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DEMOCRACY IN ZIMBABWE: FROM LIBERATION TO LIBERALIZATION.

by

Alfred Gwarega Nhema

Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Philosophy

at

Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia

1994

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DEDICATION

To my Mother and

the memory of my Father

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
BSAC	British South African Company
CAS	Capricorn African Society
CAZ	Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe
CIO	Central Intelligence Organization
CSFD	Child Survival and Development Foundation
CYL	City Youth League
DAs	Development Associations
DP	Democratic Party
ESAP	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Programme
FANWS	Federation of African Native Welfare Societies
FLS	Front Line States
FORUM	Forum for Democratic Reform
FYNDL	Five Year National Development Plan
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GNU	Government of National Unity
IASR	Interracial Association of Southern Rhodesia
ICU	Industrial and Commercial Workers Union
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IZG	Independent Zimbabwe Group
KOBA	Kutama Old Boys Association
MMT	Mass Media Trust
NAA	National Affairs Association

NAD	Na⸱ ⸱ /e Affairs Department
NDP	National Democratic Party
NFAZ	National Farmers Association of Zimbabwe
NGOs	Non governmental organizations
NICs	Newly Industrializing Countries
NRANC	Northern Rhodesia African National Congress
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PF	Patriotic Front (Zimbabwe)
RBVA	Rhodesia Bantu Voters Association
RF	Rhodesia Front
RICU	Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union
RNA	Rhodesia Native Association
RNLB	Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau
RRAEA	Rhodesia Railways African Employees Association
UANC	United African National Congress
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UFP	United Federal Party
UN	United Nations (Organization)
WAG	Women's Action Group
WB	World Bank
WLSA	Women and Law in Southern Africa
ZANLA	Zimbabwe National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZIMRIGHTS	Zimbabwe Human Rights Organization

|	
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
ZUM	Zimbabwe United Movement
ZUPO	Zimbabwe Union People's Organization

ABSTRACT

When Zimbabwe emerged from its settler status in 1980, the new popularly elected government inherited a corporatist structure originally designed to serve settler interests. Rather than dismantle that structure to reflect nationalist ambitions and the "new order" the new regime's corporatist inclinations became increasingly compatible with this inherited framework. The established corporatist structure was viewed as providing an institutional framework through which the new state could impose its hegemonic position thereby paving the way for the establishment of its one-party state.

Yet by the late 1980s, attempts to impose such a monolithic structure gave way to demands for political as well as economic liberalization.

Using a wide range of congruous analytical frameworks that include pluralist democratic theory, statism, and state corporatism, this thesis examines the dialectics of political liberalization in Zimbabwe over time from the settler period to the early 1990s. It asserts that democratic and civil society developments were shaped and conditioned by contradictions and contradistinctions between on the one hand the pluralism of social and economic life and on the other inherited corporatist arrangements and practices that militated against the establishment of a fully-fledged democratic society.

It further contends that the post-settler state's initial decision to maintain the status quo and perpetuate corporatist policies put in place by the settlers was motivated by its desire to ensure that alternative centres of power were prevented from arising. A system of control and cooptation of civil society dovetailed neatly with the regime's goals of restructuring civil society along lines that posed minimum threats to its hegemonic position.

ZIMBABWE

150 mi

Chinhoyi

Chitungwiza

Chegutu

HARARE

Kadoma

Hwange

Kwekwe

Mutare

Gweru

Bulawayo

Masvingo

Zvishavane

Population
10.1 Million
Area (sq mi)
150,803

City Population

▨ Over 1,000,000

▨ Over 500,000

▨ Over 100,000

▪ Under 100,000

▨ Capital

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In producing a study such as this, I am indebted to many institutions and individuals, but can only name a few.

The first on the list is the International Development Research Centre which kindly granted me an award that covered my entire study period at Dalhousie in addition to providing a generous grant that made my travel to Zimbabwe possible. Special thanks also to the Faculty of Graduate Studies at Dalhousie University for their supplemental travel grant.

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I would also like to thank the University of Zimbabwe for granting me study leave which relieved me of the responsibilities of teaching so that I could devote myself full-time to this project. At Dalhousie University, I was extended every help in completing this study alongside other responsibilities that I had to take on as part-time lecturer. The Dalhousie School of Public Administration provided me with a cosy base and many amenities that enabled me to work in reasonable comfort. My thanks to Dale Poel and Cindy MacDonald for all their kindness and consideration.

Colleagues and friends in the department of Political Science helped me socially and academically. The colleagues

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

When Zimbabwe emerged from its settler status in 1980, after a fifteen year liberation struggle, the new majority government inherited a corporatist structure originally designed to serve settler interests. Rather than dismantle that structure to reflect nationalist ambitions and the "new order" the new regime's corporatist inclinations became increasingly compatible with this inherited framework. Indeed, the established corporatist structure was viewed as providing an institutional framework through which the new state could impose its hegemonic position thereby paving the way for the establishment of its one-party state.

Yet by the late 1980s, attempts to impose such a monolithic structure gave way to demands for political as well as economic liberalization. So not only did the new African-dominated state find itself retreating from its long-stated goal of establishing a "socialist" one-party state;[1] it also adopted the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) prescriptions of structural adjustment after almost a decade of debating and rejecting them.[2]

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[1] See for example President Mugabe's statement announcing his regime's decision not to impose a *de jure* one party state. See "No One-Party State by Law - President," The Herald, September 28, 1990.

[2] In 1982 the then Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe assured the world that it was his government's intention 'to socialize the entire socioeconomic system' in

study proposes to examine the dialectics of political liberalization in Zimbabwe over time from the settler period to the early 1990s. It maintains that democratic and civil society developments were shaped and conditioned by contradictions between on the one hand the pluralism of social and economic life and on the other corporatist structures and policies that militated against the establishment of a fully-fledged democratic society.

It further asserts that the post-settler state's initial decision to maintain the status quo and perpetuate corporatist policies put in place by the settlers was motivated by its desire to ensure that alternative centres of power were prevented from arising. A system of control and cooptation of civil society not only dovetailed neatly with the regime's goals of limiting the level of political space in which groups in civil society could operate effectively; it also offered an "enabling environment" through which the regime could achieve its stated long-term objective of establishing a one-party state.

As the Mugabe regime steered the country "from a command

the _International Herald Tribune_ of April 1982. That goal was never achieved. To the contrary, in a rather volte face manner the regime embraced the IFIs' liberalization programmes by the end of the decade.

economy to one which promotes free and private enterprises,"[3] in 1990, the logical research questions to ask were: How was the transition from liberation to liberalizaticn conditioned and shaped by settler structures and practices? How much of this legacy still remained intact after liberation and how did such arrangements confine those seeking democratic consolidation? What powerful institutional instruments and practices presented a challenge to democracy after independence? What made it difficult for the regime to guide and contain the liberalization process once it began in the late 1980s? Finally, what kind of democracy is emerging under structural adjustment--what are its social, economic and political foundations and how participatory and consolidated is it? Collectively, these analytic questions animate this study.

II) SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTERS

In my attempt to answer the above postulated constructs, I have divided the thesis into seven chapters. Following this introduction, the second chapter focuses on those themes in the contemporary "democracy debate" that have largely shaped the current theoretical and practical meaning of democracy and civil society in Zimbabwe. The review of the various analyses

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[3] Senior Minister of Finance, Bernard Chidzero, quoted in Brian Raftopolous, "Beyond the House of Hunger: Democratic Struggle in Zimbabwe," Review of African Political Economy, No 54, 1992, p. 60.

leads towards a theoretical framework through which to relate theory to practice.

In order to provide a meaningful discussion about the present day "condition" of civil society in Zimbabwe or about its future prospects, reference must be made to the nature of governance during the settler period. This is the focus of the third and fourth chapters. Chapter three examines the early settler period while Chapter four reviews events after WWII. My point in reviewing the settler period is not to describe in detail the nature of settler rule but rather to highlight developmental problems created by its operation and how that practice shaped and conditioned the institutional framework within which civil society operated in the post-settler era.

The fifth chapter builds upon the findings of the previous two chapters. It explores the nature of relations between state and society in the post-settler state from 1980 to the late 1980s. Its focus is on highlighting how the new regime utilized inherited policies and strategies to restructure civil society groups along corporatist lines in a manner that differed little from the settler period.

Chapter six focuses on the decline of corporatist arrangements as the erstwhil civil society groups, initially emasculated by the cooptative state, reconstituted themselves from the late-1980s onwards. Factors that prompted Zimbabwe to adopt SAP are also explored and so are the responses of the

various social movements to its imposition. A key theme underlying the discussion in this chapter is how the regime tried to balance different incompatible interests-- its desire to extend its presence and power on the one hand and the liberalization putsch from both internal and external factors on the other.

The last chapter draws together a summary of the major analytical constructs advanced by the thesis. The prospects for sustainable democracy in the country and the whole Southern African region are also analyzed.

III) SCOPE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

This thesis is original since it is the first study to examine the development of civil society[4] in Zimbabwe over time. Its in-depth exploration of a state-constructed order dating back to the settler era based on control, manipulation and cooptation of civil society offers a perspective that has been overlooked by local and regional scholars as well as other African(ists). There is no doubt that this study constitutes a store of information on democratic and civil society development in Zimbabwe, with relevance to South(ern) Africa and indeed the whole continent.

The intent here is not to discuss all the non-state

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[4] As explained below and in chapter two the term civil society broadly refers to myriad organizations and institutions that are separate from the state.

associations which fall under the rubric of "civil society" for that would be an impossible task given the plethora of organizations involved. To help clarify the choice of civil society groups chosen for the study, a brief discussion on the state-society bifurcation is in order.

Alfred Stepan makes a distinction between the institutions of civil society (for example women's and religious groups) and the institutions of "political society" (political parties, legislature, the judiciary) and other institutional organs of the state.[5] Whereas political society is generally identified with a legal and institutional apparatus the social structure denotes patterns of association which are independent of the state and are not necessarily dependent on legal statutes.[6]

Demarcating the "social structure" from the "political structure" is not by itself sufficient, however. It is imperative that various types of civil society groups within the African context be briefly classified. The first variant

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[5] Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 3-4. A more detailed explanation of civil society is proffered in chapter 2.

[6] John Healey & Mark Robinson, Democracy, Governance and Economic Policy: Sub-Saharan Africa in Comparative Perspective, London: ODI, 1992, p. 161.

caii be categorized under the general label of interest groups. Such groups endeavour to influence public policy without necessarily seeking political office. They range from groups that have particular sectional interests like business, farmers and trade unions to pressure groups that seek to promote specific causes like human rights, student and women's movements.

There are other semi-public institutions in civil society like the press and broadcast media, professional associations and other membership groups, the clergy and laypersons in the Church, that act as "sources of restraint" on government.[7] In general, such institutions have transnational connections not only with similarly constituted groups in different countries but also with other international solidarity groups. As Harvey Glickman quiescently observes such "connections to foreign institutions and publicity... can act as constraints on governments with autocratic tendencies."[8]

More recently, scholars have focused their attention on a bevy of community self-help institutions that are subsumed

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[7] Harvey Glickman, "Beyond Autocracy in Africa: Some Thoughts," in the Carter Centre, Beyond Autocracy in Africa, (Atlanta: The Carter Centre, February 1989) p. 76.

[8] Ibid., p.76.

under the general label of development NGOs.[9] Their African origins are usually traced back to post-World War II developments. According to Michael Bratton, during that period the "African version" of NGOs sprang up in the form of welfare groups which were formed initially with a view to protesting the indignities of settler rule and later the impact of urbanization and industrialization. Eventually such groups

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[9] James Riker identifies at least four categories of NGOs. The first variety is the government organized NGOs (GONGOS) which are financed and promoted by government to carry out regime-defined projects and activities. The second is the donor-organized NGOs (DONGO), initiated and sponsored by bilateral and multilateral donor agencies. The third type are the autonomous indigenous NGOs which are creations of various social groups designed to cater for specific development imperatives. They generally tend to be self-sufficient in "organizational and financial terms." The final category is represented by foreign NGOs. Unlike the indigenous NGOs they are not accountable to their local clients but rather to their sponsors in their countries of origin.

See, James Riker, "Contending Perspectives for Interpreting Government-NGO Relations in South and South East Asia: Constraints, Challenges and the Research for Common Ground in Rural Development" in Noeleen Heyzer, James V. Riker and Antonio B. Quizon (eds), Government-NGO Relations in Asia: Prospects and Challenges for People-Centred Development, London: Macmillan Press, 1995 (forthcoming), p. 19.

For further discussions on NGO-Government relations see for example, Alan Fowler, "The Role Of NGOs in Changing State-Society Relations: Perspectives From Eastern and Southern Africa," Development Policy Review, Vol. 9 (1991) pp 5-16; Fowler, "Non-Governmental Organizations as Agents of Democratization: An African Perspective," Journal of International Development, Volume 5 3 (1993) pp. 325-39; and also David Moore and Gerald Schmitz (eds.), Crisis and Renewal in Development Discourse: Global and Regional Perspectives on Democracy, Sustainability and Equity, London: Macmillan Press, 1995 (forthcoming).

became the building blocks of nationalist political parties.[10]

In making the choice of which groups to include in the study, I took into account the "national"[11] as opposed to the local character of the various groups and their ability to

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[10] Michael Bratton, "The Politics of NGO-Government Relations in Africa," World Development, Volume 17 4 (April 1989) p. 571.

[11] This "national" characteristic partly justifies why "white civil society" groups other than the peak ones (business and agriculture) are not part of this study. To the extent that myriad white civil society group, (serving a white population of about 238,000 at its peak i. 1961 compared to 4,098,000 Africans then) existed, their exclusionary racist policies made them insular organizations. United as they were in their bid to perpetuate an undemocratic system in which virtually all indigenous Africans were denied their civil liberties such organizations could not have been used to underpin a more democratic order. In fact their very existence posed a threat to the creation of a democratic society in which all racial groupings were represented.

1 also take Charles Utete's perception that while there might have been particular white interests that dominated the political system at intermittent periods during the settler era no pivotal white settler social groupings were continuously excluded from sharing political power and very few of them fathomed the idea of extending the franchise to the indigenous population. Although a few white liberals (see chapters 3 and 4) made some paternalistic attempts aimed at extending limited civil liberties to Africans, it cannot be denied that almost all white interest groups were united in their support of exclusionary racist policies.

The inclusion of white business and agricultural interests here largely serves to highlight why they were created and how the state-business nexus cultivated during the settler era persisted after independence.

For some discussion on "white unity" see for example, Charles Utete, The Road to Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Settler Colonialism, National Liberation and Foreign Intervention, Washington, DC.: University Press of America, 1979, p. 34. The population figures are from The Zimbabwe's Government's The Statistical Yearbook, Harare: Government Printers, 1989, p 20.

mobilize large sections of the population. Such groups, if allowed to operate in an unfettered manner, can lead to liberatory tendencies favourable to the creation of a more pluralistic society.

To that end, the focus here is on business interests, labour, student and women's movements, welfare movements, human rights organizations, professional associations, social and religious organizations, the media,[12] and a few selected indigenous development NGOs. What distinguishes the latter from other groups in civil society is their focus on development imperatives. Their grass-roots and basic needs approach to development has made them key actors in the field, filling the void left by receding and over-extended African states.[13]

The scant attention given here to external NGOs is

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[12] If allowed to operate, an independent press can broaden the scope for the articulation of opinions and ideas outside the domain of the state.

[13] See for example Michael Bratton, "Non-Governmental Organizations in Africa: Can They Influence Public Policy?," Development and Change, Vol. 21 (1990): pp. 87-118; Bratton, "The Politics of Government-NGO Relations in Africa," World Development, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1989), pp. 569-87; Alan Fowler, Non-Governmental Organizations in Africa: Achieving Comparative Advantage in Relief and Micro-Development, (Brighton, Sussex: Institute of Development Studies, 1988); and also Michael Cernea, Non-Governmental Organizations and Local Development, World Bank Discussion Paper, No. 40 (Washington DC.: World Bank, 1988).

deliberate. Given their proliferation over the past decade,[14] they need to be given a more detailed scrutiny which obviously was beyond the purview of this study given its concentration on indigenous civil society groups. Although opposition parties fall outside the orthodox definition of "civil society", they are included here given the state's exclusionary, repressive and cooptive policy environment. Collectively, these groups are confronting the state in their common fight for more political space. If strengthened they can underpin an effective and sustainable multi-party democratic order.

The study aims to discuss the democracy debate in relation to its indigenous civil society, deviating from the few studies on Zimbabwe that have tended to confine their analysis to the post-independence political 'crisis.' This perspective differs from such post-1980 short-term crisis analyses which have been carried out against a backdrop of disillusionment with authoritarian single party regime tendencies. I intend to move beyond this 'gloomy' descriptive analysis to one that recognizes the liberalization process as a "tango" between civil society groups seeking to expand the level of political space available and the state's desire to contract that space.

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[14] John Clark, <u>Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organizations</u>, London: Earthscan, 1991

It cannot be denied that this is a timely study given the current economic and political developments in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and Latin America as well as Africa. The new wave of democratization and economic liberalization that has swept the world puts a new question on the agenda of the intellectual community in Zimbabwe: what elements pose a threat to the creation of an 'enabling environment' in which long lasting democracy and development is the end result?

IV) METHODOLOGY

As will be shown in Chapter one below, this study embraces a variety of compatible frameworks encompassing democratic, statist and corporatist theories. The information for the study comes from accounts in the literature, newspapers, and interviews conducted in Zimbabwe from 1990 to 1992. These were complemented by the researcher's prior experience as both a practitioner in government and a "player" in civil society.

There are some apparent limitations to this study. The first drawback stems from the nature of the investigation itself. Carrying out a study on a regime in power is never an easy task anywhere in the world. Not only were some officials hesitant to answer questions in a candid manner, those that did so at times would only agree to be interviewed as long as

they were not quoted. Secondly, a "forest of regulations"[15] tend to guide the operations of most government departments making it difficult sometimes to authenticate certain key assertions. Other than the usual classification of certain documents as "top secret" different government publications that have not been "declassified" cannot be quoted or used as references for many years to come.

To be sure, such problems palpably face any researcher that is delving into an unmapped area. Most of these problems were however overcome by the researcher's ready access to almost all key actors in Zimbabwe's political, bureaucratic and civil society groups' echelons. This was perhaps one example where the researcher's own "connections" with key decision-makers in the country proved fairly useful. At the same time this boon, which tended to counter the obstacles identified above, brings with it a danger of personal bias deriving from the researcher's own cognitive perceptions. The study was therefore pursued with these risks in perspective. Rigorous efforts were however made to minimize such occurrences by adopting a comprehensive analysis to the various issues under scrutiny in an impartial and critical

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[15] This quote was from an interview with the influential ZANU-PF senior party official, Eddison Zvobgo, then Minister of the Public Service. This was his own depiction of the web of rules guiding the operations of the Public Service. Interview, Harare: January 23, 1991.

manner.

V) EXPLAINING THE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Although this study employs a wide range of congruous analytical frameworks that include statism, pluralist democratic theory and state corporatism, the ascendance of the latter is apparent. This is explained by the fact that it provides a framework for theorizing a state constructed arrangement in which the state seeks to organize civil society along officially sanctioned paths. A major element of such a system is that the range of interests are unilaterally defined and sanctioned by the state. In such a scheme of things,

> competition among interest associations is no longer open; the... associations are... institutionally dependent on the state and consequently have to check their behaviour; the membership of associations is significantly wedded to the organizations through pressures to join and the absence of alternative channels, which itself suggests that they are under some form of control by the leadership; the associations are no longer purely private but quasi-public in their functions...[16]

While the regime may occasionally find it necessary to consult them, it is under no obligation to take their views seriously. Under such an arrangement civil society groups that are not on "good terms" with the state are unable to influence the design

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[16] Peter J. Williamson, _Corporatism in Perspective_, London: Sage, 1989, p. 67.

and execution of public policy.[17]

In order to shed some light on such a state constructed order based on control and manipulation of civil society groups a brief prognosis of its intellectual foundations is in order.

The concept of state corporatism is closely associated with organic statism.[18] The organic allegory captures the essence of a natural (and implicitly a preferred) orientation of social systems. In a normative sense, the organic metaphor provides the basis for a survival oriented system in which the needs of individuals are subordinated to the needs of the larger system. The founder of sociology, Auguste Comte spoke of society as a 'living organism.'[19] Earlier, writers like Herbert Spencer offer some justification on why societies need to be compared to living organisms by stating that:

> there is a general outline of the evidence which justifies the comparison of societies to living organisms. That they gradually increase in mass; that they become a little more complex; that at the

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[17] Harmon Zeigler, Pluralism, Corporatism, and Confucianism, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988, p. 31.

[18] Julius Nyang'oro, "State Corporatism in Tanzania," in Julius E. Nyang'oro and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), Corporatism in Africa: Comparative Analysis and Practice, Boulder: Westview Press, 1989, p. 68.

[19] See Auguste Comte, The Foundations of Sociology, Kenneth Thompson, ed., New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975.

same time their parts grow more mutually dependent;
and that they live to grow as wholes, while
successive generations of their units appear and
disappear; are broad peculiarities which bodies-
politic display in common with all living bodies;
and in which they and living bodies differ from
everything else.[20]

The term `organic', borrowed from the hard sciences, is used in the social sciences to express the relationships of the parts of a system to the whole. According to Alfred Stepan, it refers to some `normative vision of the political community in which the component parts of society harmoniously combine to enable the full development of man's potential.'[21] The term `statist' on the other hand, is used to emphasise the point that the envisaged harmony does not occur spontaneously, but rather `requires power, rational choices, and decisions, and occasional **restructuring** of civil society by political elites,' in a particular polity. [22]

Organic statist models developed out of a coherent body of ideas formulated by early theorists who regarded the state as a higher moral community, in which individuals must surrender all their rights and liberties to a sovereign organ

[20] Herbert Spencer, "The Social Organism", in Essays: Scientific, Political and Speculative, vol.1 (New York: D. Appleton, 1891), p.306.

[21] Alfred Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 26.

