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Recognition of Soviet Russia:—Mr. Semion Rapoport in the *Contemporary*.

The Mexican Fascisti:—Mr. Carleton Beals in *Current History*.

Lord Birkenhead's Doctrine of Despair:—Dr. J. A. Hutton and others in *The British Weekly*.

Mussolini and the League:—M. Stephane Lauzanne in the *North American Review*.

AMID the clamorous propagandism of different European parties, it is refreshing to find in *Current History* a calm review of German internal conditions, from the pen of Professor Hans Delbruck—the famous historian at the University of Berlin. The tone of the article is worthy of the writer's personal distinction, his temperateness both of thought and of language, and his wealth of historic analogy by which the present enigma may be made less obscure. He provides us with invaluable data for forming a comparative estimate of the forces now struggling against one another in his distracted country.

Professor Delbruck speaks of the German republic as exposed to the triple fire of Bavarian reactionaries, Rhine separatists, and economic communists. When first established in the Fall of 1918, the republic was thoroughly unpopular, for an overwhelming majority of the German people would have preferred to retain the old régime modernized by some democratic reforms. The revolution was the work of a mutinous army. But it was effected with little resistance, because President Wilson's "Fourteen Points"—offered as a basis of peace—had included the dethronement of the Hohenzollern dynasty as a pre-requisite. For the sake of the Fourteen Points, Germans were willing to accept even a republic. Professor Delbruck quotes with approval the judgment of a former Secretary of State: "Before Nov. 9, 1918, there were no republicans in Germany; after Nov. 9 there were no monarchists."

It was this accident that precipitated the republic, and a republic so precipitated was on very precarious foundation. How

long, we are reminded, did it take the English and the French to accomplish the transition from absolute monarchy to popular government! In both countries there was a persistent and a haunting illusion that lasted long,—the illusion about happiness in “days of yore, when kings were rulers.” One cannot wonder that many Germans should be subject to a like romantic forgetfulness of facts. There are to-day men working for a Hohenzollern restoration, officers and soldiers of the Imperial Army, government officials, “society people” who have lost their former influence. But most Germans are no longer monarchists. Many have come to support the republic because they feel sure that only thus can the nation be saved from civil war and from dismemberment. And not a few of the ex-Kaiser’s old personal friends cannot yet forgive him for “abandoning his army at the last minute and fleeing to Holland.” This is a reproach against the dethroned monarch which Professor Delbruck does not approve, for he feels that William II could have done nothing else. But he notes it as urged by “a considerable number.”

Moreover, he asks,—in the event of a restoration—what dynasty would be restored? The Kaiser was only highest in rank of 22 princes, including three kings—those of Bavaria, Saxony, and Wurtemberg. Must all the 22 princes return? If the Kaiser alone came back, he would not be recognized by the South Germans, the Bavarians, the inhabitants of Wurtemberg. Nor would the Prussians recognize any Bavarian nominee as their emperor. Professor Delbruck quotes the parallel case of France in the nineteenth century, and the strife among Bourbons, Orleanists and Napoleonists. At Munich a recent trial of royalist conspirators showed that the accused had agreed only in their common hatred of the republic, and had very diverse schemes for the substitute they wished to establish.

In truth, says this critic, “nobody knows what the monarchists are striving after.” General von Ludendorff, who has been living for a considerable time in Munich, and who is a sort of rallying point for the reactionaries, never knew even during the war just what he wanted himself. Hence sober-minded folk, though often conservative and theoretically monarchist, are giving no countenance to these plots. Among such “drags on the wheel” is the ex-Crown Prince. Professor Delbruck quotes a letter written by Friedrich Wilhelm on February 1, 1922, in which the view is expressed that no question of monarchy or republic should at present be raised, and that the first thing to secure is a stable Constitution which will be agreeable to the majority. The letter contained

these words: "Thus the Constitution of Weimar—whatever faults one may find with it—has become a fact."

According to Professor Delbruck's estimate, the ex-Crown Prince while living in Holland has held the rôle of a martyr, and extreme monarchists would like him to remain there that they may exploit his "martyrdom." If he returned to Germany, he would check the activities of reaction, and the Hohenzollern fanatics—discouraged by him—would be powerless. The republic would be firmly established if it were given a chance to lift the German people out of the post-war misery. Unfortunately, this critic adds, the French are doing their utmost to make this impossible, and are thus making a monarchist revival more likely.

