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Knowledge and Theory in Psychoanalysis

“Whatever you know, it is all one.” No, not Lacan, although the double-edged rubric may sound like part of his waggish repertoire. It is F.H. Bradley, whose style was often no less highly seasoned, taking up arms at the turn of the century against the sea of empiricist troubles that had been the fortune of British philosophy for over two hundred years. If Bradley’s blend of sceptical idealism demands an impossibly high standard of knowledge—and it must do so in order to swamp the empiricist claim to a consciously sound, deductive treatment of observation—then it is because he is also bolstering up a dying philosophical cause; for his is one of the last great attempts of metaphysics to describe and organise the nature of reality, synthetically, speculatively, or otherwise. Henceforth, this is the business of the natural sciences, and philosophy is content to fall back on its own internally reinforced limit, the scaled-down epistemological concern with the scope and validity of knowledge, and, more specifically, the terms of its critical inquiry into problems involving claims about knowledge; in short, what philosophy knows about itself, rather than what it knows.

As philosophy changed its guard, psychoanalysis, in its formation and popular appeal, came to be posed, significantly, in terms of an enlightenment. Now in view of the threat which psychoanalysis harbours for the rationalist cause tout court, this may appear to be a paradoxical description, but it does seem to fit nonetheless with a long-standing and representative point of view held by its practitioners, analysts and non-analysts alike. The paradox deepens, however, when we are invited to consider the many recent and seriously sustained complaints about psychoanalysis’ own lack of self-knowledge, complaints about the unenlightened assumption that psychoanalysis should be concerned with demonstrating what it knows (about the nature of psychic reality) rather than what it knows about the often unscientific procedures of its institutional structures, and the often perilous consequences they bear out in the course of analysis proper.
To court respectability under the aegis of "science," this was Freud's inveterate blueprint for the analytic enterprise, and the last words of his "autobiographical" study in 1935 confirm his desire as well as the intention behind his survey of the field—that the impression be one of "serious scientific work carried on at a high level." Outside of the pluralistic American psychiatrization of analysis, that impression has taken on its most reputable institutional shape in France, where the analytic experience has entered not only the university curriculum, accepted there as "a specific and autonomous epistemological field," but even more recently, has been offered official sanctuary in the state-administered research units—not, it should be added, without paying heed to the shibboleth raised up by the spectacle of Soviet pedagogical misuse. Is this French turn of events continuous in every way with Freud's desire, or does it involve, on the contrary, a much less conciliatory acceptance of psychoanalysis' troubled relations with the scientific ethos?

### Science and truth

Lacan's return to Freud had claimed to bypass the "science" of the ego laid out in the later metapsychological systems of the Freudian corpus, dating, let us say, from the first emphasis on the subjective structure of narcissism in 1914. Before that rage to codify and formulate set in, it was the unconscious and its formulations which held sway over Freud's interests, particularly in the work on dreams, jokes, and slips of the tongue. It has been suggested, however, that it is not only the latter half but the whole of Freud's work which should be read in the light of an epistemophilic will to master and organise a body of knowledge about the real within the limits of a speculative system, and to present this feat as a triumph of scientific resolve. Analysis, by extension, would then be little more than an experimental method, or a "laboratory" technique, designed to substantiate a pre-existing theory, and provide material for any further modifications of that theory. François Roustang, for one, has gone beyond even this in arguing that the "science" of psychoanalysis is a myth employed from its inception, and at every turn, in order to play down the less reputable aspects of its practical affairs, those which have their murky genesis in hypnosis and suggestion, and which bedevilled Freud in his dealings with thought-transference, telepathy, and the like. In soliciting this myth, he argues, a myth that "domesticates what cannot be integrated into a scientific, technological, rational world," psychoanalysis only extends the limits of science to cover the irrational, a domain from which science had hitherto been excluded. In renouncing it, analysis falls back into "occultism and magic . . . into the unsayable and the ineffable," fore-
doomed never to rise about the “level of faith-healing and witchcraft.” Roustang’s point of view is extreme, if cogently carried through on the polemical terms it establishes—psychoanalysis is compelled to masquerade in the “emperor’s new clothes” of science—terms, however, which ultimately appeal to a theory of origin that assumes a totalising destiny written into psychoanalysis from its onset in a nineteenth-century episteme in which the stifling medicalization of sexual pathology is precariously balanced against the “success” of clinically reprobate practices such as Charcot’s hypnosis techniques. Is this origin to be held up to haunt every new interpretive advance in the field of psychoanalysis, or is it, as much a myth as any old family curse, to be historically assumed, worked through, and finally shrugged off? Contemporary psychoanalytical theory, I will argue, has made an attempt to assume that origin, and to think itself beyond the reductionist grounds of Roustang’s “myth” in a much fuller self-knowledge of that move than he and others have suggested.

Psychoanalysis must, nonetheless, respond to its scienticity, owning up to what it knows in its bones, and the greatest obstacle in the path of such an honest response has been Freud’s positivism, his ideal belief in the rationality of the investigative methods of scientific theory. Although references to that belief do indeed litter the pages of his works, the one qualifying distinction that Freud posed time and time again was that between “a science of the mental unconscious,” responsible only to the manifestations of psychic reality, and the different psychiatric science of individual development, fixed, in its behavioural assumptions, upon a biological or empirical understanding of reality. The divided weight at the fulcrum of this distinction has served to shift psychoanalysis, historically, in America, and to a lesser extent, Britain, away from the Freudian emphasis and into the “family of medical sciences.” Brill’s earliest tussle with Freud over the question of lay analysis generally met with a firm enough response: “In his medical school, a doctor receives a training which is more or less the opposite of what he would need as a preparation for psychoanalysis.” And not long before his death, Freud was just as adamant in the face of the “obvious American tendency to turn psychoanalysis into a housemaid of Psychiatry.” Medicalism, in fact, prevailed in America in spite of Freud; a medicalism bent on testing the validity and credibility of his theory by every means available to science—from formal experiments to controlled observational sessions—with the kind of technological sensibility levelled at putting his “subjectivity” and lack of rigor in its historically belated place. The institutes attached their clinics to the medical schools, and a succession of architectural technicians came to shape and install their respective versions of the analytic process within
the structure of a scientific community which prized hygiene—mental, physical, and social—above all else: Hornby's sociologically determined biologism, the development of an ego psychology of adaptation by Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein, Erikson's psychosocial allegory of the genetic theory of embryology, Alexander's Psychosomatic Medicine, and Sullivan's Genetic Behaviourism. Outside of the more orthodox institutes, which are currently made to appear staid and reactionary by comparison, the schools of therapists study the psychodynamics of the analytic process itself, from outside, with tape recorders and stopwatches at hand. While in the university research centers, in the long nurtured hope of finding an organic root for the neurosis, the geneticist, the neurophysiologist and the microbiologist compare data with the analyst in the course of a collaborative effort which proceeds, as Lacan might have put it, as if the unconscious never existed. And if it didn't, he might have added, then such a community would see no reason to invent it.

