militarizing the North emerge is political: it gives the government leeway to spend money there and, as mentioned, often results in positive public opinion. In addition, headlines about militarizing the North are newsworthy – and ultimately Southern news sources are concerned with readership. As mentioned above though, I think this exacerbates the idea that the North is empty and in need of defence, when perhaps focussing the security of people already living their might be just as strong a claim to sovereignty.

**Threats**

Many of the articles I collected showcased different opinions on whether Canada’s Arctic sovereignty was in fact being threatened by other countries, mainly Russia and China. In a piece
in the National Post, history professor and Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute fellow, Whitney Lackenbauer (2013) argues that more and more, nations that are not Arctic states are taking an interest in the region. At the time, the European Union, Italy, China, South Korea, Japan, India, Mongolia Singapore, as well as several non-government organizations were trying to get a place on the Arctic Council. Lackenbauer (2013) wrote, of Canada’s time as Arctic Council chair, the challenge lies “not in excluding Asian states from regional conversations, but in striving to educate non-Arctic interests about why the existing system of governance is appropriate and relevant” (para. 7). Furthermore, Lackenbauer argued, “alienating Asian states will feed perceptions that the Arctic countries view the region as a private backyard, dismissing international interest and simply diving the spoils amongst themselves” (para. 7).

In contrast, in January 2014, The Globe and Mail covered Stephen Harper saying that “the Arctic should be the domain of countries with territory there and he would oppose efforts to grant influence to outsiders in a region attracting growing global attention amid climate change and the hunt for resource riches” (Chase, 2014b, para. 1). Furthermore, in this interview with The Globe and Mail, Harper said that he was “not comfortable with the expansion of the council to include observers” (Chase, 2014b, para. 7) and he dismissed the concept that the Arctic could be managed internationally the way Antarctica is. The Globe and Mail continued this discussion just a few days later, publishing an interview with Heather Exner-Pirot, who works with indigenous engagement and outreach with the University of Saskatchewan, and Joel Plouffe, from the Center for Interuniversity Research on the International Relations of Canada and Quebec. Exner-Pirot and Plouffe (2014) argued that Harper’s Arctic Sovereignty rhetoric was detrimental the Arctic Council’s ability “to advance common interest in the circumpolar world” (para. 2). They said Harper’s interview with The Globe and Mail “demonstrated a troublingly
uninformed view on Arctic sovereignty and governance, seeing threats to Canada’s territorial integrity where non exist, and often painting regional collaboration as an obstruction, not an opportunity” (Exner-Pilot and Plouffe, 2014). Moreover, they argue that there is no real chance of the Arctic becoming internationally run, like Antarctica.

This discussion highlights two ways that governance of the Arctic could be approached: international co-operation or exclusive sovereignty. News coverage suggests that Harper favoured the latter, and Southern media seemed failed, in most cases, to question whether an exclusive sovereignty approach was in fact the best fit for the Arctic. Interestingly, ITK texts showed that Inuit describe sovereignty not as absolute ownership – the concept of owning the land does not fit with Inuit ontology – but as sharing territory (Peter, 2013). Inuit were historically nomadic, and international boundaries that carved up the Arctic were not necessarily relevant or appropriate for Inuit in the first place. Therefore, an international sharing approach to the Arctic, especially one that allowed Inuit to move freely among Arctic nations, might actually make more sense. However, the dismissal of this approach by the Harper Government coupled with the lack of news coverage positioning an international sharing approach as a legitimate possibility meant that it received very little attention in the wider public.

Former minister of foreign affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, published an opinion piece in The Globe and Mail in April 2015 outlining the government’s choice to “send a ‘tough message’ to Russia about its ‘aggression against Ukraine’ at the Arctic Council” (para. 1). Axworthy calls this choice “grandstanding” and “contrary to the council’s purpose and founding declaration which disbar it from addressing military security matters, and is a misuse of the Office of the Chair which serves all eight Arctic states – not the foreign policy of one” (para. 2). Axworthy argues that Harper may be doing this because it generates votes in the South, but unfortunately, it
may also “disrupt the signing and implementation of agreements on climate change and prevention of oil pollution that have taken Arctic states years to negotiate within the framework of the Arctic council – a co-operative and consensus-driven forum” (para. 3).

On the other hand, three articles in the National Post suggested that Russia’s military incursion into Ukraine means that Canada needs to re-think its relationship with NATO in order to protect its territory in the Arctic (Ivison, 2014a; Ivison, 2014b; Dowd, 2015). According to one article,

Both Russian and Canadian policy in the Arctic has been cartoonish in its own way, designed for domestic consumption, with rhetoric far outstripping capability. But while the Russians have been re-arming – building a new generation of nuclear powered icebreakers; new ballistic missile submarines; and, creating two special army brigades to be based in the Arctic – Canada is still talking (Ivison, 2014a, para. 11).

In addition, according to the National Post, while Canada “has long blocked discussion of Arctic issues at NATO, [it is] under increasing pressure from allies to drop its resistance and come up with a co-ordinated response to Russia’s aggressive militarization of the far North” (Ivison, 2014b, para. 1).

Several articles explicitly discussed Canada’s relations with Russia over the Arctic. In a January 2014 interview with The Globe and Mail, Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird said that despite acrimony between Canada and Russia over certain issues, the two countries are working well together when it comes to the Arctic (Blanchfield, 2014). But the article goes on to cite political scientist and Arctic expert Rubert Huebert, who says this doesn’t mean that Canada shouldn’t continue to invest in its military presence in the Arctic, pointing to Norway, who has recently made massive defence expenditures in the Arctic (Blanchfield, 2014).

In May 2014, both the Toronto Star and the National Post published articles following a speech by Russian President Vladimir Putin where he suggested that, while he was happy to
work with Canada on the Arctic, but that Canada should refrain from meddling in the conflict in Ukraine (Woodcock, 2014; “Putin to Canada,” 2014). By August 2014, however, at a speech in the Northwest Territories, Harper said that, given Putin’s growing aggressiveness in Ukraine, Canada could not be complacent about Russia’s growing presence in the Arctic (Boutilier, 2014b; Rennie, 2014).

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the true extent of military threats to Canada’s Arctic are dynamic, contested and ultimately outside the scope of this project. That said, Russia’s 2014 incursion into the Ukraine fit with the Canadian media narrative that the country is a threat. Given that it is also an Arctic nation, one that is far more militarized than Canada, it is understandable that the idea that Canada needs to protect its Arctic territory from Russia became a common Southern news discourse.

For example, articles in the Toronto Star and The Globe and Mail discussed Russia’s increasing militarization in the Arctic (“Staking Arctic claims,” 2011; MacKinnon, 2014). An editorial in the Toronto Star argues “Russia is sparing no expense to exploit the Arctic and its resources” (“Staking Arctic claims”, 2011, para. 2), citing Russia’s new icebreakers and submarines, increased mapping and capability for oil and gas extraction and heavy investments in infrastructure in the Arctic. According to the Toronto Star piece, all this “confirms the wisdom of Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s moves to modestly firm up Canada’s own presence in the north by investing in politics, people and infrastructure” (para. 4). An article in The Globe and Mail similarly calls Russia “the technological and military superpower of the far north” (MacKinnon, 2014, para. 3). According to this article, “Mr. Putin’s Arctic ambitions are an element of his drive to restore some of the territory and influence lost when the Soviet Union crumbled twenty-two years ago” (para. 8).
The Globe and Mail and the National Post also discussed the potential threat from China in the Arctic. An international affairs columnist for the National Post argued that one of the reasons Canada should acquire new F-35 fighter jets is, potentially, to protect against Chinese incursions into the Arctic (Fisher, 2012). According to this article, China has already sent an icebreaker into Canadian waters in the Arctic Ocean and, while the China said this was a research ship, China considers the Arctic “an ‘international lake’ whose untapped resources belong to everyone” (Fisher, 2012, para. 4). Then, in December 2013, the National Post published two articles about a naval engineer in Toronto who allegedly attempted to share information about Canada’s shipbuilding strategy with the Chinese government (Bell, 2013a; Bell, 2013b). Allegedly, Qing Quentin Huang was working on Canada’s AOPS when he “contacted the Chinese embassy in Ottawa to offer up sensitive documents” (Bell, 2013a, para. 4). Beijing denied that Huang had shared information with the Chinese government, calling the claims “totally groundless” (Bell, 2013b, para. 3).

Finally, in January 2015 The Globe and Mail reported on a new national security law in China that “potentially include[s] every sphere of activity, foreign as well as domestic, within the realm of national security” (Ching, 2015, para. 3). According to the author,

The law also seems to endow itself with extraterritorial jurisdiction. It defines China’s national interests as including the “peaceful exploration and use of outer space” as well as of international seabed areas and of both the Arctic and Antarctic polar regions; hence, protecting such interests are now part of upholding national security. With global warming, interest in the Arctic and the riches of its seabed is increasing. China does not border the Arctic but calls itself a near-Arctic state, with rights and interests in the seabed.

A narrative that emerges in the stories is the Canadian state as a protagonist in the face of threats from other countries like Russia, the U.S. and China. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, repeated stories in the news are often presented, and potentially received, as objective
fact (Lule, 2005). However, Frank Sejersen (2003) argues, “an omniscient authoritarian position is not possible” (p. 68) and that all knowledge needs to be understood “in its socio-cultural context” (p. 70). Moreover, Sejersen argues, “we have to look at how knowledge is produced and exchanged… in order to understand it” (p. 70). Similarly, Donna Haraway (1988) writes that the “view of infinite vision is an illusion” (p. 582). As mentioned earlier in this chapter, news stories are presented as fact (Lule, 2005). However, I anticipate that news sources written in Russia, the U.S. or China, for example, would not present themselves as threatening Canadian sovereignty. I am not arguing that threats to Canadian sovereignty don’t exist, but the idea of these threats themselves are from the perspective of the Canadian Government and Canadians, and although perhaps accepted as reality in parts of Canada, are likely not the same discourses you would come across in another country that also claims ownership of parts of the Arctic.

**The North Pole**

In December 2013, a series of articles in the *National Post*, the *Toronto Star* and *The Globe and Mail* detailed Canada’s Arctic seabed claim extending to the North Pole, which overlaps with Russia’s claim (Weber, 2013; Chase, 2013; “Harper is right,” 2013; Watson, 2013c). Canada made the claim to the United Nations (UN): according to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), “a country can secure control of the ocean floor beyond the internationally recognized two-hundred nautical mile limit if it can demonstrate the seabed is an extension of its continental shelf” (Chase, 2013, para. 4). One *Globe and Mail* editorial argued that Harper was “right to seek more, rather than less, of the Arctic for Canada, and specifically the North Pole” (“Harper is right,” para. 1) despite the fact that Russia had already made a claim to the North Pole and then Liberal leader Justin Trudeau argued that who owns the North Pole
was better left to the experts. According to the editorial, “there is no reason for Canada to cede polar territory to Russia or any other country, by default” (para. 1).

Another Globe and Mail article later in the week though quoted Michael Byers as saying that “The North Pole is probably Danish and most certainly not Canadian” – adding that lawyers and scientists would have already told Harper this (“Why Harper and Putin want the North Pole”, 2013, para. 10). Articles in The Globe and Mail and the National Post alike illustrated just how political this claim might have been – so much so that a Conservative MP, when Trudeau suggested the claim should be left to scientists and oceanographers, said in question period,

All of the sudden the Liberals are suggesting that Santa Claus is no longer Canadian and that they would abandon the North Pole and abandon Santa Claus. On this side of the House, we are going to stand up… for all those young Canadians, in the spirit of Christmas, who are waiting for Santa Claus to come and visit (“Tory MP accuses Liberals of abandoning North Pole,” 2013).

In a 2014 Globe and Mail article, Michael Byers calls the North Pole “deeply rooted in Canada’s national mythology” (para. 1). According to Byers, “the Prime Minister knows that Canada’s claim will fail. But he also knows that the failure will emerge only after he leaves office. In the meantime, the North Pole presents him with an opportunity to rehabilitate his image as a champion of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty” (2014b, para. 23). Furthering Byers’ argument, CBC reported, “Canada’s last-minute decision to stretch its claim to the Arctic seabed all the way to the North Pole took federal bureaucrats just as off-guard as it did the rest of the world” (Weber, 2014b, para. 1). According to this article, scientists had finished mapping in 2011, and the 2013 claim to UNCLOS was planned to stop before the North Pole; however, “Harper stepped in at the last minute to insist that the North Pole be included” (para. 7). Another CBC story discussed Denmark’s submission to the UN claiming the North Pole, based on Greenland’s continental shelf (“The North Pole: Does Denmark have a legitimate claim,” 2014).
The article quotes a University of Toronto scholar, Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, who says, “there’s absolutely no doubt that the North Pole is most definitely closer to Greenland than it is to Canada” (para. 23). Finally, on Christmas Eve, 2014, *The Globe and Mail* published an article by former prime minister of Sweden, Carl Bildt, outlining Denmark and Russia’s competing claims to the North Pole. But he assured readers that this claim would be settled peacefully under UNCLOS, writing, “neither Santa Claus not anyone else has reason to be worried. The nature of the Lomonosov Ridge [disputed seabed] will be debated for years to come, while his thoughts – and ours – are likely to be focused on more immediate issues” (Bildt, 2014, para. 13).

Roland Barthes (1972) argues, “everything can be a myth provided it is conveyed by a discourse” (p. 107). While questions the aforementioned articles raised about whether or not Santa Claus is Canadian, or, more seriously, of whether the North Pole is Canadian were often met with scepticism, humour, or outright dismissal, when these discourses were repeated again and again, it worked to create a myth. Therefore, while defending Santa Claus’ Canadian citizenship in parliament may seem bizarre and laughable, it’s easy to see how it could be used to gain points politically. Moreover, Lule (2005) writes, “Editors and reporters do not have to conceive brand-new stories for each event. They do not have to tell stories never before written or read. Stories already exist. Journalists approach events with stories” (p. 101). Therefore, journalists or politicians are not necessarily creating the mythic around Santa Claus and the North Pole as Canadian, rather, it is a story told in our society, and thus news gravitates towards it.

**News Mirrors (And Cements) Existing Myths**
Overall, the aforementioned news stories, produced in the colonial milieu (Noble, 2015), shore up the already dominant worldview of settler Canadians and seldom question the legitimacy of Canada’s claim to the North. Rather than presenting the Arctic as a place where multiple polities could come to interact and two cultures could work in partnership, these Southern news stories simply reflect the unequal political context in which they were written. Of course, news stories follow events, and the lack of partnership with Inuit highlighted by these stories is indicative of broader relations between Inuit and the Canadian state under the Harper Government.

Noble (2015) follows Asch (2014) and suggests that the government only acts to ameliorate the relationship with Indigenous peoples when pressured by the public. However, Southern media is, generally, re-telling the myth of a single (settler) polity in the Arctic. This is relevant because, as previously mentioned, this is how many Southerners may learn about the Arctic. But if Inuit perspectives, worldview, ontology, acknowledgement of a colonial history and the idea that multiple polities come together in the Arctic are erased from Southern media, then they are erased from Southern discourse. If we consider Asch and Noble’s suggestion above, then this works to dissuade the wider public from pressuring the government to fulfill its obligations to Inuit.

In my next chapter, I will elaborate on how, as well as shoring up existing myths about the Arctic, Southern news often worked to erase Inuit from Arctic sovereignty discussions altogether.
CHAPTER 5
IGNORING AND ERASING INUIT

The Franklin Expedition

Of all the stories I analyzed, no single narrative received more attention than the search for and discovery of the Franklin Expedition’s HMS *Erebus*. In total, thirty-seven stories focussed specifically on the Franklin Expedition. The *Toronto Star*, the *National Post*, *CBC*, *The Globe and Mail* and *The Media Co-Op* all covered the Franklin story to varying extents.

British explorer John Franklin, along with over one hundred crewmembers, left England in 1845 on the ships HMS *Erebus* and *Terror* in search of the Northwest Passage (“Franklin Expedition’s lost ships”, 2014). By 1847, the two ships were trapped in sea ice, and Franklin had died. In 1848, the rest of the crew abandoned the ships in an attempt to make it to the mainland, but none survived (“Franklin Expedition’s lost ships”, 2014). While relics from the ships had been found in Inuit villages, and notes from crewmembers and Inuit oral history told the story of the sailors’ fate, it wasn’t until September 7, 2014 that either of the ships was found, despite England sending multiple search parties (“Franklin Expedition’s lost ships,” 2014). Eventually, after giving Canada the rights to the Northern Arctic in the late 1880s, the British government also transferred rights to the ships’ artefacts, should they ever be found, to the Canadian Government (Long, 2014).

According to the news stories I analyzed, which discuss the search for and eventually the successful discovery of the HMS *Erebus* in 2014, despite the Franklin expedition’s British roots, this tale is one that has become deeply entrenched in Canadian mythology (Davison, 2013; Rennie, 2014; Den Tandt, 2014b). From the famous Stan Rogers folk song, to works by prominent Canadian authors like Margaret Atwood and Farley Mowat, “the Franklin story has become woven into our culture” (Davison, 2013). Upon the successful discovery of the HMS
Erebus, a successful collaboration between Parks Canada and private partners, several news stories referred to this discovery as a source of pride for Canadians (“Franklin Expedition’s lost ships, 2014; Paris, 2014; “Long-lost Franklin ship”, 2014). Shortly after the discovery of the Erebus, Stephen Harper wrote an exclusive piece for The Globe and Mail, where he calls Franklin’s search for the Northwest Passage “a key moment in our country’s history” (Harper, 2014).

