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PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY IN AMERICAN LIFE

Side-by-side with the increasingly corporate trends of American society and the stresses that they are producing, there has occurred an expansion of two professions—psychology and psychiatry—whose practitioners are devoted in part to the relief of such stresses. There has been a growing public acceptance of the roles of these two professions, with a corresponding growth of prestige, over the last four decades. This growing respect is reflected in literature, on the public lecture platform, and in the curriculum of higher education. It is also reflected in the increasing acceptance of the work and functions of the psychologists in industry, in the armed services, in government, and in the schools. But most people who have become impressed with the work and personnel of these two professions are on the outside, looking in. Most laymen are insufficiently informed of the mistakes and abuses of which some members of these two professions are guilty to be able to criticize some of their practices. In contrast, there is a body of critics, often quite sophisticated, whose members have been highly critical of the failures, the sins, and the values of some members of these two professions, and of their undesirable effects upon certain aspects of American life. Among these critics are intellectuals, writers and artists, social philosophers, trade union leaders, educators, and not a few of the professional psychologists themselves.

The criticisms that have been levied against psychology and psychiatry in American life apply to a number of activities, foremost among which are the functions of the industrial psychologist, the activities involved in test construction, the uses and abuses of psychiatric terminology and modes of analysis, the questionable role of psychiatrists in the courts, the value-systems of psychiatrists in private practice, and the internecine ideological warfare that exists among protagonists of different schools of clinical psychology and psychiatry. The present paper is an attempt to assemble some of the major indictments levied against these two professions, but only in the first three of the areas mentioned. To the extent that these two professions now appear to occupy a permanent niche on the American scene, and to the extent that a native
culture is being greatly influenced by them, it is important to review the liabilities that they have created for themselves. These liabilities, if uncorrected, make the future roles of workers in these professions somewhat uncertain. The ambiguity in the present status of these two professions—caught between the idolatry and uneasiness of the public outlook and the outraged feelings and critical sense of social philosophers and intellectuals—deserves a fresh look, which is the excuse for the present paper.

The Market Place Calls

In the process of trying to improve personal relationships in industry through the skills of industrial psychologists, two depressing tendencies, which have come in for a good deal of non-professional criticism, are largely ignored in the hard-nosed daily concerns of business. The first is the fact that industrial psychologists unquestionably serve the values of a business civilization and the processes of an increasingly corporate society in their efforts to help management improve the efficiency of employees. The other is their willingness to increase the amount of alienation at work through the use of various sorts of psychological techniques. Critics have been quick to seize upon these matters and have tried to show the consequences to which they may lead.

Loren Baritz, 1 who is critical in general of the functions of the social scientist in industry, has emphasized the central role played there by the psychologist. He points out that Walter Dill Scott, who established the Scott Company in Philadelphia in 1919, our first psychological consulting organization, argued in 1911 that a knowledge of the laws of psychology would make it possible for the businessman to control and therefore to raise the efficiency of every man, himself included, in his employment. Scott did not raise the question "Cui bono?" The early claims of many psychologists as to what they could do for industry are indeed Utopian. James McKeen Cattell, the founder of The Psychological Corporation, asserted that "The development of psychology as a science and its application to the control of human conduct ... may in the course of the coming century be as significant for civilization as has been the industrial revolution." 2 Some psychologists sincerely believe that many of the world's problems would vanish if only management were more receptive to the potentialities of psychology. Douglas McGregor, 3 a psychologist at M.I.T., thinks of the factory as a miniature facsimile of society. By implication, if we solve the problems of the factory system we may be able to solve the problems of the larger society. Many psychologists declare that their science holds the key to the solution of problems of industrial conflict.
Robert Yerkes did not hesitate to claim the central role for psychology in the improvement of the human condition: he said, most sincerely, that it is "potentially the most important of sciences for the improvement of man and of his world-order." Some time after it was founded, an officer of The Psychological Corporation asserted "that by obtaining its charter as a business corporation its founders established psychological work as a legitimate means of producing profits through private business enterprise." So much then for the dreams, claims, and secular values of industrial psychologists.