As the most resolute critic of these developments, Lacan has insisted that Freud's neo-positivist claims were illusory on this point, and that the practice he conceived as analysis turned out to be the "last flowering of medicine," and the first recognition of a new practice of knowledge. For Lacan, psychoanalysis could never be a science in the rationalist sense because it is irrefutable, or rather because it is not subject to refutation, and is thus a practice more like an art, the speech-art of "gossiping." The last ten years of Lacan's teaching were indeed given over to what he called "the science of the real," but as we shall see later, is less a positivistic science than a stylised non-standard logic. Between these two, however, the "gossiping" of the talking cure, and the "mathematisable minimum" of the later concern with topology, Lacanian theory consistently knocks down any distinctions between registers said to be scientific and non-scientific—distinctions, moreover, which can be seen to draw upon the rationalist categories of truth and error and are thus part and parcel of the ideology of science itself. My concern here is to point to some of the ways in which this theory outstrips these distinctions, how it makes a move comparable, in some respects, to the one already isolated as the shift from metaphysics to epistemology, and how it calls in the end for a revision of the standard epistemological categories themselves, because it stretches them to accommodate a knowledge that is impossible to demonstrate. Such a knowledge is akin to the structure of meaning that produces the symptom, stripped of visible or manifest meaning but simultaneously replete with invisible or latent meaning. For Lacan, this knowledge is the true Freudian "discovery," not least
because its real effects make an epistemological nonsense of the conditions of scientific refutability.

If psychoanalysis is not a science, Lacanian theory still observes that it has to be placed in relation to science, and it does this not only in Lacan's appeal to the science of linguistics but also in his topological account of subjectivity. The Lacanian subject is divided because it shares a reality, one which partakes of both psychic reality, as a primary process, and a conscious, perceptual reality in the secondary process, and it is only in the latter register that we can speak of the rational cogito of science. In the former we find that knowledge, the erstwhile province of science, has been put in its place, that which Lacan confusingly calls "truth" (the truth, however, of unconscious discourse, and hence rationally outlawed)—"Me, the truth, I am speaking,"—which is quite the opposite of the rational self-assurance of "I am speaking the truth." And it is with respect to this that Freud learned from Charcot "to look at the same things again and again until they themselves begin to speak" the truth.12 If that comes off as a discovery of the "truth" of the unconscious, then it is clearly not the same truth which is traditionally brandished by the subject of science as the a priori endorsement of its technological powers. Instead it lays waste to Cartesian certainty—"I think, therefore I am," or "I think 'I am'," two voices, one speaking, one spoken, with a continent of qualities between them. Psychoanalysis, by the same token, does not seek to speak the truth, as the Derridean critique has presupposed; it only speaks up for the truth, and in a manner, like Lacan's, which turns a deaf ear to its rational privileges in suggesting that "truth" is a responsible unconscious cause even if it has irresponsible, conscious effects.

Transference in theory and practice

Undermining the grounds of the knowing subject (savoir) does not, in itself, deliver us from acting upon the intuitive knowledge (connaissance) that some people are more knowing than others. Although this is a perfect misconception, or misrecognition, it prevails all the same in practice, and is responsible for the "subjective disparity"13 of the transferential relation between any two speakers: "as soon as the subject who is supposed to know exists somewhere ... there is transference."14 Transference is thus an imaginary relation to knowledge that has very real effects. Because the transference is such an essential component of the psychoanalytical experience it is through the development of this inter-subjective relation that the cure is mediated; for the sake of definition, the cure can be recognised as a shift, if not a resolution, at some level, of the patient's real or phanta-
sized conflicts in childhood. Given the analyst’s special position of authority in the transference, the relation to the analyst opens up a whole range of identifications for the patient through which he or she acts out the prototype relations of the past, realizes the corresponding unconscious desires, and displaces them onto the analyst. At first Freud mistook this for a resistance, and then recognized it as a necessary intermediate stage of the analysis between “illness and real life” which had to be worked through for the cure to take effect. He noted its resemblance to the total dependency of the hypnotic dialogue, but more important, its affinity with the affairs of love, and in this he was quick to record the perils of detachment:

There is, it is true, one class of women with whom this attempt to preserve the erotic transference for the purposes of analytic work without satisfying it will not succeed. These are women of elemental passionateness who tolerate no surrogates. They are children of nature who refuse to accept the psychical in place of material, who, in the poet’s words, are accessible only to “the logic of soup, with dumplings for arguments.” With such people one has the choice between returning their love or else bringing down upon oneself the full enmity of a woman scorned. In neither case can one safeguard the interests of the treatment. One has to withdraw unsuccessful.

Notwithstanding Freud’s somewhat jaundiced response to the matter of the feminine response, his remarks betray certain assumptions about the analyst’s position; either the patient is forced to “accept” his suggestions, or else the analyst is forced to “withdraw.” Either way, a disparity clearly masks a power relation. In addition, and particularly in regard to the female patient, the analyst was expected to live up to his imaginary vocation of being supposed to know, by discovering the “real” behind the symptom while preserving his neutrality at all costs. In his early work on hysteria, for example, before the seduction theory was dropped, it is clear that Freud cherished the prospect of revealing the true nature of female sexuality, as if all that had been hitherto known was a sham. As for neutrality in the transference, this proved to be nothing more than an act of faith, and Freud discovered as much in the debacle of his analysis with Dora as Breuer had done in his sessions with Anna O. When Anna developed a hysterical pregnancy in the course of that analysis, it was not her desire at stake, but a manifestation of Breuer’s desire: Breuer’s wife became pregnant not long after Anna’s “pregnancy.” Lacanian theory would ascribe this to the proposition that desire is always the desire of the Other, in this case the desire of the analyst. Henceforth, it is actually the question of the desire of the analyst (much more than just the analyst’s professional desire for the patient to work through the symptom) rather than the desire of the
patient, which is properly under consideration in a transference effect that must be realised, dissolved, or merely invoked.

