Book Reviews

***The Snarling Muse: Verbal and Visual Satire from Pope to Churchill.* By Vincent Carretta. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983. Pp. xxi, 290. $25.00.**

Satire, both verbal and graphic, can be predatory at times, fully justifying the view of a critic, quoted but unnamed in Fowler's *Modern English Usage,* that it is "a cannibal dance round the idea of authority." Vincent Carretta's book concentrates on the satirists who snarled and devoured during the period of Sir Robert Walpole's ministry (1721 to 1742). His title is a trifle misleading, however, since Alexander Pope (1688-1744) produced some of his most trenchant satires before the rise of Walpole, and Charles Churchill (1732-1764) went on writing for nearly twenty years following Walpole's demise.

The title, unfortunately, is not the only misleading feature of the book. In his Preface (p. xix), Caretta admits that, although Pope "might be considered the hero of *The Snarling Muse,*"

> this is not a Pope book: he is offstage in chapter 2 and out of the theater in chapters 6-8. I concentrate on Pope in the first five chapters because he did best what so many others were at the same time trying to do. I investigate verbal and visual political satire by using Pope as a focal point, or test case.

Yet, when we proceed to the first chapter, we find the point of focus to be neither a verbal nor a visual satire at all, but a poem written, long before Walpole appeared on the political scene, in an essentially non-satirical, pastoral mode, Pope's *Windsor Forest.* The justification offered for this odd beginning is not entirely convincing:

> ... precisely because *Windsor Forest* is not one of the many satires against Sir Robert Walpole and his successors we can isolate some of the traditions of history writing and image making that lay ready for the later satirists in poetry and prints. Such traditions can be viewed more clearly without the distorting lens of satire. (p. 1)

Whether it is a distorting lens or, as Swift called it, "a sort of glass, wherein beholders do generally discover everybody's face but their own," satire can hardly be separated from the history that produced it. Carretta, who is an Assistant Professor of English at the University of Maryland, describes himself as a literary historian and his book as "an interdisciplinary study" (p. 249) which sets out to analyse both the literary and nonliterary resources available to satirists of the period. These resources include contemporary literary theory and rhetoric (since when has rhetoric been regarded as "nonliterary"?), which help us to understand "how political satirists treated anomalies such as the officially unsanctioned position of prime minister" (statement on the dust jacket).

Carretta contends that Opposition rhetorical tactics aimed at discrediting Walpole's ministry were based upon a "didactic uniformitarian" view of history (i.e. that history is to be studied for the lessons it teaches, human nature being uniform through all ages), which justified the parallels Walpole's enemies drew, both in verbal and in graphic satire, between the present and the past. Thus Walpole could be likened to Wolsey, George II to Tiberius, and so on. But this conception of history was changing to "historicism", the theory that each political event is unique. According to Carretta, much of the satire of Pope, Churchill, Hogarth and their contemporaries reflects this change.

The most valuable part of Carretta's study deals with the remarkable interweaving of the visual arts with political verse satire in the first half of the eighteenth century. With the aid of seventy-three illustrations, most of them contemporary prints and cartoons, he explores both the common ground and the differences between the sister arts as satirical instruments. His special knowledge of Renaissance iconography and typology enables him to throw light on the uses to which Augustan writers put translations and adaptations of emblem books, and to show how they eventually broke with these inherited traditions.

On the whole, illustrations, which reflect the author's eclecticism, are well reproduced, but their usefulness would have been enhanced if they had been keyed to the text. On p. 16, for instance, we see a rather startling picture of Queen Elizabeth the First, naked except for her crown, sitting in judgment on the Pope, but we have to wait until several pages later before we find out why a sixteenth-century print, adapted by Peter Miricenys from an engraving of Calisto brought before Diana, should appear in a book about satire from Pope to Churchill. The answer is that it is an example of "the richness of visual imagery poets of the eighteenth century shared with artists of popular engravings in the Renaissance." (p. 19).

From Carretta's account of the depredations of the Snarling Muse several interesting conclusions may be drawn. Visual satirists appear to be less prone than verbal ones to gross distortion, though there are obvious exceptions, such as Hogarth's depiction of John Wilkes: in general, their targets are "measures not men" (Chapter II). Apart from giving Walpole, for instance, what Carretta calls "a generalized sense of ugliness," they portray his features quite accurately, whereas the verbal satirists fre-

quently excoriate their victim with the scourge of invective. There is a close connection, moreover, between the conventional symbols of puppetry and the iconographic codes employed in graphic satire—elements of a visual language readily understood by the illiterate viewer. As Pope became more sophisticated in his rhetorical strategies, he gave to verse satire something of the emblematic and expressive force we associate with the work of Hogarth. This development in the poet's technique happened to coincide with the unprecedented growth of literacy in the eighteenth century, and with an increasing public appetite for subtler modes of ironic utterance.

After the death of Pope and the fall of Walpole, Carretta points out, verse satire declined and engraved satire experienced a resurgence as the focus shifted from measures to men, and as the hitherto stable British political system faced new and formidable challenges from France and America as well as at home. "Never again would the satirist be able to assume that his audience shared his historiographic premises or his iconographic vocabulary. The rules had to change." (p. 250).

Dalhousie University *James Gray*

The Collected Letters of Thomas Hardy, Volume Four: 1909-1913. **Edited by Richard Little Purdy and Michael Millgate. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. Pp. x, 337.**

This is the middle volume — the fourth of seven — of an admirably edited and elegantly produced set that will give us all of Hardy's extant correspondence. The high editorial standards displayed in earlier volumes, which have won golden opinions, are here maintained; and I shall confine myself to sketching some of the distinctive features of the material presented in this latest instalment of over seven hundred items, for the most part previously unpublished.

The first volume of the *Collected Letters* covered Hardy's first fifty-two years; the second, the next nine years; the third, seven years; this one, five years. This reflects, presumably, not only the fact that people were more careful about preserving his letters as Hardy came to be increasingly recognized as the Grand Old Man of English letters and (after Swinburne and Meredith died in 1909) the last survivor of the great Victorians, but also an increase in his circle of friendships and, perhaps, in his willingness to put pen unprofessionally to paper. For there is, to my mind, a greater expansiveness and candour in Hardy's epistolary manner reflected in this volume: no doubt fame and financial security gave him confidence, though his habitual and (I think) quite unaffected modesty is still in evidence. (Consider, for instance, the way in which he allowed Sydney Cockerell to dispose of his manuscripts in 1911, with no thought of their possible commercial value and indeed as if the wily Cockerell were

doing him a service in helping him to clear out so much waste paper: 'The cupboard which contained the MSS. is now agreeably empty...'.) At any rate, I have a strong impression of the reticent, buttoned-up, rather touchy Hardy of the earlier years having given way to a franker and more open personality, though his denigrators will be quick to point out that during this period he conducted a liaison with a woman young enough to be his grand-daughter.

These are the years of the publication of his third collection of poems, *Time's Laughingstocks;* of his last collection of short stories, *A Changed Man*; of the textually important Wessex Edition of his collected writings; of the award of the Order of Merit and other honours; of the death of his first wife, Emma, and the great elegies that Hardy, spurred into song by grief and memory, wrote soon afterwards; and of what must be called the courtship of Florence Emily Dugdale, whom he married six weeks after this volume closes.

When it opens, Hardy is sixty-eight and very conscious of his age, so near to the Biblical span of years: he admits to Henry Newbolt that he had 'periodic frights lest I should never live to finish' his most ambitious work, *The Dynasts.* He is troubled by minor ailments and often depressed, telling Florence Henniker in the summer of 1909 that he 'should not be particularly sorry to take my leave of [life]'. Yet, although in one sense he leads a retired existence — declining, for instance, invitations to the Coronation and the unveiling of the Victoria Memorial — he shows no inclination to retire from authorship; and much of his correspondence relates to business with publishers, editors, translators, and so forth, for Hardy continues to act as his own literary agent. In his gloomier moments, he depicts himself 'settling down to the revision of copy that I have promised to send ... to be printed for a public which does not desire a line of it' (the reference is to *Time's Laughingstocks*); but the literary labours continue, as they were to do until the very end; and one of the most interesting passages in this volume occurs in the letter to Newbolt already cited:

> Happily one can afford to dismiss the fear of writing ones self out, which we used to hear so much of. No man ever writes himself out if he goes on living as he lived when he began to write. It is the other thing — the social consequence of his first works, that does the mischief — if he lets it. (pp. 5-6)

The hostile reception of his work remains a subject on which Hardy feels highly sensitive, even in these years of fame, affluence, and as much celebrity as (or more than) he cared to enjoy: he describes himself to Maurice Hewlett as having been more 'roundly abused' by the press than any other recent English writer, 'with the single exception of Swinburne, & he is dead'. Swinburne's death two months earlier had elicited a memorable letter in which Hardy dismisses the press reaction in the phrase, 'it makes me sick in a corner'. Among other literary judgments is a pleasantly tart comment on *In Memoriam:*

> As to the form, why Tennyson, who knew so much, should not have seen the awful anticlimax of finishing off such a poem with a highly respectable middle class wedding, is a mystery, when it ought to have ended with something like an earthquake.

