

Lewis MacKenzie

Peacekeeping in the New World Disorder

I'm going to talk to you a little bit tonight about peacekeeping. It's an interesting subject in part because, egotistically, Canadians have taken it upon themselves to portray ourselves to the world as though we invented it,—and we didn't. Peacekeeping started in 1947 with the supervision of an election in Korea, and in 1948 a group of unarmed officer observers went into what used to be Palestine. It wasn't until 1956 and the Suez crisis that Mr. Pearson made the suggestion that perhaps lightly armed troops should interpose themselves between belligerents when the belligerents got tired and decided to stop fighting.

Have you ever noticed how hockey players normally get into a fight somewhere around the linesman? They don't want to fight, particularly on national television, but they have to, I mean, it may look macho at the start, but, "God, please send someone to break us up as quickly as possible." Peacekeeping is the same way. Nations attack nations, get tired, call for help, separate, and the UN on white vehicles with blue berets goes into the middle and gives them the macho excuse not to start fighting again. We did that. It was our idea in '56 at the time of the Suez crisis, for overwhelming reasons of national self-interest. We were paranoid about the idea of America and Russia squaring off in a nuclear confrontation because that would happen over Halifax, Winnipeg, Toronto, and Vancouver. We would be the battleground. And therefore, it's not because of our overwhelming humanitarian instincts, that we want to go around the world and keep everybody nice and quiet. It was born of national self-interest. And that is nothing to be ashamed of, because,

quite frankly, national self-interest drives most of the foreign policy of the 184 nations of the world, or at least the 184 nations of the United Nations.

That was the way it was from 1947 to 1992. Peaceful. It's a bizarre idea today but peacekeeping was just that; it was grammatically correct, there was a peace to keep. Except for a few rare exceptions, '56 in the Congo being one where the contingent, of which the Canadians were a large part, had to fight their way out. Another occurred in '74 in Cyprus when the Turks intervened and occupied the northern part of the island. And there were a few nasty occasions in Beirut. But, the rest of the time, the other 32 or 33 missions were pretty tranquil. The media would come to the airport and take our picture as we were leaving and, when we came back six months later, they would take our picture again, and that was it. Now they come to the airport, they take our picture, they get on the plane or the ship with us, they go over there with us, they go on patrol, they pass judgment, they create a perception within the population at home and internationally, the sides in the conflict use them to create a perception, then they fly home with us,—and then they cover the court martials.

It's a different world. And it all changed in Sarajevo. It changed big time, and it will never be the same. And it wasn't the UN's fault; it was not premeditated; it was not intended to defy the charter of the United Nations, which, to paraphrase, says, "Don't get involved in civil war, restrict yourself to wars of aggression but don't get involved in civil conflict."

When Yugoslavia started to implode in 1991, contrary to the constitution of the country, Slovenia declared its independence and Croatia declared its independence, and the international community recognized that independence, Serbia rushed in and attacked Croatia, in their words, to protect the Serbian minorities in Southern Croatia. You'll have to pass judgment how legitimate that was. All I'm saying is that there was a major confrontation. Much like the Civil War of the United States, the officer corps which, having been born of the same academic institutions, had served together for decades, now found themselves on opposite sides dictated by where they were born. And they went to war and it was nasty because a whole bunch of old wounds that really hadn't healed over from World War II were opened again.

Cyrus Vance was appointed the Secretary General's representative for former Yugoslavia. Mr. Vance went to Croatia in November of 1991 and worked out a peace plan whereby 14,000 United Nations soldiers, of which Canada would send over 2,000, would come to southern Croatia, occupy three United Nations protected (key word—protected) areas and, thereby having protected the Serbian minorities, primarily in Southern Croatia, would permit the Yugoslavian National Army to leave Croatia and go home to Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia, which was what was left of Yugoslavia at the time.

That was November '91 and the UN does not move at the speed of light. In March of '92, yours truly and 22 other officers were called to New York to put the plan together to move the 14,000 UN troops into southern Croatia. That would probably take a headquarters of a couple hundred officers about four or five months, we were given three days. Half of the group spoke English or French. I was the only General that had been on UN duty before, so my Danish colleague and I put the plan together in about eight hours. That's how the UN prepares for these missions. I'd only been in the army for 32 years at that stage, but when somebody tells me to put the headquarters of my organization 350 kilometres forward of my front line, I get a little uneasy. And that's what the UN wanted us to do. The troops would go into Croatia, 14,000 of them, but put your headquarters in Sarajevo.

