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Internal Conflicts within the *Parti Québécois**

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The *Parti Québécois* is not simply a new political party founded in October 1968, but also the spearhead of a long existing social movement whose *raison d'être* is the independence of Quebec.¹ Social movement organizations are often characterized by serious and frequent internal conflicts which are explained in the social movement literature by several bases of conflict including membership heterogeneity and the presence of competing power bases.² These two particular explanatory factors correspond to the two major cleavages in the brief history of the PQ: an ideological cleavage between radical and moderate members and an institutional cleavage between the executive council and the parliamentary wing. This article will trace the development of the PQ's major internal conflicts concentrating upon the conflicts arising from the above two cleavages.

Although the *Parti Québécois* did not experience any serious conflicts during the first two years of its existence, there were already indications of both an ideological and an institutional cleavage. A hint of the ideological cleavage was the evident anxiety of party president René Lévesque that ideological battles could disrupt the party's second national congress in October 1969. Thus in his opening speech, Lévesque requested that the delegates hold a disciplined congress with few changes in the party programme in order to demonstrate to the voters that the PQ was a serious and responsible force. He also tacitly asked them not to elect Pierre Bourgault, a well-known radical separatist, to the party's executive council.³ The delegates followed Lévesque's advice in every respect.

An early indication of an institutional cleavage appeared in September 1970 when some members of the executive council let it be known that they were highly dissatisfied with the behavior of the party's first MNAs elected in the April 1970 general election. They complained that the MNAs frequently ignored the party statutes which clearly state that *Parti Québécois* members of the legislature can not take new positions without the party's consent. The MNAs, they added, all too often made statements which did not conform to the political orientation indicated in the official party programme and sometimes they even contradicted it.⁴

The ideological division between PQ moderate and radical elements was clearly revealed in January 1971 when leftist André Larocque announced that he would oppose Lévesque for the party presidency the following month at the PQ's third national congress. Larocque realized that he had no chance of defeating Lévesque. However, he felt that his challenge was needed in order to provoke "the inevitable confrontation" between the adherents of two schools of thought within the PQ: "On the one hand, the participationists, who intend to place the decision-making at the level of the members, and, on the other hand, the technocrats, who are only concerned with efficiency and electoral advantage, scoffing consultation." He emphasized that this split in decision-making procedures was the result of a much more profound difference involving the party's objectives: the technocrats aim above all for the independence of Quebec, whereas the participationists have as their priority a socialist Quebec which could best be reached by means of independence.⁵

Predictably, Lévesque soundly defeated Larocque for the party presidency and protected the party programme from any radical shifts to the left at the February national congress.⁶ However, the radicals did manage to win two partial victories at the congress. One was the congress's acceptance of a limited decentralization of the PQ organization whereby the regions would be given more power. This step probably received the acquiescence of the party directorate which wanted to satisfy some of the demands of the "participationists" in order not to alienate them completely. The radical faction received a more stunning and unexpected victory with the election of Pierre Bourgault to one of the posts on the executive council.⁷

In late October 1971, the simmering ideological dispute between the party's moderate and radical factions suddenly exploded in the worst crisis in the PQ's history. The three major Quebec labour unions — the

Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux, the *Fédération des Travailleurs du Québec*, and the *Corporation des Enseignants du Québec* — formed a common front in support of the striking workers of the Montreal newspaper *La Presse* and called a joint political march for October 29 in which the *Parti Québécois* was invited to participate. Only hours before the demonstration, in perhaps the most critical moment in the history of the party, the PQ executive council decided by a vote of six to five that the PQ would abstain from participating. Lévesque and the other executive council members who voted with the majority feared that the demonstration would erupt into violence and the PQ's official involvement would cause the party to lose its peaceful and democratic image among the Quebec electorate. In an interview with this writer, Lévesque claimed that he had been warned by a high-placed union official, whom he preferred not to identify, that the march would be violent:

That very same afternoon when they were having that march — and we gathered it from one of the top union leaders — half their guys were drunk the rest were in taverns. They had no, repeat no, security measures taken. In other words, nothing to organize the march and they had no arrival point. So I remember asking him, the guy in question, "What the hell are you going to do then? You're just going to walk against the police and let the chips fall where they may? He said, "Yeah, that's exactly what's going to happen. We can't help it." I said, "Alright, what would you do in our place? We got a (political) party here, not a bunch of disorganized people." He said, "I'd stay home." I said, "That's what we're going to do." We just barely made it.⁸

The demonstration resulted in a full-scale riot and the death of one woman.