What, however, is the distinction between theory and practice within this modified understanding of the transference? If there is any distinction as such, then clearly it will have to be made in a way which avoids falling back upon the dualistic assumptions of an empirical methodology that maintains its own distinction between practical analytic evidence on the one hand, and the subsequent theoretical formulation of these facts on the other. For each one of the "scientistic" critiques of Freudian analysis (and the list stretches from the earliest anthropological and medical reprovers to recent internal dissidents like Roustang) has been mounted from a position which supposes, even if it does not acknowledge, that there are two separate registers in question, theory and fact, and that their relation can be falsified or else extenuated to the point of falsity, even manifest error. In order to escape the essentialist principles of this kind of logic, clinical or interpretative, it might be instructive to ask what it is that makes any coherent analytic theory impossible, thereby compelling it to enter into an endless and dynamic series of mutations. For both Freudian and Lacanian theory are always in a state of transformation, where successive stages of explication and interpretation often preserve only a rather tenuous relation with what has gone before, systematically speaking—Freud's diverse theories of the instincts/drives, or his two differing psychical topographies; Lacan's radical introduction of the objet a, or the development from the early graphic schemas to the knot and the matheme. Faced with this palimpsest of heterogeneous theoretical matter, Roustang suggests that it is only psychoanalysis' way of not facing up to the facts, facts against which it should be trying and testing itself: "One can only understand how Freud, at a given period, and confronted by specific questions or new problems, created conceptual fictions in an attempt not to classify, but to make these questions and problems work, to get them moving. In every instance, however, after a period of time, his theoretical production started to crack... and he felt he had to invent something else." Roustang concludes that any search for a consistent body of thought in either Freud or Lacan will be fruitless, but also "an excellent way of learning about analytic theory and what not to expect from it." Why must we expect, however, as Roustang seems to assume, that analytic theory is bound to measure its purpose by the capacity to accommodate and codify each new problem posed in the course of analysis? There is no doubt that psychoanalysis has always failed by this criterion of consistency. What is at stake here is the nature of that failure. If we stick so close to Roustang's myth notion of science that we too
become falsificationist judges, or victims of its empirical contagion, then that failure will, of course, be a natural consequence, the plain evidence that analytic theory, not being a science, is unable to conduct itself in a scientific manner. On the other hand, if we look to the way in which psychoanalytical theory seeks to challenge the empirical methodology, as part of the self-reflexive will to interrogate its own epistemological practices, then that failure becomes something symbolic, a symptom of an impossibility or a lack which cannot be tested or verified, but which psychoanalysis discovers at the core of its experience. Incapable of being demonstrated, it can only be theorised around, endlessly. Lacan calls this lack the “real,” and we shall see later that its distance from the empirical noncontradictory real recognised by scientific method cannot be stressed enough.

For the present, it may be useful to point to the current use of the term “theory” in intellectual discourse inasmuch as it is increasingly taken to refer to an autonomous activity. Grammatically, this use of “theory” appears to do the work of a gerund—the discipline, practice, or currently active state of theorising—but perhaps even more autonomous yet, since it escapes the petrification of a noun-form only by failing to take up the duties of a verb. The result is that it eludes the dialectical grasp not only of “theory” as it is commonly understood in the generic sense, but also of “a theory” along with its implied inferential agencies, the deductive subject and the proven system. For Lacanians, among others, this emphasis upon the activity in itself has proved to be a successful way of going about eroding the positivist coastlines. One might compare it with another development in polemical parlance encouraged by Althusser; the transitive use of the verb, to think, as in “to think a politics of the unconscious,” for example, where the activity of thinking clearly takes into account all of the possible effects of its own enunciation—in this particular case, effects that would be heavily phantasmatic. We may or may not take these to be symptoms of a current state of theoretical desire. The point I am making, however, is that theory can no longer be taken for a forensic code, like Freud’s metapsychology, a set of statutory or causicidal bye-laws designed to regulate the interpretative practice of derived evidence. Contrary to the easy truism, it is theory, and not language, which, pragmatically speaking, has squandered its referent and set up in private practice.

To illustrate some of the concrete effects of this development, I shall briefly outline Gerard Miller’s speculative survey of the changing historical face of the analytic relation in its arrangement around the transference. In the first years of analysis when neutrality is the golden rule, the analyst largely subscribes to the medical doxa of payment in return for a cure. By the fifties, the cure is no longer the
trump card, the patient wants to know as much as the analyst (who is supposed to know). In the present state of Lacanian analysis, when the patient’s symptom is just as likely to be bound up within his or her conscious knowledge of analytic procedure or even theory, he or she wants to be like the analyst, and thus identification is the starting point rather than a resolution, the passage from analysand to analyst then being the definition of a “successful” analysis. Desire-for-the-analyst is thus the desire of the patient but since the analyst’s desire is also the desire of the Other, it is no less than the desire of the patient; all of which makes for the kind of paradoxical circuit which Lacan characterised by the Moebius strip, one vicious circle where there should be two separate orbits. Surely it is impossible to systematise these historical developments in a theory-neutral way, or to conclude, as a theory of origin does, that they are each bound in turn to the nineteenth-century ideology of examination and discovery. On the contrary, it may be that theory has entered into the spirit of analysis, an entry determined as much by changing social and ideological conditions—how we address authority, knowledge, and subjectivity—as by the desire to scrutinise the internal contradictions of analytic practice. If that is the case, analysis is not then a mere testing ground for the purpose of producing ever more abstract theoretical formulae. There is an animated dialogue at stake, for theory has seldom been more in love with practice.

The Institution

In his paper on the mirror-stage, Lacan alludes, if obliquely, to the classical dilemma posed by the transference when he writes that “psychoanalysis alone recognises this knot of imaginary servitude which love must always undo again, or sever.” Is the transference ever fully dissolved? And if it is, what are the consequences in view of the fact that the majority of our social and community ties are bound together in a similar love-knot? Outside of the United Nations, the most spectacular example of the inter-cellular mayhem likely to be generated by this (un)knotting has been in the psychoanalytical community itself, in an institutional milieu with a long history of fission, persecution, and excommunication, as painful for the personalities involved as it is colorful for its appreciative pawns or disinterested observers. Freud was never more sanguine than when he noted that “psychoanalysis brings out the worst in everyone,” while later evoking a much more baleful prospect on behalf of his enemies in the “spectacle they so heartily desire—of ‘the psychoanalysts tearing one another limb from limb’.” In Group Analysis and the Psychology of the Ego (1921) he attempted to isolate the ‘herd instinct’ or more accurately the ‘horde’
instinct within the great artificial groups like the Church and the Army. Conventional love-relations and a strong identification with the ego-Ideal (in the shape of a Führer-Prinzip) combine to drive the group mentality into a nexus of orthodox allegiances, ties which unanimously sever and variously disintegrate when their common love-object, the figurehead leader, is threatened or else dies. It is not clear whether Freud was wholly aware of the extent to which the analytic institution had already, by 1921, come to reproduce that orthodox structure, and in a conspiratorial style worthy of any Jacobean cabal: an orthodoxy which had already proclaimed its heretics, Adler and Stekel in 1911, Jung in 1912; claimed its first martyr-victims in the suicides of Karl Schrötter, Herbert Silberer, Otto Gross, and Viktor Tausk; and generally conducted itself in terms of a reverential extension of its founder's word. Much of that psychodrama, in retrospect, seems to have been overdetermined by the transferential components of discipleship, if not the larger, more chronic lack of self-knowledge borne by the entire analytic enterprise. In 1910, the International Psychoanalytical Association was founded, primarily to exclude dissenters, or as Freud put it in an ironical parenthesis, to declare that "all this nonsense is nothing to do with analysis; this is not psychoanalysis." A corporate body with the power to excommunicate, to disconnect a portion of its voice and pretend to ignore it: is this not a passable description of those same repressive conditions under which the symptom is produced?