The different emphases in the accounts of Emma Hardy's last years and months given by Robert Gittings and Michael Millgate in their biographies of Hardy, with the very different light they shed on Hardy's behaviour and character, lend special interest to his final letters to the woman he was soon to describe as 'much missed'. A phrase in a letter to Edward Clodd in 1909 hints at 'domestic circumstances which, between ourselves, make it embarrassing for me to return hospitalities received'. But the letters to Emma herself seem curiously at odds with the usual versions of their relationship in these final years of their marriage. According to Gittings, Emma startled Florence Dugdale in 1910 by asking her whether she had noticed a resemblance between Hardy and Dr. Crippen; and Millgate cites the unofficial opinion of a Commissioner in Lunacy that Emma was 'probably certifiable'. Yet Hardy's letters convey no hint of the black comedy that Gittings discerns in the situation, or of the irreparable breakdown that is generally held to have taken place in the marriage by this time. On 15 July 1910, for instance, after Emma has returned home leaving her husband alone in London for a few days, he writes to her in a manner that seems to me relaxed, unostentatiously concerned, and even tender, and shows no reluctance to share his feelings with her: 'The only time that is depressing is when I come home at 10 or 1/2 past, & go into the dark silent flat, full of the ghosts of all those who have visited us there'. That 'us' reaches out like an embrace: it sounds as though the 'Woman much missed' did not have to wait to be dead before she was missed. The slight curb he puts, almost as an afterthought, upon her tactless and perhaps embarrassing impulsiveness is sensitively applied: 'Put "O.M." *only*, on the envelope after my name'. So much for Carl Weber's calumny that by this stage in their lives the pair had nothing in common but cats and the weather.

The development of Hardy's relationship with Florence Dugdale during Emma's lifetime is already familiar through Gittings' sensational disclosures; but the letters to Florence and to Clodd help to fill in the outlines. (Clodd, the most frequent recipient of Hardy's personal letters in this volume, was privy to the friendship and entertained both of them at his Suffolk home on a number of occasions.) But the summer of 1909 Hardy is referring to her as 'my young friend & assistant'; a year later she is 'my secretary' (not just a euphemism, for she certainly helped him with his correspondence and with the massive labours over the Wessex Edition); and not long afterwards, with more affection than accuracy, she is 'my little cousin'. The excellent annotations provide three intriguing items of information relating to Florence. In November 1909, she gave a paper to a ladies' evening of the St. Paul's Literary Society, Enfield (presumably a church group), on 'Thomas Hardy, Poet and Novelist' — an occasion not

without its unappreciated comedy and irony, when one reflects how the Enfield ladies might have reacted had they known all. Earlier in the year, 'Clodd's boat, with TH and FED aboard, was stranded by the retreating tide on the mud of the River Alde, and its three occupants rescued by punt some three hours later; the incident was reported, under the heading "Eminent Authors on the mud" ...'. And Hardy's 1911 Christmas card to Florence apparently carried the text from Galatians 'Ye have been called unto liberty' — which, as the editors nicely point out, continues: 'only use not liberty for an occasion to the flesh, but by love serve one another'.

Within eleven months Hardy had his liberty; and one of the first uses he made of it was to undertake, and undergo, the 'penitential pilgrimage' to Cornwall, where he revisited the scenes of his earlier courtship, that of the dead Emma. 'The visit to this neighbourhood has been a very painful one to me, & I have said a dozen times I wish I had not come. What possessed me to do it!' he wrote to Florence from Boscastle on 9 March 1913. Since the outcome was 'After a Journey', 'Beeny Cliff', and other masterpieces, we can only be thankful that he did.

University of Alberta *Norman Page*

The Short Stories of Thomas Hardy: Tales of Past and Present. **By Kristin Brady. London: Macmillan, 1982. Pp. xii, 235. $75.00.**

Given the vitality of Hardy studies over the last ten years, one might have anticipated an extended examination of his short fiction long before it has finally arrived. Kristin Brady's book is thus particularly welcome, even if it does obliquely confirm that Hardy the short story writer is unlikely to be promoted to a place alongside Hardy the poet, himself only recently elected to equal status with Hardy the novelist. For all Brady's spirited and detailed survey of both the collected and uncollected stories, the claim that they are "in their way . . . as original in form and style as the stories of a Chekhov, a Joyce, or a Hemingway" is made with more loyalty than conviction. The evaluative ease with which it is made also begs important questions that the critical methodology adopted makes it difficult to probe.

Brady confronts the problems of generic definition from the outset and in her division of the bulk of the stories into three groups — "pastoral histories" (*Wessex Tales*), "ambivalent exempla" (*A Group of Noble Dames*), and "tragedies of circumstance" (*Life's Little Ironies*) — offers a helpful frame at the same time as cautiously noting that the distinctions are intended "to argue not for generic differences between the collections but rather for variations, with some overlapping, in the prevailing mode of each." Discussion of these three volumes forms the first three chapters of the book, while a final chapter provides both a "retrospective survey" of all Hardy's short stories and a discussion of the *A Changed Man* volume

and the various uncollected stories. This inevitably means that the final chapter is the least shaped of the four, which is unfortunate since it suggests an ultimate uncertainty that undercuts the conviction of the initial tripartite labelling. It is difficult to avoid the sense that the last chapter offers the stories, facts, and judgments that don't fit anywhere else (an impression encapsulated in the uneasily associated component parts of the chapter's title: "Miscellaneous Stories: Reflections on a Career").

The conceptual schema works most convincingly in the discussions of *Wessex Tales* and *A Group of Noble Dames*. The relationships between present and past, between history and tale, between urban and rural, between Dorset and Wessex are explored in terms of the pastoralism of *Wessex Tales*, with its capacity to link the general with the particular and the commonplace with the strange. Brady is particularly sensitive to the sophistication of Hardy's narrative decisions, identifying a self-consciousness in his practice that contradicts glib assumptions about the relationship of his stories to traditional tales. Similarly, the distance established between narrator and reader in *A Group of Noble Dames* allows the elaboration of more complex moral issues than the social surface initially suggests. Given the received orthodoxy that Hardy's unease with the upper classes always disastrously damaged those fictions in which he attempted to deal with them, this revisionary analysis encourages more careful reading of one of Hardy's most quirkily idiosyncratic works.

The discussion of *Life's Little Ironies* is less satisfying, partially as a result of the terminological looseness that allows such far-reaching claims as the following: " ' Tragedies of circumstance', they contain satirical plots which are inverted to create tragic effects. Using the subject matter and situations of comedy, they elicit from the reader pity and fear, the emotions of tragedy." Even putting aside the imponderable nature of such stimulus to catharsis — consistently more imponderable in relation to the short story than to the immediacy of dramatic tragedy — this kind of resort to a generalised reader response poses more questions than it answers, albeit questions that Brady does not always seem to recognise have been raised. One is therefore not altogether surprised by such subsequent subjectivities as, à propos "On the Western Circuit," "the reader is prevented from allowing his laughter to supersede his pity, or his rational faculties to supplant his compassion."

On the terms on which Brady wishes to invoke him, the reader is throughout this study a treacherous ally, especially when clothed only in such atavistic authority as terms like "a proper understanding" and "the correct interpretation" can give him. It is difficult to make much of claims like the following: "Like Hardy, he [the reader] comes to a sudden perception of the 'tragedy of life'; like Lodge, he leaves the story ["The Withered Arm"] 'chastened and thoughtful.' "; Or this: "the reader's exasperation at the tricks of fate becomes eventually . . . an even greater annoyance at his [Barnet's ('Fellow-Townsmen')] submission to them."

Or, still more, this astonishing assumption of responsibility for the putative reader's attitudinal baggage: "In some ways, Stockdale is like the reader: coming to Nether-Moynton with no knowledge of its culture and equipped only with conventional morals about justice and law, he finds himself simultaneously attracted to, and disapproving of, its unreflective vitality" ("The Distracted Preacher"). Can the author really make this modest claim for herself as an informed reader of 19th century fiction, the pages of which are filled with examples of unconventional morality in conflict with the vested interest of conventional justice and law? More to the point, can she make it for the anonymous reader whose presumed passage from darkness to light is offered as the *sine qua non* of this kind of interpretation?

The last three examples from the first chapter suggest how the generalised invocation of reader, in ways apparently untouched by recent theoretical speculations about the reader's role, often avoids confronting the narrative questions that claims for Hardy's self-consciousness inevitably raise. To resort to a standardised reader whose laughter, exasperation, sympathy, fear and compassion are so unerringly programmable is surely to deny the very subtlety in Hardy's short stories for which much of this book convincingly argues, taking away with cavalier generalisation what elsewhere has been hard won by detailed and original analysis. It is the suggestiveness of the latter that constitutes the real strength of this book, and makes it a useful breaking of the ground.