[22] Ibid, p.27 (my emphasis).

for the common good. From Aristotle to St. Thomas Aquinas to natural law, the central theme is that the state has a moral end, or as Stepan puts it, a moral *telos*.[23] Unlike the liberal pluralist model which emphasizes the central procedures of government within which social groups compete to define goals and objectives, such writings emphasize the ends of government and are less concerned with procedural guarantees. They also differ from `command socialist' models[24] in that they are not built upon a monistic relationship between the party state and the citizens following the abolition of all elements of subsidiarity (civil society groups). In the organic statist model, intermediate groups are recognized as playing a necessary and legitimate function.[25]

Organic statism, as a model, implies `limited pluralism' as opposed to a `monistic community.' It is neither capitalist nor communist, but represents a balance between the two poles of classical liberalism and command socialism. Although it shares the statist approach with the latter, its emphasis is on constructing the "parameters, rules and infrastructure of a market economy."[26] In other words, it retains the market

[23] Ibid, p.30.

[24] V,I. Lenin, `The Immediate Tasks of Government' in V.I. Lenin, Selected Works, pp. 420, 424-25.

[25] Stepan, The State and Society.

[26] Ibid., p. 41.

economy but uses various mechanisms to regulate the activities of the market in the interests of the `common good.'

In the Zimbabwean case, successive settler regimes adopted dirigiste policies along the organic-statist model. They established a highly controlled corporatist economy that was geared towards serving the interests of the minority European settlers. It was thus a form of *exclusionary* organic corporatist statist structure based on race.[27] The Rhodesian state in conjunction with capital and other white interests employed various discriminatory practices in its attempt to restructure civil society. Some of the key instruments which perpetuated white privileges were the Land Apportionment Act which effectively divided the land into two blocks, giving the whites exclusive right to the more arable and fertile lands while the indigenous Africans were banished to the dry marginal lands; the Grain Marketing and Maize Control Acts (biasing prices of staple food crops against Africans), the Master and Servant Act and the Pass Laws, (restricting the movement of Africans) the Industrial Conciliation Acts (which barred African labour union activity and reserved many jobs

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[27] See for example, Timothy M. Shaw, "Corporatism in Zimbabwe: Revolution Restrained," in Nyang'oro and Shaw (eds.), Corporatism in Africa, pp. 156-157; and also M. Tamarkin, The Making of Zimbabwe: Decolonization in Regional and International Politics, London: Frank Cass, 1990, p. 10.

for the European settlers), among many others.[28] All these laws were designed to exclude the African from any meaningful participation in the political, social and economic arena other than as disenfranchised poorly paid workers or as peasants. Although some *inclusionary* methods were employed to create a "nice class of Africans", in general, the settler state pursued exclusionary policies designed to forestall any meaningful participation by Africans in the economic and political spheres.

When the new ZANU-PF government took over in 1980, it decided to maintain the status quo as this was largely consistent with its long-term objectives. Given the regime's stated ideological `commitment' to socialism, the inherited highly centralized economy was viewed as providing the instruments by which the newly elected government could direct the economy to its stated goal of "socialism". Second, and more important, the ruling elites were determined to maintain a monistic political system. So, by maintaining the status quo and by perpetuating some exclusionary policies that were put in place during the settler era, the new ruling elites ensured that alternative centres of power were prevented from developing.

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[28] For a detailed discussion on these exclusionary laws, see Colin Stoneman (ed.), <u>Zimbabwe's Inheritance</u>, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982, p. 10.

As shall become clear in the ensuing chapters, various policies pursued by the post-settler state differed only in form but not in content from those pursued by their settler predecessors. "[A]s in other areas, the Zimbabwean Government inherited repressive laws enacted by the Rhodesian regime which it has since added to."[29] The State of Emergency Act, in force since the 1960s, empowered the state to detain persons without trial. Until its scrapping in 1991, opposition party members and individuals critical of government suffered repeated harassment and detention under it. Corporatist labour legislation was also maintained. The Labour Relations Act of 1985, like the Master and Servant Legislation and the Industrial Conciliation Bill enacted before it weakened the bargaining power of workers by giving more power to the labour minister and through the removal of the 'right-to-strike' clause. The tripartite arrangement involving the state and business interests on the one hand and labour on the other persisted, with the latter carrying much of the burden.

At the economic level, the inherited statist approach was preserved with the state intervening heavily in all sectors of the economy while the same old economic guards continued to control the key sectors of the economy. The

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[29] Africa Watch, Zimbabwe: A Break With the Past? Human Rights and Political Unity, London and New York, October 1989, p. 63.

ruling party's leadership code limited party cadres and civil servants to owning only fifty acres of land in addition to prohibiting them from running their own businesses. Since essentially the majority of the civil servants and party members were black, what this meant was that the majority of Africans continued to be outside the formal economic realm as heretofore. At the state-societal level, a state constructed order premised on the control of major groups in civil society was conserved. In that configuration, civil society's right to exist at least in an official capacity was dependent on the approval of the state. All these policies, among many others, were meant to perpetuate the hegemony of the ruling elite by preventing the growth of alternative centres of power.

It is now generally accepted that the average wage earner in Zimbabwe is worse off today than ten years ago. The inherited economic structures have remained virtually intact. The private sector, though fairly developed by sub-Saharan African standards is still largely foreign-owned. The rural population is by and large bound to past traditions and is generally close to the margin of survival. The 'indigenous local bourgeoisie' is generally engaged in petty trading. Most lack the expertise and finance to run and manage large-scale enterprises.

The ruling party's deliberate attempt to exclude the majority of people from any meaningful ownership and control

of the means of production is verified by the fact that only 4% of the population owns 90% of the wealth.[30] Recent exhortations by government officials about the need for African advancement has led one scholar to lament that:

> It is a sad indictment on the history of the National Liberation in Southern Africa that the post-independence struggle should be reduced to a call for black advancement and not black control. This is the legacy of white settler colonialism, the post-white settler colonial situation.[31]

By employing the corporatist approach, I will be able to critically examine how the ruling elite used inherited exclusionary and inclusionary policies to restructure civil society along lines that posed minimal threats to its hegemonic position. The analysis of its initial success[32] and

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[30] Arnold Sibanda, "The Economy Since Independence," Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly (SAPEM), Volume 3, April, 1990. There is no evidence to show that the government's desire to prevent the emergence of a bourgeoisie was inspired by socialism at all. As shall become clear in chapter five, such designs were motivated by the need to prevent the rise of alternative centres of power outside the regime's state corporatist structure.

[31] Ibbo Mandaza, "The One-Party State and Democracy In Southern Africa: Towards a Conceptual Framework," in Ibbo Mandaza and Lloyd Sachikonye (eds.), The One Party State and Democracy: The Zimbabwe Debate, Harare: SAPES, 1991, p.30.

[32] The unity pact between Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZANU) and Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) in 1987 almost paved the way for the imposition of a one-party state in Zimbabwe.

the subsequent r-versal[33] of this effort will help give empirical and theoretical rigor to key concepts concerning the capacities and limits of the post-colonial state. The Zimbabwean situation represents a classic case in which the ruling elite (both settler and post-settler) has tried to move toward greater control of civil society via manipulative corporatist policies than is theoretically posited in the model.

From the foregoing discussion, it can be anticipated that while democratic theory will be utilized heavily in this study the corporatist construct will act as a salient compatible framework.

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[33] The first public announcement of the ruling party's decision against a legislated one-party state was made in Toronto on September 29, 1990. See The Herald, 30 September, 1991, Harare.

CHAPTER TWO

DEMOCRACY IN ZIMBABWE: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter identifies and examines those themes in the "democracy debate" that have largely shaped the current theoretical and practical meaning of democracy in Zimbabwe. It is divided into four broad sections. The first part begins with a definition of the key concepts from a global perspective. The second section focuses on a discussion of identifiable perspectives that underlie the debate in the continent of Africa. It ends with an assessment of the prospects for lasting democracy in Africa. This is used as a springboard through which to place the particular democracy debate in Zimbabwe within a broader African context. The third part is then devoted to a critical analysis of theories on democracy within the Zimbabwean context. The fourth and last part places the discussion on democracy in Zimbabwe within a firm theoretical framework.

A caveat is in order here. It is difficult for a study such as this to apply a single theoretical framework without recognizing that alternative concepts are indeed relevant and applicable. This is reinforced by the fact that while the collapse of the settler state heralded the creation of new multi-racial democratic state, corporatist and statist structures and practices that had their origins in the settler era present elements of historical continuity. Thus, a

wholesale application of one particular paradigm would be inappropriate as it would fail to capture adequately the various complex issues and nuances involved.

I) DEFINING AND CLARIFYING KEY CONCEPTS

Before proceeding to examine the literature on democracy in Africa it will suffice as background to outline briefly certain key concepts from a global perspective. For the purposes of this study democracy and liberalization are taken as two central but distinct phenomenon.

Democracy

Over the years, more and more ink has been spilled by theorists on the question 'What is democracy?' The almost universal approval given to democracy and the very general desire to appropriate its prestige makes the task of defining it elusive. If we ask what the purposes of democracy are, or how a democracy works, or even what a democracy is, it is not clear what materials, what procedures, we should use in seeking answers. Given this lack of clarity, scholars try to explain or to define 'democracy' by describing its realization or its institutionalization.

Democracy is a Greek word which means 'people rule' or 'rule by (the) people.' The concept and practice of liberal democracy is usually traced back to Ancient Greece. During that period, common citizens in the city states of Athens were consulted on various political issues affecting them. It must be stated however that participation was extended to only

those citizens who had inherited full citizenship. Thus, women and slaves were barred from the democratic process.

The Greek concept of democracy was selective and in a way favoured the dominant class groups in society. The class nature of these societies dictated that the democratic arrangements that existed then tended to serve the interest of the economically powerful groups.[1] Much of the conceptualization of democracy today borrows heavily from this practice. Thus, while under Greek slave society, democracy served the interests of the ruling oligarchy, in modern liberal states, democracy tends to serve the interests of the more economically powerful groups in society.

From the time political science emerged as a distinct discipline in the early twentieth century, one of its central preoccupations has been the study, interpretation, and defence of liberal democracy. Political science has accepted the use of the term 'democracy' to refer to political systems that are characterized neither by majority rule nor by minority rule but rather by the competition for influence between many competing groups that seek to enlarge their influence relative to one another in order to secure a larger share of the benefits dispensed through public policy. The people have a right to enhance their influence over public officials by

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[1] This is denoted in the liberal dictum 'no bourgeoisie, no democracy'. Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Boston: Beacon Press, 1961, p. 418.

joining or organizing interest groups and political parties. Government, in this model, has the relatively limited role of mediating between the conflicting and competing views of interest groups that comprise civil society.[2]

A key notion of liberal democracy is its defence of individual liberties and property rights and its preference for less government intrusion in the economy. Liberal democracy protagonists reject the notion that the state can legitimately and effectively define and enforce an authoritative concept of the public interest. To them, the public interest is better served by the free interaction of private interests operating within an unfettered free market system.[3]

There are of course some unresolved contradictions with these postulations. Liberal democracy accepts economic inequality in its defence of the right to own property. Under the liberal concept of private property, possession of a good constitutes a right to exclude others from it, thereby creating economic inequalities.

This juxtaposition of human equality and economic

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[2] Jean L. Cohen, Class and Civil Society: The Limits of Marxian Critical Analysis, Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982 and also John Keane, Democracy and Civil Society, London: Verso, 1988.

[3] See for example, F. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967 and also Robert Dahl Who Governs, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961.

inequalities that stems from property ownership is one major weakness within liberal democracy theory that egalitarian democrats have been able to exploit. The writings of Mills offer a good starting point. His theory of liberty and political participation is one that examines the concept of property not as a right to exclude but rather as a right not to be excluded from the means of labour and self-development. These means are taken to imply equal participation in making decisions about the allocation of resources in society.[4] He is supported by Macpherson who contends that if democracy is to become more 'embracing', it must break with capitalism and the possessive individualism that underlies it.[5] This view is similar to Gamble's assertion that liberty and equality can only be realized if the inequalities in civil society are abolished, particularly the inequality that stems from ownership of property.[6]

The above contentions notwithstanding, the notion that the right to rule a society should be based upon the consent of the governed has dominated the political life of the twentieth century. The power of this ethos is attested by the

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[4] C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, New York: Oxford University Press, 1956, chapter 11.

[5] See for example, C.B. Macpherson, Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973 and The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.

[6] A. Gamble, An Introduction to Modern Social and Political Thought, London: Macmillan, 1981, p. 89.

fact that very few governments neglect to clothe themselves in formal democratic garb. As John Wiseman quiescently observes, there are cases in which the term has been incorporated into the official name of the state (e.g., the People's Democratic Republic of North Korea, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) although the states concerned "appear singularly undemocratic".[7]

In our context democracy refers principally to a type of relationship between the state and political society. Depending on the ideological and cultural orientation of the individual, democracy may mean different things to different people. As Robert Dahl insightfully observes, if the Athenian citizen of Pericles's day were to "suddenly appear in our midst," what the industrial societies call democracy today would probably not look like democracy at all to him because of the shift from the "small, more intimate, and more participatory city-state to the gigantic more impersonal and more indirect government of today."[8]

Whatever the case may be, the notion that democracy refers to a system in which the state is governed by the representatives of the people has received popular approval. Such a system is one that meets certain basic conditions. These include meaningful and extensive competition among

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[7] John Wiseman, Democracy in Black Africa, New York: Paragon House, 1990, p.4.

[8] Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, p. 5.

individuals, organized groups, and political parties for the right to win control of the government and all positions of government power. The political structure should be organized in such a way that maximum political participation is achieved in the selection of leaders and other representatives. The selection of such leaders is done through regular free and fair elections which must not only be held on a regular basis but must be free from intimidation and manipulation. Finally, citizens must have access to alternative sources of information and freedom of association, movement and speech.[9]

In terms of these assumptions, a variety of democratic constitutions and systems of government can be identified and classified. One can talk of liberal, guided, social, participatory, corporatist or populist forms of democracy within presidential, or parliamentary, federal or unitary types of government. Fundamental to our understanding of democracy is viewing the above categories as representing ideal-types. It is therefore quite possible for countries to clothe themselves in some form of apparently formal democratic

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[9] It must be noted that this definition distances itself from liberal assertions associated with the self-contained and inviolate individualistic traditions of the West. Arguably, such assertions have no place in a society like Zimbabwe that subscribes to the view that the central ethos of African society is the communality of being.

The definition borrows heavily from the works of Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries; and Richard Sandbrook "Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: Strategies for Democratization," The Washington Quarterly, Volume 12 (1) Winter 1989, pp 141-163.

garb and yet fail to pass the democracy test. To the extent that a particular political system corresponds closely to the identified set of characteristics in our definition, it can then be classified as more democratic than one that fails to meet most of the criteria outlined.

Civil society

It is now generally accepted that, with the development of modern states, the claim to authority is no longer attached to the hereditary rank of a monarchial lineage but lies in the nature of ongoing relations between the state and its society in general; in particular the relation of state power to civil society.

The term civil society refers to the differentiation between the realms of state power and society, with the former characterized by binding commands and the rights and duties of individuals, and the latter as a voluntary realm of affinities of interests and ideas. It is noted that in a pluralistic democracy, freedom and equality among individuals and groups depends upon preserving types of organizations which nurture local freedoms and provide for the active expression of particular interests.[10] In this scheme of things, a pluralist

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[10] See for example, John Urry, The Anatomy of Capitalist Societies. The Economy, Civil Society and the State, London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1981; Jean Cohen, Class and Civil Society: The Limits of Marxian Critical Theory, Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982; Edward Shils, "The Virtue of Civil Society," Government and Opposition, 26 (1) 1991; V. Tismaneau (ed.), In Search of Civil Society, New York: Routledge, 1990; and also Michael Walzer, "The Idea of Civil Society," Dissent, Spring 1991.

and self-organizing civil society independent of the state is an indispensable condition of democracy.[11]

The idea of **civil society** is often traced to the writings of 18th century analysts who defended the right of citizens against the absolute state. The common thread that ties early writers like Locke and Montesquieu is their emphasis on a minimal state.

Hegel draws from the writings of these early theorists and develops a succinct theoretical account of state and civil society. He defines 'civil society' as an array of social groups situated betwixt the family and the state whose major purpose is the protection of their own private interests.[12] While Hegel's state is superior to civil society, the state does not seek to annihilate the latter but defend and preserve it. In such a scheme of things, freedom among individuals and groups depends upon the preservation of civic organizations which nurture local freedoms and provide for the active expression of particular interests. A pluralistic and self-organizing civil society independent of the state is viewed as an indispensable condition of democracy. According to Alexis

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[11] Alfred Stepan, <u>Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and Southern Cone</u>, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988, 3-4.

[12] Hegel is credited with coining the term 'civil society.' See for example, Nicos Poulantzas, <u>Political Power and Social Classes</u>, London: Sheed and Ward, 1973, pp. 124-5, and John Plamenatz, 'The Social and Political Philosophy of Hegel,' <u>Man and Society</u>, Volume II, London: Longmans, 1963, p. 233.

De Tocqueville, such an array of autonomous associations act as a permanent thorn in the side of political power.[13]

Marxist analyses dismiss this account as a mere rationale for hegemonic control and domination. Karl Marx ties historical progress to the contradictions that accompany capitalist production. He asserts that human beings are extensions of nature and have to battle to survive in inhospitable 'surroundings' created by capitalism. Marx traced the origin of society to humanity's efforts to create and use tools needed to extract sustenance from nature. He wrote, 'What...[individuals] are...coincides with their production, both with what they produce and how they produce it. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions of their production.'[14]

In short, Marx views capitalism as an economic system that breeds and cultivates classes; that is, capitalists and workers. The two are antagonistic classes with opposing interests. Those who own the means of production (the capitalists) are the dominant economic class. Society's institutions reflect the ideas of this dominant class. The state therefore is not a superior realm defending the general interest; it merely polices class domination in civil society. The distinction between state and civil society, though

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[13] Alex de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, edited J.P. Mayer and Max Lerner, New York: Harper and Row, 1966, p. 175.

[14] Robert Gorman, Bibliographic Dictionary of Marxism, Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1986, p. 6.

acknowledged, is eliminated. Since both the state and society are creations of class domination, both must eventually disappear when the workers rebel and create a socialist classless society. A communist civil society is thus impossible. To defend civil society is ipso facto, to break with classical Marxist theory.

A more recent analysis of civil society is associated with the writings of Antonio Gramsci, who accorded civil society an importance classical Marxists denied. A central element in Gramsci's analysis of state power is the means by which the state secures the consent of the 'dominated'. The most successful basic strategy used by the dominant groups is identified: hegemony, which refers to the "successful mobilization and reproduction of the 'active consent' of dominated groups by the ruling class through their exercise of intellectual, moral and political leadership."[15] This process involves various political patterns whereby individuals or parties are able to use a combination of force, patronage, or corruption to assure their control of state power over sustained periods of time. The domination is effected through ideological means. The process is not a simple exercise in which pundits and their epigones recite populist dogma. The process is more complex: it involves the ruling bloc claiming popular sentiments that are supposedly in the interests of the 'nation'. People therefore consent to subjection because the

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[15] Jessop, The Capitalist State, p. 148.

intellectuals who control communication induce them to believe in the legitimacy of their (ruling bloc) cause. Gramsci suggests that hegemony is operated mainly through the ideological practices of groups in civil society, such as educational institutions, media, religious organizations and political parties.

The divergent nature of the various debates notwithstanding, democracy scholars are agreed that it is necessary to counter-balance state power with the demands for autonomy that arise from civil society. It is recognized that without the protective, redistributive and conflict-mediating functions of the state, civil society can degenerate into a battlefield, in which the stronger enjoy the freedom to twist the arms of the weaker. In other words, under extreme conditions, civil society could even haemorrhage to death.[16]

The state and society exist then in the final analysis in a symbiotic relationship. While civil associations depend for their coordination upon centralized state institutions, a pluralist civil society 'independent' of the state is an indispensable condition of sustainable democracy.

Liberalisation

The term liberalisation refers to a mixed bag of regime led policies that range from the tolerance of political opposition, less censorship of the press, a more open as

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[16] Nobert Elia, "Violence and Civilization," in John Keane., ed., Civil Society and The State, London and New York: Verso, 1988.

opposed to a highly regulated economy, greater latitude and autonomy for associational groups. Its focus is largely on the relationship between the state and civil society rather than on state structures.[17]

The economic import of liberalization can be traced back to the writings of the early liberal economic theorist, Adam Smith. In his treatise titled The Wealth of Nations,[18] Smith examined how self-interest and competition created the most wealth for nations. In Smith's market economy, the sole end of production is to satisfy the demands of consumers and to produce goods and services as cheaply as possible. When demand for a product increases, existing producers make higher profits, and this in turn calls forth more production from other competing firms. The laws of supply and demand ensure that consumers are charged prices that reflect the true cost of production.

In his support of the market, he recognizes that self-interest is not an attractive motive in itself. He contends, however, that it (self-interest) is the most natural powerful

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[17] Extracted and improved upon by author from Alfred Stepan (ed.), Democratizing Brazil, Problems of Transition and Consolidation, New York, Oxford University Press, 1989, p.ix. See also Shahid Qadir, Christopher Clapham and Barry Gills, "Sustainable Democracy: Formalism vs Substance" Third World Quarterly, Volume 14 (3) 1993, pp. 416-417 and also Elly Rijnierse, "Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa?" in Third World Quarterly, Volume 14 (3) 1993, pp. 652-653.

[18] Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations: An Inquiry Into The Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations, Edited by R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976, 1st Edition.

motive of man. As he puts it:

> It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the
> brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner,
> but from their regard to their own interest. We
> address ourselves, not to their humanity but to
> their self-love, and never talk to them of our own
> necessities but their advantages. [19]

What restrains individuals to perpetuate destructive self-interest are competitive forces which act as an 'invisible hand' guiding the market to offer goods and services of a quality and price which reflects the true costs of production.

Another prominent protagonist of the market, Frederick Hayek, denies that effective and efficient social institutions can ever be centrally planned.[20] His thesis is that an arrangement based on conscious design is based on the false assurption that the organizer has objective knowledge and knows what is best for everyone. The deliberate ordering of society according to, say, a central plan, he cautions, might prove to be disastrous. Hayek's message to central planners is:

> If the human intellect is allowed to impose a
> preconcei.ad pattern on society, if our powers of
> reasoning are allowed to lay claim to a monopoly of
> creative effort... then we must not be surprised if
> society, as such, ceases to function as a creative
> force.[21]

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[19] Ibid., pp. 26-27

[20] F. Hayek, _The Constitution of Liberty: Law, Legislation and Liberty_, 3 vols, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973-79.