New stories that covered the Franklin expedition search often described Harper’s interest as genuine and enthusiastic, but still deeply entwined with the Conservative brand. For example, one National Post opinion piece stated,

[Conservatives] look to the far North as a place where the Conservative party values of patriotism, heroism, toughness and adaptation to the land and sea all come together — and Franklin fits in with that narrative perfectly. Harper envisions the far North not as a wintry and sparsely populated wasteland, but as the romantic birthplace of the nation, while the government-backed searches recast the Franklin expedition as a valiant example of Canadian principles instead of a gruesome catastrophe (Long, 2014, para. 19).

And indeed, Harper’s (2014) piece in The Globe and Mail described the Franklin mission as helping to “lay the foundations of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty” (para. 2). In the same article, Harper wrote, “The North is central to our identity. It is imprinted on the imagination of Canadians. And the North will play an even greater role in Canada’s future prosperity” (para. 9). Tellingly, there is no mention whatsoever of Inuit in the piece Harper wrote for The Globe and Mail, even though other news stories reported that Inuit oral history helped pinpoint the exact location of the Erebus. My reading of Southern news stories about the Franklin discovery suggests that while Harper was eager to make the North and the possibility of its economic exploitation part of his political brand, he was willing to do so without involving or addressing the Inuit presence in the Arctic.
Similarly, stories from CBC, the Toronto Star, The Globe and Mail and the National Post discussed whether the Erebus discovery worked to shore-up Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. And like many of stories I discussed in Chapter Four, stories about the Franklin discovery equated sovereignty in the Arctic with military capacity.

For example, CBC reported that not only was the Franklin discovery historically significant, but it proved that Canada is actually able to navigate treacherous Northern waterways and allowed Canada the opportunity to engage in ocean floor mapping; thus proving that Canada is in fact exercising its sovereignty in the North (Paris, 2014; Rennie, 2014; “Russian Ship, 2014”). However, the stories overlooked the fact that Inuit were already, and since time immemorial, navigating these Northern waterways. Similarly, articles in the National Post suggest that the Franklin discovery was only possible because of Canada’s “military muscle” in the region (Watson, 2015), showcasing Canada’s scientific prowess. The National Post also touted an “unprecedented partnership of government departments and private organizations and companies” that supposedly made the find possible (“Search for Franklin’s Ships”, 2014, para. 15). But portraying the State’s legitimacy in the North as an exclusive function of its military and scientific capability erases Inuit from Arctic sovereignty discourse. It also misses the opportunity to instead discuss whether that fact that Canadian Inuit already live in and exercise their sovereignty in the Arctic is in fact a much stronger case for Canada’s claim to the region on an international stage.

Articles in The Globe and Mail were slightly more critical about what the Franklin find might mean for Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. One article questioned whether it was valid for Harper to use the discovery of a British ship to create Canadian cultural heritage (Charnalia, 2015). Another Globe and Mail journalist writes, “Arctic experts say they’re not sure they
understand Mr. Harper’s claim that the Franklin expedition helped lay the basis for Canadian sovereignty in the region. These two British naval ships were lost decades before Confederation (Chase, 2014e, para. 8). In addition, the fact that Franklin’s history in the North is part of a broader history of colonialism and conquest is totally absent from the media narrative. Ignoring the Arctic’s colonial history does a disservice to Inuit, furthering the myth that the Arctic belongs to the State, and again, ignoring that if Canada wants to claim legitimate sovereignty in the Arctic, then it must uphold its obligations to Inuit, who are Canadian citizens and have arguably been protecting the state’s sovereignty by simply using the region.

A small number of articles accessed through CBC (Paris, 2014), the National Post (Den Tandt, 2014c; Press & Boswell, 2012a) and The Globe and Mail (Charnalia, 2015; Taylor, 2014) do however credit Inuit oral history with aiding in the discovery of the Erebus. A CBC article says that Inuit oral history has “been telling researchers where to look for decades” (Paris, 2014, para. 20). According to this article, the Franklin discovery helps affirm Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic because “mapping and maritime skill aside, presence is the most important part of a claim to the Arctic. And the ones who have been there for time immemorial are the Inuit” (Paris, 2014, para. 19).

The two National Post stories that discuss the contribution of Inuit oral history to the discovery of the Erebus don’t directly speak to how this might impact Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. Rather, they describe the Inuit role matter-of-factly (Den Tandt, 2014c; Taylor, 2014). Written before the discovery of the ship, both articles simply cite Inuit oral history as a possible indicator of where the ships might be found.

The Globe and Mail also published two articles speaking to the fact that Inuit oral history helped locate the Erebus. One article covers the unveiling of a replica of the HMS Erebus bell at
the Royal Ontario Museum (ROM) (Taylor, 2014). The bell is the focal point of a small ROM display about the Franklin discovery. According to a story in *The Globe and Mail*, the project will “stress how Inuit lore helped to locate the wreck” (Taylor, 2014, para. 7). The same article quotes then Nunavut Member of Parliament and Minister of the Environment Leona Aglukkaq speaking at the event and explaining, “the ship was discovered in the area the Inuit always said it was” (Taylor, 2014, para. 8). At this event, Aglukkaq also said “the community is very excited [about the ship’s discovery]; it validates their knowledge” (Taylor, 2014, para. 8).

Overall though, the relative lack of media discourse that explicitly connected the Franklin find to Inuit history and presence in the Arctic could be indicative of the broader political climate in which stories about the discovery were written. News coverage suggested that the Conservative Government positioned Arctic sovereignty as the ability to operate in and exploit the region, rather than a climate of partnership between Inuit and the State.

News stories also highlighted controversy stemming from the high-profile Franklin discovery. For example, both CBC and *The Globe and Mail* reported that scientist Pat Sutherland was fired from The Museum of History after publishing research that indicated that the Vikings were actually living in the Arctic and trading with indigenous people there as early as 1000 A.D., far before British conquest. Sutherland maintains that publishing this research that was not in line with the Federal Government’s views on sovereignty lead to her dismissal. Meanwhile, the Canadian Museum of History told media that Sutherland was fired for harassment but wouldn’t provide any further details (“A crucible that may change”, 2014; Stueck and Taylor, 2014).

In addition, shortly after the *Erebus* was found in the summer of 2014, CBC reported that the role a Russian ship played in aiding the discovery was “underplayed” by the Harper
According to this article, the Russian ship *Akademik Sergey Vavilov* assisted the Canadian Government with sonar and transportation, but the Prime Minister’s Office “describe[d] the ship by its Canadian alias ‘One Ocean Explorer’ and [made] no reference to its Russian ownership” (“Russian Ship”, 2014, para. 15).

*The Media Co-Op’s* coverage of the search for the Franklin ship was the only source that pointedly questions whether the Franklin expedition did in fact “[lay] the foundations of Canada’s arctic sovereignty”, as Harper proclaimed after the *Erebus’* discovery (Kostrich, 2014, para. 12). Similarly, *The Media Co-Op’s* coverage offered the only article that specifically named the colonial roots of the discovery:

In this context, sovereignty does not mean a positive relationship with the people who have known and lived on that land for hundreds of years. Despite the fact that Inuit oral histories had pinpointed the location of the ship generations ago, the ship’s discovery by a settler institution is considered a discovery (much like Franklin’s alleged discovery of the passage itself, or the “discovery” of the Americas in the fifteenth century). Inhabitants of Canada’s Arctic territories are still trapped in this discursive power relationship (Kostrich, 2014, para. 13).

The independent nature of *The Media Co-Op* may allow it to take this stance. Perhaps the example of Pat Sutherland above best illustrates the pressure that may exist to conform to an uncritical view of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic.

In *Media Anthropology*, Jack Lule (2005) points to where myth and news interact. According to Lule, like myth, “the news thrives on the ritual repetition of stories,” but furthermore, it “places such a heavy emphasis on being real” (p. 105). Lule describes how reporters, editors, readers and sources already “draw upon the universally understood stock of archetypal stories”, then these stories are repeated to the public (via the news), eventually becoming myths. In this case, Franklin’s lost ship is already found
in Canadian mythology. Southern news sources, following the lead of the Harper administration, often presented the discovery as a victory for Canada without a broader discussion of the history of colonialism in the region or the fact that Inuit and other countries were pivotal to making the discovery.

Furthermore, according to Bourdieu (1980; 1993), the way individual agents act in a given situation results from their learned behaviour. Thus agents who have been socialized similarly may have a similar habitus. Bourdieu refers to the setting where these agents’ behaviour is governed as the field (1993). In line with Bourdieu, I believe that Southern journalists writing about the Arctic are operating within the same field and may have a similar habitus. Therefore, their similar learned behaviour (for example, socialization in Southern Canada, journalistic training, day-to-day job demands, political pressure) may cause them to, unintentionally produce similar works about the Arctic. In the case of the Franklin Discovery, it was largely communicated as a “Canadian” discovery, with few journalists questioning the validity of this claim.

**Climate Change, Shipping and the Environment**

Of the articles I collected, while many make passing mention of various environmental elements associated with Arctic sovereignty (climate change opening up waterways, impacts associated with increased shipping, the fact that Northern peoples will experience climate change sooner and to a greater degree than Southerners), only a handful of articles explicitly focussed on how protecting the Northern environment, and thus the people who live there, may relate to Canada’s sovereignty in the region.
For example, in October 2013, Arctic Council meetings began in Whitehorse and *The Globe and Mail* reported, “Canada will use its position as chair of the international Arctic Council to push for new safety standards for oil tankers and other northern shipping” (Wingrove, 2013, para. 1). Then MP for Nunavut and Environment Minister Leonna Aglukkaq spoke at the meetings addressing the work that the Arctic Council must do to prevent oil spills in the Arctic and ensuring that resource development and shipping were sustainable for Northern communities. (Wingrove, 2013). Similarly, in November 2013, a *Globe and Mail* article argued, “Canada is rightly using its Arctic Council chairmanship to raise the international profile of environmental concerns in northern waters for cruise ships and commercial shipping” (Jeffrey, 2013, para. 2). According to this piece, despite risks to increased shipping in the Arctic, “if these risks are handled well, northerners will gain jobs and greater control over their future, and all Canadians will share in the economic benefits” (para. 11).

*A National Post* article calls the Arctic “one of the world’s last few unexplored energy frontiers: foreboding and risky but irresistible to world powers given its treasures beneath” (Hussain, 2012, para. 1). According to the article, a Chatham House (international think tank) report pointed to opportunities for up to $100 billion worth of mining, oil and gas investments in the Arctic “within a few years” (Hussain, 2012, para. 3). But backlash from environmental activists and the “greater risk assumption” required by oil companies are impacting the speed of development by Canada, the U.S. Russia and Scandinavian countries (para. 16). According to the article, “all countries involved are conscious that the Arctic is not just simply a resource play” (para. 18).

The aforementioned articles present a welcome acknowledgement that Canada’s ability to ensure the well being of Northerners and the environment in the Arctic are a central to its
sovereignty there. However, positioning the North as an “energy frontier” is problematic given the history of colonialism in the region. In fact, a conversation about the negative impacts resource extraction has historically had on Indigenous communities across Canada is relevant to the Arctic – where the state has the opportunity to either do things better as access to new resources opens up or repeat mistakes it has made in the past. However, this nuance was left almost completely out of Southern media.

CBC, The Globe and Mail and the National Post also reported on climate change and melting ice as they relate to Arctic sovereignty. In August 2012, CBC reported that Arctic sea ice would hit record lows, noting the opening up of waterways and what this means to Canada’s sovereignty as well as the fact that “melting ice is of major concern to Inuit people” (“Arctic sea ice levels,” 2012, para. 10). Conversely, The Globe and Mail covered comments made by Greenland Prime Minister Aleqa Hammond at the 2013 Halifax International Security Forum, who called climate change “not all bad,” citing disappearing ice that is revealing mountains and fjords full of resources (Taber, 2013, para. 6). Hammond also said that she refused to let the people of Greenland be “victimized by climate change” (Taber, 2013, para. 19).

In addition, in August 2014, of Harper’s annual trips to the Arctic, a Globe and Mail article notes, “nowhere in Canada is the impact of climate change more increasingly evident than the North. And yet, the words ‘climate change’ are never heard from Mr. Harper in the North” (Simpson, 2014, para. 5). Then, in October 2014, CBC and the National Post published a Canadian Press piece indicating that Canada will not make its 2020 greenhouse gas emissions target, as outlined in the Copenhagen Accord, nor did the Harper government have a plan for how Canada might make these targets (Brewster, 2014a).
ITK sources consistently describe the critical nature of addressing climate change to protect the Arctic and its inhabitants. Overall though, very few articles in the Southern news sources I analyzed explicitly made this connection. Furthermore, as illustrated in Simpson’s (2014) *Globe and Mail* article above, Harper refused to associate conversations about climate change to discussions about Canada’s sovereignty in the North. This presents two problems. First, as mentioned, Southern media coverage often reported on and thus amplified Harper’s position on the North, so when Harper failed to link climate change with Arctic governance, so often did Southern media. At the same time, ITK sources lambasted the Harper Government for its inaction on climate change, citing this as a failure in its obligations to Inuit, but this received little mainstream media coverage.

In January 2014, *The Globe and Mail* ran a series called “The North”. Containing dozens of feature stories, as well as multimedia content, *The Globe and Mail* website refers to the series as an “investigation of unprecedented change, to the climate, culture and politics of Canada’s last frontier” (*The North*, 2016). As part of the series, several questions were posed to an “Arctic Circle” panel consisting of Michael Byers, mentioned previously in this chapter; Wade Davis, a professor of anthropology at the University of British Columbia; John English, author of *Ice and Water: Politics, Peoples and the Arctic Council*; Shelagh Grant, author of *Polar Imperative: A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America*; Robert Huebert, the associate director of the University of Calgary’s Centre for Military and Strategic Studies; Tony Penikett, former premier of the Yukon and Mary Simon, former president of the ITK. These panelists were asked how they saw climate change impacting the Arctic.

Byers (2014) responded that the Arctic “will not find a new equilibrium, and the benefits of increased accessibility [due to melting sea ice] will eventually be negated by extreme weather,
sea level rise, and global economic and social dislocation” (para. 18). He says that economic
development in the north will never be able to fix the suffering that climate change has and will
cause Northerners – but economic development in the region “that involves and benefits them…
can provide some redress” (para. 20). John English takes this line of thinking further, noting
Canadian government policies “minimize the impact of climate change; but… the Prime Minister
and his ministers appear to accept that climate change in the Arctic will have a large and, in their
view, mainly beneficial impact” (para. 24). He argues that we must shift the conversation in
Canada and ask, “how can we assure that Northerners benefit from the exploitation of their lands
and seas?” (para. 26).

Wade Davis and Mary Simon further elaborate on the negative impacts climate change is
already having on Inuit. Davis (2014) tells Globe and Mail that the Inuit “hunting season has
been cut in half in a single generation” (para. 34) due to melting ice. Simon (2014) says she
doesn’t understand “why the Government of Canada doesn’t want to be seen as a global leader in
resolving the challenges of climate change” (para. 21), nothing that we have the second largest
Arctic coastline in the world. Simon (2014) argues,

We have a unique opportunity to become known for our investments in the technologies needed to adapt to
the changing conditions, to gather knowledge and monitoring date from the Inuit in the communities
hardest hit by climate change and to be the but for international scientific effort to understand the dramatic
changes that are occurring” (para. 31).

As mentioned, almost none of the news stories I collected make the connection that
Simon makes above between Canada’s inaction on climate change under the Harper
administration, the profound impact climate change is having on the Arctic and Canada’s
responsibility as an Arctic nation to do more to address climate change on the global stage.

Fairclough (2010) argues that the “manifesto” of CDA is to “advance human well-being”,
specifically in relation to “transform[ing] capitalism in less crisis-prone, more sustainable and more socially just directions using positive critique (pp. 16-18). In line with Fairclough, I believe that Southern news stories could do more to make this connection between climate change and the security of Northern peoples. In addition, Southern news sources could draw greater connections between the ways capitalism exacerbates climate change, as well as the impacts capitalism has and will continue to have on resource extraction in the North. When news stories fail to make this connection, it erases a central aspect of the Arctic sovereignty narrative as presented by Inuit sources: that in order for the Canadian State to govern legitimately in the Arctic, it must take care of the people who live there, and for Inuit, that is intrinsically linked with taking care of the environment.

**Boundary Disputes**

Several articles also centred on boundary disputes in the Arctic. In another piece by Robert Huebert in The Globe and Mail, Huebert (2014b) points to the dispute between Canada and the U.S. over the Beaufort Sea: at the time the article was written, an area of about 21,000 square kilometers that potentially contains oil and gas was under dispute. According to Huebert (2014b) further complicating the dispute is the Western Inuvialuit Land Claim settlement, which is based on Canada’s view. Therefore, ceding any territory to the U.S. could result in redrawing the land claims settlement.