The psychologist—and particularly the industrial psychologist—has been proud to think of himself as a social engineer. The social engineers include all those social scientists and technicians who are profoundly convinced that they can solve all the problems of the human condition merely by the more careful application of the methods of science. They are individuals who accept without question the lopsided sense of value that characterizes industrial man. They are completely untouched by the kind of awareness of our technological society that characterizes the work of Hannah Arendt. They are untouched by the kind of sensitivity towards the tragic sense of life that is exhibited by some of the more thoughtful existentialists, such as Jaspers, of our time. The techniques of "social engineering" are to be applied in industrial management, personnel management, advertising, public relations, and related areas, with a view towards achieving what has been called the "engineering of consent." These techniques are to include sociodrama, communication engineering, intercultural relations, human relations in industry, group psychotherapy, group-action workshops, psychodrama, psychodynamics, group dynamics, spontaneity theory and training, sensitivity training, role-playing, non-directive therapy, social physics, and many others too numerous to mention here. Industrial psychologists have, of course, led the way in the claims being made concerning the potentialities of social engineering.

All these new techniques are to be slanted towards the objective of making human beings adjust to the milieu, particularly the working milieu, in which they find themselves—all of which are to be taken as "given" and, of course, desirable. Any effort to engineer "discontent" is to be considered as anti-social, as evidence of personal maladjustment and, from a social standpoint, even subversive. In a brilliant chapter in Is Anybody Listening?, William H. Whyte, Jr., tried to give the coup de grace to the presumptuousness of our social engineers. But the trends of our mass society make all such efforts abortive. The potentially proto-totalitarian nature of these trends is something to which most industrial psychologists are impervious, precisely
because most of them have neither a clear idea of the nature of totalitarianism nor are sensitized by training and inclination to the humanistic, social, and emotional values opposed to totalitarianism. To judge from their writings, it would seem clear enough that most of our social engineers lack the quality of mind and heart which characterizes such thinkers as Arendt or Jaspers. Whyte is, however, aware of the looming shape of a possible totalitarian future that could emerge from the excesses and successes of social engineering. He lays that awareness on the line:

Before this sort of thing becomes thoroughly official, a dissenting view is in order. For there is something very wrong with the social-engineering movement, and we hope to demonstrate what it is. In so doing we are not questioning the validity of social science, or the necessity of learning to make groups function more smoothly. What we are questioning is the perversion of these two concepts into an embracing, end-all philosophy. For the result is not a science at all: it is a machine for the engineering of mediocrity. Furthermore, it is profoundly authoritarian in its implications, for it subordinates the individual to the group. And the philosophy, unfortunately, is contagious.

Whyte's book is a clear recognition of the corporate society towards which the American business civilization may be heading. Further recognition of this unpleasant fact was furnished in his later book, The Organization Man. An even fuller picture of the atmosphere being created by corporate life—an atmosphere which may yet be extended to American society at large—and from a writer who has viewed that atmosphere from the inside, has been given by Alan Harrington. Leading the vanguard of social scientists who are working to deepen and accelerate the growing trend towards corporatism, in and out of the work context, are, unfortunately, many modern psychologists. The industrial psychologists are not asking for a corporate society. They are only helping to build it. It is the modern businessman and modern management that are among the forces paving the way for a corporate mode of life. They have had power thrust upon them, and they are not quite aware of the moral dilemma which comes with this power or of the problem that they have to face. They still have to learn that this power demands "doing things with people as equals, not for them as inferiors." Our industrial psychologists should be contributing towards this end. Unfortunately they are not doing so.