It appears that at the Munich trial the French General Staff was shown to have co-operated with the royalist conspirators. Money, says Professor Delbruck, was supplied to them through a French Lieutenant-Colonel who had paid frequent visits to the Bavarian capital. And the rigour used by the army of occupation tended still more to produce a movement in Bavaria towards breach with the Reich. Many thousands of families have been expelled from their homes at a moment's notice, without even being permitted to take with them their household goods. The measures adopted by France in the Ruhr "could hardly be excused even in time of war." Is it surprising that the German people are restive and ready for revolution under a government that is powerless to protect them? Professor Delbruck quotes from a speech by Lady Bonham-Carter, daughter of Mr. Asquith, in which—on return from the Ruhr Valley—she said that the French have put war into the heart of every German, and that the world cannot look on such a struggle without sympathy. In the opinion of this German observer, a victory for passive resistance in the Ruhr would have made the republic safe. The prospect now is perhaps some form of Bolshevism. "When a nation is driven to a state of despair, desperate resolves may be anticipated."

It is a pessimistic article, and we have of course not forgotten to suspect the insidious ways of the German apologist. On the other hand, suspicion may be overdone. We are in search of some theory into which we may fit in credible form the strange events that have transpired, and it is of value to have the main points of the German case set before us by so competent a pen.

MANY Nova Scotians have pleasant memories of Mr. C. M. MacInnes, a Dalhousie graduate of 1915, whose triumph in college over the handicap of blindness was so notable, and who is

now Professor of Political Science at the University of Bristol, England. He is one of two contributors to a recent issue of *The Contemporary Review*, on the subject "White Migration to the Dominions." Naturally Professor MacInnes writes about the special case of Canada. He does so with real insight and force.

The article begins by noticing the curious fact that the excess of those who left the United Kingdom in 1921 over those who arrived there in the same year was only 118,938, while the corresponding figure for 1920 was 172,747, and that for 1913 was 241,997. This seems at first sight to discredit the prevailing idea that immediately after the war there was an enormous stimulus to emigration. But Professor MacInnes reminds us of the huge increase in ocean fares, and of the fact that the Dominions—besides being affected by the post-war depression—were much occupied with the re-settlement of their own soldiers. One fancies that the figures for 1922 and 1923 will tell a very different tale.

Despite this quite considerable flood of emigrants, the census returns show a steady increase in Old Country population,—greater in Great Britain for 1921 than for 1913 by no fewer than 1,100,000 persons. The writer points out that this growth in population has been accompanied by a shrinkage in trade. What is the remedy? "The present distribution of white people in the Empire is unsatisfactory." There would appear to be in Great Britain some 482 people to the square mile, as against 2.5 in Canada, 1.8 in Australia, 11.7 in New Zealand, 3.2 in South Africa. Just now there is no demand in South Africa or New Zealand for settlers who come without capital. So it is to Canada or Australia that landless folk in the Old Country must look for a home. Moreover, the value of purchases from the United Kingdom per head of population in the Dominions (apart from South Africa, for which exact figures are not available) is seen to be greatly in excess of the corresponding value of purchases from the United Kingdom by those who live elsewhere. Thus migration, properly conducted, should not only lessen the surplus of people at home, but also provide in other parts of the Empire such a demand for home goods as would give much increased employment to British industrial workers.

Yet, says Professor MacInnes, migration as a solvent of the problem of the unemployed has many disadvantages. Only picked people are wanted in the Dominions, and for the unemployables there is no use. The opportunity for settlers is not in the cities of any Dominion, but on the land, and thus only those ready for work on the land are welcome. Is it so that only the "farmer-born" can succeed? Is there not danger that this requirement will

denude the English agricultural districts? What force is there in the old story that Englishmen are not wanted in Canada, and that they are usually failures there? The writer of this article in the *Contemporary* quotes from an investigation made by Professor Fay of Toronto in the four western provinces of Canada. Professor Fay found that good Canadian farmers came not only from north of the Tweed, but from every county in England, except the little county of Rutland. Among those who had succeeded on western lands he found men most remote from the "farmer-born,"—a Yorkshire shoemaker, a London busman, a London engineer, a Manchester dairyman. And the Overseas Settlement Committee has reported that, of all the emigrants it has sent out, not more than two to three per cent have proved failures. Those who do fail attract special notice because they are so vocal.

What are the causes which prevent success? Professor MacInnes, analyzing the evidence available on this point, classified these as in the main of four kinds; physique, character, exaggerated expectations of success, and insufficient machinery for dealing with the settlers on landing. The Canadian climate is unsuitable for some, a very small number. Some are unwilling to attempt hard manual work. Some had formed such radiant expectations from the glowing emigration posters that—although they were in truth far better off in Canada than they had been in Great Britain—they made the welkin ring with their complaints. The inadequate machinery for dealing with settlers on arrival has been most conspicuous in the case of women. But this refers chiefly to Australia, and the Overseas Settlement Report suggests to Australians that they should imitate the Canadian example in having women officers to meet the arriving women immigrants.