The National Post published two articles on the same day that focussed on the Hans Island dispute between Canada and Denmark (“Hans Island is just the beginning,” 2012; Humphreys, 2012). According to the National Post, “it is difficult to overstate how unimportant Hans Island is” (“Hans Island is just the beginning,” para. 1). A 1.3 square kilometre rock
island, Hans Island has been disputed since 2004: it lies directly between Canada and Greenland, and while a maritime border has been agreed upon on the straight of water it sits on, Canada and Denmark never divided the island itself. In April 2012, a plan was proposed to divide Hans Island between the countries. At the time of writing though, the countries still haven’t settled the boundary dispute.

Articles from CBC and The Globe and Mail discuss UNCLOS and its role in Arctic boundary making. In September 2012, a CBC article discussed how the UN convention divides some of the Arctic sea floor among Canada, Russian, the U.S., Denmark and Norway (Case, 2012). However, it points to the Lomonosov Ridge as an area under dispute despite the UN convention: while Russia says the underwater mountain range is part of the Asian continental shelf, Canada and Denmark believe it is part of the North American continental shelf. A May 2013 Globe and Mail article written by the vice president of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, Colin Robertson, similarly calls UNCLOS “one of the greatest triumphs of Canadian diplomacy,” extending Canada’s jurisdiction “to the continental shelf, effectively doubling our ocean estate” (Robertson, 2014, para. 9). Robertson writes, “with forty per cent of our land mass in our northern territories, and 25 per cent of the global Arctic, securing international recognition for Canada’s claim to an extended continental shelf and seabed rights is a national priority” (para. 10). He argues that Canada must strengthen its navy in order to keep this governance model effective and protect its seabed.

Completely missing from the discussions around borders and boundaries is the fact that Inuit have been in the Arctic since time immemorial and were traditionally nomadic people, spanning the geography of what now falls into several different countries (Simon, 2011). In fact, the relationship between Inuit and The Crown around boundary-making in the Arctic has been a
difficult one, with Inuit “suffer[ing] a steady loss over [their] ability to make decisions… for [themselves] and for the land and water that has sustained [them] for thousands of years” (Simon, 2011, p. 880). Another example of the tumultuous history between the Government of Canada and Inuit were the previously mentioned relocations to the High Arctic to shore up Canada’s presence there (Simon, 2011). I argue that as scientists, geographers and politicians continue to divide up the Arctic, it is within the realm of what Sejersen (2003) refers to as the “authoritarian and omniscient position within the knowledge discourse” (p. 67) – a position that appears to be to be almost entirely unquestioned within Southern media. Sejersen argues that contextual knowledge (of Indigenous peoples in the Arctic) is a different knowledge tradition, but one should not be privileged over the other. Missing from discussions in Southern media about Arctic boundary making is local, contextual knowledge of Inuit people, who may view their relationship with the land differently than Southern Canadians.

The Rangers

The National Post and CBC reported on the Canadian Rangers and their role in protecting Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic, but overall, Southern news sources gave little critical coverage to the Rangers program. In August 2013, Stephen Harper was reported as “touting the Canadian Rangers as a pillar of search and rescue in the North – even as a newly released defence report [by the Defence Science Advisory Board] warn[ed] of ‘glaring weaknesses’ in Canada’s ability to respond to Arctic emergencies” (Brewster, 2013a, para. 1). According to CBC, the report warned of issues with search and rescue such as a lack of integration with the military and RCMP, and that the Rangers, while able to respond to emergencies, lack sea-life or air-mobile capabilities (Brewster, 2013a). In addition, an editorial by a former Army intelligence
officer, Robert Smol, (2014) in the *National Post* challenges what he calls the “widespread assumption currently pervading our government and the public that Canada has done all it can to defend the Arctic” (Smol, 2014, para. 1). Smol looks at what Norway has done to protect its Arctic, and how, in his opinion, Canada pales by comparison in its army, navy and air operations. Smol specifically notes the Canadian Rangers, lamenting that they are “not trained combat soldiers” whose training lasts just ten days and whose “weaponry consists of the Lee Enfield rifle, which was used by the rest of the Canadian military during the Second World War” (para. 7). Interestingly, the Lee Enfield rifle is still used in by the Rangers because it doesn’t freeze up in the cold climate; while the Rangers are clearly not involved in any combat in the Arctic, one of the reasons they carry the rifles is in case of polar bear attack (Brewster, 2012b).

Furthermore, two *CBC* articles published in close succession in April 2015 unearthed that forty-nine Rangers had died since January 2011 (Everson, 2015; “A closer look”, 2015). According to these articles, the military chaplain who oversees the North raised concerns about the Rangers in a report for the chief of military personnel and the chief of defence. *CBC* obtained the report through the Access to Information Act. According to *CBC*, neither the military nor the commanding officer for the Canadian Ranger Patrol Group would respond to requests for an interview (Everson, 2015). However, the Department of National Defence did provide a statement to *CBC* indicating that while “one of deaths was related to the individuals’ service in the North… the rest were attributed to other causes ‘common in the larger population of the communities in which they live’” as well as the fact that, without a mandatory retirement age, some rangers “may be dying of natural causes” (“A closer look,” 2015, para. 3). Both articles point out that the great majority of the Rangers are Aboriginal and that Rangers don’t have access to services, like medical services, that other reservists might have access to.
A review of these stories indicates that while the Conservative Government used the Rangers to bolster Arctic sovereignty rhetoric, it failed to discuss some of the structural and day-to-day problems Canadian Rangers face in public discourse. The fact that just two stories – both CBC – covered the death of 49 Rangers in four years as well as the fact that Rangers lack access to basic medical services available to other reservists is a significant gap in media. I can only speculate on the reasons for the apparent dismissal of this story, at least in the context of broader sovereignty discussions, in the other Southern sources I analyzed. As Lule (2005) suggests, news falls in line with existing myths. Canada has a history of racism towards its Indigenous populations, and most Rangers are Inuit. The fact that mainstream media largely ignored the aforementioned stories about the Rangers may, unfortunately, be indicative of a broader milieu of deeply entrenched ignorance and indifference by Southern Canadians about what they see as “Indigenous issues”. It is important to note, however, that a different approach to collecting news stories (for example, using a news index instead of a keyword search) may have returned more stories that discuss the Rangers in the context of Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic.

Northern Peoples and Challenges

Similar to the lack of stories that covered problems faced by Canada’s Rangers, of all the articles I collected, only nine specifically focussed on how challenges Northerners face relate to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. I should note that the specific keywords I searched (“Arctic + sovereignty”) is part of the reason for the small number of articles returned. Without fail, using different search terms (for example, “Arctic + services”, “Arctic + health”, “Arctic + education”) would have yielded different results. However, the lack of stories that discuss Canada’s
proclaimed sovereignty in the Arctic that speak decisively about the living conditions there is telling.

The *National Post, CBC, the Toronto Star* and *The Globe and Mail* all gave some coverage to challenges faced by Northerners, to varying extents. One *CBC* article features the Idlout family – the Inuit family featured on the back of Canada’s 1974 two-dollar bill (Lee, 2014). The author discusses how Joseph Idlout was hired to teach “Southern Inuit” (moved from Quebec to Gris Fiord and Resolute Bay) how to hunt after they were forcibly relocated in the 1950s. Another *CBC* article spoke to rampant problems with food security in Nunavut (Rennie, 2015). The article profiles an Inuit man, his wife and five children, and their struggle to get enough to eat with the prohibitively expensive cost of food in the North, and then chronicles a broader history of starvation in the Arctic – especially severe in the 1940s and 1950s when Inuit were relocated.

Although Ottawa did apologize in 2010 for using Inuit as “human flagpoles” in the High Arctic Relocation (Campion-Smith, 2010), and this apology received coverage from *CBC, The Globe and Mail* and the *National Post*, news that connected day-to-day problems faced by Northerners with Canada’s colonial legacy in the Arctic, at least in Arctic sovereignty discussions, were few and far between. This erasure is relevant because it positions issues faced by Inuit as cultural, rather than politically and historically situated, again, painting an incomplete picture for Southern audiences, who may look to the news to learn about the Arctic. That said, a few stories I collected did contribute to a narrative, one continued by the ITK, that connects Arctic sovereignty to the well-being of Inuit.

A 2011 article in the *Toronto Star* interviewed Iqaluit Mayor Madeleine Redfern about Stephen Harper’s annual trips to the Arctic, wherein she questions whether Canada can “claim to
be master of this vast land when so many basic services crucial to the well-being of northerners are absent”, citing Nunavut’s high suicide and teenage pregnancy rates and low high school graduation rate (Woods, 2011b, para. 6). Redfern tells *Toronto Star*, “territorial sovereignty in the north can’t exist without a healthy local population” (para. 7). The *National Post* columnist Michael Den Tandt writes a similar piece during to Harper’s 2013 summer visit; he says, “after days of singing the praises of Arctic sovereignty, resource extraction and development, Prime Minister Stephen Harper came face to face here with the stark challenge of catalyzing a 21st Century gold rush in a society afflicted by grinding poverty” (para. 1).

Another *National Post* piece by journalist Terry Glavin (2011) cites the astronomical cost of food in remote northern communities. Glavin writes, about the Federal Government’s approach to sovereignty thus far, “the first thing southern politicians need to get their heads around is that northerners need to eat. Worrying about Russian incursions into Canadian airspace should be rather lower down the list” (para. 7). In addition, in a long *Globe and Mail* feature, part of “The North” series, feature writer Ian Brown (2014) details his stay in Cambridge Bay. In his feature, he details some of the contradictions of the South toward the Arctic – like wanting people to live their to protect Canada’s sovereignty, while simultaneously allowing food to be so expensive.

Finally, a July 2015 *Globe and Mail* article highlights, “many of Canada’s pressing socio-economic, political and environmental challenges are more intense in the North” (Fiser and Dowdall, 2015, para. 1). The authors outline the difference between sovereignty and security in the North, writing, “Northerners value a secure Canadian Arctic. But the security dimensions that matter to northerners have less to do with sovereignty than with challenges citizens face to meet basic needs, and to anticipate and adapt to adversity” (para. 4). Therefore, they suggest that
addressing issues with the health of Aboriginal people in the North, improving infrastructure and ensuring good governance that is community focused “will enable Canada to solidify sovereignty, improve security and realize the North’s economic potential” (para. 11). The aforementioned stories present a step in the right direction in terms of media coverage of Northern issues that is more nuanced, contextual and historically aware.

Debra Spitulnik (1993) says that media anthropology should address the power mass media has as a “force that provide audiences with ways of seeing and interpreting the world” (p. 294). As mentioned in my introduction, since the average Southerner may never actually have the opportunity to travel to the Arctic, I believe Southern media could do more to educate Southerners about some of the challenges facing Northerners – especially as it relates to Canada’s claim to sovereignty there.

**Canada’s Last Frontier**

In a piece that introduced the “The North” series, *The Globe and Mail*’s editor in chief, John Stackhouse (2014a), wrote, “the North is a lynchpin of our country’s identity. It is both geography and mythology, a place that we continue to inscribe with our hopes and ambitions and our desire to articulate who we are” (para. 16).

If, according to Lule (2005) the news follows myth and supports the status quo, then it is valuable to define what myths news stories about Arctic sovereignty are supporting. Although Southern media offered many different repeat stories about Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, a myth that underscored many recurring stories was that the North is Canada’s last frontier. In *The Burden of History*, Elizabeth Furniss (1999) outlines what she refers to as the “frontier complex”. According to Furniss, “the frontier complex is framed by a particular historical epistemology that
celebrates the ‘discovery’ of a rich, ‘empty’ land by non-Aboriginal explorers and settlers” (p. 187). Furthermore, Furniss argues that the frontier complex “also finds expression in the way that Euro-Canadian community leaders represent public values and regional identities. At times, members of the public create a collective sense of belonging by evoking historical traditions captured by the image of the pioneer” (p. 189). I believe, even if inadvertent, the frontier complex creeps into the way Southern journalists portray the Arctic and Canada’s identity as a Northern nation. Viewing the North, even indirectly or unintentionally, as a frontier to be tamed, conquered, owned, explored, discovered and exploited is dangerous because of Canada’s colonial history. Furniss skillfully explains,

The power maintaining the political, economic, social, and cultural marginalization of Aboriginal people in Canadian society resides not only in the policies, practices, and ideologies of state institutions… [it infuses] the everyday cultural attitudes and practice of ‘ordinary’… Euro-Canadians who, knowingly or unwittingly, serve as agents in an ongoing system of colonial domination” (p. 11).

Following Fairclough, one way to ameliorate the perpetuation of the frontier myth in Southern news sources may simply be to bring in more Northern voices to speak to, from their perspective, what sovereignty means to them – if that is the right term for it at all. With the exception of Mary Simon and Terry Audla (both former ITK presidents) and Madeline Redfern (Mayor of Iqaluit), almost none of the stories highlighted actually quoted Inuit.

Conversely, a great number of stories consulted subject matter experts – usually academics – based in southern cities. As Southern Canadians, these sources may have been highly educated on their subject, but their contextual knowledge (Sejersen, 2003) is presumably learned through Western academic practice and is presumably different from the local knowledge that somebody who lives in the Arctic may possess.

In my next chapter, I will review press releases and news stories highlighted on the Inuit
Tapiriit Kanatami’s website, to see how the organization positions the idea of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. This will allow me to see if an Inuit organization positions the idea of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic differently, as well as what discourses are repeated. It will be important to keep in mind, as I undertake the analysis of these sources and then compare discourses found between ITK sources and Southern news stories in my final substantive chapter, that my review is itself positioned (Haraway, 1988), based on my own contextual Western knowledge (Sejersen, 2003).
CHAPTER 6 ITK TEXTS

To identify discourses found in ITK media about Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, I reviewed approximately 100 sources housed on the ITK website (see Appendix C). Following Barthes’ (1972) and Peterson’s (2003) definitions of “texts” as diverse mediums, including – written, linguistic, visual and auditory elements – the sources I’ve collected from the ITK website include declarations, reports, speeches, interviews, cartoons, news stories and editorials. Unlike the previous chapters, I have not been as restrictive about the time period I applied to sources analyzed in this chapter. The reason for this is twofold. First of all, since in this chapter I’m only reviewing media highlighted on the ITK’s website, I could expand the timeframe and still keep the chapter to a workable size. In addition, while I focussed my last chapter on Harper’s term with a majority government, possibly capturing discourses that emerged under that specific administration, the ITK’s mandate and priorities are not linked directly to that timeframe. I will review these sources with attention to the discrepancy and use Sejersen’s (2004) contextualist position to ensure that I am analyzing texts with attention to their political and historical context.

Methodologically, I collected sources much the same way as the news sources collected in my previous chapter. As previously mentioned, I began by searching the ITK website for the term “Arctic + sovereignty”, collecting and reviewing about 85 texts returned by that keyword search. I also did a keyword search for just the word “sovereignty”, as almost all the material on the ITK website concerns the Arctic, and this returned approximately 20 additional texts. Finally, the ITK uses their own cataloguing system where they tag different sources with different themes, and I ensured that I’d reviewed all sources with were tagged “Arctic sovereignty”.
As with my last chapter, I created a spreadsheet and noted the title, date published, date accessed, URL and a brief description of each source. Rather than categorizing the sources by theme as I did in my last chapter, I instead assigned a type to each source: document, media, press release or speech. While I will elaborate on each of these categories later in this chapter, broadly, documents include annual reports, declarations and strategies produced by ITK. Media refers to media highlighted but not necessarily produced by the ITK, like opinion editorials, comics and interviews by various news organizations with ITK members. Press releases refers to media releases produced by the ITK and housed on their website. Finally, speeches refers to speeches by ITK members which have been recorded or transcribed and archived on the ITK website.

As with the news articles highlighted in my previous chapter, systematically organizing ITK texts like this is in line with Fairclough’s (2010) CDA and allows me to identify recurring stories and identify where myths may emerge (Lule, 2005; Barthes, 1972). As previously mentioned, I aimed to review the sources reflexively aware of both my own partial perspective (Haraway, 1988) and attempting not to privilege my own knowledge (Sejersen, 2004) over knowledge produced and highlighted by the ITK.

**Documents**

The ITK website highlights several policy documents produced by or simply of interest to the organization that speak to sovereignty directly. For example, the 2007-2008 Annual Report for the ITK notes that while the Arctic had “captured a much greater amount of Canadian and international attention than many years in the past” (Annual Report, 2008, p. 4) focussing on things like climate change, resource development and sovereignty claims, “much less attention
[had] been paid to… the history of the human occupation of Canadian Arctic [as] primarily the history of Inuit” (p. 4). In the president’s address in the Annual Report (2008), the president at the time, Mary Simon, wrote on Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic,

The only sound basis for Canadian public policy making for the Arctic must be ongoing and genuine partnership with Inuit, and such a partnership must confront and overcome fundamental social and economic problems and gaps. Put simply sovereignty begins at home; Inuit are here to stay and Inuit count; and development must help people as well as generate wealth (p. 4).

This statement by Simon exemplifies the way sovereignty is portrayed in much of the ITK material I’ll analyze in this chapter. Rather than having to do with military capacity, absolute sovereignty and the ability to monitor, as Southern news sources suggested, ITK texts consistently equate sovereignty, from an Inuit perspective, with secure, healthy communities who work in partnership with the Canadian State.

