In Britain, September 1988 was the month of Munich. The media bombarded us with reminiscences and reappraisals, our television screens again filled with familiar newsreel footage from fifty years ago—a brave if bemused premier being paraded by his Nazi hosts through the banner-strewn streets of Bad Godesberg, or a week and three flights later, the same weary old man wielding his infamous piece of paper at Heston airfield. On television and in The Observer, Robert Harris offered a spirited defence of Neville Chamberlain, prompting a gentle but pointed reproach from his fellow columnist, the central European expert Neal Ascherson. The case for appeasement was made, in some articles very persuasively, but by the time attention switched to the next commemoration Chamberlain's reputation remained as sullied as it has been for the near half-century since his death.

The popular perception of Chamberlain as being weak and misguided remains as firmly rooted as ever, notwithstanding the efforts of pundits like Harris and of historians such as David Dilks to restore the balance. Few politicians have done more to reinforce this ill-informed albeit widely-held view than Britain's present prime minister. Mrs. Thatcher makes caustic and indiscriminatory use of that ultimate condemnation “appeasement,” in lambasting those policies and postures she perceives to be unacceptably consensual and compromising. Of all her predecessors, with the notable exception of Edward Heath, the leader who attracts then her deepest scorn is, not surprisingly, Chamberlain. There are of course no prizes for recognizing with whom she most readily identifies. Plenty of commentators have pointed out, however, that, other than a common enthusiasm for the deployment of our fighting forces, Margaret Thatcher and Winston Churchill have
remarkably little in common. Adopting a Thatcherite perspective on Britain's postwar economic malaise, no administration did more to consolidate state welfarism and tolerate unbridled trade union influence than did Churchill's 1951-55 government. His contribution to the admittedly piecemeal reform program initiated by the Liberals prior to the First World War, and even his management of the Treasury in the 1920s, are scarcely reconcilable with the Thatcherite school of sound economics. An indifference to the threats of the Tory Whips after 1931, and an earlier aptitude for crossing the floor of the House as circumstance and ambition demanded, demonstrate a laudable antipathy towards the stifling discipline imposed upon today's parliamentary party. Churchill would not have survived long in any cabinet headed by Mrs. Thatcher; nor, one suspects, as the preferred choice of his constituency association. Unlike 50 years ago, he would have been on the way out, Conservative Central Office having ensured the vote went the right way.

Chamberlain, by contrast, focussed power upon Downing Street to a degree unparallelled in peacetime prior to 1979. Not even Lloyd George in his heyday enjoyed such a systematic control of government and party, nor such widespread popular support. Opposition to Chamberlain, on both sides of the House, was disorganized and divided; the Labor Party pessimistic regarding a 1940 election victory. The Conservative Party was almost wholly loyal to its leader, both in parliament and even more so in the country. Even by the summer of 1939 the Tory anti-appeasers remained small in number and at odds over strategy. As we shall see, having resigned in despair both Anthony Eden and Duff Cooper were eager to resume office, under Chamberlain. The prime minister had inherited from Stanley Baldwin a well-oiled party machine, over which he was assumed to enjoy a breadth of influence matched only by the present incumbent. Chamberlain's single-mindedness, disdain for so many of his colleagues, and consequent enthusiasm for circumventing established practices of conducting cabinet and departmental business most notably over foreign affairs—are all too reminiscent of Mrs. Thatcher. He insulted or ignored ministerial colleagues in precisely the same way as she has done over the past ten years, depending on a small circle of likeminded Tories, personal advisers, and carefully selected senior officials, all of whom might equally have been labelled "one of us." The Foreign Office attracted a similar degree of distrust, particularly while Eden remained as Foreign Secretary, and Sir Robert Vansittart his Permanent Secretary. Lord Halifax, prior to his succeeding Eden, personal
advisor Sir Horace Wilson, and Sudetenland arbiter Lord Runciman, were all responsible directly to the prime minister, who gave scarcely a thought to the views of those formally responsible for the formulation and conduct of British foreign policy. All in all, Mrs. Thatcher would have approved of Chamberlain's style—the capacity for direct and highly publicized intervention (he was a pioneer of effective political communication via the mass media), and the ability to transform genuine defeat into superficial triumph.

