

Book Reviews

Acts of Implication: Suggestion and Covert Meaning in the Works of Dryden, Swift, Pope and Austen. By Irvin Ehrenpreis. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: The University of California Press, 1981. Pp. 158. \$14.95.

Language and Logos in Boswell's Life of Johnson. By William C. Dowling. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981. Pp. 185. \$16.00.

The reader of eighteenth-century literature is unlikely to find two more divergent treatments of the period than in these books, yet the literary theorist is unlikely to discover stronger evidence of resistance to objective criticism than these dissimilar studies provide. The first assumes an immediate and unchallengeable connection between literature and life; the second subjects this assumption to perpetual regressive questioning. Ehrenpreis, in proposing that the writings of Dryden, Swift, Pope and Austen are explicable in terms of a period style and an established political philosophy, relies on historical context rather than on generic concepts. His thesis is that the self-consciousness of Augustan authors permitted their implications to add to, as distinct from undermine, their didacticism. On the other hand, Dowling challenges the value of authorial awareness by presenting the deconstructionist case that a great work must create its own rules and be its own model. Dowling's view of the *Life of Johnson* is that it continuously dissolves narrative conventions, requiring the reader to question its narrative illusions in a serial fashion until it offers itself as so removed from history and so complete in itself that it speaks profoundly about moral actuality.

Opposed to the deconstructionist view that interpretation is valid only for the individual interpreter, Ehrenpreis disclaims critical theory in order to promote "particular acts of literary interpretation." His perspective is rhetorical as well as historical. He is confident about the accessibility of the English literary tradition, and this confidence allows him to think of his audience as belonging to this tradition. His sense that some modern readers can understand eighteenth-century authors as immediately as contemporary readers did leads him to couch his critical remarks about

this immediate relationship in the rhetorical terms of speaker, address, and listeners. For Ehrenpreis, the reader's capacity to understand the authorial impulse and to move from this intuitive certainty to a comprehension of structural and dynamic form is a paradox involving mystery and common sense, a paradox to be experienced rather than analyzed.

Interestingly, Ehrenpreis's confidence in the authority of tradition, author, and critic does not demean the reader's role. For, his argument that the acceptance of social hierarchy allowed Dryden, Swift, Pope and Austen to criticize the court and monied interests without displacing the hierarchy and his demonstration that the theoretical requirement for satire to be general and lucid became a vehicle for satiric particularity and indirection without displacing the theoretical requirement establish the paradox that, whereas authorial and critical authority demands commitment from the reader, it can do so only by heightening his critical responsibility. In Ehrenpreis's mind, the reader is expected to match the self-consciousness of the author and to recognize that ironical implications simultaneously question and confirm the literary tradition.

In his essays on the four writers, Ehrenpreis justifies this thesis by proving his ability to perceive quite different sorts of implication. He shows that the implications of Dryden's plays stem from their "surprising yet continuous changes of direction" by maintaining that *peripeteia* continually involves simple characters in complicated patterns of behaviour. Crucial to the *peripeteia* is Dryden's concept of sexual passion; it allows him to implicitly question heroic and ascetic virtues and to place English politics in the tradition of ironic romance. His plays, Ehrenpreis helpfully suggests, imply nostalgia for the pure heroism of romance together with a reluctant criticism of such heroism. Ehrenpreis interprets these implications as a royalist reaction against the Civil War and against the displacement of the Stuarts.

Ehrenpreis studies the relation of subversive implication and conventional didacticism in Swift by comparing *The Examiner* and *The Drapier's Letters*. In the former, he sees evidence of Swift's distrust of monarchy working against his obligation to defend Queen Anne. Ehrenpreis skillfully proves that Swift was restricted in generating implications in the earlier papers because his commitment to Tory political concepts was prudential rather than ideal. In the later pieces, however, since he did not feel obliged to defend George I, Swift developed a series of double reactions to the monarchy, court, gentry, and common people in which he blends seeming reverence with actual contempt, revealing a desire to place the salvation of the Irish nation above the traditional social and constitutional structure. His implications, while socially subversive, are morally ideal and show him to be the real defender of English society.

Ehrenpreis traces the source of Pope's satirical implications to his psychology, finding in the poet's early self-awareness anxiety about his physical stature and sexual incompetence and the double response of extreme self-protection and extreme desire for public recognition. Behind

the charm of the early poems Ehrenpreis detects painful emotions which he attributes to the split between Pope's association of sexuality with poetic creativity and his refusal to connect conception and sexual intercourse. With compassion he explains the later poetry in terms of Pope's making this split into a satirical resource. He points out that Pope connects sexual promiscuity to bad legislation, assuming for purposes of irony that, whereas domestic virtues effect moral public action, sexual promiscuity is equally the cause of politicians' infidelities and their misgovernment. For Ehrenpreis, the bipolar sexual implications explain Pope's conventional respect for the politically responsible country gentleman and his assertive sense of himself as the poet hero and moral authority to society.

Ehrenpreis uses his analysis of implication in Austen's novels to show why she is neither a realistic nor a symbolic novelist, why she does not make much of social allusions and does not allow the description of things to have meaning independently of her characters' moral life. Pointing out the inwardness of her plots, he demonstrates that her explicit judgments do not impede her implicit ones. He shows that her characters must be scrutinized continuously since sensible ones say silly things and silly ones say sensible things. He analyzes the systematically incomplete but moral contrasts between the characters, showing how they must be completed by the reader, and he argues convincingly that this completion of narrative patterns requires metonymy rather than realism or symbolism. His treatment of metonymy brilliantly demonstrates that Austen exploits every aspect of common life to make moral implications about her characters and to have these implications support the values of the rural gentry and the concept of Christian heroism.

Dowling's argument about the autonomy and reflexiveness of the *Life of Johnson* begins by maintaining that the conventional concept of the narrator as presiding presence is defied by the lengthy periods of Boswell's silence. Far from containing the world of the *Life*, Boswell's consciousness is only one among many worlds. Starting with this notion of narrative discontinuity, Dowling sets out to prove that the plural worlds of the *Life* exist in antithetical relation to one another. For this purpose, he relies on the pluralist assumptions that the only reality is the existence of separate realities and that the literary and everyday worlds are equally real. These pluralist assumptions allow him to ignore such things as Ehrenpreis's concern with the tension between degrees of reality and to exemplify Derrida's dictate that the critic "in an upward spiral of self-transcendence" should expose the falsity of his successive interpretations by stripping them of their metaphysical significance until interpretation becomes a free play of the imagination.

