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THE BRITISH ELECTION IN NORTHERN IRELAND:
CALM BEFORE THE STORM

In retrospect after the earlier violence in Northern Ireland, the peacefulness of the British General Election Campaign during June, 1970, was merely the calm before the storm. At the time that the elections were called, there was widespread public pessimism about the chances of getting through the campaign without major outbursts of violence. That this did not occur may have seemed remarkable at the time, and a tribute to the careful tactics adopted by candidates in more sensitive areas. But it is clear now that the more violent elements in the community were merely biding their time, awaiting an issue which would mobilize the greatest degree of support from their own adherents. Elections to a Westminster parliament did not offer this sort of issue, because the broad choices available in British politics are inherently irrelevant to Northern Ireland's own special brand of political alignments. Nevertheless, British-wide elections do provide an important sampling of the current state of public opinion within the Northern Irish constituencies. The results of this particular election were especially important in this regard, coming as they did at the end of a period of unprecedented political ferment in which genuine changes had occurred in the political system. For a brief period, it seemed that Northern Ireland might be starting to move away from the sterile sectarianism which had blighted its development since the inception of the state back in 1921. The General Election results confirmed something that was already becoming obvious from internal evidence—that issues of social justice were secondary considerations compared to the tribal hatreds which divide Northern Ireland along uncompromisingly sectarian lines.

The state of Northern Ireland and its separate parliament (Stormont) arose out of these hatreds when the British tried to disentangle themselves from "the Irish Question" after the end of the First World War. The Government of Ireland Act conceded the right of the Protestants concentrated in the north-
east of Ireland to establish a separate existence within the United Kingdom rather than submit to membership of an all-Ireland state under a Catholic majority. This “solution” has been resisted ever since then by successive Irish governments and a wide variety of unofficial militant organizations, aiming at “liberating” the Catholic minority enclosed within Northern Ireland by restoring the political unity of the whole island. The extent to which Irish governments supported armed coercion as a means to this end of liberation varied according to internal political circumstances within the Irish Republic and also the extent to which the existence of Northern Ireland was kept before the public eye by charges of injustice levelled by Catholics against the Stormont régime.

Under the terms of the Government of Ireland Act, Northern Ireland's population of 1½ million returns only twelve members to the Westminster parliament even though they might appear to be entitled to many more on a per capita basis approximate to that in the rest of the United Kingdom. These members are usually drawn disproportionately from the Unionist Party, the party of the Protestant ascendancy and an ally for Westminster purposes of the British Conservative Party. This is due in part to the nature of population distribution within the very large constituencies, and in part to divisions within the Catholic community over the propriety of participating at all in elections to a British parliament. The party alignments after the 1966 election were not untypical—Northern Ireland returned eleven Unionists and only one Catholic-supported non-Unionist, Gerry Fitt. In a close contest with a Unionist, Fitt—standing under the Republican Labour banner—narrowly won an inner urban seat in Belfast.

Between 1966 and the next general election in 1970, Northern Ireland experienced a period of sustained political activism. For the first time in the history of the state, an attempt was made to break down the traditionally rigid sectarian political structures as part of a process of political and social modernization. It even seemed possible that organizations might emerge which were oriented along more “normal” socio-economic divisions comparable with the major party identifications in Britain. This process of change started with the accession to office of Terence (now Lord) O'Neill as Stormont Prime Minister. O'Neill ran ahead of opinion within his own party by meeting the Prime Minister of the Irish Republic and openly recognizing the community of interest between the two governments over a wide range of policy issues. He also committed his party to the general proposition that the Catholic minority
was entitled to equality of treatment in the distribution of benefits and services by the state. This “liberalism” was widely applauded and supported by the Labour Government at Westminster, anxious to avoid pressure from Irish interests within Britain for action against Unionist régimes charged with sectarianism. It was also widely applauded by significant sections of the Northern Irish population, notably those concerned mainly with a quiet life and not much interested or active in political organizations.