[21] F.Hayek, _New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas_, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 247.

A centrally planned economy is a direct negation of Hayek's notion of **liberty**, which he defines as the state in which a man is not subject to coercion by the arbitrary will of another or others.[22] In order to minimize the occasions on which individuals are made to submit to someone else's will, society needs an impersonal mechanism to integrate individual actions. It is this mechanism that the market economy provides. In such an economy, a mixture of individuals' skills and luck determine where they will be placed on the ladder of income and wealth. One's relative position is not the result of anyone's deliberate action (as is the case in a planned economy), but the outcome of a process over which nobody has any control.

Much of the contemporary economic liberalization "putsch" is attributed to the writings of the public choice theorists.[23] Public choice advocates question the wisdom of government intervention in the economy. To them, such intervention has extended well beyond what is necessary. Public control is seen as illegitimate because political

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[22] Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, p 172.

[23] For earlier work on public choice theory see for example, James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962; and also James M. Buchanan and Robert Tollison (eds.), Theory of Public Choice, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972. A more recent analysis is offered by Jan-Erik Lane (ed.), Bureaucracy and Public Choice, London: Sage, 1987, pp. 1-77.

objectives are held to be less valid than market criteria. If liberal democracy is to be safeguarded, they argue, then the economy must be safeguarded from political gladiators. Public enterprise managers are seen as being motivated by power and prestige and, in coalition with bureaucrats, will strive to maximize their budgets while commercial objectives for which the enterprises were set up to pursue are sacrificed.[24]

Such a liberal position has been criticised on a number of counts. A large number of critics view the whole privatization debate as an ideological offensive against the public sector.[25] To them, the theoretical arguments for privatization are not based on any empirical evidence but on ideological convictions.[26] The assertion made that the profitability of public enterprises depends on the system of ownership is also strongly disputed.[27] It is pointed out that the contemporary experiences of Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore show that these countries achieved economic growth 'not by rigorously applying the tenets of textbook market economics, but by combining major state intervention in

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[24] W.A. Niskanem, Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Chicago: Aldine-Artheton, 1971.

[25] Kate Ascher, The Politics of Privatisation: Contracting Out Public Services, London: Macmillan Education, 1987, p. 253.

[26] The Economist, 21 September 1985, p. 72.

[27] Robert Milward, "The comparative performance of public and private ownership," in Lord Rall of Ipsden (ed.), The Mixed Economy, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982, pp. 83-4.

economic areas.'[28]

By contrast, other critics point out that the success stories concerning efficiency of the private sector, and hence, privatization, in the West have marginal lessons for developing countries' situations. While privatization in the West may simply entail the transfer of ownership from the public to private citizens, privatization in the developing countries may mean the internationalization of important sectors of the economy.[29] The rebuttals from the left notwithstanding, the liberal economic ideology has taken centre stage. Its message is loud and clear: 'roll back the frontiers of the state' while enhancing the scope of private ownership and the private sector.

The political import of liberalization can be characterized as an "invisible transition" to democracy.[30] The process is one in which formerly restricted rights are extended as the state increasingly fails to control the pressures from below; i.e. from civil society. The transition from "authoritarianism" to political liberalization follows

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[28] Armeane Choksi, State Intervention in the Industrialization of Developing Countries: selected issues, Washington DC: World Bank, 1979, p. 23.

[29] Samuel Paul, "Privatization and the Public Sector," Finance and Development, 22(4) December 1985.

[30] M.A. Garretton, "Popular Mobilization and the Military Regime in Chile: The Complexities of the Invisible Transition," in Susan Eckstein (ed), Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.

some discernable patterns.[31] It begins with the regime extending formerly restricted rights to "new" or reactivated opposition groups or coalitions although at that stage the regime still attempts to limit and control the process. Pressures from previously suppressed organizations-- labour unions, student movements, political parties, and new groups are therefore essential to advance the transition process.[32]

As the "assault" on the state from civil society is mounted those groups in civil society with "common" interests eventually unite around common issues that range from general demands for greater participation in the political and economic arenas to specific concerns aimed at institutionalizing democratization.[33]

Corporatism

Finally, the term corporatism will be used to describe a distinctive way in which interests and groups are organized and how they interact with the state. Its central feature is

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[31] For detailed discussion on political liberalization see for example Michael Bratton, "Political Liberalization in Africa in the 1990s: advances and setbacks," in *USAID, Economic Reform in Africa's new era of political liberalization*, (Proceedings of a Workshop for SPA Donors), 1993 and also Richard Sandbrook, The Politics of Africa's Economic Recovery, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

[32] For more on the liberalization process, see for example, Terry Karl's "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," Comparative Politics, 23 (1) 1990, pp 11-12.

[33] See for example Nora Hamilton and Eun Mee Kim, "Economic and Political Liberalization in South Korea and Mexico," Third World Quarterly, 14 (1) 1993

that, in a fully corporatist system, organized interests are institutionally structured in a manner that restricts competition and openness among them.[34] In essence, that relationship is one in which civil society associations are top-led by the dominant political elites rather than bottom-led by their own members.[35]

Although the writings of Shonfield, [36] and Rokkan[37] constitute some of the earlier well-articulated definitions of corporatism, for the purposes of this study, Alfred Stepan and Phillipe Schmitter's conceptions of state corporatism will be utilized. Stepan's definition is a good starting point as it gets closest to depicting the nature of interest mediation in Zimbabwe. He writes:

> Corporatism refers to a particular set of policies and institutional arrangements for structuring interest representation. Where such arrangements predominate, the state often charters or even creates interest groups, attempts to regulate their number, and gives them the appearance of a quasi-representational monopoly along with special prerogatives. In return for such prerogatives and

[34] Stepan (ed), The State and Society, p. 46; and also Shaheen Mczaffar, "Clarifying Some Analytical Issues in Corporatism," in Julius Nyang'oro and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), Corporatism in Africa: Comparative Analysis and Practice, Boulder: Westview Press, 1989.

[35] See for example, Williams, Corporatism in Perspective, pp. 75-92.

[36] A. Shonfield, Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power, London, Oxford University Press, 1965.

[37] Rokkan, S, "Norway: numerical democracy and corporate pluralism" in R. Dahl, ed., Political Opposition in Western Democracies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.

monopolies the state claims the right to monitor
representational groups by a variety of mechanisms
in order to discourage the expression of "narrow"
class-based, conflictual demands.[38]

Stepan's definition stresses the procedural components of interest mediation. In the present case, from the onset of its rule, ZANU-PF has insisted that there be single representatives of both commercial and industrial capital, of agriculture and of workers.[39] It has always preferred institutionally-structured unions in which the state monitors the activities of such groups. The central theme of such a system is that it restricts competition among organized interests. This stands in contrast to the general principles of a pluralist political system in which organized interests are in competition with each other.

Schmitter's definition is worth discussing at length because of its pervasive influence in the burgeoning literature on corporatism especially in the South. He defines it as:

a system of interest representation in which the
constituent units are organized into a limited
number of singular, compulsory, non competitive,
hierarchically ordered and functionally
differentiated categories, recognized or licensed
(if not created) by the state and granted a
deliberate representational monopoly within their

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[38] Stepan, The State and Society, p. 46

[39] See for example, Bruce Mitchell, "The State and The Workers Movement in Zimbabwe", South African Labour Bulletin, Vol. 12, no.6\7 (August-September 1987), pp 104-122; and Brian Wood, "Roots of Trade Union Weakness in Post-Independence Zimbabwe," ibid, pp. 47-92; and also "Single Body to speak for Commerce is Official Aim" The Herald, December 8, 1980.

respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supporters.[40]

When this definition is applied to the Zimbabwean situation, it fails to capture fully the form and nature of interest representation in that country. The "singular" criteria does not apply since Zimbabwean interest groups, especially those representing capital have always been represented by two or more organizations despite the governing elite's calls to integrate. The criterion of "compulsory" membership does not apply as it fails to account for the presence of a multiplicity of civil associations in the country. The "non-competitive" does apply to labour, at least until 1990, although other organizations like farmers' and teachers' organizations have always competed amongst themselves. [41]

The theoretical and political implications of all these observations are that there is no comprehensive corporatist system operating in Zimbabwe, but rather there is a regulated political system in which some sectors (especially the working class) reflect Stepan and Schmitter's definitions of corporatism. A wholesale application of the two's definition of corporatism would thus be inappropriate as it would fail to take into cognisance the fact that there are some organized

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[40] Phillipe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" Review of Politics 85 (Jan., 1974) 85-131, p. 104.

[41] Wood, "Trade Union Organization," 1988.

interests that are relatively autonomous.

The preceding observation calls for an analytical framework that recognizes the relatively plural nature of the Zimbabwean body politic and also its oft-cited preference for "mediated interests" along organic statist lines.[42] An appropriate approach favoured here is one that juxtaposes corporatism and pluralism as distinctive processes coexisting in any polity, so that one can speak of coexisting corporatist and competitive spheres of politics.

Once it is acknowledged that pluralism and corporatism are not exclusive competing explanatory paradigms, more attention can then be given to specifying the relationship between the two. This can be done by viewing pluralism and corporatism as "end points on a continuum." On the one hand is the open, competitive and amorphous interplay of interests characteristic of pluralism; on the other end is the closed, monopolistic pattern of interests best captured by the notion of corporatism.

Thus, while democratic theory will constitute the salient

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[42] As explained earlier in chapter one organic statist writings stress the need for organic unity and harmony of the political and societal community along unitary state structured lines. Such an ordered system stands in contrast to the general ethos of a pluralist system where organized interests are independent and in competition rather than collaboration with each other.

As shall become clear later in the discussion, this preference for consolidated movements along organic statist models constituted a central component of state corporatism in Zimbabwe.

analysis, corporatism and statism will be used as supplementary compatible analytical frameworks. I will view corporatism as a preserve neither of authoritarian nor democratic systems, but rather as a model in which both systems by and large accord with the model.[43]

THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT

There are at least three sets of perspectives that underlie the contemporary democracy debate as it has arisen in Africa. These three, which are the focus of my next discussion are the liberal, the populist and the statist approaches.

Liberal democracy

The liberal approach draws its inspiration from Western liberal political philosophy and its notion of the compatibility between and desirability of parliamentary government and the free market. While the cliched idea that democracy implies "government of the people, by the people, for the people"[44] is still the bedrock of democratic beliefs, most scholars are agreed that such a notion has little relevance to modern-day polities.

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[43] Phillipe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" in P.C. Schmitter and G. Lehmbruch (eds), Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation, London and Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979, p. 18. Unlike Latin American writers who have associated corporatism with authoritarianism, Schmitter is of the view that such countries as Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark and Portugal exhibit some corporatist tendencies in their dealings with organized interests.

[44] This definition was proffered by the United States President Abraham Lincoln on 19 November 1863.

What is more relevant is the notion of "representative democracy" in which 'by the people' is interpreted as meaning *by the representatives of the people*. Democracy is then generally taken to mean a political system in which:

> virtually all adult citizens are entitled to vote for a party or candidate of their choice; those who govern are selected by the votes of citizens in elections in which more than one candidate has a reasonable chance of victory; there is a substantial freedom for citizens to organize or join political parties and interest groups and act individually to influence public policy decisions. [45]

This definition corresponds closely to the authoritative definition offered by the editors of a comprehensive four volume study on Democracy in Developing Countries. For them democracy denotes a system of government that meets certain conditions:

> meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and free elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and a level of civil and political liberties - freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations-sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation. [46]

The net result is a relatively free political environment in which inhabitants can choose their own representatives through

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[45] John Peeler, Latin American Democracies, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985, p. 5.

[46] Larry Diamond et al, Politics in Developing Countries: Africa Volume 2. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988, p.xvi.

regular competitive elections. This leads to the theoretical question of how the representatives are chosen.

The extensive literature on voting refers to elections in democratic liberal settings based on the assumptions associated with theories of consent and accountability. These include theories about the consent of the governed, periodic appraisals of the public officials by a populace utilizing electoral mechanisms, and the use of public control over government officials.[47]

When the voters elect their representatives, the element of choice must be as wide as possible. A wider selection of candidates, it is argued, gives room for a competitive environment. It is through competition that choice is made meaningful in an election.[48]

Democratic Preconditions

There are several assumptions associated with the existence and sustainability of a stable liberal democratic polity. First, a certain degree of **national wealth** is considered a prerequisite for democracy. Market economies in themselves are not enough; a country has to cross a minimum

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[47] Fred M. Hayward (ed.), Elections in Independent Africa, Colorado: Boulder: Westview Press, 1987, p. 2.

[48] The notion of adversarial politics with recognized official opposition parties has until recently been the exception rather than the norm in Africa. To some the elimination of political opposition parties after independence marked the breakdown of liberal democracy in the continent. For more on this see Robert Fatton, "Liberal Democracy in Africa," Political Science Quarterly, Volume 105 (3), 1990.

threshold of economic performance before political competition can be institutionalized. As Seymour Martin Lipset has categorically stated 'the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.'[49] What Lipset is asserting is that a wealthy economy makes possible higher levels of literacy, education, urbanization, and mass media exposure while in turn providing resources to mitigate the tensions produced by political conflict. Proponents of this view often gauge a country's prospects for democracy by its per capita gross domestic product, leading the political observer to await the moment when a particular country would cross 'the threshold' into democracy.[50]

A second set of preconditions underlying traditional approaches to democracy derive from the concept of **political culture**.[51] This concept identifies underlying psychological forces that shape much of civil life. Political culture has

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[49] Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review, 53, March 1959. For the various critiques on this association of wealth with democracy see for example Adam Przeworski, "The Neoliberal Fallacy," Journal of Democracy, vol.3, no.3, July 1992, pp.45-59; and also Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

[50] For a reflective discussion on this association between democracy and economic development see, Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 35, nos 4-5, March-June 1992, pp. 450-99.

[51] The concept of political culture was first introduced by Almond Gabriel and Sidney Verba in their book, The Civic Culture, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

been defined by Walter Rosenbaum in two ways.[52] If the
attention is on the individual, then political culture entails
all the important ways in which an individual is subjectively
oriented toward the essentials in his/her political system.
This is basically a psychological focus in which the observer
wants to know what the individual feels and thinks about the
symbols, institutions, and rules that constitute the
fundamental political order of the individual's society and
how the person responds to them. In effect, one is seeking to
establish the existence of bonds between the individual and
his political system and how these bonds affect the person's
behaviour.

The other definition refers to the collective orientation
of people toward the basic elements in their political system.
This has been referred to as 'the system level' approach in
which one is interested in knowing how large masses of
citizens evaluate their political institutions. In other
words, do people in a particular polity have similar or
compatible political culture orientations which are congenial
to the political institutions within which they live? Is there
a consensus of certain values and beliefs with which people
can identify? A **civic culture** of this sort rests on widely

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[52] Walter Rosenbaum, Political Culture, New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1975, p.4. Earlier works on political culture
include, Lucian Pye and Sydney Verba, Political Culture and
Political Development, Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1965, and Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell Jr.,
Comparative Politics: a Developmental Approach, Boston, Little
Brown, 1966, especially Chapter 3.

differentiated social structure with relatively autonomous social and occupational sectors.

Third, specific domestic **historical conditions** and configurations are said to be prerequisites for democracy. It is asserted that the order in which various crises of modernization appeared and were settled determined whether economic and social transformations were conducive to the development of a lasting democratic tradition. Democratic regimes are therefore more likely to emerge if problems of nation building and national identity are resolved prior to the establishment of central government.[53]

In a different, historically grounded vein, Barrington Moore, contends that in the cases he studied (Britain, France and the United States), evolving relationships between **three classes** have determined twentieth century political outcomes.[54] The three are the landed aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, and the peasantry. In all the three cases, the bourgeois class emerged as the dominant one. The other two classes are deemed either to have come to terms with the bourgeoisie or to have been eliminated as major forces. The emergence of liberal democracy is thus seen by Moore as a direct manifestation of bourgeois dominance.

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[53] See for example, Leonard Binder, et al, Crises and Sequences in Political Development, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.

[54] Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Boston: Beacon Press, 1966.

The 'preconditions' analysis, it must be admitted, is theoretically interesting. To be sure, the argument that economic conditions can act as a factor that can be supportive or non-supportive of democracy is a valid one. A poor hungry individual probably thinks more about where the next meal will come from, than who should get into the State House. However, if the level of economic development becomes the primary measure or correlate of democratization, then most oil producing (OPEC) and Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) should be democracies by now.

The static and deterministic nature of the preconditions analysis makes liberal democracy a less useful theoretical guide when applied to countries that are characterized by undeveloped class structur-s, poverty and instability. Many African countries lack most of the preconditions associated with liberal democracy. So, as a useful theoretical guide, such an approach does not offer much to the continent.

The statist form

The statist approach's emphasis on economic development has sparked debates over the past two decades on the issue of what must come first: democracy or development.[55] There are

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[55] See for example J.S. Coleman "The Political Systems of Developing Areas," in G. Almond and J. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of Developing Areas, 1971; P. McGowan and J. Johnson, "Military Coup d'Etats and Underdevelopment," Journal of Modern African Studies, 22 (4) 633-667, 1985; T.M. Call y, "Politics and Vision in Africa: The Interplay of Domination, Equality and Liberty," in Chabal ed, Political Domination in

those who assert that economic development must come first and is likely to require authoritarian regimes to implement. National development, it is argued must take priority and must not be exposed to the divisiveness of competitive party politics. The advocates of this view generally subordinate the case for liberal democracy to other development imperatives like order, stability, efficiency and growth. [56]

The thesis is that a cohesive authoritarian ruling elite is essential in the early stages of development. Faced with the basic dilemma of how to get rid of poverty, malnutrition and illiteracy, political issues of constitutional arrangements and various democratic forms are viewed as abstract concepts by the masses. Moreover, democratic institutions, it is argued, can produce deleterious repercussions in the early stages of development. As one writer puts it:

> The exercise of civil and political rights may disrupt or threaten to destroy even the best-laid development plan, and must therefore be temporarily suspended. For example, elected officials are likely to support policies based on short-run political expediency rather than to insist on politically unpopular but economically essential sacrifices. Freedoms of speech, press, and assembly may be exercised so as to create or inflame social divisions, which an already fragile polity may be unable to endure; free trade unions

Africa, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986; and also L. Sirowy and A. Inkeles, "Effects of Democracy on Economic Growth and Inequality: A Review," Studies in Comparative International Development, 25 (1), 126-157, 1990.

[56] See for example, Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

often merely seek additional special benefits for a labour aristocracy; elaborate and punctilious legal systems on the Western model seem to be extravagant anachronisms...[57]

This argument has been attacked for its flawed assumptions. First, it is premised on the modernization theory which assumes that African countries would necessarily follow the stages of development traversed by the West. The major anomaly of such an analysis is that it portrays development as an evolutionary movement towards the 'standards' of the Western industrial countries. It fails to take into account the fact that the experience of the West is based on its specific social and political conditions that cannot be universally applied to all countries.

Secondly, even if all societies were to evolve on Western lines, what would happen when some societies tampered with the natural evolution of others? The protagonists of this view fail to realize that African countries were prevented from evolving their own systems by colonialism. As Colin Leys argues, the 'backwardness' of Africa was not an original backwardness that had once been universal. It was a 'new form of backwardness, the product of colonialism.'[58]

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[57] G. Donnelly, 1984 quoted in Richard Sandbrook, "Liberal Democracy in Africa: A Socialist Revisionist Perspective," Canadian Journal of African Studies, Volume 22, 2, 1988, p. 245

[58] Colin Leys, "Africa's Economic Development Theory and Practice," in E. Doro and N.M. Stulz (eds.), Governing In Black Africa, New York, Africana Publishing Company, 1986. P 169.

Thirdly, modernization theory, strongly rooted in the Euro-American evolution of capitalist development and liberal democracy, fails to take into account that these countries developed at a time when the world was scientifically and technologically undeveloped. They did not have to confront the challenge of a 'more developed' world than themselves.[59] Such an environment enabled them to develop their economic and political structures at their own pace. Needless to say, that pace was slow and painful. There must therefore be an African search for other processes by which one can achieve such 'modernization' since the historical circumstances of Africa and Europe are different.

For how long then should the inhabitants of Africa wait before a high mass consumption society that might allow a free press and the free interplay of organized interests emerges? In Africa, few dictatorships have been development-oriented. One study on liberal democracy in the continent found out that the four countries with the worst economic performance were Ghana, Niger, Uganda and Zaire.[60] Needless to say, all of these had authoritarian regimes during most of the twenty year period of study. On the other side of the coin, four countries

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[59] This point has been discussed at length by Abubakar Ahmad, Af.:ica and The Challenge of Development: Acquiescence and Dependency versus Freedom and Development, New York: Preager, 1989.

[60] Sandbrook, "The State and Economic Stagnation in Tropical Africa" World Development, 14 (3) 19.6. In these countries per capita income declined at an annual rate of two percent from 1965 to 1985.

with the best economic performance (those in which per capita GNP grew at an annual rate of more than two percent) are Botswana, Cameroon, Lesotho and Mauritius. At that time of the study, the first two featured as Africa's leading democracies, whereas the last two had relatively benign authoritarian regimes.

In general, there have been more instances of internal war and rioting in countries governed by autocratic than by democratic regimes in Africa. Coups and their inherent destabilizing nature have afflicted authoritarian regimes more than the more democratic regimes. Very often, one party states have slid into personalistic dictatorships or military juntas. Not only have one party or 'one-man rule' dictatorships failed to facilitate development; they have also retarded economic growth through their preoccupation with the 'politics' of their own survival.

In sum, the 'developmentalist state'[61] idea constitutes an instrumentalist view of democracy which views it as an efficacious political means to development. Democracy is not taken as a separate challenge. It is put on the agenda not as an end in itself but as means to achieving a sustainable level of economic development.

The shortcomings of such an approach are apparent. By

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[61] The developmentalist state idea owes its origin to arguments that gives primacy to economic development. In the short term, democracy must be sacrificed until a country reaches a certain level of sustainable economic growth.

utilizing arguments that give primacy to development, the analysis clouds some unsavoury - even unacceptable - characteristics associated with the pursuit of development as an end in itself.