"Yes but," I argued, "if we put our headquarters in Sarajevo when we put our flag up, it will become a lightning rod for every problem in Bosnia. And from what I read in the open media things are a little unstable in Bosnia. How will we look after our 14,000 troops in Croatia?" "No, for political reasons thou shalt go to Sarajevo. Perhaps your presence there will cool things down a bit." Cool things down with 250 staff officers, and 50 Swedish conscript soldiers. But we're soldiers, you do what you're told and off we went to Sarajevo.

We got to Sarajevo on 5 March, and things were tense. A Serbian had been shot by a Muslim at a wedding the previous Christmas and there was a lot of tension around the roads into the various ethnic communities at nighttime. The government was still functioning, approximately 44 percent Muslim, approximately 32 to 35 percent Serb, and approximately 14 to 17 percent Croatian. I say approximately because it depends which census you pay attention to; every time you had a debate on this, all three

sides would bring you in the census that favored their position. So, it's not really all that clear. There was also a significant Jewish community in downtown Sarajevo.

Over the next two or three weeks, the situation deteriorated as rumors of international recognition of Bosnia as an independent nation on 6 April floated about. Now a whole bunch of dumb soldiers, led by number one dumb, contacted our respective countries and said: "Don't recognize Bosnia, not on the sixth of April. If you do there will be fighting."

There has to be some constitutional guarantee of minorities. Because what had happened was that Izetbegović, the Muslim president, the legitimate president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, had gone to the people and said: "Do you want me to seek independence?" The 44 percent of Muslims came back overwhelmingly: "Yes." The Croatian community, 15 to 17 percent, came back and said: "Yes." The Bosnian Serbs boycotted the referendum and said: "No. We want a state within a state ultimately connected with Serbia so we're not going to play."

We could see the fighting coming. Obviously, since we had only given our home nations two or three weeks warning, there was nothing they could do about it. The Security Council did nothing about it. So we did what soldiers do pretty well: we started a pool. Put five bucks in the pot and guess when the war is going to start! And one of my majors won a significant amount of money for picking 2:30 on the afternoon of 5 April, when a crowd of 4,000 in front of the Holiday Inn, which was directly in front of the presidency, came under sniper fire. Which, by the way is an interesting vignette, because it shows how the world has changed in the way Bosnia is covered. I had a number of my civilian staff in the Holiday Inn looking out of their window at the 4,000 people crowded in front of the presidency, the congress of Bosnia, when they came under fire from snipers on the roof of the Holiday Inn and about a dozen people were slaughtered. The crowd turned to face the Holiday Inn and attacked the building with their bare hands to get up on the roof and get the snipers. As they were attacking the building, the civilian staff we had, and one woman in particular who reacted in very emotional and articulate language, turned to the television in her room and watched CNN's live coverage of the crowd attacking the hotel. She recognized a figure in the window of the hotel and realized that she was watching herself, live, real time. The crowd came into the Holiday Inn, they went to the roof, they

captured the snipers and then dragged them down thirteen flights of stairs without using the elevator, so there wasn't much left of them when they got them down to the marble floor at the entrance of the Holiday Inn.

Then the situation in Sarajevo started to deteriorate, big time. We had no mandate there. We had 300 people in town wearing blue berets but we had no mandate. Our mandate was in Croatia. If I sent a soldier downtown and he was killed, I was legally responsible for his death. Because you can only operate within the mandate when you are employing, as we were, soldiers from 31 different nations and the officers that made up our headquarters. So we had 14,000 troops in Croatia and they were wondering what the hell was going on. They couldn't talk to their headquarters. I was chief of staff at the time, and our folks 300 kilometres away couldn't get a hold of us. In a bizarre sort of situation, a number of times we could hear them talking on the radio but they couldn't hear us. We had four commanders up there: a Russian, a Nigerian, a Kenyan, and an Argentine. And they'd say: "Has anyone talked to the headquarters in the past couple of days?"

"No. Do you think they're dead?"

"I don't know, maybe one of us should take over?"