University of Ottawa *Keith Wilson*

***The Puritan Conversion Narrative: The Beginnings of American Expression.* By Patricia Caldwell. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Pp. x, 210. $19.95.**

Both English and New English Puritan congregations required a "personall and publick" account of a genuine experience of conversion from all those who would join the church. As Patricia Caldwell explains, the conversion narrative was personal because "it represented the speaker's own inner experience" and was not merely the affirmation of a body of doctrine; and it was public in that it was "delivered before and voted upon by the entire membership" (p. 46). Much of the value and interest of these narratives (which were often transcribed by the church minister) stem from their linking of the personal with the public, or institutional, lives of their tellers. As accounts of heartfelt experience they reflect, to some degree at least, a personality responding to particular historical conditions. Yet since their role in reformed churches was much disputed, there also exists a body of "criticism" having to do with what the narratives ought to be like and with how they ought to be interpreted. Professor Caldwell's convincing account of the development of the narrative (taking

the 1640s as something of a high-water mark for the genre) draws upon both earlier Protestant uses of creeds and confessions and on the records of the Presbyterian and Congregationalist controversies over the role of these spiritual autobiographies in church government.

The contemporary existence of Congregational experiments in both England and America allows Professor Caldwell to speak very precisely about the effects of place on literary expression. She distinguishes American narratives not merely in terms of obvious references to new places and experiences, but also in terms of the effects of the new place on the nature of the spiritual experience which the speaker seeks to express. In English narratives suffering can be objectified and externalized. Those who experience conversion can point to the major, shared afflictions of Parliament, established church, civil war, and rival sects as objective causes of the unhappiness they feel, and as real evils from which they have been saved by grace. Often affliction is an agent of conversion in a narrative which ends on a note of "insight and peace" (p. 158).

Few American narratives arrive at such a secure resolution. In New England, most of the English afflictions were absent, and the troubles with wilderness and native inhabitants, real as they were, do not seem sufficient or specific enough reasons for the "disorientation and guilt [which] paint the whole world gray" (p. 168). Disorientation, after such a voyage to such a new place, would seem to have been a forgivable weakness. However, the decision to make the voyage was itself regarded as a possible mark of election, and the place itself was seen as the destination of a divine errand. Hence the guilt: "to feel disappointment in America was a sin" (p. 130). The real homesickness and hardship of early life in New England, instead of being an external affliction to rise above, becomes internalized as somehow being the sufferer's fault. The speakers of American narratives have no "objective correlative" for the sadness, bewilderment, and anger they feel, and thus their stories retain an anguished tone in spite of their conventional attempts to assert conversion from the dead-heartedness the speakers initially felt in their new home. "The words of the narratives say that hearts have been cured of their disappointment in New England, but the music says that hearts are disappointed in themselves for still being disappointed in New England" (p. 130).

Professor Caldwell's thorough discussion of the evolution and eventual role of the conversion narrative will be valuable to anyone wanting to use these texts with the fullest possible understanding of their original contexts. Her comparison of English and American narratives is similarly useful, but this aspect of her discussion is also a fascinating example of how a rhetoric develops in response to historical conditions, of how personal experience in a new land yields a new form of public speech. Her treatment of conversion narratives is a fine instance of a comparative approach to colonial literature, and her discussion should be of interest to

anyone working on so-called sub-literary texts with the tools of literary analysis.

Dalhousie University *Bruce Greenfield*

The Mind of the Novel: Reflexive Fiction and the Ineffable. **By Bruce F. Kawin. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982. Pp. 376. $34.50.**

Bruce Kawin's remarkable book, *The Mind of the Novel,* has not perhaps caused much of a stir in a season when most books on the novel have "semiotics" or "structure" or "desire" in their titles, and indeed it is remarkable for its success in doing two slightly old-fashioned things: explicating novels closely in terms of their narrative techniques and (still more out-dated) trying to ascertain how novels work to express the ineffable (the inexpressible, the spiritual, the 'nagual') and indeed how their narrative structures provide models of our relationship to those great intangibles (the Beyond, the Self) which give both our lives and our works whatever meaning they may ultimately possess. The first goal Kawin achieves with some brilliance: his second and fourth chapters, on certain kinds of first-person and frame narration, are absolutely essential reading for those interested in narrative structure, or indeed in any of the ways fiction works. As for the second, the attempt is worthwhile, even noble, and the defeat, though honourable, is perhaps by definition inevitable.

The connections between these two purposes are not always clear, and his declarations of intention can be almost alarmingly sweeping:

> By comparing Castaneda's perspective with those of Wittgenstein and the ancient Hindus, and by tying that in with our observations on narrative structure, we may arrive at a tentative structural synthesis between the literature of the ineffable and the philosophical and spiritual structures that literature addresses.

It's the "tying in" that poses the difficulty. The "philosophical perspectives" Kawin provides include also Hegel, Heidegger and, towards the end, Derrida, as well as abundant references to philosophers of mysticism and the occult. His handling of these sources and backgrounds to the philosophic problems at issue is lucid and masterly; they make the book a valuable contribution to the understanding of philosophic issues in fiction. As long as primacy is given to fiction in Kawin's argument, and these more abstract concerns are seen as the limits, topics or explicit concerns of fiction itself (as is self-evidently the case, despite the general critical neglect of such issues; Kawin's contribution has been much needed), and insofar as Kawin is discussing technical means, such as (chiefly) the strategies of narrative structure, and the implications of those strategies for the authorial expression of essentially (by definition) inexpressible

things, there can be no quarrel with Kawin's aims or accomplishments. But at many points in the third and fifth chapters (Kawin disarmingly admits to "alternating analysis and intuition") the emphasis seems reversed, and the novels seem to become only examples to help us understand the philosophical issues at stake. So if one asks whether he in fact establishes (even tentatively) his "tentative structural synthesis," the answer is, perhaps, "maybe." The "ands" in some of his formulations are working overtime for very little pay.

His major explications, of some fifteen familiar and important novels from *Frankenstein* to *Gravity's Rainbow* (as well as several worthwhile but less familiar ones), are framed by very full discussions of books that are indeed also "fictions," though unusual ones, and which are explicated as such, at first, in very cogently sceptical ways. Carlos Castaneda's first four volumes about his discovery of the world of the sorcerer Don Juan (1972-1976) conclude the discussion of first-person narrative in chapter II, but take on a new role, as instruction manuals to the attaining of the ineffable, at the beginning of chapter III (on the Higher Self and transcendence). Likewise the fifth chapter essentially ends with a very full discussion of Books I-III of Edmond Jabès' remarkable philosophic poem-novel, *The Book of Questions*: again its qualities as a fiction become overshadowed, this time quite fascinatingly, by its role as an instruction manual.

The heart of the book, for critics of the novel, must be what lies in between these two fictions which burst the boundaries of fiction, Kawin's brilliant account of the tripartite nature of mediated narrative: first, a category of fictions of "metaphysical heroism," narrated by "the second first person" (the term is cumbersome), i.e. the narrator who writes a book about his hero, in whose life and adventures he has participated. Kenneth Bruffee has more recently (in *Elegiac Romance*, Princeton, 1983) defined such a narrator as one who has, duplicitously, written a book about his hero, which turns out to be a book about how he, through his experience of the hero, has come to know himself. (Four of Kawin's six examples of "metaphysical heroism" are elegiac romances and the other two [*Watt* and Castaneda] might be treated as such). It is a pity Bruffee and Kawin could not have been aware of each other's work, for they approach such narratives from distinctly different but wonderfully complementary angles. Bruffee, emphasizing the narrator's coming to awareness, provides a better account of the more psychological-epistemological-ironic works of this type, like *The Great Gatsby*, or *Pale Fire*, while Kawin's greater emphasis on the centrality of the hero's vision accounts better for what I would call "visionary" elegiac romances like *Moby Dick* or *Dr. Faustus*. It is difficult, after reading Kawin, to go back to these books and see them as the stories of Ishmael or Zeitblom, as Bruffee's overprivileging of the narrator asks us to do. With a book like *Heart of Darkness*, a Bruffee-esque view which (one might say) overprivileges Marlow, could be nicely

juxtaposed with one which (like Kawin's) perhaps overprivileges Kurtz, to the enrichment of both.

Kawin's accomplishment, with this first narrative strategy, is largely owing to his wonderfully lucid metaphor of the "step-down transformer" or "optical filter" functions of such narrators, which provide, in works like *Moby Dick* and *Heart of Darkness*, where visions of the ineffable are central, a "hierarchy of access to transcendent experience." Thus Marlow, the man of words, can transmit, at the lowered energy necessary to express the "ineffable," Kurtz's "horror" in a form we can grasp; the strategy of Marlow as narrative filter becomes a device for "saying" the unsayable. Likewise Ishmael transmits to us his version of Ahab's vision of the white whale, the image of ineffability itself; likewise the demonic visions of Leverkühn are mediated for us by Zeitblom. All these narrators are more than bystanders or witnesses; they actually experience some *part* of the hero's intolerably excessive experience.

Another form of mediation is provided by narrators who are more nearly bystanders, the suppliers of the frame narratives of books like *Frankenstein* or *Wuthering Heights* (or, for that matter, the frame story of *Heart of Darkness*, which surrounds Marlow's tale). Kawin goes on to show how, in the horror story, journals and other inner texts provide different kinds of filters, ones which keep horror penned in, "framed," distanced and thus *bearably* terrifying, *by the same process* which makes it possible for the reader to intuit its ineffability; a subtle argument, for which the sequence of self-reflexive textual horrors found in Poe's *Pym*, Chambers' *The King in Yellow*, and Lovecraft's *At The Mountains of Madness* provide central examples.

