TO MAKE BRITAIN'S VICTORY COMPLETE*

Otto Strasser

I SPOKE to you on a previous occasion from this platform on the subject *Why Hitler cannot win the war.* At that time, when his lightning offensive in Russia had overrun Przemysl and Brest-Litovsk, Odessa and Kiev, when Kharkov and Leningrad had been surrounded, and the fall of Moscow seemed only a question of days, when the United States had not joined the camp of the Democracies with huge moral and material strength—I endeavored to prove by military and economic and moral arguments that Hitler, despite his apparent success, could not ultimately win. I argued that he had lost the decisive battle in August and September, 1940, when the glorious victory of the R.A.F. inflicted upon him his "Battle of the Marne." Just as the First World War could not be won by Kaiser Wilhelm after the Battle of the Marne in August-September, 1914—whatever might be his victories in the following years—so Hitler could not win when the heroism of the R.A.F. and the stoicism of the English people had made the conquest of England impossible for him. Too frequently world opinion forgets that he can win this war only if he succeeds in conquering the Island Fortress, or by cutting off its life-line to America and starving it into submission. As long as Britain and the life-line to America hold, all other victories—be they in Russia, Africa, the Near or Middle East—can bring no victorious decision for Hitler. And how far he is from victory on those other fields now, each day's news makes more plain. The Democracies, holding these vital positions and continuing from these bases, had in fact already won the war.

In the light of such fundamental considerations concerning the military situation, Hitler's attack on Russia proved to be a gain for the Democracies, because his war machine was thus seriously weakened without bringing him any victorious decision. Economically, I endeavored to show in that previous lecture that his prospect must degenerate from month to month. Europe is not able to feed its 450 million inhabitants, and does not possess sufficient raw materials to keep its huge industrial plants going. This is true in time of peace: how much more so in time of war, whose demands involve the greatest waste of material ever known! All the hoarded provisions and all the booty

* Based on a lecture delivered by Dr. Strasser at the People's Forum, Montreal Dec., 1942.
from conquered countries cannot alter the fact that the longer
the war lasts, the surer the strangle-hold of the British blockade
is to make itself felt. Here too Hitler's attack on Russia brought
a change for the worse in his position. It cut off the last possi-
bility of bringing him supplies of food and raw materials that
had been open for the first two years of the war. Europe became
then in truth a besieged fortress, with no hope of reinforcements
and no chance of fresh supply.

The decisive factor for Hitler's defeat, however, seemed to me
when I spoke to you before, and still seems to me now, to be the
moral factor. To the world (including the majority of the
German people) the injustice of his cause was apparent, and
the iniquitous means he employed brought the abhorrence and
hatred of all decent people. Besides, it is the essence of such
a reign of terror, depending only on brute force, that it can
arrive at no peace—with the overrun and conquered nations,
with neutral countries, or even with its own people. This was
illustrated by the rebuff of the sensational peace offer submitted
by Rudolf Hess, and by the growing resistance of the conquered
peoples of Europe, as well as by the increasing animosity of
neutral countries. Finally by the unabated terror in Germany
itself, that necessitates constant reinforcement of the Gestapo
after ten years of Hitler's rule. Events since my previous
address have made it still more obvious that Hitler cannot win,
especially what has happened in Russia where his losses of men
and material have mounted enormously without his being able
to force a decision on that battle-front. The same conclusion
is confirmed by the victories of the British army in North Africa,
and by the mighty attacks on Hitler's production centres and
lines of communication in Germany itself as well as in the
occupied countries. America's entrance into the war has
strengthened the forces of the Democracies immeasurably more
than Japan has added weight to the Axis—as was so clearly
shown in the "Second Front" attack on French North Africa.

If it was certain a year ago that Hitler cannot win the war,
the present problem is—How quickly can the Democracies win,
in such manner that they will also have won the coming peace?