"Gee, I don't know."

This is the type of bizarre conversation that was going on. So we left. We left 100 behind under John Wilson, an Australian colonel, to take on humanitarian activities, which you can do outside of any mandate. You can stitch people back together, you can exchange bodies, exchange prisoners, you can get away with that. Except that, in a civil conflict, when you help one side the other two sides say you are collaborating with their enemy. That doesn't happen in wars of aggression, where peacekeeping means a nice implementable agreement between two sides, but in civil conflict we were soon being accused of collaborating. We would load up Muslim bodies to take to the morgue or some injured to the hospital and a Serb would stop us at gunpoint to unload those bodies into a ditch and load their injured. We would load up Serbs, and the Muslims would stop us. We got used to it. Then 200 of us went to Belgrade, because it was our job to facilitate and to organize a withdrawal of the JNA from Croatia back into Serbia; so we set up beside their headquarters. Then the face of peacekeeping changed. Four overachievers sitting around a coffee table in Belgrade: my boss, General

Nambiar, an outstanding Indian three-star general, much maligned in the press, an outstanding gentleman; Philippe Morion, whom you probably all know, the French commander who went to Srebrenica and appeared a lot on CNN; Cedric Thornberry, who just delivered a convoy of humanitarian aid to Mostar three weeks ago because the whole area of Mostar was starving—you'll be interested to know that at this time last week the food hadn't been picked up, nobody really needed it; and yours truly, the Chief of Staff. We said: "Look, we told them, the UN, that we didn't want to go to Sarajevo, it was a dumb idea. They sent us there anyway and now professionally, we're embarrassed. We left with our tails between our legs. We know why we left. We had no mandate. But the citizens of Sarajevo don't understand that. How do we get back?"

We said: "Look, the Serbs have been portrayed as the lepers of the international community over the last month, let's play on that." We decided to go to them and say: "Look, why not give us the airport in Sarajevo? Have the Bosnian Serbs turn the airport over to the UN. We'll open it up. We'll bring in food and medicine, and we will show the world that you're not the only villain in this peace, that there is some compassion on your side." And it worked. Within 24 hours they agreed to it.

And so I got 16 volunteers, because—don't forget—no mandate. You can't order soldiers to do something that wasn't covered in the original mandate. So we got around that by saying: "Who wants to go back to Sarajevo?" I got 16 volunteers and we went back to Sarajevo. It's a six-hour drive, and it took three days. We were kidnapped, they stole our vehicles,—all the standard things that happened in Bosnia on a Sunday afternoon drive,—but we got back to Sarajevo. And we worked out a deal with the Serbs to take over the airport on 28 June. And on 27 June, at about 8:30 in the evening, the phone rang. Which in itself was unusual because we had had about 500 lines cut by a multi-barrel rocket-launcher attack the previous afternoon. The main switchboard for that area of Bosnia was knocked out. It was a very strong French accent on the other end: "General Mackenzie?"

"Yes."

"The President of France will arrive at the airport in an hour and thirty minutes."

Now when you get a crank call like that in Canada in the military, it's normally a drunk on a Friday night trying to get you to do something really stupid, like report to work when everything is locked up for the weekend. We would have a verification check, get the individual's number, call him back and confirm that he is who he says he is. Well, you couldn't do that because I couldn't phone Split, and this call was coming from Split. In fact it was coming from the Minister of Health and Humanitarian Affairs for the French Government, Minister Kouchner.

So I said: "Please tell the President of France that we have a major tank battle going on at the airport right now, on the runway. We have three wrecked cars on the runway. I know, I've seen them placed there. There is shrapnel all over the runway, any piece of which will cut the tire of President Mitterrand's aircraft, pitch it off the runway, into one of the two minefields laid parallel to the main runway. And on each side of the runway, facing the runway, are about 300 claymore mines. Nasty little devices with about 1,500 jagged ball bearings sitting in front of plastic explosives and the command detonation device, I know, is in the tower. I have seen it. We have mountains on almost three sides of the runway, it will be dark in an hour, I have no lights, I have no radar. Other than that, I would be delighted to see the President of France."

And the voice said: "The President will be there in an hour and twenty-five minutes."