Popular democracy

The shortcomings of both the liberal and statist approaches have propelled radical scholars in Africa to offer an alternative approach. Unlike the liberal and the statist approaches that give primacy to economic development the radical theorists emphasize the importance of mobilizing the "popular forces." They draw their intellectual inspiration from the historical experiences of 19th and 20th century Europe and the late 20th century liberation struggles in the continent in which the concerted efforts of popular groups forced various colonial and exclusive regimes to succumb to democratic rule.

Popular scholars acknowledge that the building of a democratic culture entails the reconstitution and strengthening of civil society groups that have been crushed by post-colonial regimes.[62] Anyang' Nyong'o expects the 'popular protests' to take many forms, including alliances of students, trade unions, religious organizations, among many others.[63] To him, the nature and form of democracy must be

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[62] Claude Ake, "Democracy and Development," West Africa, March 26, 1990, p. 591.

[63] Anyang Nyong'o, ed., Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa, London: Zed, 1987

articulated by these groups.[64] He is supported by Mahmood Mamdani who sees the primary task of popular forces as breaking the economic hegemony which the bourgeoisie has over the peasantry. This is to be achieved through the transformation of production relations.[65]

Popular democracy scholars are not agreed, however, on how the alliances of popular movements can be translated into democratic state power.[66] Apart from Gutto's feeble outdated advocacy of armed struggle, most proponents of the popular form fail to offer viable guidelines.[67] Critics are sceptical about how an impoverished and oppressed mass strata can emerge as a major democratic force with which to reckon.[68]

Their scepticism is justified. To be sure, civil structures in the rural areas, where the majority of people live and work, are small in scale and very local in

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[64] Nyong'o, "Political Instability and the Prospects for Democracy in Africa," Africa Development, 13, 1, p. 81.

[65] Mahmood Mamdani, "Contradictory Class Perspectives on the Question of Democracy: The Case of Uganda," in Anyang' Nyong'o, ed., Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa, p. 93.

[66] Samir Amin, "The State and the Question of Development," preface to Anyang' Nyong'o (ed.) Popular Struggles for Democracy, 1987.

[67] S.B.O. Gutto, "Social Revolutions - The Preconditions for Sustainable Development and People's Democracies in Africa: A Contribution to the Anyang' Nyong'o/Mkandawire Debate," Africa Development, Volume 12 (4) 1988.

[68] See for example, B. Beckman, "Peasants and Democratic Struggles in Nigeria," Review of African Political Economy, 1988, Vol. 41

orientation. The tragedy of such a state of affairs is that the intensity of concern with local issues leads to a situation where events at the national level are viewed with a certain level of disinterestedness. The problem is compounded by the fact that peasant identity stems not from class consciousness but from kinship and traditional norms and customs.[69] It becomes difficult to galvanize such a proto-class as it does not operate as a homogenous group with common interests.

All in all, popular democracy challenges the universality of liberal values and the authoritarian stance of statist positions. Its major weakness is that it has not been well-developed as a serious viable option. In the present debate on democracy, the popular remains 'fuzzy and confused'[70] in light of the apparent triumph of liberal and neo-liberal ideology.[71]

PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: AN ASSESSMENT

The literature reviewed above summarizes the views of the liberal, statist and popular democracy theorists. Given the divergent nature of these three schools of thought, a balanced

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[69] See Richard Sandbrook, The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 65.

[70] Issa Shivji (ed.), State and Constitutionalism : An African Debate on Democracy, Harare: SAPES, 1991, p. 255.

[71] Larry Diamond, "The Globalization of Democracy," in Robert O. Slater, Barry M. Schultz and Steven Dorr, eds., Global Transformation and the Third World, Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1993.

approach to the study of democracy in Africa must involve the adoption of a tough and questioning attitude towards liberal assertions, whilst at the same time, rejecting the aggressive ideology of those who are `geared up to sell' the liberal democratic ideology wholesale.

Scholars on democracy in Africa are generally unenthusiastic about the prospects for sustaining liberal democracy there. A large number of them emphasise how colonial practices encouraged the emergence of one-party states in the continent.[72] According to Chabal, it would have been historical blindness to expect democracy to flourish given the autocratic nature of colonial rule. To him, colonialism failed to erect a sturdy political base upon which democracy could flourish.[73] By contrast Richard Sandbrook is more cautious about dismissing liberal democracy outright. While he recognizes the problems confronting the fledging `democracies' of Africa, he nevertheless advocates a liberal-democratic model that promotes decentralization in decision-making and satisfies basic needs.[74] This is a radical shift from his earlier view in which he argued that the best alternative then was `decent, responsive and largely even-handed personal

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[72] See for example Richard Sandbrook, "Hobbled Leviathans: Constraints on State Formation in Africa," International Journal, 1986, XL1, and Chabal (ed.), Political Domination in Africa.

[73] Chabal ed., Political Domination in Africa, p. 2.

[74] Sandbrook, "Taming the African Leviathan," p. 698.

rule.'[75] His revised position owes its inspiration to the fact that such countries as Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius and Senegal have had some semblance of representative democracies for more than a decade.

However critics are not convinced that such countries represent v. le liberal democracies at all. They point out that the majority of these cases have small populations,[76] strong one-party dominance and other repressive features.[77]

Democracy, viewed in strictly bourgeois terms is not the answer, according to Nyong'o.[78] Using the example of Nigeria, he argues at no time has the bourgeoisie in that country thought it necessary to give more content to the democratic process and involve the masses.

Liberal and radical scholars agree that the low level of industrialization and the associated poverty levels are major obstacles to democratization. The social foundations upon which liberal democracy rests (for example, strong middle class and organized working class) are largely in their formative stages. In the absence of an established capitalist society, liberal democracy can be ruled out as a real option.

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[75] Sandbrook, The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation, p. 157.

[76] John Healey and Mark Robinson, Democracy, Governance and Economic Policy: Sub-Saharan Africa in Comparative Perspective, London: ODI, 1992, p. 139.

[77] Wiseman, Democracy in Black Africa, Chapter 4.

[78] Nyong'o, "Political Instability and The Prospects for Democracy," p. 78.

Democracy under Structural Adjustment

Given this gloomy assessment, what then are current prospects of a strong civil society emerging in the continent? Larry Diamond sees the current World Bank and International Monetary Fund initiatives to open up the market and `roll back the state' as the most significant boosts yet to the democratic prospect on the continent.[79] The argument is that the retreat of the state will create a mixed economy and an enlarged political space within which associational life can flourish. It is under such conditions that groups within civil society will captivate a following.

Yet a large number of academics and other analysts disagree. To some SAPs are simply short-term financial crisis management techniques which fail to look ahead.[80] The former executive director of the Economic Commission for Africa, Professor Adedeji has warned `that to permit orthodox SAP, as we have known them in the 1980s, to dominate the 1990s would reduce Africa to an abyss so low that it would be virtually impossible to emerge from it.'[81]

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[79] Diamond, "Introduction: Roots of Failure, Seeds of Hope," in Larry Diamond, et al (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa, p. 27.

[80] See for example, IDS Bulletin, January, 1988; UNICEF, Adjustment With a Human Face: Protecting the Vulnerable and Promoting Growth, Oxford: OUP, 1987 and also Fred Bienefeld, `The Significance of the Newly Industrializing Countries for the Development Debate.' Studies in Political Economy, 25, 1988.

[81] West Africa, 8-14 January, 1990, p. 1.

Other academics point out however that little empirical evidence exists on the long-run effects of the Fund and World Bank programmes. They view the structural adjustment programmes forced upon African countries as geared to achieving quick, short-term improvements in the balance of payments at the cost of severe economic hardships.[82] The South Commission Report has pointed out that the 'the policies...of the international financial institutions... must bear a heavy responsibility for forcing developing countries onto a path of prolonged stagnation and retrenchment.'[83]

Other theorists are concerned that the World Bank's structural adjustment programmes in their present form can only be implemented by 'courageous, ruthless and possibly undemocratic governments.'[84] The World Bank's response would seem to encourage the emergence of such dictators when it states that 'however difficult the policy reforms may have been to adopt, in due course they will create much easier conditions for developing countries than would prevail if the

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[82] See, for example, Julius Nyang'oro and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), Beyond Structural Adjustment in Africa: The Political Economy of Sustainable and Democratic Development, New York: Praeger, 1992.

[83] South Commission, The Challenge to the South, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 70.

[84] M. Bienefeld, "The Significance of Newly Industrializing Countries," p. 14.

reforms were derailed or abandoned!'[85]

One notable African scholar, Claude Ake, is emphatic that de-statization or even the 'strength' of the state has nothing to do with the strengthening of democracy. He dismisses the assumption that if the state is weakened democracy is strengthened on the grounds that it is empirically unproven. He argues that the states in Africa are paradoxical: they are strong from one perspective and also very weak. He cites the example of Zaire as one case in which the state is authoritarian but has very little penetrative capacity.[86] This argument is similar to Mazrui's observation that African states are 'excessively authoritarian to disguise the fact that (they are) inadequately authoritative.'[87]

While scholars are not agreed on the nature and prospects of democracy, liberal and radical positions converge in their emphasis on the need for an autonomous civil society.[88] Both

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[85] The World Bank, quoted in ibid., p. 14

[86] Claude Ake, 'The Case for Democracy,' in Carter Centre, African Governance in the 1990s, Atlanta, Georgia, March 1990, p. 5.

[87] Ali A.Mazrui, "Political Engineering in Africa," quoted in Michael Bratton, 'Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa,' p. 410.

[88] See for example Bjorn Beckman's analysis, "Whose Democracy? Bourgeois versus Popular Democracy," Review of Africa Political Economy, 1990, Numbers 45/46, p. 90. It must be noted also that in general scholars fall in between those who subscribe to the state-civil society polarity paradigm which views civil society in oppositional terms to the state and others who, while subscribing to the notion of independent civil society, would still prefer a closer state-civil society relationship. Scholars like J.-F. Bayart "Civil Society in

sides tend to agree that, in the absence of groups that are independent of the state, any talk about sustaining democracy is meaningless.[89]

For example, Ibbo Mandaza asserts that any meaningful discussion on democracy in Africa cannot be carried out without a specific focus on the analysis of the post-colonial state and its relationship to civil society.[90] To Diamond the pressure for regime transformation will not come from above but from civil society.[91]

Michael Bratton sees groups in civil society such as trades unions, business groups, student organizations,

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Africa" in <u>Political Domination in Africa</u>, edited by P. Chabal, 109-25; J.D Barkan, "The Rise and Fall of a Governance Realm in Kenya," in <u>Governance and Politics in Africa</u>, edited by G. Hyden and M. Bratton, 167-92 fall in the former while Naomi Chazan's "Africa's Democratic Challenge: Strengthening Civil Society and The State," <u>World Policy Journal</u>, Spring 1992 falls in the latter camp.

[89] See for example, Rene Lemarchand, "Uncivil States and Civil Societies: How Illusion Became Reality," <u>Journal of Modern African Studies</u>, 30 (2) 1992; Naomi Chazan, "Africa's Democratic Challenge," <u>World Policy Journal</u>, Spring 1992; Samuel Decalo, "The Process, Prospects and Constraints of Democratization in Africa," <u>African Affairs</u>, 19, 1992; and Robert Fatton, "Democracy and Civil Society in Africa," <u>Mediterranean Quarterly</u>, Fall 1991

[90] See for example, Mandaza, "The One-Party State and Democracy in Southern Africa: Towards a Conceptual Framework," in Ibbo Mandaza and Lloyd Sachikonye (eds.), <u>The One Party State and Democracy: The Zimbabwe Debate</u>, Harare, SAPES, 1991 p. 19.

[91] Diamond, "Introduction: Roots of Failure, Seeds of Hope' in Diamond, <u>et al</u> (eds.), 1988; and G.Hyden "State and Nation Under Stress," in Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <u>Recovery in Africa: A Challenge for Development Cooperation in the 1990s</u>, Stockholm, 1988.

professional associations, religious communities, peasant leagues, women's clubs and various tribal and ethnic associations as constituting civil society in Africa. He further views such groups as offering avenues through which people can be trained in what democratic idea_s entail. The same groups would also act as bulwarks for democratic principles and as buffers against monopoly state power.[92]

Other analyses have pointed out that Africa has a vibrant civil society tradition which is not in any way associated with 'modernization.' According to this view, civil society in Africa

> is formed less by the institutions of learning and professional bodies which have long since been taken over by tyrannical governments, but rather by the extended family relationships and religious and ethnic associations which have been the bulwark of freedom against both colonial and post-colonial tyrants.[93]

At this point a question may be posed: what theoretical conclusions can be derived from the Africa debate and how relevant are they to the Zimbabwean context?

THE ZIMBABWE DEMOCRACY DEBATE

It is apparent that the broader "African" debate like the narrower Zimbabwean one is being carried out within a particular post-settler frame of reference in which democracy

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[92] Bratton, "Beyond the State," p. 416.

[93] Africa Confidential, Volume 31 (8) March 9 1990, p.2.

is viewed as 'a good thing' and, dictatorship, a 'bad thing.'[94] While in general this might be true, the adoption of a particular stance by the various writers denies the observer a balanced, critical and rigorous analysis of the factors that account for the emergence and perpetuation of authoritarian tendencies four years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. As Graham Fuller warns " [d]emocracy can become a trap when it stimulates the erroneous belief that with the passing of the Cold War we are emerging into a new and automatically promising world." [95]

In addition, no firm conclusions can be drawn from the discussion about the type(s) of democracy suitable for Africa at levels both of theory and praxis. While most scholars are agreed on the need for a more democratic as well as developmental Africa, they are not agreed on the form and nature of that democracy. Such a position is perhaps a reflection of the heterogenous nature of African societies. Indeed, from the perspective of world history and comparative politics, the reasons why societies come to accept or espouse democracy vary immensely from country to country. Needless to say, democracy in England, France, the United States on the one hand and Botswana, India, and Mauritius on the other developed in extremely distinctive ways. The distinctive

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[94] See Moyo, Voting for Democracy.

[95] G.E. Fuller, The Democracy Trap, Perils of the Post Cold War, 1991, p. 2.

institutions that were utilized to craft and design a specific democratic framework that is compatible with the cultural, social and political needs of each particular country differed from country to country.

Indeed, a doctrinaire global democratic theoretical framework is neither proper nor possible; it will simply sk the real variations among the countries under scrutiny. Detailed distinctive characteristics like the historical, economic and social peculiarities of countries undergoing democratic transformations must be taken into account before a powerful theoretical framework can be adopted.

Without doubt, there is a remarkable degree of convergence between regional and local scholars on the need for some form of democratic system in a case like that of Zimbabwe. In both cases the heat has gone out of earlier debates on such qualificatory concepts as "one-party democracy" "democratic centralism" or "African socialist democracy". No doubt this is one of the consequences of the ideological thaw that resulted from the collapse of the Cold War.

Like the broader Africa debate itself, the majority of Zimbabwean scholars on democracy fall within the alternative liberal and radical camps. The former take comfort from the fact that Zimbabwe has the most sophisticated economy in the African sub-continent next to that of South Africa. They note that economic activity is fairly commercialized not only in

the urban areas but also in the outlying 'growth points' and the rural areas.

Others take the view that Zimbabwe is and has always been a pluralist society. Religious, social, and ethnic pluralist tendencies have always been a feature of Zimbabwean political and social life.[96] As Sithole claims, it was this "pluralist dynamo" that propelled ZANU (PF) to break away from ZAPU back in 1963.[97] Jonathan Moyo takes this argument a step further. To him a liberal democratic framework is not a new discovery in Zimbabwe. As he puts it:

> The struggle for Zimbabwe was one of racism and not democracy. The basic ingredients for an institutional framework for national democracy were already present in Rhodesia despite, or because of, its racism.[98]

This argument, it m ;t be noted, however, is theoretically flawed. Denial of rights on grounds of race meant that a universal franchise did not exist in Rhodesia. Without either practice or experience how were the disenfranchised majority expected to grapple with constitutional arrangements that had their origins in England? While it is true that the basic ingredients of liberal democracy were already present in

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[96] Sithole, "Zimbabwe In Search of a Stable Democracy," in Diamond (ed.), Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa, 1988, pp. 454-455.

[97] Sithole, "Should Zimbabwe Go Where Others Are Coming From?" in Mandaza and Sachikonye (eds.), The One Party State and Democracy, 1991, p. 77.

[98] Moyo, "The Dialectics of National Unity and Democracy," in Mandaza and Sachikonye (eds.), The One Party State and Democracy, p. 85,

Rhodesia, the issue that is of theoretical interest is: what were the social, economic and political foundations of that liberal democracy in both settler and post-settler Zimbabwe?

An "authentic democratic" system is one in which there is a complementary relationship between democratic political institutions and social organizations. It is doubtful that the largely rural citizens of Zimbabwe identify closely with the political institutions which govern them, given the fact that they are largely unrelated to indigenous structures.

By all accounts, it is apparent that the democratic framework adopted in 1980 had no roots in the society it was designed to serve. Reliance was placed on fashioning constitutional systems that appealed to the formally educated elite ignoring the fact that the majority were simple country folk.

This point has been missed by scholars in Zimbabwe. They have tended to work their way backwards by identifying the end products of democracy as practised in the industrial countries--pluralist choice, individual rights and an independent judiciary--[99] without questioning the applicability of the inherited liberal democratic framework. The issue of how such values can be developed, nurtured and

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[99] See for example, Masipula Sithole, 'Zimbabwe: In Search of a Stable Democracy,' in Diamond et al (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa; Wiseman, Democracy in Black Africa: Survival and Renewal, pp. 74-86; and also Moyo, "The Dialectics of National Unity and Democracy" in Mandaza and Sachikonye (eds.), The One Party State and Democracy, 1991.

sustained is left largely unexplained.

By contrast, reflecting contemporary contexts, the radical camp, led by Mandaza, still adopt a rather classical Marxian and dependency approach to analysis. Mandaza is of the view that the debate on democracy must address the issue of 'democratizing the economy'. To him, this entails creating an economic framework that lays "the bases for [a] national economy, based on classes that have *national consciousness* and are therefore anti-imperialist."[100] These classes encompass a whole array of disadvantaged groups like the peasants, workers and student movements. As he sees it, the current SAP will accelerate the marginalization of these groups. To him the programmes will "strengthen the link between, on the one hand, international capital and, on the other, a growing alliance of an essentially compradorian (sic) state and the emergent compradorian black bourgeoisie." [101]

Mandaza's position is supported by Lloyd Sachikonye who also contends that the current SAP is not likely to financially empower the workers, poorer peasants and students but will instead enrich the emerging black bourgeoisie, the master farmers and the richer peasants. Sachikonye is of the view that the more "substantive content" of democracy such as

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[100] Mandaza, "The One-Party State and Democracy in Southern Africa: Towards a Conceptual Framework," in Mandaza and Sachikonye (eds.), The One Party State and Democracy, 1991, p. 39.

[101] Ibid, p. 38.

the land question, the liberalisation programme and the investment codes must target the disadvantaged groups in society. He foresees a major ideological contest between the winners and losers as the country embarks on its SAP.[102]

In a related vein, Andries Rukobo argues that, for democracy to be all-encompassing, it must not only address issues like property relations with a view to satisfying the aspirations of the masses and the workers but must also be anti-imperialist.[103] He is supported by Kempton Makamure who is adamant that the only class that has remained consistent in its defence of civil liberties is the working class. According to Makamure, this class laid the foundation for a mass democratic movement against settlerism. Unlike the bourgeoisie, who prevaricated from time to time, the workers have been unequivocal in their opposition to the one-party state in Zimbabwe. Any failure to recognise the political and economic potential of the working class in Zimbabwe, he contends, would be an exercise in historical dishonesty.[104]

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[102] Sachikonye, "The Context of the Democracy Debate" in Mandaza and Sachikonye (eds.), The One Party State and Democracy, 1991. See also his "From 'Equity and 'Participation' to Structural Adjustment: State and Social Movements in Zimbabwe," in David Moore and Gerald Schmitz (eds.), Crisis and Renewal in Development Discourse: Global and Regional Perspectives on Democracy, Sustainability and Equity, London: Macmillan Press, 1995.

[103] Rukobo, "Misplaced Emphasis in the Democracy Debate," in Mandaza and Sachikonye eds., The One Party State and Democracy.

[104] Makamure, "The Struggle for Democracy and Democratization" in ibid.

A disturbing feature of the Zimbabwean debate is that so far it has not gone beyond the cynical 'post-independence crisis' approach. This approach, understandably, should be viewed as a reaction by the intellectual community to the initial stated goal of the ruling elite to establish a one-party state. There is need therefore for the discussion to move beyond this 'reactive' stance and take a proactive discourse. Hopefully, this study will help to fill this gap.

Finally, the debate lacks an explicit and agreed conceptual framework. Although Mandaza and Sachikonye's edited volume reviewed above represents the first attempt to bring together an array of civil society groups, radical and liberal intellectuals in the country, its journalistic style does not lend itself well to academic scrutiny and thus cannot be used as a useful theoretical guide. Other writings have failed to capture the fact that the new regime had its own agenda[105]

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[105] Jeffrey Herbst's State and Politics in Zimbabwe, Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1990 not only fails to explain the fact that the new elites had agendas of their own; it also does not capture the notion of a party-state characterized by an inclusive corporatist structure encompassing bureaucrats, the army, business interests on the one hand and other major groups in civil society on the other.

The issues overlooked by Herbst are somewhat addressed by Christine Sylvester's Zimbabwe: The Terrain of Contradictory Development, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991, p. 91. However having argued that Zimbabwe is a "hyphenated" breed of "capitalism and socialism" she wades into contradictory conclusions that posit Zimbabwe as a "liberal-corporatist-populist-welfare economy!" The foundations of such a configuration are not examined and like other scholars reviewed earlier, no succinct analysis as to why the post-

while others have either been largely descriptive, focusing on narrow sets of prescriptive formulas,[106] or too populist.[107]

It is apparent that there is no agreed framework that systematically explains: (i), the distinctive way in which interests are organized and interact with the state; (ii) how the transition from settler rule to independence was conditioned and shaped by inherited structures and policies; (iii) why a system of state-society relations based on control and cooptation of civil society groups was maintained; and finally why a "democratic" experiment of over a decade has been unable to fully legitimate itself.