There is no question that industrial psychologists are willing to lock arms with management to achieve the power and profit goals of business. But in giving the uncritical nod to the values of our business civilization, they
overlook both the ethics of the situation and, even more importantly, the inhumanity to which much of their work can lead. They really wish to become technicians who help to accomplish the smooth functioning of our system of production rather than ambassadors of good will and a new morality. As a group they do not commit themselves to fulfilling the social obligation of relieving stress and misunderstanding, through their greater knowledge. They are concerned with establishing conditions for employee satisfaction and morale—this is true—but only within the framework and limitations set by the need to achieve profits and meet competition. They are in no sense social philosophers. Rarely do they raise the question "What is the good life?" and, when they do, they make no effort to see the relevance of the answer for the modern work milieu. The atmosphere created by the industrial psychologist is quite alien to questions of social philosophy. It has been most aptly described by Erich Fromm:

Most investigations in the field of industrial psychology are concerned with the question of how the productivity of the individual worker can be increased, and how he can be made to work with less friction; psychology has lent its services to "human engineering", an attempt to treat the worker and employee like a machine which runs better when it is well oiled. While Taylor was primarily concerned with a better organization of the technical use of the worker's physical powers, most industrial psychologists are mainly concerned with the manipulation of the worker's psyche. The underlying idea can be formulated like this: if he works better when he is happy, then let us make him happy, secure, satisfied, or anything else, provided it raises his output and diminishes friction. In the name of "human relations", the worker is treated with all devices which suit a completely alienated person; even happiness and human values are recommended in the interest of better relations with the public. Thus, for instance, according to Time magazine, one of the best-known American psychiatrists said to a group of fifteen hundred Supermarket executives: "It's going to be an increased satisfaction to our customers if we are happy... It is going to pay off in cold dollars and cents to management, if we could put some of these general principles of values, human relationships, really into practice." One speaks of "human relations" and one means the most in-human relations, those between alienated automatons; one speaks of happiness and means the perfect routinization which has driven out the last doubt and all spontaneity.

The alienated and profoundly unsatisfactory character of work results in two reactions: one, the ideal of complete laziness; the other a deep-seated, though often unconscious hostility toward work and everything and everybody connected with it."
There have been, to be sure, psychologists who have protested over the years the extent to which industrial psychologists were the willing lackeys of management. Among these have been, to cite a few examples, such figures as Kornhauser, Allport, and Hartmann and Newcomb. But most industrial psychologists have quietly assumed the managerial point of view and have tended to weaken unionism, have sought to manipulate the attitudes of the working rank and file, have tried to increase worker productivity to the degree that such productivity was affected by psychological rather than technological considerations, and have tried to help management cut costs, wherever possible.

Testolatry in American Life

One of the major ways in which the psychologist has oversold a bill of goods to the American people is the promotion of public acceptance of testing programmes in industry and in the schools. The case against the misuse and abuse of psychological tests in industry has been well stated by a number of writers. Two of the better known protagonists in this connection have been Whyte and Gross. Whyte has argued that the dominant ideological drift in organizational life is towards both idolatry of the system and the misuse of science to achieve this idolatry. The major manifestation of this drift which Whyte chose to emphasize was the testing of “personality”, that is, the probing of the prospective employee’s “psyche.” Whyte’s quarrel with personality tests—apart from the questionable uses to which they are being put, which is, of course, the major consideration—is not that they are insufficiently scientific. It is rather that he repudiates the idea that they can be scientific at all. Apart from such questions as whether the content of projective tests like the Rorshach and the Thematic Apperception Test are the best materials for doing the job they are supposed to do, an equally important question is whether the tester’s interpretations are based upon sound considerations. Whyte mentions a business executive who tells the story of an absurd tester who had declared a testee to be unstable because, in the face of the fact that he had two children, he had bought a convertible and, in addition, was building an “ultra-modern” house. He also mentions an anecdote furnished by David Riesman, about a “history major” who took the TAT. A card showing a man going out of a doorway was shown to this history major, who interpreted it as a famous historical figure who had a difficult choice to make. To the interpreter, this was clear-cut evidence of maladjustment, shown by the fact that the student had talked about people who were dead.
story about an historical figure from the past was taken by the tester, without
provisos, to indicate evidence of maladjustment.