II

We have become accustomed to speaking of the war: but
it would be more correct to speak of two wars—the European
and the Japanese. Neither in their causes nor in their aims
are they identical. Their common interest is confined to making the most of temporary and tactical considerations. Hence their strategy and tactics—both military and political—are definitely divergent.

The European war is ideological. Here is the challenge of revolutionary Fascist and Nazi ideologies hurled at the democratic conception of life—in the broadest sense at our Christian culture and our western civilization. One does not do justice to the tremendous cataclysm that has shaken Europe's Christian civilization to its basis, if one does not appreciate how revolutionary ideas first expressed in the World War of 1914-1918 paved the way for Fascist and Nazi later rise to power. The present European war is a civil war within the white race. Whether the principle of domination or that of cooperation shall prevail, is the fundamental issue at stake.

We must not, however, overlook the fact that the weakness of our old democratic order, especially of our economic order, facilitated the unscrupulous Fascist and Nazi campaigns. Likewise we need to face the truth that after this terrible struggle is over, there can be no return to the inherent weaknesses of that old order. Our civilization will have to be reborn in an entirely new spirit, to embody and truly to represent modern Democracy—a just economic order and humanitarian Christian ideals. History shows that every civil war is especially cruel. The front line goes straight through every nation, through every class, through individual families; thus in each European country we find those who place their faith in domination and those who are willing to fight for cooperation. It is the great struggle for external and internal freedom that has characterized two thousand years of European history.

The Japanese war is different. There we are face to face with a new and important epoch of Japanese Imperialism, that seeks to conquer and to rule Asia. Not only since the famous Tanaka document has Japan's imperialistic programme been evident. We have proofs of her insatiable purpose in the blood record of the Japanese-Chinese war of 1894, in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904, in Japanese conquests in the Pacific that resulted from participation in the World War of 1914; above all, in the assault upon China, developing into the horrible Second Sino-Japanese War. The Tokyo purpose is to establish a huge colonial empire, embracing not only Korea and the whole of Manchuria, but the Malay States with Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, surrounded by vassal States such as Indo-
China, Siam, Burma and the Philippines, while China and the whole of India are to be fitted in as a kind of Dominion of the "New Japanese Order in Asia."

Primarily these aims are an attack on the British Empire, on the United States and on Holland. They are, furthermore, a threat to the position of the white race in Asia, and in their repercussions are a present and immediate danger to our entire civilization. If one cast but a fleeting glance at the economic interests of the United States in Asia, or keeps in mind what the final loss of Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, Burma and India would mean to the British Empire, one begins to realize the deeper meaning of the Japanese war. Those of us who envisage the full significance of the consumer markets of China, India and Indonesia—with more than one thousand million people—being closed to the products of the industrial white nations will perceive that the standard of living and the fate of every single white worker must be affected by such outcome of the Japanese war. There is the additional danger that the slave wages of a victorious Japan would facilitate an export-offensive into African, South American and European domains. The issue in the European war is that of the form which our western civilization shall bear: in the Japanese war the whole existence of our western civilization is at stake.

This makes it clear that the European war must be brought to a victorious end as quickly as possible, and with the least possible loss of life and treasure for the Democracies—in order that the Japanese war may be launched and won on a grand scale.

III

Now that victory of the Democracies is certain, how shall it be won in the shortest possible time and with the least necessary loss?

In view of the enormous productive power of the United States, and the concentrated fresh forces of Britain together with her Dominions, Hitler's armies, weakened by the Russian resistance, must yield in a war of attrition. But even when this had happened, the Democracies would face the gigantic task of conquering a strengthened Japan, with exhausted armies and depleted arsenals. It would be a task demanding long years of hard fighting. But cannot the Democracies win over the Axis by a method quicker than that of attrition?

I believe this may be achieved by an internal revolution
TO MAKE BRITAIN'S VICTORY COMPLETE

against Hitler. Many people do not see the possibility of this. In my book *Germany Tomorrow* I have answered these sceptics. Out of intimate knowledge of German affairs I set forth an argument that German revolution is possible, on grounds which I shall here present again.