For example, in 2008, the ITK also submitted its own draft Arctic strategy to the Federal Government to encourage Inuit involvement in creating Northern strategies. One of six objectives of the strategy was “sovereignty, security and civility working together in Canada’s Arctic” (p. 15). While the strategy notes that Canada’s sovereignty is largely uncontested on land, sovereignty over marine areas is more contested. The document defines “sovereignty challenges/questions posed by other states” (p. 7) as a key pressure and risk in the Arctic. According to the strategy, “reinforcing Canadian sovereignty and security in the Arctic should entail building up healthy regions and communities” (p. 15). Texts produced by the ITK consistently use the word “security” interchangeably with the word “sovereignty”. However, “security” takes on a much more nuanced meaning, referring to the social and cultural health of Inuit communities, environmental security and Inuit partnership with the State, as well as military security.
In addition, the ITK, in collaboration with the Inuit Circumpolar Council – Canada (ICC Canada), published at letter to the editor in *Arctic Journal* in response to “The Lakehead Manifesto: Principles for Research and Development in the North”, which was published in the June 2013 issue of the journal, *Arctic*. “The Lakehead Manifesto” came out of a symposium hosted by Lakehead University’s Centre for Northern Studies and outlines ten principles “for research and development in the circumpolar North” (Morris et al., 2013). In their letter to the editor in a response published in March 2014, then ITK president Terry Audla and ICC Canada President Duane Smith (ICC Canada President and ICC Vice-Chair, 2016) provided a joint response wherein they wrote, “It is extremely discouraging to find that the Manifesto was developed and published without the involvement of the very people whose interests that manifesto’s principles purport to serve” (Audla & Smith, 2014). Written entirely by Southern researchers, Audla and Smith (2014) recognized the Manifesto as coming from “passionate concern” about the Arctic but “colonial” in its approach nonetheless, writing, “it is at best naïve – and at worst, highly paternalistic – to discount the efforts and the capacity of Inuit residents of the Arctic to envision and develop solutions to meet the intensifying pressure faced in their homelands.” The lack of Inuit voices and perspectives, lack of consultation with Inuit and ignorance of existing texts created by Inuit that speak to Arctic sovereignty highlighted by the Lakehead Manifesto discussion is reminiscent of the erasure of Inuit from Southern news discourse.

Instead, Audla and Smith (2014) point to existing documents created by Inuit that speak to resource development in the North that researchers could look to for guidance, including *A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic*. In April 2009, the Inuit Circumpolar Council adopted the *Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Arctic Sovereignty*, which
the ITK published on its website. The declaration is one of the most comprehensive statements on Arctic sovereignty that I found on the ITK website. The declaration is a one-page document broken into four main sections. First, it emphasizes that the Arctic is home to Inuit, who have been living there since time immemorial, and whose “unique knowledge, experience of the Arctic, and language are the foundation of [their] way of life in the Arctic”. The Inuit Circumpolar Council represents Inuit in Canada, the U.S., Russia and Denmark / Greenland but the declaration states, “though Inuit live across a far-reaching circumpolar region, [they] are united as a single people” (Inuit Circumpolar Council, 2009). In addition, the declaration states, “Inuit are an indigenous people with the rights and responsibilities of all indigenous peoples”, including “rights recognized in and by international legal and political instruments and bodies”. Moreover, these rights are “exercised within the unique geographic, environmental, cultural and political context of the Arctic”. In addition, Inuit have the same “rights and responsibilities afforded all citizens under the constitutions, laws, policies and public sector programs” of the Arctic states in which they live, without diminishing “the rights and responsibilities of Inuit as a people under international law.”

The second section of the declaration discusses “the evolving nature of sovereignty in the Arctic”. It states that sovereignty is a “contested concept” that “does not have a fixed meaning,” but that in all Arctic states, sovereignty must always be “examined and assessed in the context of [Inuit peoples’] long history of struggle to gain recognition and respect as an Arctic indigenous people having the right to exercise self-determination over [their] lives, territories, cultures and languages.” While the declaration states that Inuit “continue to develop innovative and creative jurisdictional arrangements” to balance their rights, Arctic states have “neglected to include Inuit in Arctic sovereignty discussions in a manner comparable to Arctic Council deliberations”.

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The third section in the declaration focuses on Inuit “as active partners”, noting the “inextricable linkages between issues of sovereignty and sovereign rights in the Arctic and Inuit self-determination”. The declaration lists factors like Inuit knowledge and “emphasis on sustainability in the weighing of resource development proposals” as “practical advantages to conducting international relations in the Arctic in partnership with Inuit” and suggests, “Inuit consent, expertise and perspectives are critical to progress on international issues involving the Arctic.” Furthermore, the declaration argues that new partnerships must be formed between Inuit and states “for the protection and promotion of indigenous economies, cultures and traditions.” These partnerships, however, “must acknowledge that industrial development of the natural resource wealth of the Arctic can proceed only insofar as it enhances the economic and social well-being of Inuit and safeguards [their] environmental security.” Finally, it states that a “coordinated global approach to the challenges of climate change” is necessary, and that “Arctic states and their peoples [must] fully participate in international efforts aimed at arresting and reversing levels of greenhouse gas emissions.” In order to exercise sovereignty in the Arctic, communities there must be “healthy and sustainable.” This means Arctic states must conduct economic activity in the Arctic sustainably, extract resources in a way that does not cause harm and “achieve standards of living for Inuit that meet national and international norms and minimums.” According to the declaration, Inuit will use international institutions (like the ICC and the UN) to “exercise [their] rights of self-determination in the Arctic.”

In the fourth and final section, the declaration describes how sovereignty in the Arctic is “inextricably linked” to self-determination there. It explains that international affairs in the Arctic “are not the sole preserve of Arctic states or other states; they are also within the purview of the Arctic’s indigenous peoples.” Therefore, it argues, Arctic institutions “must transcend
Arctic states’ agendas on sovereignty and sovereign rights and the traditional monopoly claimed by states in the area of foreign affairs.”

Sejersen (2003) describes how Inuit communities have “increasingly encountered researchers [who are] arrogant, dominant, authoritarian and unappreciative of Arctic and Inuit realities” (p. 63). However, he writes, “Arctic indigenous peoples have purposively challenged this dominant position of science and the state” (p. 64). The documents produced by Inuit organizations highlighted on the ITK website offer an alternative to outside researchers looking in. I suggest Southern journalists writing about Arctic sovereignty could also consult these documents to begin to bring Inuit perspectives into mainstream news discourse.

Media

One of the things the ITK uses their website for is highlighting work by others relevant to their organization. I gathered editorial cartoons, opinion editorials and interviews with ITK members that the organization had showcased on their website.

In collaboration with Montreal Gazette cartoonist Terry Mosher, the ITK highlighted 100 editorial cartoons as part of a traveling exhibition called “Polar Lines,” which is also housed on the ITK website (Polar Lines: The Inuit Editorial Cartoon Exhibition, 2012). Many of the cartoons in the exhibition spoke specifically to Arctic sovereignty. All the cartoons in the Polar Lines exhibition were grouped by themes (such as “Polar Bears and Seals,” “Nunavik,” “Inuit Life,” and so on). Within a “Climate Change” theme, one cartoon is captioned “2020: The Territorial Dispute over Hans Island is Resolved by the Melting of the Arctic Ice Cap” and shows a Canadian and Danish soldier standing shoulder-deep in water, holding the flags of their
respective countries, and each saying to one another dejectedly, “it’s yours” (Polar Lines: Climate Change 08; 2012).

Ten cartoons in the exhibition were categorized explicitly as “Arctic Sovereignty”. Several cartoons in this series speak to competing claims for sovereignty in the Arctic, as well as the military presence of other countries there. For example, one cartoon depicts a small Canadian cabin on an ice flow with a sign in front that says “Ice Station Beaver.” Directly beneath the cabin, a plethora of submarines from various other countries travel through the water (Polar Lines: Arctic Sovereignty 10, 2012). Similarly, one cartoon shows a Russian flag planted at the North Pole. A (presumably Canadian) polar bear is urinating on the flag, and the caption reads, “No doubt, Russia’s territorial claim to the Arctic will be challenged” (Polar Lines: Arctic Sovereignty 04, 2012). A couple of cartoons poke fun at Canada’s supposedly inadequate military presence in the Arctic. For example, one cartoon shows a single Ranger standing with a pile of snowballs under a large sign that reads “Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Defense Base” (Polar Lines: Arctic Sovereignty 05). Another cartoon similarly depicts a single igloo beside a sign that says “Harper Arctic Sovereignty Station.” Behind the igloo, a huge American icebreaker has approached. A speech bubble coming from the igloo reads “Did I hear what?” (Polar Lines: Arctic Sovereignty 08). Finally, a couple of cartoons illustrate how Canada’s claims to sovereignty may be impacting Inuit. One cartoon shows an Inuit man reaching into a mailbox pondering, “that’s odd, still no invitation to discuss who owns my Arctic” (Polar Lines: Arctic Sovereignty 01, 2012). Another cartoon shows an Inuk kayaking through a waterway between the cracks of broken ice. He is stopped at a traffic light in an intersection in the waterways. Submarines are visible coming from two other directions (Polar Lines: Arctic Sovereignty 09, 2012). Without a caption, this image could reference a spectrum of issues, from
climate change; to infrastructure in the Arctic; to Inuit being portrayed, as suggested by ITK commentary with the image, “as patient onlookers waiting for the light to change, in order to proceed in the Arctic homeland” (Polar Lines: Arctic Sovereignty 09, 2012).

Ten cartoons in the exhibition were grouped under the theme, “Prime Minister Harper’s Arctic Adventures”. Within this group, several of the cartoons spoke to Arctic sovereignty. For example, one cartoon highlighted in this series depicts Harper in a “Mr. Arctic Sovereignty” shirt, flexing his muscles, one bicep reading “military spending” and the other “social spending”. The bicep labelled “military spending” is disproportionately larger than the “social spending” bicep (Polar Lines: Prime Minister Harper’s Arctic Adventures 03, 2012). Another cartoon depicts Harper riding in a Tim Hortons branded sled, proclaiming “donuts for everyone!” (Polar Lines: Stephen Harper’s Arctic Adventures 04, 2012). The title is (translated from French) “Stephen Harper Defends Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic”. Yet another cartoon shows Harper addressing the press from a podium on an ice flow – as he has done during his Arctic visits. Directly behind him though, a Russian submarine has broken through the ice, and a speech bubble, coming from the Russian submarine reads, “Wait for it! Ah, yes…here comes the part where he declares Canada’s sovereignty over the Arctic” (Polar Lines: Stephen Harper’s Arctic Adventures 06, 2012). Another cartoon titled “Northern Strategy” shows Stephen Harper saying to an unconvinced looking walrus “You’re Canadian! Pass it on…” (Polar Lines: Stephen Harper’s Arctic Adventures 07, 2012). Overall, cartoons in this thematic depict Harper’s trips to the Arctic and Arctic sovereignty pushes as largely rhetorical, ineffectual, and met with scepticism by both those living in the Arctic, as well as internationally.

Although these cartoons were highlighted by the ITK, they were ultimately pulled from other Southern sources. Therefore, the narratives showcased by these cartoons are similar to
those found in Southern news stories. Although some of the cartoons featured Stephen Harper or Arctic animals, Inuit were more visible in the cartoons highlighted by Polar Lines than in Southern news sources. Like the news stories I collected though, many of the cartoons highlighted the myth that the Arctic is uninhabited – especially the cartoons featuring animals rather than people. I suggest that inclusion in the Polar Lines exhibition does not necessarily suggest agreement; rather, I see the Polar Lines series as a way for Inuit to reclaim some of their media depictions.

In addition to the cartoons highlighted in the Polar Lines series, the ITK highlighted four opinion editorials written by then ITK President Mary Simon that discussed Arctic sovereignty. In a piece featured in the National Post, Nunatsiaq News and The Labradorian, Simon (2008) discusses how media coverage of challenges in the Arctic (around issues like unemployment, education and violence) often present the situation in Nunavut as if there’s no hope. Simon contests this discourse, writing that she has tremendous hope for young people in Nunavut. While Simon acknowledges challenges in Arctic communities, she reminds readers how new the Government of Nunavut is, writing, “the Government of Canada and Inuit demonstrated vision and courage in establishing a fully public Territorial Government run by and for Inuit. Give it time to mature. Support it! Canada will be justly proud!” (Simon, 2008, para. 13). Finally, she discusses Canadians’ increased interest in the Arctic due to sovereignty concerns. She suggests that the Government of Canada must partner with Inuit in all discussions about the Arctic.

In an op-ed published in The Hill Times, Simon (2008) points to the impact that climate change is already having in the Arctic and the subsequent increased international attention on the region, both as a barometer of climate change and for resource development and shipping in the Northwest Passage. Simon writes, “the best way to address the national and internationally
important issues that climate change raises in the Canadian Arctic – including accelerated resource development and sovereignty – is through a partnership between Inuit and the Government of Canada” (para. 7). Furthermore, Simon argues, “Canada’s strongest card in the Arctic sovereignty debate is the fact that Canadian Inuit use and occupy the disputed waters of the Northwest Passage, as [they] have done for centuries” (para. 8).

Similarly, in another op-ed published shortly after in *The Globe and Mail*, Simon (2008) writes about Harper’s annual trips to the Arctic, his building new patrol vessels and his attention to energy and mining potential for Canada in the Arctic. She contrasts Harper’s vision for Canada’s North with “less upbeat” news stories of youth suicide rates among Inuit, inadequate housing and health concerns (para. 3). As with her previously mentioned editorial, she argues for full Inuit involvement and partnership in Arctic sovereignty conversations, writing, “Arctic sovereignty is too important to be treated as just an adjunct to foreign relations or as a stage for foreign investment. It must be built from the inside out” (Simon, 2008, para. 5). According to Simon, “coherent policy-making for the Arctic must commit to two things: a credible power-sharing partnership between Inuit and the government; and a determination to overcome the obvious gaps in basic measurements of well-being that separate Inuit from other Canadians” (para. 6). She suggests that the Government, to shore up Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, can do a better job of implementing land claims agreements in the North. In addition, she recommends more environmental monitoring, expanding the Rangers program, and better infrastructure for commercial fishing that would positively impact locals.

A third op-ed by Mary Simon (2009) published in the *Toronto Star* critiques the Government of Canada for its lack of action on climate change. In the article, Simon discusses the impact eroding shorelines and melting permafrost is already having on Inuit communities,
including damage to infrastructure to the extent that some communities are considering relocating. Meanwhile, Simon writes, “Canada has failed to achieve any sort of workable consensus on the challenge of climate change,” citing increasing greenhouse gas emissions (para. 8).

The ITK website highlights interviews with the organization’s membership. Two interviews with Mary Simon during her tenure as president spoke to Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. In one interview with CBC, Simon (2012) discusses the formation of the Arctic Council and the inclusion of indigenous people in the organization. She shares her concerns about adding more member nations to the Arctic Council. She says, “[Inuit] are a people…fighting to get our right to develop our own resources. And we have enough trouble within our own country to get our voice heard. Can you imagine what it would be like to try and get our voice heard by these nations?” (Simon, personal communication, Jan. 31 2012). In the interview, Simon (2012) says she’s “trying to work with the Canadian government to have a voice and be a partner in any of the development that may or may not go on in the Arctic” but acknowledges her fear that Inuit communities “will get left behind” (personal communication). She says,

I talk about our communities in a way that hopefully will educate other people about how important it is to build vibrant, sustainable communities that have healthy people living in those committees. Those are the people that will assert Canada's sovereignty. We are a permanent population in the Arctic. We're not about to move. We've been there for millennia. We will be there for another millennium. It is our home and we want our governments and other people, Canadians, other developers, to look at the Arctic in a way that it’s not just a resource filled region that you can make a lot of money from and not even look at the communities that are there trying to sustain their own livelihoods (personal communication, Jan. 31, 2012).

As opposed to Southern news discourse, which heavily emphasizes sovereignty as military capacity in the Arctic, Simon outlines a different understanding of sovereignty held by Inuit and illuminated by the ITK. According to Simon in the texts above, sovereignty from an
Inuit perspective has to do with the health of both Inuit communities and the environment – in fact, environmental and community health are presented as intrinsically linked. In addition, Simon argues that Canada’s strongest claim to sovereignty in the North has to be the historic presence of Inuit in the Arctic, Canadian citizens who exercise Canada’s sovereignty in the region every day by simply using the region. However, according to Simon, if the state wants to use Inuit to bolster its claim to the Arctic, then it must take care of the people and environment in the Arctic, as well as include Inuit as partners in all Arctic sovereignty discussions. This paints a powerful counter-narrative to Southern news discourse, which sometimes failed to acknowledge Inuit whatsoever.

**Press Releases**

I found thirty-five press releases published on the ITK website that mentioned Arctic sovereignty in some capacity. Of these, the vast majority simply mention sovereignty, and it’s the central topic in just a few press releases. Press releases provide useful insight into ITK discourses on Arctic sovereignty since they indicate what the organization wants the public to know.