The institution has the other, more domestic function of training analysts and, thus, of passing on psychoanalytical knowledge. Unlike in any other discipline, this knowledge is acquired, not through standard pedagogical channels, but almost entirely in the trainee's analysis itself; hence its course is determined by the transference relation. Even when it is said to be dissolved, that relation is passed on to the putative master of the institution, as the subject who is most supposed to know, thereby producing the familiar structure of discipledom. In the case of Lacan we are tempted to consider this process in an exemplary light. Indeed we are invited to do so since Lacanian theory not only openly acknowledges its ex cathedra stance, but also advertises the dangers of its institutionalization while observing how its premisses have been acted out within such a setting, the given site of a continuous history of breaks, interregnums, schisms, and intra-political skullduggery. At this point we are brought up short, if only by being forced to recognize the huge discrepancy between this high level of curricular self-knowledge and the apparent artlessness of the Freudian experience. Not wishing to throw ourselves into more of an epistemological tangle than Lacanian theory demands by course, we might listen to some of the things it says about its relation to institutionalization.
On the face of it, Lacan's involvement with the institution seems compelled to repeat the earliest patterns of Freudian discord, almost as if to superimpose its new fractures upon the old faultlines. Expelled from the Paris Psychoanalytical Society in 1953, he helped to form the French Psychoanalytical Society from which, in turn, he was excluded in 1964 as the price to pay for its recognition by the IPA. His own school, the Ecole Freudienne, set up in the same year, flourished until internal dissension caused him to dissolve it peremptorily in 1980, after which the new Cause Freudienne led a much more tenuous existence, caught in the often virulent crossfire between his loyal and his dissident students. Lacan's death, in 1981, was theoretically and ritualistically acknowledged well before its time. However, in the numerous attempts of others, before and since, to theorise both the death and the preceding dissolution, we are offered a textbook example of the way in which analytic theory is driven by the need to follow up as many of the approaches to the real as possible, and to circulate around that lack, concretely suggested or represented by the material loss of Lacan himself. Poetic accounts of this are legion. Catherine Clément suggests that Lacan met "death by rumour", that he was a surrogate victim or martyr, pursued and devoured, like Actaeon, by his hounds, while Stuart Schneiderman projects the event onto a full-sized Shakespearean stage upon which the tragic flaw of hubris returns to strike down its repenting hero. Jacques-Alain Miller, as Lacan's sutured stand-in (occupying the privileged son-in-law's position which had gone auspiciously unfilled in Freud's family) presents a more literal view in observing that the mass hysteria caused by both of these events, the death and the dissolution, was merely a "destiny consonant with [Lacan's] theory of transference."

It is Roustang, above all, who has surveyed the grounds for that last suggestion, constructing an argument important and powerful enough to warrant closer examination. In Dire Mastery, he has written a critique of the institution as a society which works to reinforce rather than dissolve the transference bonds, one which obsessively demands a submission in advance to the Master's word which can only assume the socially dangerous form of an utter transference so redolent of the familiar response to political dictatorship. Not only does this preclude the possibility of free speech, but it also brings on an induced psychosis in the analyst-disciple whereby he or she is deliriously bound to the thought and discourse of an Other. For Roustang, that discourse is Lacanian theory, which then becomes no more than "a symptom or system of defence" against the furtherance of true analytic work. His account reaches its colorful heights in a description of the "sterility" of Lacan's followers, reduced to "intransigence, pretension, crass ignor-
ance and fanaticism" before the gaze of their "master-hysteric-educator-analyst" in a scene redolent of the definition of Alfred Hoche—"a fanatical sect blindly submissive to their leader"—which Freud took pleasure in quoting in his history of the movement.26 Even in spite of his rare bouts of vitriolic, Roustang's impatience with this alarming model of servitude would seem to appeal to our emancipatory instincts, forcefully drawing upon assumptions that have traditionally sharpened those instincts, especially those about self-expression and its idealist libertarian promise of an unshackled speech. Whether or not one accepts the political analogy—analyst/analysand = State/citizen—the structure of that analogy is already assumed to some extent in Roustang's argument. The analogy, however, is one that brings into play the same kind of criticisms that Gramsci and Althusser levelled against the Marxist topography of base/superstructure, and the rationally determinate relation that obtains between them. Roustang's general argument invites a similar critique because it preserves and emphasizes a distinction between a utopian state of analytic investigation that would provide a truly representative knowledge of the facts, and a distorted or "repressive ideology" of false theoretical speculation. Such a distinction is supported by the categories of truth and error which Lacanian theory, in its style and purpose, seeks to put to the sword. If psychoanalysis has to have the imprimatur of "science," then perhaps, to follow up the analogy, it would be more appropriate to refer to Althusser's understanding of science as a properly theoretical relation which breaks up, rather than confirms, a set of natural or imaginary ties to a given reality. This latter notion is what Althusser employs in his own critique of the correspondence theory of economic determinism as a rationalist construction. In the case of psychoanalysis, "science" would then be a theoretical point of view which attacks the 'seemingly natural' relation between metapsychological theory and the 'given reality' of the facts as they appear, a relation already classed here as methodologically empiricist.27

Roustang's argument, however, is not an empiricist one, and it would be a misrepresentation to claim it as such. It only assumes certain empiricist responses. Nonetheless, in moving through these to outline a new panacea for the problems of current analytic theory in terms of a fresh and unmediated symbiotic unity between analyst and patient, it turns towards a more esoteric referent which is precisely the flipside of a thwarted empiricism. And is this not the historical experience of psychoanalysis itself? For those of the Freudian dissidents who eschewed the biologist path of empiricism chose to invest instead in anthropological mysticism and mythologies, like Jung, Rank, Roheim, Adler and Fromm, or else the myths of utopian power/de-
sire, like Reich, Marcuse, Laing and the anti-Oedipalists. The trajectory of Roustang’s own nostalgia for an imaginary unity is not so straightforward, but his basic reasoning is as follows. Analysis aims at resolving the transference, an act which can only bring on madness, and so the transference is never actually dissolved. In the institutional structure it is displaced from the analyst on to the Master, and from there, on to the Master’s theory. Analysis is thus impossible, if by it one means the satisfactory resolution of an unmediated transference—hence Binswanger’s formula, “he whom psychoanalysis has once seized, it never lets go.” The converse of this is less straightforward, for Roustang goes on to suggest that “the psychotic succeeds where the analyst fails.”

