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THE Premier of France, like Mr. Lloyd George, Lord Birkenhead, and other political chieftains, has been "drifting into journalism." But his article in *Foreign Affairs* seems to have been composed before he was called to the responsibilities of office. It aims at setting forth "the fundamental programme of the French Radicals against the day when they will once again be called to power."

M. Herriot is concerned that the name "Radical" may not be misunderstood. Americans, he has found, tend to think of this as signifying extremist, if not anarchistic, purposes. But in general complexion the Radical Party in France is like the Liberal Party in England. Its spokesman tells us that, in the first place, it will insist on the payment of reparations by Germany for the wrong she did. To tolerate "the immoral spectacle of a Germany exonerated from her debts" would be false to the very spirit of that group which takes as the keystone of its political edifice "the introduction of morality into politics." Thus M. Herriot adopts the high ground that the problem of reparations is not just a problem in economics or finance. Punishment is a duty. Forgiveness, one would almost gather from his argument, would be a vice.

But the motive on which France should act must be kept pure from any taint of chauvinism. To seek the destruction of Germany would be stupid from the point of view either of morals or of politics, and—as Napoleon proved once for all—a people *cannot* be destroyed. French policy, this writer regrets to admit, has so far failed to distinguish as it should have distinguished between the Germany of the Junkers and that democratic Germany which is still very weak, but which should be helped to gather its forces. The roots of German de-

mocracy are indeed, he confesses, far from deep. The overturn of 1918 was provoked by discouragement and weakness; it was not the result of a change of heart. But its feeble beginnings should be stimulated, not repressed. And those who seek to dispel the shadow of Bismarck need have no quarrel with the heirs of Goethe or Beethoven.

Passing to relations between France and England, M. Herriot points out how these two nations, while differing profoundly in their "systems of national ethics," are complementary to each other, and how their mutual accord is indispensable for the establishment of world peace. For that project of peace is, above all, a project of education. Like a fleet, justice and peace need "bases of support." And, since the thirteenth century at least, "England has been the bulwark of modern law." French and English liberal thinkers laid the basis for that constitutional régime founded on human reason and on belief in human progress. This is to-day the common creed of all democracies, and those who combined to establish it must combine also to support it whether against monarchy or against communism or against "doubtful republicanism."

For, in M. Herriot's view, the European conflict at present is between democracy and dictatorship. The new-born Greek Republic and the young Turks of Angora are examples of that democratic impulse which the older free nations will do well to encourage. On the other hand, the Soviet government of Russia "seems bent upon justifying all the prejudices against it." But one must never forget how Russia had to free herself from the most frightful misgovernment ever inflicted on a long suffering people, how the *moujik* once freed revenged himself naturally—like the slave of ancient times—and how the anti-Russian expeditions organized "with the help of notorious adventurers" served to make Bolsheviks appear as the saviours of Russian nationalism, just as the cause of the French Jacobins was once so notably reinforced by the action of the "emigrés."

M. Herriot is roused to his highest pitch of enthusiasm when he comes to speak of the League of Nations, whose Covenant "reverberated in our ears like a psalm." It was like an altar raised on the vast field of carnage. It was like the dawn after darkness. That the United States did not enter the League was something not to be criticized, but to be deplored. The newly formed Association was, indeed, fragile and imperfect. It required reforming. But the reform must come from within, not from without.

On matters of French internal policy, the Premier has something

to say about the Church question. He deprecates the charge that French Radicals are anti-religious, while admitting that they are resolved to keep politics and diplomacy under lay control. He is proud of the work of Radicals in establishing the income tax, after the excellent pattern set by England. He hopes to reduce expenditure on armaments and to shorten the term of military service; to combat unwise demands for State management of everything by insisting that the State shall manage those concerns—e. g. railways—where such management is best; and to introduce a single-school system under which the children of rich and poor shall be educated in their earliest years together. And he has a fierce word of denunciation for the menace of anti-Semitism.