The executive council's decision not to participate in the march came under immediate and severe attack by PQ militants, officials, and riding organizations. Many *péquistes* were incensed that when all of the major forces of the Quebec left descended into the streets with the workers when they were most needed, the PQ was absent. The executive council's decision confirmed their worst fears that their own party was not of the left and thus the party directorate did not intend to initiate substantial social and economic reforms after independence. The most vocal of the important critics was PQ parliamentary leader Robert Burns who participated in the *La Presse* demonstration in spite of the executive council's decision and then sarcastically labelled his party as being "a little more advanced than the Liberal Party."⁹

On November 8 an angry Lévesque revealed at a press conference the degree of the conflict between the PQ moderates and radicals. His most biting words were reserved for Burns whom he invited to "clear out if he wants." In addition, he pressed those elements who had supported the *Front de Libération du Québec* in the preceding year's October Crisis to leave the party; severely deplored the behaviour of the Quebec union leaders who, he charged, were alienating the workers from all veritable politization; reproached those who by beatifying terrorists incited young people to commit incensed acts; and underlined that the PQ was committed to accomplishing independence which was to be only a means in view of realizing other reforms.¹⁰

Two weeks later the PQ national council met in extraordinary session in order to dissipate the conflict which had been raging within the party since the October 29 vote of the executive council against participation in the *La Presse* march. The executive council proposed a compromise to its radical critics. It would not repent of its decision to reject PQ participation in the march, but it would end its policy of refusing to discuss electorally dangerous economic and social issues. Thus it promised to prepare a manifesto consisting of more radical economic and social propositions, thereby proving that the PQ was indeed a party of the left. The manifesto could be released in several months for study purposes and then presented to the next party national congress where its propositions could be integrated into the official party programme. By the overwhelming vote of the national council in favor of this compromise and the peaceful nature of the council discussions, the radical members of the national council replied that they accepted the offer. The crisis was over.

In April 1972 the PQ executive council released the promised manifesto, entitled *Quand nous serons vraiment chez nous*,¹¹ in which it proposed to its militants the social and economic character of an independent Quebec under a PQ government. The executive council explained that an independent Quebec under PQ direction would reject both doctrinaire socialism and capitalism. Rather, the aim would be to build a true social democracy with the men and resources already available. The authors put forward two great objectives which they would try to accomplish in the new society: a more just division of the wealth of the collectivity and an improved participation of the citizen in the economic and political life of the nation. The document was generally well received at PQ regional congresses in May and June at which the delegates translated its proposals into propositions suitable for submission to the party's next national congress.

In January 1973 the internal dispute between the moderate and leftist factions once again flared up, indicating that the executive council's proposals of expanded social and economic goals in *Quand nous serons vraiment chez nous* were not sufficient to silence all tensions. Three attacks upon the moderation of the executive council followed quickly upon one another within a period of less than two weeks. First on January 18, Pierre Bourgault announced his resignation from the executive council and squarely accused Lévesque of camouflaging the most radical challenges of independence for electoral ends.¹² This was followed by the resignation of Pierre Marois from the post of president of the executive council. Although he was less directly critical of the party directorate than was Bourgault, he did state his desire that the PQ allow an increased and more active participation of its members.¹³ Finally MNA Claude Charron severely attacked Lévesque and other members of the executive council for being strictly preoccupied with building an electoral machine and not consecrating enough party funds to the political education of the PQ membership. Charron also promised to continue the debate next month at the PQ's fourth national congress by running for one of the posts on the executive council.¹⁴

As a result of these successive outbursts the fourth national party congress promised to be a rowdy one, although the moderates hoped to keep things under control. As one of the PQ's most prominent moderates, Claude Morin, said at the time: "It's crazy to oppose the two factions within the party and thus arouse false conflicts. These two factions have their place they can and must coexist."¹⁵ The moderates were in fact successful in preventing the eruption of a serious confrontation between the two groups.¹⁶ Despite the absence of confrontation, this congress will be remembered as one of the most important of all PQ national congresses because, as expected, it integrated the compromise social democratic proposals of *Quand nous serons vraiment chez nous* into the official party programme.