In contrast to his brother Austen, Chamberlain was a latecomer to the real world of high politics. According to his father, his role in life was to guard the family's power base. Neville Chamberlain's long apprenticeship in Birmingham business and local government prompted Lloyd George's oft-quoted observation that, subsequently, "he viewed foreign policy through the wrong end of a municipal drainpipe." Ironically, it took a war, the First World War, to bring Neville Chamberlain into national politics, and to public office at the very highest level. Although within two decades he was to become such a powerful and respected figure within the Conservative Party, his late entry qualifies him as an "outsider" in any leadership categorization. There are those leaders who might crudely be labelled "insiders," in so far as they make their way up the party ladder on the inside lane, cultivating parliamentary and grassroots support, whether consciously or unconsciously, and invariably maintaining a high profile. Popularity at conference and in the constituencies is always a major criterion, and the insider *par excellence* was undoubtedly Eden. Given the genuine warmth felt towards him throughout the party, an insider manqué was Lord Home. The same label might be applied to Edward Heath, but for the very opposite reason: he fits the category perfectly, except for the absence of widespread affection. In fact, the number of genuine Tory insiders who make it to the very top are few and far between.

Far more interesting are the outsiders, constituting as they do the majority of Conservative Party leaders since Bonar Law. Given the speed with which Baldwin rose from relative obscurity at the Board of Trade to become prime minister, he warrants inclusion in this second, more motley category. Chamberlain's presence has already been noted, but the clearest example of all is, of course, Churchill. Here, Mrs. Thatcher clearly does have a very great deal in common with her supposed hero. Lord Whitelaw's reluctance to challenge Heath directly ensured the election in 1975 of a leader who, by virtue of both gender and ideology, was the most outrageously successful outsider
progressive Conservatism largely compatible with his own far more rigorously defined vision of “social progress.”

Always his own man, Macmillan nevertheless emerged as a handy intermediary between the two most prominent groups of anti-appeasers in the parliamentary party. Yet long before the autumn of 1938 he had established close links with lobbyists and dissenters outside the House of Commons. As early as 1927, in his first major policy statement, *Industry and the State*, Macmillan was questioning strict party loyalties and seeking the middle ground. By the time his best-known work, *The Middle Way*, appeared eleven years later, he saw an unashamedly centrist government as the only means of facilitating a planned economy and aggressive social amelioration. Ideology was anathema, and class an irrelevancy. More at home with the nation’s liberal intelligentsia than most of his party, Macmillan joined the 150 “informed men of moderate opinion” who signed the preface of *The Next Five Years*, a program of reform to be undertaken during the life of a single parliament. The signatories subsequently founded The Next Five Years Group, in order to promote further their insistence that liberal democracy’s very survival depended upon planning, welfare initiatives, and a credible system of collective security. This motley assortment of “the great and the good” claimed to articulate the views of a liberal consensus synonymous with a broad but silent spectrum of public opinion. Not surprisingly, Macmillan drew his inspiration from Lloyd George, and much of his thinking from Maynard Keynes, whose work he published. Conceived originally as an essentially academic and educative organization, The Next Five Years Group was seen by Macmillan as the potential basis of a popular movement committed to joint non-party political action—a centrist equivalent of the Popular Front. He took effective control of the group’s journal, *The New Outlook*, in order to advance his ideas; but by 1938 he and his erstwhile allies had gone their separate ways, divided over the response of a system of collective security when faced with persistent acts of aggression. For a privileged few, including the Member for Stockton, the debate continued in the high-powered discussion group that met regularly at All Souls College, Oxford, from December 1937.

Macmillan viewed the National Government’s failure to tackle the misery of Depression as abnegation of the duty and responsibility for the well-being of the impoverished at the heart of “One Nation” Toryism. The indifference and inertia displayed at home paralleled and reinforced the image of impotence and introspection conveyed abroad. Thus, Macmillan had few qualms in seeking the downfall of,
first, Baldwin's government, and then, that of his successor. What is so remarkable is the frankness of his opinion—clearly, the Cavendish shield stretched far beyond Chatsworth.