For the analyst, theory is taken up as a garde-fou; it staves off the delirium threatened by a resolved transference. For the psychotic, with no stable sense of ego, it is his only hope; since all of the thoughts and ideas which inhabit his consciousness belong to an Other, it is up to him to re-appropriate them, to speak in his own name again, in short, to theorise his own case. The psychotic’s resubjectivation goes by way of theory, while the analyst’s attempt to sever his theoretical ties goes by way of delirium. In Roustang’s scenario they are travelling in opposite directions, and manage to meet in a hypothetically charmed spot:

The analyst and the analysand may intersect at the point where all consistency is voided (which is indeed a definition of the dissolution of the transference transposed into analytic discourse). Where the psychoanalyst attempts the impossible task of voiding all consistency, he finds the analysand caught in the impossibility of giving consistency to the task of voiding and in the impossibility of establishing any supposition for discourse. If the intersection takes place through the identification that I have mentioned, it becomes possible for the psychotic, at this point of maximum voiding that is offered to him not to establish a stable other. Rather he can run up against the inconsistency of another who is voiding himself and is therefore no longer a threat to him, as another who presents or presents to himself a threat of being cut short in the boundlessness of his discourse by another subject who thinks in order not to think—and no longer quite simply be another nonsubject-who-does-not-think.

A psychosis theory has increasingly become the promised land of an anti-establishment psychoanalysis, and recently the psychotic has been valorised as the speaker of truth with free and unrestricted access to a more ‘natural’ source of knowledge. In his emphasis upon resubjectivation, Roustang appears to be at odds with this assumption (associated, above all, with Deleuze and Guattari), and in fact he disclaims it outright. His call is for a ‘re-territorialisation’ nonetheless, a renegade place in a no man’s land between madness and the social-
ised symbolic order, a place where the conflicts of filiation are meaningless (the psychotic rarely has any ancestry). Lacan definitively puts psychosis outside of the symbolic in his insistence that this is no simple hurdle to cross since it radically forecloses everything outside of its limits. Although he does not take issue with the Lacanian theory of psychosis, Roustang discounts the symbolic by implying that the analyst can come and go at will, flirting with 'temporary' psychosis and the like, and this amounts to an invitation to a free-for-all, like that of the anti-Oedipalists, where desires can be met and fulfilled in an egalitarian setting at a safe distance from the repressive social ties which bind us to the Other. And in *Psychoanalysis Never Lets Go*, he reveals the price to pay for this visionary space. For it means accommodating telepathy, thought transference, and the other marginally occult areas of thought from which psychoanalysis has struggled to clear its name ever since Freud's dabblings in hypnosis. Against the 'mediated' transference of orthodox analysis, Roustang puts forward a case for a direct psychical transference which Freud had suggested may have been "the original, archaic method of communication between individuals" before the ascendancy of the sign, and yet still prevalent in phenomena like mass hysteria. Analysis employs the mediated transference as *infinite* in duration in order to ward off this primitive, symbiotic relation which might otherwise be established between the unconscious of the analyst and that of the analysand. Noting the analytic evidence of the "vital need for a primitive unity" or archaic fusion, one set within an entirely *ahistorical* time, Roustang proposes a discourse of the non-said, as opposed to the Lacanian half-said, as the basis for a new form of analysis which "would then be the thread-by-thread production of a symbiotic fabric in which two unconscious minds would progressively and silently communicate under the cover of an analysis through language." Since this process appears to have no need for symbolisation, it is difficult to see where the talking cure could have any role to play in its operations, or, for that matter, most of what is understood today as the psychoanalytical *sine qua non*: repression, castration, sexuality, even the unconscious. Each of these would fall, one after the other, into theoretical redundancy once the requirement for a psychic structure of mediation is withdrawn. One of Roustang's examples of a more concrete symbiotic unity is the mother-child relation prized by the Kleinian school, and it is this attachment which has been lately taken up by French feminists like Irigaray and Cixous in the course of another bid to mythologise the analytic other (not the Other), specifically, their pursuit of a 'natural' female pre-symbolic voice beyond the patriarchal castratory order of speech. Like theirs, Roustang's final court of appeal may have to be to the natural as
opposed to the symbolic. This is a reference, normally made directly to
the body, which all occult systems, no matter how esoteric, try to
preserve; it is not very far at all, effectively, from the empirical appeal
to biological reality which both Freud and Lacan were at pains to
challenge.

**The Real as Impossible**

Given Roustang's inverted priorities, his conclusion—that psy­
choanalysis is impossible—will be interpreted as a *natural* failure. But
what if this were to be read as the symbolic recognition of an impossi­
bility internal to the psychic constituency of the subject, and not just to
analysis: the real inasmuch as it is impossible it lies beyond our
conceptual ways of representing it symbolically. It would not then be a
case of failing to cope, theoretically, with the facts, but of representing
the facts *in as much as they do not appear*, and then accepting, through
that representation, that this lack is reproduced at every level of the
analytic experience.

I have suggested that the most pertinent example of this (and it
involves mass hysteria) is the dissolution of Lacan’s school, an event so
heavily theorised that it seems ‘impossible’ that it should have acted
out or represented anything which had not already been discussed at
length, cited, proposed in writing, or feared out loud. And yet, within
Parisian analytic circles, it still produced all of the calamitous effects
normally reserved for a catastrophe no-one had thought possible. By
the time it took place, it had become an ‘impossible’ occurrence. It was
no longer a *natural* outcome. Over the year Lacan had made ample
reference to the ‘horde’ effect, and in his Letter of Dissolution, he
alludes explicitly to this in a discussion of the psychoanalytical
Church, in addition to recognising his own position as the severed link
in the Borromean knot—once cut, the one that frees all the others and
puts an end to the dire mastery of his disciples’ transference. For two
months before the dissolution, Lacan had been silent, an event which
gave rise to the long predicted mass anxiety, and at the pitch of that
anxiety, he played out the hitherto unvoiced assumptions about his
magisterial discourse by suggesting that “if it turns out that I have to go
away, tell yourselves that it is in order to be the Other at last.” Since
Lacan was only confirming what had always been obvious for his
students, why were all of these formidable symptoms thrown up
around such a theoretically inevitable turn of events? To confirm it
further? Or in the hope of catching up with the real by coming upon
something unmentionable that had been excluded from considera­
tion?
At this level of interpretation it is not enough to be theoretical, one must be theoreticalistic in order to follow the path of theory. For Lacan, the real is characterised in relation to the unmentionable, to that which has always already been excluded. Excluding is a necessary, constitutive act for any order of cultural experience, and the psychoanalytic institution is no exception. We have seen how Freud found the IPA on this principle, and indeed how the French societies excluded the bête noire of Lacan's own voice. Which might lead us to consider the proposition that "there is a real at stake in the very foundation of psychoanalysis" and one, as Lacan suggests, that has something to do with the impossibility of the psychoanalytical group "as a group." The communique issued by his students after his death records that his interest in the group was not in how it worked, but rather in its failure and in how "the psychoanalytical formation is put to work" within that failure. The purpose of the dissolution was to allow that formation and its impossibility to "ek-sist" and stand out like a symptom even though it could never be wholly resolved.

