

CURRENT MAGAZINES

America Teaches, Japan Learns:—Mr. K. K. Kawakami, in the *Atlantic*.

The First Year of the Spanish Republic: Mr. L. J. de Asúa, in *Foreign Affairs*.

Ireland and the Commonwealth:—Mr. Hugh A. Law, in the *Fortnightly*.

British Democracy 1832-1932:—Lord Ponsonby, in *Current History*.

ABOUT ninety years ago, Dickens was at work on his *American Notes*, and on that other volume of American studies, *Martin Chuzzlewit*, of which Chesterton has predicted that it will outlive the United States. When one thinks of the picture of self-sufficiency and intolerance of criticism which is there drawn, what change can be more amazing than is shown in the publication of Mr. Kawakami's article by the *Atlantic Monthly*? It stands first in the issue, as its merit deserves that it should; for whatever view we may take of its conclusions, we must admit that they are marshalled and illustrated with extraordinary skill. But the satire upon what may be called the American social conscience could hardly be more intense.

The writer is a Japanese journalist, who has lived for the last thirty years in Washington as editorial correspondent of leading Japanese newspapers. He writes with considerable authority, as shown by the fact that his recent book, *Japan Speaks on the Sino-Japanese Crisis*, had an introduction from the pen of the premier of his country. His main thesis in the present article is that the United States at least has no right to play the censorious critic of recent procedure in Manchuria or in Shanghai, because in what his countrymen did they were inspired throughout by American example. Perhaps, indeed, they carried out the enterprise on a larger scale, courting wider risks, and staking more upon the issue. The article bears a suggestive heading from *The Merchant of Venice*: "The villainy you teach me, I will execute, and it shall go hard but I will better the instruction" Calmly accepting the rôle of Shylock, Japan thus appeals to the mentor from whom its methods were adopted to stand by her in cynical contempt for the moralising of the outside world. At least let not her tutor in international immoralism affect to be shocked by its consequences. "Tokyo and Washington, then, are in the same boat, and Tokyo is dismayed

by Washington's apparent lack of heart!" There is a refreshing Machiavellian ring about an article like this.

Looking back on American history for a generation or so, Mr Kawakami notices the thread of a continuous policy in relations between the United States and Santo Domingo, Haiti, Nicaragua, Cuba, Hawaii, Mexico, the Philippines. It comes to his mind that when the first treaty ever concluded by Japan with a western nation was made, through the efforts of Commodore Perry, with the United States, the western negotiator, in token of the new era, presented his Japanese colleague with a sewing machine, a miniature locomotive, and a case of ardent spirits. Thus began the Occidental influence; thus came to Tokyo western industry and western alcohol. The treaty, too, was signed under the threat that, in the alternative, American warships, lying not far off, would have their guns trained on the Japanese capital. This completed the threefold inspiration of contact with the Occident: business, drink, and long range guns. Japanese interest was fascinated. The youth of the Island Empire began to cross the ocean that they might learn more of this wonderful American people:

of that marvellous civilisation which had produced the Liberty Bell and slavery, Lincoln and carpet-baggers, universities and night clubs, missionaries and racketeers, battleships and chewing tobacco, the Church and the saloon.

Such of them as had a talent for public administration, too, would follow with eager eye the sequence of events in United States dealings with the republics of the Carribean Sea. Thence they got the principle, and in great measure the method, which they were to apply when the time was ripe in Korea. And now they are applying it again:

Secretary Stimson. . . is too charitable if he thinks that Japan's romantic General Staff, if not her stolid Foreign Office, before launching the Manchurian intervention had not burned a lot of midnight oil scrutinizing 1,200,000 or so fascinating words spoken or read at the Senate hearings at Washington on Haiti and Santo Domingo in 1922; or that Admiral Shiozawa, before bombing the Woosung forts and landing his sailors at Shanghai, had not scanned the pages of Professor Nearing's *Dollar Diplomacy*.