Macmillan was unique in his determination to foster a dramatic realignment in British political life, in his own words, “1931 in reverse.” The major rupture in the Conservative Party prompted by the Munich agreement spurred him on in his endeavors to disrupt established party loyalties. Traditional allegiances and obligations proved as resilient as ever, and the open conspirator's grand (and personal?) ambitions only achieved partial fulfilment eighteen months later. Hitler, not Harold Macmillan, destroyed the old political order.

Among the dissident Tories gathered around either Churchill or Eden, Macmillan appeared a rather elusive, and even peripheral, figure. Both groups were held together by the assumed charisma of their respective leaders, a deliberate or involuntary exclusion from the party mainstream, and a deep scepticism regarding current British policy towards Germany and Italy. Chamberlain's backbench critics invariably perceived more established diplomatic procedures as conducive to maintaining the traditional balance of power in continental Europe. In consequence, they opposed further concessions to Hitler or Mussolini without credible long-term guarantees. This is possibly a fairer summary of Eden's position following his resignation in February 1938, than that of Churchill. Defended in the House by only a handful of equally maverick colleagues, and with his reputation at an all-time low, Churchill proved a strident and relentless critic of the Government's reluctance to hasten rearmament, and to forge a “grand alliance” against the dictators. His “Old Guard” was basically Boothby, his son-in-law Duncan Sandys, and the newspaper proprietor Brendan Bracken. Churchill, like Macmillan, was one of the nineteen government supporters who abstained in the Opposition's censure vote on Eden's resignation. Yet, unlike Macmillan, he was swift to demonstrate his loyalty when the party then rallied around its front bench: behavior consistent with his position during the Norway debate in May 1940.

Eden, whose resistance to fascist aggression when in office was scarcely resolute, refused to mount a general attack upon Chamberlain's administration. Presuming his eventual return to office, and hence unwilling to acquire a reputation for disloyalty, the former Foreign Secretary rarely adopted the mantle of arch anti-appeaser. He was never truly a focus of internal dissent, and his circle only convened on an informal basis as late as August 1938. Despite the gravity of the
situation in central Europe, members studiously avoided fixed policy positions. They embraced a wide range of Conservative thinking, taking pride, as Harold Nicolson recorded, in being "all good Tories and sensible men." Publicly, Churchill kept apart from Eden, in order not to deter previously loyal supporters of Chamberlain from joining the "Glamour Boys." Macmillan ably fulfilled the role of courier, particularly as parliament had yet to reconvene. By September, as the crisis deepened, Churchill's group quickly expanded, to include, among others, the Liberals' Sir Archibald Sinclair. Much to Macmillan's satisfaction, Churchill was making every effort to entice the Labor leadership into joining forces in order to thwart any betrayal of the Czechs. Clement Attlee greeted such overtures with characteristic coolness, and his foreign affairs spokesperson, Hugh Dalton, was similarly cautious. While not wholly ruling out an alliance, Dalton's main concern was the effect collusion with the likes of Churchill would have on grassroots party morale. Also, how would leading trade unionists like Ernest Bevin react?