The Swedish soldiers bless them, were basket cases after a week because we were working them for 20, 22 hours a day guarding everything that moved. They had been replaced by French marine commandos. I called the French marine commandos together. You have to appreciate, generals dream about events like this; if they don't they shouldn't be generals. I mean, no colonels, very few majors, just you and the troops and you're there with a very austere organization. My French isn't great, it got a lot better because the French commandos spoke no English. So I briefed these young lads that I was going to phone the liaison officers (LOs) to the two warring parties, the Croats and the Muslims were actually getting along at that stage and fighting as one, and I phoned them and the Serbs, to try and get the fighting to stop. I was going to take all the French commandos over to the airport, have them walk the runway, where they would be fired at and sniped at, while they picked up the shrapnel and put it in their steel helmets.

The UN in its generosity had given us six armored personnel carriers for 300 people. I was going to put two of them in the minefield at the front of the runway, two at the back and two at the touchdown point for the aircraft. When Mitterrand's aircraft appeared in the horizon we would flick on the lights and hopefully he would touch down in the right spot. You would have thought I was asking these guys to go for a stroll in the mall. This was the second coming, their political and emotional leader was coming to town.

I had three officers in the room at that time. One was an Australian, one was a Russian, and one was a Canadian. And I turned to them and said to the Australian in particular: "What if this was the Prime Minister of Australia, and these were Australian soldiers, what do you think their reaction would be?" His response is not repeatable. I didn't ask the Canadian but he volunteered an opinion. But these French soldiers, I'll never forget it. I mean if we could generate some sort of loyalty like that, we would really have something going for us.

To make a long story short, we had an electrical problem in one of our six vehicles so we were five minutes late leaving. Then I got a call that, in actual fact, Mitterrand would arrive the next day. He would come by fixed wing by 8:30 the next morning. So we whipped out there at 6:00 in the morning. The French cleared 16 steel helmets full of shrapnel off the runway and pushed off the wrecked cars. We stood there like idiots until 11:30 when the president arrived by helicopter, and got hit on the way in. In fact his party came in on two helicopters and got hit with a 50 calibre round, 12.7 millimetre. That's nothing to sneeze at. He landed and was going to see President Izetbegović, the President of Bosnia, only. That's when the rules of peacekeeping kicked in, because even though it's not pure peacekeeping, there are some basic principles that apply here. Impartiality and objectivity. And I said: "Mr. Mitterrand, you've got to see Dr. Karadić, the head of the Bosnian Serbian Republic."

"No, I won't."

"Sir, you've got to. Otherwise you're going to leave me in an awkward position."

"O.K. I'll see him for five minutes, on the way out, shake hands with him and that's it."

"Well, actually Mr. President, you'll meet with him for an hour."

"No, I said five minutes."

"I'm not saying you'll meet with him for an hour. But as soon as you start meeting, it will be show time in Sarajevo."

Whenever I'd go anywhere for a meeting, I just rated about 10 rounds of mortar fire. I'd sit down with the Muslims and Croats or I'd sit down with the Serbs and I'd hear, thunk, thunk . . . thunk. Outgoing mortar rounds and then the people say to me: "You see General MacKenzie, we're meeting with you and already we're being shelled."

And I'd say: "No, not actually, but we will be in about 45 seconds because you've just shelled the other side." And sure enough, RUMP!

Well, Lord Carrington, when he came, rated about 30 mortar rounds. Mitterrand he got about 40 to 50. Big-time attention because he had a lot of media around him. Not only did he have the 32 agencies that were with me but about 10 others that came with him.

So he shook Karadić's hand at the airport. I said it would happen about two and a half minutes after the meeting started. I was out by 30 seconds. At the two-minute point, all the tanks, and all the artillery in the local area opened up, hammered the two villages of Dobrinja and Butmir who, quite understandably, fired back. We had a major firefight in our hands which lasted exactly 55 minutes.

During that meeting three individuals, Serbian soldiers, were dragged in seriously wounded, one of whom had his arm blown off, and were shown to President Mitterrand as having defended the honor of France. I turned to my medical adviser, who was British, and asked her afterwards, how old were their wounds. None of them were fresher than four hours. So they had been held as mannequins in the battlefield, one with his arm blown off, just to get a nice little picture for CNN so they could be shown as having defended the honor of France. This was a common characteristic of all sides in the conflict.