Time and again Whyte tries to show the extent to which questions of
value become intertwined with both the content and the interpretation of tests.
Objectivity in this sense is an empty pretence. The purposes and values of the
organization, of the tester, or of the larger culture, will invariably be served.
This can be illustrated by reference to the Strong Vocational Interest Blank.29
The Strong Test, known as an Interest Test, is used to sample the testee's
interests or lack of them in such areas as occupations, school subjects, amuse­
ments, miscellaneous activities, and the peculiarities of people. The subject's
revealed interests are compared with those of persons successfully engaged in
a variety of occupations. The typical interest profiles for a number of different
occupations have already been obtained from a representative sample of pro­
fessional and business men and women engaged in these occupations. From
a personnel standpoint it is believed to be highly desirable that the interest of
a prospective employee be quite similar to those of successful people in the
occupation or profession which he desires to enter. A personnel man may
have other reasons for not hiring a prospective employee whose interests are
very similar to those found in a typical vocational or professional profile. He
will rarely hesitate, however, to recommend rejection if the prospect's interest
profile is markedly dissimilar from the prevailing one.

What must now be noticed is that we have here a phenomenon that
sociologists refer to as a "self-fulfilling prophecy". If the only applicants who
enter a vocation or profession are those whose interests are highly similar to
the normative interest profile of the calling in question, then the representa­
tiveness of the profile will be further enhanced. More people than ever be­
fore will exhibit the standard interest profile for the occupation in question.
The claim that the profile of concern most aptly represents the interests of
those in the work-category involved will now have more statistical justification
than before. If a personnel man then picks up an applicant's profile and finds
it very dissimilar to the normative one, he will reject the prospect with more
conviction than ever before. The theory behind such rejection is always
the assertion that a would-be employee whose interests are markedly dissimilar
to those of people already in the occupation is not very likely to get along with
them. He will, to some degree, be isolated because of his different interests
—or so it is claimed—and this isolation is likely to impair smooth employee
relations, job efficiency, and general morale.

But now consider how different the situation can be if we are less rigid
about the matter. Let us consider mechanical engineers of the "roll-up-your-sleeves-and-slosh-around-in-the-mud" variety. Individuals of this sort, in our country, are very unlikely to have such typical interests as the following: attendance at the opera and an interest in serious plays of social content; an interest in acquiring skills for ballet dancing; preoccupation with the composing of poetry; an interest in acting in amateur theatrical productions or in summer-stock companies; a desire to play chamber music in one's leisure time; the writing of plays or of works in philosophy; or the use of one's free time in painting, sculpture, or musical composition. Men of action in the United States—and the mechanical engineer in the field is typically a man of action—have traditionally held such pursuits to be somewhat unmasculine and best left to women. It should be emphasized again that the reference here is to the typical mechanical engineers. But, strangely enough, some of these "aberrations" would be commonplace in the USSR. In the Soviet Union the typical mechanical engineer does enjoy these contrasting activities and may be found either engaged in one or more of them in his free time or, at least, enjoying one or more of them as an auditor, reader, or spectator. Thus if the Russians were interested in mental testing—which is decidedly not the case—and if they were interested in constructing interest tests for the first time, the resulting norms would be considerably different from our own. Clearly the interest profile for mechanical engineers would then reveal a rich variety of interests. The range of interests shown would then be the typical or prevailing interest profile for mechanical engineers. The notion that interests of this sort bespeak effeminacy would be completely alien to the Russian mechanical engineer.

The social psychology concerning what matters constitute proper cultural interests permissible to each sex would, in this case, be the same for both sexes, at least in the USSR. If such interest tests had then been established and the Russian administrator had to accept or reject prospects for field work in mechanical engineering on the basis of such a possible interest test, it would be the candidate with narrowly professional interests who would be likely to be rejected. The strictly professionally-minded mechanical engineer would be seen as out of place in the work-context. We would then have a complete reversal of the American administrator's or tester's attitudes. Thus do the values of a culture often determine both the content of tests and the interpretation of the results of testing. In this sense Whyte is completely justified in emphasizing the value-laden features of the psychological tests which the Organization Man is willing to swear by.
For Whyte the testing movement in industry, by and large, is concerned with deepening the amount of at least expressed conformity in American life. The questions on personality tests, he feels, are aimed at making testees testify against themselves. They remove the last shreds of psychological privacy from the individual. Whyte wishes to have the line drawn somewhere in order to stop this incessant invasion of privacy:

How much more must a man testify against himself? The Bill of Rights should not stop at organization’s edge. In return for the salary that The Organization gives the individual, it can ask for superlative work from him, but it should not ask for his psyche as well. If it does, he must withhold. Sensibly—the bureaucratic way is too much with most of us that he can flatly refuse to take tests without hurt to himself. But he can cheat. He must. Let him respect himself.24

Martin Gross takes essentially the same tack as Whyte. In personality testing in industry, says Gross, a man is accused and convicted, not for any illegal or unsocial behaviour but rather for his deviation from the norms felt to be desirable both by management and by social engineers. To settle a man’s fate or at least his bread-and-butter opportunities by means of so unscientific an instrument as a personality test, Gross believes, is highly immoral. But there is no protection against the immorality and injustice of an arbitrary set of test norms or from the arbitrariness of the highly imaginative criteria of some irresponsible tester who enjoys playing God. The traits of the group determine the acceptability or unsuitability of the individual in personality testing, in industry, in government, and in the armed services. The norms of the group spell life or death, occupationally speaking. From these norms there is no protection. Gross puts it this way:

In this non-science of group likelihood of criminality, just as in nonlaw, there are no specific safeguards, no psychological habeas corpus, no impartial judge or unanimous jury to review, rebuke, or even find in scientific contempt. Although society has not yet outlined the suitable defenses against non-science, we should assume that they are quite the same as those needed to curb nonlaw.25

The use of tests in industry, Gross points out, de-emphasizes the individual. The tester’s fight for the right to hire only “adjusted” individuals is plainly a fight for the status quo and a battle against high-level intelligence, originality, and resourcefulness. Some critics feel that the use of tests and
techniques intended by psychiatrists for the emotionally disturbed is gradually destroying the human element in industry. The degree to which one can go overboard in placing undue faith in testing was rendered conspicuous by Professor Truman Lee Kelley of Harvard. Professor Kelley made headlines when he left a small fortune to his sons—a fortune which would pass on to them only if they selected their wives on the basis of mental and personality tests.

The dangers of idolatry in the use of tests in industry have been well summed up by Gross:

Brain watching today cannot be successfully minimized or dismissed... the brain watcher has decided to use the opportunity to earn rather than learn. If his powers continue to grow, we may find ourselves totally overwhelmed by this aggressive non-science in this most scientific of ages. To surrender now to a twentieth-century mystique which many have confused with an inevitable touch of progress would indeed be a harsh irony.

Testing can also be abused in the schools. A writer who has done yeoman's work against the uses and abuses of psychological techniques in educational testing is Banesh Hoffman. Hoffman's indictments of educational testing, particularly the use of multiple-choice tests in education, as well as similar criticisms from many other well-informed sources, are summed up as follows:

The tests deny the creative person a significant opportunity to demonstrate his creativity, and favour the shrewd and facile candidate over the one who has something of his own to say. Unlike essay examinations, they are mainly concerned with predetermined intellectual snippets, and not with the crucial ability to conceive, design, and actually carry out a complex undertaking in an individual way.

They penalize the candidate who perceives subtle points unnoticed by less able people, including the test-makers. They are apt to be superficial and intellectually dishonest, with questions made artificially difficult by means of ambiguity because genuinely searching questions do not readily fit into the multiple-choice format.

They take account only of the choice of answer and not of the quality of thought that led to the choice.