Of the press releases that I collected mentioning Arctic sovereignty, I’ve categorized several as “announcements” – detailing events important to or concerning the ITK. Events that press releases detail include the 2005 signing of a partnership accord between ITK and Canada “designed to ensure the Crown fully comprehends the nature of Inuit rights interests and aspirations in the various departments and agencies that make up the government of Canada” (Partnership Accord, 2005, para. 11). According to the press release, “the accord underlines… that Inuit have contributed significantly to Canada’s history, identity, national unity and
sovereignty in the Arctic” (para. 5). Three press releases discuss conferences the ITK hosted – each press release outlining the importance of addressing Arctic sovereignty at the conference (Inuit, Academics and NGOs, 2009; From Eskimo to Inuit, 2011; 40th Anniversary Conference, 2011). Another press release announces the signing of the “Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Resource Development Principles in Inuit Nunaat” at Arctic Council meetings in May 2011. According to the press release, the declaration is mindful of both the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty”, discussed earlier in this chapter. According to the ITK, this document “sets the context for resource development in the modern Arctic, taking into account economic, social, and political development of Inuit in Canada, Greenland, Alaska, and Russia” (Inuit in Canada Welcome Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Resource Development, 2011, para. 5).

These press releases indicate that the ITK is actively discussing Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic at conferences, events and meetings. In addition, they show that the ITK is putting Arctic sovereignty in discussion with existing international bodies, like the Inuit Circumpolar Council and the United Nations. Neither the Harper administration nor Southern news sources spoke to how Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic interacted with these international bodies – possibly because it drew the absolute sovereignty approach favoured so strongly by the Conservatives into question.

Seven press releases that mentioned Arctic sovereignty spoke to work the ITK is involved with. Two press releases highlighted 2004 President Jose Kusugak’s role at a Canada-Aboriginal Peoples Roundtable (Inuit Table Policy Documents, 2004; Aboriginal Summit, 2004). Inuit used this roundtable to write to the Prime Minister requesting a Partnership Accord – the 2005 signing of which was mentioned earlier in this chapter. The remaining five press
releases highlight speeches or presentations made by ITK presidents. One press release highlights a 2004 speech made by then-President Kusugak discussing the role of Inuit in the Canadian economy (First Canadians, Canadians First, 2004). According to the press release, audience questions “included a query as to the state of Canadian efforts to assist sovereignty in our Arctic while other nations prepare to exploit the Northwest Passage for marine transport” (para. 4). Four more press releases highlight speeches made by President Mary Simon. In one speech, she discusses how Canada might become more “socially just” for Inuit and points to the Inuit Circumpolar Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic as an important guiding document (Inuit and Social Justice, 2011). Another press release discussed Simon’s unveiling of an Inuit Action Plan that “sets the scene for future Inuit development with the Government of Canada in the post land claims era” (Action Plan, 2007, para. 1). In this speech, according to the press release, Simon reiterated, “the best way to assert Arctic sovereignty…is with the people who live there” (para. 4). As transcript of Simon’s speech was included with the Press Release.

According to Simon’s speech,

Canadian sovereignty over Arctic islands and waters rests very heavily on the unbroken history of Inuit use and occupation. Yet to date, the discussions pay little attention to the views or potential contribution of the Canadians who actually make up a large part of the Arctic – the Inuit (Simon, personal communication, February 15, 2007).

This statement by Simon confirms what my research has uncovered: despite the fact that Inuit have been using the Arctic since time immemorial, which is pivotal to Canada’s claim to the region today, mainstream Arctic sovereignty narratives regularly fail to engage with Inuit perspectives and opinions.

In addition, a press release highlighted a press conference by Mary Simon where she spoke about daily challenges Inuit are faced with, like “a life expectancy fifteen years lower than
the average Canadian…, the cost of living in the Arctic three to four times higher than in 
Southern Canada and an average Inuit income half of that of non-aboriginal Canadians” (The 
North Wants In, 2009, para. 3), adding that Canadians should generally be more aware of these 
issues and not just remember Inuit “during times of sovereignty issues” (para. 5).

The press releases analyzed show that addressing challenges facing Inuit communities is 
not only just, but it will ultimately bolster Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic. Simon’s statement 
that Canadians generally must have a better understanding of issues facing Inuit is especially 
poignant when compared with Southern media, which often ignored Inuit in Arctic sovereignty 
discourse.

The largest number of press releases I collected (approximately eighteen) commented on 
the Inuit relationship with the Federal Government, or government policy in the Arctic. Under 
President Kusugak’s tenure, ITK press releases “commend[ed] the Prime Minister [Paul Martin] 
for announcing the creation of an Inuit Secretariat within the Department of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development” (Creation of Inuit Secretariat, 2004, para. 1) as well as called on 
Stephen Harper to “explain his position on the writing and statements of Tom Flanagan, Senior 
Advisor to the Conservative Leader and National Campaign Chair for the Conservative Party 
(Explain Writings of Tom Flanagan, 2004, para. 1). Regarding one of the excerpts from 
Flanagan’s book, First Nations? Second Thoughts, the press release cites his position on 
sovereignty as an “attribute of statehood, and aboriginal peoples in Canada had not arrived at the 
state level of political organization prior to contact with Europeans” (Explain Writings of Tom 
Flanagan, 2004, para. 9). In addition, when the Harper Government was sworn in the first time, 
in 2006, an ITK press release discussing the new cabinet advocated “that the new Conservative

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2 In his book, On Being Here to Stay, Michael Asch (2014) carefully refutes Flanagan’s position, arguing that in fact 
Indigenous peoples were in fact living in organized societies when Settlers arrived.
government visit the Arctic as soon as feasibly possible in their mandate to discuss the issue of sovereignty with Inuit” (Inuit Favourable to New Conservative Cabinet, 2006, para. 4).

The majority of the remaining press releases I collected were published under Mary Simon’s tenure as ITK president. For example, one press release stated that Simon told the Inuit Circumpolar Council that the Harper Government had “indicated a distinct backward shift in its approach to Inuit and other aboriginal peoples,” and that more consultation with Inuit was needed around their (largely military-focussed) plans for Arctic sovereignty (Inuit Need to Take Tougher Approach in Dealing with Governments, 2006, para. 8). Another press release called on the Navy (among other vessels) to change their practices around dumping waste in Arctic waters after the Government made changes to the Canadian Shipping Act – citing disappointment that the environment was under increased pressure in the name of Arctic sovereignty concerns (Inuit Call on Canadian Navy, 2007). A few years later, another press release responds to another new set of shipping regulations brought in by the Federal Government, which Simon then calls “a step in the right direction” but says that Inuit still “seek greater consultations with Federal Government regarding how they will be implemented and followed up” (Inuit See Value in New Federal Arctic Shipping Regulations, 2010, para. 1). Looking at these two press releases side by side indicates that, even after three more years in office, the Harper Government still hadn’t made great progress in including Inuit as partners in the Arctic – at least when it came to creating shipping regulations. Another press release responds to the Harper Government’s 2007 budget; it states, “at a time in history when…sovereignty in the Arctic remains an issue, the Government of Canada has delivered a budget that leaves Inuit out” (“That’s Your Canada” Budget, 2007, para. 1).
ITK press releases repeatedly asked for greater partnership with the Federal Government, and repeatedly the organization appeared to be ignored. In addition, the Southern news sources I reviewed failed to give sufficient coverage to the link between Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic and partnership with Inuit. I argue this gap in the media and the Harper Government’s failure to adequately bring Inuit perspectives into Arctic sovereignty discussions are fundamentally related: government discourse erased Inuit from these discussions, and the media echoed government discourse. Acquiring their knowledge about the Arctic from the media, Southerners may not have known to pressure the government to change their approach, so the government maintained the status quo.

Two press releases responded to a National Resources Canada report on climate change released in 2008. According to one press release, Simon said “the report supports what Inuit have been saying for years regarding the melting of permafrost, increased species coming into the Arctic, increased navigability of Arctic marine waters, and the increased pressure on Inuit to maintain [their] way of life,” adding that Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic is at stake as well (Climate Change Report, 2008, para. 2). Simon criticised the report for only defining “Northern Canada” as the three territories, when really, “the Arctic doesn’t follow provincial and territorial boundaries” (para. 3), pointing to Nunivak land in Quebec and the Nunatsiavut land in Newfoundland and Labrador. Again, the Harper Government’s failure to link climate change and the (related) health of Inuit communities to Arctic sovereignty discourse was mirrored in a gap in Southern media.

Two more press releases discuss the 2008 Federal Election. For example, an ITK press release reported that Simon had called the campaign “an ideal time for all parties to clarify their policy commitments in relation to a number of key issues facing Inuit and the Arctic,
including…the ‘people’ dimension of Arctic Sovereignty” (Inuit Expect Clear Policy Commitments, 2008, para. 1). Another press release similarly details questions the ITK sent to all five party leaders leading up to the 2008 Federal Election. One of the twelve questions presented was, “Does your Party agree that asserting Canadian Arctic Sovereignty must by design include a human dimension that ensures a healthy, well educated economically viable Inuit majority population in the Arctic?” (Inuit Send 12 Questions, 2008).

In 2009 the ITK responded to the Northern Strategy created by the Federal Government. A press release stated that Simon found several aspects of the Strategy promising. The four broad priorities identified by the Strategy are “exercising Arctic sovereignty, protecting environmental heritage, promoting social and economic development, and improving and devolving Northern governance,” which, according to the press release, Simon saw as “broad enough to serve as a practical way of mobilizing greater federal government investment and policy effort” (Inuit Respond to Federal Government’s Northern Strategy, 2009, para. 2). However, the press released identified one priority that was missing. According to Simon, the “fifth priority should be a specific and direct relationship with Inuit in the four Inuit land claims regions” (para. 3). Simon also said that the importance of the Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic should have been acknowledged in the Strategy.

A March 2010 press release outlined Simon congratulating the Federal Government “for committing to take steps to endorse the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” in a throne speech (Inuit Welcome Federal Promise). According to the press release, “Simon also called attention to a brief mention of Arctic sovereignty and a commitment by the federal government to work with other northern countries to settle boundary disagreements”
(para. 6) in the throne speech; however, “she pointed out that any discussion of Canada’s Arctic…must include Inuit at the table” (para. 7).

These press releases showed the continued advocacy work the ITK does to bring the human aspect into Arctic sovereignty debates. This advocacy work is arguably done in direct opposition to mainstream government and media narratives that, intentionally or not, often work to shore up a terra nullius myth about the North. ITK advocacy also consistently points to the importance of the Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic, which challenges existing Arctic sovereignty myths, focusing on Inuit presence in the Arctic, the contested nature of sovereignty in the Arctic, the need for partnership with Inuit in all Arctic sovereignty discussions and the link between States’ sovereignties and Inuit self-determination in the Arctic – none of which are recurring themes in Southern news or government discourse.

Just two press releases mentioning Arctic sovereignty found on the ITK website were produced under successive President Terry Audla’s tenure. In October 2013 a press release said Terry Audla “welcomed commitments to resource development and northern sovereignty” delivered in a throne speech earlier that day. Another press release outlines Audla’s response to the Government’s 2014 Economic Action Plan. According to the press release, the “ITK [was] satisfied to see the Government’s continued attention to economic development in Northern Canada and Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty” (National Inuit Leader Responds to Economic Action Plan, 2014, para. 1). Audla is quoted in the press release, saying,

We know that countries around the world – including our own - are looking Northward as the next frontier. As the world gazes in our direction for opportunity and development, it is our responsibility to point out that Inuit have been the stewards of the Arctic for millennia and we will continue to be the stewards of our homeland for millennia to come (para. 6).
In this statement, Audla takes Simon’s orientation even further. While ITK discourse under Simon’s tenure provided a powerful reminder that ITK needed to be brought into Arctic sovereignty debates as partners, Audla’s position that Inuit are stewards of the Arctic could indicate a slight shift in the ITK’s ideology: Inuit in fact need to be more than partners in the Arctic. The Arctic is their home, and they should actually be leading, not just included in, discussions about sovereignty there.

Three of the press releases I collected focus centrally on the topic of Arctic Sovereignty. Two focus on outreach work Mary Simon was doing around Arctic Sovereignty: an online discussion on The Globe and Mail website where she answered questions from interested Canadians on the subject and the launch of a cross country speaking tour called, “Inuit and the Canadian Arctic: Sovereignty Begins at Home” (ITK President Encouraged by Support for Arctic Sovereignty, 2007; ITK President Mary Simon Launches Cross Canada Speaking Tour, 2007). The press release regarding the speaking tour shared Simon’s perspective on its propose:

To make the case that the best way to assert Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic is through its residents who live in the region. The Inuit approach to asserting sovereignty is holistic in nature and calls for the development of healthy people and healthy communities alongside the military and legal measures (ITK President Mary Simon Launches Cross Canada Speaking Tour, 2007, para. 2).

Finally, a press release details the release of the “Nilliajut: Inuit Perspectives on Security, Patriotism and Sovereignty” film and companion document, which I will discuss in much greater detail in my next chapter. In the press release, Audla is quoted as saying, “Inuit have played our part in asserting the sovereign rights of Canada in the Arctic. These rights are founded on the bedrock of Inuit use and occupation of Arctic lands and waters” (Nilliajut Project Explores Inuit Perspectives on Security, Patriotism and Sovereignty, 2013, para. 4). In my next chapter, I will discuss how discourses found in Southern and ITK texts speak to one another. However, I will
use the Nilliajut document as a guiding document, since it already presents such a comprehensive set of perspectives on sovereignty created collaboratively by several Inuit organizations, including the ITK.

Overall, ITK press releases show that the organization has produced consistent and specific narratives about Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic. Namely, that sovereignty is an evolving and contested concept, that the historic use and presence of Inuit in the Arctic is the State’s greatest claim to sovereignty there and that the legitimacy of the Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic rests on its ability to take care of Arctic residents and the environment. These narratives work as powerful counterpoints to Southern news discourse that elevated myths that, above all else, the Arctic was uninhabited and in need of military protection.

Speeches

The ITK also highlighted speeches on its website. I collected a total of thirty-seven speeches that were given between August 2008 and March 2016. Almost all of the speeches I collected were made by the ITK presidents – spanning from Mary Simon, to Terry Audla to Natan Obed during the time period I covered. The speeches I collected were made at a wide range of events – from conference presentations; to appearances in Parliament; to guest lectures at museums and universities; to national, international and Arctic-specific meetings, roundtables and planning sessions. The range of the events at which ITK presidents spoke indicates the breadth of the organization’s advocacy work.

Of the speeches included in my analysis, approximately thirty-two mentioned sovereignty, while approximately five focused specifically on sovereignty. Speeches that mentioned sovereignty generally discussed the importance of the Circumpolar Inuit Declaration
on Sovereignty in the Arctic, discussed earlier in this chapter, portrayed a view of sovereignty more holistic than that portrayed in Southern media depictions and spoke to the need for partnership with Inuit in all discussions and decision making around Arctic sovereignty.

Speeches by both ITK Presidents Mary Simon and Terry Audla speak to the *Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic* (referred to herein as the Declaration) and the importance of balancing sovereignty claims with self-determination for Inuit (Opening Remarks: 2030 North Conference, 2009; Council of the Federation Meeting, 2009; Opening Remarks: Inuit Circumpolar Council 11th General Assembly). At a 2009 lecture by Mary Simon at the University of Edinburgh, Simon tells the audience that the Declaration can act as a guide, “at a time when issues of sovereignty in the Arctic have been very much in the news, including disagreements as to assertions of sovereignty and sovereign rights by Arctic states;” she says, “the Declaration offers a reminder that the concept of sovereignty must necessarily be situated within a wider body of still changing international law” (Canadian Inuit and the Arctic, 2009).

Similarly, in a speech at the Canadian Council on International Law Conference, Simon says she thinks the Declaration is remarkable because “it calls on governments of the circumpolar world to be mindful and respectful of their obligations to indigenous peoples under a variety of international agreements” (Remarks to the Canadian Council on International Law Conference, 2010). In addition, it shows that “Inuit have rights both as indigenous people and as citizens of the four Arctic states” (Remarks to the Canadian Council on International Law Conference, 2010). According to another of Simon’s speeches, the Declaration shows that “the old ways of doing business in the Arctic are gone” and that “Inuit have governance structures in place that must be respected” (The European Union, Canada, and the Arctic, 2011). Finally, in 2014, Mary Simon’s incumbent, Terry Audla, as part of a panel address, encouraged the audience to read the
Declaration (Panel Address, Oil and Gas Symposium, 2014). He said it shows that Inuit have already “provided an informed, sensible, balanced and transparent” set of governing principles that “properly and fairly applied, can meet both the challenge of securing and maintaining the political confidence and support of Inuit, and can also meet many other tests of sustainability” (Panel Address, Oil and Gas Symposium, 2014).

The Declaration and ITK speeches that discuss its importance emphasize that Inuit, at least the Inuit Circumpolar Council, has an existing and specific vision for how Arctic governance should be approached, both within states and internationally. Moreover, suggestions made in the Declaration are powerful, concrete and agreed upon – at least compared to nebulous sovereignty perspectives that change with each successive federal government. Therefore, the Declaration should serve as a guiding document, not just for Inuit organizations framing Arctic sovereignty, but also for Southerners (like journalists and scholars) weighing in on Arctic sovereignty debates and for governments working in partnership with self-determining Inuit.