Before Mitterrand left, he did something that no other VIP did, bless him, and after he arrived we had a lot of visiting VIPs. Mitterrand said: "What can I do for you?"

I said: "Well Mr. President, your arrival here today has delayed the opening of the airport by 24 hours because of the fighting your presence generated. But all we'd have is a chunk of ground, pilots are not brain dead, they're not going to fly into this airport. It's much too dangerous. If you send us two French aircraft tomorrow, the odds are pretty good, it will embarrass the rest of the world into flying in here."

Mitterrand is called a sphinx. You don't know—I didn't at that time—whether he's paying attention, whether he agrees with you. We had slipped into English because he said it was going to take too long for him to visit if I was going to insist on speaking French. Believe me—he pays attention.

The next morning at 8:30, two French C-160 Transals fell out of the sky and landed on the Sarajevo Airport. One had water. We didn't need water, Sarajevo didn't need water. That didn't matter—it was Humanitarian Aid. The other one had the United States Army's revenge on the Muslim diet, a thing called MRE-meals ready to eat. That didn't matter either—because it kick-started the operation. Within 24 hours, 36 nations were cued up to fly into Sarajevo and show that they wanted to help out the people of Sarajevo.

At that stage the Security Council met at ambassadorial level and approved the dispatch of the Canadian battalion at Duruvar, Croatia, to cross five lines of confrontation and drive to Sarajevo, thereby setting a record for track movement of some 350 kilometres. Why did the Canadians come down? Well other than being a Canadian myself and the UN Chief of Staff—that was only a minor factor—the Canadians had cheated more than any other battalion there. When the UN sent the twelve battalions into Croatia, they ordered that they only bring 15 armored personnel carriers for the 850 personnel. The rest would be in what we call in the military, soft-skinned vehicles, which you would call Toyota four-by-fours or whatever.

The Canadians cheated. The French cheated. The French brought 80, but they had wheels on them so they called them armored trucks and got away with it. We brought 83 but they had tracks and we got caught, and we were in the process of sending them back to Germany. Not only that, the UN was going to charge us for the fuel they consumed for the two months that they were there. Thank God they cheated.

We brought them to Sarajevo. Canadians are really good at this business but not for the reason you might think. Not because we're the best soldiers in the world, we're probably not. On any day of the week we're in the top five, I mean, my God, maybe once a month we're the best, who knows. There are lots of good soldiers around. We're good at this business because of things that are, for most of us anyway, totally and absolutely out of our control and that's our nationality. We're good

at it because we are Canadian. We don't have any territorial ambitions, we can't even look after what we've got. We don't have any colonial background. We've taken property away from people within our borders perhaps, but we have never taken our flag somewhere else, jabbed it in somebody's territory and said, this is ours. If you travel a lot around the world, you'll see that our foreign policy and foreign aid is seen as being very even-handed. We never humiliate people when we give them something. We slide a million under the table and say: "Please, it's from Canada, take it." I mean, it's something to be proud of. You get a synergistic effect when you mix our national reputation with good soldiers.

This morning when I left Toronto, there were 184 flags flying in front of the UN on the East River in New York. I mean it goes up every day but 184 nations belong to the UN today. You can go to one of them and say: "Here's a list of the nations of the world, you've got yourself in a world of hurt, who will you accept to come and give you a hand?" When you go back, at the end of the day, there's maybe 20 ticks on the list and Canada's always one of them. It's not that they love us, they don't even like us half the time, they might not even respect us. But in competition with all the other nations in the world, we're at the top of the "desirability" list. And that's why we've been on every UN peacekeeping mission since '47. It's also become competitive, the government doesn't want to miss one. It sounds good to say that we've been on every UN mission. We even found five other non-UN missions to do too. Like Vietnam and the M.F.O. Force in the Sinai. So it's something to be proud of but it's because of our national characteristic. And it's something that the current Minister of National Defence doesn't seem to understand.