But, for the activists in political life who predicted all their actions upon the reality of sectarianism, O’Neill’s approach was regarded with great suspicion and cynicism. The Unionist Party had come into being as the defender of the Protestant ascendancy and the bulk of Unionists refused to believe that O’Neill’s approach would have the intended effect of reconciling the Catholic minority to membership of the state of Northern Ireland. Concessions to the Catholics—by granting equality of treatment and equal access to political patronage in the form of jobs, public housing, and government expenditure for development—were suspect because they might be interpreted by the Catholics as a sign of weakness in Protestant resolve and thus serve as an encouragement to further political action towards the ultimate aim of re-unification of Ireland under a Catholic majority. So O’Neill found that policies well-received within Northern Ireland and Britain as a whole were endangering his own political future within his own party. His modest concessions were seen as giving ground too fast in a party whose most successful leader had coined the popular slogan of “not an inch”.

Nor did O’Neill’s policies and approach strike a sympathetic chord with the aspirations of political leaders among the Catholic community. For fifty years the only hope for Catholic advancement had lain in the achievement of an all-Ireland Republic, and Catholic political organizations were committed to this as a final objective. The considerable material advantages to Northern Irish Catholics of remaining within the United Kingdom—which had increased since the introduction of the wide range of welfare-state benefits—had always, by tradition, been offset by the discriminatory policies pursued by the Unionist régimes at Stormont. O’Neill’s claim that this discrimination would soon be ended struck at the basis of the traditional Catholic leadership’s identification with Irish Republicanism, since it posed awkward questions for the ordinary Catholic less concerned with ideological issues than his leaders. Consequently O’Neill sparked off an ambivalent reaction among the leaders of the Catholic community—a welcome for any improvement but a fear also that any realign-
ment of political forces might lead to a weakening of the Catholic community's traditional determination to support the re-unification of Ireland. New leaders and new organizations emerged to exploit and consolidate O'Neill's commitment to equality of treatment for the Catholic minority, playing down the whole issue of Irish unity and consequently drawing sympathy from non-activist opinion among the Protestant community and also from the Westminster government. Some, for example the Civil Rights Association, were middle-class in orientation, concerned with individual rights; others, such as People's Democracy, were more radical and socialist in flavour, aiming at revolutionizing society on both sides of the Irish border and drawing considerable support from student bodies.

The sequence of events leading to the downfall of O'Neill, a story of resistance by the core of the Unionist Party to significant concessions and of impatience and provocation by the Catholic activists, is now recorded in a number of journalistic accounts of the background to the present disorder. It is not the purpose here to re-tell that story or to adjudicate upon the variety of accounts offered. With regard to electoral alignments, the effect of these events was two-fold. Within the Unionist Party, a split developed which was partially healed by Chichester-Clark bringing some of the recalcitrant Protestant "hard-liners" into his cabinet when he took the place of O'Neill. Other factions could not be reconciled and uncompromising views were voiced by Paisley and Craig; as Westminster pressure held Chichester-Clark firmly to his reformist course, so these factions grew in strength. The victory in Stormont by-elections of Paisley and one of his followers just before the British General Election underlined the electoral appeal of this uncompromising defence of the Protestant interest. At the same time, there was evidence that the O'Neillite vision had affected significant sections of the urban middle-class Protestants and organizations had sprung up which had successfully contested Stormont seats against "hard-line" Unionists and thus posed problems for the official Unionist Party structure in some areas.

On the other side of the sectarian "divide", there was an initial period of equal confusion and tactical disagreement. Acceptance of the aim of equality of civil rights was seen to imply a recognition of the authority from which these rights were demanded, namely the authority of the British parliament over a part of Ireland. Some civil rights leaders made this explicit in their public statements, demanding the establishment of British standards and civil liberties rather than the existing discriminatory situation which had been created and
supported by successive Unionist Party régimes. The issue of Irish re-unification was relegated to a long-term aspiration unlikely to be achieved before Catholics had come to play a full part within the political life of Northern Ireland. This was too much for many of the “old guard” republicans, such as the Stormont Republican Party leader MacAteer, since it involved denying the validity of a long political career based upon the primacy of the aim of re-unification. These members of the “old guard” initially stayed out of the civil rights movement and remained particularly suspicious of more radical and socialist movements, such as the People’s Democracy, which were able to mobilize widespread non-sectarian sympathy by criticizing the sterile and reactionary characteristics of régimes on both sides of the border. Apart from tapping the universal fount of youthful idealism among the Belfast student population, the civil rights movement remained basically Catholic-oriented in its support and leadership. But its success in capturing public imagination in Britain as a whole—armed as it was with self-evident cases of civil injustice and discrimination—meant that the “old guard” had to take account of the reality of its widespread support. O’Neill failed in his attempt to shore up his own position within the Unionist Party by a Stormont election. That election, however, did clearly illustrate the extent of Catholic support for the Civil Rights movement at the expense of the traditional parties, since these parties had no policies of hope to offer beyond the aspiration to Irish re-unification which was (and remains) the one issue on which progress could not expect to be made without violent revolution of an unthinkable magnitude.