At no time were there more than 10% convinced Nazis in Germany. Clear proof of this statement is the fact that out of a total of eighty million inhabitants only four million are members of the Hitler Party, although membership is open to everyone, and affords important privileges in both private and business life. Neutral observers corroborate this. For instance, Howard K. Smith, the American correspondent, says in his book entitled *Last Train from Berlin*: "The German people are not convinced Nazis, not 5% of them". Smith's figures agree with mine, as he takes the percentage of the entire population, whereas I base my statement on the grown-up population only. You will find the same situation with Germans abroad. Here we have as proof the figures published in an official report by an investigating committee of the Argentine Parliament. This Taborda Committee states that out of a total of 230,000 Germans in the Argentine, only 14,000 belong to the "Labor Front", and only 8,000 are members of the Hitler Party. The smaller percentage is explained by the better possibilities of information afforded the Germans in foreign countries.

About the same number, 10% of the German people only, are convinced *anti*-Nazis—without, however, constituting a unified group. On the one wing there are Communists, on the other the members of the "Black Front": between these the Social Democrats, Conservatives, and the important group of religious opposition. The truth that these 10% of anti-Nazis have never weakened in their fight against the Hitler regime is attested by the fact that after ruling for ten years the Gestapo's machine of terror has to be increased in strength from year to year. Without any foreign assistance this inside opposition has conducted the fight against the Hitler regime, and nothing could better illustrate the scope and heroism of their struggle than the figures published by the Socialistic "German People's Aid" in 1939. From 1933 until the end of 1938 more than 12,000 German men and women were murdered by the Hitler regime. In the same period of time, 225,000 German men and women were condemned by the public courts, because of their opposition to the Hitler system, to a total of 600,000 years of hard labor, while more than two million Germans—almost
exclusively Aryans, not Jews — were sent to Hitler's concentration camps and tortured. Those who know how fearful was Himmler's and Heydrich's reign of terror, and who realize that in all the years from 1933 to 1939 the German opposition fought alone against Hitler, without weapons and condemned by the rest of the world, must admit that this resistance provides an epic chapter of the civil war in Europe.

The great majority of the German people—I should say, about 80 per cent—are not politically minded. They are more or less loyal to any form of government so long as this government does not endanger their national existence or their future. Howard Smith describes them correctly as follows: "They are a people frightened stiff as to what fate will befall them if they do not win the mess the Nazis have got them into." It is specially important to note that the German army is recruited out of this unpolitical mass. The Nazis of military age are assembled almost exclusively in the S.S. formations. These have been greatly increased in number and equipment during the last four years.

IV

What, now, are the best means of provoking revolution in Germany? Experience gained during the previous war, and knowledge of the German character indicate the following answer: Aerial bombing and propaganda.

At last, after long doubt and uncertainty, the Democracies have seen that carefully planned, concentrated bombing attacks on a large scale cause the greatest destruction both to civilian morale and to war potential. The effect of material destruction is the same in every country, but the effect on civilian morale differs widely in accordance with the diverse characters and temperaments of those attacked. The food situation, political conditions, and the depressing consciousness of a bad cause help to heighten the effect of bombing raids and undermine morale.

All reports and letters from Germany agree that nothing has such catastrophic effect on the people as the nightmare of R.A.F. attacks. Many hundreds of thousands of civilians, evacuated from the large cities of North and West Germany, have spread tales of horror and have greatly augmented the fear of British attacks among the population. Major Seversky's slogan "Victory through Air Power" is thus justified.

Another weapon that can be used in the immediate offensive is Propaganda. Hitler has for many years demonstrated the
value of this, which he calls his "secret weapon", but the Democ-
racies have largely failed to use it as they might have done.
Conditions have never been more favorable than they now are
to its use. The second year of the war against Russia brought
new victories and conquests of new territories, at least in its
early months, for Hitler, but it ended with the terrible defeat
at Stalingrad. At the same time British and American armies
remained comparatively intact, even grew in strength and equip-
ment, besides gaining valuable time for training. Thus the
German people had been made to realize that prospects of
victory when 1943 opened were worse than they had been in 1942,
just as they were worse in 1942 than in 1941, and in 1941 than
after Dunkirk. In these last days, however, events have turned
every lingering doubt on the matter into a certainty. The an-
nihilating defeat that Rommel’s African Corps suffered at the
hands of the British army marks the turning point of the war.