I have summarized so much of M. Herriot's paper rather for the importance which his office now gives to all that he has said, than because he has said in these pages anything very definite about Radical purposes. One would like, for example, to know just what he means by the remark that French and English differ profoundly in their systems of national ethics. And he is somewhat studiously general in his commitments about reparations. When he declares that his party takes its stand "between theoretical socialism on the one hand and egotistical individualism on the other", he does not tell us very much of what we most want to know. But such is the handicap of a wary leader who has been persuaded to expound policy in the public press. And M. Herriot's general tone is one which liberal-minded men everywhere will be quick to applaud.

A GREAT deal has been written about "stricken and devastated France." But Mr. Sisley Huddleston has another story to tell, the story of a country that may well excite the envy of "less happier lands." In France, he assures us, there have been practically no labour troubles despite the upheaval of the war,—for the simple reason that *there have been no unemployed*. There has been more work to do than there have been men to do it.

In short, France—by reason of the war—has made immense industrial strides. In pre-war days the country was regarded as in the main agricultural; now it is highly industrialized. The damaged coal mines have been restored, with technical equipment much better than before. Up-to-date machinery has been installed in the textile factories. The woollen, cotton, chemical and engineering trades have been similarly transformed. France to-day, in Mr. Huddleston's opinion, is not only potentially but actually one of the richest countries in Europe, and it may well in a few years be the richest of them all.

Agriculture, too, has benefitted. The French farmer used to be primitive in his ways, conservative in his adherence to the tradition of his ancestors on the small holding. Now he has been taught to employ modern machinery. "Thanks to intensive propaganda," a co-operative spirit has been fostered, and farmers even in the smallest villages are clubbing together for the purchase of agricultural instruments. The country has abundance of rivers and waterfalls from which all the requisite electric power can be obtained, and this natural resource is being systematically developed for the first time.

In the "devasted areas" some two millions of people have returned to their homes, so that the population of the North is smaller by only a few thousands than in 1914. Three and a quarter million *hectares* of land had been ravaged; well over three million *hectares* are again under cultivation. 3,500 communes were occupied by the enemy; and in 3,250 of these, municipal organizations have been re-established. There are to-day 7,008 elementary schools as compared with 7,298 before the war.

A like tale has to be told of successful advance in many other directions. There has been something like a new industrial revolution, liberating new energy and inspiring a new spirit of progress. The old habit of industry on a small scale, of "keeping business in the family" and avoiding "interlocked companies" has disappeared. In M. Citroen the French have developed a Henry Ford. And, since the war, colonial enterprise—for which France had not shown much aptitude previously—has filled the newspapers with marvellous reports from Indo-China, Algeria and Morocco.

Whence comes the money for all this? The public credit of course has been pledged, and vast loans have been raised. In consequence, one is not surprised to learn that the cost of living has risen fivefold. But trade has risen with it. There have been protests, both at home and abroad, against the excessive expenditure on reconstruction, against the inflated claims of war victims which are said to have been paid "without strict investigation," and against the inequality by which large concerns that were able to fight their case have profitted in comparison with smaller people upon whom it was easier to impose. The army, too, is a huge charge. But, on the whole, discontent is slight and prosperity is general. Mr. Huddleston is full of admiration for the daring with which the Government has taken large risks and relied on the promise of the long view forward. A point to which he makes no reference is the debt of six hundred millions sterling to Great Britain, whose discharge does not seem as yet to enter into the programme

of this opulent neighbour. If it is possible for France to undertake such vast reconstruction works that there are no unemployed to cause public anxiety, this is not the case in England. That little sum of six hundred millions would be very useful towards allaying the more clamant discontent of the British workman. And as the Lancashire operative, tramping the streets with only his war decorations to console him, has to read about bulging trade in the country he did so much to rescue, he may be pardoned for letting his mind return to that still unpaid debt. France must not be surprised if he has thoughts for matters other than the extraction of more and more reparations from Germany to spend on industrial plants at Lyons and Marseilles.

THAT doughty Free Trader, Mr. Francis W. Hirst, sings a paean in *The Contemporary Review* over the result of the last British elections. There was, he remarks, nothing surprising in "our victory"—except "the simplicity of the Tariff Reformers in thinking they could succeed." The Citadel was indeed betrayed by its friends in 1915 and subsequent years. But, apart from this temporary lapse, never since the overthrow of the Corn Laws in 1846 had the great cause suffered a reverse. The "trustful axe of Philip Snowden" hewed down speedily the McKenna Duties and the Safeguarding of Industries Act. Thus a Labour Government, accepting the gospel of Cobden and dropping the gospel of Marx, has removed practically every trace of protection from the British budget. For a Conservative Government chose to "commit hari-kari after a year of office."

