HISTORY IN STONE AND BRONZE

D. C. HARVEY

I

THROUGHOUT the Dominion of Canada, the Historic Sites and Monuments Board have been freely erecting monuments, cairns and boulders, with bronze tablet attached, to mark the sites of historic incidents and achievements, in order that Canadians may not be unmindful of their past or unable to localize the deeds of their ancestors. In this work, Nova Scotia has not been overlooked; (for this province has been the stage of much drama, both tragic and romantic), and one of the more recent proposals of the Board is to commemorate two dramatic incidents that occurred at or near Bloody Creek.

The history of Annapolis Royal is known to all students of Canadian history; and Fort Anne Park, with its museum, has made its romantic story more or less familiar to even the casual tourist; but few people, whether student or tourist, are aware that two of the most costly encounters in which the garrison of Annapolis was ever engaged took place about thirteen and fourteen miles from the Fort, in the immediate vicinity of what is now Bridgetown, which has thus acquired a vicarious history. The first of these took place on June 10, 1711, old style; the second on December 8, 1757.

II

To get the background for forming an opinion on the ambuscade of 1711, it is necessary to recall the date of the final capture of Port Royal by the British forces, the circumstances under which the French capitulated, the condition of the Fort when it changed hands, and the actual status of the Acadians, outside the Fort, between the capitulation of 1710 and the definitive Treaty of Utrecht in 1713.1

After many vicissitudes of fortune, the little French colony of Port Royal was finally captured by the British in 1710. On

1. The source materials for this discussion are in the Public Archives of Nova Scotia, volumes 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 7a, 8 and 9. Some of these, but not all, have been published in Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, volumes 1 and 4.
September 24th, old style,² British and Colonial forces, in overwhelming numbers, had appeared before the Fort; and, within eight days, by a brave display of superior force, had induced Governor Subercase to capitulate,—but on terms extremely favourable to the French, considering the disparity of the numbers opposed. On October 5th, Subercase marched out of the Fort with the honours of war; and, a few days later, he set out for France, with his officers, civil and military, their wives and families, and the remainder of his garrison, 258 in all, on three transports, which had been provided and provisioned with profuse compliments by the extremely self-satisfied General Nicholson, Commander-in-Chief of the British and Colonial forces.

When he had arranged with Subercase for the despatch of Sieur de St. Castin to Quebec along with Major John Livingston, who had commanded a party of Indians at the siege, to inform the Governor of Canada of the fall of Port Royal; had issued a proclamation to the Acadians forbidding trade at any other place than Annapolis and had decided upon the size and composition of the garrison that was to be left behind, Nicholson himself sailed for Boston with his victorious armada, and there took part in a day of public thanksgiving, that had been proclaimed throughout Massachusetts and New Hampshire, for “delivering up the Enemy and their stronghold into the hands of Her Majesty’s Forces, with so little effusion of blood.”

To defend Port Royal, now re-named Annapolis Royal, a composite force of over 500 men was left under command of various officers and Col. Samuel Vetch, Governor and Commander-in-Chief. Though more than twice the number that Subercase had been able to muster, Colonel Vetch’s forces were all too few, considering the state of the fortifications and the fact that the “stronghold,” which they had taken so easily from the enemy, was sadly in need of repair, and that the materials needed for such repairs were to be the occasion of greater “effusion of blood” than the actual conquest had been.³

In the articles of capitulation it had been agreed that the inhabitants within cannon shot or three miles of the Fort should remain on their estates, with their corn, cattle, and furniture, during two years, duly taking the oath of allegiance and fidelity to the Queen of Great Britain. According to a list delivered by

². All references in this article are to the old style of calendar, unless otherwise intimated. The British did not adopt the new style until 1752, when dates were advanced eleven days and the legal year was made to commence on January first instead of March twenty-fifth.

³. P. A. N. S. vols. 6 and 7; N. S. H. S. vol. 1, 86. Nicholson states in his Journal that 200 marines and 250 New Englanders were left in garrison; but Vetch listed a total of 564 and mentioned other branches of the service.
Mr. Allyn of Annapolis on October 20, 1710, there were 481 persons within this three mile circuit or banlieu; but though there were 84 heads of families on this list, Vetch could get only 56 to take the oath of allegiance.