These framing devices overlap with the simultaneous or divided selves which constitute Kawin's second major category of narrative modes, one which multiplies perspectives, and then asks the reader to get a "fix" on the intangible by unifying these multiple perspectives himself; this hypothesis works especially well in Kawin's discussion of the multiple identities of Quentin and the other narrators in Faulkner's *Absalom, Absalom!* The third category, which provides his title and the culmination of his argument, is harder either to follow or to summarize than the other two. It seems itself to be an analogy, a critical metaphor, one which, unlike "optical filter," used so well in the first section, has to do the work of its referent as well as its own. In short, the "mind of the novel" is a concept very close to that of the ineffable expressing itself through the "systemic consciousness" of the book; in the "real" world, this must be a variant of authorial consciousness (as Kawin acknowledges); however it stands for something beyond that, some apparently impersonal yet self-conscious intention of the limited closed system that a book (by analogy to a mind) can be. Kawin summarizes the tripartite scheme near the end of the book in terms of Beckett's sequence of novels from *Watt* (told in the second first person by Sam, and thus, incidentally, virtually an elegiac romance), through *Molloy* and *Malone Dies*, told by various kinds of divided selves,

into *The Unnamable*, perhaps the clearest, because the most extreme, example of a novel narrated by the "mind of the novel." But the "mind of the novel" seeps back into the other categories: in a sense the whole trilogy is its work, as in a sense Ishmael has been only a mask for the "mind" of *Moby Dick*, and Addy a mask for the "mind" of Faulkner's *As I Lay Dying*. By which point the concept loses its clarity from being asked to do too much. But the book properly concludes here, not with the final section on the quest for Self in feminist philosophy and fiction, which seems something of an addendum, but where the discussion of Jabès and the mind of the novel culminates in the proposition that from a genre's battering against its limits, which are partially the limits of language, to express Self and other forms of the ineffable, may come "a regeneration of literature, perhaps a new genre, certainly a new awareness . . . ."

I have not been able to do justice to the subtleties, richness and complexity of Kawin's arguments in the space available, but I hope I have shown enough of its charm and interest to encourage others to grapple with the problems and limitations it sets out for us. Its stimulating enlargement of the scope of the discussion for first-person and mediated narrative and its restoration of the claims of the Beyond, philosophically considered, to be part not only of the subject and motivation of fiction but of the very nature of fictionality, combine to make it one of the most intriguing and important of recent books on the novel.

University of British Columbia *Patricia Merivale*

The Open Boundary of History and Fiction. **By Suzanne Gearhart. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.**

The Open Boundary of History and Fiction establishes a dialogue between major Enlightenment figures and contemporary criticism. Professor Gearhart does not actually apply modern critical methodologies to eighteenth-century *philosophes* in order to reinterpret their writings, rather she confronts both groups with the larger question of the distinction between history and fiction, or more precisely, with the distinction between the writing of history and fiction. Her thesis, a fascinating one in so far as it aims to dissolve traditional boundaries and thereby enlarge the very notion of *écriture* itself, is essentially integrative to the extent that she maintains that the boundary separating history and fiction is more open than closed:

> The present work, then, seeks to understand the implications for theories of history and literature of a critical analysis of the philosophy of the Englightenment. It argues that the relation between history and fiction is not peripheral but rather the central question in the philosophy of history of that age; and, moreover, that, in this form, the problem of

> history itself was not peripheral to the French Enlightenment but was instead a major, if not the major problem it faced.

According to Gearhart, theories of history sought to fix the boundary between history and fiction and to establish the specificity of each. On the other hand, she argues, contemporary criticism abounds with theories of history and fiction, and, on the whole, challenges the certitudes upon which the distinctions are based.

Methodologically, Professor Gearhart situates her analysis of the problem involved (i.e., defining the boundaries) in a diachronic perspective, for she reminds the reader that literature in the Eighteenth Century did not have the specificity as a discipline that it would later acquire. Prior to French Romanticism, literature subsumed philosophy, political philosophy and history. It was only when the philosophical and scientific concept of a universal reason became operative that history hived off as an independent science. Viewed from the perspective of modern critical thinkers such as Foucault and Barthes, among others, history during the Enlightenment became synonymous with rational history, hence Foucault's endeavor to write a history of madness, to oppose the latter to civilization in order to underscore the distinction between history and fiction, "for there is a profound affinity between Foucault's concept of madness and his concept of fictive or poetic language." Similarly, Barthes focuses on the formal or linguistic nature of history writing and discusses the relation of history to fictional narrative. In *The Open Boundary* . . . . one is thus brought face to face with the problematic of history as process and history as the totality of historical writing. Gearhart claims, in conformity with Hayden White's theory that history can be subjected to the same kind of formal analysis as literature, that the debate between history and structuralism is essential, since, for the structuralist, history has become a form of literature:

> The interdisciplinary relationship on which this work focuses is not based on a simple opposition in which literature and history are seen as sovereign, autonomous entities with the power to institute or curtail movement across their boundaries. Instead, it is a relationship in which the two terms are seen as formally similar because each borrows from the other and each refuses in its own way to acknowledge that borrowing. And yet for the same reasons that history and fiction are not sovereign, they never completely merge. The difference between the two constantly reasserts itself, for though they may be seen from a certain perspective as formally identical, their relationship is never purely formal.

Five major Enlightenment figures are made to encounter several outstanding exponents of modern critical theory. It would be extremely difficult to do justice to the numerous points raised in the debates between these great minds, especially as two chapters are devoted to Voltaire, Montesquieu and Diderot, Condillac is discussed along with the latter in one chapter, and Rousseau becomes the subject of another, quite substan-

tial chapter. I shall, therefore, limit myself to the main elements which Gearhart puts before both Enlightenment and contemporary thinkers. In Chapter I, Voltaire's attempt to found a history on reason is examined vis-à-vis Foucault's endeavor to write a history that reason cannot write (i.e., a history of the unsaid, of madness). In Chapter II, Voltaire's conception of a history in mimetic terms, wherein historical discourse tends to privilege the referent rather than the form of historical writing, is opposed to White's proposal to analyze historical writing itself, as verbal structure, and to Genette's argument that a history of formal categories does indeed exist and that it has posited a hierarchy among the various tropes as well as a distinction between the figurative and the literal. In Chapter III, Montesquieu, in his *Lettres persanes*, represents the historian qua anthropologist, that is, as an outsider looking at other cultures from the Enlightenment perspective. This 'anthropological' optic was much closer to the idea of pure reason since it advocated a disinterested observer whereas the history which the Enlightenment inherited was dominated by the orthodoxy of the Catholic church. Barthes and Lévi-Strauss are emblematic of the anthropological viewpoint: namely, that the alien culture under scrutiny is a realm of pure signification, thus devoid of meaning in its normal sense. However, the boundary between culture and history also disintegrates when the anthropologist comes to the realization that there is no 'outside' which is not already determined by the 'inside' of culture. Chapter IV takes up the distinction between the theory and practice of history as it is made apparent in Montesquieu and Althusser. For the latter, the enemy of history is idealism: for this reason, there is a need to establish a science of history based on the concrete and the real. In this regard, Althusser argues, Montesquieu is a model (in the structuralist sense) historian because he refuses to judge what is by what ought to be. In Chapter V, Gearhart demonstrates that contrary to the analyses of Condillac and Diderot in which they attempted to show the unity of the perceiving subject (i.e., one abstracted from history), "there are no ultimate criteria for distinguishing between a science based on direct observation and a history based on a reconstruction of the past." In Chapter VI, Diderot's *Jacques le Fataliste* is subjected to a critical reading in order to reveal that "narrative is not an object in any simple sense, because it always overreaches the boundaries delimiting it by invading the spaces—whether they be natural or theoretical—that are thought to lie beyond narrative." Chapter VII, on Rousseau, relies heavily on Paul de Man's thesis that a single structure—language—organizes all of Rousseau's work: political theory, fiction, autobiography. To quote Professor Gearhart: "De Man argues that a determinable meaning cannot be attached to the political or historical text any more than to the literary text, because language determines all illusions of meaning and because the nature of language is fundamentally literary or rhetorical."

The Open Boundary of History and Fiction questions basic assumptions about the autonomy of so-called traditional disciplines. Such auto-

nomy, Gearhart maintains, is often delusive to the extent that it articulates itself in opposition to an alterity which is itself bound to the same mediating entity: language. On the basis of the commonality of language, — the instrument of history and literature—, it would be possible to construct an interdisciplinary approach to the problematic posed by a referential vs. a poetic function of language by becoming attentive to "the way in which language and metaphor determine all discourse independently of any referent, the intentions of an author, or the constraints of any historical or social context . . . ."