Encouragement to take the plunge was supplied, Mr. Hirst goes on, by the spectacle of bad trade at home and good trade in the United States. But think of the difference in conditions. "The United States is an immense Free Trade union of forty-eight States, with a wonderful diversity of soil, climate, and mineral wealth." These States can produce and exchange all necessities by themselves. They are divided by an ocean from the broils and turmoils of the Old World. Mr. Hirst believes that if they were not surrounded by a tariff wall their material prosperity—assured under any tariff conditions—would be still more rapid than it is. (Others will perhaps interpolate a query as to why this fact has so far escaped the notice of American statesmen). But their triumph over this disadvantage offers, in his view, no evidence that a tariff would not be fatal to a small island in which only one-twentieth of the population lives by cultivating the soil, so that more than half

of the sustenance of life has to be imported. "The masses who live in our towns will not hear of any project for making their food dearer." Hence, since the repeal of the Corn Laws, no British party has dared to propose high import duties on cereals and meat for the protection of the British farmer. A like hindrance blocks the way of protection for such raw material of great industries as wool, hides, timber. And herein, we are told, lies a fatal bar against colonial preference. For it is just such impossible objects of a tariff that constitute the staple imports of the British colonies. So Mr. Baldwin fell back upon apples, fruit juices, honey, and tinned salmon, and at election meetings this proposal proved very unpopular.

Turning to the case of manufactured articles, Mr. Hirst emphasizes the fact that British staple manufactures belong largely to the exporting trades, which depend for success on a low cost of production. He thinks that foreign competition is felt at home in perhaps ten per cent. of the whole, and for this fraction there are no markets to speak of abroad. His conclusion is this:

Under a general tariff to protect the home market a trade whose imports exceed its exports might hope to gain, while a trade whose exports exceed its imports would stand to lose; and the greater the excess, the greater the loss.

In the light of this principle, our critic examined the official statistics of import and export trade from January to October, 1923, where he found British imports valued at 191 millions sterling, while British exports are valued at 482 millions. So he infers that under protection manufacturers might expect to lose £48 for every £19 they would gain. In the case of cotton, according to Mr. Hirst, the loss should be in the proportion of £148 to £5! Some of the "smaller industries," he admits, might show a surplus the other way, for example the trade in paper, leather, and silk. And he sums it all up thus:

If one wants a fair political comparison of the tariff question as between the United States and Great Britain, one should ask whether the New England States, with New York and New Jersey thrown in, would be inclined to welcome, and would expect to gain by, a protective tariff against the other States and against the world in general. If such a proposal were put to the vote, it would—I imagine—be defeated at least as decisively by the New Englanders as were the proposals of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain in 1905 and Mr. Stanley Baldwin in 1923 by the Old Englanders.

Mr. Hirst wields a vigorous and incisive pen, and—whether we agree with him or not—we are always able to see what he means.

But perhaps nothing brings home to one more effectively than argument and counter-argument regarding Free Trade just how intricate and difficult are some of the questions by which the modern democratic elector has his wits distraught in the weeks that precede a British election.

SIR Valentine Chirol describes the French Protectorate over Morocco as analogous in many respects to the British Protectorate over Egypt, and compares the work of Marshal Lyautey with that of Lord Cromer. Twelve years have elapsed since this enterprise was undertaken, years which included the period of the Great War when efforts at internal development must have been halted. Yet within that time, under French control, Morocco has shown great progress in industry and commerce, in road and railway building, in educational equipment, and in other "outward and visible signs of a new life of law and order." The country is as large in extent as France itself, with about one-tenth as large a population. And to Marshal Lyautey is ascribed the credit for such notable advance.

He differs from Lord Cromer in that he is essentially a soldier, and that his task has been to a great extent a military task. But the two men were alike in their combination of energy with patience, in their capacity for looking ahead, and in the confidence they were able to inspire among native rulers. Marshal Lyautey defined the French Protectorate thus:

A system under which the country preserves its own institutions, and governs and administers itself through its own organs, under the mere control of a European Power who—having taken charge of its foreign relations—assumes the general direction of its military forces and finances and economic development.

