CAN CANADA REMAIN NEUTRAL?

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In international affairs to-day it is becoming increasingly true that the difference between a pessimist and an optimist is that a pessimist believes another world war will probably break out in about two years' time, while an optimist believes its outbreak can probably be postponed for about eight years. This is not to say there is general agreement that the outbreak of war before 1943 is inevitable—merely that it is probably inevitable. In other words the expectancy of peace, given her present state of galloping deterioration, is not more than eight years.

Under such circumstances the only people who are in a position to be cheerful are the communists and the "die-hard" conservatives, since both agree that it is fantastic to expect permanent peace in the present world. The prerequisite to the establishment of a peace world is a social revolution, according to the communists, and a change of heart according to the "die-hards". Both are therefore in a position to say to-day to those who since the war have hoped and worked for world peace, "I told you so". The peace-workers are too busy thinking out a new policy to have time to retort. For seeing that the chances of success in the struggle against war are so slight, the peace-workers in most countries are beginning to realize that it would be the height of stupidity for them not to have a plan in case of failure. The peace-workers are preparing for war.

In Great Britain most of them are preparing for war by supporting a strengthening of the sanctions of the League, and by trying to persuade the British people that their government should pledge itself to take part in applying those sanctions against an aggressor (meaning Germany). The British peace movement is going militarist. In the United States most of the peace-workers are asking themselves the question—If a world war cannot be prevented, how can we prevent the United States from being involved in that world war? The American peace movement is going isolationist.

The not unnatural result is that the Canadian peace movement is galloping off rapidly in both directions. When the strain becomes too great, the movement will probably split in two. We
shall have a League of Nations Society which will be all out for sanctions, and a Canadian Neutrality League which will be all out for Canadian isolation. The Canadian Neutrality League will not be without influential support. Possible honorary presidents are Senator McRae, Mr. Bourassa and Mr. Woodsworth. The difficulty which a Neutrality League will encounter will not be in obtaining honorary presidents, but in working out a neutrality programme for Canada.

The question whether Canada can remain neutral is so complicated that, to begin with, it would be advisable to simplify it to this—Can Canada remain neutral in the event of Great Britain becoming involved in a major war? To this question there are at least four different aspects. There is first of all the question, Has Canada the legal or constitutional right to remain neutral if Great Britain is at war? Secondly, Will public opinion in Canada permit a Canadian government to remain neutral and so to refuse assistance to a Great Britain who may be fighting with her back to the wall? Thirdly, suppose public opinion in Canada supports a declaration of neutrality, what steps should the government take to ensure that that neutrality is maintained? The United States declared its neutrality in August, 1914; it was apparently supported in that action by ninety per cent of the American people. Yet two and a half years later the United States entered the war. How is Canada to ensure that a Canadian declaration of neutrality in, say, August, 1937, will not be followed by a Canadian declaration of war in April, 1940? Finally, what immediate changes are involved for Canada in the adoption of a neutrality policy?

I. The Constitutional Right of Neutrality.

The beauty about the first question—Has Canada to-day the legal or constitutional right to remain neutral if Great Britain is at war?—is that there is apparently no answer to it. Our British Commonwealth is so full of anomalies that there appears to be no good legal or constitutional reason why the King in Great Britain should not be at war while the King in Canada is at peace. Professor W. P. M. Kennedy holds that the enactment of recent legislation by South Africa gives the Governor-General of South Africa power, on the advice of his ministers, to proclaim South Africa neutral, even though the King on the advice of his United Kingdom ministers has declared war*. If this is so, then Canada, if she wants

to remain neutral, should pass legislation similar to that already passed in South Africa.

The isolationists, however, should make assurance doubly sure by demanding that an imperial conference be called to make it clear to the world that any self-governing part of the Commonwealth has the right to remain neutral in a war in which another part is engaged. Having made this declaration, the conference can then, like the conference of 1926, appoint a committee of constitutional lawyers to work out the proper method of getting this right recognized by international law. Since, following the Japanese precedent, wars will probably not be called wars in future, the declaration must be drafted to cover not only war, but also any resort to force as an instrument of national or international policy.