This urgency to catch up with the real might be posed as a supplement to Roustang's in advance, the complete submission to a theoretical discourse ahead of time. His reasoning demands, however, that the transference on to theory rests upon the assumption that the theory is complete, that it reintegrates a discourse of faults, holes and lacks (the character traits of the unconscious) into a "new coherence", the aim of which is to "suppress the lack itself through [the disciples'] faith in a logic based on the lack." Only then can the transference take place, only if the theory is "supposed to know." The logic in question is Lacan's 'science of the real' and we must now consider whether that logic is indeed a discourse of mastery, or whether, a contrario, it advertises its own inconsistency in a way which effectively alienates knowledge. For the most acute resistance to Lacanian theory has been drawn, not from the ranks of the traditional censure of theory—that it takes abstract liberties with the facts—but from a squeamishness about coming to terms with the unperformed or incomplete; and this is a distinction which cannot help but point up the serious and often frightening distance between the real and the functionally complacent order of empirical reality. Indeed, one of the chief causes of dissent among the Lacanian school was precisely over this 'science of the real' and the teaching of the matheme. A project which came to dominate more than a decade of the last stage of Lacan's thinking, it follows on, in the trinitarian schema, from the identification of the imaginary first established in the mirror stage of 1936, and the systematisation of the symbolic set out in the Discours de Rome of 1956. If we had to choose a similar mooring-point for the public demonstration of the real, it
would be the 1973 seminar on feminine sexuality, _Encore_, and its blunt message—the non-performance of the sexual relation.

**The Real and Logic**

Evidence for the real subscribes to a fugitive or non-standard logic and not to a set of classical proofs, since the real can be conceived of only as escaping or exceeding us. As a contradictory event which is out of logical range, it eclipses our logical understanding, so much so because it is bound up with the cardinal experience of analysis, the symptom. Although it should not be regarded as a sophisticated disguise for the real, the symptom is made up in such a way as to suggest that its meaning is preserved elsewhere and this goes beyond its bogus appearance as a part of speech or bodily sign, thus providing the most graphic record of its relations with what is inconsistent or lacking in human experience, what it always misses out on. The real is mentioned (_le dit-mention du réel_) through the symptom or other signifying testimonies, it can then be said to butt in (_le but_/ _la butée_/ _le bout de réel_); but not headfirst (since its face is religiously forbidden), rather by way of its backside, as if in the impossibility of its making ends meet. Lacan describes it as “always a tail-end, a stump and, although one around which thought is worked, its stigmata is that it is not bound up in anything.”

Since it has no consistency, it carries its weight only in its effects, those obstacles, snags, or hitches which block the path taken by our common sense; or in a larger sense, as those complex moments when History comes to grief, catalysed by a set of events (frequently violent) which flunk the test of our available understanding, the events of 1968 being the prototype of this for Lacanians.

Tracking down or catching up with the real is a necessarily fruitless undertaking: we can only come to terms with its effects. In a more clinical context, this would correspond to the problem posed for analytic theory by the symptom, which is always a deferred effect and can never “speak the truth” about its origin. Lacan’s late method turns that theoretical problem into a virtue, and it does so, not by travelling beyond the real in an attempt to explain or positivistically set out the organising principles of that real, but by embodying its unfinished logical character in demonstrating that it is undemonstrable, even in the very premisses it supports. If that brings on a logical headache it is a sympathetic one, but hardly conducive to a discourse of mastery. On the contrary, it is a response in keeping with the turn taken by epistemology in which logic is no longer the faultless proof of a systematic knowledge of reality, but rather the discursive interrogation of its own ‘problems’, the calculating evidence of things which it
cannot prove, or which stretch its capacity to prove beyond its own formally approved limits. Theory, epistemological or analytic, then becomes an issue of language. This is nothing new for Lacanian theory, but in his late, consuming interest in mathematical topology, Lacan is moved by a more exacting desire: to trade meanings in the very language which would punish rationalism on its oldest and firmest ground, the Euclidean method of formal analysis and deduction.

Lacan places the real in the “tangles of the true” of its symbolic setting. From there his concern with the topology of the knot develops into the scrutiny of an array of chains, braids, tores and rings—graphemes which, like the semes of linguistics, are the simplest of self-contained units, falling somewhere between metaphors and representations of psychic space: what is interior/exterior and how their forms and shapes change when viewed from different positions. Graphically, then, they can represent the contradictory in terms of folds, points and surfaces; but, because of their planar contacts with limits like the circle or ellipse, they also suggest some kind of bodily consistency by inviting us to consider them as phantasmatic projections of bodily space:

In everything concerning topology one must always be very careful to avoid attributing it with any kind of Gestalt function. This does not mean that certain living forms do not give up, sometimes, the sensation of being a kind of effort of the biological to forge something that resembles the portions of those fundamental topological objects that I developed for you in my seminar on Identification—for example, the mitre, you will remember, is a self-intersecting surface projected into three-dimensional space. I could very easily designate for you a particular point or plan of the anatomical configuration that seems to exemplify life’s touching strivings after topological configurations.