In Morocco, as in Egypt, a western people was assuming control over Mohammedans. But while in Egypt the Khedive recognized the spiritual authority of the Ottoman Sultans, the Sultan of Morocco was always his own "Khalif". The temporal overlordship of a non-Mohammedan Power was a thing hard for the orthodox Mussulman to reconcile with the dictates of his faith, and two or three years ago in Morocco there was a tendency to turn rather to the Turk for religious protection against a Sultan who had thus compromised the creed of Islam. But since the "Republic of Turkey" has deposed its own Khalif, risk of such insurrection has disappeared.

A more serious danger to French control is incipient "nationalism". There is a region within the French Protectorate known officially as *territoire insoumis*, where the Berbers maintain a resistance like that of the Riff tribesmen in the neighbouring Spanish "zone". But, it seems, this district is steadily shrinking in extent under the pressure of French penetration.

SURPRISE has sometimes been expressed at the "persistent maligning of Mussolini in English newspapers." Mr. Wickham Steed is disgusted because, in his view, the error has been just the reverse. He finds that "with some honourable exceptions"—such as *The Manchester Guardian*, *The New Statesman*, and *The Daily News*,—English journals generally have panegyricized the Italian Dictator, and have failed to tell the horrible truth about his faults. Correspondents in Rome, he admits, may plead Fascist terrorism as some excuse for their reticence. But Mr. Steed cannot understand why their courage has been so inadequate as to make them add a chapter so discreditable to the history of British journalism.

For his own part, he will tell readers of *The Review of Reviews* a quite unvarnished tale. Fascism, he grants, must be credited with restoring a kind of public order. It suppressed strikes, put an end to communist excesses, established a punctual train service. But it also made parliamentary government a farce, inaugurated a series of "bloody deeds running into thousands," kidnapped and murdered political opponents, set the example of authorized barbarity as an instrument of terroristic rule. It is thus, in the gospel according to Mussolini, that Italy is to be "saved"! The whole scheme is "inverted Bolshevism". And the horrors thus indirectly stimulated may well outbalance all that has been gained by the direct reforms.

Illustrations are given. A Liberal Deputy was cudgelled into unconsciousness by Fascist ruffians in the street, while on-lookers did not dare to interfere. The proprietor of a Conservative journal of moderate views was described by the head of Mussolini's Press Bureau as one with whom only the language of the revolver could be talked. The Dictator himself nodded assent and his supporters shouted their approval when an Opposition speaker in the House said it was the Fascist purpose to remain in power by violence, despite any possible result of a General Election. A Socialist leader named Matteotti, who had ventured to speak his mind, was kidnapped, murdered and mutilated. For this last

occurrence Mussolini expressed most decorous regret, and disowned all responsibility. But it was strikingly consonant with the spirit of much that had gone before, much that he could not repudiate. For he had incited his followers to give their opponents "three minutes of quick firing," "Fascist treatment", "red-hot lead in the back". Apparently such a programme was adopted.

A few brave men, Mr. Steed tells us, "supported by the silent approval of right-thinking, hard-working Italians", are now engaged in a struggle—at the risk of their lives—to restore the decencies of popular government. Senator Albertini, proprietor of the Milan *Corriere della Sera*, has shown heroic courage in a speech that lays bare the truth:

What fruit had Fascism borne, apart from the establishment of apparent external order? Could justice be freely administered? Were infractions of the law punished? On the contrary. Violence of every kind was being done. Humble folk were cudgelled in such numbers that all account had been lost. At Turin, Spezia and Pisa there had been massacres. Local life was poisoned by the domination of Fascist chieftains who usurped and transgressed the rights and duties of Government. Worst of all, the Government tolerated, or inspired indirectly, the acts of violence committed by its party, and granted immunity to their authors.

Here is an indictment by a distinguished Italian, whom no one can accuse of communist proclivities. He was speaking of what he knew, and on the spot where all men could judge the accuracy of his language. One waits to hear the Fascist rejoinder. And one remembers the children in Corfu.