In order to establish on the most unmistakable terms its possession of all aspects of sovereignty, the Irish Free State may demand that the constituent parts of the Commonwealth shall have the right to make war on each other and still remain in the Commonwealth. This reduction of the Commonwealth to an absurdity should be resisted as doctrinaire. A good case can, of course, be made out for saying that the right of neutrality is also doctrinaire. It is obvious that if a Dominion remained neutral in a major British war, if she refused to give assistance to a Great Britain who, as in the last war, felt that she was fighting with her back to the wall, the ultimate effect of her neutrality in anything but a very short war would be her secession from the Empire. For the bitterness of feeling which arose in Great Britain against a neutral United States in the early years of the last war would be as nothing compared to the bitterness which would arise in Great Britain against a neutral Canada in the next war. Even if the British government itself remained polite, it would be very difficult to prevent newspapers and public speakers in Great Britain from uttering charges of bad faith and cowardice against Canada. These charges would arouse resentment in Canada, and with mutual recrimination the legal tie between the two countries would be snapped.

A Canadian declaration of neutrality in any major British war, except perhaps a very short one, means the secession of Canada from the Empire. To ask the other countries of the Empire and the other countries of the world to give legal recognition to the right of neutrality, is equivalent, therefore, to asking them to give legal recognition to the right of secession, and it can be argued that there is not much point in doing this. For if a Canadian or South African government wanted to secede, it is most im-
probable that a United Kingdom government would use force to try to prevent it. That is to say, Canada and South Africa have to-day the actual power to secede. The acquisition of a legal right to secede would not make any appreciable difference, and would be difficult to get, because it would involve a dangerous precedent especially in India.

If then the right of secession is doctrinaire, why is the right of neutrality not doctrinaire? The reason is that not everyone in Canada or South Africa would recognize that neutrality probably involved secession. Many people might therefore support their government in a declaration of neutrality though they would not support it in a declaration of independence. The chances of their being persuaded to do this are increased if the right of neutrality is a constitutionally recognized principle in British Commonwealth relations.

One has only to imagine a political campaign fought on this issue to see how useful a constitutional recognition of the right of neutrality would be to Canadian isolationists. If Great Britain became involved in a major war to-morrow, Canadians who advocated that Canada should remain neutral would be met by the following, among other arguments: “The enemy nations won't pay any attention to it. They will treat us as part of the Empire”; and “Great Britain will consider it an act of secession”. The recognition by imperial and international law of the right of neutrality would destroy most of the usefulness of both these arguments.

II. Canadian Public Opinion and a Neutrality Policy.

At this point in the argument someone may well say: “All very interesting. But what is the use of discussing the steps which Canada should take in order to remain neutral, when the Canadian people don’t want to remain neutral, and there is not the slightest possibility of persuading them to change their minds until they have gone through another war? If there is only a hundred to one chance of preventing another world war, there is probably only a thousand to one chance of preventing Canada from participating in another world war. You would therefore be spending your time much more usefully if you worked out plans for taking the profit out of the next war, and for making certain that if men are conscripted, there is also conscription of wealth. Or if you want to keep out of danger yourself, you ought to be making plans either to take to the woods or else to get a job in the war-time ministry of propaganda and public enlightenment”.
This criticism may be well-founded. But there is no way of proving whether it is well-founded. The only thing we can say with reasonable certainty about Canadian public opinion on foreign affairs is that we do not know what policy will receive the support of a majority of the people in the event of a crisis. The only scientific attitude on the question is agnosticism. Advocates of neutrality have about as much justification in assuming that, given proper leadership, the people will support them in the event of a crisis, as the imperialists have in believing that they will once again rally to the side of Great Britain, or as the League of Nations enthusiasts have in believing that they will support the application by Canada of sanctions against an aggressor. But though it is impossible to be dogmatic on the subject, it is possible to make certain comparisons between the attitude of the Canadian public in 1914 and possible public attitudes to-day towards Canadian participation in a major British war. Most of these comparisons tell in favour of the isolationists, though how much they tell is a different matter.

In the first place, two-fifths of the voters in Canada to-day are under thirty-five. They were born between 1900 and 1914. They came to maturity in a mental atmosphere which has been rapidly becoming completely different from that in which their older brothers and sisters, their parents and grandparents had been brought up. These previous generations, as Arnold Toynbee pointed out in the introduction to his Survey of International Affairs for 1931, “could look back in their personal experience, within the span of their own lifetimes, to a previous state of economic prosperity and political security that had never been equalled in any earlier chapters in the long histories of their respective civilizations”. They had been brought up in an atmosphere in which institutions and traditions were secure if not sacred. The youngest members of the post-war generation were coming to maturity in a mental atmosphere in which, for the first time in seventeen centuries, Western minds were contemplating the possibility of a spontaneous internal disintegration of Western Civilization. Though no doubt only a few of the post-war generation consciously realized this, yet many of them must have come across prophecies similar to that made by Mr. Stanley Baldwin in 1926:

Who in Europe does not know that one more war in the West and the civilization of the ages will fall with as great a shock as that of Rome?
And even those to whom such remarks have not percolated know that the twentieth century has already seen the crash of three empires.