Six weeks ago the minister, Mr. Siddon, said: "We can only afford to have 1,000 peacekeepers out of the country at any one time." Two weeks later he announced 1,800 for the former Yugoslavia starting this month. I mean, it's got to be one or the other. And because we have a small army, he said, maybe we can go and train bigger armies how to be peacekeepers. We don't have any genetic superiority that makes us better peacekeepers than anybody else. We are good for the reasons I've just discussed. If you want to make other armies peacekeepers, fill a Hercules aircraft full of Canadian passports. That's what will make them better peacekeepers. We can't hand over this responsibility to somebody else

and quite frankly, I'm disgusted to the point of anger that during a run up to the election of a new government of this country, have you heard anybody talk about defence policy? You're going to say you heard money discussed. I'll give you that, helicopters being the favorite subject; but nobody has discussed policy. You can't do it from the bottom up. You have to confirm your foreign affairs, your external policy, which I think will probably say, no matter who forms the government, that we are interested in a more peaceful and stable world. I mean, you can drive a truck through that definition but it's still a pretty good objective. And from that, along with a domestic policy, emerges a defence policy. You can't discuss bits of equipment outside the context of a policy.

Let's use the helicopters as an example. Under the existing defence policy, the helicopters make all kinds of sense. They're justified. Unfortunately, the existing defence policy was written about 10 minutes before someone took a sledgehammer to the Berlin Wall and brought the Cold War to a close. It has to be re-done, and maybe, when it's re-done, they'll still be justified. Don't ask me because I will be perceived to be prejudiced—because I'm brown. I'm an army general retired. I think when it's re-done they'll discover that the army, which is in a distant third place in equipment priority, for all the right reasons under the old Cold War, because we were going to have time to mobilize and so on, should receive some care and attention. I was one of the few people in Sarajevo that was born before the vehicles my soldiers were driving around in were made. I tell the anecdote of the Royal Canadian Regiment sergeant. When I was taking Lord Carrington to the Serbian headquarters I told the sergeant: "Look, when we get down to the end of the runway and you turn right, that building there, you're going to be fired at by a Muslim machine gun. I want you to fire back."

What I didn't tell him but I was thinking was: "And I'm really sorry that when you fire back, Lord Carrington and I will be ducking down in the back of this vehicle. And you will remain exposed from the waist up, firing an inaccurate 50-calibre machine gun off a pintlemount in the front of the vehicle. I'm really sorry we didn't buy you a proper combat vehicle 12 years ago when it was decided we couldn't afford it." That's not good enough. If this government continues to commit soldiers into the most dangerous areas of the world, where they're being shot at every day, they deserve better. And better is built in London and being sold

everyday to the United States Army and the United States Marine Corps. Isn't that an irony?

But it seems that anything beyond our borders is taboo in this election. That's what really surprises me. You would think that some spin-doctor would say: "Let's stop dragging the Canadian population through the swamp of it's own agony. Why don't we talk about something that brings us pride?" Other than hockey, it's peacekeeping. Why doesn't some spin-doctor say: "Why don't you try to generate some pride in the nation. Why don't you concentrate on the work that the forces are doing overseas right now. The sons and daughters of Canadians that are serving in dangerous places for high objectives, high reasons—humanitarian undertakings. Why don't we talk about that?"

"Oh, gee, we can't do that. Look what happened to the Airborne Regiment. There seems to be some problem there. We don't want to be associated with that."

This nation is turning itself inside out over the two questionable deaths, nothing proven yet, of two Somalis. Our neighbors to the south have done crowd control in Mogadishu with 20 millimetre vulcan cannon, fired from helicopters, killing 300 women and children while they were doing it and maybe for good reasons. They could well have been used as shields for the fugitive, warlord Aidid and his thugs. And they're not worrying about it. But we will turn ourselves inside out, it's the Canadian way. I'm not criticizing it but I am saying that there is something wrong with the priorities here. "It's o.k., politicians, you can praise the army again." It's politically correct, but they haven't got the message. They don't understand that there is a law of *noblesse oblige* for the international community and it says: "Your obligations abroad are proportional to your blessings at home." And listening to politicians and aspiring politicians, you would think we don't have any blessings at home. All we have is our agony over the deficit and unemployment.

Unemployment is really important, particularly if you don't have a job! But it doesn't equate with somebody coming across the street and killing your baby in its carriage because the baby's the wrong color, religion, or ethnic extraction. That's happening in a lot of areas including Bosnia. That doesn't happen in Canada. We take great pride in that. People just don't come to this country because we are a soft touch. That's one of the reasons, but a lot of them come here for what we stand for.