It will be noticed that no mention whatever was made of the inhabitants outside the banlieu. This vagueness of the capitulations may have been agreeable to both Nicholson and Subercase. To Nicholson it meant that these inhabitants were prisoners at discretion, and to Subercase it left a nucleus of French subjects, unhampered by an oath of allegiance, with whom he could co-operate when he returned, as he hoped to do in the following spring, to re-capture Port Royal. But, to Governor Vetch, these inhabitants were a problem to be dealt with immediately; and, while recommending that ultimately all those who would not become protestant should be transported to Martinico and Placentia, he tried to exact tribute from them in return for an assurance of freedom from molestation by the British.4

From the inhabitants of Cobequid and Chignecto he demanded a present of 6000 livres and 20 pistoles a month for his table; and the same tribute from the people of Annapolis River. Though this tribute was not generally granted nor enforced, the mere suggestion of it was to the Acadians an act of oppression by no means calculated to conciliate their affections or to make them eager to become British subjects. In fact, at the very moment when Mas­carene was trying to secure Vetch's tribute from the people at Minas and Beaubassin, the inhabitants of Annapolis were asking Governor Vaudreuil to help them to leave a country where they were treated "like negroes" by the British Governor. It is not unnatural, therefore, that the Acadians outside the banlieu, who were told that they were prisoners at discretion, should regard themselves as still in a state of war, or at least in a state of suspended hostility, on terms imposed by the conquerors. Nor were they left without incitement to that end. Agents of Vaudreuil were sent to Acadia to confirm them in their allegiance to France, Sieur de St. Castin was sent to Penobscot to organize the Indians there, and the Abbé Gaulin exerted himself strenuously to stir up his Indians against the British and to use them as a threat against Acadians who should show too great acquiescence in British rule. At the same time, rumors of an expedition being organized in France to retake Port Royal were rife in Acadia.

Under these conditions the British officials spent an anxious winter at Annapolis Royal. Provisions were scarce, and such as came down from Minas or Beaubassin were preempted by the

Acadians in the *banlieu* and could not be diverted to the garrison without ill feeling. When the commissary of the Fort went up the Annapolis River to seek supplies, he was set upon by a party of four, who started to carry him to Canada, but finally consented to accept a ransom, which was temporarily paid by an Acadian from whose house he had been abducted. This led to an act of reprisal, in which a priest and four of the principal inhabitants were brought as hostages to the Fort, until the persons who had waylaid the commissary should have been surrendered. The priest was later taken by Vetch to Boston.

At the same time, the overcrowding of the Fort, coupled with scant provisions and lack of adequate heating facilities, led to a heavy mortality amongst the troops. During the winter 116 were "lost by death mostly and desertion". All these facts were known to the French leaders, and exaggerated for circulation among the wavering Acadians. Abbé Gaulin reported to the French minister that more than 300 of the garrison had died of an epidemic, and Christophe Cahouet reported that he was sure that not more than 120 officers and men of the entire garrison had survived.

It was under these conditions also that the officers tried to procure timber from the Acadians for repairing the fortifications. The ramparts were of sandy earth, and full of breaches that were constantly being widened by frost and wet. The engineer found it impossible to repair these breaches without large trees to support the walls. First, a French carpenter was persuaded to go up both sides of the river, and at some personal risk to find a number of suitable trees. Steps were then taken to get the inhabitants to raft these down. At first they did not refuse, but pleaded for time, alleging that their cattle were weak from lack of fodder and that the creeks were full of ice.

In the meantime, Madame Freneuse arrived with her son and an Indian guide, secured food and shelter in the *banlieu*, and became a centre of intrigue,—a sort of liaison officer between the Acadians, de St. Castin, and Canada. From the date of her arrival, the Acadians along the Annapolis River found new excuses for delay, in fear of the Indians who threatened to destroy them if they supplied the British with trees.

Consequently Sir Charles Hobby, who commanded during the absence of Governor Vetch in Boston, decided to send a party of 50 men up the river to warn the Acadians that, if they did not bring down a quantity of wood within four days, he would "lay them under military execution".

This threat had the desired effect for a time, the Acadians began to bring down their trees, and considerable progress was
made with the repairs. When Governor Vetch returned, he brought provisions with him for the garrison; and, in a more amiable mood, he released the hostages who had been taken just before his departure for Boston; but this harmony was too good to last; and, fearing an accommodation, Gaulin and others incited the Acadians to desist once more, while at the same time he organized his Indians to intimidate them and to prepare for an attack on the garrison.