In the light of all this, is it not reasonable to expect that the members of the post-war generation have become so inured to crisis that they would view with much greater equanimity than those who were of the same age in 1914 Canadian neutrality in an Empire war, leading to Canadian secession from the Empire, leading perhaps in its turn to a break-up of the whole Commonwealth, and Canadian dependence upon the United States? After all, when one is told that a whole civilization is crashing, one not unnaturally looks upon the wreck of an empire as no great matter. This might be how it would strike the more intellectual of the younger generation. The less intellectual might meet an appeal to rally to the help of the old Motherland with indifference, and a warning that secession meant ultimate annexation to the United States with the refrain “Who’s afraid of the big, bad wolf”?

Nor must one discount the amazing influence on Canadian thought of Beverley Nicholls and the other assailants of the private manufacture of arms. If Great Britain gets involved in war, we may be surprised to discover the number of Canadians who will say that it is due to her own fault in refusing to suppress the “traffickers in blood”. Others will say she can stew in her own juice because it is her own fault in refusing to suppress Sir John Simon. Others, and they will constitute probably a majority in the C.C.F., that the war is an imperialist ramp, a struggle between rival capitalists, and that Canada should have nothing to do with it. This cry would, of course, lose a good deal of its effectiveness if Great Britain under a Labour government were fighting in alliance with the Soviet Union against a Nazi Germany. Canadian imperialists should contribute heavily to the election funds of the British Labour Party. By so doing they may save Canada for the Empire.

Another consideration must also be taken into account before we assume that it would be impossible in the event of a crisis to rally a majority of the Canadian people to a policy of neutrality. War came in 1914 to a Canada which had received during the previous ten years an enormous number of immigrants from the British Isles, so many that in August 1914 they probably constituted about an eighth of the non-French voters in the country. These immigrants had not had time to become Canadianized. When war broke out, the response of most of them must have been automatic, for Great Britain was still their native land.

If war should come again, it will come to a Canada which has received during the last ten years only a trickle of immigration from
the British Isles. Recent immigrants from Great Britain now number probably less than a thirtieth of the non-French voters. Moreover, unlike the pre-war immigrants, many of those who have emigrated from Great Britain to Canada since the war were members of the British Labour Party, and their response to an appeal for assistance from a British government, if it were of Conservative complexion, might not be in the least automatic.

Finally, it is to be expected that the United States will not enter a major European war for some months or even years after its outbreak. At the commencement of a major war (provided it is a European one) public opinion in the United States will be strongly in favour of isolation. The Canadian air will be full of broadcasts denouncing any suggestion that the United States should participate. Father Coughlin will make his appeal to one audience in the United States and Canada; Professor Charles A. Beard and Mr. Raymond Leslie Buell will make their appeal to another audience in the United States and Canada. President Roosevelt, or his successor, may give a talk to the firesides of North America asking for neutrality in thought, word, and deed. The influence of all this may do much to counteract the Canadian daily newspapers, which, with few exceptions, will probably come out for Canadian participation on the side of Great Britain.

It is therefore not possible to dismiss with a shrug of the shoulder the possibility that a well-organized Canadian neutrality movement might not win the support of a majority of the Canadian people. Presumably such a movement could count on the almost unanimous support of the French Canadians, and they constitute twenty-eight per cent of the population. The only thing which might prevent French Canada from rallying to a neutrality standard would be if it felt that by so doing it would become isolated from the rest of Canada. In order to get the almost unanimous support of the French Canadians, a Canadian neutrality movement would only have to assure them that it had substantial support from the English-speaking parts of the Dominion—and that support it could in all likelihood secure.

III. The Outlines of a Neutrality Policy for War Time.

During the past twelve months a very important discussion has been taking place in the United States on the preparations which that country should now make if she intends to preserve her neutrality in another major war. This discussion is of the very greatest importance to Canadian advocates of neutrality. Many Canadians who favour neutrality for Canada seem to believe...
that all that Canada has to do to keep out of war is to make a declaration of neutrality and possibly a declaration of independence. They forget that the United States found that a declaration of neutrality made in 1914 and a declaration of independence made in 1776 did not keep her out of the last war, and that the Scandinavian countries which did manage to keep out of the last war did much more than merely carry out their legal obligations as neutrals.