The events of August, 1969, were a turning point in events and political alignments in Northern Ireland. On the one side, they consolidated the split within Protestant ranks between those who complied with Westminster pressure for massive social reform and those who opposed concessions imposed from outside Northern Ireland by a socialist government which encouraged Catholic “extremism”. On the other side, the evident success of the civil rights movements in winning genuine changes in the environment to the benefit of the Catholic minority caused traditional leaders to accede to the force of Catholic opinion and reach some sort of modus vivendi with new figures such as Hume, McCann, and Devlin. From the Catholic viewpoint, the high point of success came when the Westminster government took over direct responsibility for civil order, disbanded the exclusively Protestant “B Special” police reserve and discontinued the para-military role of the predominantly Protestant Ulster Constabulary. The British Army was welcomed at that stage as a more pal-
atable alternative—even though it was systematically denigrated later—and the Callaghan policy of “softly, softly” meant in practice the recognition of the special status of Catholic enclaves in both Belfast and Londonderry. In addition, it seemed likely that the worst abuses against the minority—at the level of local government—would ultimately be eliminated by the re-structuring of local government and removal of one of the key patronage powers (over the allocation of public housing).

It was this success that widened further the rift among Protestants. Chichester-Clark held firmly to a reformist programme although little attempt was made in practice to conceal the extent to which the Stormont government was being made to conform to pressures from Whitehall. Strong currents of opinion within and outside the Unionist Party were deeply resentful of this and deeply distrusted Labour Party intentions. Aspects of the reform programme which related to local patronage and to security—the disarming of the police, the removal of the “B specials” and particularly the suspicion that Stormont did not control small but symbolic areas of Northern Ireland—were vigorously attacked by dissident Unionists such as Craig (who were ultimately deprived of the party whip in Stormont), by Paisley and his Protestant Unionist Party, and by large numbers of party activists at the grass-roots who persisted in passing a flow of resolutions critical of the actions of their own leadership. By the time of the 1970 General Election, it was clear that the policies of the Chichester-Clark government were acceptable to Unionist Party activists and probably to the bulk of the Protestant community only because they were seen to be caused by pressure from Westminster. The retention of Chichester-Clark as leader was a price to be paid as the alternative to the institution of direct rule from Westminster and a consequent loss of the political advantages of the existing arrangement. There was considerable scepticism about claims that the Catholic minority would rest content with their gains or that the issue of Irish unification was buried; primordial fears about the security of the state and thus of the Protestant minority remained dominant and were fuelled by events south of the border.

It was these events within the ruling party in the Irish Republic that provide the final piece in the complex mosaic of forces which influenced electoral behaviour in the General Election of 1970. The Fianna Fail party claims direct lineage from the organization that resisted any concession to the British in 1920 and gave emotional support to the terrorist campaigns of that period. Much more than the bulk of the Irish community, party activists feel
committed to support of the Northern Catholics and the policy of re-unification. But a half-century of static relationships, based upon tacit acceptance of co-existence with the North because of the benefits which accrue to the Republic from friendly relations with Britain as a whole, had bred a new political outlook among younger and newer Irish leaders. Concern for maximizing resources within the Republic had led Lynch to play down the emotional issue of the North and to emphasize the need for a peaceful solution—which, since it presumably implied Protestant agreement, would mean a very long-term solution. Lynch's predecessor had reacted cordially (if rather secretively) to O'Neill's overtures for closer collaboration, but both he and Lynch were forced to act furtively in order not to offend too deeply their own staunchest party activists.

