

A NEW STRATEGY OF WAR AND PEACE

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WITH rare acuteness of perception, the American people have recognized the crucial point of the war in the Pacific. That point is that this war opens up an entirely new chapter in our history. In doing so, it is bound to affect profoundly all the other aspects of this so-called Second world war.

This is not due solely to the entry of the United States into the war. The same event took place during the first world war, without changing materially either the character or the tactical and strategical aspects of that conflict. At the time, American armed might merely served as the additional weight needed by the Allies to push home the final thrust. The military background of the war, the plans, methods, and spheres of action remained the same.

Now, the position is different. The fact that America has entered the European-African war pales before the significance of Japan's mighty assault upon the white man's strongholds in the Pacific Ocean. In short, we are not concerned with a mere extension of belligerent activity to the spheres of two world-powers not so far involved in the struggle. We are confronted by an entirely new war, which happens to coincide with the war in Europe and Africa.

From the historical standpoint, this view seems justified when we consider that Japan's attacks in the Far East began in 1931, two years before Hitler even came to power in Germany, and that Japan had been proclaiming her policy of a "New Order in Asia" for many years before Hitler copied that slogan in Europe.

As far as Japan's actions in the past are concerned, it was only to be expected that she would use for her own ends the political phenomena of the last years—the internal crises in Russia, the irresolute attitude of London, the weakness of the League of Nations in the matter of Abyssinia, Hitler's anti-communist policy, as well as his pact with Stalin, which even led to the brief closing of the Burma Road.

ment there of the puppet-state of Manchukuo. The aims of this policy are: (1) Japanese domination of the Pacific; (2) the acquisition of a Japanese colonial empire, consisting of the Philippines, the Dutch East-Indies, and the Malay Peninsula; (3) the foundation of a "Japanese Commonwealth", which will include not only the puppet-states of Siam and Burma, but also the whole of India.

The realization of this Japanese policy would mean no less than the end of the white man's influence in the East; it would mean the destruction of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and it would be a deadly menace to the economic and political position of the United States.

If this view of the situation is alarming, it is not unnecessarily so. That may be inferred from a few figures. The territories in question are densely populated—480 million Chinese, 360 million Indians, 130 million inhabitants of Indo-China and the Pacific islands, even without the 100 million Japanese and Koreans, make up about 50% of the population of this planet.

Loss of her trade in these parts would be just as severe a blow to England (whose wealth and power are founded upon trade) as the loss of the best markets for her industrial products would be to America. Both countries would be vitally affected, and would have to undergo great structural changes. Besides, the British Commonwealth would hardly outlive the loss of such members as the Malay Peninsula (whose export of Rubber and Tin alone brings Britain 523 million dollars a year), of Burma, and of the "crown-jewel", India.

Furthermore, the changes wrought by such a shifting of the political and economic forces would become more pronounced as the years go by: the raw materials, the markets, all the innumerable sources of power of the Far East, would be at the disposal of Japan, which would thus become the most powerful empire on earth. That would be the end of the dominant position of the white race and the Christian civilization.

It is necessary for us to face these larger issues of the war in the Pacific, in order, first, to come to a clear evaluation of current events, and secondly, to find the right strategy for this war and the peace which will follow it. There is no foundation for the widespread belief that this new war is only an extension

"common front of the Allied nations", Russia has taken no steps towards attacking the "common enemy". Yet, she alone of all the Allied countries is in the right geographical and strategical position for such an attack.

Diplomatic tactics, and perhaps, too, the desire to be polite to a friendly nation, have persuaded the democratic press to drop enquiries as to a possible Russian action from Vladivostok. At present, the press no longer even asks why Moscow does not at least place her Siberian airdromes at the disposal of the United States, since those are the only bases which would permit steady and powerful attacks upon Japanese industrial centres.

This amount of consideration, however, jeopardizes the true interests of the nations involved. They have a right to insist upon an absolutely clear view of their tasks, and of the danger they are in.

Regardless of whether a future Japanese attack upon Vladivostok will enforce Russian solidarity with the Allied cause, it will be imperative to remember that the loss of Hong-Kong and Wake Island, the impending loss of the Philippines, and the fate of Malaya, though actively caused by the Japanese attack, are in no small way due to Russian "neutrality". (One cannot help remembering Russia's attitude towards Poland, in 1939 . . .)