A Canadian neutrality policy cannot be copied direct from Scandinavian or United States models; for, unlike the Scandinavian powers, Canada is not next door to the possible sphere of conflict, and unlike the United States she is not a great power. But from a study of Scandinavian and United States experience we may be able to work out a policy fitted to Canadian conditions.

Canadian isolationists should therefore read with care the article by Mr. Charles Warren in Foreign Affairs for April, 1934.* For this article, outlining the policy the United States should follow if it wants to remain neutral, has been making history for twelve months. Mr. Warren was able to prove fairly conclusively that the United States could remain neutral in a major war only if it was willing to pay a very high price for its neutrality—a price paid by the endurance of so-called stains on the national honour, and by the foregoing of opportunities to make profit. By putting the price so high Mr. Warren apparently thought he had reduced to absurdity the concept of United States neutrality in a major war. But he cannot to-day have much hope of this; for in December, 1934, the State Department in Washington started to make a survey of the question; in March, 1935, when it hesitated to support immediate adoption of new legislation, President Roosevelt informally requested the Nye Munitions Committee of the Senate to take the lead in the movement for legislation on the subject; now individual members of the Committee are beginning to outline the first steps of a programme designed to keep the United States from being driven into another war, and these first steps are based on the proposals made a year ago by Mr. Warren.

Mr. Charles Warren, as assistant attorney-general of the United States from August, 1914, to April, 1917, was charged with enforcing United States neutrality laws and obligations, and with investigating and prosecuting all hostile activities of belligerents in the United States so far as the Department of Justice was concerned. As he says himself, he “was therefore placed in a position in which a clear comprehension was to be had of what steps the

* Reprinted as International Conciliation Pamphlet, No. 301, (June, 1934.)
United States would be obliged to take in a future war, if it expected to keep out of such a war”. His main thesis is as follows:

There is no magic in the word “neutrality” as a protection to us against war. In fact, the very condition of neutrality engenders frictions which nowadays are likely eventually to implicate a powerful neutral in any war in which the great powers may be engaged (especially if one of those powers happen to be a naval power)...

Belligerent disregard of rights growing out of neutrality is very likely to drive the neutral straight into war. And even full and rigid compliance by a neutral with its legal obligations may constitute an irritant to one or the other of the belligerents, and be a means of involving it in the war; for, by reason of geographical or other conditions differently affecting opposing belligerents, an obligation imposed by international law upon a neutral frequently operates in such a way as to render a country, while technically neutral, an aid in fact to the one side as against the other.

Hence, in the future, in order to keep out of war, it will be necessary...for the United States to do far more than merely comply with its legal obligations of neutrality. In order to avoid friction and complications with the belligerents, it must be prepared to impose upon the actions of its citizens greater restrictions than international law requires. It must also be prepared to relinquish many rights which it has heretofore claimed and asserted, and to yield to contentions by belligerents hitherto denied by it, with respect to interference with the trade and travel of its citizens on the high seas, if the interests of the belligerents seem to them so to require.

One of the first of the specific proposals advocated by Mr. Warren is that upon the outbreak of war the government should forbid its citizens to sell or supply arms and ammunition to all belligerents. His argument is that if one belligerent has control of the high seas and the other has not, a neutral can sell munitions to only one belligerent. Suppose, for example, that Great Britain is fighting Germany. Free shipments of munitions from a neutral Canada to all belligerents will mean in fact shipment only to Great Britain and her allies, and when the Germans see their soldiers killed by Canadian-manufactured armament, they will inevitably become infuriated against Canada. Some critics will say that it is impossible to define arms and ammunition. Mr. Warren, however, holds that it is possible to define in a statute the words, munitions of war; and though it is difficult to draw the line, “it is sales of such munitions as cannons, shells, explosives, bombs, machine guns, cartridges and the like which...will give rise to the bitterest resentment by belligerents and which resentments will be obviated by the proposed legislation.”
Another proposal is that the government should forbid the public floating of loans within the country by a belligerent government. This will not only avert frictions and resentments in belligerent countries, but it will also lessen "the possibility of pressure being brought by our own citizens upon our government to enter the war on the side of a belligerent to whom the bulk of such loans shall have been made". "Denmark in the Great War, it may be noted, penalized any person publicly inviting participation in a State loan of a belligerent".