Tracing the analogy in detail, the writer points out how Japan—like the United States—had to defend her nationals abroad. As Mr Coolidge said, wherever a citizen goes, the duties of his Government must follow him, for his person and property even in foreign lands are still within its domain. As Chief Justice Hughes said, no sovereign could dare to disavow responsibility for affording such

protection to the very limits of the possible. As Mr Kellogg and Mr Root said, every nation must judge for itself what constitutes necessary self-defence, and it is absurd to suggest that this can be restrained within the area of "territorial jurisdiction". If these principles are sound regarding Americans in Mexico or in Cuba, why should they not equally apply to Japanese in Manchuria? At Havana, in 1898, the blowing up of the American battleship *Maine* precipitated intervention, and the horrors of the Spanish-American War. But there was not nearly so much evidence of the guilt of Spain in that affair as could be produced for the guilt of China in the outrage on a Japanese railway at Mukden in September last.

Nor had the Japanese taken steps of imperialist aggression equal to the United States raid on the Philippines. It is argued that Spanish misrule in Cuba had become insufferable, so that interference by a Power culturally superior was justified. But, asks the critic, may not this plea, dangerous as it is, be urged with equal force regarding the ravages of Chinese war lords, the universal disorder, and the rampant banditry of Manchuria? It is a point which is worth pursuing a little further. The duty to spread a higher civilisation even by force had been illustrated many times in the past. How was the Panama Canal built? For the sake of building it, the secession of Panama from Columbia had to be contrived, and this was done "under the aegis of American warships and American marines". Academic consideration of the rights of Columbia was not permitted to arise. Colonel Roosevelt put it frankly in 1910: "I took the Canal Zone", he said, "and let the Congress debate, and while the debate goes on, the Canal does also. . . Unless I had acted exactly as I did act, there would now be no Panama Canal. It is folly to assert devotion to an end, and at the same time to condemn the only means by which the end can be achieved". Mr. Kawakami thinks this excellent doctrine. But he thinks also that, like Holy Scripture, it can be of no "private interpretation". Why should it be held an outrage to set up the "puppet republic" of Manchuria, if it was thoroughly defensible to set up a puppet State in Panama? Why should the digging of a canal be a more sacred purpose than the safeguarding of Port Arthur and Daren?

Next comes a story about the "Central American Court of Justice", organized in 1907 as an arbitration tribunal for Nicaragua and the other Central American republics. It was founded at the prompting of the United States, but—we are informed—its decision a few years later was treated with contempt by the American

Government because it dared to decide against American interests. Costa Rica, Salvador, Honduras in vain shrieked their protest to the world. In all these samples of what the Germans used to call *Realpolitik*, Japan has been an apt pupil, and now she thinks of taking a final step—also after the American pattern—viz., “to get away from the orbit of the League of Nations”. She has learned to appreciate the wisdom of the United States in keeping clear of that entanglement. The League gives such a chance to small States to “air before the whole world their multitudinous grievances”. But it is not with small States that Japan has come into conflict. Not with Haiti, Santo Domingo, Hawaii, but with an ancient Power than can enroll armies out of a population of 400,000,000, and whose very bandit gangs number 200,000. Surely a Power which has needed to escape League embarrassment in dealing with the weaker countries will understand Japan’s necessity for such freedom in dealing with far stronger ones.

The ingenious Mr. Kawakami could, no doubt, by ransacking the past of any great Power, discover pieces of sharp practice in its foreign policy which may be cited to make his own countrymen easier in their minds. But, to make his parallel with the United States complete, it would be necessary to show that the war with Spain, for example, was begun without any formal declaration, that Spanish ports and inland cities were bombarded without a word of warning, that unfortified areas were included, and that no discrimination was made between combatants and non-combatants. It would likewise be necessary to show that, before doing this, the United States and Spain had alike pledged themselves in the most solemn way, by a covenant registered at international headquarters, never to make war on each other without first submitting the cause to an international tribunal. The action would have to be exhibited as following hard upon definite “renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy”. And will the mordant critic of American procedure be good enough to show how the Japanese administration of conquered countries, such for example as Korea, will compare in humane and considerate management with American administration of the Philippines? Or that anything in Japanese history is remotely like to the United States decision, after victory, that Cuba should not be annexed?