The Quebec general election later that year, on October 29, 1973, not only resulted in a landslide Liberal victory (at least from the point of view of seats) but also aroused diverse PQ internal tensions. Thus during the several months which followed the election, the PQ underwent an intense period of self-questioning and self-evaluation. One area of evaluation concerned its principal objective of independence: Would it not be more realistic and electorally profitable simply to drop the independence option and transform the party into a social democratic alternative to the Liberals?¹⁷ A second area of self-questioning was with respect to the

PQ's post-electoral opposition: Given the Liberal Party's overwhelming majority in the Quebec parliament, should the PQ not concentrate upon extra-parliamentary opposition in coordination with the labour unions, citizens committees, and other left-wing groups? The internal questioning also dealt with the electoral campaign which the party had recently conducted: Instead of concentrating upon presenting a serene and reassuring image of the PQ and its primary option of independence, would it not have been wiser to have conducted a more traditional campaign for an opposition party, i.e., an aggressive campaign based on attacking the record of the government party? A fourth area of evaluation revolved around the leadership of Lévesque: After two elections under his leadership in which the party was defeated by unexpectedly large margins and in which he personally failed to have himself elected to the National Assembly, was it not time for him to step down from the party presidency? If he did stay on as president, would it not be preferable that he be elected to the National Assembly by means of a special election arranged by having one of the party's six MNAs resign (all of whom volunteered to do so) in Lévesque's behalf?¹⁸

The party's responses to the first two areas of consideration came in early November during a weekend meeting of the members of the executive council and all six PQ members of the legislature. The participants agreed that there was no question of dropping the independence option which had already attracted to the party 110,000 members and 892,000 voters. They were also in accord that the party should not radicalize its action but should play to the hilt its new role of Official Opposition. Given the fact that this parliamentary opposition would be only symbolic because of the overwhelming parliamentary majority of the Liberal Party, the PQ established a daily independentist and social democratic newspaper in February 1974, *Le Jour*.

The PQ's responses to the other two areas of consideration came shortly afterwards. The party's conclusion that it had indeed conducted the wrong type of campaign became evident on November 23 when Jacques Parizeau, one of those chiefly responsible for the campaign, resigned from his post on the executive council. As to Lévesque's future leadership role, Lévesque announced on January 4, 1974 that he would retain the presidency at least until the PQ's fifth national congress the following autumn and that he had definitely decided not to run in a by-election to fill a seat made vacant by the resignation of one of the PQ deputies.¹⁹ On May 19 he finally ended any doubt about his leadership intentions by declaring that he would once again solicit a renewal of his presidential mandate at the fall congress.²⁰

A serious internal crisis did not result from this tense period of self-questioning as the party leadership was able to control the limits of party dissidence in the immediate post-electoral period. However, in early September the PQ abruptly found itself enveloped in its most serious internal conflict since the October 1971 *La Presse* affair. The new conflict was not a repeat of the earlier ideological battle between the party moderates and radicals. This time the conflict would be predominantly organizational in nature, opposing the executive council and the parliamentary wing of the party. The catalyst which allowed the constrained institutional tensions to break loose into a major conflict was a by-election in the riding of Johnson on August 26 in which the PQ candidate finished a poor third. Elements within the PQ parliamentary branch were angered because they believed that the executive council waged a poor electoral campaign in the riding and thus wasted the hard work of the party's MNAs who had forced the by-election by publicizing an alleged conflict of interest of the Liberal Party MNA from Johnson, Jean-Claude Boutin. André Larocque, Lévesque's opposition for the presidency at the PQ's third national congress and since 1971 the *chef du cabinet* of PQ parliamentary leader Burns, later asserted:

The executive council waited to read in the newspapers: "Boutin Resigns." Then they said to themselves, "Do we enter a candidate or not? We got an election on our hands." The MNAs were angry as hell. They figured that they started the ball rolling, but it wasn't their job to organize the election in the county as well. They gave their all to make the MNA resign, there should at least have been a plan to replace him already in operation. On the contrary, there was nothing set up. For the PQ, the election in Johnson turned out to be a total improvisation from A to Z.²¹