Meanwhile, Churchill and Eden were equally unsuccessful in their attempts to stiffen the Government's resolve: Britain had to stand firmly by France in defence of Czechoslovakia's territorial integrity, while at the same time placing the national interest before party prejudice in order to secure Soviet support. Discreet lobbying in Whitehall by old enemies was unlikely to influence Chamberlain on the eve of his second visit to Germany—especially if the advice given was to court Stalin. Churchill's by now quite sizable group agreed that they would, in Nicolson's words, "go all out" against the prime minister if he returned from Bad Godesberg bearing "peace with dishonor." Hitler's subsequent insistence that the Sudetenland be ceded to Germany at once meant that, for three days, both sides of the House were united. Tory advocates appeared to be no longer crying in the wilderness. The full Cabinet had rejected Hitler's demand, and war appeared imminent. Yet the delay in mobilizing the Fleet, the unduly conciliatory message Chamberlain sent to Hitler, his reluctance to stiffen the resolve of the French, and above all, his radio broadcast on the evening of 26 September ("a far away country ... peoples of whom we know nothing"), highlighted a continuing determination to secure a settlement. While the likes of Duff Cooper, First Lord of the Admiralty, agonized over a lack of positive action, an inner cabinet of Halifax, Sir John Simon, and Sir Samuel Hoare, gave Chamberlain every encouragement to cave in. His dramatic announcement in the Commons of Hitler's invitation to a four-power conference in Munich,
and the resulting dismemberment of the only liberal democracy in eastern Europe, brought about a short-lived fusion of opposition forces. In the face of national rejoicing and relief, Attlee still doubted whether the Conservatives could mount a revolt worthy of Labor’s support. As the Commons debate on the Munich agreement began, on 3 October, Hugh Dalton decided to abandon caution and foment revolt among the Tory ranks.

The rebels, although disappointed by Eden’s muted remarks, were buoyed up by Duff Cooper’s resignation speech, Attlee’s unexpected rhetoric, and above all, Dalton’s ruthless dissection of Chamberlain’s record. Late that night Macmillan secured an immediate meeting between Dalton and leading members of both the Churchill and Eden groups. Although eager to embarrass Chamberlain, the rebels feared his revenge in the form of a snap general election rallying the people’s support for the “man of peace.” Thus, the vote on Munich would be a loyalty test, with the price of opposition or abstention being the withdrawal of the Whip; official Conservative candidates would contest their constituencies. Macmillan had already explained that, if Labor’s amendment to the Government’s motion was unduly censorious, it would deter waiving Tories from abstaining. What prospect was there of jointly drafting the amendment in order to ensure a large revolt, and furthermore, how likely was the prospect of mutual support in the rebels’ constituencies come the election? Dalton’s notorious reputation as a fixer notwithstanding, the questions revealed a characteristic Tory ignorance of how the Labor Party operated - an implicit assumption that its decision-making process could be as centralized and hierarchical as that of the Conservatives. Dalton could, and the following morning did, ensure that the amendment was acceptable to his new-found friends. On the electoral deal, he prevaricated, or at least so he later claimed. In Winds of Change, Macmillan claimed that Dalton was confident Labor could ensure the rebels had a clear run if they stood as Independents. Chamberlain later insisted that he had no wish for an early general election. Nevertheless, Dalton had “delivered” regarding the amendment, and had given every indication that further cooperation was possible between himself and Tory rebels as uncompromising as Churchill and Macmillan.

Unable to catch the Speaker’s eye in the main debate, an indication of his parliamentary standing at the time, Macmillan was called in the adjournment debate that followed. He had to be satisfied, therefore, with Churchill’s call for fresh policies. Again, Churchill publicly refrained from demanding a new, broader-based administration. Such
a request came from the unlikely figure of Sir Sidney Herbert; ailing, always ultra-loyalist, widely-respected, and a former PPS to Stanley Baldwin. Macmillan applauded Herbert's courage, while regretting the timidity of too many of his more intimate colleagues. On 6 October, around 25 Conservative Members abstained in successive divisions on Munich. Ironically, Herbert's speech had inflicted the most damage on the Government, party loyalists viewing the attacks of Churchill and others as par for the course.

For the next six months all the well-known dissidents faced the threat of unhappy constituency associations adopting new candidates: a general election was likely sooner rather than later, and their political lives were clearly under threat. Chamberlain's popularity with the party was at an all-time high, as congratulations from Conservative Associations poured into Downing Street. Even as late as September 1939, not a single local organization had registered its disapproval. Only the Duchess of Atholl was actually dropped by her constituency association, but not even former ministers were exempt from criticism: both Duff Cooper and Lord Cranborne were carpeted, and, in effect, put on probation. Fear of deselection, and in some cases a still unquenched political ambition, forced a number of Chamberlain's fiercest critics to suffer in silence. Central Office ensured that the pressure was kept on, almost claiming the scalp of Churchill himself. For the first time since 1931, Macmillan experienced difficulties in Stockton. This was not perhaps surprising, especially if the local party was given some indication of his machinations in the winter of 1938.