The whole issue is one on which history can be invoked at Washington without serious dread—not that any American thinks his country faultless, but that by comparison with Japan her faults become hard to find.

PROFESSOR Lingelbach wrote some time ago in *Current History* about the decree of President Zamora dissolving the Jesuit Society and seizing its property in Spain. There is special interest in this occurrence because we are fairly near to the four hundredth anniversary of the founding of that great Order, and also because the idea of it first took shape in the mind of a Spaniard. Exactly four hundred years ago, in the little Spanish town of Manresa, Ignatius Loyola was writing his spiritual exercises, and of his five associates who helped him to draw up his plan for submission to Pope Paul III, three were of his own Iberian stock.

The decree of the Republic provides as follows: "The Company of Jesus is hereby dissolved throughout Spanish territory. The State henceforth does not recognize any religious or legal rights for it as an Order". Jesuits, moreover, are forbidden to form congregations, or "to live in brotherhoods, either in public or in private manner". The property seized is estimated to be of the value of \$30,000,000 and will be applied to educational or charitable purposes. Hundreds of Jesuits, says Professor Lingelbach, have left Spain for Belgium, Italy, South America, and the United States. It is the policy of the Church not to refuse recognition to the new authority, but to accept the Republic, and endeavour by quite constitutional means to organize public opinion in resistance to such of its measures as are unjust. Especially, systematic protest has been made against the new divorce laws, the establishment of lay education, and the treatment of the religious Orders.

Certain parallels come inevitably to one's mind. A little more than a quarter of a century ago, the Briand Law in France was fiercely resented by churchmen on like grounds, and the development in Soviet Russia is later still. The raid upon religion in Mexico, and the burlesque enactment that there may not be more than one priest to every 100,000 of the population, provided food for thought to social scientists in the last two years. It may well be doubted whether the Briand Law would ever have found its way to the statute-book if its promoters had not misread the psychology of their time, for the French Church was very conspicuously strengthened in influence by the measure designed to enfeeble it. There has been, of course, the usual torrent of historical or pseudo-historical reflection about the Jesuit Order, stirred by this latest decree. All organizations of men with a history of anything like four centuries have had their failures, their blemishes, their periods of corruption. But one's thought turns at this time more fitly to the noble work of the Jesuits in many lands for education and for philanthropy, most of all to the record of Spanish Jesuit priests in the dark days of

Spanish rule on this American continent. Their heroic resistance to tyranny, and their protest in the name of the Christian religion against the barbarity of Spanish conquerors towards the native peoples, should always be cherished as a bright chapter in the history of Christendom.

It is always a difficult question how far property and endowments descending from past generations and bequeathed by them to a religious use may fairly be diverted by the State when the circumstances of the bequest have changed. But it does not appear that the Spanish authorities have been troubled by many of the scruples which have made it hard for some other Governments to balance the pros and cons of such a problem. They have everywhere given the State the benefit of the doubt, and have thus added to the long tale of "the spoiling of goods". Charitable and educational institutions, we learn, are to be benefitted. One recalls a remark by John Stuart Mill: "It is not the part of an honest man to cast up the probable advantages of an act of plunder".

But, like those British Liberals of whom Lord Crewe has written, it seems that the Spanish republican Ministers have just now to wage a war on two fronts. In Russia the Government was Communist, and in the name of Communism went out to fight the Church. In Spain it is the same Government that has to fight Churchmen and Communists alike. A "united workers' front" was lately proclaimed, and a protest strike stopped all work in the third largest of Spanish cities. The Minister of the Interior announced to the Cortes that he had particulars of a nation-wide "Red" movement which had been planned for a certain date, and by swift action he was able to seize the ringleaders before they had time to deliver their blow. Over three hundred were arrested. It is not surprising that in this situation, verging always upon anarchy, a manifesto should have appeared in favour of a royalist restoration. The peseta dropped to "a new low"; and how far unemployment will be cured by the extraordinary new decree "compelling land-owners to hire more labourers on 'undermanned' properties, on pain of losing their land" is a nice problem for the social scientists to discuss. One thing it clearly shows—how difficult the Spanish labour situation has become, and how fertile must be the soil on which Barcelona agitators may sow seed. Syndicalists from elsewhere too, according to Professor Lingelbach, have been pouring into the country. So the case of the Jesuits may be far from the most difficult of the problems for the Republic.

