DOES U. S. A. WANT A "U. S. OF EUROPE"?

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A

n editorial in The Saturday Evening Post, "Americans hope for United States of Europe," is a most positive and enlightening contribution to the question it raised. But, unfortunately, it tells only part of the story.

Not many people among Europe's 350 million inhabitants—without England and Russia—will now question that the best thing that could happen to Europe would be "to become as much like the United States as possible"—as the editorial puts it. And all Europeans will be delighted to hear this American voice, "We can't see why Europe should be satisfied with anything less than making a United States of itself. A Europe engaged in trade within its own borders and with other parts of the world, prosperous, but not above sending America enough immigrants to keep us supplied with quaint restaurants and lecturers, and loosely federated in some sort of political union, would suit Americans down to the ground."

How much more would it suit us Europeans! But, the editorial continues, "What we can never understand is why Europe hasn't wanted this as much as we do." The peoples of Europe wanted it ever since they lost this unity, but they were driven apart by forces from within and without.

Many people have now forgotten that Europe once was a political, spiritual and economic unit. That is why we are able to talk of Europe at all. For Europe never was geographically a clearly separated unity, like the continents of Australia, Africa or America. It is, geographically, only a small peninsula of Western Asia. What did make Europe a separate unity and still makes it one is its history, its culture, its racial composition and, above all, its spiritual unity. Before talking about European unity, past or future, we have to make it very clear what Europe means and who belongs to Europe. Because, I repeat, Europe is not a geographical entity, but a spiritual and cultural one.

In exact terms this means: No country belongs to Europe which was not part of the old Roman Empire, or the people of which were not for at least a thousand years under the spiritual leadership of the Church of Rome or its later branches.
During the centuries of the old Roman Empire, this part of the world became an entity. Some parts of it broke later away, especially in the Near East and in North Africa, but even they kept some of the traditions which we call European. On the other hand there were some acquisitions, especially in the North and the North-East, which through more than a thousand years of adherence to the Church of Rome became essential parts of Europe.

These two basic elements of the entity called Europe—membership of the Roman Empire and adherence to the Church of Rome—make it clear once and for all that Russia did not belong and does not belong to Europe. The eastern border of Europe, therefore, followed more or less accurately the western border of Russia, till September 1, 1939.

The two basic elements were re-enforced by such profound common events as the Crusades, the Renaissance and the Reformation, events which shocked and formed spirit and soul, the political and the economic life of the European peoples. Peoples who have not taken part in these character-moulding spiritual and economic revolutions do not belong to Europe.

A similar conformity interweaves the cultural life of the European peoples, their poetry, their dramas, their painting, their music, etc. The Sagas of King Arthur or Roland or Parcifal are not English, French or German, but European. Don Quixote and Don Juan are not Spanish characters but European characters. Dante and Michelangelo do not belong to Italy but to Europe; Molière, Shakespeare, Goethe are citizens of Europe, as are Raffael and Rembrandt, Beethoven and Mozart. Again we note that Russia does not belong to Europe, whereas England did belong to Europe—until she turned her face westward, founding an Empire which embraces one fifth of the earth.

Having thus stated what Europe is—and is not—and who belongs to Europe—and who does not—we may now go down to the practical political question: if and how Europe could be united economically and federated politically.

It is obvious that the foreign policy of England and Russia could not favour and did not favour the political unification of Europe. A unified Europe would have upset Britain’s "balance-of-power-policy", which seemed to her a prerequisite of her undisturbed world policy. And a unified Europe certainly would not have tolerated Russia’s grasping for Polish land, which
diminished the territory of Poland during the 17th century to one third and exterminated Poland completely in the 18th century. (We need only to open a good American history book, like that of Ferguson and Bruun, and look at the map of Europe in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, to note of what important parts Eastern Europe was stripped by the Czars of Moscow.)

True enough, the malevolent policy of these two antagonistic Powers did find at any time centrifugal forces inside Europe—as is always the case in every community, big or small. Let us imagine that the territory of what is now the United States had been sandwiched between a powerful and imperialistic Russia in the north and an even more powerful and imperialistic England in the south. We may easily come to the conclusion that in all probability the formation of the United States would have become impossible, or certainly would not have survived the Civil War. The conclusion which we have to draw from this historical observation is very simple; so long as England and Russia think it to be their interest that Europe shall not become a political unity—so long this goal cannot be reached.

This was always true—but never so much as now. The most impartial observer—and being a Spanish citizen, I have the advantage of being one—is forced to recognize that Europe now is clearly divided into a Russian zone of influence and an Anglo-Saxon one. The line between these two zones goes straight through the heart of Europe, roughly following the line from Luebeck to Trieste.

That means that of Europe's 5 million square-kilometer territory and its 350 millions inhabitants (both figures exclude any part of Russia and England) 42% of the territory and 40% of the population belong now not only to the Russian zone of influence, but are actually occupied by the Red Army! With 25% of Europe's territory and 15% of its population belonging to neutral countries, the Anglo-Saxon zone of influence covers about 33% of Europe's territory and 45% of its population. (The smaller part of this is called "liberated Europe", the greater part "occupied Europe".

It is both realistic and fair to recognize that under these circumstances the unification of Europe—urgent and necessary as it is—cannot be the work of the European peoples themselves. They are now more or less objects of the world-policy, as was best demonstrated by the absence of three fourths of Europe from San Francisco.

On the other hand, there can be no doubt that there never
was a more pressing need for a unified Europe than at present. It is therefore heartening for Europeans to know that—as the editorial puts it—"Americans hope for United States of Europe", and to hear equally friendly voices from England like that in the London Times, stating some time ago: "Security is the goal. But it is obtainable only through policies that are constructive and European, not through policies that are destructive and purely national."

I have not the slightest doubt that Europe with its 350 million highly cultured and educated people has the spiritual and material forces for recovering and for essential contributions to the new and peaceful world we are aiming at. Even now, with all the hardship of their daily life, we hear of new ideas and parties called Christian Democrats, Christian Socialists, Christian Solidarists, showing a very definite and common trend among so different peoples as the French, the Italians, the Germans—a trend which lies, as Europe itself, between the Anglo-Saxon world of capitalism and the Russian world of communism.

The American people and the American policy would earn the undying gratitude of the European peoples and of American future generations, if they would use all their influence in helping to build a federated Europe which, by the way, would also be the best and surest way—perhaps the only one—for a just and durable solution of the problem of Germany.

Last but not least, it would also pay for the United States. For the fact remains that even in the war-pregnant year of 1937 the export-trade between the United States and Europe (without England or Russia) amounted to 1 billion 365 million dollars—whereas during the same year the export-trade between the United States and Russia amounted only to 735 million dollars—only one half the amount of the export-trade with Germany alone.

The 350 million Europeans will still be the biggest consumer-entity on earth, not only because of their number—twice that of the Soviet Union—but even more because of their standard of living and their need of raw material of every kind. The best policy still is to keep your customer going, and a united Europe which has not to pour 30 or 40 or 50% of its national income into the security-taxes of military preparations, will therefore be the most important pillar for a prosperous economy—for the United States and for the world.

It is most fortunate that the egoistic interests of both the United States of America and the United States of Europe coincide with the general welfare and the peace of mankind.