Dowling advances the view that the critic cannot be concerned with any reality that exists independently of language by describing how Boswell first learns of Johnson through the latter's writings, then is shocked to meet Johnson in the flesh, and finally learns through Johnson's conversa-

tions to regard the world of physical appearance as illusory. After suggesting that this process is a model for the reader, Dowling criticizes Boswell's self-consciousness, showing that Boswell's celebration of Johnson as a conventionally pious man is untrue to the depths of Johnson's spiritual malaise. Dowling's point is that the *Life* presents models of coherence, such as Boswell's control of reality by language, only to subvert them. His thesis is that the *Life's* principle of coherence is that the progressive search for coherence must be thwarted.

Dowling maintains that the act of quotation supports this antithetical structure since Boswell's presentation of Johnson's words exists as a world in relation to the anti-world of Johnson's unquoted words. Drawing upon the structuralist linguistic concept of words as a system of differences without positive terms, Dowling goes on to explain the antithetical structure of Boswell's narrative world as a set of explanatory fictions whose substantiality is limited to their existence in a system of anti-worlds. In order to expose this relational aspect of the *Life*, Dowling insists that Boswell is no different from others who react to Johnson. By levelling the narrator with the characters, Dowling proposes that Boswell is no key to the coherence of his work. Evidently, Boswell is identical with the others in his frustrated attempts to see in Johnson a spiritual presence and a moral authority. For Dowling, the frequently cited *Prayers and Meditations* evidences Johnson's spiritual uncertainties and resists the idealizing of Boswell and the others. Since Boswell cannot admit Johnson's spiritual struggles, Dowling concludes that the biographical task of preserving Johnson is impossible and that the true subject of the *Life* is the impossibility of biography.

The illusion of Johnson's presence Dowling also finds in the conversation scenes because he levels the reader with Johnson's audiences. Just as these audiences posit a single consciousness behind the discontinuities of Johnson's utterances, so does the reader. Yet, according to Dowling, the effect is the reader's understanding that there is no presiding presence in Johnson but language itself. Johnson cannot be the moral centre of the *Life* because he is always more serious about conversation than its subjects. For Dowling, when the fiction of Johnson's presence is realized, so too is the truth that mind is equivalent to speech: language both dissolves the inner world and sustains it.

Dowling ends his study by defending the humanism indicated by deconstructionism. That deconstructionism enacts its assumptions makes it compatible for him with objective criticism. Since the human world is a world of language before it is a world of things and since criticism should create as well as discover truth, Dowling believes that the negative reaction against deconstructionist critics is primarily a comment on the increasing illiteracy of society.

Dowling's presumption that the world owes deconstructionism recognition matches his unwillingness to consider the persuasive and didactic functions of literature thoughtfully. In separating logos from idea, he

holds to a purely cerebral sense of literary action which in turn depends on simple-minded, because rigidly dichotomous, concepts of reality and perception. Granted that truth depends on the progressive perception of error, Dowling's insistence on antithetical perceptions and bifurcating truths is, nonetheless, reductive. He does not seem to care about the moral problems of pluralism: when he mentions the reader's need for order and other such common psychological impulses, he actually dismisses a metaphysical examination of pluralism. Readers of the *Life of Johnson* are likely to feel that Dowling's claim about Johnson's being more interested in the nature of conversation than in its topics totally ignores Johnson's brilliant dialectical sense of particular and general moral truth. Johnson's moral dialectic resists Dowling's structuralist antitheses by transcending them. Moreover, Dowling's prose in its colloquial vagueness, slack analogies, and imprecise repetitiousness is not a model of literacy; it cannot describe or contain the humanity of Johnson's language. By contrast, the prose of Ehrenpreis is exact, provocative, and insightful. Without theoretical pretensions, he both analyzes and imitates the style of his subjects. His sense of logos being more comprehensive than Dowling's, he knows that language is reflexive and denotative, transparent and opaque. Ehrenpreis's sense of linguistic dialectic may not be evidenced by his casual reliance upon rhetorical analogies as expository metaphors, but this dialectic does inform his thesis that the more readers hold in common the more they can be exercised in contemplating the uncommon without surrendering what is common. If Ehrenpreis suggests conclusions rather than works out the processes of literary self-consciousness, his sense of dialectic and collective mentality is more fruitful than Dowling's strategies. Sometimes Ehrenpreis risks the intentional fallacy, especially in his perhaps too speculative treatment of Pope, and his reliance upon historical context rather than literary theory ignores the problem that a philosophical framework is essential to historical description. Yet readers of eighteenth-century literature will learn more from Ehrenpreis about literary history, ironic processes, and moral judgement and will see that he pushes out, more successfully than Dowling, the boundaries of objective criticism.

University of Alberta

Robert James Merrett

***The Education of J.J. Pass.* By T.F. Rigelhof. Ottawa: Oberon, 1983. Pp. 197. \$23.95. Paper, \$11.95.**

***The Lion's Mouth.* By Caterina Edwards. Edmonton: NeWest Press, 1982. Pp. 180. \$16.95. Paper, \$6.95.**

***Zarkeem.* By Pegeen Brennan. Dunvegan, Ontario: Quadrant Editions, 1982. Pp. 136. Paper, \$6.95.**

Two recent novels, *The Education of J.J. Pass*, by T.F. Rigelhof, and *The Lion's Mouth*, by Caterina Edwards, deal with a relatively uncommon theme in Canadian fiction: the effects of the DP label on children who were brought involuntarily to Canada and who, because of their psychological and intellectual isolation in the culture in which they were subsequently raised, looked elsewhere for attachments and some direction in life. The most important features of these novels are their ultimate rejection of Canada as a viable environment and their suggestion that an identity and a purpose are only to be found by going backwards, back to Europe.

Of the two, Rigelhof's treatment of the theme is the more profound, if only because he presents in J.J. Pass (Bucky) an individual who begins life without a background and who, therefore, must find or create one for himself. As it turns out, his is an education in theft; having been educated to steal everything else, he learns in the end how to steal an identity. This apparent inheritance from his father is his triumph. Nevertheless, it is ironical that it is the narrator, Alex, and not Bucky, who learns what "theft" in this sense means. Alex represents the creation of identity not by the theft of the heritage of others but by stealing their actual lives. Both literally and metaphorically, he is a murderer, if an unsuccessful one. For all of Alex's alienation from Bucky's father, he is in some ways closer to him than Bucky is, that is, to theft in its most destructive sense. *The Education of J.J. Pass* is, therefore, not so much a rejection of Canada itself as a critique of its refusal, implicit in the arbitrary and rigid conventions of its rootless society, to resolve the central problem of individual identity.

For Edwards, the thematic difficulty lies not in the need to create a background but in the oppressive dominance of the already existing Venetian one. The immigrants from the Veneto defiantly refuse to transplant their roots: they see the future rather than the past as transient, even meaningless. Edmonton is one of those cities where "nothing ever happens," a city whose inhabitants can at any time pack up their buildings and move away. Unlike Venice, Western Canada does not even possess the appearance of permanence; its citizens live in temporary camps on an alien landscape. Those who are committed to the country certainly see it in terms of a future, but it is a petty capitalist, individualistic future, manufactured by professional migrants who dissociate themselves from the implications of what they are doing.