Dalhousie University *James W. Brown*

Olaf Stapledon: A Man Divided. **By Leslie A. Fiedler. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. Pp. ix, 236. $19.95. Paper, $7.95.**

Before the appearance in 1982 of Patrick A. McCarthy's *Olaf Stapledon* (reviewed in the *Dalhousie Review*, vol. 63, no. 1), no book length introduction to this writer was available. Now, to McCarthy's book, Leslie Fiedler has added a second—one which will further guide readers to an understanding of Stapledon's work and influence on science fiction. This study is better unified than McCarthy's, holding throughout to the central theme of Stapledon's ambivalent philosophical view and showing the personal affirmations, retreats, and doubts of his commitment to the principles of communism.

In Fiedler's presentation, Stapledon emerges as a man of unremarkable philosophical gifts, though of extraordinary imagination. In matters of faith, Stapledon's position was that of "reverent agnosticism." Essentially moderate in his socialist politics, he sympathized with the communist experiment in Russia, remaining to the end of his life innocent of the real nature of the Soviets—long after most intellectuals who had been attracted by the ideals of communism had seen the light. Fiedler argues against the view of Sam Moskowitz in *Explorers of the Infinite* that Stapledon's "faith in the Communist-inspired 'peace movement'... [was] shaken by his experiences in New York" at the Cultural and Scientific Conference for World Peace held in 1949. Involved with the Communist Party for twenty years, only death prevented Stapledon from making a planned pilgrimage to the Soviet Union. Fiedler's portrayal respects the seriousness of his subject's political idealism at the same time that it exposes Stapledon's undefeatable naiveté and basic inconsistency. One manifestation of the divided nature of Stapledon is evident in Fiedler's description of Stapledon's politics as "an instinctive and only half-confessed elitism" combined with "an avowed espousal of the Bolshevik Revolution." Indeed, while Stapledon professed himself a socialist, he lived comfortably on inherited money. As he said himself, "I live chiefly

on dividends and other ill-gotten gains, even while I proclaim that the system on which I live must go. . . ."

Discussing Stapledon's links with contemporaries and correspondents, Fiedler traces to H.G. Wells Stapledon's debt for "basic strategies of science fiction" and most of his major themes as well." Both Stapledon and Wells

> wrote as if neither the Modernist "revolution of the word" nor the consequent splitting of literature into high and low, popular and elite had ever occurred. And both, therefore, were able to produce what we now think of as science fiction without being aware that they had thereby separated themselves from the "mainstream" of polite letters; and that they were doomed, consequently, for a while at least, to be ignored, despised, or condescended to by the official guardians of literary standards, while being adulated by a group of parochial fanatics who thought of themselves as despising all fiction except that disreputable new sub-genre of the novel.

This insight will awaken memories of the literary skirmishes between Wells and Henry James. Today, there are signs that the appeal of Stapledon and Wells is mainly to those who are also well-read and discriminating in mainstream literature. Certainly, Stapledon is not known to many persons who limit their reading exclusively to science fiction.

Each of Stapledon's major works of fiction receives attention. The overview of *Last and First Men*, Stapledon's most important novel, avoids the pitfall of excessive synopsis and replaces the usual praise of the author's "scope, . . . grandeur, . . . [and] vastness" with a sharp analytical focus on Stapledon's major theme. *Sirius* is judged to be "by all odds the best of his fictions—with the possible exception of *Star Maker*." As works are discussed, attention is directed to notable links between the author and characteristics of the fiction. For example, Fiedler says that Stapledon tended to see events, nations, peoples, and races in "generalizing clichés." As a case in point, the unfavorable picture of America given in the early chapters of *Last and First Men* results from an "anti-Americanism which most passionately obsessed Olaf Stapledon, distorting his view of history, past and future, as anti-Semitism had distorted Hitler's in *Mein Kampf*." For Stapledon, America became the "mythological Enemy."

A summary such as this can at best oversimplify Fiedler's speculations on the handling and significance of sex in Stapledon's writings—speculations which are, if not always convincing, invariably intriguing. Even allowing that all discussion of sex is within a Freudian frame of reference, one suspects that "homosexuality" is a misleading term to associate with the "intellectual union of the two authors" in *Last and First Men*; nor is it so much homosexual love that binds the narrator and the protagonist of *Odd John* as it is the kind of love that exists between man and dog, which is suggested when John playfully names the narrator "Fido." As John matures, he does pass through a phase of homoeroticism,

the object of which is not the narrator but a boy slightly older than John. These reservations should not, however, be taken as a sign of fundamental disagreement with Fiedler's views, or with many of his specific analyses. The sexual passages in *Odd John* and *Sirius* are clearly intended to be seen in a Freudian light.

There is some question as to the sensitivity of Fiedler's response to Stapledon's humor. He dismisses the possibility that Stapledon intended humor when he has a pair of Far Future lovers sing "Old Man River," though Fiedler says himself that "People who knew Stapledon personally report that he was a witty man." To Fiedler, "as a writer he [Stapledon] seems essentially humorless." The reader may judge for himself. Much of Stapledon's wit is satirical and ironic, but not especially subtle, and in many instances it is downright obvious. Consider the startling revelations that come to newlyweds whose sex organs are endowed with gustatory powers (*Star Maker*), the many puns on "doggedness" in a book with a canine protagonist (*Sirius*), and the termination of a flame-creature's lengthy lecture when the supply of coal runs out (*The Flames*). Fiedler underrates Stapledon's sense of humor.

Throughout this book, the attempt to establish links between Stapledon's fiction and his personal life—in particular, suggestions about the psychological motivations behind his works—will unsettle some readers. Conjectures about Stapledon's "self-hatred" and secret hatred of his father are not, and are unlikely ever to be, substantiated. On the other hand, views such as these do not impair the substantial amount of worthwhile commentary—an instance of which is the discussion of Stapledon's use of allusive names in *Sirius*. In other matters, too, Fiedler is helpful, as when, in relation to *Star Maker*, he deals with the male companionship theme that he identified in American literature more than a quarter of a century ago, and when he speaks of Stapledon's influence on later writers. His observations on *Star Maker* and *Nebula Maker* should encourage critical discussion of Stapledon's conception of the Spirit and the creative force at the same time that they clarify the reasons for C.S. Lewis's attack on Stapledon in the *Perelandra* trilogy.

In the past, Fiedler has not been one to evoke lukewarm responses to his criticism, and on occasion he has been called to task for less than scrupulous concern for scholarly accuracy. Seen against the background of far more ambitious works, such as *Love and Death in the American Novel*, his study of Stapledon is a slight book that will attract little attention. Nevertheless, *Olaf Stapledon: A Man Divided* is a valuable appreciation of Stapledon's strengths which does not underplay his shortcomings, most notably the repetition in his writings of a very limited number of ideas and themes.

Fiedler's study, richer and more complex than this review has been able to indicate, has the added virtue of being well-written and lively.

Dalhousie University *S.A. Cowan*

Analyzing Marx: Morality, Power and History. **By Richard W. Miller. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. Pp. xii, 320. $30.00. Paper $8.95.**

Analytical philosophy, applied in this book to the close study of Marx's doctrines, begins by making of Marx's view of morality a view opposed to morality, at any rate to what Miller takes to be the prevailing, narrow conception of what a morality amounts to. It goes on to contend that the inquiries of pluralistic political scientists have not laid to rest the Marxist hypothesis of a ruling class present even now in advanced capitalistic systems and continually making sure of distinctive long-run interests. Finally it interprets Marx's theory of social change as something quite different from technological determinism, best presented, in Miller's view, by G.A. Cohen in *Karl Marx's Theory of History* (1978), and giving causal primacy to changes in productive forces narrowly defined. According to Miller's analysis, Marx gives primacy instead to the mode of production, within which both changes in work relations and changes in the relations of production must be taken into account, with the relations of production acknowledged to have political features.

On all of these topics, Miller's brisk argumentation mobilizes deep learning, in Marx's tests, in the history of science, and in the philosophy of science, to produce a rich variety of original insights. No one, however steeped in Marxism, could fail to find the book instructive throughout. I deem it, in fact, a landmark in Marxist scholarship—a demonstration comparable to Cohen's that analytic philosophy can penetrate farther into Marx's theories than previous commentators have, and simultaneously contribute significantly to the advancement of social science. This is just what Miller meant to demonstrate and in this respect the book is an entire success.

Nevertheless, the learning is not infallible, not on the state of various branches of current social science (Miller does not, for example, seem to be aware of the full variety of "academic decision theory"), and not on all aspects of Marx's texts either. Nor is Miller's argumentation equally successful in all three of the chief enterprises of the book.

Miller is most successful, I think, in his treatment of the hypothesis of a ruling class. Here he argues that the hypothesis cannot be disposed of by taking up the question, "To what extent do various people get what they want to get out of government?" and answering as pluralists do, that one group gets one thing and other groups other things, without any group winning all the time. Mixed success, especially in the short run, is what one would expect for a ruling class that left to professional politicians the task of minimizing short run unrest. The politicians would find the costs of some proposals raised by the ruling class—by leaders in big business, for example—against the long-run interests of the class; and others premature. The politicians would be mistaken in some of these findings. However, the presence (and identity) of the ruling class would be con-

firmed if it is shown that short-run concessions, whether they have to be corrected or not, are consistently followed by long-run advantages for the class; if it is explained why politicians consistently produce such advantages; and if it is established that the groups losing in the long run cannot redress the balance in their favor by any actions open to them and permitted by the government. Though the ruling class can, if need be, change the rules of the game to suit itself, by actions permitted, even facilitated, within the system, other groups can change the rules only by resorting to illegal violence—sit-in strikes, riots, and if the issue is, finally, displacement of the ruling class, revolution.