A third proposal is that the government should, in the event of a major war, refuse passports to its citizens travelling in war zones, or upon the high seas. This will make it clear that any citizen travelling in war zones or upon the high seas does so at his own risk, and need expect neither protection from his government nor protest from it if he is killed. In order to make it less likely that the boat in which he is travelling at his own risk will be sub­marined, and he drowned, and public opinion at home aroused, the government should forbid its citizens to travel as passengers or members of the crew on any ship, whether belligerent or domestic, carrying arms or munitions of war, or armed whether for defence or offence with cannon, or which has emplacements for cannon. "It will not be wise to run the risk of another Lusitania complication".

Finally, the government should declare on the outbreak of war that any citizen who trades with a belligerent does so at his own risk, the government having no intention of contending for any neutral rights of trade. "It is better that our citizens should run the risk of commercial loss than that the country should be involved in a war to protect their alleged commercial rights".

It must also be remembered that Canadian neutrality in a British war would probably mean, under the terms of the Foreign Enlistment Act, that Canadian citizens would be forbidden to take service in the armed forces of any belligerent including, of course, Great Britain. If this prohibition were not covered by existing legislation, a Canadian neutrality act would have to include it, for as Mr. Warren points out, "the extent to which American citizens enlisted in belligerent armies, notably in the French and Canadian forces", did much to arouse hostile sentiment against the United States in the Central Powers. "Denmark wisely made it a crime for one of its citizens 'to take service in the armed forces of any belligerent.' The neutrality act should also forbid the agents of a belligerent to enlist new recruits within Canada or to assemble and despatch abroad reservists from Canada. These measures are
very important, for if we are to remain neutral, we must try as far as possible to prevent the emotions of Canadians from being aroused, and there is no surer way of arousing people's emotions than by permitting their relatives or friends to fight and be killed in the service of a belligerent.

IV. An Immediate Neutrality Policy.

The adoption by Canada of a neutrality policy will involve certain immediate changes in Canadian policy. In the first place, the Canadian government should ask parliament to approve a declaration that Canada intends to remain neutral in all future wars, whoever the belligerents may be. Possibly it will be necessary to make an exception for a war involving the invasion of Canadian territory.

In order that this declaration should be effective in removing any moral obligation, under which we may at present be, to come to Great Britain's assistance in the event of war, its sincerity must be made manifest by certain changes in the machinery for inter-Commonwealth consultation on matters of defence. Since, for instance, there will no longer be any eventuality in which it will be necessary, as at present, for British and Canadian armed forces to co-operate "with the least possible delay and the greatest efficiency", there will be no necessity for Canadian defence forces to use "the organization, equipment, establishments, and training manuals issued by the Admiralty, War Office, and Air Ministry of the United Kingdom". There will be no point in having "a Canadian Air Liaison Officer in London, with offices at the Air Ministry", nor for the staff of the Ministry of National Defence in Canada to correspond direct with the staffs of the service departments in the United Kingdom, nor yet for the chiefs of staff of the British and Canadian services to exchange periodic liaison letters. Certainly it would become a waste of time for Canadian officers or civil servants to receive training at the Imperial Defence College "in the broadcast aspects of the higher Imperial strategy" and in elaboration of plans "for the co-operation of forces in different parts of the world in the face of common emergencies".*

Another outward and visible sign of Canada's conversion to a policy of isolation would be the entire or virtual disbandment of her land defence forces—that is, her permanent force and her militia; for as the editor of the Canadian Defence Quarterly has demonstrated in admirably lucid articles, once we rule out the

possibility of participation in overseas wars, the only function of Canadian defence forces is the preservation of Canadian neutrality, and in such a scheme of national defence there is scarcely any rôle for our land forces to play. Our naval and air forces should be able, with perhaps a slight increase in strength, to guard our coasts against attack from an overseas foe and thus to safeguard our neutrality.

Perhaps if we want to keep out of war we should disarm completely, and not remain content with a mere disbandment of our land forces. For if we start building up an air force to defend the British Columbia coast against a violation of its neutrality by Japan, there is no telling in what mad armament race it will end, if advances in technique increase very considerably the range of aeroplanes, cruisers and submarines. Probably, therefore, we had better rely quite frankly on the United States protecting our shores in order to protect her own. In any event we cannot build up a defence force capable of defending our neutrality against the United States; and if the Americans want to pass through our territory in order to attack Japan, we would be well advised to emulate Luxembourg rather than Belgium.

The acceptance by Canada of a neutrality policy may very well affect our trade by causing a reversal of the tendency towards closer imperial economic union which was begun at Ottawa in 1932. The Ottawa Agreements and this declaration of future neutrality may not go well together. They certainly will not go well together if part of the price Canada paid for the Ottawa Agreements was an indefinite obligation to come to the assistance of Great Britain in war.