And the more we pull in and get behind our own borders and do the Fortress Canada thing, the more our reputation will erode.

In the meantime, if the UN doesn't smell the coffee, the US is going to have to do their job by default. I spend most of my time in front of American audiences telling them: "Don't let your soldiers be deployed on the line of confrontation in peacekeeping." They are subjected to a degree of risk out of all proportion when compared with any other nation in the world. Why? Because the UN is getting involved in civil conflict. If I was a warlord in Mogadishu today, and General Aidid, one of the other five, I'd kill every American I could left, right, and centre. I'd spend 75 bucks—that's what it costs, I've been to Mogadishu—and get myself a little transformer and I would announce myself as General Aidid's radio station. I'd brag about killing Americans every hour of the day. Then I'd watch the Americans come in and kick the living daylight out of Aidid. Then when they're gone, I would take over. That's the characteristic of civil conflict. That's what will happen in Bosnia if President Clinton sends 25,000 troops there as part of a peacekeeping force. But he won't because he has rewritten the criteria and they'll never qualify to go, congressional approval being one of the criteria. If the Serbs didn't kill Americans, the Muslims would kill them and make it look like the Serbs. If the Croatians didn't kill them, the Serbs would kill them and make it look like the Croatians. Because the US is a superpower, they can project power strategically. We can't. Most other nations in the world can't. Heaven forbid if 20 Canadians are killed in Srebrenica tonight, all we could do is write letters to the editor or debate it in parliament. Politicians might even mention it on the campaign trail, though I doubt it. But we can't do anything about it. That's why we're not targeted. We are normally killed because of splash-over from some other engagement. We're not directly targeted, as Americans will be targeted. But they do hold a solution for the majority of the UN's problems. The Americans aren't paying their bills at the UN. If I was American I wouldn't be paying mine either because they know how the money is being misused, wasted, within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, and therefore they hold back. My advice to America is provide the UN with strategic lift, get the troops in and out, logistics. The UN has no logistics and I mean zero; it's done by civilian contract, it takes four months to arrange. Communications, satellite imagery and intelligence, bases around the world would be

invaluable to the UN. Provide that and not only will they do it better than anybody else in the world but they would have an audit trail. The Americans would not just be giving money to the building on the East River, they'd be giving it in kind, support in kind, the kind that the UN needs. Let the other nations of the world, particularly some that have been sitting on their hands in the General Assembly for the last 45 years, let them get off their butts and do some of this work. Where's the Organization of African Unity in Somalia? That's an organization whose charter states that it's interested in keeping peace in Africa? Where the heck are they? What are Americans and Canadians and Germans and Italians doing there?

Peacekeeping was very popular for a while. After the Cold War ended, there were a lot of unemployed armies around. Gee, countries said, we give a battalion to the UN and the UN pays us \$1,000 US a month for every soldier on peacekeeping duty plus a surcharge on each of the vehicles. Except, all of a sudden, it has become dangerous with over 500 casualties in Bosnia and over 70 people killed in Somalia.

Isn't it funny the volunteers have all dried up and it's back to the historical supporters of peacekeeping? Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, the Scandinavian countries, Canada, the Brits and the French are getting involved big time along with Brazil and India. It's going to be hard to talk the other folks into doing it but they're going to have to. Because when we criticize the UN we criticize ourselves as it's merely the sum of its parts: it needs help. It's as I explained it to the Secretary-General by letter: when all these wild accusations that were generated by a media campaign against the UN in general, and me in particular—to try and discredit what I was saying because I said: "Don't intervene militarily"—I wrote the Secretary-General and said: "I hope you understand this is tough love. I am going to be hard on you because I believe in the UN. I believe it's the only institution that can look after the challenge in the next century but it's got to grow up big time, starting with the Security Council. It's organized for 1945, the winners of World War II, who were going to police the world with thousands of aircraft and hundreds of ships—and the atomic bomb, by the way. That was going to be the UN police force. The Cold War came along, and the Security Council was hand-cuffed because of the veto. Now it can do exactly what it was originally designed for but, son of a gun, somebody changed the world

in the meantime." Now, three-quarters of the world looks in from the developing world and the Third World and says: "I don't know if I like a whole bunch of white folks in the west organizing the world,—you know, America, France and England." Because China is worried about China and Russia is worried about Russia, the permanent five are now the permanent three. I'm not sure if they should be policing the world. Conventional wisdom says we'll make Japan and Germany members of the Security Council. So, I guess it's the balance in your bank account that dictates whether you're on the Security Council or not. Maybe it should be countries like India and Brazil, as an example, great middle powers and supporters of peacekeeping.