The measures most necessary for the improvement of present conditions are declared to be (a) greater co-operation between the Mother Country and the Dominions, (b) careful selection and advice in settling, (c) a reasonable amount of supervision and after-care. Professor MacInnes offers the surprising hint that the "man with capital," who has so often been regarded as able to look after himself, often needs the most guidance of all. "Some of the most dissatisfied people, and some of the most dismal failures on record come from this class."

It is a most sprightly and suggestive article. We may be proud to have sent to the Old Country a Canadian so well equipped for enlightening British readers on the points they most need to realize about migration to the land of his own birth and training.

THE President of Spain's new "Military Directorate" has contributed to *The Nineteenth Century* a brief exposition of "what happened on September 13." The deposed government, it seems, had been ineffective in Morocco, wasteful of resources, and hence a danger to the State. It had exasperated many Spaniards into a mood of Communism or Bolshevism. Anarchist outrage in large cities had been followed by the closing of factories, and capital had been driven abroad. The law courts had not shown adequate severity in repressive action. Hence a group of young officers, led by the writer, had "agreed to take a decision." Their starting-point was Barcelona, where the scandals were at their worst, and were complicated by the presence of a small but bellicose "separatist" party seeking autonomous rights for the province of Cataluna.

The decision which these officers agreed to take involved some strong steps. Certain constitutional rights were suspended, especially rights of assembly and of the press. Seditious notices, for example, were prohibited. But public opinion throughout Spain was heartily with the self-constituted Directorate. Moreover, the measures adopted are only temporary. "The Constitution will be re-established." Justice, economic rigour, firm action in Morocco, apparently a general reign of righteousness and efficiency—these are the declared objects. "The Military Directorate are dedicating to this task twelve hours of earnest work every day, and are hoping to develop it very soon." Such allowance of time does not appear excessive for such a purpose. It would be interesting to hear the story told by those against whom the Marqués and his associates "agreed to take a decision." Spanish politicians are bad enough in all conscience; but the outside world's faith in Spanish military men is as yet incomplete. And those familiar with the history of the country for the last hundred years will wonder at the faith of the Marqués de Estella that his projected reform can be achieved "very soon."

MR. Semion Rapoport sympathises with the reader of articles in pro-Russian papers, who is never sure whether he is being "led by the nose or pulled by the leg." How far a like alarm should beset us when we read Mr. Rapoport's own contribution in *The Contemporary Review*, we have no means of judging. But he strikes a responsive note when he acknowledges the danger.

It seems that some newspapers, among which the Paris "Humanité" is mentioned, frankly admit financial debt to the Bolsheviks.

In Germany a Communist journal has confessed that it received £50,000 to stir up agitation against the Stresemann government. This critic thinks that the public is less likely to be deluded by those who write on Russia without ever having been there at all than by those who have just paid a flying visit to one or two cities, or have viewed the southern and central parts of the country from the window of a first-class railway car.

It is urged that Great Britain should "recognize" the Soviet government for the sake of opening up trade. But—according to Mr. Rapoport—it is not the absence of "recognition" that prevents business relations. These are prevented because Russia has no products to sell, and therefore is unable to buy. This, in turn, is due to the fact that all import and export has been monopolized by the Soviets. The Russian producer who would like to make sales abroad must first sell his stuff to the *Vneshtorg*,—that is, the Government External Trade Department. This Department can fix prices as it likes, and generally fixes them so low that the producer finds the foreign market not worth his while. Similarly, the British exporter must deal with Russian buyers through the *Vneshtorg*. There is no direct contact between the manufacturer of the one country and the market of the other. Again, those who speak of resumed trade with Russia as the remedy for British unemployment forget that even in pre-war days the export to Russia was not more than about 3 per cent of Britain's total export business.

But Mr. Rapoport cannot agree that the usual arguments against recognition of the Soviet régime have real force. Those arguments are generally based either on the fact that the authorities in Moscow have repudiated the debts of the earlier Russian government and have refused to compensate private persons for the pillage of the last few years, or on the plea that Bolshevik atrocities make it impossible for a self-respecting nation to have dealings with those who perpetrated them. How often, in the past, have governments repudiated debts without forfeiting recognition abroad, as in the cases of Old Turkey, and some of the South American republics! And who ever heard of recognition being refused by other States to a government just because it treated its own people with cruelty? Again, one may ask, what about the Turks?