The alleged manifesto from the king in exile has been disavowed. It appeared with Alfonso's signature, and accompanied

by a manifesto from his uncle, the head of his family, and latest of the "Carlist" aspirants by whom the orderly succession of Spanish monarchs has been for almost a hundred years intermittently challenged. Now, says the *Times*, the Carlist movement has been at length extinguished, for the two groups of monarchists have all they can tackle, even in combination, if head is to be made against the Republic. Political misfortune, like other sorts of misfortune, will make strange bedfellows. Genuine or forged, these two manifestos beyond doubt express the discontent of a great section of Spaniards with what has happened, and their readiness for a return to monarchy. But a great section may be a very long way from a majority. And it is hard for outsiders to judge, until the censorship is lifted, whether the republican government is good or bad. In these matters, said old Jeremy Bentham, we do well to distrust the declamations of chagrin and the exaggerations of complaint.

It is but fair to recognise, however, as Mr. de Asúa makes clear in his valuable outline of Spain's new Constitution, that the harsh measures towards the Church are combined with some admirable international purposes. Spain must be almost if not altogether alone in having pledged herself never to enter upon war except with the sanction of the League of Nations. Neither there nor in Russia is it reasonable to expect a very rapid passage from the old era to the new, and in both one can see the survival under new form of an ancient tyranny. But in Spain at least there is an unmistakable effort to set up a liberal régime. One can but hope that its guides will not be above learning from those older countries in which experience has shown—by slow degrees—how much a liberal régime implies. For the moment, it is apparently conceived at Madrid as, in the main, destructive. But what it enjoins is at least as important as what it forbids.

MR. Hugh Law has a special title to be heard on Anglo-Irish questions, not only because he has studied them long and earnestly, but also because he has had much experience of parliament as a member both at Westminster and in the Dail. Best of all, he has shown again and again the flexibility of mind and judgment which can adapt itself to new circumstances. And in the Anglo-Irish scene of late the circumstances have never remained long the same.

It is with a cheerfully optimistic note that Mr. Law's article opens. Looking back over thirty years, he sees to-day both in town and country conditions of comfort for the Irish people beyond

any he can remember—nay, beyond those “at any time of which we have knowledge”. This makes the renewal of discontent all the more regrettable, and it is indeed to be deplored that complaint of outraged Irish nationality should be heard again when, for the first time in the whole seven and a half centuries of Anglo-Irish relationship, the whole government of the island is in native hands. Mr. Law agrees with Mr. Bernard Shaw’s comment that in the Free State many people “do not yet know that Dublin Castle no longer exists”, and he conjectures that the root of the present trouble is not in animosity to England, but rather in the “domestic passions aroused during the debates on the Treaty and the subsequent Civil War”. It is so hard for the circle of Mr. de Valera to acknowledge a satisfactory state of things if the acknowledgment would imply that Griffith, Collins and Cosgrave had been right all through that troubled time. So deep is the human *amour propre*, especially in politicians.

Everyone knows that the outstanding matters of dispute just now are two, (i) the oath of allegiance, and (ii) the land annuities. Regarding the first, it is the contention of Mr. de Valera that so long as the compulsory oath remains, a part of the electorate is practically disfranchised, for republicans are precluded from sending representatives who will really represent them. Mr. Law quotes on this matter a strong statement issued from the Sinn Fein Headquarters, which the President will have difficulty in reconciling with what he has said. It denies absolutely that the group for which it speaks can be appeased in this simple fashion:

While awaiting a full and comprehensive statement by Dail Eireann on the national position, the Standing Committee of Sinn Fein desire to correct certain misleading statements. One is that the Oath of Allegiance in the “Irish Free State” is an obstacle the removal of which would ensure the entry of Republicans into the Bogus National Assembly. Mr. de Valera and the other prospective Ministers of H. M. King George V may remove as many oaths and tests as they wish; but they will never induce Republicans to accept the shameful position of surrender and subservience represented by membership of the “Free State Parliament” which is not Dail Eireann.