In the circumstances, the return to Venice is imperative, but as it is presented, Venice is equally unsatisfactory. For all their faults, Canadians are at least "confident of their ability," while the Venetians, despite their heritage, apparently lack this confidence. They are custodians of their city (this is how the hero, Marco, seems to view himself), but only like rats running around in its sewers, engaged in private battles in an environment which was not built for them and which at any moment can submerge them in its own drowning. Thematically, it is interesting that Marco wishes to preserve buildings rather than to create; even so, his is a

negative form of preservation, a crumbling into the encroaching tide. In the case of his congenitally deformed son, Francesco, his refusal to face the harsh logic of repair is merely sentimental.

Both novels are distinguished by a problematic disparity in the narrative point of view. Shifting from first to third-person narrative, they suffer from uneasy relationships with their characters. Structurally, *The Lion's Mouth* does provide some justification for the shift. The narrator, Bianca, falls in love with Marco when she is fifteen, and spends the ensuing years trying to recreate him in a novel. But as she changes, so she changes him and the validity of her interpretation is weakened. She rebels against the physical domination of her Ukrainian-Canadian lover, Jack, but he has already rejected her Venice, and Marco, in favour of a Venice of oppressed immigrants that neither she nor Marco can really see. For all its culture, her Venice is crippled, as Marco is crippled, subject to a violence whose causes she fails to analyze and whose effects are at times presented with an absurd superficiality that disparages their importance in life, and even in the novel.

Bianca derives her intimate knowledge of Marco from the process of fiction itself, but the same does not obviously apply to Alex in *The Education of J.J. Pass*. As a third-person narrator he knows too much: his relationship with Bucky cannot be what he says it is. This problem is related to another, partly explicable in what appears to be a form of religious fellow-travelling, a religion without commitment. The characters of this novel are alienated from reality, but that view of them could well be nourished by Alex's own alienation, not theirs. As a result, the reader has difficulty in measuring the trustworthiness of his narration.

While this inevitably makes the novel difficult to approach structurally, it does not seem to be an altogether accidental formal effect. There is an irony in the accusation of witchcraft brought against Alex by his young housekeeper that involves more than a mere reversal of rôles. Alex's obsessions are ultimately much like Bianca's, and lead to the definition of fiction itself as a form of witchcraft. It remoulds the characters of others according to the narrator's own fantasies. In terms of theme, the effect of such a definition is complex. The immigrants of these two novels come to Canada in the 1940s and 1950s as refugees from the degradation and oppression of war-ravaged Europe. As DPs they can be regarded with detached compassion, but they are also victims dumped into a society where they are seen only too often as potential contaminants of the mythical values and traditions of the dominant Protestant, English-speaking culture. When their search for individual identity is undermined, as here, by a process of fantasizing viewed as intrinsic to fiction, what independent validity can they possibly achieve?

Zarkeen, by Pegeen Brennan, poses different problems, largely associated with the techniques of mythopoesis. In this novel, Brennan presents a passively matriarchal society in which artistic creativity is developed by women. Within the course of a few months, and closely linked to pregnancy and childbirth, three women invent painting, sculpture, and music.

There is no particular anthropological evidence to suggest that one sex rather than the other was responsible for these developments, so the specific association with childbirth is unfortunate, since it implies that one activity may substitute for the other. Also, the emphasis on dreams as a source of artistic inspiration, and even on the possibility that a form of extra-sensory perception may be involved, is equally unfortunate, given that it suggests that female artistic creativity has nothing to do with rational thinking, but is sub-intellectual.

As a whole, *Zarkeem* itself suffers from a lack of rational thinking. Too much of the action takes place in the mind of its heroine, Zaru, and the psychological tension thus set up, while it may well increase the depth of characterization, tends to collapse the myth. In addition, Zaru's objections to the ritualistic laws of her people are trivial: they lack mythical vigor. Consequently, the end is predictable even if its implications are unconsciously contradictory. By going against tradition, Zaru cedes authority to the men (they already have power), and the child born of her compromise is a male child. It is he who will take over.

Saint Mary's University

Margaret Harry

***The Feast: Meditations on Politics and Time.* By Tom Darby. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982. Pp. xvi, 234. \$27.50.**

A deconstructionist-structural reading of Tom Darby's book might pass many hours spinning within its frame. It is the first part of a trilogy with the general title: *The Feast*. Feast is a word connected to the Latin terms for holiday and for holy place. It is also connected to the modern English, ferial, which now means non-festal, but which used to mean, in ecclesiastical Latin, the opposite. Darby's intentions are clarified by the observation that the six chapters are divided into two parts: the first three establish the problem, the last three answer it. Each chapter is divided into three sections. The book begins by discussing three theories of time and is a "meditation" on its triple structure: past, present, and future. But it is not really a meditation. First, because Darby has produced a discourse so deeply anchored in the context of Hegel-scholarship that it has trouble rising above it. And rise it must if it is to be a genuine meditation, a reflection, or even a thinking of politics and time. For that, there are too many appendices and footnotes; to meditate is to fly, and this scholarly apparatus is like the cable of a barrage balloon. Second, it is not a meditation because it is a confession.

Darby begins with the great confessor of modernity, Rousseau, because Rousseau is such an exemplar of modern alienated consciousness. His attempts at superseding alienation, those pitiful and nauseating recipes for being a happy child of nature, simply made things uglier because original sin came from man's falling into time as history. The way beyond

was to overcome history not wallow in nature or flatten flowers in a book. This insight was pressed home by the French Revolution. The influence of Rousseau on the Jacobins has often been recorded; Darby emphasizes the specific impact his views had on the founding of a new temporal order and a new calendar. Meanwhile, *outré-Rhin*, the Germans were accomplishing what Marx called their revolution in thought. Capping the entire process was Hegel, for whom time was the internal and self-overcoming element of reality.

Historians, often the last to learn of such things, are uncertain whether nineteenth century Europeans knew what Hegel had done to them. In any event, the key to understanding how history was both a *via dolorosa* and a path of conceptual redemption, Good Friday and Easter at once, was forged by the industry of two refugees not from the French Revolution but from the Russian one, Alexandre Koyré and Alexandre Kojève. Both taught in Paris between the wars before pupils like Aron, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Bataille. Of the two interpretations, Kojève's is the more complete and has most thoroughly riled the community of so-called Hegel scholars. These persons, for the most part, are as supremely irrelevant to Darby's interest as Kojève is central, for Kojève explained, with great wit, how Hegel brought history to a speculative term and superseded the alienation that so troubled Rousseau.