They too often degenerate into subjective guessing games in which the candidate does not pick what he considers the best answer out of a bad lot but rather the one he believes the unknown examiner would consider the best.
They neglect skill in disciplined expression.
They have a pernicious effect on education and the recognition of merit.\textsuperscript{27}

The long and the short of this part of the argument, then, is that professional criticism, as well as popular but informed criticism of psychological testing in industry and of educational testing that hides its weaknesses by making use of psychometric and statistical techniques is quite justified. An ambiguous technique providing uncertain contextual results has been oversold to industry and to the schools. Injustices are created for many individuals by the use of questionable testing techniques. The statistical dressing with which the psychometrician surrounds his test materials and the interpretation of his test results does not make the instruments more functional or the use to which they are put more reasonable. There are probably many avenues by which high ability can be detected. Psychological and educational tests may not necessarily be the best of these avenues. The road should be kept open for further inquiry as to how excellence may be detected. One thing, however, must be avoided, according to Hoffman. We have to shun over-dependence upon tests that are blind to dedication and creativity. We have to become aware of the inability of tests to detect intellectual subtlety and depth of knowledge. By remaining uncritical towards the excesses of the testing movement, we would simply create a new form of alienation—testolatry.

\textit{Taxonomy for the New Witchcraft}

In clinical diagnosis and subsequent therapy, it is important that the terminology of psychiatry be used with understanding and care and that the assessment of human motives be kept quite separate from an assessment of the quality and the value of their fruits. In this respect a somewhat uncritical development in clinical psychology has occurred over the last three decades. The development of this field has been uncritical in these matters because of the larger fact that there has been in several ways a denaturing of general professional skills that are needed in the field.

First, the accelerated training given to clinical psychologists during World War II, under the pressure to meet the needs of military personnel, resulted in both incomplete training and incomplete understanding in the field of requisite professional skills. This uneveness became a sort of professional cross which a number of the older men in the field had to bear. Second, a somewhat ambiguous terminology, glibly employed, is quite common in clinical psychology. This terminology has resulted in a phenomenon which Menninger
and others have criticized, namely, a tendency to find a diagnostic label for a patient or inmate and then, as it were, to fold up shop. But the more conscien­
tious clinical psychologist has pointed out that the use of psychiatric nomenclature is the beginning, not the end, of the psychiatric interview. Thereafter, assuming that an accurate classification has been achieved, the psych­
ologist’s or psychiatrist’s task is to help the sufferer, to relieve him of both the causes and the symptoms of his condition, and to return him, hopefully, to a fuller state of self-acceptance. Third, a shift in professional emphasis has subtly occurred for many clinicians, in that, instead of concentrating upon the rectification of the socially maladaptive behaviour of the patient, they have become more concerned with characterizing the motivational dynamics underlying that behaviour. Quite obviously the motivational bases of behaviour are inseparable from understanding it. Clearly there can be no quarrel on this score. It is equally obvious, however, that some motives, even though self-centred, are socially worthy and acceptable and that some are not. To the extent, however, that some professional psychologists imagine that they have condemned the social unacceptability of a person’s behaviour merely because they have been able to lay bare the personal needs that have prompted it, they have gone astray. There is a noticeable tendency upon the part of some clinicians to do this.

A fourth type of professional denaturing has resulted from what might be called—if we allow ourselves the luxury of statistical terminology—a “bimodal distribution” of clinical psychologists, with respect to general cultural background. Some of the most cultivated, intelligent, sensitive, and humanistically oriented men are found in clinical psychology. On the other hand, some of the narrowest and most ignorant of individuals are also found in the profession. The latter are likely to be men who enjoy making quick, highly structured, and fixed judgments of individuals. They enjoy the processes of pegging and categorizing. They have an unquestioning faith in test instruments. Finally, they eschew the roles of intuition and insight in trying to understand people, pinning their faith primarily upon the research design, the extensive case-history, and the neat categorization of individuals to which an abuse of psychiatric nomenclature can lend itself. Furthermore, they are quite fruitful in extending the meaning and application of the psychiatric label, giving to it meanings and ranges of application that were never intended by the American Psychiatric Association.28 In short, they are guilty of excessive worship of that dehumanizing “technique” that Ellul29 abhors in his criticism of the spirit of the technological society. Above all, many of these
educationally and intellectually narrow professionals seem to know little outside of their field of professional endeavour and, what is worse, seem uninterested in anything else.