What breaks up that “touching” phantasy of consistency and continuity is the notion of self-intersection, whereby a topic element in a chain (and the Lacanian knot is always a chain) crosses itself, is cut and divided, but continues nonetheless, in spite of its loss of ‘identity’ as a point occupying a unique and homotopic space. The fact of division (symbolic) does not prevent its continuity (imaginary) even though that may appear to us to be logically impossible (real). Because of that capacity to represent the combinatory elements of Lacan’s analytic model, the knots are a convenient way of talking about ordinary neurotic discourse—something that cannot be spoken, comes across itself traumatically, and is repeated as a symptom without, however, disturbing the rational surface of discourse or snapping the thread of meaning.
Lacan's commitment to some of the method of mathematical theory is certainly a maverick one, but it is wrong to assume that there is nothing more at stake in this than the prospect of finding increasingly more efficient analogies for any given analytic operation or model. It would be rhetorically satisfying, for example, to suppose that the "matheme" is simply another "writing of the real," an embodiment of that which is un-writeable (ne cesse pas de s'écrire), and that it merely serves to furnish Lacan with a new style, another way, perhaps more concretely inconclusive than his earlier circumlocutory discourse, of mimicking the fickle spaces and drifting will of the unconscious. This would be to assume that the matheme is constructed solely for the purpose of proving the assertions of analytic theory. Rather than adhere to this "testing" model of interpretation, we might entertain the less positivistic notion that it is the psychoanalytical treatment of knowledge which has something to contribute to the general conditions of a mathematical logic, or at least that there is some continuity between psychoanalytical theory and the efforts of mathematical theory to examine a logic of consistency or completeness. Interpreted in this light, the matheme is then conceived of as a working medium for distinguishing a standard logic (based on the classical criterion of consistency which governs the definition of a properly scientific procedure) and a non-standard logic (based on the tolerance of inconsistency and contradiction so endemic to analytic procedure).42

As distinct from the foundational requirements of Euclidean deduction—axioms as self-evident truths—Lacan's matheme subscribes to Cantor's transfinite universe in which different orders of infinity obtain; this is also the difference between a fixed Cartesian conception of the mathematical object and a more fluid world of continually variable functions. The increasingly abstract dimension of modern mathematics and its subsequent attempts to formulate connections between various branches such as geometry, algebra, and topology, have led theorists to propose that a pure mathematical logic is possible, and that it would have an ultimate basis, if any, in number theory, the discipline of infinite processes developed by Cantor and Dedekind. Lacan's inspiration is to recognise that the infinite, or the un-finished, is the working limit of all psychic operations inasmuch as they either derive from incomplete processes or else produce incomplete formations: two examples of these respective failures of unicity are suggested by Lacan's translation of das Unbewusste (the unconscious) as l'une-bèvue (mistaken-for-one, or one-at-odds), and his emphasis on the "not-all" (pas-toute) of Woman as a universal sexual category. Both these examples can be read as highly qualified critiques of the ways in which concepts like "the unconscious" and "Woman"
have been essentialized as fixed and easily available terms of reference. L'une-bèvue challenges both the Jungian and Deleuzian attempts to speak about the unconscious as a "collective" or universal substratum of vital energy, to be merged with or plugged into, but it also critiques the practice of referring to an "individual's unconscious" as if it were a particular possession. Similarly, the force of pas-toute is not only to militate against the idea that all women, by virtue of a common gender, can best be represented by one common term, but also to suggest that references to particular or personal experience ("the personal is the political") cannot be presented as if they were natural and unproblematic reflections of a universal, sexual essence. Both these issues, of course, have complex social consequences. Lacan's insistence on the unfinished at all psychic levels helps to explain why these problematic social consequences cannot be so easily assumed or resolved.

One result of drawing attention to the infinite constitution of psychoanalysis is to challenge any belief in the success of mounting a universally valid formal system of psychoanalytical knowledge, capable of accounting for all of the vicissitudes of analytic theory and practice. Far from aspiring to such a formal purity in the spirit of Leibniz's mathesis universalis, the matheme is predicated solely upon treating those instances of failure or contradiction which would effectively destroy the consistency of any such systematic knowledge. Catastrophe theory in mathematics, for example, seeks to analyse or accommodate in a logically cogent way what happens when "reality" goes wrong. In Lacanian times, the catastrophe would be the effect of the real. The difference is that the real and its effects are not a local inconsistency or contingency as the catastrophe is for catastrophe theory; the real is a constitutive and thus necessary event for Lacanian theory. Inasmuch as the real would then be the object of knowledge for a psychoanalytical science or systematic logic, it would have to be the only object, and one that necessarily eludes definition according to the formal axiomatics of a system that requires some standard measure of consistency. For Lacan then, the matheme is important because it refuses this criterion: it demonstrates, significantly, that it cannot properly accommodate "impossible" elements into such a system, while the demonstration of this undemonstrability is something it will only embody, finally, like any other articulated discourse.

Inasmuch as psychoanalytical knowledge comes under the purview of epistemological attention or explanation, it is a knowledge that fails to work in any consistent, or at least recognizably consistent, manner which could fit such an explanation. Perhaps the result of this will, after all, be nothing if not depressing. Rationality will reclaim its
limits, and stake out its familiar ground on its familiar and time-honored terms. Psychoanalytical knowledge will be pushed outside of that cordon sanitaire (one which still harbours hopes of immunity to an all-vitiating human catastrophe), and will be stripped of its dubious privilege of respectability. Surely there is a way of avoiding such a reductive outcome, and I hope that I've managed to describe, as best I can, some of its more basic premisses in this paper. Obviously, it is more than a case of merely capsizing empirical procedure, but even that at least would make room for the following proposition. Rather than submit the knowledge that psychoanalysis offers to a proof, rather than submit it to the test of a logic of necessity, whether scientific or epistemological, it may be that psychoanalytical knowledge as such offers one way of modifying, perhaps even rethinking, a classical logic of necessity itself.

A Conclusion

The real is as much an inconsistent level of construction within Lacanian theory as it is a part of a phenomenal practice to be tried and tested rationally against that theory. In effect, it is neither, and thereby defeats the categorical imperatives of a scientific methodology which even denies the existence of a dynamic relationship between theory and practice, let alone admits to the effective promiscuity of that relationship. I have pointed out the rejection of these categories, first of all in Lacan’s epistemological treatment of knowledge and truth, and secondly in the paradoxical role of the transference relation: transference is the balance between theory and practice, and it fails, not because the relation between theory and practice is misconceived or erroneous, but because transference enacts “the reality of the unconscious” which determines, symbolically, its failure. In a brief survey of the teaching on the real, and the institutionally disruptive effects that draw attention to that real, I have suggested that these two discursive areas can be seen as interdependent, a fact which might call for a more serious consideration of this aspect of Lacanian theory, although it should in no way advance the misconception that the real is confined to psychoanalysis or its institutions. And lastly, I have argued that the matheme and the “science of the real” are ways of approaching a non-standard logic that militates against the university of scientific method.