It is equally important to remember that this Russian attitude is not a perfidious one. It emanates from the fact that the two wars are in no way identical, and that they affect Russia's interests differently. For, while Russia must at any price resist German aggression in the West, her position in the East would not be endangered by the expulsion of British and American interests from the Pacific. The contrary would, in fact, be the case. Russia would gain tremendous spheres of influence, both economic and political, in China and in India, from which she is excluded at present by Great Britain and America. Even the more or less peaceful acquisition of Afghanistan and Baluchistan, which would afford her an outlet to the Indian Ocean, might be envisaged by Russia.

Japan, on her part, is not interested in adding a fifth enemy to the formidable four she is facing already.

For these reasons, it is only logical that the discussions in Washington were limited to agreements between the British

This view of the revolutionary significance of the war in the Pacific, a view so far expressed only by the instinctive reaction of America, and by the Australian press, is further confirmed when one regards the European-African conflict in the light of the latest events.

Up to now, Allied strategy in this theatre of war was aimed more or less at leading the Axis powers into a war of exhaustion. This strategy resigned itself to the fact that the well-prepared war-machine of the dictators would be launched into one or several major offensives every year, hoping to resist them, accepting, if necessary, territorial losses, in the knowledge that even the Nazi energy must eventually exhaust itself.

Hitler's costly assault upon Russia, accompanied as it was by the heaviest losses the German Army has had so far in both quantity and quality of men and materiel, gave rise to the hope on the part of the Allies that a combined Russian-British-American army might successfully invade Germany—if not in 1942, then in 1943, 44, or even in 1945.

Obvious and justified as such a strategy may have been before December 7, 1941, subsequent events have so changed the situation that it has become a dangerous, not to say, a fatal plan. For it is this very strategy Japan needs in order to make her conquests, and to render them impregnable against a future Allied assault.

The enormous sacrifices, both of an economic and of a financial nature, already made by the democracies have demonstrated how expensive even a defensive war against Germany and Italy can be. How much more will it cost them not only to hold out in the defensive for another two or three years, but to take the offensive against Germany in Europe? The prospect becomes still more serious when we consider, for instance, that Vichy and, more especially, Spain, might participate actively in the "defence of Europe", or that Hitler might employ the Bulgarian Army, as yet hardly touched by the war, to make a bid for Mosul, or to launch an attack upon the Suez Canal.

Another point worthy of consideration is that in a long war the financial burdens carried by the democracies are several times as great as those of the dictatorships, because the wages, the pay of the soldiers, and the civilian standard of living, all are much higher than in the Axis countries. In spite of all this.

But—how would this strategy affect the situation in the Far East?

The concentration of British and American efforts upon the war in Europe, especially if accompanied by a continued Russian neutrality in the Far Eastern war, would most certainly result in the loss of the Allied positions in the Pacific. The Philippines would fall, as did Guam and Wake, Singapore would go the way of Hong-Kong,¹ and, after weeks and months of battle, the great and rich territories of the Dutch East-Indies would fall prey to the Japanese. Remembering that the gigantic construction program of the U. S. Navy will not be finished before 1944, and basing our view of the situation upon the course of the war up to now, we can regard as a moral certainty that in another six months Japan would be in possession of all the territories that have so far been under attack, and that the Imperial armies would be at the gates of Australia and India.

Adherents of the strategy of exhaustion would probably accept this course, comforted by the thought that in 1943 the Allied armies would take the offensive in Europe and would perhaps camp in Berlin in 1944. This is a prospect which may appeal to the imagination of a frenzied mob. The responsible leaders of the democracies, however, are more concerned with the question: "Does that mean we have won the war?"

The triumphal entry into Berlin, even the partitioning of Germany, would not compensate Great Britain and America for the loss of their interests in the Far East, interests of infinite importance for their entire mode of existence. Thus would arise the task of reconquering the positions without which neither the British Commonwealth of Nations nor the American way of life can survive.