The conflict itself started the first week of September when PQ parliamentary whip Marcel Léger (one of the party's top organizational specialists) told a journalist that if the PQ did not immediately put the accent on the structured electoral organization it would never take power. However, he thought that the party directorate was too involved in erudite ideological concerns to bother about the practical aspects of reaching power by electoral victory.²² Léger's criticism was followed a few days later by a more direct attack by Burns who stated that Lévesque should step aside as party president if he were not soon elected to the National Assembly in a by-election.²³ In addition, MNA Lucien Lessard sent a letter to all the PQ county presidents in which he too suggested that Lévesque resign.²⁴

At a national council meeting of September 7-8, Lévesque counter-attacked strongly against his parliamentary critics. With respect to the organizational criticisms of Léger, he argued that there were established procedures within the party for this type of complaint which Léger should have used rather than resorting to the press. As for Burns, Lévesque deplored the fact that he did not have the courage to explain himself in person at the meeting and charged that he had a penchant for "stardom" characterized by an overly intense desire to see his name in the headlines! Finally, he dismissed Lessard's critical document as being simply emotional. Lévesque explained that the attacks upon him and the executive council by his party's MNAs aroused a new fervor for him to stay on. He added that he saw the MNAs' challenge essentially explained by the need of a definition of tasks between the party's executive and parliamentary wings.²⁵

On September 13 Lévesque continued his counter-attack against the MNAs at another level by holding a press conference in order to discuss the division between the party's parliamentary and executive wings. He reproached the parliamentary wing for trying to dominate the party and for professing "a sort of disdain" towards the executive council. He was convinced that leadership was a team project requiring extensive cooperation between the executive council (too weakly equipped in terms of money and staff) and the parliamentary wing (overly equipped in terms of money and staff). He reminded the MNAs of the nature, scope, and limits of their role and insisted on the primacy of the executive council. If a division of tasks were not recognized at a special joint meeting of the executive council and the parliamentary wing scheduled for two weeks later, he would not be afraid to affront the parliamentary wing at the national congress in November in a battle for the presidency.²⁶

The joint meeting between the executive council and the MNAs was successful in calming down tensions between the two wings of the party, and the participants agreed upon measures to prevent similar institutional conflicts in the future. Although the participants were reticent to reveal them at the time, the most important of the measures included the requirements that the executive and parliamentary wings hold regular bi-monthly meetings; transmit to each other the *ordres du jour* and minutes of their meetings; and consult each other before adopting an initiative that could affect the other body.²⁷ However, they did not solve the problem of the sharing of powers between the bodies, which Lévesque had so strongly emphasized at his press conference of September 13.

Besides dealing with the conflict between the parliamentary and executive wings of the party, the meeting was significant because its participants unanimously agreed to propose to the party's next national congress an extremely important project worked out by Claude Morin. According to Morin's plan the PQ programme would include a pledge to hold a referendum on independence after a PQ electoral victory in the event (a near certainty) that Ottawa provided opposition to the initial steps towards independence taken by a PQ government. In the case that the Quebec population were to vote against independence in the referendum, the PQ would strive to govern as well as possible within the Canadian political system and at an opportune time organize a new referendum. Morin was particularly concerned with making the party more electorally attractive since voters would know that the tremendous step of independence would require two votes: one for the *Parti Québécois* and another for independence.²⁸

The referendum resolution was accepted into the official party programme by the delegates of the PQ's fifth national congress in November 1974 by a two to one margin.²⁹ Some PQ militants, particularly the more radical ones, remained disturbed by the referendum plank. They feared that the PQ was betraying its major goal — independence — and that the PQ might actually take power and continue to stay in Confederation. A minority of them also suspected that this was precisely what some of the party leaders, especially Lévesque and Claude Morin, wanted. In private some of them would charge that these men were not true independentists after all but rather shrewd political opportunists who were using the increasingly popular separatist option as a means of personal advancement without ever intending to accomplish independence.

In late September 1975 the referendum issue returned to the foreground following a controversial interview given by Claude Morin to the Quebec City daily *Le Soleil*. In the interview, Morin tried to clarify further the meaning of the referendum resolution passed by the party's last national congress by explaining that a referendum on independence was absolutely required before Quebec could declare itself independent:

For the PQ, it is decided and understood (we always recognized it in principle, but now it is recognized in our programme) that there is no question of independence if the citizens don't want it. It's a democratic pledge, written in black and white, which is given to the people; it's a formal engagement. The PQ has not exploited, sufficiently explained nor sufficiently propagated that major addition, that absolutely necessary precision to the programme.³⁰

The PQ regional *regroupement* of Montréal-Centre immediately replied to Morin's statement by accusing him of diverging from the decision of the last national congress by an "erroneous and abusive interpretation of the referendum resolution." It recalled that the congress clearly refused to dissociate the election of the PQ from the accession to independence. Once the party arrives in power it must at once pass a law starting the procedures to independence and only if these procedures are blocked by Ottawa is a referendum necessary.³¹ Morin's position was publicly backed by Lévesque and PQ leader of the Opposition Jacques-Yvan Morin while that of Montréal-Centre was defended by Marcel Léger.