These considerations suggest the need for a conceptual tool that adequately captures the various nuances in a succinct manner. The adoption of corporatism as a supplementary framework is therefore expected to fill that void.

AN ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

It is useful to look at the transition from liberation

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independence elites preserved much of the status quo is offered.

[106] See for example, Moyo, Voting for Democracy.

[107] See for example, Brian Raftopoulos, "Beyond the House of Hunger: Democratic Struggle in Zimbabwe," Review of African Political Economy, No. 54: 59-74; and also Shadrack B.O.Gutto, "Land and Agrarian Questions and Problems of Democratization in Zimbabwe," in Lars Rudebeck, ed, When Democracy Makes Sense: Studies in the Democratic Potential of Third World Popular Movements, Uppsala University, Sweden, 1992

to liberalization as one dictated and shaped by two powerful, but diametrically opposed forces: continuity and change. The justification for focusing on change and continuity is premised on two trends of thought.

The most obvious and superficial change was the collapse of the settler regime and the creation of a new multiracial democratic state. Apart from the anomaly of the separate white voters' role which gave the former settlers a disproportionate number of parliamentary seats, the 1980 elections were largely democratic. Since then, Zimbabwe has been governed officially within a pluralistic democratic constitutional framework. The political arrangement include a popularly and nationally elected president and two vice-presidents, and a single chamber Parliament with 150 members. In terms of social pluralism, the country's political landscape is littered with not less than ten political parties and a plethora of civic organizations and NGOs, all operating under the Lancaster House derived constitution. Although not immune from politicizing pressure, these constitute a potentially significant and continuous source of pressure for democratic and accountable government. Formal electoral democracy has been maintained although opposition parties are manipulated to ensure the "correct" outcome to elections and other political debates.[108] Press freedom has somewhat survived with the small independent media playing a positive role both in relentlessly

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[108] Moyo, Voting for Democracy, 1992.

exposing corruption and abuse of power. The judiciary exhibits considerable independence and various examples of judges' findings against government have been noted.[109]

Less obvious and more subtle was the fact that the above developments were taking place against a backdrop of largely unaltered structures and inherited policies.[110] At the economic level the new government decided to preserve the inherited dirigiste economy. With regard to organized interests, the post-settler elites preserved the paternalistic intervention strategies crafted by its predecessors.

In between the transformations and continuities lay a political space in which the rules of the "political game" were not yet fully developed. A war-weary civil society displaying cleavages along colour, class, ethnic, religion, gender and ideological lines emerged after liberation. Differences among ethnic and racial groups were so distinct that a shared political culture transcending the many divisions was hardly discernable. For the majority of the people, especially the rural folk, ethnic localism was still a major political reality. This tendency, at times, was

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[109] Richard Sklar,"Reds and Rights: Zimbabwe's Experiment" in R. Sklar and C. Whitaker, Africa Politics and Problems in Development, Lynne Rienner, 1991. In most cases, government has generally failed to honour the court's findings.

[110] See for example Timothy M. Shaw's "Corporatism in Zimbabwe," in Nyang'oro and Shaw (eds.), Corporatism in Africa: Comparative Analysis and Practice, p. 150.

stronger than the tendency towards a national identity as the 1980 and 1985 national and local government elections demonstrated.[111]

The lack of a developed political culture in which there was a collective orientation of people toward the basic elements of their political system worked to the advantage of the ruling party which, having operated in exile, away from the constraints of civil society, sought to establish its hegemony over those it was elected to serve. The process combined elements of inclusivity which encompassed a broad set of alliances consisting of business and agricultural elites, urban professionals, bureaucrats on the one hand and labour and other marginalized classes on the other.[112]

All in all, the governing coalition was an inclusionary corporatist one, encompassing a broad set of ethnic groups and organized interests. The broad base accorded the ruling elite with options to build coalitions with elements within the ruling party and with some outside it.

The democratic transition from liberation in 1980 to liberalization in 1990 has to be viewed as a process characterized by the gradual disintegration of inherited "corporatist structure" which often assumed the form of

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[111] Sithole,"The General Elections: 1979-1985," in Mandaza (ed.), Zimbabwe: The Political Economy Of Transition, 1980-1986.

[112] Herbert Ushewokunze, An Agenda For Zimbabwe, Harare: College Press, 1984, p. 22.

liberalization if not liberation. Such formal and informal liberalization manifested itself through a mixed bag of policies that ranged from tolerance of political opposition, less censorship of the press, a more open economy, and greater latitude and autonomy for associational groups. The assumption is that as the process of liberalization continued and became entrenched in society, democratization and democracy would be the end result of that transformation.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SETTLER RULE AND THE REACTION OF EARLY AFRICAN CIVIL SOCIETY: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

INTRODUCTION

The extant economic, political and social conditions on Zimbabwe are the result of a composite set of influences that had their origins in the settler legacy.

This chapter will explore the early foundations of settler state[1] power, its modus operandi, and some of the key instruments employed by the regime in its bid to create an "exclusive state" based on racist ideology and practice. Issues pertaining to the role of the state in the economy, the level of political control and its effect on the African community, and the institutionalization of racial non-competition will also be examined. With that background, the chapter ends with an examination of the consequent reaction of early African civil societies to settler rule.

My point in reviewing the early settler period is not to describe in detail the nature of settler colonial rule but rather to highlight how it shaped the form, nature and operations of civil society in the country up to the present.

PRE-SETTLER SOCIETY: NATURE OF GOVERNANCE.

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[1] Zimbabwe differs from most other former colonies in Africa in that, in its case, immigrants from Europe decided to settle as permanent residents. By 1923 they had voted to form what they termed a "responsible government" which had its own constitution. Total separation from Britain was made in 1965 when the then Rhodesian prime minister decided to declare the Rhodesian state an independent republic.

Little is known about Zimbabwe's political systems before its encounter with the Europeans in the nineteenth century. Indeed studying the nature of governance during that period is often a tortuous process, fraught with controversy. Given the dearth of written evidence by the indigenous people themselves, much of the information available are the views and interpretations proffered by missionaries, trac s and successive generations of settler scholars.

The indigenous population, before 1890 can roughly be divided into two major ethnic groups: the Shona and the Ndebele. The latter had only been in the country themselves for some fifty years by 1890 while the former had occupied the land between the Zambezi and the Limpopo for thousands of years before settlerism. The **Shona** were a diverse group made up of various clans speaking dialects of Shona. Economically, they were mainly agriculturalists, engaged in full-scale, systematic forms of crop raising consisting of regular tillage and harvesting. "The Shona," wrote a settler administrative officer, "are essentially agriculturalists. They are of the earth, earthy. Agriculture to the Shona is not an occupation or a trade. It is a mode of life."[2] Like other Bantu-speaking tribes, the Shona placed a high regard on livestock, especially cattle, which not only served as objects of wealth

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[2] E.D. Alvord, "Agricultural Demonstration Work On Native Reserves", Department of Native Development, Occasional Paper No. 3, 1930, quoted in Ranger, <u>The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia 1898-1930</u>, London: Heinemann, 1970, p. 13.

and prestige, but were also used to provide draft power. Other economic engagements involved hunting and alluvial gold mining.

The land which the Shona occupied could not be owned, leased or sold to individuals but belonged to the whole clan or tribe. It was held in trust by the chief on behalf of his people. This largely explains why the "land grabbing," policy of the settlers was to constitute a major rallying point for the liberation movement.

Politically, the typical Shona communities were made up of a nucleus of persons related by common-ties through kinship, totems and religion. These myriad kinship cliques, extended family structures, clan networks and religious groups constituted what could be characterized as "traditional" civil society. Established cultural norms, taboos and practices guided the operations of the state and civil society organizations.

Authority was vested in the chief. He/she was assisted by a council of elders made of older men and women. Theoretically, each councillor had as much right to speak as any other person. In practice, however, certain individuals who had attained society's respect because of their accumulated wealth, military bravery or some well-recognized technical talent tended to wield more influence.

While ultimate authority rested with the chief, the governing system of the Shona was based on a high degree of

popular discussion and consent. The chiefs often used persuasion rather than force to win support and consent of their people. Indeed, as one writer puts it:

> It was a rare man who chose to wield dictatorially any powers granted by the system. He was usually controlled by bonds of custom and by the knowledge that he had to win and keep the voluntary submission of the people to his authority. If they did not like him, they were at liberty to break away ... and join some other group.[3]

The chiefs' powers were circumscribed then. They could only act in accordance with the wishes of the followers who had the right to remove them should their rule conflict with the expected established norms and practises.

By contrast, the Ndebele were a break-away Zulu group that arrived in present day Matabeleland in the early 1800s. Led by Mzlikazi, the Ndebeles had moved north after conflict with the Boer trekkers in South Africa. Compared to the Shona tribal counties, the Ndebele state was much more centralized. It was organized on a caste, rather than a clan basis with the original trekkers the Nguni, forming a higher caste, while captives and other assimilated groups formed the middle and lower classes. The king was the commander in-chief of the military regiments. In a society in which a militaristic culture was embedded, most young men were warriors.

A key source of economic power for the king was the

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[3] Hilda Kuper, "The Shona" in Hilda Kuper et al. eds, The Shona and Ndebele of Southern Rhodesia, London, International African Institute, 1954, p. 31.

control over the wealth of the state in the form of cattle. Occasionally the cattle could be assigned to the different sub-chiefs for care, but ultimate control remained in the hands of the king. Unlike the Shona chiefs whose control centred on the land, the Ndebele kings laid more emphasis on cattle.

Religion played an important part in both Shona and Ndebele societies. The Almighty *Mwari* (in Shona) or *Mlimo* (in Ndebele) was the supreme god. The spirit mediums acted as the intermediary between the living and the dead. The chiefs through the spirit medium constantly sought the advice of the Almighty on important issues affecting the community. As a link between the people and God the spirit mediums were held in very high-esteem and were almost revered.

As in most pre-colonial African societies, individuals were born into a subsistence social system which made it infeasible for egregious economic disparities to exist.

> Because people lived at subsistence level, their economic situation was more or less equal. A chief might have larger and larger herds of cattle than a commoner, but he could only eat sufficient to satisfy his hunger; he had no means of storing his surpluses for long periods, What he produced in excess, or what was brought to him as tribute, he had to re-distribute among his followers. Consequently, the standard of living did not differ significantly.[4]

This does not however mean that the Shona and Ndebele were

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[4] A.K.H. Weinrich, **Black and White Elites in Rural Rhodesia**, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1973., pp. 102-103.

classless societies. No one disputes the fact that the chief
and his family enjoyed a higher status than, say, a commoner.
Equally uncontestable is that those who were better off as,
say, farmers, hunters, smiths or warriors enjoyed a higher
social and political standing than those who were less
successful. Traditional Shona and Ndebele folklore is replete
with stories of the benevolence of the "rich and famous."
Words like *mupfumi* (the rich) and *murombo* (the poor) in Shona
or *isinothi* and *umuyanga* respectively in Ndebele are
indicative of societies that generally differentiated the
"haves" from the "have nots."

Unlike Alexis de Tocqueville's America in which "there
were neither commoners nor nobles and ...(where) professional
prejudices were always as unknown as prejudices of birth,"[5]
the social and political inequality which existed in both
Shona and Ndebele societies was one associated with birth. It
was an environment in which people were simply born to
different social classes within a subsistence agricultural set
up. Those individuals who distinguished themselves were
accorded due respect only within the confines of their
ascribed status. The principle of social equality which,
according to Tocqueville, Euro-Americans accepted as the basis
of their social relations[6] was alien to pre-settler Zimbabwean

[5] Alexis de Tocqueville, <u>Democracy in America</u> (ed.), J.P.
Mayer, trans. George Lawrence, New York, Garden City: Anchor
Books, 1969, p. 305.

[6] Ibid.

society.

A particularly influential practice which guided the relations between the ruler and his/her subjects in both Ndebele and Shona cultures was "the culture of silence" premised on the notion of organic unity reviewed earlier in chapter one. At its most utopian level, paternalism was revered and conflict avoided at all costs; the ruled were obedient to those in authority while the rulers were benevolent towards their loyal subjects. Leaders were therefore analogous to the father in the family.[7]

These observations challenge the implicity acknowledged view that pictured pre-settler society as "a world in which the elders would gather together under the shade of a big tree, and discuss issues until agreed."[8] I contend that such a rosy romantic picture only tells half the story. The "popular mythology" positing pre-settler Zimbabwean society as a fully democratic society ignores the fact that the society was one in which for the most part inhabitants considered themselves more as "subjects" than as citizens with full sovereign democratic rights. To the extent that this was the case, the tribal states could not be defined as fully fledged "democratic entities" accustomed to "self-rule." Rather they

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[7] Later nationalists like Joshua Nkomo exploited this cultural trait and his party emblem referred to him at as the unrivalled "Father of the Nation."

[8] Christopher Clapham, "Democratization in Africa," Third World Quarterly, Volume 14 (3) 1993. p 424

were entities in which government and society were merged into a seamless organic whole with all the "subjects" knowing their places in the hierarchy.

THE RISE AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF A CORPORATIST SETTLER STATE.

From company corporatism to state corporatism

Once the Ndebele and the Shona had been defeated militarily, the British South African Company (BSAC) was formally constituted and empowered to govern the new territory. The 1898 Southern Rhodesia Order in Council authorized the Company to provide a skeletal structure that would administer the newly conquered country. This highly corporatist structure consisted of five BSAC appointed officials and four elected members, with the Company administrator as president.

As it became apparent to the BSAC official- that mineral deposits were not as abundant as had been previously anticipated, their emphasis shifted from gold prospecting to land settlement. An Estates Department was set up in 1908 for the purposes of encouraging white commercial farming. Various incentives, ranging from low interest loans to expert advice were put in place to assist the new farmers. The new focus on farming meant that more and more Africans would have to be evicted from their land to give way to the settlers. "The land provided had to be ... the best available...and this meant creating artificial inducements to the Africans to leave their

own farming...[9]

As the European immigrant population increased, settler interests became predominant and gradually this strength in numbers propelled them to demand more representation in the Council. Eventually, the Company gave in to the settlers' demands in 1913. Elected membership was raised to two thirds in a Council of eighteen so assuring the settlers a majority.[10] After that it became clear that the issue was when and not whether total political control would be transferred to the white immigrants in due course.

A year later, the twenty-five year jurisdictional term granted by Britain to the British South Africa Company's charter expired. A new agreement culminating in the renewal of the Charter for another ten year period was reached. The renewal was approved on the condition that the option of settler self-government existed after the expiry date of the Company Charter. This demand had been made by the settlers as a key condition to their support of the renewal plan.

As expected, after WWI, the settler lobby intensified its campaign for self-rule and the end of company corporatism. This lobby machinery harped on the undemocratic nature of Company rule. It further contended that the company was mainly interested in fattening the pockets of its shareholders at the

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[9] Colin Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959, p.9.

[10] Patrick O'Meara, Rhodesia: Racial Conflict or Coexistence? Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975, p. 5.

expense of the overall development of the colony.[11] Self-rule was therefore viewed as the only means through which they could take the reigns of power and determine the developmental path of the colony. Responsible government would also accord them an opportunity to resist incorporation into South Africa, a stance which the British government favoured.[12]

In 1921, two years before the Company Charter's expiry date, the Buxton Royal Commission was set up to examine the possibility of self-government. The recommendations of the Commission were that a referendum be held to decide on three options: i) the continuation of Company rule; (ii) a union with South Africa which the British government favoured; and (iii) self-government.[13]

Obviously the first option was predictably rejected outrightly. Opponents of the second alternative and their protagonists feared that a union with South Africa would force them to raise African wages to match those paid south of the border. The working class was anxious that a wave of poor whites from the South would flood the job market thereby creating unemployment for them. Others saw a union with South

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[11] James Mutambirwa, The Rise of Settler Power in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), 1898-1923, Cranbury: Associated University Press, Inc., 1980, p. 66.

[12] Anthony Verrier, The Road to Zimbabwe: 1890-1980, London: Jonathan Cape, 1986, pp 29-30

[13] O'Meara, Rhodesia, p. 6.

Africa as leading to Afrikaner dominance.

Eventually, when the referendum took place in November 1922, a large majority of the settlers voted for self-rule. After an animated campaign, 8744 voted for self government while 5898 voted to join South Africa.[14] Thus, on 12 September 1923, Southern Rhodesia was formally annexed to the United Kingdom. The following month, October 1923 a self-government representing 19,000 electors in a total population of 864,000 under the premiership of Charles Coghlan was installed.[15] By opting for self-rule, white settlers were parting with a system in which a private company had virtually run the state for over twenty years. All matters pertaining to the interests of the disenfranchised Africans were to fall under the jurisdiction of the Native Affairs Department. As in other African colonies much of the day-to-day administration of 'native affairs' was left in the hands of identified African traditional leaders.[16] In situations where they failed to identify leaders, settlers imposed their own hand-picked ones.[17] The appointed chiefs were accountable to the colonial authorities rather than their own people. This had the effect

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[14] Ibid., p.7.

[15] D.J. Murray, The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970, pp. 5-6.

[16] A.K.H. Weinrich, Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia: Transition from Patriarchal to Bureaucratic Power, London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1971.

[17] Theodore Bull (ed.), Rhodesian Perspective, London: Michael Joseph, 1967, pp. 63-67

of subduing or silencing the democratic content of traditional societies. In turn, this meant that political survival for the chiefs and their surrogates no longer had anything to do with how responsive they were to the needs of their subjects, but rather how well they satisfied the machinations of their colonial masters.

Legislating racial non-competition

After the attainment of self-rule, state intervention in every sector of the economy was accelerated. Not only did the state invest in infrastructure like railways, electricity, iron and steel and meat processing plants; it also provided credit and marketing services to both farmers and industrialists. To ensure control, the state employed 'corporatist' interest mediation strategies to contain the powerful organized interests that had thrived under BSAC corporatist rule Thus most of the white interest groups like the Rhodesian National Farmers' Union, the Chamber of Mines, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Association of Rhodesia Industries launched during this period did so with the "blessing" of the state and in most cases were created at its behest. These groups were institutionally structured in such a manner that restricted competition and openness among them. Not only were they sanctioned by the state, but they were licensed and monitored by the appropriate state bureaucracy. This practise stood in stark contrast to the general ethos of a pluralist system in which organized interests are autonomous

and are in competition with each other.[18]

To entrench its political and economic power over the Africans, the settler state introduced legislation and other forms of political controls whose purpose was not only to restrict African competition, but also to place the Africans in a disadvantaged position economically, socially and politically.

In 1925 a commission under the chairmanship of Morris Carter was set up to look into the issue of land tenure and the bifurcation of land into African and European areas. It recommended that out of the 75 million hectares outside the African reserves, 48 million purchased be reserved for European settlement and just under 7 million be reserved for African settlement while the remaining 17.8 million be left as unassigned land.[19] It was on the recommendation of this Commission that the Land Apportionment Act was enacted in 1930.

This iniquitous Act, referred to by settlers as the "Magna Carta" of white settlerdom, represented the pinnacle of racial domination and discrimination in Southern Rhodesia. Under it the best agricultural and all the urban areas were designated "European land." This meant that all Africans on

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[18] Lionel Cliffe, "Zimbabwe's Political Inheritance," in Colin Stoneman (ed), Zimbabwe's Inheritance, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981, p.12.

[19] Robert Blake, A History of Rhodesia, New York: Knopf, 1978, p. 202)

designated "European" land would be evicted and that no Africans could buy or lease a house in any urban area. They could only live in specific areas created for them by the municipalities but even then had no right to permanent occupation.

By April 1, 1931 when the bill became law, the European areas boasted of 49 million acres of land while the Africans were confined to 7.4 million acres.[20] The enactment of the Act was an economic blow to the Africans. In addition to reducing their productive capacity, it robbed them of their source of livelihood. As Leornard Kapungu puts it:

> To the African, land holds a deep meaning that transcends the needs of his day-to-day livelihood. On land is based the African's traditional social systems, his security as an individual, as member of a family, his ties with his ancestors and therefore the basis of his religion. Take away the land and African society ceases to exist; the security of the individual and the family is threatened.[21]

By removing the Africans from the fertile land which they had occupied for generations and confining them to barren lands unsuitable for farming, the settlers were destroying the farmers' very source of livelihood. Apart from destroying the basis of the social organization of the African economy, the settlers also denied the original inhabitants the freedom to live and work freely anywhere in the land of their birth. All

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[20] Ibid., p. 202.

[21] Leonard Kapungu, Rhodesia: The Struggle for Freedom, New York: Orbis Books, 1974, p. 13.

in all, the Act signified the first systematic attempt aimed at creating an exclusionary white settler state based on race. Through the enactment of this racist legislation, a system of highly differentiated economic, social and political relations meant to ensure white hegemony was entrenched.

Other pieces of legislation designed to destroy any remaining viability of African farming bolstered the Land Apportionment Act. The Danzinger Commission, set up in 1933 to review the economic position of the agricultural industry cited competition from the African farmer as one of the major causes of the poor state of white commercial farming. In its recommendations, it noted that:

> Evidence has been put before your Committee regarding native competition in the local markets. The general opinion is that the date of the operation of the Land Apportionment A ., 1930, should be anticipated and all natives farming in European areas should be removed to native areas at once; that no native-produced article should be sold in the European areas and vice versa except under permit.[22]

The report went one step further: it recommended that government subsidies to white farmers be effected as a matter of economic survival. From 1934 onwards special financial aid packages and technical support programmes were launched. These included low interest loans for the purchase of farms including deferment of loan repayments and a 50% subsidy plus free technical programmes enabling white farmers to build dams

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[22] The Danzinger Commission Report quoted in "The Land Acquisition Bill," Harare: Zimbabwe Parliament, 1991, p. 12.

on their farms for irrigation purposes. By 1950, 5022 new dams were built on white farms.[23] During the same period, various agricultural boards were established with a view to boosting white commercial farming.[24]

Other downright discriminatory policies were also put in place, through the enactment of the Maize Control Act of 1934. This Act guaranteed white farmers a higher price for their maize at the expense of African farmers. Whereas African farmers previously sold maize locally at 10s to 12s per bag, after the Act they could only fetch a price of about 6s for the same bag of maize.[25] Price differentials were also introduced for livestock, especially cattle. The state-owned Cold Storage Commission held a monopoly in the purchase of African stock. It is estimated that the prices offered for African livestock were generally 20 per cent below comparable

[23] Ibid, p.12

[24] The various state-structured Boards were established as follows:

Maize Control Board (GMB, 1950)	1931
Tobacco Marketing Board (TMB)	1936
Cotton Research and Industry Board (CRIB)	1936
Cold Storage Commission (CSC)	1937
Dairy Marketing Board (DMB)	1937
Natural Resources Board (NRB)	1941
Sugar Industry Board (SIB)	1944
Sabi-Limpopo Authority (SLA)	1965
Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA)	1967
Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC)	1971

[25] Daniel Ndlela, Dualism In The Rhodesian Economy, Lund, Lund Economic Studies 22, 1981, p. 163.