Finally, we might mention here that it is in the very nature of mass society to demand a type of mass production for services as well as goods. In so far as psychological help and advice is an increasingly sought service under the stress of modern life, this service will tend to take on features of mass production. When it does, the public can be expected to go for the routine diagnosis, the glib terminology, the shallow explanation, and the plausible, easily understood but rarely checked allegation of causes. Under such conditions the superficial clinical psychologist has a field day. He need worry only about criticism from the professionally sophisticated and more responsible type of colleague. There are, of course, other factors that have tended to denature the quality of clinical psychology, but those few already mentioned will, I believe, indicate some of the undesirable aspects in the professional atmosphere created by the epigonoi of the profession—aspects which have generated both internal and external criticism.

Out of this welter of professionally denaturing factors have emerged a number of unsatisfying consequences. One of these consequences, however, is so central to current criticism of clinical psychology that it has been given internal, professional attention. I am referring to the dissatisfaction felt by many psychologists with the tendency of a number of their clinical colleagues to diagnose each other and to reveal mutually rejecting attitudes towards their own professional motivations. This type of activity develops into an essentially immature attitude. It becomes a sort of psychiatric “Everyone is crazy except thee and me, and sometimes I have doubts about thee.” I have dealt elsewhere with this phenomenon, but perhaps the most succinct treatment of it has been given by David Lynn. This author provides examples from a variety of clinical settings to expose the fatuous dehumanization of clinical practice.

This first example is that of one clinician in high authority informing another, also in high authority, that a third colleague was “obviously schizophrenic” and therefore should be dismissed. This “diagnosis” was made on the basis of a brief interview. The clinician making the evaluation is, paradoxically, quite cautious in clinical practice and makes such diagnoses only after the most careful study. Parenthetically, the “schizophrenic” colleague has been very productive for a number of years, has published widely, and is still functioning quite well.
A second example is a clinician who seriously passes off anyone who publishes as an “exhibitionist” and anyone who does research as “a person who is unable to participate in interpersonal relationships because of his inability to cope with his hostile impulses and must, therefore, withdraw to the cloistered laboratory.”

The third example is that of two clinicians, each of whom informs one in “strictest confidence” that the other is a “sick person”.

A final example is that of a psychological study seminar, confounded and reduced to childish insults (in the guise of clinical interpretations) because the participants focus on possible motivational determinants producing their colleagues’ ideas rather than on the ideas per se.31

Lynn notes that when a clinical impression of a colleague is conveyed to him it often receives a cool reception, but when it is conveyed to other colleagues it can damage professionally the person in question. I urge the reader to read this brief paper by Lynn for the flavour it conveys of dehumanization in the clinical setting and the confirmation it provides of the new dispensation available to nosological Johnny-come-latelies.

Abraham Maslow32 has referred to the generalization of this phenomenon as “rubricization.” He employs this term to refer to the habit of looking at one another and assessing one another in terms of labels or stereotypes. As Maslow puts it, stereotyping is a process which not only serves social bias and prejudice but is applicable to the way in which we perceive people and events. Social perception is not simply a matter of a photographic recording of what is passing before our eyes. The recording is filtered through our own consciousness, that is, it is subject to interpretation by our “cognitive maps”, to use an expression from psychology. This filtering results in an evaluation and classification of the persons and events before us.

Public and professional criticism of rubricization has been due to the use of practices springing from it in the treatment of patients. One example of this is also furnished by Maslow. He tells the story of a psychiatrist who terminated a brief and hurried first interview with a prospective patient with the following remark: “Your troubles are roughly those characteristic of your age.” This would-be patient became quite angry, feeling that she was both brushed off and insulted. Feeling that she had been treated as a child, she retorted, “I am not a specimen. I’m me, not anybody else.”33

Maslow notes that people resent being rubricized because such rubricization is a denial of their individuality and reflects an indifference to their sense of self and personal identity. Resistance to such rubricization is not
at all resistance in the psychoanalytic sense of a sickness-protecting manoeuvre. It is essentially a rejection of shallow judgment and misperception in personal relationships. Rubricization is resented when it is employed by laymen. How much more it will be resented when it comes from clinical psychologists or psychiatrists, the reader can well imagine.