In early November the executive council and parliamentary wing met together in order to back Morin's position by passing a resolution testifying to their agreed conviction that in between the taking of power and independence "a period of transition is inevitable." The resolution explains that even if Ottawa agrees to independence, there would be delays for such matters as beginning negotiations, gaining the assent of the National Assembly, and preparing negotiation briefs. In any case, it is more prudent practice to predict that Ottawa will refuse to engage in negotiations apropos of independence with a PQ government; thus, the referendum will be required, insuring a further delay.³² To make sure that the debate was terminated, a national council meeting was called for two weeks later at which the declaration passed by the executive council and parliamentary wing was formally ratified.

The cleavage between the executive council and parliamentary wing came close to erupting once again in June 1976, but the problem was quickly and effectively settled before it evolved into a crisis. The dispute centered upon the party's relations with its official newspaper, *Le Jour*. There had been strained relations between the PQ and *Le Jour* since the paper's founding because of the paper's complicated collegial decision-making system whereby party officials and journalists shared authority over all aspects of the paper's business including editorial content. At a meeting of the paper's stock holders on May 31, these tensions came to a head when three spokesmen for the executive council conveyed the council's decision that "profound changes" are required if the party was to continue to support the paper, financially and otherwise.³³ During the next few days, several of the top PQ leaders publicly contradicted each other as to the nature of the changes. In particular Lévesque demanded that the paper's directorate be given full responsibility for editorial content whereas MNAs Burns and Charron attacked the paper's directorate

and defended the journalists.³⁴ The parliamentary wing called for a special joint meeting with the executive council in order to settle the problem before it got out of hand. At the meeting of June 9 the participants were not able to agree on the nature of the necessary "profound changes", and therefore it was decided that the party would cut all links with *Le Jour*. The newspaper ceased all operations in August.

In late September Lévesque used an interview which he granted to Radio-Canada as a means of reminding his party's militants that Quebec was on the eve of an election and thus party discipline was more important than ever. Referring to recent criticisms of the party leadership by Claude Charron over the *Le Jour* matter, Lévesque said that "Politically, the statements of Mr. Charron were not particularly called for at a time when we are perhaps only several weeks away from an electoral campaign." He stressed that his words were not only directed towards Charron but towards all PQ militants inclined to discuss publicly the internal problems of the party. He suggested that those militants who were dissatisfied with his performance as party president should wait until the PQ's next national congress in February 1977 to vent their feelings.³⁵ His advice was followed to the letter. During the entire electoral campaign, which officially started on October 18 when Premier Bourassa called elections for November 15, the party discipline was exemplary.

The stunning victory of the PQ at the November 15 general elections was in part a tribute to the PQ leadership's ability to control the limits of the party's frequent and severe conflicts in the past. In particular, the leadership's skilful handling of the extremely dangerous internal party conflicts following the 1971 *La Presse* affair and the 1974 by-election in the riding of Johnson limited the scope of two conflicts which, by themselves, could have ruined all future PQ electoral chances. The victory itself will influence the nature of the party's future internal conflicts. Since the party president is now a member of the National Assembly as Prime Minister, the institutional tensions between the party's executive council and parliamentary wing should disappear. However, the party's ideological tensions can be expected to continue as moderates and radicals battle over their sudden responsibility of formulating and implementing governmental policy. Furthermore, if the Quebec population votes against independence in the forthcoming referendum on the subject,³⁶ the revulsion of the PQ radicals to the prospect of continuing to govern within the Canadian federal system could lead to a conflict which would surpass all others in severity and consequence.