Miller is right, I think, to hold that the inquiries of pluralist political scientists have not extended to deciding for or against the hypothesis of a ruling class so conceived. On the other hand, what present use is the hypothesis to a Marxist who wants to maintain the necessity of a revolution? What Miller has to say in the third of the chief enterprises of the book implies, very little use. There Miller argues that Marxists should not hold the theory of a social change to standards of explanation and confirmation as exacting as those expounded by positivist philosophers of science. Less exacting standards, he claims, suffice to certify many outstanding achievements in science, for example, the theory of evolution by natural selection.

Unfortunately, one of the things that the Marxist theory of social change abandons in shifting with Miller to less exacting standards is the attempt to formulate empirical laws predicting the future. But then what is one to make of the necessity of revolution? While no expectation of revolution comes out of technological determinism, according to Miller, he asserts that "the general case for the mode of production interpretation" of Marx's theory of social change is "the general case for the necessity of revolution."

Must one then not be able on occasion to reason from changes in the mode of production that open up new opportunities for given groups outside the ruling class to the conclusion that those groups will enjoy those opportunities only by carrying through a revolution? That entails a prediction. In particular, it is a prediction to say that a revolution will succeed in bringing about socialism, while any less violent measures will fail. Might Miller say that it is a prediction without being a predictive law? But some predictive laws are essential to the case for the revolution, among others the hypothesis (to which Miller himself subscribes), that if socialism supplants capitalism, in time every one living will lead fuller lives, exhibit a high degree of mutual concern, and realize other things that they will regard as benefits. Nor can the prediction that revolution alone will get us there be lightly degraded to an *ad hoc* diagnosis, favored or disfavored on crucial points by our intuitions. It would be utterly irresponsible to leave such a matter to intuitions. But the alternative to operating by intuitions is to make explicit under what conditions a revolution with the features contemplated may be expected to succeed

and with what kind and degree of success. That returns us to the demand for predictive laws or at least some reasonable approximation of them.

Such laws, and with them being able to make a rational case for revolution, may be beyond our grasp, though Marx would have been reluctant to grant this. Or there may be no need to make a case; maybe the revolution is going to happen anyway, not by rational choice on anyone's part, but because a large number of people are going to act blindly, out of despair. Marx himself, however, thought a case could be made even to a working class living (off the job) in some comfort, whose slavery under the system of wage labor "becomes more severe in proportion as the social productive forces of labor develop, whether the worker receives better or worse payment" (Critique of the Gotha Program).

For that case one needs not only well-founded predictions on the points already mentioned. One needs a well-founded prediction that the good achieved by the revolution will more than offset the pain (which Miller, to his credit, insists must be recognized) that it will cause on all sides while it is being fought through. The reckoning may properly include the miseries entailed by temporizing with the present system; but on this point, too, a prediction is required. A fully convincing case on these moral issues may not have to meet the standards for morality that Miller in his third enterprise, making out Marx's view of morality, argues that Marx repudiated: universality in appeal to rational persons; generality—application in all times and places, without exceptions; equality in concern with everyone affected. A champion of the working class cannot possibly make a case meeting those standards to members of the ruling class, taking their positions and attitudes into account without prejudice.

Even now, however, must not the damage to be done to those people be justified? One route to a fully convincing case would be through a multiple-value census-guided utilitarianism, if it could be shown both that fewer lives would be lost and that fewer lives would be wasted in other ways (deprived of education and employment, for example) during the revolution and afterwards. Some balancing, contrary to the standard of generality, between different values might occur on this approach, even perhaps some balancing between lives cut short and lives redeemed from wasting. However, the sacrifices to be imposed on members of the ruling class may be more than can be readily offset, unless they are discounted as deserving some disregard. What could be apter for this purpose than the contention that the positions which they would be clinging to, refusing to join the revolutionary cause themselves, were unjust ones? They are oppressors, who are no longer to benefit from their oppressions.

According to Miller, Marx would not have this recourse. Marx makes no use of the concept of justice in making a case for revolution. But he does, as he must, to make the case complete. I agree with Miller (and with his colleague Allen Wood) that Marx repudiates the term "justice". I do not agree that his denunciations of wage-slavery and oppression, using those terms, are not be understood as denunciations of injustice. True, it

would have been—it remained—in Marx's eyes idle to denounce slavery and oppression in earlier systems, where they were features of modes of production in their time indispensable to economic development. However, the slavery and oppression of capitalism just before its downfall have no such defense. Are they not unjust? What could be more unjust in any ordinary broad sense of injustice than indefensible slavery and oppression?

Moreover, though again Marx does not use the term, justice is one of the features that recommends the social system that will through revolution supersede capitalism. Once achieved, that system will operate according to the principle, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!" That is (in very general terms) a complete principle of distributive justice, prescribing for the burdens of production on one side and to the benefits of consumption on the other. I am not saying that Marx thought it sufficed to make a case for revolution to point to the moral beauties of the society which he predicted would be brought about by the revolution. Not by a long shot. But justice, among those beauties, is part of the case, and not easily dispensed with on the moral side. Moreover, among the other beauties will be a realization then of standards of morality that cannot currently be given effect. After a time, there will be equal concern with everyone living. The prevailing rules (like the rule of justice just cited) will be as general as many philosophers (including St. Thomas and Hume as well as Aristotle) have thought they could be, needing further specification in particular circumstances. Finally, everyone then living will be able to agree rationally to endorse the system, though admittedly this point will have been reached by selecting for cultivation attitudes that incline people to such agreement.

Marx may not have been able to fill out the case in every particular, but that is the sort of case, scientific and moral, that he aimed to make. The outline of the case is less visible in Miller's discussion than it ought to be.

Dalhousie University *David Braybrooke*

***Weapons and Hope*. By Freeman Dyson. New York: Harper and Row, 1984. $17.95.**

Freeman Dyson's concern in this book is how to get from here to there—from the *here* of an ever-escalating race in nuclear arms to the *there* of their gradual reduction and ultimate elimination. A large part of the *how* is the production by arms control experts of an educated public. He tells us in his preface that the first suggestion that he try to explain nuclear weapons to the public came from William Shawn, the editor of *The New Yorker*. The result was an article that appeared in *The New Yorker* in 1970. The contents of the book under review first appeared in the four February 1984 issues of *The New Yorker*.

A great many articles and books have been published on the control of nuclear arms in the nearly forty years since the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima but most of them have been written by experts for other members of the arms control community. *The New Yorker's* readership is wider than that community but unfortunately it too does not reach a wide public. Neither, I suppose, does *The Dalhousie Review* but it may pick up a few interested readers that *The New Yorker* does not. And perhaps others will take up the mission of spreading still farther the gospel according to Dyson. A great merit of his book is that, unlike many others on the subject, it is likely by virtue of both its style and substance to hold the attention of lay readers once they have been induced to read it, and to give some measure of hope to those who have been unable to see a realistic way out of our present predicament and have concluded there is nothing they can do about it.

Dyson fully recognizes the importance of the organized anti-nuclear movements that exist today but he also realizes that they can be effective in influencing those in control of the direction of arms policy only when they are agreed on an objective and when that objective is such that it can arouse broad public support. One instance of success is the inclusion in the Salt I Treaty of 1972 of the provision that binds the United States and the Soviet Union not to deploy serious ABM defences. On that occasion the few generals and politicians who opposed the provision were unable to stem the strong tide of popular opinion.

Another objective that has a fair chance of succeeding within a few years is the freeze. In 1981 a Princeton citizens' peace movement, the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament, debated its choice of objective. Would it be a freeze or no-first-use of nuclear weapons? Dyson, an active member of the group, belonged to the no-first-use party but he realized that it was useless as a campaign issue because the ordinary citizen would not understand what it meant. So he went along with the more politically experienced members of the group who said that the freeze was the only objective that had a chance of getting nationwide support. The group helped to get a freeze on the ballot for the 1982 election in New Jersey where it was approved by a large popular majority. He does not minimize the importance of achieving a freeze:

> If in the next few years a consensus should develop in the United States population and government in favor of a freeze, this would have important consequences. The Soviet government already expressed its willingness to negotiate the conditions of a freeze. If the United States were wholeheartedly in favor of a freeze, it is likely that a treaty could be negotiated which would achieve to a large extent the stated objective of the peace movement: stopping the nuclear arms race. . . . Such a treaty would be a major achievement (234).