Even if Great Britain is willing to continue to make trade bargains with a country which is going to be neutral in her next great war, it would probably be as well for Canada to seek to encourage her trade to move north and south rather than across the oceans. We do not want the North Atlantic route to become too important to our trade. The British government found it very difficult to keep that line of communication open during the last war. They may find it even more difficult in the next. The greater the importance to Canada of her trans-Atlantic trade, the greater the dislocation to her economic life, if war interferes with that trade.

Moreover, we should take to heart the warning of a Canadian military expert writing recently in The Army Quarterly. From internal evidence it seems clear that this anonymous expert is the editor of the Canadian Defence Quarterly, Colonel K. Stuart.
Colonel Stuart (if it is indeed he) has been arguing in this article that Canada cannot be expected to contribute to the defence of the North Atlantic route, because though "the security of the North-Atlantic route is vital to the national existence of the United Kingdom... it is not so as yet to Canada". He goes on, however, to say that if the proportion of Canada's trade passing over the North-Atlantic route becomes greater, if it thus "becomes of vital material interest to the Canadian producers, middleman and consumer that the North-Atlantic sea-line of communications be secure, then... the whole problem of Canada's defence is altered accordingly".* If we are trying to embrace a policy of isolation, we most assuredly do not want to see the whole problem of Canadian defence altered in this manner. A declaration of our intention to remain neutral in future wars should therefore be followed by strenuous efforts to conclude far-reaching trade agreements with the United States, and with the other American countries. The building up of trade connections with Mexico and the Central and South American countries will be very valuable if war in Europe or Asia makes it difficult for the European powers or Japan to maintain their transoceanic trade, for these trade connections will make it easier for our exporters to take the place of their European or Japanese competitors in American markets. Part of the gains which these exporters make will probably last only for the duration of the war; but a considerable part should be permanent, and will make up to Canada to some extent for the trade losses she will incur because of the general impoverishment of the world by war.

There still remains to be discussed what changes, if any, should be made in Canada's relations with the League of Nations, if a Canadian neutrality policy is to be made effective. At present if the League Council decides by a unanimous vote that a certain state has committed aggression, and if it requests the members of the League to apply economic sanctions against the aggressor state, and if the Canadian government agrees with that decision, Canada is under an obligation to participate in applying those economic and financial sanctions. At most this might mean that Canada would sever all trade and financial relations between Canada and the aggressor country.

The point that should be particularly noted is that Canada has the right to decide for herself whether or not she will take part in League sanctions. If the Canadian government thinks

* Canada and Imperial Defence, by "Canuck", *The Army Quarterly*, July, 1933, p. 244.
that the Council has decided wrongly, Canada is under no obligation and can wash her hands of the whole business.

A violation of the Covenant of the League might conceivably be so flagrant that no Canadian government, acting in good faith, could possibly maintain that the Council of the League had given a wrong decision. Therefore Canada, if she is to stay in the League and yet adopt a policy of isolation, must make it a condition of her remaining in the League that she be under no obligation to assist in applying sanctions against an aggressor country. If the other members of the League are willing to accept Canada as a member on this understanding, there will be no reason for the isolationists to advocate Canada’s resignation. If the other members of the League are not willing to accept this Canadian reservation to the Covenant, Canada will have to give notice of withdrawal from the League.

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To sum up. If Canada wants to remain neutral in the next great war in which Great Britain is involved, the Canadian government should, as soon as possible, issue a declaration approved of by parliament, stating that Canada is resolved to maintain her neutrality in all future wars whoever the belligerents may be. Canada should then pass status acts similar to the South African acts, and should demand from the next imperial conference formal recognition of the right of neutrality. There should be passed through parliament a stringent neutrality act, the enforcement of which should be mandatory upon the government in the event of the outbreak of a major war. The existing machinery for consultation with Great Britain on matters of defence should be scrapped, and we should either reorganize our defence policy and arrangements, or disarm completely. Finally, we should attempt so to reorganize our national economic life that our trans-oceanic trade shall become relatively less and less important.

These measures, if supported by a strong public opinion which is prepared to face their implications, may make it possible for us to preserve our neutrality in a British war. If the United States gets involved in a major war, we should endeavour to enforce our neutrality act; but we should recognize that if the United States wants to infringe our neutrality, there is nothing we can do about it except to send a note to Washington.