NOTES

1. On the *Parti Québécois* as a social movement see Léon Dion, "Anti-Politics and Marginals," *Government and Opposition*, 9 (Winter, 1974), 37-38, and Michael B. Stein, "Le Crédit social dans la province du Québec: sommaire et développements," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 6 (December, 1973), 581.
2. For discussions on the bases of conflict within social movements see especially: Kurt Lang and Gladys Lang, *Collective Dynamics* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1961), p. 533; Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 361-64; Michael B. Stein, *The Dynamics of Right-Wing Protest: A political analysis of Social Credit in Quebec* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), pp. 16-17; and Mayer N. Zald and Roberta Ash, "Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay, and Change," in *Protest, Reform, and Revolt: A Reader on Social Movements*, ed. by Joseph R. Gusfield (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1970), pp. 531-32.
3. *Le Devoir*, October 20, 1969, p. 1. Although Lévesque did not mention Bourgault by name, his target was clear when he requested that the delegates elect an executive council "as harmonious, efficacious, and united as possible." *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*, September 16, 1970, pp. 1, 6.
5. *Ibid.*, January 29, 1971, p. 3. Larocque later wrote a book expounding these same ideas; see André Larocque, *Défis au Parti Québécois* (Montreal: Editions du Jour, 1971).
6. Lévesque had to threaten to resign from the party, however, in order to prevent the delegates from including in the party programme a radical proposition advocating the abolition of governmental subsidies to English language schools; see *Le Devoir*, March 1, 1971, p. 3. One PQ radical later wrote a book attacking the executive council's moderate language policy; see Bernard Smith, *La Loi 22: Le Parti Québécois aurait-il fait mieux?* (Montreal: Editions du Jour, 1975).
7. Lévesque and his allies did not actively oppose Bourgault's election as they did at the previous national congress. Bourgault insists that this was because an extremely prominent PQ figure threatened to denounce Lévesque if he worked against Bourgault. Interview with Pierre Bourgault, Montreal, March 2, 1976.
8. Interview with René Lévesque, Montreal, March 1, 1976.
9. *Le Devoir*, November 9, 1971, p. 1
10. *Ibid.*
11. The manifesto was later published. See: Le Parti Québécois, *Quand nous serons vraiment chez nous* (Montreal: Editions du Parti Québécois, 1973).
12. *Le Devoir*, January 19, 1973, p. 2.
13. *Ibid.*, February 13, 1973, p. 7.
14. *Ibid.*, January 25, 1973, p. 2. Charron was not, in fact, elected to the executive council the following month.
15. *La Presse*, February 3, 1973, p. A7.
16. There was one exception to the on-the-surface peace between the two ideological wings of the party: a heated debate over the merits of allowing the employees in an independent Quebec control the decision-making of their companies. See *Le Devoir*, February 26, 1973, p. 7.
17. This was directly suggested to André Normandeau, a defeated PQ candidate in the 1973 elections, in a letter to *Le Devoir*: see *Le Devoir*, October 31, 1973, p. 4. Another more moderate change apropos the party's independence option was made by Claude Morin who suggested that the party consider adopting an "independence by stages" policy; see *Le Devoir*, November 17, 1973, pp. 1, 8.
18. The information in this paragraph is based primarily on newspaper articles from the period, discussions with PQ militants, and formal interviews with PQ leaders.
19. *Le Devoir*, January 5, 1974, p. 1.
20. *Ibid.*, May 20, 1974, p. 1.
21. Interview with André Larocque, Quebec City, March 9, 1976.
22. *Le Devoir*, September 4, 1974, p. 6.
23. *Ibid.*, September 9, 1974, p. 6.
24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 1, 6
26. *Ibid.*, September 14, 1974, pp. 1, 6
27. Protocol (number ES-4-7) of PQ national council meeting of March 22-23, 1975.
28. Interview with Claude Morin, Quebec City, February 26, 1976.
29. For the text of this important resolution see Le Parti Québécois, "Le Programme, l'action politique, les statuts et règlements; édition 1975," p. 5.
30. *Le Soleil*, September 20, 1975, p. B2.
31. *Le Devoir*, September 23, 1975, pp. 1, 6
32. *Ibid.*, October 8, 1975, p. 4.
33. *Ibid.*, June 4, 1976, p. 4.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 1, 6.
35. *Ibid.*, September 21, 1976, p. 2.
36. A public opinion poll taken two weeks before the November 1976 election indicated that 58% of the Quebec voters opposed independence; see *Ibid.*, November 10, 1976, p. 1.