Finding that some of the inhabitants were bringing no trees, and that others were reluctantly supplying barely half their quota, Governor Vetch decided to imitate Sir Charles Hobby and send another armed party up the river to intimidate where he had failed to conciliate. It was this expedition that met with disaster on June 10, 1711; and it is not for lack of material, but because of conflicting statements in the various accounts, that it is difficult to be absolutely sure of the details of this ambuscade. But the main facts are these.

On June 9th, Capt. David Pidgeon was ordered to take 60 good men from the marines and New England troops, Lt. Fox, Ensign Grissmond, 3 sergeants, 3 corporals, and two drums, and under the direction of Major Alexander Forbes to go up the river, where the timber was being cut. There he and Major Forbes were to consult as to the best method of getting it down. The Acadians were to be offered protection and prompt payment, if they agreed to work; and to be threatened with severity, if they did not. In order to make those threats real, he was to "let the soldiers make a show of killing their Hoggs." "But do not kill any", the order continued, "but you may let them kill some fowls— but pay for them before you come away."

So far all is clear; but it is not so clear as to how many actually went on the expedition, because a number joined as volunteers. The total number mentioned in orders was 73, including Captain John Bartlett, who went as a volunteer. Governor Vetch, reporting the incident to the Governor of Massachusetts, says;

Some days ago Major Forbes with a party of seventy men Commanded by Capt. Pidgeon was sent up as well to order down the ffolots of timber as to View the River and Mills for Sawing of timber and Planks of which we wanted a great Quantity for the fort besides Major Forbes, Capt. Pidgeon, Lieutenant fox, Ensign Coxedge and Grissmond who were upon command Capt. Bartlet, the fort Major and several other Gentlemen asked me Leave to go as Volunteers which I accordingly granted they Were a Very Compleat party.

In another report, which he made apparently to the Board of Ordnance, he says: "Accordingly upon the tenth of this instant
a very good party of near seventy men under the command of a Capt. and two subalterns with some more officers who went as volunteers went along with Major Forbes." But in another letter to Lord Dartmouth he says: "I sent along with Major Forbes a party consisting of a Captain three subalterns and sixty good men."

These three statements from the one pen permit us to put the number somewhere between 65 and 80; and 80 (eighty) is the estimate of Abbé Gaulin, who was in a position to count the killed, wounded, and prisoners, as he acted as intermediary in arranging later for the ransom of the wounded. But, when Governor Vetch is reporting the ambush from the same standpoint as Abbé Gaulin, that is, from the point of view of ransom, he says:

In this Action Major Forbes William Elliott fort Major were killed and Sixteen more Captain Bartlett Ensign Coxedge and about Nine more Wounded. I must own that the Indians have treated them better than ordinary and offer to Sell (as their manner is) all the Wounded for about one hundred fifty pounds Who are tenn in all 1 Captain one Ensign two Sergeants and Six men the others they refuse to ransom proposing to carry them to Canada. I would willingly give them five pounds per man for the private men tenn for a Sergeant twenty for one Ensigne and fifty pounds for the Captain both because wee Extreamly want them and because they press so hard for itt being to March five hundred miles by land in which journey most of them must dy for want of provisions there being not one house by the way and all they have to depend upon is the produce of their hunting by the way.

In a postscript to the letter he adds, "I have ransomed eleven of our wounded men one Ensign and a Sergeant for about 70 lb. value in strouds shirts and blankets. All the well prisoners save two officers they have sent to Canada being about 40 in number."

Now if we add together the 18 killed, the 13 mentioned above as ransomed, the two officers not yet ransomed, and the 40 sent to Canada, we have a total of 73. But as "about 40" is not a definite number, we still cannot be sure. Yet I am inclined to be satisfied with this number, as we know definitely of only two volunteers, Captain Bartlett and the Fort Major William Elliot; and may assume that any additional volunteers who went were necessary to make up the total suggested in Capt. Pidgeon's orders.

All the officers can be accounted for, except that Abbé Gaulin gives a different rank to one of the subalterns. He says: "Among the dead were an engineer and a major; the latter having refused to give himself up was killed by an Indian who swam across the river with an axe at his side and a pistol between his teeth. Two captains, two lieutenants and the ensign were made prisoners".
Apparently he ranks one of the ensigns as a lieutenant. If not, some lieutenant of the garrison must have gone as a volunteer.