Following the Declaration, many ITK speeches also indicate a much more holistic view of sovereignty than that found in mainstream Southern discourse, which has to do with self-determination for Inuit, responsible resource extraction, and addressing climate change. For example, in a keynote speech at a conference on Arctic change, Mary Simon said that Inuit discussion on climate change takes “a broad, holistic view that touches on the inter-connections between our environment, our politics (particularly in the area of sovereignty) and our social, economic and cultural well-being” (Keynote Speech – Arctic Change, 2008).

At a 2014 Canada-US Arctic Marine and Resource Development Roundtable, Audla discusses the colonial history associated with the “somewhat mythical ideal of ‘sovereignty’” (Inuit and Sustainable Development in the Arctic, 2012). He discusses how Inuit were
disinherited through colonization. Then, Audla says, Inuit were “told that all the rights and privileges that attach to sovereignty – notably the power to make binding laws within Canada and to resist intrusion or interference within Canada by foreign states – rested in the hands of political institutions located elsewhere” (Inuit and Sustainable Development in the Arctic, 2012). Audla said that political efforts by Inuit around sovereignty in the Arctic have not being about owning the Arctic – which would be contrary to Inuit worldviews. Rather, it was about decolonization and “a fundamental reassertion and rebalancing of [Inuit] rights and responsibilities with other, including governments located outside the Arctic” (Inuit and Sustainable Development in the Arctic, 2012).

In this speech, Audla articulates the historical context that mainstream news discourse sorely lacks. In addition, he is being more direct than Simon in both addressing a legacy of colonialism in the Arctic and expressing skepticism towards the Federal Government. The shift in stance between Audla and Simon may have resulted from the timing of Audla’s presidency. Audla served as ITK President when the Harper Government was in power, when, as I’ve shown, Inuit were increasingly erased from Southern discourse. In addition, under the Conservative Government, a huge amount of funding was cut from Aboriginal organizations in Canada, Inuit and the ITK specifically being among the hardest hit by these cuts (Sahar Zehrehi, 2015).

In March 2016, Natan Obed, the ITK’s current president, spoke at the Meeting of First Ministers and First Nations, Inuit and Metis Leaders. Obed re-iterated that Inuit are “the reason Canada has sovereignty claims to the Arctic” and “a core piece of Canada’s political architecture” (Remarks by Natan Obed at the Meeting of First Ministers and First Nations, Inuit and Metis Leaders, 2016). He said that Inuit should be partners, not only in discussions around Arctic sovereignty, but in climate change discussions and creating a national strategy to reduce
Canada’s carbon emissions. This sentiment is also nicely summarized in a 2010 speech by Mary Simon at a Canada-United Kingdom Colloquium, where she advocates for international partnership, but with the understanding that “sovereignty is not simply about ownership and power, it is about viewing the Arctic through the lens of partnership, environmental security, sustainable economic and social development, respect for the rule of law and self-determination for indigenous peoples” (The Arctic and Northern Dimensions of World Issues, 2010).

ITK speeches by presidents Simon, Audla and Obed also re-iterated that Inuit must be included as partners in discussions and decision-making around Arctic sovereignty: Inuit have lived in the Arctic since time immemorial and, according to much of the ITK material I’ve collected, see themselves as stewards of the region, thus – as Mary Simon says – Canada’s Arctic sovereignty must start with Inuit. Several speeches by Simon emphasized that federal investment that contributes to the social wellbeing of Inuit (like housing infrastructure, for example) is the best way to shore up Canada’s claim to sovereignty in the Arctic (Meeting with First Minister and NAO’s, 2009; Remarks to Senate: Anniversary of the Apology to Victims of Residential Schools, 2009). Likewise, in one speech, Simon suggested that Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic is actually “weakened by the conditions in which Inuit live” (Launch of 2010 Year of the Inuit, 2009). Nevertheless, Simon told several audiences that Inuit could and must work with partners – both nationally and internationally – to dictate what happens in their Arctic, and moreover, to tackle global challenges, namely, climate change (National Inuit Education Accord, 2009; Katherine Graham Lecture on Aboriginal Policy, 2010).

Simon’s assertion that the State’s failure to ensure acceptable living conditions for Inuit weakens its sovereignty in the Arctic is a powerful and thought-provoking statement – one that certainly was not addressed in Government or media narratives. If I unpack Simon’s statement a
little further, and I consider that Canada actually might not have sovereignty in the Arctic because of the conditions in which Inuit live, then does the State more broadly not have sovereignty in the many other parts of Canada either, due to the poor living conditions facing many other Indigenous communities? Even further still, does any group, community or polity living in marginalized conditions within a state erode its claim to legitimacy? Framing Arctic sovereignty in these terms certainly illuminates why it might have been easier for the Harper Government to ignore Inuit altogether, rather than acknowledge the Canadian State’s historic failings in the North, thus calling its own power there into question.

Speeches by Simon and Audla also, in line with other ITK communications, stressed that Inuit should be included in sovereignty discussions about the Arctic because of their historic presence there. Not only does this give Inuit the right to self-determination there, but they also have deep knowledge of the Arctic – like wildlife and weather patterns and what it means to live on the ice – therefore, they have so much knowledge to offer both the Canadian government and the international community (ICC General Assembly Address, 2014; TransAtlantic Science Week, 2014; Arctic Circle Conference, 2014). For example, Audla summarizes this sentiment in one speech:

It is important to remember that Inuit are the only players who have the advantage of building on a rich ancestral wisdom that allowed us to thrive for thousands of years in one of the harshest climates. It is this intrinsic and pragmatic traditional knowledge that should ensure that we are part of any discussion that potentially involves the lands and resources of the North (TransAtlantic Science Week, 2014).

Furthermore, in 2015, Terry Audla made a speech where he said, “the permanent Inuit presence in the Arctic is this country’s greatest claim to Arctic sovereignty” (Inuit Engagement in the Future of the Arctic, 2015). In order for Canada to assert this though, Audla says, the government should do a better job of implementing land claims agreements “in line with their
spirit and intent… in line with the objective of reconciliation and partnership in an ever changing world” (Inuit Engagement in the Future of the Arctic, 2015). Even further to this point, in his speech, Audla says that if Canada’s claim to sovereignty in some parts of the Arctic “depends on Inuit historic use and occupancy… then it seems to me that our historic and continuing use and reliance on our Arctic ice and waters must also receive an appropriate degree of respect in decision-making about these areas” (Inuit Engagement in the Future of the Arctic, 2015). In this speech, as in other ITK speeches and press releases, Audla points to both the *Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic* and the “Nilliajut” project as “good source[s] of information for interested parliamentarians” (Inuit Engagement in the Future of the Arctic, 2015).

Even though Inuit did not sign treaties with Settlers, the idea that the Government must do a better job at honouring the “spirit and intent” of land claims agreements with the “objective of reconciliation and partnership” is similar to how anthropologist Michael Asch (2015) suggests the Canadian State could approach its relations with Indigenous peoples. I will further unpack how Asch’s propositions for working towards reconciliation with Indigenous peoples in Canada are also valuable to Arctic sovereignty discussions later in my analysis.

In 2009, Mary Simon went on the previously-mentioned speaking tour entitled “Sovereignty Begins at Home: Inuit and the Canadian Arctic.” In a series of speeches, delivered across the country, Simon tells audiences

Inuit find themselves at a interesting point in our modern history – we live in a part of Canada that is at the forefront of sovereignty discussions, at the centre of energy supply plans, and has been the ‘canary in the coalmine’ for the global dialogue on climate change. However, the reality that exists in many of our Arctic communities calls into question one of our core Canadian values – social justice. And yet, this has not made it to the forefront of policy discussions (Sovereignty Begins at Home, 2009).
Simon gave another speech to the House of Commons Committee on National Defence in 2009 about Arctic sovereignty (Arctic Sovereignty, 2009). In this speech, Simon cites the history of colonialism in the Arctic as slowly eroding Inuit’s power to make decisions about themselves and the land on which they had always lived – citing the forced relocation of Inuit and the residential school system as epitomizing this problematic history. While Simon acknowledges that the relationship between Inuit and the State has improved in recent years, accompanied by a “changing international understanding of how the rights and roles of states interact with the rights and roles of…indigenous peoples,” she makes several recommendations for the Government of Canada regarding both domestic and international policy-making (Arctic Sovereignty, 2009). First, she says the Government should “acknowledge the central importance of Inuit use and occupation of the lands and waters of Inuit Nunangat since time immemorial” every time it asserts “sovereignty and sovereign rights in relation to Arctic lands and waters” (Arctic Sovereignty, 2009). According to Simon, “consistency in acknowledging Inuit use and occupation isn’t just a matter of effective advocacy before an international audience. It’s also a matter of fundamental respect owed to Inuit” (Arctic Sovereignty, 2009). In addition, she says that any Government “policy making for the Arctic must be built around the idea of a core partnership relationship with Inuit” (Arctic Sovereignty, 2009). She also tells the Committee that “sovereignty will not be enhanced if it ignores or understates the basic material needs of the permanent residents of the Arctic, or fails to understand that the alienation of the young is the surest way to undermine respect for the law and toleration for others” – therefore, as stated many times before, sovereignty must start with strong, healthy Arctic citizens (Arctic Sovereignty, 2009). In addition, she challenges the Government not just to stand up for Inuit, but “for
aboriginal rights everywhere” – saying the Government’s willingness to do this “cannot be divorced from” its overall partnership with Inuit (Arctic Sovereignty, 2009).

In many of Simon’s speeches, she speaks to the intrinsic link between climate change and Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic. For example, in one speech at an Ipsos Reid conference on Canadian foreign policy, Simon said, in addition to the pressure a changing climate is already putting on Inuit, “the urgencies of addressing climate change transcend all other issues. The sovereign claims of states in the Arctic will be of little value if humanity’s sovereign responsibilities for the earth as a whole are not respected” (Rethinking Canadian Foreign Policy, 2009).

To re-iterate, reviewing ITK material revealed several key discourses different from those seen in Southern media. First, a great deal of ITK material spoke against the Federal Government or other Southern groups making policy decisions in the Arctic without the involvement of Inuit – this sentiment was most clearly demonstrated in the ITK’s joint response to the Lakehead Manifesto. ITK texts pointed to the colonial nature of such an approach. In fact, ITK texts often painted a much more historically contextual picture of Arctic sovereignty, discussing the history of colonialism in the region and how that history continues to impact modern day interactions between Inuit and the State. Furthermore, a number of ITK texts discussed the exclusion of Inuit even from today’s Arctic policy-making. Instead, ITK material suggested that Inuit should be consulted about all claims to sovereignty in the Arctic.

In addition, ITK texts point to growing attention on the Arctic, both nationally and internationally, in recent years. Some Southern news stories described the Government’s concern that Canada’s authority on Arctic matters could be diluted if too many other countries become involved in the Arctic – this is most evident in the news stories that described Harper’s
trepidation to allow more observer states in the Arctic Council. Similarly, while ITK material points out the importance of international partnerships for Inuit, it does highlight concerns around Inuit voices being drowned out as more and more states become interested in the Arctic. That said, one of the most prevalent themes emerging from ITK material is that greater partnership that is required between Inuit and the Federal Government in all discussions of Arctic sovereignty. In addition, ITK texts discuss how Inuit may benefit from international partnerships, especially with Inuit in the other Arctic nations – for example, through organizations like the Arctic Council. ITK material suggests that these partnerships among Inuit across boundaries are important for both cultural and political reasons. While several ITK texts spoke to the importance of international agreements, like UNDRIP, for Inuit, discussions of Inuit rights in a broader global context were completely absent from Southern news stories.

In addition, ITK texts described a much more holistic understanding of sovereignty than that seen in Southern news sources. While Southern news sources often described sovereignty in terms of military capability, jurisdiction and ownership, ITK texts linked sovereignty with self-determination and wellbeing. A large number of ITK texts – especially those produced under Simon’s tenure, said that sovereignty must start with Inuit. While Southern news stories, when they discussed Inuit at all, often spoke of issues plaguing communities, Simon suggested that what was missing was stories about Inuit agency. In fact, when read in comparison to ITK material, its seems that Southern media may even be working to shore up a myth of social conditions in the Arctic as hopeless. Much ITK material, on the other hand, discusses how, in order for Canada to have any legitimate claim to sovereignty in the region, Arctic communities must be healthy and self-determining.
Another theme within ITK texts is that sovereignty in the Arctic is inextricably linked to environmental stewardship. This has to do both with sustainable resource extraction that benefits communities and respects the land as well as acting on climate change. According to several ITK texts, Canada’s inaction on climate change – specifically under the Harper administration – was actually seen as de-legitimization its sovereignty claims in the Arctic. After all, climate change is arguably having the greatest immediate impact on the Arctic and Inuit, and how can a state claim sovereignty over a land and people it isn’t taking care of?

Another related discourse within ITK material is that the presence of Inuit in the Arctic since time immemorial is definitively Canada’s strongest claim to sovereignty there. Moreover though, ITK texts point to the deep knowledge Inuit have of the Arctic and suggest that Inuit have a great deal of knowledge about the Arctic to offer both the international community and the rest of Canada, should they be adequately included as partners. Relatedly, ITK texts suggest that the Federal Government and the international community should look at the work Inuit have already done on sovereignty in the Arctic, especially the Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic.

Fairclough (2010) describes how discourses can be “operationalized as strategies and implemented” (p. 20). Since so much of what the ITK does is education and advocacy work, even though the ITK is still working within a colonial structure, the discourses the organization presents are actually interrupting the hegemonic views of Arctic sovereignty in the South evident in Southern media. While both Southern news stories and ITK texts only show partial perspectives, the more holistic view of sovereignty described by the ITK represents a move away from the privileging of Western knowledge and the “disembodied…objectivity” of Southern media (Haraway, 1988, p. 576).
Fairclough (2010) suggests that Critical Discourse Analysis can “identify [a] range of discourses that emerge” as well as “how different discourses are brought into dialogue” (p. 19). Therefore, in my next chapter, I will discuss how narratives about Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic found in the aforementioned ITK material speaks to narratives found in the Southern news sources discussed in my last chapter. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, I will use the “Nilliajut” project as a guide throughout the remainder of my analysis.
CHAPTER 7  
HOW DISCOURSES SPEAK TO ONE ANOTHER

As previously mentioned, following Fairclough (2010), I will use this chapter to discuss what insights can be revealed when exploring how discourses found in ITK texts and discourses found in Southern new stories are in dialogue. In addition, throughout this chapter, I will use the edited volume, *Nilliajut: Inuit Perspectives on Security, Patriotism and Sovereignty* to guide my thinking.

The Nilliajut Project is “is a series developed by Inuit Qaujisarvingat [Inuit Knowledge Centre] to capture and showcase Inuit perspectives on important topics affecting their daily lives” (Nilliajut, 2013, para. 1). The Inuit Knowledge Centre, launched in 2010, is a “centre for research housed at Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami in Ottawa” (Inuit Knowledge Centre, 2016, para. 1). According to the Centre’s website, “Inuit Qaujisarvingat is working to bridge the gap between Inuit knowledge and western science and build capacity among Inuit to respond to global interests in Arctic issues” (Inuit Knowledge Centre, 2016, para. 2). The first Nilliajut Project was completed in collaboration with the Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program and, over a year, “captured Inuit perspectives on security, patriotism and sovereignty” in the Arctic (Nilliajut, 2013, para. 2). The first Nilliajut Project produced both a film as well as the aforementioned edited volume, which I will be using to assist my thinking in this chapter. According to the Nilliajut website “the Edited Volume was designed to allow a variety of authors to contribute their perspectives to discussions around Arctic sovereignty and security” in addition, the document “allowed great flexibility in the style, form and length of papers allowing authors creativity in writing [pieces] that truly portrayed their perspectives and work” (Nilliajut, 2013, para. 3). For the remainder of my analysis I will simply use *Nilliajut* (or cite the specific contributor) to reference the edited volume.
I believe bringing the *Nilliajut* document into my analysis is important for several reasons. First, the project was highlighted in an ITK press release and it is housed in the Inuit Knowledge Centre, under the ITK umbrella, so the document is already in close conversation with ITK discourses. In addition, it provides an in-depth series of Inuit perspectives on Arctic sovereignty and complements the ITK material discussed in my last substantive chapter.

Looking at Southern news discourses and ITK and *Nilliajut* discourses on Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic side by side is significant because it reveals discrepancies that exist between Southern news discourse and Inuit discourse. Following Bourdieu (1993), the differences in discourses identified may emerge because of differences in the field – news stories versus an advocacy organization. However, as I suggested in my introduction, this discrepancy is potentially harmful to Inuit because policy decisions about the Arctic are still being made largely in the South, by Southerners influenced by their own mainstream media. A changing climate and new technology are literally opening up the Arctic and paving the way for a neo-colonial era, as Settlers make decisions for Indigenous peoples without adequate consultation and consent.