Darby's confession of all this, it must be said, is thoroughly dense, as was Kojève's guidebook through the swampy prose of the master. All three explain why: they wish our participatory attention; they want us to be involved in their confessions because it is we about whom they confess. Moralizing intellectuals would say that Darby wishes to corrupt his readers. Indeed he does, for he thinks there is no other way to learn than from within. That is, we are made to confess along with Darby. The reward is not absolution or the bad faith of Rousseau but a kind of self-overcoming. We learn, for example, that, so long as we live, we are immortal, which is no mean achievement. We are reconciled to more than death, however; we reconcile "the most extreme polarities in existence, active and passive, praxis and theory, time and eternity, man and God, male and female." What more could one ask? Nothing at all; or rather, not even that.

But things are never quite what they seem even in the darkness of the confessional. These reconciliations and the political regime they apparently imply need not actually have been, so long as they might have been, or might yet be. But then the System of (Hegelian) Science turns into an ideal, as Kojève called it: "thus, the system itself becomes political propaganda for the obliteration of adverse opinion and ideology that will act as an arbiter through which science recognized as truth, and an element of social control for the realization of a state (power) fully integrated into a system (wisdom)." In this fashion, the confession of Darby-Kojève, as Rousseau's, turns out to be as well the history (the post-history) of the present. And as Nietzsche said of such historians, theirs is a gay science.

More accurately, a gay technology. This is why Darby ends with some lapidary remarks on snobbery and play.

Even that is not what it seems. Lurking beneath the occasional remarks on his predecessors is the rictus of Nietzsche and his whispered wisdom: the will to knowledge is the subtlest form of the will to power. Every discourse, even Darby's, combines, as he said, the twin potentials that realize "a state (power) fully integrated into a system (wisdom)." And so, "like a man," Darby has been bold in his attempt to tell us what he means and who we are, to give us and make us take his experience of the world neat, to expose his soul and turn us complicitous. He is anything but passive in this, and sometimes his aggressions are tedious. As Rousseau's, these self-revelations are, perhaps, in the end, a trifle unseemly. But Hegel said we must put up with it, look the negative in the face, and abide there with it. Darby's book, already a public document, will help us endure our reflective gaze. It is the first course of a larger feast, and written, as is everything nowadays, on the sabbath of history. Now we can only wait for the coming of the second part.

University of Calgary

Barry Cooper

Gerard Manley Hopkins. By Jerome Bump. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1982. Pp. xvii, 225. \$12.95.

Jerome Bump's *Gerard Manley Hopkins*, prepared for the Twayne English Authors Series, is informed by the characteristic strengths and emphases of his many other contributions to Hopkins studies. In fact, the book includes (sometimes verbatim or nearly so) rather a lot of his previously published work, already familiar to Hopkinseans. To comment on this book, then, is mainly to describe it and to estimate the success of Bump's effort to merge apparently discrete materials into one introductory volume.

The seams do show. Bump intensively explores five topics: the young Hopkins's aesthetic development; the hermeneutics of two poems composed during the otherwise silent early 1870's; *The Wreck of the Deutschland*; "The Windhover"; and "No Worst, There is None." These are looked at from different perspectives and seem to be (or to have been) independent studies. Embedding the highly specialized discussions in narrative and commentary of another sort—sometimes factual and general, often acutely insightful in matters of detail. Nearly everything in the book is well done, but the impression of patchwork is strong. The level of the argument varies occasionally, the focus shifts in the middle from style to theme, and certain subjects receive more attention than is justified by their importance for "an introduction to Gerard Manley Hopkins's contribution to our civilization" (Preface).

Such inconsistencies notwithstanding, the book is unified in its assumptions: that Hopkins is traditional and can be interpreted best with reference to specific aspects of his heritage; that formal coherence is essential in literary texts and is only apparently lacking in some of Hopkins's; that ostensibly opposed critical readings of Hopkins can and should be reconciled by appreciating his intentional multivalence of simultaneous meaning; that the poetic impulse in Hopkins is fundamentally proselytical; and that a vigorously renewed medievalism of spirit is at the imaginative core of the poet's achievement.

Bump also succeeds in his object of presenting background and interpretive schema unavailable in other introductory studies of Hopkins. Heavy emphasis (four of the seven chapters) is given to the poet's early artistic indebtedness (to family influences, to Ruskinian realism, to the poems of Christina Rossetti and the Pre-Raphaelites, and to medievalism in religion) and to a pair of neglected Hopkins poems from the silent years: "Rosa Mystica" and "Lines for a Picture of St. Dorothea." If a general objection could be made to the first four chapters, it would be that they are four. Specialist and non-specialist readers alike will wonder whether a 196-page introduction to Hopkins is warranted in spending half its length on pre-1875 background. Especially since some of that material has been published elsewhere by Bump, it should perhaps have been condensed.

Similarly familiar to Hopkinseans is Bump's more obviously important theory, extended here in Chapter Five, that *The Wreck of the Deutschland* belongs in the literary tradition of the "dynamic sublime." Bump argues that problems in interpreting Hopkins's great "dragon in the gate" are reduced if we associate its ideas and effects with the customary psychology of responses to the sublime or infinite in Nature. This reading—connected also to Hopkins's incarnational and sacramental beliefs—is an often compelling account of structural, metaphorical, and theological principles in *The Wreck*. Now that it is available in a popular volume, the Bump reading is bound to assume an important place among conventional interpretations of Hopkins's formidable ode.

The sixth chapter, "Poet of Nature," features a fourfold exegesis of "The Windhover." Setting out to "assimilate the multidimensional, polysemantic character of Hopkins's art," Bump finds in patristic and medieval allegorical interpretation a solution to some of the enigmas of this much-disputed poem. In fact, he addresses every notorious conundrum of the text: the heart in hiding; the buckling; the dangerousness; the ringing; and more. We are offered a "way of assimilating all the diverse, contradictory readings of this, the most explicated poem of its length in the language." In a sense, Bump's method does synthesize the sonnet's reception, reconciling divergent interpretations by locating them at different allegorical levels. Many exasperated readers of Windhover criticism will be as satisfied as Bump is by the results of this approach; it lends the sanction of literary and religious tradition to the sonnet's unsettling

indeterminacies. Other friends of the poem will be less impressed, feeling that relativism is no better in formalist clothing than in, say, flashier deconstructive garb. Another group of readers—perhaps the majority—will simply wonder afresh at the unflagging zeal with which ingenuities of analysis continue to be stirred by a bird. Bump does a good job in his briefer discussions of some other nature poems composed by Hopkins in the late 1870's. Unencumbered by the demands of a sweeping theory, he offers specific and worthwhile suggestions about the language and imagery of such pieces as "Pied Beauty," "The Starlight Night" and "As Kingfishers Catch Fire."