Immediately following the Munich debate, the rebels made further overtures to the Labor leadership. Despite Chamberlain's declared reluctance to call an election, they still wanted a clear run if obliged to campaign as Independents. Macmillan, however, was interested in more than mere survival. He wanted a coordinated and sustained attack upon the Government, leading ultimately to an alliance between the dissidents, Labor, and the Liberals: as the basis of an alternative National Government. In promoting this unlikely scenario, Macmillan found an unlikely ally in the leading Labor renegade, Sir Stafford Cripps. Abandoning an earlier insistence on "proletarian unity" as the basis of any "united front," Cripps told Dalton on 6 October that the path to socialism must be temporarily abandoned, in order to form a government "under the control of the common people." Cripps urged a deal with Churchill, Eden, Leo Amery, and Sinclair; sacrificing Attlee for Herbert Morrison. Surprisingly, Attlee gave Dalton every encouragement, perhaps because he appreciated the
difficulty in practice of replacing him. With Cripps a key figure in the negotiations, Dalton need no longer fear future retribution from the Left. He consulted with Macmillan, who, despite his own eagerness to press on, confessed that the Tories were already going their separate ways. Eden’s group was wary of conspiracy, and increasingly convinced that keeping a low profile was the best way of heading off constituency rows. On 12 October, Dalton and Macmillan met again, the latter still hoping for “1931 in reverse.”

Dalton pointed out that the dissidents would first have to reconcile themselves to voting against the Government, and that a top-level meeting prior to parliament reconvening could discuss a common line of attack. Macmillan had to admit that Eden’s intentions remained vague, and that Churchill was “in danger of relapsing into a complacent Cassandra.” At this point, he saw Duff Cooper as the only ex-minister capable of reviving a spirit of rebellion. But when approached by Macmillan, Duff Cooper refused to act without Eden. As with all subsequent initiatives, whether to broaden the base of the Government, or to speed up the level of rearmament, Eden deferred. Heavily-veiled attacks and ultra-caution proved the order of the day; a policy with which most of his circle reluctantly concurred. By early 1939, Eden had already decided that he would accept any future invitation to rejoin the Cabinet. It is tempting to conclude that the generally cool relationship which Eden and Macmillan maintained throughout their subsequent careers, culminating in the bitterness of Suez, dated from this period. Churchill was, of course, more than willing to talk with Attlee, Dalton, and Morrison: but the latter were only interested in working with all the original rebels. They saw Churchill as a worthy ally, but in reality a spent force. Eden was the key figure, and, if he preferred more “statesmanlike” tactics to a full-blooded revolt, then the Labor Party would respect his wishes. The “Glamour Boys,” conscious of an ensuing election, set out to capture the party machine from the inside. They viewed Churchill as a liability, Nicolson dismissing him as, “more bitter than determined, and more out for a fight than for reform.” Macmillan was different—disillusioned by the rebels’ lack of resolve, he wanted a fight and reform. Six months later, he expressed anger and astonishment that Chamberlain was still in office, blaming Eden’s circle for having been “too soft and gentlemanlike.” He lambasted Nicolson and his friends for their servility. None of them had fully supported his campaign for immediate National Service and a powerful Ministry of Supply, or
joined him in endorsing A. D. Lindsay, the anti-Munich candidate in the Oxford by-election at the end of October 1938.\(^8\)

Macmillan’s grand, if not grandiose, plans foundered on the twin rocks of the Eden group’s deeply-felt sense of loyalty and responsibility and of the Labor Party’s inability to maintain an agreed, coherent strategy for more than a few weeks. The Right remained sympathetic to Macmillan’s aims, maintaining contact throughout the Christmas recess. Dalton and Morrison now had the support of TUC Secretary, Walter Citrine, but felt unable to give Tory dissidents adequate assurances regarding the “moderate” nature of any agreed policies. The Left effectively destroyed any lingering chance of such assurances being accepted, by backing the victorious Popular Front candidate in the Bridgewater by-election on 17 November 1938. Ironically, it was Cripps who performed the final *coup de grace* in January 1939. He called for a Popular Front that should include all parties from the Communists to the Liberals, but deliberately exclude any Tories associated with that “warmonger” and symbol of “reactionary imperialism,” Winston Churchill.\(^9\) His hopes dashed, Macmillan drew even closer to Churchill, and waited for the tide of events to vindicate their thwarted rebellion.