This mirror-image effect of politics on each side of the border is one of the constant and devastating ironies of the whole Irish mess. Men of goodwill and peaceful intentions are trapped in a web of political and ethnic emotions which requires that they be seen to oppose each other bitterly in order to retain their own position of leadership. The need to be seen to oppose is a stimulus to further emotions and to actions based upon these emotions, and ultimately extremism feeds on extremism at the expense of social harmony. The result is economic and political disadvantage for all. At the time of the 1969 riots in Londonderry and Belfast, gestures were needed to re-affirm the Republic's commitment to Catholics in the north if Lynch was not to be regarded as a traitor within his own party. Appeals were made to the United Nations and troops were dispatched along with first-aid posts to the border, speeches were made in which Lynch stated that "the Republic would not stand idly by" if things did not improve for Catholics in the North, but action leading to direct confrontation with the British forces of law and order were avoided. After the riots had led to the direct involvement of the British army in responsibilities for security, Lynch helped to calm the atmosphere by re-affirming his commitment to a peaceful solution by negotiation among all interested parties. But this view and the general conduct of the Government during the crisis was widely criticized by influential figures both within and outside the cabinet—just as occurred within Protestant ranks in the North. The split in the South opened up when, following recurrent rumours about massive importation of arms into the North by extremist organizations on both sides, Lynch sensationally dismissed two of the senior members of his cabinet for their involvement in one such arms-smuggling exploit. The British General Election came
before they were brought to trial, but the incident undoubtedly contributed to Protestant fears about future Catholic intentions.

So the General Election campaign opened in late May with both sides in disarray. Political disunity among the Catholic political leadership was no new experience—the constant splits and factions represented in Stormont are testimony to that—but the Unionist division was far more serious because it was so out of character. The split was a product in a fundamental sense of the pressure for liberalization which had been exerted from the Westminster Labour government. This was a fact which strengthened the commitment of the Unionists to the Conservative cause, even though there was no significant difference between the policies of Callaghan (as Home Secretary) and his opposite number in the Shadow Cabinet (Hogg). But the Unionists felt that a Conservative administration would be less concerned with Catholic susceptibilities than a Labour Party which drew significant support from Catholic Irish voters in England and Scotland. In this, later events upheld their calculations in the sense that Maudling rather than Hogg became Home Secretary and took a much stronger line in support of Stormont and—in response to para-military resistance—also used the army in a much more forceful way. On the other side, the Catholics hoped for a Labour victory but, as O'Leary noted in relation to the previous election, generalized sympathy for Labour in Britain did not lead to support for the same party in the local situation. (See C. O'Leary, “Belfast West” in D. Butler & A. King, *The British General Election of 1966*, London, 1967.) Indeed, it was a striking feature of this election that, with few exceptions, the voters retired behind their mental barricades and voted for the most uncompromising candidates on offer to defend their respective interests.

This polarization was obvious well in advance of the British General Election, having been demonstrated in Stormont by-elections (mentioned earlier) which had brought in two Protestant Unionists (Paisleyites) and reinforced by growing fears about the possibility of military confrontation between extremists on both sides. Accordingly, the first move in the election campaign was the effective withdrawal of the only major non-sectarian organization involved (apart from the Northern Ireland Labour Party). The O'Neillite moderates had formed themselves first into the New Ulster Movement, which allowed membership of political parties to be retained, and then—in a rather botched affair—transformed itself just before the election into the Alliance Party. Then the leaders of that party, having made little public im-
 pact despite all the welcoming noises from the British press, decided to face reality and not fight the election rather than face an inevitable hammering by the established sectarian-based parties. Much the same calculation probably motivated the tacticians behind the People's Democracy, which realized that it would not be able to repeat its impressive showing in the earlier Stormont election against the established and conservative Catholic parties and might only end up splitting the vote unnecessarily. Both parties urged their sympathizers to vote for whichever candidate took a stance nearly in harmony with the viewpoint of their respective platforms. This did not stop individuals offering themselves as alternatives to the established parties without the dubious benefit of these party labels. As will be seen, liberal Unionists were put up against the more reactionary of the official candidates, and Bernadette Devlin opposed orthodox Catholics, as well as a Unionist, without benefit of any party label.