The last section of the book concerns the origins and character of the "terrible sonnets" written by Hopkins during his unhappy years in Dublin. The poem chosen to represent this period and to receive close examination is "No Worst, There is None"—a piece that Bump seems to admit is atypically disconsolate. Nevertheless, it most suits his purpose of linking the dark sonnets with the world-weariness and despair of both medieval *acedia* (or *tristitia*) and modern ennui. His learned explanation of *acedia* strongly suggests a profitable vein of moral, religious, and psychological interpretations, but Bump is less successful in attempting to reconstruct an actual "context of allusion" featuring intentional evocations of Dante's *Divina Commedia*. Even if the Dublin poems are not explicitly Dantesque or medieval, however, the analogies drawn by Bump are striking enough to justify the use he makes of them. Indeed, one strength of his final chapter is its eventual clarification of the ironic "antiparody" by which these poems—notably "No Worst"—appear to diagnose and defy the modernist *Weltschmerz* and despair that some critics imagine they express.

Although marred by the effects of disproportionate emphasis and warmed-over material, the Twayne *Gerard Manley Hopkins* by Jerome Bump interestingly relates much of the poet's life and work to important artistic, philosophical, and religious traditions. Apparently intended for a non-specialist audience, Bump's sustained emphasis on his subject's cultural bearings may also help to moderate the surprisingly hardy myth of Hopkins as the fluke of literary history.

Wilfrid Laurier University

Michael D. Moore

***Natural Space in Literature.* By Tom Henighan. Ottawa: Golden Dog Press, 1982. Pp. x, 283.**

Tom Henighan's title is slightly misleading, since his subject is the presence and function of the natural world in modern literature, chiefly poetry and fiction, from Wordsworth onwards. Even so, it is of course a vast theme, and a certain superficiality is part of the price normally exacted of such undertakings. The author's range of allusion is admirably wide (his

appendix of "relevant texts" would provide reading-lists for several exciting graduate courses), but he has chosen to organize his book in two main sections: the first hundred pages or so are largely general and theoretical, while the rest of the book concentrates on three novelists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries — Hardy, Lawrence and Wells. This method is open to question — there is obviously a certain arbitrariness about the selection of three case-studies (why three? why these three?) — but at least it has the merit of reducing the subject to more or less manageable proportions. Since Henighan's concern is with poetry as well as fiction, though, it seems a pity that we hear so little about Hardy's poems, which so often both reflect and create a landscape with figures.

The superficiality is the most damaging in the early chapters, the titles of some of which have an amplitude of promise that contrasts oddly with the meagreness of performance ("The Idea of Nature in Western Civilization" is dispatched in — four volumes? — no, less than four pages.) There is more elbow-room in the chapters devoted to individual authors, but here the novel-by-novel method of treatment makes for fragmentation. A discussion of Hardy that ranged freely over his fiction and verse would surely have served the author's purpose better than an attempt to scamper through a list of works *seriatim*. The result is that some of the commentaries are ludicrously brief (a single paragraph on *The Mayor of Casterbridge*); moreover, some of the quotations are overfamiliar (e.g., p. 124), as indeed are many of the observations — at this stage in Hardy criticism the news that, say, Tess and her fellow-workers at Flintcomb-Ash are dehumanized by their drudgery has lost its freshness). A point of accuracy; it was not a "pig's bladder" (p. 135) that Arabella threw at Jude; Hardy's missile was both more daring and more apt than his critic's.

The presence of Wells in this company comes as a surprise; one had not thought of him as a novelist with much to say about "nature," except perhaps in the more sentimental portions of *The History of Mr. Polly*, where Wellsian pastoral takes the form of a riverside pub. But this is to attach too narrow a meaning to "nature": he wins his place in the triumvirate as "the first great novelist to carry us into cosmic space" (*Paradise Lost* does not qualify in this space-race), and the discussion is based on a group of his early scientific romances, including the haunting Darwinian allegory *The Island of Dr. Moreau*. Lawrence is a more predictable choice, and the major novels are discussed chronologically.

Perhaps it is not unfair to say that this book attempts to do too much and achieves too little. The subject is one of great interest; it would have been good, for instance, to hear more about the actual means, technical and stylistic, by which a novelist creates a sense of "natural space," so that in, say, *The Woodlanders*, Hardy creates such a powerful sense of the environment and of movement from one point to another within it. But the piecemeal organization of the book works against sustained analysis of this kind. The notes and bibliography are full and useful, but an index is lacking.

A Medieval Italian Commune: Siena under the Nine, 1287-1355. By William Bowsky. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981. pp. xxii, 327. \$29.50.

In 1955 William Bowsky made a brief trip to Siena as part of his research for a book on the Emperor Henry VII. He was thrilled by this "exquisite" city. Even more exciting, the city which thrilled him was the creation of the historical period in which he was interested. From 1287 to 1355 Siena was governed by the Nine, a committee of solid citizens, selected supposedly by lot and rotated every two months. It was they who laid out the breathtaking shell-shaped *Campo*, divided into nine equal segments, and rebuilt the *Palazzo Pubblico*, requiring the windows of the surrounding private palaces to be remodelled to conform to the architectural style of the new public buildings. For the Cathedral high altar they commissioned Duccio di Buoninsegna to paint the city's patron and protectress, the Virgin Mary. The *Palazzo Pubblico* they decorated with another Madonna in Majesty by Simone Martini, and their own council chamber with a gigantic and overwhelming allegory of Good and Bad Government by Ambrogio Lorenzetti.

Few committees have exercised such distinguished artistic patronage. But the Nine have another and greater merit in the eyes of an historian: they have left an unusually extensive collection of records detailing their decisions, if not their deliberations (one hundred and twenty volumes for the decisions of the *Consiglio Generale* alone), although the records are far from complete, many having been burnt and looted during the popular uprising which overthrew the Nine in 1355.

Bowsky returned to Siena, and for two decades he has worked towards a general history of Siena under the Nine. *En route* he has produced a book on the commune's finances and eight valuable articles, many of which are recapitulated here in his *magnum opus*, a book which the University of California Press has produced with the care its subject deserves. A meticulous scholar, a fine subject, and a handsome book: and yet the pleasure lies almost all in the anticipation, and hardly at all in the reading.

What went wrong in the course of those twenty-five years? Partly, Bowsky lost sight of the wood as he penetrated ever further amongst the trees. He himself admits that he has been "less than successful" in "eschewing the temptation to cite every article, monograph, or—yes—even archival text bearing upon the subjects treated here." Once, in 1967, Bowsky published an article in which he was more successful in mastering this temptation. As a consequence, a fellow scholar felt free to question the accuracy of one of his claims. Bowsky now replies with a single sarcastic (and devastating) footnote running to over a page in length. Such is the comradely conversation of the republic of letters.

But the problem is not simply the accumulation of detail. It is the absence of information on crucial subjects. There is virtually nothing in this book about daily life, getting and spending, marriage and death.