European-owned livestock.[26]

After the Second World War, a scheme known as The Rhodesian Ex-Service Men Land Settlement was devised. Its purpose was to support white ex-servicemen going into agriculture. On being allocated a farm, a farmer was given a grant of 450 pounds[27] for preliminary development work. In addition to the grant, the report specified that:

> " a farmer on a Crown land farm (could) be granted a loan up to a maximum of 2,500 pounds, or in the case of ranches, of 3,000 pounds. The terms of the loan (was)... as follows: (a) Period, twenty years. (b) No interest for the first five years. (c) After the first five years, simple interest (would) be charged at the rate of 3.5 percent per annum".[28]

The report was explicit on the issue of land pricing and availability. It noted that "if suitable land cannot be purchased at reasonable prices, the Government should take powers of expropriation."[29]

As the eviction of Africans from "European areas" accelerated, more and more Africans found themselves confined

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[26] Montague Yudelman, African on the Land: Economic Problems of Africa's Agricultural Development in Southern Central and East Africa, with Special Reference to Southern Rhodesia, quoted in Ibid, p. 170.

[27] All currency amounts in this chapter are denominated in British sterling.

[28] Post-War Settlement in Southern Rhodesia With Particular Reference to Settlement on the Land of Rhodesian Ex-Service Men Report, under H.G. Munday (chair), Salisbury, Rhodesia, 1945 quoted in Land Acquisition Bill 1991, pp 14-15.

[29] Ibid, p.14.

to the already overcrowded reserves. The congestion reached crisis proportions by the late-1940s. In a survey done by the Department of Agriculture, it was revealed that of the 338,000 families occupying the "native reserves" 126,000 would have to be moved out to reduce overpopulation.[30] The same investigation also established that the reserves were overstocked with cattle by 145 per cent.[31]

In sum, then, settler land policies created a land distribution policy biased in favour of white agriculture. As one writer succinctly puts it, the whole process converted Africa farmers

> from successful and enterprising people growing a surplus of food, and preserving their independence from the demeaning status of working for whites (particularly white farmers) into impoverished subsistence farmers in overcrowded reserves... The whites meanwhile developed from being subsistence farmers into highly a successful rural bourgeoisie with guaranteed markets and prices, governmental subsidies, a range of extension services, and a quite unjustified reputation for being essential to the future capacity of the country to feed itself.[32]

Through various restrictive policies, the established social organization of African production was destroyed. Many an

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[30] N. Bhebhe, "The Nationalist Struggle," in Canaan Banana (ed.), Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe 1890-1990, Harare: College Press, 1989, p. 56.

[31] Ian Phimister, "Rethinking the Reserves: Southern Rhodesia's Land Husbandry Act Reviewed," Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 19., 2. June 1993, p. 224.

[32] Colin Stoneman, "Agriculture", in Stoneman ed, Zimbabwe's Inheritance, p.130

African was therefore forced to look for alternative sources of livelihood. A large percentage of the young men found themselves drifting to the cities and the mines of South Africa looking for employment, leaving women to till the land in the reserves. Since then women have found themselves providing major labour inputs ranging from 50 to 80 percent into communal agricultural production.[33] Given the absence of the husbands, women also found themselves as both cultivators and "home keepers."

Labour policies

In the early 1890s, labour recruiting policies were disorganised and brutal. Given the low wages, very few Africans were enticed to join the labour market in the first conquest decade as most could still make a living through farming. As Arrighi observes:

> before 1906, European farming in Rhodesia was insignificant and it was only in the middle 1910s that it got off the ground on a large scale. Throughout this period the mines relied almost entirely on African produce to supply their (workers) with mealies... In 1903 it was estimated that the annual amount received by Africans for sale of grain, other produce and stock was 350,000 (pounds) or well over twice the total wage bill by indigenous African labour in Rhodesia... African participation was not limited to the sale of traditional produce: in certain districts maize soon displaced the traditional grains, and, in the vicinity of towns, vegetable gardening was introduced and the produce marketed regularly. The production for the market of green vegetables potatoes, wheat, groundnuts and tobacco was either

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[33] Report on "Changes to Women's Status in Zimbabwe Since Independence," Department of Women's Affairs, Ministry of Political Affairs, p. 6, Harare, 1991.

> introduced or expanded... The differential between
> the returns from self-employment (as farmers) and
> wage employment was very large. In 1903 for example
> it was reckoned that an African cultivating one or
> two acres could make as much money in a month as he
> could in three months of wage employment... The
> Mashona could largely rely on the produce market
> for their cash requirements.[34]

In response to the labour shortage compulsory labour recruiting methods (chibharo) akin to slavery were utilized. Under the 1901 Masters Servant Act, Africans who left their employment without the consent of the employers were subject to a fine or imprisonment of up to six months.[35] An employee found performing below expectations could also be liable to a fine or one month's imprisonment.

A second method used to coerce Africans to work was taxation usually collected in cash, cattle or alluvial gold. In 1895 alone, over 8,000 pounds was collected in taxes and in some districts cattle, sheep and goats were rounded up by force for those who had failed to pay taxes in cash.[36] Still the supply of labour fell far short of expectations as Africans continued to raise the requested amounts through farming.

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[34] G. Arrighi, 'Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective: the Rhodesian case,' quoted in T.O. Ranger, The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia: 1898-1930, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, p. 14.

[35] T. M. Franck, Race and Nationalism: The Struggle for Power in Rhodesia-Nyasaland, New York: Fordham University Press, 1960, p.111

[36] Robin Palmer, Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977, p. 44.

After 1903 the company introduced schemes encouraging foreign recruitment of African labour for Rhodesia. Attempts were made to recruit workers in South Africa, Malawi, Somalia and Abyssinia. The coordination was entrusted to the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau (RNLB) which was set up in 1903. Through its recruitment drive, the number of foreign workers in Rhodesia increased from 3,000 to 96,000 (out of a total African work force of 172,000) and in 1926 to 203,000 (total workforce of 363,000) in 1946.[37]

The inflow of immigrants created a surplus labour reserve which had the effect of depressing African wages even further. This development was in line with the settlers' objective of maintaining high wages for the white workers by ensuring that African wages remained below the market rate. They were aware that cheap labour by the Africans was the key to their maintaining a high standard of living. In a candid admission, one of the longest serving prime ministers of Southern Rhodesia, Godfrey Huggins admitted that:

> "We (whites) cannot exist for five minutes without the native today. He is absolutely essential to our wage structure, if nothing else...if we went on a purely European basis with the present conditions of living and pay... the country would be sub-economic and down and out in five minutes."[38]

Clearly cheap labour was considered a sine qua non of settler

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[37] L. Tow, The Manufacturing Economy of Southern Rhodesia: Problems and Prospects, quoted in Martin Loney, Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response, Manchester: C. Nicholls, 1975, p. 63.

[38] Prime Minister Huggins quoted in Loney, Rhodesia, p. 64

capitalism. Africans were restricted to unskilled work and the RNLB ensured that the "colour-bar" policies placed Europeans in a stronger bargaining position.

With the ascendancy of Godfrey Huggins[39] to the "throne" in 1933, proposals legalizing non-racial competition in the labour force were pursued with vigour. A year later, legislation curtailing competition from Africans in all forms of skilled work was passed. The Industrial Conciliation Act barred Africans from competing with whites for any skilled work in the country. In addition, the Act denied African workers the right to form unions. This meant that African workers could not take part in collective bargaining agreements nor could they be members of a recognized union. More importantly, the Industrial Conciliation Act contained a clause which gave European unions control over apprenticeships in the industry. This way, the white unions were able to exclude Africans. The Act essentially rendered African unions ineffective. Through it, the state guaranteed that white wages would always be higher than those for Africans.

To facilitate control over the African population, all

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[39] Godfrey Huggins (the longest serving prime minister of Southern Rhodesia [1933-1953]) had campaigned on the ticket of complete segregation between whites and Africans. This policy of parallel development was to remain the cornerstone of his economic development policy until the 1940s when he opted for "multi-racial" partnership in his bid to stem the Africans nationalist tide. For a detailed autobiography of this longest serving premier, see L.H. Gann and M. Gelfand, Huggins of Rhodesia, London: Allen and Unwin, 1964.

Africans were required to carry a registration certificate, which both served as tax receipt and as a form of identification. The 1936 Native Registration Act tightened the movement of Africans in the urban areas even further. It compelled each of them to have proof that s/he had permission to seek work or visit any urban area. In the next section I proceed to examine the subsequent reaction of African social movements[40] to settler rule before the break-out of WWII.

RESPONSES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS TO EARLY SETTLER RULE

From the start, the growth of settler capitalism and the transformation of African society were intractably tied together. To be sure settler capitalism brought with it a certain degree of disorganization, anomie and "homelessness" to the Africans. Most found themselves caught up in "transition between a traditional peasant culture and the new ethic of modernity."[41] The development of cities, schools,

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[40] The term social movement best captures the protest nature of early African movements. Andrew McFarland defines a social movement as an organization whose activities are directed towards changing "institutions and behaviours of importance to a society as opposed to peripheral institutions or routine behaviours. ...(Its) defining feature... is its mode of political expression, often consisting of unconventional tactics and behaviour, such as civil disobedience, organizing demonstrations, breaking up into small groups for the purposes of consciousness raising and even the threat or actual use of violence (own emphasis)." Andrew McFarland, "Public Interest Lobbies vs Minority Faction," in Ann G. Serow et al, (eds.), The American Polity Reader, New York: W.W. Norton, 1990, p. p.438.

[41] Colin Turnbull, quoted in William McCord and Arline McCord, Paths to Progress: Bread and Freedom in Developing Societies, New York: W.W. Norton, 1986, p 57.

factories, clinics and differentiations based on income systematically eroded the old social structures and cultures. Whereas in the past social hierarchies were based on traditional subsistence social systems, with the introduction of a capitalist economy social relationships now derived from new economic statuses, occupations and political influences. These new developments synergically combined to replace the old categories based on traditional loyalties.

With the destruction of traditional civil society organizations and the social system under which they thrived, it comes as no surprise that the early years after the Ndebele and Shona defeats were years of "shock and despondency" characterized by a yearning for a return to the past.[42] As shall become clear later in the discussion, it is by no coincidence that the first indigenous civil society would expend its energies on resuscitating its lost "glorious past."

The first Africans in Rhodesia to protest against settler exclusivism were the black South Africans[43] who had been brought into the country by the pioneers in 1890 as "part of

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[42] Nathan Shamuyarira, Crisis in Rhodesia, London: Deutsch, 1965, p. 29.

[43] The dominance of South Africa in Rhodesian politics would constitute another element of continuity. Both the white settlers and Africans benefited from their interactions with South Africa. The white settlers benefited from the opportunities South African offered as a trading partner, while early African civic organizations were benefited from their contacts with black South African organizations like the ANC and the ICU.

a scheme by Rhodes to form a cordon of loyalists around Bulawayo to counteract any hostile movements of the Matabele.[44] These "alien natives" had assisted in the suppression of the Shona and the Ndebele in the 1893 and 1896 war.

After the war, the settlers moved swiftly to disarm them and to the black settlers' bewilderment, no preferential treatment was accorded as had been previously promised by Cecil Rhodes. They were now expected to carry passes and, again contrary to previous assurances, were not granted the land they had been promised. It was this treatment that motivated them to set up civil society groups to press for better treatment and more land. The most active organizations in the early 1900s was the Union of South African Native Association and the Union Natives Vigilance Organization.[45] Led by moderates like John Hlazo, they urged the settlers to grant them more land and title to that land. In their several petitions they requested that they be exempted from carrying passes and other provisions enshrined in the 1903 Masters and Servant Act. Despite their numerous protests the African settlers never achieved their objectives, however. The BSAC insisted that the alien natives would continue to be confined to their designated reserves and that they would be treated

[44] Wellington Nyangoni, African Nationalism in Zimbabwe, Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1977, p.36.

[45] Ranger, The African Voice, p.47.

just like any other indigenous natives.[46]

By the end of the First World War, many of their members had realized that they had forge an alliance with the Ndebele and the Shona, marking the start of an alliance has peristed up today.[47]

For the indigenous Africans, the earliest form of protest after the Chimurenga wars came from Matabeland when the Matabele National Home Movement was launched in 1915. It was led by Nyamanda, King Lobengula's eldest son. Assisted by the National Congress of South Africa and the former leaders of the "alien native" associations, the Movement pressed for a sort of home rule within Matabeleland under the direct supervision of Britain. It rejected both options of a union with South Africa and the creation of a "responsible" settler government. Through the advice of prominent South African lawyers like Alfred Mangena, petitions for more land were made to the British High Commissioner in South Africa. Realizing that its requests were not being accorded the due attention they deserved, the Movement decided to send a petition to the King of England. Drafted in March 1919, it read in part:

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[46]Ibid., pp. 50-51.

[47] This marked the beginning of unity between the Shona and the Ndebele that has persisted up today. The 1987 unity pact between the Zimbabwe African People's Party (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) led by Joshua Nkomo (Ndebele), and Robert Mugabe (Shona) goes a long way to show historical continuities that have their origins in this post-WWI alliance between the Shona and the Ndebele.

> The Members of the late King's family (Lobengula)
> your petitioners, and several members of the tribe,
> are now scattered about on farms... parcelled out
> to white settlers, and are practically ... nomadic
> people... living... under a veiled form of
> slavery...(with no permission)...to cross from one
> farm to another, or from place to place except
> under a system of permit or Pass, and are
> practically forced to do labour on these private
> farms as a condition of their occupying (the
> designated) land...[48]

The petition was consequently brought to the attention of the British when Reverend Henry Reed Ngcayiya, an ANC (South Africa) chaplain, who had been chosen to act as a spokesperson for natives in both countries, was granted an interview by an official from the Colonial Office in June 1919. Africanist pressure groups took up the issue and published the petition in full in the *Africa and Orient Review*.[49]

The BSAC officials reacted by restricting Nyamanda's movements while his relatives were banished to South Africa. As we shall see successive settler regimes, would employ the same expulsion strategies in their bid to silence regime critics. Although the movement survived, and continued its call for a separate homeland, with time it died a natural death. Its significance was that it was the first organized movement to employ what can be classified as "modern" forms of political organization and opposition.

The origins of national as opposed to "tribal" movements can be traced back to the post-WWI period. The gradual growth

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[48] Ranger, The African Voice, p. 73.

[49] Ibid., p.74.

of a capitalist economy brought with it the proliferation of urban centres across the country. As more and more Africans drifted to the cities in search of employment, a new class of urbanites developed. Whereas in the past, the major overriding concern was land, the urbanized Africans now had begun to grapple with new concerns. Other than the overriding land issue, new issues ranging from poor housing, urban squalor, lack of recreational facilities and inadequate services, to lack of educational facilities gave the novel civil society movements a new focus.

One of the first urban civil society organizations to be launched was the Rhodesia Bantu Voters Association (RBVA) founded in Bulawayo in 1923.[50] It sought to improve the economic and living conditions of its petit bourgeoisie membership. Under the leadership of Abraham Twala, a South African activist, it brought together for the first time both Shona and Ndebele urbanites. Its objectives were:

a) To safeguard the interest of the Bantu People domiciled in Rhodesia;

b) To be the medium of expression of representative opinion and to formulate a standard policy on Native Affairs for the guidance of the Parliament;

c) To endeavour to secure co-operation with the powers that be and all others interested in the advancement of the Bantu

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[50] It must be noted that at that time Bulawayo was the industrial hub of the country, hence the concentration of organized interests before WWII.

peoples.[51]

At its formation the organization confronted obvious limitations which included too few African voters and the lack of a mass support base. However attempts were made by some of its leaders like Martha Ngano, to bridge the gap between the educated elite and the masses. Travelling to rural areas, she advocated increased African voter registration and proposed the use of cattle holdings as a qualification for the franchise.

The most influential urban organization in the 1920s was the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) launched in 1927 by Robert Sambo. Sambo had been sent to Rhodesia by the leadership of the South African Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union.[52] Unlike the RBVA and RNA, the ICU was more confrontational. It called upon all Africans to bury their tribal differences and unite in their fight for better wages and conditions of work. In its bid to de-emphasize the tribal factor, the union's Matabeleland representative was a Shona while the one in Mashonaland was a Ndebele. Alarmed at the growing influence of ICU, the Rhodesian officials responded by

[51] Shamuyarira, Crisis in Rhodesia, p.30.

[52] This move is significant in that it marked the development of a transnational civil society in the region in addition to confirming the dominance of South Africa as regional hegemonic power that has persisted up today. As we shall see in Chapter four that dominance would reflect itself not only at the economic levels, but also in the way political developments in Zimbabwe evolved.

deporting Sambo back to South Africa.

With the onset of the depression of the 1930s and the subsequent enactment of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934, the ICU found itself in disarray. Massive unemployment coupled with the lack of recognition of African workers made it difficult for it to organize. With time, its membership declined and by the mid-1930s, it had lost its momentum.

The ICU's major contribution was that it raised workers' consciousness by highlighting the need for worker solidarity. It also served as a training ground for would-be nationalists. Some of the ICU leaders like Charles Mzingeli and Masotsha Ndlovu were to eventually play leading roles in the nationalist movement.

An important player during the early 1930s period was the African National Congress launched by Aaron Jacha in Bulawayo in 1934. Like its Northern Rhodesian, Nyasaland and South African namesakes, it was a reformist organization concerned with the promotion of cooperation and communication between the settler regimes and Africans with a view to furthering the educational, social, economic and political advancement of its urban members.[53] Its activities were mainly confined to Bulawayo and it was to remain a low profile regional organization until the 1950s when it was revived as a national party under the chairmanship of Joshua Nkomo.

Opposition to settler rule also came through the "voices"

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[53] Shamuyarira, Crisis In Rhodesia, p.31.

of African indigenous Christian Churches, particularly the Vapositori Movement, the Zionist Movement and the Watch Tower whose operations were mainly concentrated in the rural areas. They urged their members to resist paying taxes and opposed the implementation of the Land Apportionment Act. Promising their adherents that "the world will shortly be changed and the white people that have high positions will be our servants in heaven,"[54] these churches attracted a large following among the rural Africans.

The success of these social movements can be explained by the fact that a large majority of their followers could identify with them given their indigenous roots. Also the movements' emphases on the exploitative nature of settler capitalism added a political and economic element to their campaigns. By promising Africans a supernatural exit out of the bondage of "white chains," the movements were obviously playing to the sensitivities of many of their followers.

The state's reaction, predictably, was to pass more restrictive legislation to control their activities. The Sedition Act was passed in 1936 to combat their burgeoning operations. Even before this act had been passed the state had proceeded to proscribe the activities of the Zionist movement. There is n' doubt that during this period the movements acted as the "voice" of the rural folk.

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[54] A Watchtower member quoted in Ranger, The African Voice, p. 201

It is clear from the above discussion that African organized interests were operating in a restrictive environment from the 1890 to the 1930s. Elements of continuity abound during this period. They ranged from the dominance of South Africa to the heavy handed repressive tactics used to control African organized interests. All these had their origins in the early years of conquest.

Once the white settlers were assured that political and economic competition from the Africans had been eliminated, they expended their energies on developing the economy. In line with dominant Keynesian ideology of the time, state policies tilted towards enhancing state economic activities. By the early 1940s public enterprises were found virtually in all economic sectors as the settler government embarked on a wide range of ventures.[55] State-owned enterprises including the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Corporation, Cotton Research and Industry Board, Triangle Sugar Estates, Cold Storage Commission (specializing in cattle rearing and abattoirs), Electricity Supply Commission were all established during this period. These state led development efforts received a further boost when Britain chose Rhodesia as one of its training bases during WWII.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined the nature of settler rule from

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[55] G.D. Clarke, _Foreign Companies and International Investment in Zimbabwe_, Nottingham: Russell Press, 1980, p. 20.

the 1900s onwards and the subsequent reaction of African civil society to that rule. It started by examing the nature pf pre-settler society with its emphasis on organic harmony. With the introduction of settler rule, the first form of corporatism was established by the BSAC Company which was in control for the first twenty or so years setting a trend that would mark both settler and post-settler rule: corporatist tendencies bolstered by one party rule dispositions.

It also established that after the attainment of settler self-rule in 1923, successive settler regimes adopted dirigiste policies along corporatist lines. They established a highly exclusionary interventive corporatist state geared towards serving the interests of minority European settlers only.

With regard to organized white interests most were created at the behest of the state. "While particular (white) interests might dominate the political system both at the legislative and executive levels... no significant white settler social stratum was ever permanently excluded from sharing power in the (settler) state." [56] Almost all white interests were united in their support of an exclusionary organic state structure based on racist policies. [57]

In their bid to further perpetuate white dominance,

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[56] Charles Utete, The Road to Zimbabwe, p. 34.

[57] D.J. Murray, The Government System in Southern Rhodesia, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970

settlers employed a variety of discriminatory legislation that included the Land Apportionment Act (1930), the Grain Marketing and Maize Control Acts (1934) and the Industrial Conciliation Acts (1934): all designed to exclude Africans from any meaningful participation in the economy other than as poorly paid labourers.

The chapter ended with an examination of the reaction of African civil society to settler rule. It noted that with the coming of the latter rule, most indigenous civil society organizations and the social system under which they thrived were disrupted leaving many in a state of "shock and despondency," at least initially. However, eventually as they became assimilated into the capitalist mode of production, they reconstituted themselves from 1900 onwards. Reflecting the dominance of South Africa, the first forms of what can be termed "modern' African civil societies were launched by the black immigrants who had accompanied the white invaders from South Africa. From the 1920s onwards various African civil society groups sprouted across the land. The major groups - the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) and the African National Congress (ANC) - later transformed themselves into formidable political forces.