The story of the disaster itself can easily be told. The party set out happily on the morning of the tenth of June in two flat-boats and a whaleboat. About halfway to their destination they landed to wait for the tide; and as they rested, the news of their expedition travelled ahead of them. When they resumed their journey, the whaleboat travelled faster and was about a mile ahead when it ran into an ambush, in a narrow part of the river, just after its final bend, east of the mouth of Renne Forest brook and near Bridgetown of to-day.5

All in the whaleboat were killed, except Ensign Coxedge, who was seven times wounded before the others came up. When the others did arrive, they rowed straight into the line of fire; and, being crowded in the boats while the enemy were behind trees, they were soon overcome and made prisoners.

Most of the ambushing party were Indians newly come from Penobscot, with reinforcements from Canada and Minas, and were said to be 150 in number. They were sent by the Governor of Canada and mobilized by St Castin and Gaulin. It is asserted that among them were some Frenchmen disguised as Indians, including two sons of the notorious Madame Freneuse. Certainly these two came to Annapolis the same evening and took their mother to a place of safety up the river.

How far the Acadians themselves were involved, it is difficult to say. At any rate the disaster to the British troops changed their attitude from furtive evasion into defiance. Almost all the inhabitants of the banlieu withdrew, asserting that Vetch had violated the capitulations, and threatened to cut the English throats. Gaulin was delighted and immediately began to organize a combined attack on the garrison, in which St Castin should be the leader, Placentia should aid with supplies and ammunition, Canada should contribute men and money, and the Indians should strike terror into all concerned. He himself went to Placentia and arranged for supplies, but the vessel that bore them was captured by the English. St. Castin was kept busy on the New England frontier; and Canada, threatened by invasion, decided to keep its men at home. Thus Gaulin had to be content with organizing sniping parties, who molested small detachments of the garrison until finally Sir Charles Hobby, in the absence of Governor Vetch, had to send out a force of 200 men to reduce the banlieu to order.

5. All the earlier historians including Haliburton, Murdoch, Calnek and others less known confuse this incident, which took place on the north side of the Annapolis River, with a later one which took place on Renne Forest brook more than a mile from its mouth and changed its name to Bloody Creek. The late Dr. M. E. Armstrong of Bridgetown took great interest in this distinction, which was made by the editors of Knox's Journal, later referred to in this article.
With the arrival of reinforcements from New England, brought by Governor Vetch now on his way to the invasion of Canada, the garrison was able to breathe more freely; and in the following winter, when Major Livingston led his company of Mokawks into Annapolis and built a new fort near Hogg Island, Gaulin’s Indians gave no further trouble, except on one occasion when Livingston was absent in Cape Breton. As for the Acadians, they now settled down to await the outcome of the larger struggle that was going on in Europe; and later, under the Treaty of Utrecht, they put into practice the lessons of skillful evasion learned from this their first intimate contact with the British.

III

In order to understand the second disaster that befell the garrison of Annapolis, it is necessary to recall the racial bitterness that accompanied the expulsion of the Acadians in 1755 and the Seven Years’ War that followed it. Though the intention of Lawrence had been that the expulsion should be as thorough as it was ruthless, many Acadians escaped from all the chief centres of activity, and these fugitives, with a great bitterness upon them, still hoping against hope that, by the aid of the Indians, the Canadians and the French, their wrongs would ultimately be righted, remained in hiding, eking out a miserable existence by the fruit, roots, grain and livestock that had not been destroyed by the British. Consequently, during these years, from Annapolis Royal to Miramichi, roving bands of these dispossessed Acadians, under partisan leaders, scoured the country; appeared at intervals in the vicinity of the British garrison posts; picked off stragglers from these posts; and whenever occasion offered, sought what often proved costly revenge.

In this guerilla warfare every advantage lay with them. They were desperate men who felt that they had nothing more to lose; and, as such, they performed many acts of daring, covering long distances with remarkable speed. While they had no fixed abode and knew every inch of the countryside, the garrisons, which changed frequently, were conspicuous for situation and for ignorance of their respective localities. 6

It was precisely under such conditions as those described above that a detachment from the garrison of Annapolis Royal encountered a band of Acadians, at Bloody Creek, December 8, 1757. The garrison, which consisted of six companies of the 43rd Regiment, 450 men in all, had but newly arrived, on October 18th. The

6. For an excellent if unconscious revelation of this type of warfare, see: Diary of John Thomas, N. S. H. S., Vol. 1, pp. 131-140.
nucleus of its enemy was some 48 families from Annapolis River, who had escaped expulsion, refused all subsequent attempts at conciliation, accepted arms, ammunition and leadership from Canada, and seized every opportunity to annoy the garrison.  