The freeze movement in the United States made substantial gains in 1984. A Boulder, Colorado, member of the movement reported on these in the *Boulder Daily Camera* of December 25, 1984: eighteen months before the

1984 elections it organized a political action committee, Freeze Voter '84, which mobilized support for pro-freeze candidates. It was active in seven Senatorial and 36 House contests and succeeded in electing four pro-freeze Senators and 25 pro-freeze Representatives. His assessment, a justified one, is:

> It is significant that for the first time, a foreign policy issue was important enough to a large segment of mainstream America for a unified, organized electoral effort to be mobilized. And it is unprecedented for such an effort to have been so successful in such a short amount of time. Momentum is with the Freeze.

Unfortunately the principal virtue of a freeze is that there is a fair chance of its leading in a few years to a negotiated treaty with the Soviet Union. It does nothing to reduce the danger of nuclear war which, as Dyson points out, arises more from the existing stock of weapons than the development of new ones. Nor does it address the incompatibility between the American concepts of assured destruction and limited nuclear war and the Soviet concept of a first-strike, and so does nothing to point the way to progressive arms reduction. Dyson dismisses other objectives of the anti-nuclear movements in the United States because they have no chance of winning the support of the government or of a sufficiently large segment of the public. A crusade to ban the bomb and do it now suffers from this defect. It may indeed be emotionally satisfying to those who support it but Dyson does not consider this a virtue: it enables those who join it to indulge in what he calls vicarious pacifism. An indulgence is what it is and nothing more. It seems to me that vicarious pacifism also marks existing anti-nuclear movements outside United States: the opposition to the testing of the Cruise in Canada, the obstruction of its deployment in Britain, the opposition in some NATO countries to the acceptance of the Cruise and the Pershing II, and the determination of an increasing number of Australians that Australia, at least, be not contaminated with the filthy stuff. The fervour of those who participate in these protest movements attests to their concern and no doubt serves as a healthy reminder to governments that more and more persons want them to do something. But it fails to tell the government of the United States, the one government that in the first instance has to be persuaded, what it can realistically do.

It was my reading of Dyson in the February issues of *The New Yorker* that led me, in late March in Halifax, to attend what was billed as a major conference: Beyond the Arms Race: Building Peace and Security. I went with his message in mind to discover to what extent the local movement appreciated the hard thinking and staying power that will be required to reach the ultimate goal of a nuclear-free world. Some sensible things were said from the platform and occasionally from the floor but I found little disposition to follow them up. One panelist found to his mild discomfiture that supporters of the local movement were sensitive to the charge of

naivety but naive was what many if not most of them were. I detected a belief that it was not necessary to seek the guidance of arms control experts, of 'intellectuals': goodwill and fervour were enough. I tested the knowledge of one participant by asking him whether he knew the difference between a first use and a first strike. He did not and I suspect that many others were equally ignorant. Well, they are in exalted company: in a speech in early September, 1984, Geraldine Ferraro revealed that she did not know either. The difference is a crucial one, so crucial that Dyson suggests that the first step in educating the public might well be to explain it. I found too a general belief that time is running out as if the continued escalation of the arms race itself increased the danger of nuclear war. It does not: neither of the superpowers is going to allow the other to get so far ahead that it will be readier than it is now to initiate nuclear warfare. The belief was put in a particularly sensational form on the cover of the April 1984 issue of *Quest*, Canada's Urban Magazine (It's Three Minutes to Midnight and Counting . . .) to draw attention to its featured article. The belief is no doubt sincerely held but I cannot refrain from wondering whether the objective of its insistent reiteration is to frighten more persons into joining anti-nuclear movements on the mistaken assumption that if only enough of them were to put their shoulders to the wheel a quick solution is possible. Dyson knows better, and repeatedly reminds his readers that it will take twenty, thirty or more years for the way out he suggests to be completely successful, if it ever is. His is a long-range plan.

In Part IV, the final part of his book, after assessing and for various reasons rejecting six other concepts, he explains it fully. He puts strongly the case for non-nuclear resistance. Accepting that it would involve some risk, he sees no convincing evidence that the risk the United States is now accepting is smaller. But he finally rejects this too because it is marked by vicarious pacifism though to a lesser extent than non-resistance, because it is insufficiently robust, and because it does not give due weight to the persistence of original sin.

The plan he proposes is freer from these defects. It was first put forward in 1969 by an expert witness, Donald Brennan, in his testimony to a U.S. House subcommittee and has become known in the jargon of the arms control community as "parity plus damage-limiting". Dyson prefers the more readily understood "live-and-let-live". It requires the United States to say to the Soviet Union, "We prefer live Americans to dead Russians", to be expanded when bilateral negotiations have reached an appropriate stage to "We prefer live allies to dead enemies." It also requires the United States to abandon its concepts of assured destruction and limited nuclear war but progress is in principle negotiable since the Soviet counterforce doctrine is consistent with bilateral reductions to any desired level and because live-and-let-live "does not demand any substantial shift in Soviet doctrine or patterns of behavior'." In essence the proposal is for a shift in emphasis from offensive to defensive weapons. Its long-range objectives are the same as non-nuclear resistance but differ from it in that they are to

be achieved bilaterally instead of unilaterally and the shift from nuclear to non-nuclear defences is to come about as advances in technology improve the effectiveness of the latter. The problem of vicarious pacifism "hardly arises, since live-and-let-live is only mildly pacifism in concept and does not impose much greater risks upon our allies than upon ourselves". The problem of robustness is more serious because the concept is not easy to explain but it is logically coherent and politically practical and is robust enough to have a chance of holding the different constituencies in the United States together while negotiations are under way. It is also robust enough "to flourish in winter" because it does not require "a mood of joyful unanimity to make it politically acceptable." It is unlikely to be wrecked on the shoals of original sin because it does not require an unprecedented quantum leap in the moral capacity of humankind.

Other experts may not be fully satisfied with some of his arguments; though I am not one of them I have a few queries myself. But his book could well serve as a text for the new public debate for which he says the time is now ripe.

Dalhousie University *J.H. Aitchison*

Technology and The Canadian Mind: Innis/McLuhan/Grant. **By Arthur Kroker. Montreal: New World Perspectives, 1984. Pp., 144. Paper, $6.95.**

In this short but compelling book, Arthur Kroker dramatically explains how and why technology is a pre-occupation in Canadian thought. He begins with graphic accounts of technology's presence in the Canadian mindscape and landscape. The description, for example, of the obtrusive CN Tower in Toronto as a visual sign of an all-pervasive technological culture is emphatic enough to make the reader call up his or her foreboding icons and images. References of this sort infuse the whole book yet it is principally taken up with the ideas of George Grant, Marshall McLuhan and Harold Innis. They are the composite proof of the Canadian intellectual preoccupation with technology and Kroker provides a fairly comprehensive reading of their work. A chapter is devoted to each thinker but the author engages in some skillful cross-cutting which enables him to continually play up their differences and limitations.

As Kroker sees it, Grant offers an eloquent discourse on technological dependency. The familiar Grant themes are explored: Canada's embrace with the United States, reliance on the forms and force of technology as being synonymous with a total submission to modernity, nihilism and the tenets of liberalism and finally the insistence that it is technique itself that is our obsession as we strive toward mastery and domination intent only on the "will to will". The connection to Nietzsche is of course central and Kroker expends considerable effort analysing the linkage but unfortu-

nately to the extent that he anoints Grant as "the Nietzsche of the New World". Both reached similar conclusions about the state of the human condition but their ideas about the fate and redemption of the world are very distinct. As for Grant's deeply Christian views, Kroker feels uncomfortable with them as if they spoil an otherwise accurate picture of the crisis of contemporary culture.

For Kroker, it is Grant's fixation of belief and "panic remembrance" which ensure that his philosophy has "no means of translation into politics". Somehow natural law, revelation and constant reflection are not the kinds of action ultimately required to tackle the very consequences of technology that Grant decribes. Grant would no doubt regard such exclusion as yet another submission to nihilism. Still, Kroker considers Grant a great commentator, if not a prophet. You can feel the affection for him as he recommends in almost religious tones how we must continue to listen to Grant listening for what Grant calls the "intimations of deprival" in an increasingly technological age.

Kroker does not have the same enthusiasm for the ideas of Marshall McLuhan. He rightly acknowledges McLuhan as a master rhetorician who has been instrumental in developing our awareness about the form of technology. But he castigates McLuhan for subordinating or dismissing outright political and economic realities such as corporate media concentration. This is regarded as the great "blindspot" and in stark contrast to Grant it enabled McLuhan to wholly embrace technology as an emancipatory force. Kroker holds out for liberating possibilities too and credits McLuhan with providing some of the genesis of hope. But the lack of political and economic dimensions remains the great omission. Kroker traces them to medical and religious perspectives.

Since McLuhan regarded all forms of technology as extensions of ourselves, he saw in them the causes of social and cultural numbness and dislocation but also the cure for our communicative needs and ills. As for the religious dimension, McLuhan was committed to Catholic humanism which enabled him to conceive of and accept technology as an instrument of cultural preservation and in universalist terms. Both perspectives, insists Kroker, placed McLuhan in the position of legitimating existing control and not recognizing Canada's particular situation *vis-à-vis* the United States. The end result was that McLuhan had no real understanding about the possession of time and space, even though he often waxed brilliantly about the capacity of technology to extend and enrich ourselves.