On the Protestant side, the election campaign was haunted by the spectre of rampant Paisleyism. In view of the by-election set-backs to the official organization and the splits which had appeared on the right wing side, a determined effort was made to show that the Unionist Party was just as uncompromising about the basic sectarian issues as any of their opponents, such as Paisley's Protestant Unionist Party. In their appeals to the voters, hardly any of the candidates alluded to the reform programme which the official party had carried through, in the realization that this reform was seen as a symbol of weakness and an electoral disadvantage. Party nominations were in the hands of local constituency organizations, many of which resented the extent to which the Westminster Labour government had been able to force through reform measures and were critical of the Unionist leadership in Stormont for allowing this to happen. The result was that many nominees were drawn from the most uncompromising wing of the Party, especially since there was a clear threat from Paisley that he would intervene to split the Protestant vote if he considered any candidate too "soft" for his tastes. The nominees even equivocated about supporting the Prime Ministership of Chichester-Clark even though he came out strongly in their favour in a blanket endorsement of all Unionist candidates (which conveniently ignored the fact that many of them categorically opposed policies to which he was committed.) If Catholics needed any proof that the majority of the Protestant politicians had accepted the reform programme initiated by O'Neill and carried through by Chichester-Clark with something less than half-hearted resignation, the candidates provided them
with unequivocal confirmation of this fact. Chichester-Clark might dance to a socialist tune to keep Stormont in being, but in the business of winning Protestant votes it was Paisley who pulled the strings. Paisley was the staunch defender of the constitution, the strong man able to resist any blandishments from the Westminster socialists to take a soft line towards treacherous Catholics, the person who simplified the future by representing it in terms of the past and the easily understood symbols of Orangeism.

The only political figure to stand up to Paisley by arguing in terms of the future rather than the past was the phenomenal figure of Bernadette Devlin. Yet ultimately the system engulfed her too, sending her back to Westminster (or, more precisely towards Westminster as her next move was into jail) on the basis of electoral support that was as uncompromisingly “green” as that of Paisley is Orange. The interest that centred around the Mid-Ulster campaign was not solely in the public personality of Devlin but also in the curious alignments which seemed likely at one stage to rob her of the seat she had acquired thirteen months before in a by-election. The electorate was marginally in a Catholic majority, but the Unionists had often picked up the seat because of divisions within the Catholic community. For this election their nominee was a forceful challenger capable of getting out the maximum Protestant support, and he seemed a possible winner if the Catholic vote split in any significant numbers. And the Catholic vote seemed likely to split because of the uncompromising way in which Devlin alienated her support in traditional Catholic circles by her fervent radical-revolutionary ideologies and by the contempt with which she seemed to be treating the domestic affairs of the electorate. Whatever she may have done for the Catholic minority’s cause in her activities behind the barricades in Londonderry or on tour in North America, the fact remained for many of her supporters in Mid-Ulster that she had not nursed the constituency in the way that they felt that it was entitled to be nursed. Nor did her policies and personal behaviour seem anything but wildly remote from the hard realities of sectarian living in Mid-Ulster, where the word of the Catholic Church resembled the rule of law. Her advocacy, for example, of an integrated school system free from sectarian control as a contribution to easing communal hatred was totally at odds with the Church’s position on this delicate issue.

The result was that opposition developed from within the Catholic community aimed at denying her renomination as the official Unity candidate. This move failed, but doubts were raised about the procedures by which Devlin
emerged as a claimant for Catholic support and ultimately two Catholic opponents emerged. One of these was essentially a protest candidate against her behaviour towards her own supporters within the constituency. This candidate publicly withdrew from the race on the eve of the election, thus saving face after making his point. The other, with a more serious challenge, was an orthodox Church-supported republican, emphasizing the older issues of a united Ireland and sectarian solidarity and attacking Devlin for importing such foreign and un-Christian ideologies as Marxism and revolutionary socialism. For a long while during the campaign, the fissures and contradictions which were implicit in the type of support attracted to the civil rights movement were openly exposed to the public gaze. But as the campaign drew to a close the Catholic community closed ranks again behind the notion that only Devlin could keep out the Unionist. Amid a high turn-out (in excess of 90%) this is just what happened, and Devlin—who throughout the campaign had maintained her position against her Catholic critics—returned to Westminster as the only revolutionary socialist supported by an almost universally sectarian conservative electorate.

The collective implications of the twelve results were not obvious immediately to observers “from across the water” in Britain. The Northern Irish question had been kept out of national politics until very late in the campaign because it was appreciated by the front-bench spokesmen on Irish affairs that the delicate security situation in Northern Ireland might be upset by any intemperate accusations between the parties. The Conservatives were embarrassed by the parliamentary alliance which linked them so firmly with the Unionist Party and its unsavoury image in the national media. They prevented too much of the dirt from rubbing off on them by staunchly supporting the Labour Party’s handling of events the previous year, and Callaghan as Home Secretary responsible for handling these events paid public tribute to the sense of responsibility displayed by Hogg, his opposite number in the shadow cabinet. And in his public statements in Belfast, Hogg used his advantages of being within the Conservative-Unionist alliance to urge very strongly on the Unionist leadership the need to establish amicable relations with the Irish Republic and even perhaps move ultimately to some form of institutional collaboration—the sort of talk which would have been quite unacceptable from Callaghan.