To get acquainted with the country and to cut firewood for the garrison, "a detachment of one Captain, two subalterns, and 126 rank and file, with Sergeants and Drummers in proportion", had been sent down the river on October 19th; and they were allowed to carry on without interruption, as they were too strong for any skulking party to attack; but, on October 25th, a big fire was kindled in the woods on the north side of the river in a vain effort to decoy a party from the Fort. On November 3rd, all the soldiers who were off duty were sent to the orchards about three miles east of the Fort to gather apples for the garrison. Including townspeople, artificers and the covering party, they amounted to 50 armed men. After the unarmed members of the party had filled their bags and returned safely to the Fort, the armed men went on a tour of inspection in two groups; but one of them got lost; and it was only after several hours of anxious marching that they were able to meet again and return disgruntled to the Fort.

As November went by and the night fires continued, it was decided to send out another detachment to discover, if possible, some trace of the enemy. On December 1st, 30 armed men covered another apple-picking excursion and then marched up the south side of the river. After an hour’s march, they came upon a number of tracks; and, recognizing the imprint of both moccasins and Canadian shoes, they prepared for action, followed the trail, until they reached the cleared lands of Round Hill, and in the centre of the clearing they saw a building, which proved to be a storehouse, partly underground, lined with three tiers of shelves. On the shelves and on the floor, which were covered with straw, they found the choicest collection of apples that they had yet seen. Apart from the apples, there was nothing in the building except some wooden shoes and a half peck measure.

The soldiers filled their pockets and haversacks with fruit and then set fire to the building, an act of wanton destruction, observed at a safe distance by a wandering band, who had used it, and remembered by them as an additional act of cruelty to be avenged. While the soldiers watched the blaze, their guides followed the tracks of the retreating Acadians and concluded that they were trying to decoy them to Barnaby’s Mills (Round Hill Brook),

and ambush them there in “as wicked a pass as any in the country”. They thereupon advised to return to the Fort. This they did, exploring as they went. They saw many tracks, discovered an abandoned camp, waited there for a time in hope of an attack, but finally returned to receive the welcome of those who are thought to have been lost.

On December 6th, whether from over-confidence due to almost two months’ freedom from annoyance, or from a belief that the guns of the Fort were sufficient protection, an unarmed party of soldiers and artificers was sent across the river to cut wood on the north shore. But at noon while at dinner, they were surprised by a band of 15 irregulars and utterly demoralized. Grenadier Miller was killed on the spot and stripped of everything but his breeches; and six men, one of whom was wounded, were made prisoners, including John Easton, the master carpenter of the garrison. Though the Acadians fled with their prisoners, when they saw a rescue party leave the Fort, they returned in the evening to fire a feu de joie “and set up a shout”.

This was too much for the garrison; and they decided that, whether they knew the country or not, these marauders must be rooted out and destroyed. Accordingly, a formidable detachment of 130 armed men was organized and marched out the same evening, under command of Captain Peter Pigou. That evening they marched up the river seven miles and they lay on their arms all night. It had been raining, but a sharp frost had set in. They were wet and cold; but dare not light a fire, lest they reveal themselves to a lurking enemy. In the cold sleet of the morning they resumed their march, crossed Round Hill Brook, then known as Barnaby River, and for the first time saw Barnaby’s Mills, a dangerous pass, flanked on the left by the sawmill and offices and on the right by an orchard enclosed by a high board fence. Here they were on the lookout for an attack, but were unmolested. Shortly after noon, they crossed Renne Forêt bridge in safety, but immediately came upon the tracks of horses and of moccasined feet. They pushed on to the head of navigation, at what is now Bridgetown; and, when opposite Ruffee’s Hill, they tried in vain to ford the Annapolis River. They saw horses on the opposite side and concluded that the enemy had got over by swimming these horses. Hungry and discouraged they encamped for the night. This time they made beds of spruce tops, built fires and cooked thirteen sheep, which a scouting party had caught, for supper.