McLuhan's contradictions, omissions and naiveté are unduly emphasized but Innis's positions are embraced almost to the point of praise. For Kroker, he combined the philosophical and political astuteness of Grant and McLuhan's rhetorical abilities. Innis emerges not so much as a theorist or prophet but as providing an all encompassing method to understand culture and technology. According to Kroker, Innis was the realist *par excellence* who got beyond Grant and McLuhan's diagnosis of

technology by his careful attention to the seams and texture of history. The development of technology is to be considered in relation to the development of staples, commodities and institutions that are technology's cause or consequence. Indeed, Innis appeared to wrestle with technology to the extent that its monopolistic and commercial tendencies he so feared seem capable of transcendence. Kroker concurs and Innis's method makes him optimistic.

Nevertheless, he concludes his book with an almost Grant-like sobriety. Technology is the problem and the dependency and domination which it wreaks has created an "ethics gap". Kroker looks upon his three thinkers as having begun to provide the basis for rethinking and recasting technology. Yet he is much more insistent than any of them in regarding the "American challenge" as the major obstacle to Canada controlling its cultural and technological destiny.

However, a fixation with the American "technological dynamo" is partly the cause of the most glaring omission in the book as it turns Kroker away from our own backyard. There is virtually no consideration of the role of education as systems and process in the Canadian context. And education in the form of mass schooling is nothing more than technique in one of its most expansive and pervasive phases. Consider for example the role of universities. As cornerstones of the knowledge-industry they not only use certain technologies, they invent, advance, exploit, sophisticate and perfect them. That our schools and universities are a mixture of American, British and French influences should also not divert us from attending to their crucial roles in the technological enterprise. Nevertheless, one might not have called Kroker on this omission if it were not for the intense interest in education of Grant, McLuhan and Innis. One only has to refer to Grant's essay on the university curriculum, to McLuhan's reception by the academy as well as his conception of media as classrooms without walls. As for Innis, his interest in education as a communication system and process runs throughout his work as attested by his "Idea File". He also served on a Manitoba Commission on Adult Education and judging from the views expressed, his rather elitist conception of the role of the university might seem incompatible with his fears about the monopolies of knowledge.

Despite the omission, *Technology and the Canadian Mind* is a fine invitation to the ideas of Grant, McLuhan and Innis while also being an arresting consideration of the Canadian technological experience. I look forward to further installments of New World Perspectives of which this book is the first of a proposed series on North American thinkers.

McGill University *Lon Dubinsky*

Queen's University, Volume II, 1917-1961. By Frederick W. Gibson. McGill-Queen's University Press. 1983. pp. xiv, 318. $49.50.

It is tempting for anyone who knew Queen's, as I did, during part of the time covered by Professor Gibson's history, to enter the volume through the index. And I must confess that is what I did. What a goodly company there is to be found: Andre Bieler, the painter, Arthur Lower, the historian; scientists like J.A. Gray, B.W. Sargent and Gleb Krotkov; Ralph Jeffrey, the mathematician; and, of course, R.C. Wallace, W.A. MacKintosh and J.A. Corry, Principals during my time at Queen's. Of my own generation, there were people like Douglas Le Pan, John Meisel, J.E. Hodgetts, George Whalley, Hans Eichner, Gerard Bessette, David Slater and the author of this history, Frederick W. Gibson—men just beginning in the 'fifties to win national recognition. And still alive in the minds of everyone in my day and very visible in the early chapter of this book are such worthies as John Watson, O.D. Skelton, Norman MacLeod Rogers, B.K. Sandwell, Peter McArthur and J.B. Harrison. To mention only these few names out of so many of like merit, is to suggest something of the massive influence which Queen's University has had on the cultural, political, scientific and educational life of this country.

But, as I soon realized, it will not do to explore the Gibson volume in a random hunt for big game. The book has a shape. Its sub-title is "To serve and yet be free". In his Preface, Professor Gibson tells us that he has "tried to view the history of Queen's dispassionately and to write about it candidly and fairly, believing that for a university, no less than for an individual, it is worth being reminded of failures as well as successes".

Certainly there are moments of failure recorded here and whole periods of disaffection. The Principalships of Bruce Taylor and W.H. Fyfe in the 'twenties and 'thirties were blemished in Taylor's case by bad academic judgement and in Fyfe's by an indifference to the practical problems of university management. After one regrettable academic decision by Taylor the young W.A. MacKintosh wrote to his Principal:

> I should inform you and the Board of Trustees that the strong claims which Queen's has had on my loyalty and services have all but dissolved and that I feel that the lack of good faith and the absence of any considered policy . . . give little basis for hope for the future of the University.

A rowdy student body and a lethargic faculty seemed to reflect an aimlessness and ineptitude in Taylor's governance. His successor, W.H. Fyfe, a fellow of infinite jest with the highest academic standards, was dismayed by the situation he found on his arrival from Britain:

> Many classes are, through lack of staff, already much too large for the purpose of effective instruction: there is a lack of tutors to correct exercises and give personal advice; new developments and the expansion of intellectual interest are beyond hope; and it is increasingly

> difficult to find even the most meagre subsidy for that research work without which the spirit of a University loses life and power.

With no previous experience in university administration, Fyfe "became at once—and remained—heavily dependent on his vice-principal and treasurer", D.W.E. McNeill, whose hoarding of "contingency money" and "reserves" prohibited any improvement in faculty, library, and research facilities. Enrollment declined and the old Queen's pride in herself dwindled. Fyfe did manage to make a few strong appointments and himself found outside financial support for music and the fine arts.

But it was R.C. Wallace, installed as Principal in 1936, who restored a firm academic purpose to Queen's by restoring the authority of the Principal's office, by insisting that research was the heart of the academic enterprise, by discovering himself new sources of financial support while at the same time liberalizing McNeill's "reserve" and "contingency" policies.

Progress was slow, painful but real in the late 'thirties but in the immediate post-war period and with the upsurge of the economy, Wallace was able to make a series of notable appointments and expand facilities for research in all the major areas. His successors, MacKintosh and Corry, in an even more hospitable economic environment, were able to carry Wallace's initiatives much further. There were, it is true, set-backs and crises. But the university had left adolescence behind. The unique character of Queen's foreshadowed in the days of George Monro Grant was now fully realized.

It is impossible in a brief review to do justice to Professor Gibson's masterful deployment of detail drawn from archival holdings, public and private records, and direct personal knowledge. The book abounds in anecdote, brilliant portraiture, lucid appraisals of policy. Yet the details never obtrude. There is no cataloguing, no fact-for-fact's sake. Instead we have the readable, utterly engrossing study of a living organism, growing pains and all, coming to maturity not easily but well.

There is one chapter that expresses in little the unique character of Queen's University and illustrates perfectly the sub-title of the book: "To serve and yet be free." It is an account of the cases of Israel Halperin and Glen Shortliffe, two distinguished Queen's professors who suffered from that form of anti-communist feeling which we think of now as "McCarthyism". Halperin, in the Gouzenko affair in 1945, was arrested and charged with having betrayed secret information to the Soviet Embassy. In a subsequent trial he was acquitted for lack of evidence against him. Principal Wallace immediately lifted the suspension against Halperin, restoring him to his place on the faculty. Certain members of the Board of Trustees protested vehemently and Wallace, adhering "to the British way, that until a man is proved guilty, he must be regarded as innocent," took the matter to the full Board where his defence of Halperin had the eloquent support of the Chancellor, Charles Dunning. No action was taken against Halperin. As Gibson puts it:

> The Queens trustees served their university well. They had refused to be rushed into harsh or ill-considered action, they now upheld the authority of the courts of Canada and the rights and liberties of Canadian citizens under the law . . . . At the same time they gave notice that at Queen's University there would be no witch-hunting for Communists or fellow travellers.

The case of Glen Shortliffe was rather different. He had appeared regularly on the CBC "Week End Review" and while wholly critical of Soviet abuses of human rights had been equally critical of right-wing dictatorships supported by the United States. Principal Wallace, in the midst of a fund-drive, was deluged with letters of protest from prominent citizens. He asked Shortliffe to modify his radio comments. Shortliffe promptly gave up his broadcasting. He shortly after accepted an offer from Washington University and resigned from Queen's only to find himself barred from entry to the United States. Wallace immediately reappointed Shortliffe to Queen's, unhappy and repentant that his own earlier "censorship" had caused his professor deep distress. As Gibson tells us "Shortliffe was amazingly busy during the rest of his life . . . . His energies were remarkable and his wit indestructible. Yet at his very core he was a man disappointed in himself and in his country".

Gibson's summary of the two episodes is judicious and fair:

> In the case of Israel Halperin the University dealt with the problems in a way that was altogether creditable to its officers and governing bodies; but, in the case of Glen Shortliffe, in a manner less so. Queen's, however, gave convincing proof of its desire to retain Shortliffe, as well as Halperin. Shortliffe's troubles stemmed mainly from the fact that neither he nor the university was able effectively to defend his civil liberties outside the academic community. Queen's although not impervious to the infection of the cold war, showed itself to be, on the whole, a place of liberty.

Dalhousie University *Malcolm Ross*