There is not a single recognisable individual, nor a single striking event, scarcely a well-turned phrase. Bowsky's '67 article informed scholars that it was the law, in the city of the Virgin, that the convicted sodomite who did not pay a fine of £300 within a month of sentencing was "to be hanged by his virile members in the principal market place, and there remain hanging... for an entire day." There too Bowsky discussed the law's recognition of the vendetta, and the pervasive presence of the police (one policeman for every 145 habitants). But how many died in vendettas, how many (and from which social classes) were condemned by the state? To questions such as these Bowsky is no nearer an answer now than in 1967: the records, which record so many laws, seem to tell us far too little about their execution.

The bad workman blames his tools, and the poor historian his sources. If the records, for all their amplitude, are as limiting as this book would suggest, then Bowsky should have abandoned hope of writing anything more than a series of learned, particular studies on the government of the Nine a decade ago. But one can't help but feel that a different approach and different questions might have paid off: there is nothing here to match, for example, Nicolai Rubinstein's brilliant and learned article on the political theory underlying the frescoes of Lorenzetti and Taddeo di Bartolo (1958). Certainly a tougher intelligence would have convinced the author that the Sieneese taste for religious flagellation could not be explained in the simplistic terms he proposes here (pp. 266-7). Nor will it do to argue that the government's efforts to "make available an abundance of good fish and meat at reasonable prices" to "urban workers and the poor" were an important source of political stability (p. 313), when it has earlier been reported that "it seems to have been impossible for most laborers even to have earned enough to maintain their physical strength, and then only by making bread the mainstay of their diets" (p. 193).

This last issue points to an underlying problem. Bowsky, on his own admission, is perhaps "overly sympathetic" to the Nine because of their concern for "stability, security, continuity, and ordered change." He has been attracted to the strict oligarchy of Siena for reasons similar to those which have attracted other distinguished American historians to that other stable, and beautiful, Republican oligarchy, Venice. In this respect, Bowsky is, as he admits, at odds with his more democratic predecessors. A sharper eye for injustice and distress might, however, have led him to portray a more real, a more tangible world. Even the efforts of the Nine to protect social welfare reflect their scale of priorities. Few, if any, other communes provided not only a fire brigade, but also free insurance against fire damage. But their concern with the threat of fire and the price of meat reflects their sensitivity to the interests of the propertied and the well fed, to business not labour. Bowsky dismisses the rebel cry "*Viva il popolo* and the guilds, and death to those who starve us" as an historical anachronism (p. 133). The language of guild and *popolo* may have been anachronistic, the starvation real.

Queen Elizabeth and the Making of Policy, 1572-1588. By Wallace T. MacCaffrey. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981. Pp. 530. \$37.50

This second volume of Professor MacCaffrey's projected trilogy on the reign of Elizabeth well maintains the standards set by the first, and carries the account to the arrival of the Armada in the English Channel. In contrast to those Tudor historians who sometimes appear to be in thrall to the personalities of the period, the author maintains a cool and refreshing detachment. He is accordingly free to make the kind of incisive judgments that make his study worthwhile reading.

MacCaffrey devotes more space to Elizabethan foreign policy than is customary in works of this type, and his coverage of the Queen's tortuous dealings with the French, Spanish and Dutch is detailed, sometimes painfully so. But we are provided with a first class account of policy-making, the quality of which would alone give the work a secure place in Elizabethan historiography.

Recent scholarship has steadily undermined the stereotype of Elizabeth as Calvinist heroine. We now see her more accurately as the major stumbling block to a thoroughgoing Protestant church settlement and as engaged in a personal struggle on this issue, not only with parliament, but with her council. This work makes clear that her distaste for Puritans (if we can still use the term) extended to their continental allies. From their point of view, she left something very much to be desired as a Protestant Deborah. Her support for French Huguenots waxed and waned according to the demands of policy, and her enthusiasm for William of Orange and his Calvinist followers was even more fitful. In the end, she was quite willing to hand the Dutch Protestants back to Philip II of Spain, on the rather tenuous condition that they be accorded such toleration as would square with his conscience!

In politics if not in religion, Elizabeth was almost the quintessence of *Realpolitik*. But she had constantly to deal with those such as Walsingham and Leicester who, for different reasons, demanded a "Protestant" foreign policy. The resultant tug-of-war produced a strategy notable only for its vacillation, the end result of which was dangerous isolation and war with Spain, a conflict welcomed only by the freebooters and the more extreme Protestants.

In his examination of parliament and religion, the author follows, in general, the leads provided by Neale and Collinson. Here he might profitably have related the conduct of foreign policy more closely to the internal religious and political struggle, especially as it involved the Earl of Leicester, who emerges as a particularly significant if somewhat sinister figure. Although MacCaffrey is reluctant to regard Leicester as a party leader, he provides us with much evidence pointing in this direction. A man who was the patron of at least ten bishops, Chancellor of Oxford and Steward of Cambridge, nominator of M.P.s in the parliament of 1584, sometime lover of the Queen and protector of the left-wing Protestants was a force

to be reckoned with. But as MacCaffrey demonstrates, the Peter principle was at work when he led his unwieldy expedition to the Netherlands, allied himself with the extreme Calvinists and set himself up as supreme governor of the Low Countries. Elizabeth had no enthusiasm for a continental Empire, much less for Leicester's pretensions and possible ambitions. His fall from grace and death three years later was a disaster for the English Puritans.

Professor MacCaffrey demonstrates the radical character of the parliaments of Elizabeth, particularly those of 1584 and 1586 but, in his more general remarks on parliament's role, he follows the recent fashion in minimizing the tension between parliament and the crown and in characterizing the former as the instrument of the latter. The authority of the crown, he says, was "ancient and unchallenged," and asserts that "the fundamental nature of parliament" had never been spelled out. In this he ignores the many challenges from Magna Carta, through Edward II, to the deposition of Richard II. As for the fundamental nature of parliament, the writers of the much vexed *Modus Tenendi* (now pretty certainly dated to the early 1320s) made a tolerably good stab at it when they asserted that the commons rather than the peers were essential to parliament because they represented the "community of the realm." The parliament men of the late sixteenth century thought of themselves as regaining a lost initiative and, in general they were right. Exception might also be taken to the statement that it was the Queen's "mere will and motion" which "powered the whole system." Certainly Elizabeth herself discovered that her mere will was insufficient when, after the execution of Mary, Queen of Scots, she demanded that her Council consent to the hanging of Davison.

These caveats aside, we can look forward to Professor MacCaffrey's third volume and hope that he will give full scope to his powers of political analysis in examining the power struggles of the closing stages of the reign.