The next morning they went farther up the river and attempted to ford it near Paradise, but again failed. With no prospect of better success, with no food save some joints of mutton left over
from the previous meal, and with guides who had got beyond their knowledge of the country, they decided to return as rapidly as possible over the route by which they had come. In this project they were undisturbed until they came to Renne Forêt bridge.

In the meantime, their expedition had been closely observed by the Acadian irregulars. The 15, who had attacked the wood-chopping party, had gone up the north side of the river about nine miles before they encamped for the first night. From a sentinel posted in a tree they had learned of the detachment sent out from the garrison. They thereupon hastened with their prisoners to a hut, on the north side of the Annapolis, almost opposite where the Renne Forêt River debouches into the Annapolis. These they left under guard, and spent the night signalling for reinforcements. In this way they had got together 56 men and, before daylight on the morning of December 8, they crossed the Annapolis and lay in ambush on the west side of Renne Forêt bridge, which by noon was to be baptised as Bloody Creek.

The traveller en route to Annapolis to-day, soon after leaving Bridgetown, descends by an easy grade to a modern bridge over Bloody Creek. Not far from this bridge traces of an older highway may be seen to the left, which crossed the stream at an acute angle to the present highway, directly in the face of a steep hill. In 1757 this path or highway serpentined up the hill, apparently avoiding the level land to the right, which no doubt at times was wet and impassable. On both sides of the stream are hills; but that to the westward rises abruptly, while the eastern hill is lower, slopes more gently, and grades off into a level space of some twenty yards wide. This little apex of a triangular valley broadens out at the base into a diminutive plain extending to the Annapolis River. Both hill sides, at that time, were covered with trees. The British detachment was marching down the eastern hill under cover of these trees; and, on the western hill, the Acadian irregulars lay in ambush. Over the stream itself, at the crossing place, which was 40 or 50 feet wide, two planks were laid to form a bridge, not more than 18 or 20 inches wide, without a handrail, so that only one man at a time "could go over abreast."

As soon as the British advance guard had reached the planks and attempted to cross, the Acadians opened fire. Captain Pigou fell dead; and all his men, except three or four, were killed or wounded. This threw the main body into confusion; and there was a cry, "Retreat to the Plains". They fell back a hundred yards, until Captain David Maitland, the second in command, could take charge and rally his men; but they all agreed that the only thing to do was to force the bridge. This was bravely done, not without...
further loss, and the Acadians, outnumbered two to one, stealthily withdrew to the left of the path, having themselves suffered severely from the British fire. The British detachment, taking six of their wounded, now made a forced march to Barnaby River, where they feared another ambush. To avoid the dangerous pass, they made a detour; and, successful in this, they did not halt till they reached L’Esturgeon, where they rested for half an hour, at the request of their wounded. There they were joined by an officer, two guides, and 18 men of their detachment, who had first tried to ford the creek farther south to get behind the enemy, but had been unable to do so, and, therefore, were compelled to cross the bridge alone. In doing so they exchanged shots with the Acadians, who had returned to carry off their wounded; but suffered no loss.

As soon as this party had joined the detachment, they all resumed their march; and they reached the Fort in time for supper, which they needed badly, having had nothing to eat since the preceding night.

In this encounter, one captain, a serjeant, and 16 men were killed or left to die of their wounds beside the creek. Six others, who were less seriously wounded, were brought back to the garrison. Of the Acadians, seven men were killed, four were slightly, and five desperately wounded.⁸

IV

Such, then, are the facts, as I gather them from the records that have been preserved and from my own examination of the sites. In both encounters, the losses were disproportionate to the ends achieved; and neither can be regarded as a decisive engagement; but both incidents were cumulative in their effects. On the British side, the first confirmed New England fear and hatred of Indian warfare and priestly influence; the second contributed towards delay in New England occupation of the Acadian lands. As for the Indians and Acadians, ambushes seemed to be justifiable acts of war, in which their peculiar methods of warfare and their intimate knowledge of their own country could be utilized to the best advantage, against a more powerful enemy.

It is fitting, therefore, that, in marking the sites of these desperate encounters, the old bitterness should be forgotten and only this remembered: that, in the long struggle for control of Acadia, a number of men, fortuitously chosen by the malice of destiny, from both races who now occupy and improve it, met death bravely, fighting on opposite sides and by different methods for the same ultimate cause.