Psychoanalysis has its origins in an empirical methodology which troubles it yet, and on both sides of the Atlantic. There is little difference between Charcot’s limited point of view when he announces, within Freudian earshot, ça n’empêche pas d’exister, and that of other worried lovers of reality, like Samuel Johnson, stubbing his toe on the stone to refute Berkeley’s theory of the nonexistence of matter.
The other side of this essentialism is the esoteric scepticism of Bradley’s monism - “Whatever you know, it is all one.” In Lacanian thinking, “One” is many things: a number as well as a metaphysical unity, and so it is unlike any other signifier, a cipher of the real because it suggests, in its ambivalence, an order of knowledge about which we have an incomplete understanding, and which necessarily exceeds us — “It is only known for what it has ... it is never known for what it is.” Which can only alienate our knowledge, and the free use of it, still further — it’s not what you know, it’s who you know, if by who one means the Other.

NOTES


3. See the fifth issue of L’Ane: le magazine freudien (1982) for a report.

4. An impressive critique along these lines can be found in Samuel Weber’s The Legend of Freud (Minneapolis: U of Minneapolis Press, 1982). Weber’s sense of a coherent “system” draws more upon its antecedents in metaphysics than upon any overview of the synthetic aspirations of science itself. On this general point, Freud was insistent that psychoanalysis need not publicise a world-view of its own: “it does not need one: it is a part of science and can adhere to the scientific Weltanschauung.” He quotes Heine’s lines about the philosopher’s eccentric audacity in order to decorate his point: “with his nightcaps and the tatters of his dressing gown he patches up the gaps in the structure of the universe.”


6. Freud met head-on with an origin-based complaint at least once, in The Question of Lay Analysis, and responded with a properly psychoanalytical reading of the medical claims to possession of his work: “It is argued that psychoanalysis was after all discovered by a physician in the course of his efforts to assist his patients. But that is clearly neither here nor there. Moreover, the historical argument is double-edged. We might pursue the story and recall the unfriendliness and indeed the animosity with which the medical profession treated analysis from the very first. That would seem to imply that it can have no claims over analysis today. And though I do not accept that implication, I still feel some doubts as to whether the present wooing of psychoanalysis by the doctors is based, from the point of view of the libido theory, upon the first or the second of Abraham’s sub-stages — whether they wish to take possession of their object for the purpose of destroying or of preserving it.”


18. Much of what has popularly been at stake for psychoanalysis on this point can be summarily suggested by an extract from a publisher's blurb for Stekel's Frigidity in Woman, Vol. 11 (New York: Liveright, 1941): "No other scientist could treat this subject with greater understanding and human sympathy than Dr. Stekel. His authority is paramount and is based upon practice and not mere theoretical observation."
22. Ibid., p. 43.
24. As the only American student of Lacan, Schneiderman has written his theoretical memoir in the staple genre that follows on from those who underwent a similar experience with Freud over half a century earlier. The aims of his book are twofold; firstly, to present a candid resume of Lacanian techniques for the broad-minded American analyst, and secondly, to serve as a neo-journalistic account of the late schismatic turn of events around Lacan.
27. For a very meticulous assault on the empirical point of view in the philosophy of science, see B. R. Cosin, G. F. Freeman and N. H. Freeman, "Critical Empiricism Criticised: The Case of Freud" in The Journal of the Theory of Social Behaviour, 1, 2, pp. 121-151.
29. Ibid., p. 155.
34. "L'Étoude, Ornicar?," Scilicet, 1 (1968), p. 36.
39. In the course of an otherwise incisive account of Charcot's teaching methods in The Sexual Fix (London: MacMillan, 1982), Stephen Heath notes that the only comparable event in Parisian public life since the Salpêtrière lectures has been Lacan's own seminar (p. 48n), and implies that the same expository code of masterful demonstration is being enforced. Lacan, however, calls his talks monstutations; which might be translated as "showings" in the sense employed by the medieval mystics to suggest that a fullness is elsewhere, and can only manifest itself in what is 'shown' to be lacking from it. A scientific demonstration, by contrast, would seem to depend on the implied epistemological, if not actual, presence of an object to accompany the principled display of the coherence of its effects. The monsturation, semantically, acknowledges its own distance from such a procedure.
41. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p. 147. In this, Lacan is following up some of the comments made by Freud concerning psychic modes of representation: for example, "the ego is not only a surface, but also the projection of a surface." The Ego and the Id, Standard Edition, IX, p. 26.
42. This has always been a concrete philosophical distinction, from the Heraclitean paradox to Engels' literal reading of the neo-Hegelian assertion of the existence of contradictions in nature. One recent example of a polemical attempt to argue the non-standard case while
allaying the *horror contradictionis* of classical logic is *The Logic of Inconsistency* by Nicholas Rescher and Robert Brandom (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1979) [for a more comparative cost-benefit analysis of “alternative” logics see Susan Haack, *Deviant Logic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974)]. Rescher and Brandom’s concern with *ontological inconsistency* leads them to advance the claim that non-standard possible worlds and their objects are ontologically on a par with standard, consistent, and complete worlds. By separating epistemological inconsistency—an inconsistent world-description—from ontological inconsistency—an inconsistent-world description—they reason that there is no need to lapse into inconsistency to describe the inconsistency of an object world. “We can have our cake and eat it too,” they claim (p. 139), for the attempt to make provision for paradoxical, contradictory, or impossible objects in no way requires that we modify or dispense with the principles of classical logic. Overall rationality can be preserved if inconsistency is treated as a “localisable anomaly” rather than an “all-vitiating” catastrophe.

Rescher and Brandom’s proposed logic is not in itself non-standard, if only because it is granted immunity to the contagion of contradictions they are prepared to attribute to possible worlds. The Lacanian insistence on a logic of discourse which acknowledges responsibility for its enunciation would, of course, remove this immunity, which is to say that the “inconsistency” of the real, far from being simply the non-standard object of the matheme, affects the discourse of the matheme itself. The real, furthermore, belongs to neither of Rescher and Brandom’s categories of logical inconsistency, the “local” or the “all-vitiating” catastrophe. On the contrary, its inconsistency is the *foundational* element of psychoanalytic “logic,” and it is this exceptional circumstance that renders not only the ontological but also the epistemological and the semantic requirements of the matheme all non-standard at one and the same time. Whatever the hypothetical consequences of such a situation, it is important to recognise that Lacan’s quarrel is not with systematic rationality as such, but rather with claims for *universality*. In contrast to Freud’s obsessive onal struggle with dualism, Lacan’s polemical anxiety turns on the “something of One” (*Y a d’Un*) which psychoanalysis represents as the failure of universal propositions (theocratic and democratic alike, which explains perhaps why psychoanalysis, when used as a direct source of political fuel, will always burn with a very weak flame).

43. “Là où on se reconnaît, c’est seulement dans ce qu’on a ... on ne se reconnaît jamais dans ce qu’on est.” *Le Sinthome. Ornirar*? 9 (1977), p. 36.