**Language, Worldview and Different Concepts of Sovereignty**

In the previous two chapters, I outlined different discourses found in ITK texts and Southern news sources around Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. Useful to this discussion though, is the idea that Inuit actually have a different worldview than Southern Canadians, which contributes to a different understanding of sovereignty. For example, an article by Terry Fenge (2013) in *Nilliajut* suggests that “Arctic sovereignty is a much used term which means somewhat different things to different people, and is sometimes used to justify initiatives that have a tenuous connection with the actual issue at hand” (p. 49). While ITK material positions
sovereignty as having to do with security, wellbeing, environmental stewardship and partnership, ITK texts generally didn’t explicitly connect these understandings to worldview. However, many articles in *Nilliajut* make this connection much more clearly. For example, one article describes how part of the reason the Federal Government is disconnected with the people in the Arctic is because they, literally, speak different languages, and sovereignty is a concept that illustrates this well (Kalbutsiak, 2013, p. 4). According to another *Nilliajut* article, “the concept of an arbitrary line on a map is unknown to [Inuit] until very recently” (Peter, 2013, p. 43). In fact, according to the author, “contrary to how sovereignty is exercised by westerners, sovereignty from an Inuit perspective is welcoming; it is open and sharing, based on laws that enabled Inuit to survive in the Arctic” (Peter, 2013, p. 43). This is not to say that Inuit haven’t exercised sovereignty since time immemorial in the Arctic, it’s just been a different approach to sovereignty (Peter, 2013). One example that Peter (2013) outlines is “an elder who welcomes visitors to a community by offering to share a seal” (p. 45). She writes, in this case, an elder is “exercising authority that has been bestowed upon him following traditional laws from his ancestors for thousands of years,” and this is “a true exercise of sovereignty” (p. 45).

References to different epistemological and ontological positions on sovereignty are almost totally absent from Southern news narratives, as well as narratives put forward by the Harper Government, as portrayed by Southern media. However, in order for the State to approach sovereignty in a way that is just, both worldviews need to be considered. Factoring Inuit ways of knowing the world into decision-making in the Arctic should be more than symbolic. For example, Peter (2013) writes that Canada must acknowledge Inuit sovereignty in the Arctic not just through recognition of their use and occupation of the region, but by “show[ing] the utmost respect and gratitude for the land, the water, the animals and the people”
there (p. 46). This may mean, in concrete terms, not rushing resource development in the North until Inuit, Nunavut and Canada are on “an equal playing field” (p. 47). Clearly, slowing down resource development in the North or working with respect for different worldviews there would have very real economic implications for the Federal Government. However, in order to exercise legitimate, just sovereignty, this would need to happen. It’s easy to see how though, in the name of economic gain, it might have been easier, for the Harper administration to take a terra nullius view of the Arctic.

Furthermore, while ITK texts advocated for the Government to include Inuit as partners in all sovereignty discussions, some Nilliajut articles questioned whether sovereignty is in fact the right concept to be using in the Arctic at all. For example, one definition of sovereignty found in Nilliajut is the Inuktitut word aulatsigunnarniq (Qitsualik, 2013, p. 26). The literal translation is, “the ability to make things move” (p. 26). However, the author of this article notes that there really isn’t a true Inuktitut equivalent. In fact, she writes, “never before now, in this complex sociopolitical milieu, have interpreter-translators been so required to invent Inuktitut terminology” (p. 26). Furthermore, Qitsualik (2013) draws the distinction between anthropogenic and non-anthropogenic worldviews. She writes that in an anthropogenic worldview, one which would prevail in the South, “there grows the expectation that an environment is responsive to the human will;” whereas, in a non-anthropogenic worldview like Inuit have, the mind “relies upon responsiveness to a reality outside the human condition” (p. 27). Therefore, “the non-anthropogenic mind cannot expect to impost geometry upon the world, since it is the world itself dictating all conditions” (p. 27). Furthermore, Qitsualik (2013) writes, “it is absurd, in the non-anthropogenic understanding of classic Inuit thought, that a human may possess any level of supreme or divine control over shifting Land” (p. 32).
Another Nilliajut, contributor Rachel A. Qitsualik, suggests yet a different meaning for sovereignty. She writes,

Sovereignty… is truth. For Inuit, it is the self-maintained right to define themselves, mind and soul: by the Water; on the Land; under the Sky. Inuit, who know the Nuna [earth] so well, cannot define sovereignty via mastery of their home, but rather of their own hearts. For they have never owned the Nuna… but were blessed with enjoyment of it; with wisdom gleaned from it; healthful lives modeled from it (p. 32).

Nowhere in my research did Southern news discourse question whether humans could actually own land in the Arctic. Land ownership, on the state and individual level is deeply entrenched in Settler culture. I surmise discussions of a non-anthropogenic worldview in the Arctic didn’t make it into government or news discourse partially because of the shared habitus of both journalists and government officials. My findings suggest that mainstream Southern discourse doesn’t often include a critical discussion of the different worldviews and worlds that co-inhabit the Arctic; rather, the monopoly of the Settler worldview is taken for granted. This revelation is deeply troubling when I consider that the Canadian State, in the Arctic and more broadly, is supposed to be a place where Indigenous and Settler polities can co-exist.

To re-iterate, these differences in worldview are not symbolic or rhetorical. They have real and concrete implications. For example, Southern news sources almost completely ignored the fact that Inuit were traditionally nomadic people, spanning the geography of what now falls into several Arctic states. According to Nilliajut though, these international borders, now separating Inuit, “were imposed by the conquerors without any input from them” and “do not reflect the Inuit’s idea of collective ownership” (Ejesiak, 2013, p. 68). This contributor suggests, “from a cultural survival standpoint, and to ensure they share with one another their strength of identity, it is critical for the Inuit to question the borders as they apply to them” (p. 68).
For the Canadian Government to put anthropogenic and non-anthropogenic worldviews on a level playing field would mean a fundamental shift in how the State approaches land ownership and boundary making, with implications on both the domestic and international level. However, to ignore them altogether ignores the Government’s obligation to Inuit and further entrenches the colonial notion of one unitary polity in Canada. Noble (2015) might suggest this troubling impasse is part of the “colonial milieu” in which we find ourselves in Canada.

**Terra Nullius Thinking and Arctic Sovereignty**

As previously mentioned, several stories repeated in Southern media portray terra nullius thinking about the Arctic. For example, news stories that discussed Harper’s annual trips to the Arctic followed the storyline of a Southerner making a trek to the remote Arctic. Harper’s trips often coincided with Operation Nanook, which is meant to assert Canada’s sovereignty in the North. In addition, the stories were often told in terms of how Harper’s trips to the Arctic fit into his broader political platform. Moreover, these articles tended to focus on the harshness of the Arctic environment, focusing on survival activities Harper partook in there, like target-shooting practice, and romanticize Canada’s frontier history with little or no commentary on the colonial history of the North.

Another series of Southern news stories that perpetuated a terra nullius myth is the coverage of the Franklin Expedition find. Aside from two articles that mentioned that Inuit oral history helped researchers find the *Erebus*, only one article in *The Media Co-Op* discussed Inuit and the history of exploration and imperialism that Franklin was a part of. Furthermore, in *The Globe and Mail* article that Harper wrote about finding the *Erebus*, he suggests, “it was Franklin’s exploration of the North that helped lay the foundations of Canada’s Arctic
sovereignty” (Harper, 2014, para. 2). This statement misses that fact that, according to ITK sources, it is actually the presence of Inuit in the Arctic that gives Canada any claim to sovereignty there. Furthermore, it ignores the colonial history of Western explorers imposing their boundaries and governance on Inuit.

Of course no Southern news sources suggested that the Arctic is uninhabited. However, stories like the aforementioned that discuss sovereignty in the Arctic with no mention of Inuit work to erase Inuit from Southern sovereignty myths.

One article in Nilliajut speaks to the sometimes-ambiguous nature of Canada’s claim to Arctic sovereignty, referring to everything from boundary making to international threats to military presence (Kuptana, 2013). Conversely, Kuptana (2013) writes, “the right of Inuit to our land and seas has never been nebulous. We have used and occupied both the land and sea for our very survival as a people for millennia” (p. 12). Kuptana might agree that the Federal Government could spend less time, money and energy on sovereignty rhetoric and instead spend greater efforts working with the people – Canadian citizens in fact! – who already have a presence there.

While many recurring Southern news stories do perpetuate terra nullius thinking, the advocacy work of the ITK acts against it. For example, one of the messages repeated in many of Simon’s interviews and speeches was that sovereignty begins with Inuit. When considering this discourse alongside myths produced in Southern media, it is easy to see that this is not just rhetorical. It is essential for Southerners to understand, to avoid a new wave of colonialism in the Arctic, that Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic is tied inseparably to Inuit presence (as well as health, knowledge, culture, self-determination and more) there.
Absolute Sovereignty or International Management?

According to the Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic, sovereignty “is a term that has often been used to refer to the absolute and independent authority of a community or nation both internally and externally.” My research showed that Southern news portrayed the Canadian Government as favoring an absolute sovereignty approach: one where the State subsumes Inuit (culturally and politically) under its supreme governance.

As mentioned in my first substantive chapter, a discourse that emerged in Southern media was the idea that the Canadian State is under threat from other Arctic nations, as well as non-Arctic nations, and thus has to protect its sovereignty there. While different commentators expressed a variety of opinions on the extent that Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic is in fact being threatened, the idea that Canada has absolute sovereignty in at least parts of the Arctic was almost unquestioned in Southern media.

For example, stories discussing national defence, military and infrastructure in the Arctic were usually framed in terms of whether Canada could protect its sovereignty in the Arctic. Was the government investing enough in Navy ships? Did the Coast Guard have the capability to respond to crises in Arctic waters? To what extent is the Canadian State at risk of incursions from neighboring countries? None of the stories discussing defence, military or infrastructure in the Arctic considered whether an approach outside absolute sovereignty was even a possibility – except one article that dismissed the fact that the Arctic could be managed internationally, like Antarctica (Exner-Pilot and Plouffe, 2014).

The Harper Government’s absolute sovereignty approach was also suggested by news stories about ownership of the North Pole and whether Santa Claus was Canadian. Even though articles that mused on the nationality of this fictional character were light-hearted and seasonal,
the question period exchange between Conservatives and Liberals about Santa Claus’s nationality may be indicative of just how important maintaining the mythology of Canada’s claim to the North was to the Harper Government. Conservative Members of Parliament weren’t even willing to question the nationality of a fictional character that different stories and traditions revolve around all over the world.

Similarly, news coverage of the discovery of the *HMS Erebus* suggested that the Harper Government had an absolute sovereignty approach. Stephen Harper’s personal involvement in positioning the Franklin find as important to Canada was made clear in a personally written article in *The Globe and Mail*. While it might be uncommon for the Prime Minister to write an opinion editorial in response to any nationally important topic, the fact that he chose this one to write about it telling. In this article, Harper calls the North “central to our [Canadian] identity” (para. 9) and describes the *Erebus* find as demonstrative of “Canada’s ability to operate in the harsh and remote Canadian Arctic” (para. 7). Not included in Harper’s article was the help provided by a Russian ship, or the role Inuit had in telling scientists where to look. Therefore, sovereignty is not only portrayed as Canada’s exclusively, but also based on the State’s ability to exercise power rather than on history, memory and presence in the region.

However, the *Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic* suggests that sovereignty is actually “a contested concept… and does not have a fixed meaning,” citing its breakdown “as different governance models… evolve.” Similarly, *Nilliajut* and ITK texts suggest greater openness to different approaches to governance in the Arctic. While ITK texts certainly don’t suggest an international governance model for the Arctic like Antarctica, they point to the cultural and political importance of partnership with Inuit from other Arctic nations,
namely, through the Arctic Council. An article in *Nilliajut* takes this line of thinking even further. Contributor Kirt Ejesiak (2013) writes:

> More and more Inuit are questioning the legitimacy of... artificial borders: whose interest are they serving? Do the Inuit have the right to self-determination? Could the Inuit join as one state as other threatened peoples have done in recent times? The claims for Inuit self-determination have been considered mostly in a national context, within their own countries, but perhaps self-determination as a collective group may be where the Inuit should go (p. 68).

Finally, several ITK texts, the Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic and *Nilliajut* all use international instruments, like UNDRIP, to acknowledge rights that should be afforded to Inuit as Indigenous peoples. The Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic unambiguously states, “international and other instruments increasingly recognize the rights of indigenous peoples to self-determination and representation in intergovernmental matters, and are evolving beyond issues of internal governance to external relations” (Inuit Circumpolar Declaration, 2009).

The possibility for international Inuit partnership and governance in the Arctic was entirely left out of Southern news discourses, possibly because it fell in stark opposition to the absolute governance perspective news suggested the Harper Government had. The complete lack of coverage of the international work Inuit are doing in the Arctic, or the possibility of different governance models in the Arctic in Southern media coverage of Arctic sovereignty shows just how deeply entrenched the absolute sovereignty model is in Southern Canadian mythology. Beyond what is happening in mainstream discourse though, Inuit – through mechanisms like the *Declaration* – voiced different perspectives on what sovereignty in the Arctic looks like for them. Inuit organizations suggested approaches that fit better with their worldview and better allowed for Inuit autonomy and self-determination that is not currently
being met under Canada’s governance model. Yet the Government seemingly ignored these perspectives. Because these perspectives were coming from respected, established, government-funded Inuit organizations, I have to assume that the Government was not simply ignorant of Inuit understandings of sovereignty in the Arctic, but that the Government actively ignored perspectives that didn’t support its presumed absolute sovereignty in the Arctic.

**Sovereignty or Security?**

While Southern news stories seemed to tie security almost exclusively to national defence and the State’s military capability in the Arctic, both ITK texts and *Nilliajut* often used sovereignty and security much more interchangeably; moreover, they regularly used security rather than sovereignty to describe their aspirations for Arctic communities. Rather than using security exclusively in reference to military capacity though, the ITK and *Nilliajut* used security to refer to the wellbeing of Inuit communities, encompassing everything from cultural and spiritual wellbeing, to health, to education, to food security to environmental security to self-determination.

Southern news stories around Arctic security were highly politicized, especially regarding the Harper Government. Political commentators, like University of British Columbia Political Scientist Michael Byers, were often consulted for expert opinions, and as previously mentioned, expressed a broad spectrum of views as to the whether the government was doing enough to protect the Arctic from outside threats. Moreover, because Southern media framed security in terms of military capacity, journalists often brought in military personnel to provide commentary. Because these military commentators were operating within a similar field (Bourdieu, 1993), they offered similar perspectives on security in the Arctic, thus maintaining
the discourse that security in the Arctic revolves mainly around military protection, and thus the myth remained unchallenged.

The Rangers were also discussed, and to some extent, politicized in Southern media discussions of Arctic security. The Ranger program was often either vaunted as Canada’s “eyes and ears in the North” (Canadian Rangers, 2015) or maligned for its insufficiencies (for example, Rangers’ enduring reliance on World War II era Lee Enfield rifles). However, the alarming number of Rangers who have died in recent years or the fact that Rangers don’t have access to the same benefits the rest of the army has received very little coverage. The cost maintaining security is having on the (largely-Inuit) Rangers is seldom brought into Southern security discourses. This is not so different from the lack of coverage given to the harms caused to Inuit who were relocated to the High Arctic in the name of securing Canadian sovereignty there in the 1950s.

_Nilliajut (2013)_ contributor Karen Kelley describes how “Canada’s exertion of sovereignty in the Arctic is…reactive, focusing on a response to threats rather than proactively engaging with northern communities as a different way of bolstering sovereignty” (p. 58). Moreover, she points to the many sceptics who suggest that “Canada’s claim to Arctic waters and the Northwest Passage are not backed by the ability to defend, patrol, or provide escorts through this region on a year round basis” (p. 58). Critique about the ability of Canada’s Army, Navy, Coast Guard, Rangers, and so on, to protect the Arctic was pervasive in Southern media; however, the media gave little coverage to “the long term Inuit use and occupancy of Arctic Canada (including marine regions) to support national sovereignty claims” (p. 59). Either this is reflective of the Harper Government’s approach to Arctic sovereignty in that time frame, or
stories about militarization in the Arctic are more sensational and “newsworthy” – or perhaps a combination of the two.

In addition, different discourses around sovereignty in the Arctic and climate change were revealed between Southern news stories and ITK texts. Southern news stories usually discussed climate change in the context of new waterways opening up and, if Northerners were brought in at all, impacts were framed in terms of how they might be affected by new shipping and resource development. The only time Southern news stories drew a pointed connection between the Federal Government’s inaction on climate change, the impact climate change is already having on Inuit and Canada’s legitimacy claiming sovereignty in the Arctic is in interviews or editorials provided by Mary Simon where she suggests that in order to claim legitimate sovereignty in the Arctic, the government must take care of the people there, which includes working towards environmental security.

_Nilliajut_ (2013) also discusses how security relates to sovereignty in the Arctic. One author describes how insecurity in the Arctic is “a result of [Inuit] experiencing such a rapid shift from living in a traditional culture to constantly trying to balance that culture with the demands of a new and powerful culture” (Kuptana, 2013, p. 9). Another _Nilliajut_ contributor similar discusses how a history of colonialism and imposition of the State mean “Inuit have yet to find true security in Canada” (Nungak, 2013, p. 15). And finally, another article describes hardships faced by Inuit in the neo-colonial era, like the High Arctic relocations and the impact this has had on the wellbeing of Arctic communities and argues for Inuit to be “active in the sovereignty cause” with “direct input”. Furthermore, the article argues that the Government must “recognize that people need to be the priority and the military is not the answer to sovereignty” (Karetak-Lindell, 2013, p. 22).
Overall, comparing discourses around security in the Arctic shows how Southern media works to downplay stories of everyday life in Arctic sovereignty discussions. As a result, a myth emerges in Southern discourse about empty Arctic lands – and the valuable resources housed there – needing military protection. The dominance of this discourse comes at the expense of Inuit in the region, erasing their historic and continuing presence there from Southern mythology.