Saint Mary's University

John R. MacCormack

***Jack in Port: Sailortowns of Eastern Canada.* By Judith Fingard. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982. Pp. ix, 293. \$35.00; \$12.50 paper.**

Nineteenth century shipping probably conjures up images of sturdy sailors living a life of danger on the high seas more than any other images. Shipping was indeed a dangerous affair then, particularly on sailing vessels, and the author of *Jack in Port* does not let the reader forget it. Early in her book she recounts the story of the wreck of the *Dorchester*, a typically unseaworthy timber vessel which came to grief off the coast of Ireland. First the galley washed overboard, taking the cook with it. Then

two crewmembers were carried away trying to release some of the timber loaded on the deck. The rest of the crew spent the next five days in the tops of their derelict vessel before Irish fishermen rescued them.

Jack in Port is not, however, just another romantic account of the perils which faced nineteenth century sailors at sea. Much of the book is devoted to an examination of the lives of these sailors in major eastern Canadian ports in the mid-nineteenth century. The author's purpose in writing the book was "to rescue from obscurity those merchant sailors and the shoreside milieu in which they moved." This is an aspect of maritime history which most historians have largely ignored, despite the fact that there are some rich primary sources, such as crew agreements and official ships' logs, of which some 80% for British-registered vessels in this period are lodged in the archives of the Maritime History Group at Memorial University, Newfoundland.

Jack in Port provides considerable insight into the life sailors led in ports such as Halifax, St. John, and Quebec City. The author describes such institutions as the river police force established in Quebec in 1838, which lasted until 1893. Often criticized for its apparent ineffectiveness at controlling crimping (the illegal recruiting of sailors), the river police force actually averaged over 500 arrests of sailors and crimps in the 1870's shipping seasons. The force also suppressed land-based strikes of ship labourers in 1878 and 1879.

The author looks at seasonality, at different categories of sailors (career, casual, non-English-speaking, non-Canadian, and female seafarers.) Women seafarers were few in number, but did work on cargo vessels as well as on passenger vessels, as stewardesses, which apparently meant that they were helpers in the galley and officers' quarters. Not all of the stewardesses met their employers' expectations. The captain of the Saint John vessel *Wealth of Nations* discharged a stewardess at Boston in 1868, recording in the ship's log that she was "filthy, wasteful and incompetent and when spoken to uses most disgusting and obscene language such as 'stick it up my ass' and threatens to black the eyes of some of the officers."

This is a rewarding book, a welcome addition to the literature on seafaring life. The author characterizes her work as "largely descriptive," but where possible she has provided a quantitative context. It would be interesting to know if sailors in lesser parts such as Yarmouth and Liverpool, Nova Scotia, experienced the same conditions which prevailed in the larger ports. Perhaps this could be an area for future study.

Dartmouth, N.S.

Donald F. Chard

***Canadian Relations With South Africa: A Diplomatic History.* By Brian Douglas Tennyson. Washington: University Press of America, 1982. Pp. xvi, 238. \$26.95 Paper, \$12.95.**

This book is a welcome contrast to the usual fare of Canadian foreign

policy studies. Touted as the "first major study of Canadian relations with South Africa ever published," Brian Tennyson's history examines how two arguably peripheral states have handled their equally peripheral diplomatic relations with each other. Whether it qualifies as a "major study" is another matter altogether.

Originating as the author's doctoral dissertation for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies of the University of London, the book deals primarily with the years 1899-1961 when the two countries shared a direct tie with Great Britain. Here, not surprisingly, we find a historian organizing his material into eight time periods and then allowing the record more or less to "speak for itself." Such an approach, unfortunately, often leads to unevenness of treatment: gaps appear where the official record is missing or sparse, and some issues and events are, by their nature, more significant than others. Nevertheless, Tennyson covers the major issues both economically and well.

For example, he shows how Canadian and South African perspectives on the proper nature of the Empire-Commonwealth connection converged during the pre-World War I period of the "special relationship," and then increasingly diverged thereafter as each state sought to achieve its own conception of national autonomy and identity. He then accurately portrays the process whereby Canada's policy of what others have termed "disinterested detachment"—earlier masquerading in the guise of the so-called "functional principle" (i.e. Canada had no interest in, and hence no special responsibility for, colonialism)—was abandoned as Canada struggled to come to grips with South Africa's repugnant apartheid policy in the context of an emerging multiracial Commonwealth. His account of Canada's attempts to resolve its basic policy dilemma—of satisfying its aspirations to serve as an effective "linchpin" between the western and nonaligned worlds (and also between the colonialists and anti-colonialists) while not alienating South Africa entirely—will appeal to those readers who espouse the virtues of pragmatic, "quiet diplomacy" as well as to those who criticize the government for moral "fence-setting."

The volume also contains interesting vignettes of South Africa's persistent manoeuvring to establish formal diplomatic relations with Canada, and of John Diefenbaker's role in helping to oust South Africa from the Commonwealth in 1961—the latter account being beneficially embellished by the author's interviews with key officials on both sides.

Despite its considerable virtue as a succinct diplomatic history, the reader will be hard-pressed to discover much that is "new" in the book's analysis of the factors which have shaped the direction and substance of Canadian policy towards South Africa over the years. This shortcoming reveals itself most glaringly in the superficial, eleven-page "Epilogue" dealing with the post-1961 era—a section possibly added in an ill-advised attempt to make the book "topical." Here the author is clearly beyond his depth both in a historical and analytical sense.

On the one hand, the specialist may be dismayed to discover some important omissions. The 1961-70 period is almost wholly neglected in the

text, and there is no mention of the 1970 *Black Paper* and its impact on official and unofficial opinion in Canada. Furthermore, the author devotes only one sentence to Trudeau's "important role" in preserving a semblance of unity at the 1971 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting over the divisive issue of British arms sales to South Africa.

On the other hand, Tennyson displays little inclination to provide his own interpretation of the main determinants of Canadian policies towards South Africa. For instance, his explanation of the "timorous" nature of these policies is borrowed almost entirely from a short article by Robert Matthews and Cranford Pratt—two authors known for their strongly critical views of Ottawa's stance on Canada-South Africa economic relations. Such unquestioning acceptance of a one-sided explanatory framework is puzzling given the author's generally objective treatment of the mixed motives of, and competing pressures and constraints on, various Canadian administrations.

Overall, by concisely outlining the main policy issues and the positions held on them by each government, Tennyson has produced a useful, compact, and eminently readable compendium of "thumbnail sketches" highlighting the evolution of a little known, and even less well understood, relationship. Despite this laudable achievement, the volume is marred by a largely secondhand concluding section somewhat lacking in depth, balance, and originality.