The German nation was not really aware that it had suffered
defeat in the air battle over Britain in August and September,
1940, because their attacks were only beaten off. But this time
they see that their armies have been hopelessly defeated and
driven to flight, that their generals have been either killed or
taken prisoner, and that the victorious British advance continued
for hundreds of miles. The victory in Egypt was far more than
a local success, more than rescue of Egypt and a threat to Libya.
It opened the door for mighty operations by the American army
in North Africa—that tremendous double-blow which supplied
an answer to the agitation for a "Second Front".

Conscious of the deep continuity of history, one can discern
repetition of the fateful events of the previous war, for it was
from Egypt that the deadly blow was struck in 1918.

I shall never forget how incomprehensible it was for us
officers at the western front that we were suddenly forced into a
continuous retreat, although only a few days earlier—on July
15, 1918—we had for the second time crossed the Marne, and
were nearer to Paris than at any time before. We knew that
our eastern army stood in the Caucasus—in Kiev and Odessa—
and that in only a few weeks’ time winter would bring us a pause
for much needed rest. What we did not know was that in these
same days a British army, led by Lord Allenby and advancing
from Egypt, had broken through the Turkish-German Front
in Palestine, without Ludendorff being able to send a single
soldier to aid the Turks. The next blow the Allies struck was
the advance of the Salonika army in the Balkans against
Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary, again without any possibility for Ludendorff to send even one division to the rescue of the tottering Bulgarians and Austrians. From a purely military standpoint, all this was not of vital importance. The fighting in Palestine was far off, and the entire Allied Salonika army was not stronger than about 300,000 men. But military repercussions were overshadowed by political and moral effects. Turkey collapsed, a few weeks later Bulgaria begged for a separate peace, and again only a few weeks later there was revolution in Germany and Austria.

Note the analogy with events in North Africa. Rommel's defeat, and von Arnim's, put only about four German and between eight and ten Italian divisions out of action. With a total strength of nearly three hundred divisions, the German army would not have suffered seriously from a purely military point of view, if the blow had not fallen at the moment when the German High Command—exactly like Ludendorff—was not in a position to throw in any effective reinforcements. The sole succour that Hitler could offer his weary discouraged troops was in his hysterical phrases, and the officers and men of the German army knew how little they could serve against the armies of Montgomery and Eisenhower. For this reason I think the supreme significance of the Anglo-American offensive now lies in the moral and political sphere.

Politically, Vichy will be forced to a decision that will make the unfortunate French people realize how they stand, and will thus hasten the process of their recovery. But the real deadly blow is at Italy and at German morale. Since the seventh November, 1942, Italy—having lost her empire through Mussolini's criminal policies—knows that defeat is certain. With North Africa in the hands of the Allies, an invasion of Sicily and Southern Italy seems imminent. Only Rome's capitulation can avert this disaster. Tripoli now plays the role which Turkey played in 1918, while the new Salonika army is assembling in Morocco and Algeria, to strike a blow against the weakest part of the Axis. This weakest part now is Italy, as it then was Austria-Hungary. How will these events affect the German people and the German army? From my personal experience in 1918 I know that thousands of German officers and hundreds of thousands of German soldiers and millions of German men and women are feeling just what we felt in those days on the western front: This is the beginning of the end.