MR. HUGH A. Law was formerly Vice-President of the Irish Local Government Board,—one of those numerous and costly "Departments" so much hated in Ireland under the British administration. His seniority may be judged by his reference to occurrences which he remembers to have happened in 1879. One might expect in such a man the mood of an exasperated bureaucrat, and a spirit of carping criticism towards a régime so different from that of the past.

But this is not what one finds in his article. Mr. Law, with Celtic vivacity, begins by poking fun at those who seem to regret the disadvantages of living at peace. He points out that in the years preceding the Treaty the Irishman was free from some of his present worries. The British Government and regular Courts

of Law had been put out of action. Hence there was no need to pay income tax or rates; rents were gloriously uncollectable; salmon poaching and the making of poteen flourished exceedingly. Except for the Sinn Fein Courts and the Volunteers—each a proscribed organization—anyone could do as he chose with his neighbour's land and goods. During the period of the "Irregulars" a like facility of personal freedom was to be had. But those times are gone, and their immunities have passed into wistful memory. The Free State, with its rigorous ways, is popular among quiet folk, but not all folk like to be quiet. One recalls a remark by the late General Collins, "The readiness to fight remained after the occasion for fighting was gone."

The Free State, we learn, has been guilty of numerous unpopular interferences. It has greatly increased the penalties for salmon poaching. It punishes the makers and vendors of illicitly distilled spirits by imprisonment, not (as formerly) by fine. When cattle are deliberately sent to trespass on a neighbour's lands, it has them seized and sold to provide compensation. It has met part of the threatened deficit in revenue by reducing the salaries of judges and civil servants,—even those of primary school teachers and army officers. It has initiated a Bill to enforce the closing of public-houses on certain days, to shorten the period within which spirits may be sold, and to stop altogether the pernicious habit of selling intoxicants and other goods on the same premises. All of this has given offence. And a prolonged rainy summer of last year, with the damage it inflicted on crops, has added—quite absurdly—to the Government's burden of general discontent.

Yet, Mr. Law points out, there is nothing to show that Republicanism is gaining ground, or that the Treaty is in danger. The Government's pledged supporters are still a majority in the Dail; and so far as maintenance of the Treaty is concerned, they can always count on the support of the Independents, of the Farmers' Group, and probably of the Labour men. They have effected large economies by reducing the army to about two-fifths its former size, and the vast majority of both officers and men accepted the reduction with good humour. The army estimates for 1924-25 are thus lower by nearly seven million pounds than those of the previous year. And though it will be impossible to balance the Free State budget until the vast claims for senseless destruction by the Irregulars have been met, these will be cleared off finally within a few years. The National Loan was quickly over-subscribed, Trinity College and the Representative Body of the Church of Ireland being among the first and largest subscribers.

Proportional Representation has been tried in the Free State, with results on the whole satisfactory. The alleged difficulty of electors in understanding how to vote under this system has been disproved by the fact that the percentage of spoiled votes was small. And minorities have received representation they could never have had under the old method. For example, a Unionist of the old brand has been elected in County Donegal, for the first time in nearly forty years.

The burning question at present is that of the northern boundary. As fixed in 1920 this line is immensely long, and its zig-zag course cuts across roads, railways and farms. It demands an extraordinary number of Customs Houses and frontier forts on both sides. How is it to be rectified? The core of the problem, Mr. Law reminds us, is to be found in the centre counties of Tyrone and Fermanagh. But there the local areas which would be likely to vote for inclusion in the Free State are situated in the very middle of the counties. What about an interchange of populations? Shall compulsory migration be tried? The precedent of the Greek exodus from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace does not encourage this. County option would be likely to bring over to the Free State the counties of Fermanagh and Tyrone, as well as the city of Londonderry, that is, if the figures now available about religious and political proportions are still accurate. Mr. Law concludes that such an arrangement might be the least of evils, but that the one true cure for the trouble is a union between the North-East and the rest of Ireland to administer the powers of a Dominion. Once this were achieved, it would be of little consequence whether the provincial parliament at Belfast had a large or a small area to control. A truly interesting verdict from an ex-Vice President of the Local Government Board!

H. L. S.