The next chapter reviews developments after WWII. It will show how the various African civil society groups identified in this chapter evolved as the country became more industrialized and urbanized. Efforts will be made to show how

these former disparate civil society groups crystallized themselves eventually into a nationalist movement under the umbrella name of the ANC.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE SETTLER STATE AND AFRICAN CIVIL SOCIETY: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS FROM 1945 TO 1979

INTRODUCTION

The society and politics of contemporary Zimbabwe were shaped by the nature of governance[1] during the settler period, especially after WWII.

This chapter examines the political and economic development that came after WWII to 1979. It demonstrates how African civil society development was shaped and conditioned by urbanization and industrialization as the settler economy picked up from the 1940s onwards. More specifically, it traces the challenges facing various African civil society groups from the late 1940s, through the federal period, and up to the late 1970s.

A key point pervading the discussion is the issue of how the former disparate African civil societies managed to crystallize themselves into formidable nationalist parties. After half a century of moral argument and fruitless endeavours aimed at reforms, a stage was reached when elements in African civil society recognized the need for cohesive and

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[1] The term governance refers to the general manner in which a society is structured and governed. Specifically, the term is used to describe the nature of interactions between the formal institutions of government and the multifarious institutions that comprise civil society in any polity. For a more elaborate definition, please see, Carter Center Report, Perestroika Without Glasnost in Africa, Atlanta: Georgia, Conference Report Series, Volume 2, Number 1, 1989, p.1.

continuing organizations that would spearhead their quest for liberation.

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE RISE OF AFRICAN ORGANIZED LABOUR

With the outbreak of the war, Rhodesia, despite being a settler state rather than a colony, was chosen as a base for British war training. This move strengthened and accelerated the industrialization process even further. Domestic consumer demand rose due to the presence of allied forces, with the local manufacturing industries being the principal beneficiaries. Demands for raw materials and metals by the Allied powers led to the proliferation of extractive industries. It is estimated that when the war broke out the colony had a small industrial base of about 300 industrial establishments. By 1953 the number of firms had more than doubled to 700 and gross output over the 14 year period leapt from 5 million pounds to 62 million.[2]

After World War II, Southern Rhodesia experienced an economic boom as the price of minerals and tobacco sky-rocketed. The world-wide demand for strategic minerals like chrome, and preferential trade agreements with Britain for Rhodesian tobacco contributed to export-led growth. It was also during this period that the government adopted an industrialization policy whose aim was to promote self-sufficiency through sectoral modifications which encouraged

[2] W.J. Barber The Economy of British Central Africa, Oxford: OUP, 1961, p. 140

import-substitution enterprises.

The industrialization process brought with it an increase in the number of African workers and the need for settled urbanized workers. It is estimated that the number of African workers increased from 254,000 in 1926 in to 377,000 in the war years,[3] rising to 550,000 by 1954 as shown in **Table 4.1** below. Unlike the 1920s when the labour force was small and diffuse, unions could now draw from a large pool of employees.

Table 4.1

Annual Average Numbers of Africans in Formal Wage Employment by Industrial Category, 1954-1962.[4]

Cate	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961
Agr	218000	250000	228000	226000	230000	231000	240000	240900
Min.	62000	59600	60900	60700	57100	52500	52300	48500
Manuf	62500	66100	70700	74000	72400	74200	75000	74300
Cons.	51000	53000	58000	64000	64000	59000	57000	45000
Elect.	5200	5300	5400	5900	6300	6400	6700	6000
Comm.	25600	27500	31200	32900	34200	35700	36100	35200
Trans.	12100	13000	13200	14900	15100	15500	16000	16500
Serv	117000	124100	134000	141400	148600	153200	156800	161100
Total	555000	574000	602000	620000	628000	628000	640000	628000

In 1944 the first industrial union - the Rhodesia Railways African Employees Association (RRAEA), under the

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[3] Arrighi "The Political Economy of Rhodesia," in G. Arrighi and John Saul (eds.), Essays on the Political Economy of Africa, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977, p.351.

[4] Phimister, "Husbandry Act Reviewed", p.232.

leadership of Joshua Nkomo[5], was formed in Bulawayo followed by the Milling Employees Association.

The next year, 1945, marked a turning point in the role of African trade unions in Southern Rhodesia. In the past, trade unions like the ICU had failed to achieve much in terms of collective bargaining. This era was to end when the RRAEA officials confronted railways management demanding that they be recognized and that an inquiry into the working conditions of the workers be instituted. In typical settler fashion, the management ignored their request. Spurned by the latter, the union called for a strike in October 1945. Initially confined to the 2,000 employees in Bulawayo the strike spread to other parts of the country, attracting more than 8,000 participants. The 'highly disciplined and well-organized strike, the first-ever organized by a formal black trade union organization'[6] was so effective that it almost brought rail transport in Central Africa to a stand-still.

The strike forced the government to set up the Tredgold Commission to look into rail workers's grievances. In its report, tabled before parliament in November 1945, the

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[5] Joshua Nkomo would become the first leader of the leader of the ANC nationalist party. He is serving as one of the two vice-presidents of Zimbabwe under the current regime.

[6] Labour and Economy: Report of the National Trade Unions Survey, Zimbabwe, 1984, Volume One, Harare: Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare, 1984, p. 15. Hereafter, this report will simply be referred to as Labour and Economy.

Commission recommended the setting up of a Native Labour Board that would determine and set wages for the various employee grades in the rail industry.

The success of this strike triggered the proliferation of union activity in the country. By the end of 1946 the Federation of African Workers' Union had been formed while the old ICU was reconstituted under the new name of the Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (RICU). In concert with the RRAEA they called upon the government to speed-up the process of implementing the recommendations of the Tredgold Commission. The government responded by instituting the first Native Labour Board charged with the task of rationalizing industrial and commercial wages in July 1947. The board moved swiftly to award minimum wages and increased overtime allowances for all the rail workers.

As news of the awards spread throughout the country, workers in other sectors agitated for similar working conditions. When in 1948 the Chamber of Commerce announced wages that were below those of the railways workers, FAWU leaders called for a general strike.[7] This strike which started in Bulawayo was enthusiastically supported by workers in Gweru, Kadoma, Harare and Mutare. Although it was called off after threats from the state, the workers did not go back empty handed. Minimum wages similar to the ones already awarded to railway workers were granted in January 1949.

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[7] Labour and Economy, p. 16

The heightened milit\ncy of the workers and the success of the strike came as a considerable shock to the settlers.[8] The whites pressed their government to enact more repressive legislation to control African workers along corporatist lines. While agreeing with them in principle, Prime Minister Godfrey Huggins reminded his followers that the strike marked "the emergence of a proletariat, and ... it happens to be black."[9]

Later he was to declare resignedly that "we shall never be able to go much with these people (i.e. African workers) until we have established a native middle class."[10] It is therefore not by accident that Huggins was to be the architect of the "multi-racial partnership" strategy-- a paternalistic corporatist attempt geared towards the creation of an African middle class that would act as a "buffer zone" between the whites as a privileged upper class on the one hand and the peasants and the workers on the other.

There is no doubt that most of the settlers dreaded the rise of a developed proletariat, let alone a African petty bourgeoisie. They saw it as detrimental to the economy and their well-being. While they accepted its inevitability and the need for catering to the needs of numerous lower classes,

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[8] Martin Loney, Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response, Manchester: C. Nicholls., 1975, p.100

[9] Gray, The Two Nations, p. 294.

[10] Arrighi, "The Political Economy of Rhodesia," p. 360.

they were alarmed that meeting workers' demands would result in a drop in their own living standards. In other words, they were wary of conceding too much as this could mean breaking the dam wall holding back the perceived lower classes anarchical "primitive" tendencies. The partnership scheme was therefore designed to create a "working alliance between the European ruling strata and the more prosperous Africans, who included bus owners, master farmers, building contractors (and) senior employees."[11]

From the late 1940s onwards the Huggins regime shifted from its previous "separate development" policy[12] to "partnership" between black and white. This change in focus propelled many liberal white settlers to launch multi-racial civil societies for "their" Africans from the late 1940s onwards.

FROM SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT TO PARTNERSHIP

As the industrial development process gathered momentum, social processes -- simultaneous causes and effects of industrialization -- took place. These included internal migrations leading to intense urbanization, the development of a national, albeit, white bourgeoisie supported by state policies and favourable conditions of the domestic market, an increase in the industrial proletariat, and the expansion of

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[11] Ibid, p. 360.

[12] Bull (ed.), Rhodesian Perspective, chapter 2.

the white middle class. Such developments provided a base for the constitution of a broad class alliance. Given the dominance of agricultural, industrial and mining interests, the bourgeoisie controlling these operations naturally emerged as the dominant coalition. The white workers, who should have been the natural "foes" of this hegemonic group were won over. Whatever differences may have existed between the two "natural antagonistic" classes, both felt they had more a potent class enemy: the Africans.[13] Racial discrimination therefore took precedence over class differences.[14]

On the part of Africans there were visible signs that a "proletariat" was emerging as evidenced by the wild-cat strikes of 1948. However, they frequently appeared inorganic, confused and were still caught up in the mire of tribalism and localism. This is largely explained by the fact that up until the early-1940s, a large percentage of the African "proletariat" were of foreign origin and had come to the country under the aegis of the RRLB created in 1903. The majority of indigenous Africans had largely kept to their traditional way of life and had shunned the lure of urban

[13] The desire for "partnership" has to be viewed within the context in which whites as a racial grouping viewed the rise of a large informed black middle class as a threat to their own livelihood and privileged status. The subsequent control measures discussed below were meant to thwart the development of alternative centres of power outside the white organic state structure.

[14] Coenraad Brand, "The Anatomy of an Unequal Society," in Stoneman, Zimbabwe's Inheritance, p. 51.

existence if only to avoid the humiliation of working for their "new white masters." Those who had been engaged as workers had strong ties to their rural homes in the "reserves." As such they did not constitute a class of workers in the classical Marxian sense but could more appropriately be referred to as migrant "peasant" workers. The migrant nature of African workers largely explains why, even up to the present, a fully developed stable proletariat divorced from its roots in the rural areas has not emerged.

The industrialization process coupled with the "liberal" policies of the Federal period acted as pull factors for many Africans who left their villages in search of employment. However, as more Africans joined the rank and file of urban workers, new problems emerged. Whereas the traditional rural set-up was predictable and whereas everyone knew their place in that social hierarchy, in the city such demarcations were not as clear-cut. Few avenues, if any, existed through which Africans could express their own sensitivities and their identity and culture. It was this urge for identity that led to the proliferation of welfare associations during the latter part of the 1940s.

The control of African welfare societies [15]

From the mid-1940s onwards, most Africans in the cities were members of a variety of civil society associations organized on the basis of ethnic background, occupation, religious affiliation, sport and entertainment. As the urban population increased so did the number of registered societies. In 1953 a total number of 67 welfare societies was reported in the city of Salisbury alone; by 1955 the number had actually trebled.[16]

Despite their proliferation, their political influence at national levels was minimal as they rarely appealed to larger audiences. Their local orientation and the lack of cohesion at higher ecumenical levels prevented them from playing major political roles. Apart from a few, the majority tended to concentrate on a narrow set of local interests. Few links, if any, existed between them.

With the launching of the well-funded, white liberal initiated Native Welfare Movement, this era of uncoordinated

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[15] The first Native Welfare Society had been established in Salisbury in 1926 by a group of whites who wanted to provide sporting facilities and other recreational facilities for Africans. Buoyed by the success of their initial endeavour, the society broadened its scope to include providing a "channel for the presentation of the problems and difficulties of the Africans." The Welfare movement eventually spread and by the late 1930s it had established seven branches in the major urban centres. For more details see for example Ian Hancock, White Liberals, Moderates And Radicals In Rhodesia 1953-1980, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980, p. 21.

[16] Murray, The Government System in Southern Rhodesia, p.325.

welfare activity was to be a thing of the past. An umbrella organization called The Federation of Native Welfare Societies (FNWS) was launched in 1942 with representatives from major societies occupying key positions in the executive council. African leaders representing important organizations included Enoch Dumbutshena[17] and S.J.T. Samkange of the African National Congress; Jasper Savanhu, president of the African Workers Trades Unions and also Secretary of the African National Congress; and the indomitable Charles Mzingeli, leader of the Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers Union.

With the appointment of the Reverend Percy Ibbotson, a prominent well-respected member of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society, as a full time organizing secretary, the FNWS's national stature was enhanced. After his appointment the settler government's Native Affairs Department (NAD) began to take the Native Welfare organization more seriously. Not only did it now view the FNWS as the principal organization representing African interests in the urban areas, it also consulted it on most matters regarding the welfare of Africans. Eager to maintain good relations, the FNWS routinely invited officials from the Native Affairs Department (NAD) to

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[17] Enoch Dumbutshena would become the first black post-independence chief justice. At 75 years of age, he is currently the leader of the FORUM party - a movement that has been propelled to the front by civil society groups disillusioned with the cooptative corporatist policies of the ZANU-PF ruling party. For more on this see chapter 6.

most of its executive council meetings.

Thus, unlike other earlier civil society groups whose operations were considered a threat to state security, the FNWS was considered to be an ally. Its board was dominated by people who were prominent in the white political structure. Its first chair, H. Martin was the Chief Government Medical Officer while its second head, L.B. Fereday was a former Salisbury Mayor before becoming the Minister of Mines. The government did not feel therefore that there was any political threat from its activities.

It must also be noted that, unlike in the rural areas where NAD structures were in place to tackle native issues, no such "appropriate" structures had been devised by the NAD to deal with Africans residing in urban areas. The formation of the FAWS was therefore regarded as a positive move. Not only would it provide the NAD with valuable information on the "state of the natives" in the urban areas; it would also do so without engaging any of their staff members to do the research, thereby minimizing its operational costs.

At its peak, the association established several affiliated branch organizations in the major urban centres. Its journal, the *Concord* had a total circulation of 2000 members while its monthly sponsored seminar series, "Open Forum"[18] in Harare drew large multi-racial crowds.[19] It also

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[18] A post-independent multi-racial organization cum political party would later adopt "Forum" as its own name.

successfully managed to lobby the government on matters concerning the provision of training facilities for medical orderlies and nurses; the provision of better housing; employment of African artisans in the construction industry located in African residential areas; provision of waiting rooms for Africans at railway stations; the introduction of advisory boards, and the possible enactment of new industrial legislation.[20]

Despite its prominence, however, the FNWS fell out of favour with nationalists who became disenchanted with its operations. Influential nationalists like Nkomo and Mzingeli felt that activities of the FNWS were undermining their own organizations' operations and effectiveness. When asked why he had accepted in the first place to serve on the executive of an organization he later viewed with suspicion, Mzingeli contended that he had only joined to assure himself that the society would not distort the view of the African people.[21] Lawrence Vambe, a prominent figure in later multi-racial societies had this to say about the Welfare Society and Ibboston's role in it:

> The Rhodesian Government did everything it could to strengthen the influence of the native welfare societies in each urban area. Later they were

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[19] Leys, European Politics In Southern Rhodesia, p.124.

[20] Murray, The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia, p. 332.

[21] Lawrence Vambe, From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, London: Heinemann, 1976, p.99.

> coordinated into what was called the Federation of
> Native Welfare Societies, under the Rev. Percy
> Ibbotson... He was very close to the Prime
> Minister, an accomplished political manipulator,
> and soon showed himself to be the Government's
> chief watch-dog in African affairs. In this role he
> tried hard to distract black people from their
> nationalist aspirations.[22]

In addition to the concerted opposition of the nationalists, the association faced other obstacles. Although it had a sympathetic audience in the NAD, political proposals to improve the conditions of Africans required political action outside the jurisdiction of the Department of Native Affairs.

By the end of the 1940s, an African middle class consisting of politicians, union activists, teachers, businesspersons, journalists, farmers, agricultural demonstrators, and clerks had begun to emerge. This small middle class was eager to break the myriad laws and restraints that denied them the amenities, opportunities and privileges to which they felt entitled.[23] It was this class that white liberals would target with the launching of multi-racial civil associations.[24]

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[22] Ibid, p.99.

[23] Jasper Savanhu, a prominent figure in multi-racial politics quoted in Hancock, White Liberals, Moderates and Radicals In Rhodesia 1953-1980, p. 20.

[24] Up until the 1940s there had always been a minority group of white liberals who had led campaigns aimed at redressing land grievances and the improvement of workers's living and working conditions. As far back as the 1920s, two Anglican clergymen, John White and Arthur Cripps had openly supported the efforts of African civic organizations in their campaigns against the enactment of the Land Apportionment Act of 1930. The campaigns were sporadic and uncoordinated. This

Cooptation of African civil society through multiracial movements.

Meanwhile, within the organic white political community, "multi-racial partnership" became the new buzzword from the late 1940s onwards. The simultaneous challenge posed by the rising pressure of African nationalism and the hardening of racial attitudes in South Africa following the introduction of apartheid in 1948 forced Rhodesian settlers to opt for a strategy that would both keep blatant apartheid policies out[25] and African nationalism at bay.[26] The previous "two pyramid policy" or "separate development" was dropped in favour of multi-racial "cooperation". It was this new thrust that propelled the emergence of multi-racial societies.

After WWII, a group of white ex-servicemen who had broadened their experience by fighting alongside African troops during WWII came back determined to make their country

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was to change with the formation of multi-racial associations. See Canaan Banana, "The Role of the Church in the Struggle for liberation in Zimbabwe" in Canaan Banana ed., _Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe 1890-1990_, Harare: College Press, 1989.

[25] Given the relatively small white population in the country overt apartheid policies were neither enforceable nor economically feasible.

[26] It is quite possible that some settlers would have preferred the introduction of apartheid policies. However, whereas the ratio of whites to Africans was 1:4 in South Africa in Rhodesia it was only 1:20. The ratio of whites to blacks in Malawi and Zambia were 1:35 and 1: 270, respectively.

a "better place to live in."[27] Upon their return they launched the Ex-Servicemen's Vigilance Association to lobby for housing and employment programmes for the white ex-servicemen. Satisfied that their needs had been taken care of, they decided to broaden activities of their Association to include campaigns for better understanding between whites and blacks.

To publicise their activities they launched a series of lectures under the auspices of the newly formed National Affairs Association (NAA). Covering a broad range of topics from economics, native affairs, and political philosophy the lecture series provided an avenue through which various speakers of different races could speak on issues of importance to them. Other than act as sources of informed discussion, the meetings also accorded white settlers an opportunity to decipher the level of frustration among the emerging African petty bourgeoisie. After a series of meetings, it dawned upon some key NAA organizers like Hardwicke Holderness and Jack Humphries that there was a real need to direct "advanced Africans" towards co-operation with the whites and steer them away from destructive agitation. It was within that context of multiracial corporatism that the Interracial Association of Southern Rhodesia (IASR) was launched in 1952.

Its membership consisted of 17 Europeans, 14 Africans, 4 Asians and 3 coloureds. Key African members included three

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[27] Hancock, White Liberals, p. 23.

journalists: Lawrence Vambe who later served in the federal government as a press attache in London; Stanlake Samkange, an urbane historian who later left the country for the United States where he taught African History until 1978 when he became an MP in the Zimbabwe Rhodesia parliament; Nathan Shamuyarira, now minister of Foreign Affairs in the Mugabe government;[28] and finally Herbert Chitepo, the colony's first African lawyer and later Attorney General of the Republic of Tanganyika before assuming the leadership of ZANU until his assassination in 1974. Although the latter frequently attended multi-racial society meetings and occasionally made speeches, he was, according to Ian Hancock always a reluctant and cautious convert.[29]

No such circumspection was apparent among the largely white membership which reached 170 out of a total membership of 240 in 1954. Drawn mainly from the business and professional circles from the two major cities of Bulawayo and Harare, these whites shared one thing in common: they were educated elites who generally had little interaction with either the white rural bourgeoisie, or lower class whites, let alone Africans. The professionals were motivated by their liberal sentiments and as such were basically interested in

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[28] In an **interview** held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Harare on 5 August, 1992 with this writer Shamuyarira in hindsight castigated the whole partnership arrangement as an attempt to stem the tide of nationalism.

[29] Hancock, White Liberals, p. 27,

sharing ideas with middle class Africans. To be sure, they were not perturbed by the entrenched racist legislation responsible for denying Africans their civil liberties nor did they wish to radically alter it; they were more interested in coopting those Africans they regarded as potential nationalist leaders into the "white establishment." As one observer puts it, these liberals were of the opinion that

> if this class was not absorbed it might well lead
> other Africans into revolution...(T)he cultivation
> of selected Blacks had a practical ... selfish
> intention: the protection of a way of life by
> extending its privileges to potential saboteurs."[30]

The business class had other considerations in mind in its support of the Interracial Society. Industrial elites were more interested in the creation of a stable middle class with enough purchasing power to stimulate increased domestic demand while the miners saw a stable environment as conducive to a steady supply of labour. They viewed the whole partnership alliance as one conducive to the creation of a good and stable investment climate.

When the Association was launched it had three areas of focus: extension of a limited franchise to Africans, recognition of African labour unions, and provision of better housing.

The issue of qualified franchise had always been manipulated by the settlers to make sure that very few Africans met the specified criteria. Over the years, each time

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[30] Hancock, <u>White Liberals</u>, p. 27.

it seemed likely that Africans were meeting the income qualification criteria, the successive settler regimes would always raise them further. The 1951 Electoral Act was one such Act that had raised the franchise qualification to an annual income of 240 pounds or property valued at 500 pounds, making it impossible for the majority of Africans to qualify as voters. For example, of the fifty thousand qualified voters in 1956, less than six hundred were Africans.[31]

Within the IASR there were two conflicting opinions on the issue of African franchise between the two major branches. The Bulawayo branch preferred the immediate introduction of universal suffrage.[32] The Salisbury Committee was of the opinion that universal suffrage was "not immediately possible"[33] and were more inclined towards supporting the existing franchise. In response to criticisms, they dropped the income qualification criteria in favour of one which entitled all Africans with a junior high school certificate to cast a vote.