Dalhousie University

Dan Middlemiss

***Sonya: The Life of Countess Tolstoy.* By Anne Edwards. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981. Pp. 512. \$15.95.**

The sexual conflict started less than a week before their marriage, when Tolstoy insisted that Sonya Andreyevna Behrs read the diary that detailed his liaisons with gypsies, whores, peasant women, even her own mother's friends. Repulsed, and still little more than a girl herself (she was eighteen when they married, Tolstoy thirty-four), she fought her husband physically on their wedding night as he tried to paw her. Eventually she yielded: Sonya bore thirteen of Tolstoy's children (and saw seven of them precede her to the grave). In fact she became a passionate and willing lover, but the very abandon he aroused in Sonya sickened Tolstoy. Even marital passion was vile, he decided, and he paid Sonya the supreme compliment of using her as the model for the "lustful, evil" wife of *The Kreuztzer Sonata*.

By now it is well known that the Tolstoys were world-class quarrelers. They make their nearest competitors, the Lawrences and the F. Scott Fitzgeralds, look positively parochial in comparison. By relying on unpublished diaries and letters, Anne Edwards shows that the most harrowing spats, if not the most lurid, occurred elsewhere than in the bedroom. Intensely literary, the Tolstoys wrote everything down, read

what each other had written, corrected it or crossed it out, reproached each other, and, if they were so inclined, began the whole procedure over again. Shortly after their marriage, Sonya composed a frosty if polite note to a Tolstoy relative of whom she was jealous. Irritated, Tolstoy added a postscript: "I find this letter of Sonya's to you rather annoying, my dear Alexandra; I sense that direct relations between you will be quite different, but probably, however, it has to be like this. You understand that I can't speak the truth about her at present—I'm afraid of myself and afraid of the disbelief in others.... She's reading this letter and doesn't understand a thing and doesn't want to understand." At this point Sonya took the pen from his hand and wrote: "I cannot leave it at that, dear Auntie. He's mistaken! I understand everything, absolutely everything that concerns him." There followed a scene, complete with weeping, and then each party rushed off to his or her private diary to record an episode that is but a single instance of the lifelong conflict that was marriage to this unhappy pair.

Of Tolstoy's relations with women, Gorky wrote: "There is nothing he likes so much as to punish them. Is it the revenge of a man who has not achieved as much happiness as he is capable of, or the hostility of the spirit toward the 'humiliating impulses of the flesh?' Whatever it is, it is hostility, and very bitter." Tolstoy's sons remember his warning that "the most intelligent woman is less intelligent than the most stupid man." In Edwards' prologue there is a sentence that might have served well as a conclusion: "[Sonya] had lived in the shadow of Tolstoy, she realized with rancor, because her husband, fanatical in his belief that all men were equal, never extended his humanity to include women." Like charity, such sentiments usually begin at home, which means that Tolstoy was blind to the qualities of a wife who was not only capable and independent but who also loved him wholeheartedly, at least in the beginning.

But if, as Henri Troyat said in his biography of the great novelist, Tolstoy was not one man but ten or twenty, all sworn enemies of each other, there were similarly conflicting elements in Sonya as well. One need not live intensely in order to write that way; Flaubert counselled young writers to "be regular and orderly in your life like a bourgeois, so that you may be violent and original in your work." But the Tolstoyes were violent and original everywhere: singly and together, in public and in private, in person and on paper. Though she sacrificed her own literary ambitions in order to further Tolstoy's, Sonya was no mean stylist. "If I could kill him and then make another man exactly like him," she wrote in her diary, "I should do it joyfully."

Canada's Urban Past: A Bibliography to 1980 and Guide to Canadian Urban Studies. By Alan F.J. Artibise and Gilbert Stelter. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1981. Pp. xxxii, 396. \$42.00.

If bibliography is a measure of the maturity of an academic field, then urban history in Canada is rapidly growing up. *Canada's Urban Past* contains more than 7,000 entries, as well as an extensive guide to research in the field and several detailed indexes. Every major Canadian city is represented, as well as many smaller centres. St. John's, Newfoundland, at one edge of the country has 66 entries; Victoria, British Columbia, at the other has 92. Shawinigan, St. Boniface and Lethbridge have sections to themselves. Intended to identify "the present state of research in urban history" in Canada, the book, its authors proudly claim, contains "virtually all the material that already exists" on the subject.

It is indeed an impressive piece of work, and not just in terms of sheer quantity. Its authors begin with a sixteen page introduction which tells us not only what is in the book and how to find it, but also a great deal about the current condition of urban studies in Canada. There are, we learn, three major categories of Canadian urban history. The first, somewhat pretentiously termed by the authors "Urban as Entity," includes the history of individual cities. This is the largest body of writing about the Canadian metropolis and the one which is most familiar to nonspecialists. In such works, "the city or town is treated as a personality with distinguishable characteristics," a process of personification which fits in rather neatly with the predilection of Canadian historians in general for a biographical approach to the past. Artibise's own *Winnipeg: A Social History of Urban Growth 1874-1914* (1975) is, in this sense, in the same tradition as biographies of such prominent Winnipeggers as Clifford Sifton and J.W. Dafoe. This category also includes studies of regional and national urban systems and the examination of particular themes such as population and municipal government. The second category, "Urban as Process," is concerned with the effect of the urban environment upon people and events. Michael Katz's important and controversial *The People of Hamilton, Canada West* (1975) is to be found here, as well as studies of the impact of the city upon immigrants. And sometimes, of course, the city is just a backdrop — a place where things happen. The third category, "Urban as Setting," comes in here. It includes studies in labour history like Gregory Kealey's *Toronto Workers Respond to Industrial Capitalism, 1867-1892* (1980) which have concentrated upon individual communities. Artibise and Stelter recognize that such material is sometimes peripheral to the concerns of the urban historian. They suggest, for example, that Bryan Palmer's *A Culture in Conflict: Skilled Workers and Industrial Capitalism in Hamilton, Ontario, 1860-1914* (1979) "makes little contribution to urban studies."

Yet they include this item in their bibliography, and this is an indication of what may well be the principal value of their book to the non-specialist: the inclusion of a good deal of interesting, unusual, or even off-beat

material which may or may not be scholarly or central to the concerns of the academic historian. John Marlyn's novel *Under the Ribs of Death* (1957) is listed, as well as Leacock's *Sunshine Sketches of a Little Town* (although the latter's *Arcadian Adventures with the Idle Rich* is inexplicably absent). The subject index has entries for squatters, civil liberties and Stampede: Calgary. Egyptians: Montreal, and Sikhs: Vancouver, are listed. Indeed the only real gap in the bibliography is in the field of modern popular periodical literature. *Maclean's* is missing, as are *Weekend Magazine* and the newspaper writings of numerous local historians. The inclusion of pre-World War One articles from the *Canadian Magazine* such as Mrs. W.F. Grant's "Bygone Days in Toronto" (1914) makes this omission even more apparent.

But this is largely a quibble. The book is an important one—well-organized, well-researched, highly competent, and certain to be useful.

Memorial University of Newfoundland

Hugh Tuck