Under the current Security Council, you get a resolution in the field as a UN Commander. You're sitting in your bunker in Sarajevo, you can't see further than 20 feet in any direction, there's no power, there's one telephone line, and you get a Security Council resolution to tell you what you're supposed to do. You get a flashlight, you read it, you can drive a truck through its wording. The only thing for sure, is that if something goes wrong it will be your fault. Because 15 diplomats have wordsmithed this thing to cover their butts. There is a requirement for a Military Council. A commander and staff reporting to the Security Council to translate diplomatic language into some sort of terminology that those of us in the field could understand. And it should not be drawn from the permanent five. I resent the Chinese ambassador debating the impact of air strikes on Serbian positions around Sarajevo in the Security Council while the Canadian representative, Ambassador Frechette, has to sneak in the back door and lobby with her friends the Americans, for example, to get our point of view across. When we've got over 2,000 troops on the ground and the Chinese don't have anything, or the Russians, in Sarajevo. What gives them the right to debate something that has an impact on our soldiers. We've paid our dues. We deserve a seat on the Military Council more than any other nation in the world. Our sons and daughters have paid with their lives and we deserve a seat, and they require a Military Council. And from that, they require troops on standby, but not a permanent force. Because if you put a permanent force together the first thing that will happen, 12 battalions together, they'll play together, they'll get really good, it'll cost a lot of money, they'll say they're ready and then it will come time to go somewhere, pick any

country in the world, pick Sri Lanka, as an example. Probably six of the nations that have contributed troops would say: "Hold it, hold it, we don't have any foreign policy objectives in Sri Lanka."

"And you say the Commander is coming from Bangladesh."

"No, no, I don't think so. We don't want to play."

And the team falls apart at the eleventh hour.

Those aren't really big changes for the UN but I suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, they are absolutely essential because if there is anything for sure, it's not working now. And what is driving foreign policy—Somalia stands out as a living example—what is driving foreign policy at home and in the UN are the pictures on the late news. It is foreign policy driven by television, driven by the media and, believe you me, it's not their fault as they can't be everywhere. But leadership is responsible for seeing what the media is talking about, gathering other information, bringing it together and making proper decisions and assigning priorities. It's not nuclear physics, it's not that difficult; but it's not being done well.

In the meantime, and in conclusion, let me tell you that those that suggest that our folks overseas are failing in their mission, do not understand the mission that they have. I used to get a little upset when I came out of Sarajevo and they said: "Hey, too bad things didn't go very well." I said: "Hold it just a second. The Security Council told us to try and open the airport, and try and deliver food and medicine." They said: "We think we'll send you seven aircraft a day, that's all you can handle. By playing on the competitive juices of 31 nations, we handled 23 a day. Those soldiers achieved their mission. The very brave Hercules crews that flew some of the food in achieved their mission."

The Security Council might have floundered, but it was the best it could do for Sarajevo under the circumstances. I always use the analogy with World War II. Could you imagine going up to the German commander of the siege of Stalingrad and saying: "Excuse me, I'm from the UN. I know you're killing a lot of Russians in there, but I'm from the UN and I would like to deliver 300 tons of food and medicine everyday to them. Any objection?" I don't think you would have been received that well. Hopefully, this is a mark of enhanced civilization because in the 1990s we're doing just that. There's a war going on that they're using to sort themselves out. In the meantime, soldiers are risking their lives, to

help a girl that's had her arm blown off 30 days ago and hasn't seen an aspirin. When Canadian soldiers see situations like that they do something about it. When they see an institution for the mentally retarded being abandoned by its staff, they do something about it.

Politicians might be ashamed to talk about it, but you and I shouldn't be. Our soldiers deserve your support, and I want you to know how much they appreciate the support of the Canadian public they have received in the past. I'm confident they will receive it in the future.