This seems clear enough, in all conscience. What party, then, will Mr. de Valera’s policy conciliate? Surely Mr. Lloyd George well said of him that in the interests of world peace he is, happily, almost unique.

Mr. Law has no difficulty in disposing of the wretched pretence that the oath is not “mandatory” in the Treaty, and he disputes very warmly the view that on the oath question, in the main, the

recent election was fought. The success of Mr. de Valera, he assures us, was due to quite other causes, especially to the promise of retaining the land annuities in Ireland, and the undertaking to end unemployment. In regard to the former, he suspects that it may be found difficult to collect the land annuities at all, and that the farmer will decide simply to keep the cash in his own pocket. In respect to the latter, what will happen for the good or ill of the Free State unemployed depends very largely on the Ottawa Conference, and there—one may add—Great Britain will hold a great allowance of trump cards. Many things have to be settled at Ottawa, this Irish business among them.

JUST one hundred years ago in England, the first parliamentary Reform Act was passed into law, and it is fitting that the great grandson of the premier who secured its passage should now write a reflective article on that event. Lord Ponsonby has indeed travelled far from the strict Whig principles of Earl Grey. One remembers the exclamation of Harold Transome in George Eliot's novel when his mother asked him in alarm whether it was possible that he had become a Whig. "God forbid", he exclaimed; "I am a Radical". The men who in 1832 enacted the first Reform Bill thought they were providing a guarantee against a more profound upheaval. They were "opening wide the gates to that force which else will enter through the breach". In this spirit they gave thanks, as one of their number expressed it, that what other nations had been forced to seek, and had too often sought in vain, by means of violent and bloody revolution, England had achieved by a peaceful and a lawful reform. But the timid Whig plea for extension of the franchise to "ten-pound householders" compares strangely with the programme of the party now calling itself Socialist, and it is an ironical comment on the Whig noble of 1832 that his great grandson should to-day be leader of the Labour Opposition in the House of Lords.

Of such ancient lineage, and beginning his own career as Page of Honour to Queen Victoria, he might have been expected to develop in almost any direction rather than in the one he actually took. But the high courage which nerved the ancestor has reappeared in his descendant. Such family phenomena have of late been by no means rare. Lady Cynthia Mosely is the uncontrollable daughter of Lord Curzon. Mr. Stanley Baldwin has an erring son, Oliver. And the present Socialistic Lord Russell (Mr. Bertrand Russell of a year ago) is grandson of the Whig "Lord John."

This article in *Current History* takes the Act of 1832 as a starting point of democratic development. After its passage the people were in a genuine sense masters of their own business. No longer could seats in the House of Commons be either purchased or inherited. No longer could it be said that over three hundred members of the House were returned by the influence of land-owners and borough-mongers. No longer were great cities left without a parliamentary spokesman, while "rotten boroughs"—with not more than twenty genuine electors—still counted in the national legislature. Lord Ponsonby feels, as Macaulay felt, that such a change, such an undoing of the historic feudal system as the Reform Act brought about, could have taken place in other countries only as the result of civil war. Very fitly, and with justifiable pride, he recalls his ancestor's first move in this high matter, when—as far back as 1792—Charles Grey gave notice of a Reform motion for parliament in the following year.

There have been numerous similar Acts since then. How far have they fulfilled their promise? The reader who compares the entries in Cobbett's *Rural Rides* with Lady Gwendolyn Cecil's reflections in the biography of her father may not feel quite so sure as the Reformers felt in 1832, or even as the Liberals felt a generation ago. Sombre misgivings about democracy have taken the place of glowing confidence. But perhaps this too is a result of the depression, and will pass as the depression passes. Meanwhile, Lord Ponsonby's provocative article is of the most timely interest.

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