On 15 March German troops entered Prague, occupying the former East Prussian port of Memel a week later. Eden and Duff Cooper joined Churchill in signing an early-day motion on the need for a new National Government: but as Chamberlain knew only too well, their hearts were not in it. Macmillan, in contrast, had no worries over future preferment. In Stockton he warned his constituents that further delays meant not only war, but unavoidable defeat. Two months later, formal talks with Russia finally began, and the Churchill camp concentrated its oratorical and journalistic resources upon the need for their speedy resolution—Britain’s guarantee to Poland, an astonishing *volte-face* announced on 31 March, was well-nigh meaningless without Soviet military support. By August, with still no positive news from Moscow, Churchill and Chamberlain engaged in some of their bitterest exchanges. The prime minister refused to give an assurance that any change in the situation would prompt a recall of parliament. Fresh rumors arose of an impending election, and again the Eden group held back from declaring their intentions. For Macmillan, there was no dilemma: as in 1935, he would stand on an individual platform. If necessary, he would join a new party or faction, of which there could only be one choice for leader.
The signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, and the reaffirmation of British support for Poland, rendered talk of an election irrelevant. Parliament was recalled to pass emergency legislation, and then adjourned. Even at such a later stage, Chamberlain appeared to prevaricate, desperate for another Munich. Eden’s discussion group, with Macmillan normally present, met almost daily; but in reality could do little. Appropriately, they were gathered together when the Prime Minister announced to the nation on 3 September that, as of 11 a.m., Britain and Germany were at war. For Macmillan, an even more appropriate location would have been by Churchill’s side. Yet by that Sunday lunchtime Churchill already knew that the years of backbench frustration and conspiracy were over: the offer to return to the Admiralty had already been made. He was again holding and relishing power, yet the dramatic circumstances of spring 1940 could scarcely have been anticipated. The Norway debate, the collapse of confidence in Neville Chamberlain’s administration, and the creation of a coalition broad enough to embrace Leo Amery and Sir Stafford Cripps, let alone Ernest Bevin and Lord Beaverbrook, were all the culmination of an erratic process that had its origins in the days and weeks following Munich. Churchill once reminded Macmillan that, without the events of 1940, they would both have gone down in history as total failures. The Second World War revived their political careers, laying the foundation for Macmillan’s rapid rise to the very pinnacle of power in the 1950s. Without the political realignment of May 1940, and the thirty-year consensus forged by the Coalition Government, Macmillan would have remained an attractive yet obscure backbencher. However, to have dismissed him as such, would have been to ignore the patience and persistence with which he defended the middle ground, striving to replace party prejudice with common agreement and endeavor. It is little wonder that he died saddened and bemused by the events of the last decade.10

NOTES

6. Ibid., 202-3.
8. Or, on 5 November 1938, burned an effigy of Chamberlain on a Guy Fawkes bonfire, in front of 40 Czech refugees given shelter by the Macmillans. Macmillan's case for National Service, and his argument that rigorous economic planning was the key to grand strategy, can be found in his pamphlets: The Price of Peace (London: Macmillan, November 1938) and Economic Aspects of Defence (London: Macmillan, February 1939). A.D. Lindsay, Master of Balliol College, was persuaded by Richard Crossman and other Labor dons to stand against the Conservative candidate at Oxford, Quintin Hogg. Lindsay halved the Tories' majority. Macmillan's campaigning prompted threats of the Whip's withdrawal at Westminster, and subsequent deselection in Stockton. On the fiftieth anniversary of the by-election, a highly original television "drama with witnesses," A Vote for Hitler, was shown in Britain by Channel 4, marred only by the depiction of Macmillan as a political lightweight.