The real reason, in Mr. Rapoport's view, for refusing to deal with Moscow is the absence of proof that the Moscow bureaucrats are acting with the authority of the Russian people at all. It cannot be argued that they are an outlaw government because

they will not compensate private persons whom they have robbed. The Bolsheviks have declared their willingness to do this, and all that is wanted is an impartial court of arbitration to adjust the amounts. But there is the gravest reason to think that they are ruling against the will of their own people, so long as they forbid an independent press, free speech, public meetings and associations, —suppressing every such movement by the horrors of their jails and their sentences of exile. It is fair to demand that they shall first apply to their own people for "recognition," by establishing a free election and a free House of Representatives. If thus endorsed, whatever their record of misrule, they should then be permitted to send their Ambassador to London. But not until then.

ACCORDING to Mr. Carleton Beals, the so-called Mexican Fascisti have very little in common with those Italian followers of Mussolini whose "exotic name" they have appropriated, without being able to pronounce it. Italian Fascism has a fiercely nationalistic element; its earliest manifestations were the burning of foreign-language schools, newspaper offices, churches; it stirred up once more the problem of Fiume and Dalmatia, exactly in the old spirit which for the last fifty years has brooded in sullen discontent over "unredeemed" Italy. But there is no similar crusading zeal in Mexico,—no notion of winning back Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California from the clutches of alien despotism. Nor does it occur to anyone as worth a struggle to destroy the American, German, and French schools, so that good Mexican citizens may be made out of the foreign petroleum producers.

Again, in Italy the Fascisti were roused to battle against revolutionary Socialism, while the half-million Mexican organized workers are in tacit sympathy with the Obregon government, and their head is director of the national munition factories. A point of similarity is to be found in the tradition of the super-State controlled by a dictator. Obregon had in this respect a chance even better than Mussolini had. His country has inherited from its old Spanish-Roman hierarchy the habit of obedience to an autocrat. Of late years it has affected all sorts of popular institutions, and the habit of nominal voting has disguised the reality of that individual sway which votes are used to sanction afterwards, not to determine in advance.

Obregon has admirably used his powers. While Mussolini has extended the term of military service, increased the standing army and police forces, founded a Black Guard and created a

volunteer militia, the Mexican Fascist dictator has frowned upon militarism, immensely stimulated education, shown large liberality to political offenders, and protected the liberty of the press.

Mr. Beals points out one respect in which Obregon has been really similar to Mussolini. It has been the purpose of Italian Fascisti to uproot the co-operative colony system of the Socialists and Popularists, substituting for this a régime of small land holding. Likewise in Mexico the Fascisti have been opposed to the widely desired restoration of the *ejidos* (village commons,) and prefer the system of large *haciendas* (ranches). This, however, appears to have been a development rather than the originally avowed intention of the Fascist policy. For, as Mr. W. J. Shultz has pointed out in his paper "Mexico's Successful Struggle for Recognition," it was Obregon himself who as Minister under Carranza carried the famous Article 27,—the oil and land legislation under which the State resumed ownership of all lands and waters, together with all minerals and oils found in the subsoil.

This agrarian policy was a reaction against the centuries of oppressive control by Mexican landlords. Mr. Shultz reminds us that as late as 1910 a few hundred families owned all the cultivable land in the country, while the twelve millions of Indians not living in the towns and cities had sunk to a level worse than that of American slaves before the civil war. They could not be sold, but their wages amounted to no more than a few cents per day, and they were often allowed to starve. It was such people that gave ferocious support to the Madero and Carranza revolutions.

But small ownership is one thing, while village communal ownership is quite another. Obregon aimed at the former, but the local Commissions he set up to redistribute land to small proprietors "legally and without injustice" had soon to be checked by a "National Agrarian Commission." Hence, no doubt, the present cry that the sovereign rights of provinces and local bodies are being over-ridden by Federal interference. In the light of the fierce local revolts against the Obregon government these two articles may now be read afresh. Once more we find the mediating plan of a moderate reformer exposed to a double fire from the two extremes he has tried to restrain.

THE passage from Lord Birkenhead's rectorial address upon which the fiercest attack of critics has been concentrated is this:

For as long a time as the records of history have been preserved, human societies passed through a ceaseless process of

evolution and adjustment. This process has been sometimes pacific, but more often it has resulted from warlike disturbance. The strength of different nations, measured in terms of arms, varies from century to century. The world continues to offer glittering prizes to those who have stout hearts and sharp swords; it is therefore extremely improbable that the experience of future ages will differ in any material respect from that which has happened since the twilight of the human race. It is for us, therefore, who in our history have proved ourselves a martial rather than a military people, to abstain, as has been our habit, from provocation, but to maintain in our hand the adequate means for our own protection, and—so equipped—to march with heads erect and bright eyes along the road of our Imperial destiny.