The Northern Irish question flickered across the national stage only briefly towards the end of the campaign, largely as a result of Paisley’s asser-
tions about a deal being made between his organization and the official Unionists in a number of constituencies. Wilson used this as a basis for an attack on Heath's "guilt-by-association" with Paisleyism as part of the general image of Heath as a prisoner of "hard-liners" on issues of race and religion. Heath was called upon to repudiate the Unionist candidates who would be elected as a result of Paisleyite support, but he steadfastly refused on the grounds that Prime Minister Chichester-Clark denied the existence of any such deal. It was made clear, however, that Paisley would not be welcome within the Conservative-Unionist ranks and would not receive the party whip. This has not, of course, stopped Paisley from sitting firmly among the Conservative backbenchers in the company of the Unionists, many of whom have urged their own party to change its policy sufficiently to accommodate the Paisleyites in their ranks.

The primary reaction after the election, however, was one of relief that there had been no further outbreaks of violence comparable to the disturbances which had followed the Easter season of traditional parades. The army and police had provided some degree of security, but the basic reason for the quiescence was that elections (particularly elections to Westminster) do not usually stimulate the public in the same way as the traditional symbols of past defeats or victories. Where Paisley appeared before his adulatory followers, emotions might be stirred by political campaigning of an especially evangelistic kind, but in the remainder of the constituencies there were relatively few instances of riotous activity. This was partly because candidates kept public meetings to a minimum, secure in the knowledge that recent events would ensure a high turnout as a demonstration of loyalty to their respective creeds. But this was still a quiet election by Ulster standards and many people were thankful for this alone.

The results themselves, however, pointed in a much more pessimistic direction. Votes had been won in large numbers by candidates—whether Unionist, Catholic Unity, or Protestant Unionist—pledged to a wholly uncompromising defence of sectarian interests. The reform programme adopted by O'Neill and pursued with surprisingly fervent effort by Chichester-Clark was an electoral irrelevance and an embarrassment to those candidates prepared to stand by it. Most Unionists found it politic to ignore both the programme and the current leader saddled with responsibility for it. Alternatively they blamed its existence solely on the hated Westminster socialists, who would be thrown out of office in the event of a Conservative victory and then "normality"
would return. On the Catholic side, the reforms were seen as a legislative sham, a commitment on paper which would never be honoured in practice, and a ploy to divert Catholic opinion away from the basic issue of defending their own community and aspiring to the reunification of the nation.

The surprise victory of the Conservatives set the scene for the confrontation which quickly followed. The basic factor in the Labour Party's administration capacity to contain the situation was a belief that the Wilson/Callaghan approach was one of searching for an impartial role for Westminster. This explains the "softly, softly" policy on security, by which the army did not attempt to restore immediately the rule of law over those sections of Belfast and Londonderry held by Catholic activists behind the barricades; it also explains the urgency with which reforms of the police and local government were pressed upon the Unionist government at Stormont. Although the Westminster Conservatives accepted the virtue of this approach despite the fact of their electoral alliance with the Unionists, both Protestants and Catholics assumed that the Protestants would benefit in some way from a change of party in control at Westminster and thus in control of the activities of the army and the Home Office. In a sense, these assumptions were to prove correct because they were self-fulfilling. The Catholics felt that the army, whatever its advantages as an impartial peace-keeping force earlier, was now the instrument of British and Protestant suppression and started a campaign to discredit it among their own supporters, using the same tactics as employed in an earlier period against the Royal Ulster Constabulary. The Protestants felt confident that the army was on their side, too, and pressed home with their perceived advantage by refusing to limit their traditional Orange rituals. So activists on both sides gained success as a result of the election campaign in the sense that their supporters were stimulated and mobilized for action—stirred out of their apathy, the masses were ready to go back on the streets again once an appropriate issue arose. During the election, a popular slogan had summed it all up: "No Surrender". This was appropriate for both sides, with the Orange and the Green divisions freshly drawn up facing each other. "No surrender" means that the war will shortly be resumed.