The psychological and psychiatric professions have begun to sink deep roots into American life, and if, to any degree, their skills and services are mis-employed, something will be lost. That psychological and psychiatric services are, in fact, being mis-employed, is a charge that is being increasingly made, sometimes by laymen, sometimes by psychologists and psychiatrists themselves. When the mis-employment of professional skills in these fields is fostered by an uncritical, large-scale demand for the services their practitioners can provide, this is bound to alter somewhat the nature of contemporary American culture. The process of alteration may prove to be slow but, given a few decades, it will also prove to be sure. For reasons such as these, the task of drawing up a bill of particulars dealing with the misuse and abuse of professional skills in these areas is worth while. It may make a small contribution to liquidating considerably — although never diminishing entirely — the abuses and misuses that have been mentioned.

8. For an illuminating and discouraging example of what social engineers mean by "sensitivity training", see the following: Irving R. Weschler & Jerome Reisel, Inside A Sensitivity Training Group, Monograph Series: 4 (Los
This may seem a strange statement to make. But in Western society the applications of technology, and of various scientifically-based techniques of efficiency, carry their own imperatives. These imperatives tend to promote a social psychology with features of which some are found in Fascism and some in Communism. Most industrial psychologists do not, I believe, think in these terms. In this connection see the following: Zevedei Barbu, Democracy and Dictatorship: Their Psychology And Patterns Of Life (New York: Grove Press, 1956). Barbu is a social psychologist.


18. William H. Whyte, Jr., op.cit.


21. Testimony to the widespread interest in cultural matters among all classes and occupations in the Soviet Union comes from many quarters. Thus John
Gunther in *Inside Russia Today* (New York: Harper, 1957) tells us of audiences at the Kirov Theatre in Leningrad, composed of a few aristocratic survivors of the ancien régime, typical, hard-working Russians, sailors, children, and Chinese visitors (pp. 411-12). Irving R. Levine (*Main Street, U.S.S.R.*, New York: Signet Books, 1960) describes the widespread literary and cultural interests of the Russians. He speaks of the Soviet Union as a land where everyone reads. He describes "a taxi driver who has an open book on the seat beside him; an elevator operator reads a manual on ham-radio operations; a cloakroom attendant at the Bolshoi Theatre reads a translation of Jack London while waiting for the rush at the final curtain." (Speaking of an educated Russian, Levine tells us that "like most educated Russians, he knows about William Shakespeare and Charles Dickens; he has read Upton Sinclair, William Faulkner, Howard Fast, and other authors whose works either are classics or who paint an unpleasant picture of some aspect of life in non-Communist societies. The *Pickwick Papers* are presented on the stage of the government's Moscow Art Theatre; children read *Oliver Twist* in school. Dickens' description of exploitations of workers two centuries ago in England conforms nicely with the concept of capitalism presented to Russians today" (p. 17). We have no sympathy, of course, with the anachronistic features of Russian cultural fare, used to create anti-capitalistic propaganda, but one can admire the latitude of Russian cultural interests. The important point in the present connection is that this latitude will be found among Russian engineers as well as Russian citizens in other fields.

22. Brian Simon, ed., *Psychology In The Soviet Union* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1957). For a variety of reasons the Soviets have rejected mental testing for years.

23. I am assuming that Soviet rejection of psychometry covers all types of testing, not just intelligence testing. If, in fact, the Russians use interest tests, I am not aware of it.


THE HEAD OF MAN

Stanley Mason

The head of man is a bag of jewels
the ways of memory are
crusted with carbuncles, the eyes
an amazement of amethysts
and the stiff beliefs
crystal stalagmites in caves of cornelian

The head of man is a pomegranate
where secret thoughts in tiers
lie packed in a pink ichor

The head of man
is a jangle of garish dreams
with two blue holes in the middle
to let the sky shine in

The head of an old man
is a seed-pod of memories
that rattle in time's wind