As the late William James once remarked about a letter he had received from a correspondent who repudiated all sense of sin: "If we are in search of a broken and a contrite heart, clearly we need not look to this brother." And as Mr. Chesterton said of a self-flattering Englishman: "He wants the world to know that he at least does not stand in the Valley of Humiliation, like the man called Christian."

The London *British Weekly* has long used as its sub-title the phrase "A Journal of Social and Christian Progress." It describes Lord Birkenhead's address as one that glorifies selfish and pagan reaction. And this journal has obtained statements of opinion on the matter from outstanding people. One of them remarks as a curious coincidence that the ship *Birkenhead* once tried conclusions with rock truth near the place called "Good Hope," and that it was the vessel which went down,—not the rock. Lady Frances Balfour says she seems to "hear again the voice of the 'War Lord,' with his material gains and vulgar ambitions." She is glad Lord Birkenhead has attacked the League, against which are ranged "all the forces of darkness," for it is well to make people realize that they are at the parting of the ways, and "if there is any stuff in it, the League will prosper all the more from such attacks." Dr. J. A. Hutton recalls the "shining armour" speech of the ex-Kaiser, and hopes that the gospel of self-interest will not be taken seriously to heart by Glasgow Socialists. If the world has indeed glittering prizes for those who have stout hearts and sharp swords, Dr. Hutton thanks God that there are still jails available for such people too.

It may be argued that Lord Birkenhead did not mean to approve the system under which these rewards are still available for strong and unscrupulous natures, but merely to point out that while the world is so constituted the righteous too must keep their

powder dry. Yet his way of expressing himself was singularly unfortunate. A Glasgow student writes to the press to say that in placing his own self-interest below the enthusiasm of a great human cause in 1914 he is now constrained by the Lord Rector to judge himself a sloppy fool, and that he has moods in which he thinks Lord Birkenhead is right. The students who listened to the address are said to have received this "Rectorial" in unwonted silence.

It is a great occasion in Scottish university life when a Rectorial address is delivered. Carlyle, Gladstone, Mill, and other great masters of language have found in such an opportunity a stimulus to their highest effort. It is not to be denied that Lord Birkenhead spoke with remarkable incisiveness and with his usual felicity of phrase. But it is freely stated that the address had been given before to an audience in America! Hence the irritation with which a Glasgow graduate wrote to the press: "To take out an old manuscript and deliver it as a serious ultimatum upon life and public duty . . . was an offence which will not be forgotten." Those who know the majesty that surrounds a Scottish "Rectorial" will appreciate this.

DID France encourage Mussolini to defy the League of Nations? This suspicion will certainly not be weakened by M. Stephen Lauzanne's article in *The North American Review*.

The writer is described as editor-in-chief of *Le Matin*, and he tells us how an intimate friend of his own was with Mussolini on the day the Italian fleet occupied Corfu. This gentleman suggested to the Dictator that European and American opinion might condemn such a step, and was met with the reply that the British fleet had similarly blockaded the Peiraeus in 1850, when Don Pacifico's furniture had been pillaged by a riotous Athenian mob! Mussolini went on to explain that the League of Nations could not be invoked in the Italo-Greek crisis, because there was "nothing to be arbitrated," and also because it was clear that the League's judgment would go against Italy!

M. Lauzanne plainly thinks the Dictator's argument was good, and he adds some diverting comments of his own. Had not various items in the Versailles compact been ignored already? What about the clause providing for trial of the ex-Kaiser? (No mention is made of the Reparations clause, which seems to be sacrosanct in French eyes, no matter what happens to the rest). Why did not the League intervene to stop the Greek attack on

Turkey? (Nothing is said about French transactions with the Turks at the same time). Had not the League failed to settle two or three other disputes, for example that between Bolivia and Chile? (How far France—herself a signatory to the Covenant—was to blame for making it ineffective, is not discussed). M. Lauzanne's conclusion apparently is that Mussolini was right in the blockade that killed those Corfu school children, and that the League which his own country pledged her honour to support should be treated as just an amusing variety of international club. When one hears a precedent from 1850 quoted as a rule for to-day, one wonders whether the procedure of Napoleon I will figure next as a guide to life. But no doubt M. Lauzanne believes, with Lord Birkenhead, that those who would improve human practice are sloppy idealists. The best thing in his article is his friend's remark to Mussolini: "Your decision will no doubt be understood in Paris, but it will probably be blamed in London." This is exactly what happened. But the compliment was to London rather than to Paris.

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