Foucault’s (1997) *Society Must Be Defended* shows that sovereignty, as states practice it today, is a construct stemming from Western notions of power, governance and domination (see Hobbes’s *Leviathan*). In fact though, sovereignty, as practiced by the Canadian State, has no more fundamental “truth” than Inuit ways of interacting with their environment and each other. Foucault suggests that rather than looking for theories of sovereignty, we should look for theories of domination by “showing how actual relations of subjugation manufacture subjects” (p. 45). Moreover, Foucault argues, we should be “showing how the various operators of domination support one another, relate to one another, at how they converge and reinforce one another” (p. 45). I argue the Canadian State’s sovereignty over Inuit “subjects” is reinforced by the myth of a unitary polity and sovereignty in Canada – supported by historical understandings of what sovereignty is, as envisioned by Western thought. Southern media also acts as an “operator of domination,” supporting the version of sovereignty practiced by the Canadian State. However, ITK texts and *Nilliajut* suggest that if the State does not provide security for Inuit, then it is not truly sovereign, neither in the region nor over Inuit. Asch (2014) offers an alternative to the unitary, normative and colonizing sovereignty practiced by the State. He suggests a nation-to-nation relationship with our Indigenous partners, which runs counter to sovereignty at presented by Hobbes’s *Leviathan*. In my concluding chapter, I will further discuss Asch’s
recommendations for how we Settlers might “build a house together” with our Indigenous partners.

Self-Determination, Inclusion and Partnership

A counter-narrative to the dominant theory of sovereignty as military capacity is found in ITK material, which speaks to sovereignty as self-determination, inclusion and partnership at both national and international levels.

ITK texts consistently suggested that the Government must consult Inuit in all discussions about sovereignty in the Arctic. Unlike Southern news discourses, which often excluded Inuit altogether, ITK material positioned Inuit as stewards of the Arctic, experts in the region, and the reason which Canada can claim sovereignty in the Arctic in an international arena. Despite the fact that Inuit are Canadian citizens whose presence in the Arctic since time immemorial may be Canada’s strongest claim to sovereignty in the North, a recurring story in ITK discourse is that of Inuit being excluded from Arctic policy making. Following this repeated exclusion from Arctic decision-making, ITK material consistently spoke to the need for greater inclusion, partnership and consultation with the government in matters relating to the Arctic.

In fact, the appeal for greater partnership in the Arctic was probably the most consistent discourse in ITK texts. The repetition of this basic request to be consulted about what happens on land that they have used since far before the arrival of Settlers to what is now Canada, as well as the repeated stories of the failure of governments, policy makers and academics to adequately consult Inuit in ITK texts was simultaneously unsurprising and alarming. Unsurprising as a student of anthropology who is aware, theoretically, of how colonialism persists in modern-day
Canada. However, I expected ITK discourses to be more radical, to speak more to the harms done to Inuit communities by the State and demand justice. While these discourses did exist, I was surprised by how often ITK texts, as well as *Nilliajut* contributors presented Inuit as proud Canadian citizens who are patriotic and grateful when the Government pays attention to the Arctic at all. What I found jarring was how basic the recurring appeal for inclusion in Arctic governance was, and despite the straightforwardness of this request, the continued failure for it to be delivered. Neither ITK texts nor *Nilliajut* made sweeping appeals for political overhaul – they just argued for respectful partnership.

As a start, ITK texts described how both the Federal Government and the international community should look at the work Inuit have already done on Arctic sovereignty, for example, the Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic and the *Nilliajut* project. Between these two documents alone, Inuit organizations have already made several recommendations for how they can be better included in Arctic sovereignty discussions. Unfortunately, despite the work that ITK did to publicize these documents, neither the Federal Government nor Southern journalists seemed to be listening.

**Sovereignty and the NLCA**

Both *Nilliajut* and ITK texts suggested that in order for Canada to have legitimacy in its Arctic sovereignty claims, the Government must do a better job of implementing the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA), yet this line of thinking was totally absent from Southern news narratives. For example, a *Nilliajut* article by Terry Fenge (2013) describes how Canada’s claim to sovereignty in the Arctic is actually strengthened or weakened by its ability to implement the NLCA. Fenge writes,
The Government of Canada should use the NLCA as a component of its legal, political and public relations strategy to assert Arctic sovereignty. To do so effectively, however, would be markedly assisted if the Government of Canada actively engaged Inuit on this file and ensured the Nunavut Agreement is fully and fairly implemented, which currently is not the case (p. 49).

On the flip side, Fenge argues, Canada’s failure to implement the NLCA could actually weaken the country’s claim to sovereignty in the Arctic. Fenge (2013) hypothesizes, “it might be that the current Government of Canada’s difficulties with implementing modern treaties and using the NLCA for sovereignty assertion purposes reflects a deeper, ideological aversion to the place of collective rights in Canada” (p. 52). Furthermore, Fenge (2013) discussed Harper’s recurring “use it or lose it” mantra about the Arctic and provided the following commentary:

This quite extraordinary statement repeated by the Prime Minister and his ministers…provided a political justification a “hardware” and “military investment” approach to sovereignty assertion. In doing so, the Prime Minister stepped back from the long-standing sovereignty supporting “historic title” position of previous federal governments. Some commentators suggest that the “use it or lost it” aphorism actually weakened rather than strengthened Canada’s Arctic sovereignty (p. 52).

This insight from Fenge is especially interesting when considered alongside discourses found in Southern media. For example, if Fenge is right, then the “use it or lose it” approach gave the Harper Government and Southerners much more leeway to go into the Arctic and “use it” as they saw fit – presumably, resource extraction – without consulting Inuit that are in fact already using the Arctic and possibly without working within land claims structures. A cynical view on Harper’s position is that this was totally calculated. Even though the extent of real threats to Canada’s sovereignty the Arctic, based on a review of ITK and Southern media discourses, is not agreed upon, Harper’s “use it or lose it” position as a defence against perceived threats conceivably allowed him to score political points in the South while simultaneously moving away from collective rights, land claims implementation and an international sharing
approach. Southern media, favouring a sensational story and within the habitus (Bourdieu, 1993) of journalists’ Southern-Canadian-centric perspective, was a useful tool in perpetuating the “use it or lose it” myth. However, suggesting any of the above would be purely speculative.

Southern News and the Myth of a Unitary Polity in Canada

Even though Nilliajut (2013) speaks to how the concept sovereignty doesn’t fit well with Inuit ontology, many articles in Nilliajut, as well as ITK texts still use a more Southern concept of sovereignty (that relates to jurisdiction and ownership) as a tool in framing their recommendations for the Government. For example, Nilliajut suggests Inuit should be included in sovereignty discussions as “stewards of the Arctic” but also as “citizens of Canada” (p. 3). ITK material describes how sovereignty must begin with healthy Inuit communities, or how Inuit use and occupation of the Arctic since time immemorial is Canada’s strongest claim to sovereignty their. In these cases, even though the ITK presents a more nuanced description of sovereignty than portrayed in Southern media, the organization is still using the concept in a way that is easily accessible to Southerners and the Government. The reason for this may be two-fold. First, the ITK, despite being an Inuit group, is still a government-funded organization working within the State system. In addition, working with similar sovereignty discourse as the Government may be a pragmatic way for the organization to ensure its voice is heard.

According to Nilliajut, Canada needs Inuit in order to exert a claim to sovereignty, and many articles as well as ITK texts suggest that many Inuit are happy to be citizens of Canada, bolstering Canada’s claim to the region. However, one Nilliajut author adds, “Inuit don’t want to just be symbols. Inuit want to be contributing individuals to the Canadian society” (Kusugak, 2013, p. 17).
The discrepancies between Arctic sovereignty discourses in Southern media and Inuit texts, as presented by the ITK and the *Nilliajut* project, is potentially harmful to Inuit because policy decisions about the Arctic are still being made largely in the South, by Southerners influenced by their own mainstream media. The *Nilliajut* project on Arctic sovereignty compliments and builds on discourse found in ITK texts as well as the *Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic*. Reviewing the aforementioned Inuit texts shows that Inuit perspectives on sovereignty and how these perspectives diverge from the sovereignty practices of the State are well documented. As mentioned, this suggests that the Harper Government was not simply pushing a sovereignty agenda that didn’t fit with Inuit worldview in ignorance, but that Federal Government intentionally disregarded Inuit perspectives on sovereignty in the Arctic. Furthermore, Southern media then presented a unitary concept of sovereignty and a single polity in Canada. Presenting sovereignty this way was an extension of a history of colonialism and deeply entrenched Euro-centric understandings of nationhood and sovereignty, but it also extends coloniality by presenting these understandings as absolute, universally agreed upon truths.

In my concluding chapter, I will take up Michael Asch’s (2014) concept of treaty relationality, as it speaks to the repeated request of the ITK for partnership in the Arctic.
CHAPTER 8  CONCLUSION

In my introduction, I mentioned the aphorism, “perception is reality” and questioned whose perception was defining whose reality in the Arctic, and what to do when there are multiple realities to begin with. Reviewing Southern news stories alongside ITK texts, as well as The Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic and Nilliajut showed how different worlds and worldviews, and thus different understandings of sovereignty, come to interact in the Arctic.

When examining both ITK texts and Southern news sources, it was sometimes difficult to distinguish where I should be speaking about epistemology versus ontology, field versus habitus, “real” versus construct. My analysis shows that these concepts overlap in the Arctic. A better way of ultimately framing these differences in discourse could be to view the differences as resulting from the context (Sejersen, 2004) and situated knowledge (Haraway, 1988) held by those producing the texts I analyzed. Perhaps those producing Southern news and ITK texts inhabited different discourse communities (Noble, personal communication), where those in a similar habitus produced texts that articulated similar perspectives. I argue the important task is to not just highlight these differences in discourse, but to suggest why they might occur.

Following Noble (2015), my analysis indicates that different Arctic sovereignty discourses stem from and demonstrate the colonial milieu that persists in Canada today. Arctic sovereignty discourse shows how coloniality works both as an “oppositional encounter of self and other” as well as an “apparatus or milieu” (Noble, 2015, p. 429). To begin with, in the Arctic, an “oppositional encounter of self and other” is at work the Canadian State “impose[s] boundary coordinates – such as those of territory, knowledges, categories, normative practices – on the domains of land, knowledge, ways of life of an other who…had prior, principal with those
lands” (p. 429). Furthermore, media depictions of the Harper Government’s approach to Arctic sovereignty indicated coloniality as an “oppositional encounter of self and other,” where the Government appeared to ignore Inuit discourse in favour of its own position (self), which further subordinated Inuit perspectives (other). Then, demonstrating “coloniality as apparatus,” Southern news sources echoed and amplified the Settler, colonial, unitary presentation of sovereignty in the Arctic, “sustain[ing] the other and maintain[ing] a dialogue between the self and other, while always ensuring… that the other remains other, partially welcomed into the arrangement but necessarily in a subordinated position, subjugated, inscribed as other by self, thereby securing the power position of self” (Noble, 2015, p. 430). In other words, the news was indicative of Inuit-State relations under the Harper Government, ignoring and erasing both Inuit and a history of colonialism in the Arctic. This media erasure seemed to stem from Government discourse, but simultaneously shored it up, presenting it as truth, and presenting Southerners relying on the news with a concept of sovereignty that was universal, unitary and unquestioned.

ITK texts, Nilliajut and the Declaration, on the other hand, suggested that Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic was contested and dynamic and that multiple sovereignties and versions of sovereignty overlap in the Arctic. Furthermore, ITK texts conflated sovereignty with security in the Arctic, suggesting that the State’s legitimacy there was absolutely contingent on its ability to take care of and partner with Inuit. However, my research showed that Southern media portrayals of the Harper Government repeatedly ignored these discourses, despite their ready accessibility through documents like the Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic, Nilliajut and the extensive advocacy work of the ITK. In line with the ITK, I argue that the State’s sovereignty in the Arctic is not legitimate, neither internationally nor domestically, until it acknowledges and engages with Inuit perspectives, like those articulated by the ITK, and
better partners with Inuit in the Arctic. Asch’s (2014) notion of treaty relationality, as also utilized by Noble (2015), resonates with the idea of partnership repeated in ITK discourse.

At the conclusion of On Being Here to Stay, Asch suggests that a first step to building better relations with Indigenous peoples in Canada is shift the focus from an Indigenous rights approach (within an overarching Settler polity) to our obligations as Settlers in nation-to-nation relationships. Despite the fact that Inuit did not sign treaties, Asch’s proposal to honour the “spirit and intent” of treaties is applicable to how we might honour the spirit and intent of land claims agreements, like the NLCA. He makes two concrete recommendations for how we might meet our obligations to our Indigenous partners in Canada. His first recommendation is to help our Indigenous partners when they are faced with calamity – like the affordable food crisis, high suicide rate, low high school graduation or environmental degradation facing Inuit today, for example. The second is to “seek to live on these lands in a manner that best ensures that no calamity befalls Indigenous peoples” (p. 151). When considering the context of the Arctic especially, these words become clear and simple, yet powerful. They resonate with the words of Mary Simon: “pursuing a sovereignty agenda must be more than pursuing the promise of immense profits from uranium, diamonds, and natural gas in the Arctic” (2009, p. 252).

In terms of helping our Inuit partners when they are faced with calamity, based on my reading of Southern news stories, I suggest the Federal Government could focus less on military capacity in the Arctic and more on closing the gap in living conditions between Inuit and Southern Canadians. In addition, Canada is of course not solely responsible for the impacts of climate change in the Arctic. However, as a partner to Inuit Canadians, who are one of the most vulnerable populations when it comes to melting ice, is Canada not obliged to be a leader in the fight against climate change? Similarly, when it comes to ensuring that our actions do not create
calamity, is there more work that the Federal Government could do to ensure that Inuit are not be negatively affected by resource exploration (and exploitation) in the Arctic. Do the policy decisions the Government makes today allow Inuit to continue to live in the Arctic as they have since time immemorial?

News stories portrayed the Federal Government as taking a unitary approach to the concepts of sovereignty and citizenship. Therefore, another step the Federal Government could take in recognizing this partnership might be to rethink dominant narratives of what it means to be sovereign and what it means to be a Canadian citizen. These words may not be appropriate to the situation of Inuit, as the dominant connotations they carry are Eurocentric and thus colonial in nature. Could the State approach these concepts with more openness and acknowledgement that they are dynamic rather than static? Are there alternatives to Westphalian notions of sovereignty and boundary making in a place where people were historically nomadic and melting and freezing ice creates a liminal landscape? Could re-thinking these dominant narratives act as a decolonial move?

Noble (2015) discusses the “double bind” that coloniality leaves us in – where we seem to be faced with the choice of either denouncing the State and the colonial system we live in altogether or resigning ourselves to working within it, thus potentially perpetuating the system. He suggests that within land claims settlements, like the NLCA, “Inuit understood they were promised the ongoing support of the Crown in exchange for access and control in their lands” (p. 438) and that we might “return to the original intent of the agreement” (p. 438). I believe this “treaty turn” (p. 429) could simultaneously address the colonial milieu, as well as honourably and respectfully address the problem of incommensurability between worlds and polities.
According to Noble, in order to do this, we could “enact social and political arrangements where promises are kept and obligations fulfilled with others at every register of action, not merely as different folks with different cultures but as collectives of actors constituting two polities” (p. 438). Moreover, Noble (2015) suggests that for anthropologists, “what we insert into the Indigenous-settler conversation, by way of our actions and by way of a more adequate retelling of inter-political relations both the academy and for wider publics” is the best way to bring about changes in government policy. I wholeheartedly agree, and even further suggest that Southern journalists could re-frame the way they tell the Inuit-Settler story in the Arctic in a way that better educates the public about how Settlers might work in partnership with Inuit and help avoid new wave of colonialism in the Arctic. This might seem like a big task for journalists, but luckily for them, Inuit perspectives, like those highlighted by ITK texts, are already well documented. In fact, one important thing for journalists, government and the public alike to do to combat colonialism in Arctic sovereignty discussions might simply be to pay attention to what Inuit are and have been saying. Inuit recommendations for how we might better approach relations in their Arctic are out there – as a place to start – perhaps all we need to do is listen.
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Kunuk, Z. (Director). (2010). *Inuit Knowledge and Climate Change* [Motion Picture].


Shadian, Jessica. Building Bridges (and Boats) Where There Once Was Ice: Adopting a Circumpolar Approach in the Arctic. Policy Options, 30, 71-75.


APPENDIX A  SOUTHERN NEWS SOURCES


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APPENDIX B  ITK SOURCES


APPENDIX C  RAW DATA

The two Excel files where I compiled ITK and Southern news data are available via DalSpace (https://dalspace.library.dal.ca).

Please note, in the “Summary” and “Additional Notes / Insights” columns in the “Southern News Sources and Themes” spreadsheet, text was copy and pasted directly from the cited news stories. Similarly, in the “ITK Documents” spreadsheet, text from ITK documents, press releases, speeches and web pages was copy and pasted in the “Description & Notes” column.