The leaders of the Allied armed forces, who are at present barely able to ward off the furious Japanese assault, would then—after a long and exhausting campaign—be confronted with the impossible task of carrying the war back to the Japanese, who meanwhile would have had plenty of time to fortify their newly-won positions. This task would be made still more difficult by the fact that, once Japan has conquered the territories now under attack, she can count on a *de facto* armistice—especially if the democracies were to concentrate their energies on the conflict in Europe and Africa. (Another Russo-Japanese war alone could alter the situation; but that, if it is to be had at all,

the outbreak of the war in the Pacific demands the formulation of a new strategical plan for the war in Europe.

It should be the aim of this strategy to bring the war in Europe to a victorious end, as soon as possible, and with a minimum of energy, in order to strike back at Japan immediately, without having first exhausted part of the Allied strength in Europe. It is imperative to strike back fast and hard in the East, because the chances of ousting the Japanese will diminish with the years, and, let us not mince words,—upon the re-establishment of the Allied predominance in the Pacific depends the future of our civilization, the future of our race.

In order to reach this goal, the Allies must now turn to that "political" strategy which is called for by the nature of the war in Europe. Up to the present, the democracies have been remarkably blind to the fact that this European war is not a "war of nations" but a "war of ideas". They have refused stubbornly to see that it was only the realization and utilization of this fact that made possible Hitler's victories in Europe.

For more than ten years, my friends and I have tried—as have a number of far-seeing men in all countries—to show the democratic peoples and politicians that Europe was and is undergoing an ideological war of the first order, a war in which the frontline cuts across nations and classes alike, and does not even respect family ties. Hitler has made use of this fact very cleverly: only thus is it possible to explain the phenomenon of the Quislings (Norway), Musert (Holland), Degrelles (Belgium), Déat (France), Mosley (England), Hacha (Czechoslovakia), Tiso (Slovakia), Pavelic (Croatia), Neditch (Serbia), etc., etc.

It explains also why it is that millions of Germans and Italians regard the interests of the democracies as their own, and why it is that they have fought for years, untiringly and heroically, a terrible battle against those in authority over their countries.

Recognition of this fact is the key to the present situation. It is also the key to victory!

No less an authority than Mr. Churchill said in his Washington speech that the Allies would not be able, militarily, to take the offensive before 1943, even in Europe. Therefore, they must take the offensive, politically. The nations of Europe—belligerents and neutrals alike—must be persuaded that their own future and their own happiness stand and fall with an

and well-being depend upon the victory of the democracies, and not on Hitler and Mussolini.

If the Allies succeed in separating the majority of Germans from the Hitler régime, if they succeed in winning the active support of that majority for the cause of Freedom, a quick Allied victory in the European conflict is assured. This quick victory will not only keep Allied losses at a minimum: it will permit a quick (and therefore less costly) re-conquest of their lost possessions in Asia. Only when those territories are once again in Allied hands, only then have the Allies won the war.

Besides, this course is the surest—and possibly the only one—if the Allies are to *win the Peace as well*.

I am speaking not as a German, but as a diligent student of History, when I say: "A true peace is achieved only if the conditions merit the consent of the vanquished. Everything else is an armistice."

However, there are not a few people who have less regard for the lessons History teaches us than they have for the gratification of an understandable desire for vengeance. They are asked once again to turn their eyes towards the Far East, and to visualize the connexion between the revolutionary changes in progress there and the coming European peace.

Only a true pacification of Europe, the creation of a "European Federation" that adopts the principles of the Papal New Year's message, will alleviate the terrible hardships this two-fold European war has brought upon the Western Nations.

Only a healthy, peaceful, and amicable Europe can give the Anglo-Saxon Union the support it must have in order to keep its position in the world.

Only the political, economic, and cultural collaboration of the European Federation with the British Commonwealth and the United States can maintain the fundamentals of our civilization and can assure for the world the peace it so urgently needs.

It is possible that passionate hatred has blinded the eyes of European peoples and politicians to these facts, or that they are too much involved with the conventional strategies of War and Peace.

Therefore it is for the American nation to put into practice the thing of which it already feels the need instinctively. America must create the new strategy, based upon an all-out political