1. Written before the recent announcement of a French Liberation Committee.—Editor.
Here it is interesting to note the difference in British and German characters. The British, with perhaps less imagination, have a great store of stubbornness—like a bull dog that bites itself into an opponent and cannot be shaken off. The German, with lively imagination, is prone to ask himself whether the fight he has started shows prospects of success. The moment he realizes that there is no chance of victory, he breaks off the fight, as shown lately in Tunisia. Recall the incident after "Black Friday"—it was again a Friday when Montgomery's army began its offensive—when Ludendorff asked the German government to initiate peace talks within 48 hours. He took this step not because the military situation had become hopeless, but because victory had become hopeless. Compare Churchill's attitude after Dunkirk with this action of Ludendorff, and you will get some idea of how sudden and thorough the revulsion of feeling in the German people and army is bound to be.

Now that German morale is showing strain and the first signs of cracking, the most effective propaganda to transmit in ever varied form would be—Hitler cannot win the war. This truth is already beginning to dawn, and is spreading doubt in Germany. When Germans arrive at its full acceptance, then the 80 per cent unpolitical will instinctively turn from even passive adherence to the Hitler régime, and their whole outlook will undergo radical change. For the Allies this would seem to be the moment to hammer home a second topic into vacillating German minds: With Hitler there can be no Peace. At this stage of commencing disintegration, Allied propaganda should encourage the Germans to act by offering them a possible alternative, if they abandon the Nazi cause, with the assurance: Without Hitler you can have peace and a future, in cooperation with all the democratic countries. For as long as they fear that the United Nations plan annihilation not only of the Nazis but of Germany in its entirety—what Goebbels unceasingly tells them—it is only natural that they should rather defend themselves to the last drop of blood than submit to such a cruel fate. On the other hand, as soon as the German people are convinced that Hitler means the ruin of their country while cooperation with the Democracies means both peace and a future, they will join the cause of the free countries, under the leadership of the actively fighting opposition in their own ranks.

* * * * * *

To aim at such a revolution is in no way inconsistent
with the needful procedure of punishing the guilty. Quite the contrary.

We realize that Hitler and his accomplices are endeavoring to arouse hatred of the entire German nation, by ever greater acts of terror in the occupied countries, and by cruelty towards prisoners of war, so that the real criminals may remain indistinguishable. It is imperative to thwart his diabolic intentions.

In an attempt to create such criminal solidarity between himself and the German people, Hitler said with pathos in his speech of September 30, 1942, "Either all of us must survive victoriously together, or we are destined for extermination together." To this President Roosevelt gave a fitting answer on October 7, when he declared: "It is not the intention of this government or of the governments associated with us to resort to mass reprisals. It is our intention that just and sure punishment shall be meted out to the ringleaders responsible." For the British government Viscount Simon confirmed this statement next day.

The Free German Movement, of which I am chairman, took this position from the very beginning. It was set forth two years ago on page 6 of the pamphlet Free Germany against Hitler in these words:

It is not sufficient to destroy the Nazi system that Hitler has installed in Germany and a great part of Europe; punishment of those responsible is absolutely imperative. The restoration of justice is possible only if we comply with the sense of justice in millions and millions of people, which has been outraged in the past eight years.

The Free German Movement therefore declares that proper legal proceedings will be undertaken against Hitler, Goering, Goebbels and all the leaders of the system, the party, the State and the army, on charges of wholesale murder, arson, embezzlement, etc.

Apart from the punishment of the great criminals, an investigation will also be made of the little henchmen, who have committed or carried out under orders numberless deeds of violence within the Reich, as well as in Poland and Czechoslovakia, in Denmark and Norway, in Belgium and Luxemburg, in Holland and France.

It is in accordance with the eternal demand of justice that the trial should take place where the deed was done. The Free German Movement therefore proclaims that all deeds of violence committed against foreign peoples will be judged by those peoples, and that the criminals will be handed over to the peoples concerned.
Just because we are convinced that the majority of the German people has had no share in these crimes, we disavow all false national solidarity, and demand the restoration of the standards of justice.

Justice and right must be reinstated in the Reich and in the occupied countries, as the precursors of the rule of law and order in Europe. Intense aerial bombardment, supplemented by clear, judicious propaganda, might, I believe, "finish the job" (as Mr. Churchill would say) in 1943.