Another area where the IASR lobbied without success was their call for an amendment of the Industrial Conciliation Act -- a piece of legislation in force since 1934 that essentially

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[31] Hancock, White Liberals, p. 52.

[32] The Bulawayo Branch's decision was largely influenced by the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC), which was then a regional based party with its headquarters in Bulawayo.

[33] Hancock, White Liberals, p.53.

barred African union activity. A sub-committee on industrial relations comprising Eileen Haddon, Fred Lacey and Charles Mzingeli, among others was setup in 1953 with a view to drafting a proposal that would recognize all unions irrespective of race. After some consultation with both white and African trade unions, the committee came up with the following proposals:

1. The need for a new approach to the problem of industry and labour furthering the cause of racial harmony in the field of industry.

2. The desirability of amending the Industrial Conciliation Act to include the African as an employee.

3. The expediency or otherwise of seeking official recognition for existing African trade unions in those spheres of employment which are entirely African.

4. The advisability or otherwise of admitting the Africans to membership of European trade unions in those spheres of employment where there is or will be a mixed labour force.

5. The desirability or otherwise of admitting to the facilities of apprenticeship to anyone possessing the relevant qualifications irrespective

of race.[34]

The proposals were to be presented before a conference involving labour unions of all races. The two day conference which took place in Harare in early July 1954 attracted thirty five delegates that included seven representatives of white unions, twelve African Union leaders, seven delegates from the Employers's organizations; four Industrial Council officers, four Labour Department officials, and a representative from the Salisbury African Welfare Society.

At the end of the second day, the majority of the participants had agreed on the need for closer racial cooperation, expansion of a skilled African labour force, and creation of a stable African working urban population. Although no concrete proposals were adopted, many white delegates used this meeting as an occasion to meet and "share" views with prominent African labour movement leaders.[35]

Through the "good offices" of its founder member, Hardwicke Holderness, now a back bencher under prime minister Garfield Todd and a member of a select committee charged with the task of reviewing labour legislation, the IASR made their views known nationally and pressed for their incorporation into the drafted bill. The suggested principles were never incorporated. Todd lost office in 1958 before the Bill reached

[34] Hardwicke Holderness, Lost Chance: Southern Rhodesia: 1945-58, Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1985, p. 153

[35] Holderness, Lost Chance, p. 153..

its second reading stage. After Todd's ouster an Industrial Relations Bill replete with controls and inhibitions was eventually passed. Although it gave tacit recognition to African unions, the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1959 was nothing more "than a control measure." [36]

The final area where the ISAR focused its attention with some degree of success was on the issue of urban housing which had reached crisis proportions by the mid-1950s as a result of the industrial revolution taking place in the country. The association issued a humanitarian appeal for better housing schemes in which Africans would own their own houses through the extension of mortgage facilities and the introduction of title deeds. It also called upon the authorities to expedite efforts aimed at creating an African middle class divorced from its roots in the reserves. Their efforts were not entirely fruitless: the government repealed by-laws that had prohibited Africans from staying with their families in town. "Self-governing" township boards -- apartheid style -- in which Africans had a say were also instituted.

Another conspicuous multi-racial society during the federal period was the Capricorn African Society (CAS) launched in 1949. Unlike the IASR, it was well endowed with an impressive array of patrons locally and overseas. Under the

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[36] Minister of Labour, quoted in Ndlela, <u>Dualism in the Rhodesian Colonial Economy</u>, p.113.

leadership of Colonel David Stirling, a "British eccentric"[37] and WWII veteran, the Society started as a league charged with the task of promoting a federation of all "those lands of Eastern and Central Africa which lie between the Abyssinian border and the Limpopo River."[38] Supported by local and foreign businessmen, Stirling pursued his dream with a passion. The dream -- similar in many respects to Cecil Rhodes' Cape to Cairo one -- was taken up by a group of Southern Rhodesia business people who saw expanded opportunities for their businesses in a larger expanded federal structure.

Events however took a different turn with the establishment of the Federation of Nyasaland, Northern and Southern Rhodesia in 1953. Overwhelmed by African opposition (especially in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland) to the federal structure, Stirling decided to make "multi-racial partnership" the dominant concern of his Society. His hope was that by joining forces with the African middle classes in the three countries, he would stem the tide of protests against federation and also promote a feeling of goodwill between the African middle class and the whites.

In early 1954, CAS published its manifesto calling for the creation of an integrated community in which human rights,

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[37] This characterization of him was given by Shamuyarira, Interview, August 5, 1992.

[38] Holderness, Lost Chance, p. 170.

justice and the equitable distribution of resources would be observed. The manifesto was to tabled and debated before a convention the following year. When the convention was consequently held at Salima, Malawi in June 1956, it attracted 150 delegates and over 40 observers.[39] African delegates from Southern Rhodesia included Leopold Takawira, the CAS Executive Secretary, Herbert Chitepo, and Nathan Shamuyarira, among many others. To the delight of the organizers and the Southern Rhodesian delegation that formed the largest contingent, the proposals were ratified.[40]

After the Salima Convention, efforts were made to seek a "political vehicle" through which the Society could implement its policies. Branches were formed in Bulawayo, the Eastern highlands and the Midlands with a view to attract a targeted membership of 20,000. Much to Stirling's despair however, the numbers never exceeded 3,000 and with the launching of the African National Congress in 1957, the numbers fell steeply. Many African members had become disillusioned with its ineffectiveness and therefore looked elsewhere for "something more compelling and emotionally more satisfying."[41]

A question that is of theoretical interest is did the formation and activities of multi-racial societies accelerate

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[39] Leys, <u>European Politics</u>, pp. 122-4.

[40] The Malawian nationalists by and large boycotted the Salima conference despite the fact that it was being held in their own country.

[41] Hancock, <u>White Liberals</u>, p.47.

or retard the development of African civil society groups in Rhodesia?

At a superficial level, a cursory examination of the list of Africans members of multi-racial societies reads like a "who's who" of present-day Zimbabwean politics. It cannot be denied that the multi-racial adventure provided a training ground for leaders both in technical skills of running mass organisations and in the substantive appreciation of "modern" politics. In addition they also served as communication networks through which new ideas could circulate.

However, looking at a more substantive level, the associations retarded the development of indigenous civil associations. Most of them were paternalistic in every sense.[42] Not only were white liberals the financial backers, they were also both advisors and office holders. African membership was restricted to only those who were perceived as leaders of the urban Africans. The whole partnership arrangement was one in which Africans were the "horse" and their liberal white counterparts the "riders".[43]

Whilst their counterparts in Malawi and Zambia were vigorously transforming their civil society groups into fully fledged political parties, the Rhodesian nationalists were busy expending their energies on bolstering the activities of

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[42] See Tafataona Mahoso, "Between Two Nationalisms," unpublished PhD thesis, Temple University, 1986.

[43] Interview with **President Canaan Banana**, first president of Zimbabwe, Harare, 10 July, 1992.

multi-racial associations. Unlike the case of Zambia, where political resistance was engineered by welfare associations which amalgamated into the Federation of African Societies in 1946 only to become a political party (the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress [NRANC]) in 1948,[44] the welfare associations in Zimbabwe were "hijacked" by white liberals. Under Rev Ibbotson the FANWS a non-confrontational NGO maintained very close ties with the settler regime until the 1950s.

While nationalists in Zambia and Malawi were vehemently opposing the federal structure the Rhodesian ones were supporting it. The then ANC (Northern Rhodesia)'s president Harry Nkumbula and Dr Hastings Banda of Malawi were consistent in their opposition to federation from beginning to end. They correctly perceived the whole federal plan as a deliberate attempt to delay self-government for the three territories.[45] Whereas they were united in their condemnation of it, Nkomo and his followers in Rhodesia maintained a tranquil silence. Indeed, so thorough was the state's corporatist cooptative methods that **three African members** of the multi-racial association ended up serving in the Federal government as

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[44] For a detailed discussion on political developments in Zambia, see William Tordoff (ed), Politics in Zambia Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974.

[45] Ndabaningi Sithole, African Nationalism, London: Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 42.

diplomats in foreign embassies.[46] Shamuyarira captures the mood of the African middle class during that period when he acknowledges that most Africans had put a lot of faith in liberal overtures, particularly during the reign of Garfield Todd. He writes: "(b)y 1956 a stage had been reached when Africans had begun to regard the (UFP) government as their own."[47] It was such attitudes that made attempts by Africans to take over direction of their own associations painstakingly slow. It was not until the 1950s that African nationalists completely abandoned the idea of working from within the "white establishment" despite the existence of a few quasi-political formations formed before WWII.

THE RISE OF NATIONALISM

In this section I examine the evolution of the various identified civil society groups into the first viable national African nationalist party.

If the inhospitable environment of the 1930s and 1940s was responsible for retarding the developments of political movement in Central Africa in general and in Southern Rhodesia in particular, it was the liberal policies of the federal period[48] and the subsequent disillusionment with these liberal

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[46] The three were Jasper Savanhu (information officer in Washington), Lawrence Vambe (press attache in London) and M. Hove (High Commissioner to Nigeria).

[47] Shamuyarira, Crisis in Rhodesia, p. 21.

[48] Prime Minister Garfield Todd's reign that the stands out as the only settler premier who moved beyond the "white enclave mentality." Although under his helm, the legislature

overtures that created a context within which most social movements would gravitate towards becoming political movements.[49]

As we have already noted, nationalists in both Malawi and Northern Rhodesia had opposed the whole grandiose federal plan from its inception as they viewed it as a manoeuvre by Southern Rhodesians to extend white power and privilege. Not only did their respective political movements boycott participating in both federal and state elections; they intensified their opposition to federal arrangements.

In the case of Southern Rhodesia, events took a different twist. The tendency was to try and reform the settler system

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continued to pass restrictive laws such as the Public Order Act that authorized troops to disrupt any African political meetings without prior warning, his United Federal Party made some efforts to encourage the inclusion of Africans in the political and economic arenas. In general such neo-liberal policies created the context within which most African civil society movements would gravitate towards becoming political parties. It was these liberal sentiments that partly contributed to Todd's ouster by his own party supporters who felt that he had gone too far.

The cooptative paternalistic nature of his policies notwithstanding, most African civil society leaders at that time found his multi-racial partnership policy more ideologically acceptable than the previously overt segregationist policies of the 1930s. After the break-up of the Federation Todd's accelerated attempts to coopt middle class Africans were jettisoned by the right wing Rhodesian Front that took over in 1962. ᵀts cooptative policies took a different form. It focused more on the cooptation of influential chiefs and those nationalists that had fallen out of favour with the guerillas.

[49] Having survived the cooptative corporatist strategies of the settler state, the "reconstituted" groups demanded equality of opportunity in the economic, social and political arenas.

from within. Most protest movements in Southern Rhodesia were therefore organizations whose major objective was to improve the living conditions of their members. The leadership did not think in terms of wresting power from the settlers. Thus when a number of highly educated leaders such as Joshua Nkomo, Enoch Dumbutshena, and Leopold Takawira joined multi-racial societies like the African Capricorn Society and the Inter-Racial Association, their intention was not to fight for majority rule but to fight against white exclusionary policies. The transition from social movements to political parties did not therefore occur by design but because the settler state, through its continued restrictive policies, forced the demands of social movements to the terrain of politics.

Faced with the settler regime's intransigence not to grant an unqualified franchise to the Africans, the latter's social movements changed their focus in the 1950s. In 1955, a militant organization called the City Youth League (CYL) was formed. Led by young intellectuals 'ike James Chikerema and George Nyandoro and Dunduza Chisiza, a Malawian immigrant who eventually became a key figure in Malawian politics following his deportation from Rhodesia, the CYL sought to raise the political consciousness of Africans. A year after its formation it organized a three day bus boycott in protest against a steep increase in fares. This boosted its image in the urban areas tremendously. To attract rural membership the

CYL set out to humiliate and vilify the Native District Commissioners as these were considered visible representations of white domination. The intention was to destroy their invincibility in the eyes of the Africans.

By the late 1950s, Southern Rhodesian Africans were represented by at least three political organizations. In addition to the CYL based in Harare, Bulawayo was home to two political organizations which included the African Voice Association, led by Benjamin Burombo whose contribution to the successful 1948 strike had earned it some support among the proletariat, and the moribund African National Congress (ANC) which had been revived by Joshua Nkomo.

Motivated by the need to form a national organization, the various African leaders decided to meet in Harare in 1957 to create a national party that would represent "the interests and aspirations of both the educated and uneducated Africans."[50] On September 12, 1957, the Rhodesia **African National Congress** was launched with Joshua Nkomo as president while the former City Youth League party chair, James Chikerema, assumed the post of Vice-President.

The banning of the ANC and the formation of the National Democratic Party.

The new party intensified its campaign for rural

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[50] Bhebhe, "The National Struggle 1957-62" in Banana ed., Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe 1890-1990, 1989, p. 53.

resistance to the Land Husbandry Act of 1951.[51] The nationalists effectively managed to expose the injustices of the legislation and this led many Africans to resist its implementation. Sporadic outbursts of violence were reported in various parts of the country with several reported incidents in which African farmers burnt down cattle-dipping tanks, beer garden shelters, and school buildings. Land development officers were accosted and prevented from addressing meeting regarding its implementation. [52]

The party's successful campaign triggered fear among the settlers who responded by arresting over five hundred leading members of the Congress in February 1959. Its leader, Joshua Nkomo, escaped the net as he was in Cairo. He was to spend the next eighteen months self-exiled in England. Immediately after the arrests, five new laws were passed. These included the Unlawful Organizations Act, the Law and Order Maintenance Act, the Native Affairs Amendment Act, the Preventive Detention Act and the Emergency Powers Act. These laws gave the government powers to curb free speech, movement, assembly and association, to arrest and detain without trial, to control businesses and prevent strikes in the so called essential services area. So repressive were these laws that the Federal

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[51] This act sought to obviate the crisis of overcrowding in the reserves by reducing the size of the plots per family. Those individuals who were gainfully employed would automatically lose their leasing right of plots in their villages of origin.

[52] Shamuyarira, Crisis in Rhodesia, chapter five

Chief Justice, Sir Robert Tredgold, resigned in protest. In his resignation statement, he cited the provisions of the Law and Order Maintenance Act which to him violated every basic human right, and "if passed into law, ... (would) remove the last vestige of doubt about whether Rhodesia is a police state."[53]

The banning of the ANC did not deter nationalists from forming another party. A year later on January 1, 1960 the National Democratic Party (NDP) under the leadership of Michael Mawema, whose presidency was temporary pending the eventual return of Joshua Nkomo, was launched.

By the time of its launching, Africans leaders had become disillusioned with previous strategies of reforming the system from within. They realized that the reforms they had been pressing would not be forthcoming without wresting power from the settlers. Other exogenous factors also did play a part. The days of the Federation period were numbered and the writing was clearly on the wall: Malawi and Zambia would emerge from Federation as independent polities. Also, by then Ghana had already attained its independence and some of the former ANC members had attended its inrependence celebrations. The same year that the NDP was banned, Harold Macmillan had delivered his famous "wind of change" speech in Cape Town which alluded to the inevitability of independence for the

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[53] Martin Meredith, The Past in Another Country: Rhodesia 1890-1979, London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1979, p. 28

Africans. These and other factors led to the call for the
first time on "freedom" and "one man, one vote" In its
statement of principles the NDP's stated objectives were:

> ...to serve as a vigorous political vanguard for
> removing all forms of oppression, and for the
> establishment of a democratic government in
> Southern Rhodesia, to work for speedy
> constitutional reconstruction in Southern Rhodesia,
> with the object of having a government elected on
> the principle of "ONE MAN, ONE VOTE", to work for
> the educational, political, social and economic
> emancipation of the people, especially the
> underprivileged; to work with other democratic
> movements in Africa and the rest of the world, with
> a view to abolishing colonialism, racialism,
> tribalism and all forms of national or racial
> oppression and economic inequalities among nations,
> races and people.[54]

Soon after its launching the NDP called upon the British
government to organize a constitutional conference in which
all parties to the conflict would be represented. Mass protest
meetings were held with a view to pressurizing the Rhodesian
and British governments to convene the conference.

The British gave in to the demands and in 1961 a
constitutional conference was held in Salisbury. Chaired by
Duncan Sandys, a British government minister, the meeting
agreed to give Africans 15 seats in a House of 65! When the
news was announced the reaction of NDP supporters to the
agreement was negative. There was a surge of discontent with
the way Joshua Nkomo had handled the talks leading some senior
members of the party to publicly repudiate him. Leopold
Takawira, Enoch Dumbutshena and Paul Mushonga, NDP

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[54] Shamuyarira, Crisis in Rhodesia, p. 60

representatives in London, cabled Nkomo denouncing the agreement as disastrous. Other leaders including Robert Mugabe who was the Publicity Secretary called for a review of party leadership.[55] Radical overseas students issued a statement castigating the NDP participants which read in part:

> At the crucial 1961 Constitutional Conference, Sithole, Chitepo, Nkomo and Silundika sold the African masses to colonialism by agreeing to a constitution that only brought in 15 Africans in a parliament of 65.[56]

This was the first time that supporters had openly criticised Nkomo's leadership. Although Nkomo later repudiated the deal, the seeds of disenchantment with his leadership style had been sown.

Faced with heavy opposition from its supporters, the NDP officials refused to participate in anything relating to the new constitution. To prevent African voters from registering for the 1962 election the leaders employed violent tactics which included ransacking homes of non-party members and the looting of schools and beer-halls. The wave of violence persisted leading the government to send in troops to quell it. When order was eventually restored in December 1961, the NDP was banned with most of its leaders, with the exception of Joshua Nkomo, arrested.

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[55] Bhebhe, "The Nationalist Struggle," in Banana (ed.) Turmoil and Tenacity, pp. 88-91.

[56] Zimbabwe Students Union in Europe quoted in Nyangoni, African Nationalism in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), p. 48.

The launching of ZAPU and the ZAPU-ZANU split

Eight days later the Zimbabwe African People Union (ZAPU) was founded, with Joshua Nkomo still at the helm. As a direct successor of the NDP, the "new" party employed the same strategies as its predecessor. Its objectives were however broadened to include:

-the establishment of a policy of one-man-one vote as the basis of government;

-to maintain the spirit of democracy and love of liberty among the people of Zimbabwe;

-to fight for the total liquidation of imperialism and colonialism, direct and indirect; and to cooperate with any international forces supporting this struggle;

-to create conditions for the economic prosperity of the people under a government based on the principle of one man one vote;

-to foster the spirit of Pan-Africanism and work co-operatively with other movements in Africa and elsewhere supporting the spirit of Pan-Africanism;

- to promote the development of the best values in African culture and traditions with a view to establishing a desirable order.[57]

During the first half of 1962, Nkomo concentrated on

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[57] Shamuyarira, <u>Crisis in Rhodesia</u>, p. 71.

drumming up international support for majority rule in Rhodesia. He managed to press for a debate on Rhodesia at the United Nations Assembly in June 1961 with the UN eventually passing a resolution demanding that a new constitution be drafted after discussions between all races. Whitehead's reaction to Nkomo's overtures was to increase the repressive legislation allowing the state to monitor nationalistic activities more closely.

Not long after Nkomo's triumphant return from the UN, ZAPU was banned on 20 September 1962 and its leaders confined to restriction camps. As usual, Nkomo was out of the country. However, on this occasion pressure from Nyerere and other African leaders forced Nkomo to return and on arrival he was arrested. He was to spend the next three months in a restricted camp with his colleagues.

While most nationalist leaders were still in restriction, elections based on the 1961 constitution were held and its results were to radically shape the country's future for many years. First, the fall of Whitehead ended the hegemony of a party which under a variety of names had held power for most of the post-Company rule period. Second, the triumph of the right-wing Rhodesian Front, led by Winston Field (which won thirty five seats against the UFP's twenty nine of which 14 were won by African UFP candidates) marked a turning point in the political developments in the country.

The nationalists were now facing a new settler regime

which was determined to stop at nothing in its bid to crush African nationalism. After releasing the detained nationalists, the new government tightened the Law and Order Maintenance Act, introduced the death penalty and beefed up its police force. So, by the time a conference was held to finalize the break-up of the federal structure in early 1963, African nationalists were "drifting aimlessly without clear directives."[58]

It is clear that ZAPU had failed to produce a programme for national liberation. Much emphasis had been put on constitutional approaches and petitioning the United Nations. Because of the failure of both approaches, criticism of Nkomo's leadership was mounting. The schisms resulted in a split in the nationalist movement with those supporting Nkomo forming the Peoples Caretaker Council[59] and those opposed to him led by the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, a Methodist clergyman, launching the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in August 1963.

In its bid to eliminate ZANU, ZAPU and its supporters adopted violent tactics. The violence soon spread to urban and rural areas. Almost all African civil society groups including trade unions were affected by it. Pitched battles between the two parties were not uncommon. The violence soon spread to the

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[58] Bull (ed) Rhodesian Perspective, p. 125.

[59] Since ZAPU was legally banned this "new" organization acted as a "front" for ZAPU.

white community with ZANU's petrol bom.) campaign on white homes and its killing of a settler in 1964 at a road block set up by its supporters.

The Unilateral Declaration of Independence

Meanwhile within the white community, moves were well under way to declare unilateral independence. This move was engendered by the apparent fear among the whites that the British government was succumbing to nationalist pressures for majority rule. The RF and its supporters viewed demands for majority rule as the death knell for the privileged political, social and economic status.

Thus, when Field developed "cold feet" over the "white independence issue", the party moved swiftly to replace him in April 1964. His former deputy, Ian Smith, who had skilfully exploited white fears, took over. Once assured that he had full control over his party[60] and his government,[61] Smith set out to cultivate for himself the image of a "tough but caring" father figure [62] whose fight for the "white cause" was never in doubt.[63] In the elections held in 1965 the RF won all fifty

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[60] See for example Bowman, <u>Politics in Rhodesia</u>, and Barber, <u>Rhodesia: The Road to Rebellion</u>.

[61] Tamarkin, <u>The Making of Zimbabwe</u>, p. 5.

[62] The legend of "good old Smithy," has been well chronicled in Meredith's <u>The Past Is Another Country</u>, especially Chapter 3.

[63] In a speech after being sworn in as prime minister he declared that, "If we (whites) ever have an African majority in this country we will have failed in our policy, because our policy is one of trying to make a place for the white man,"

parliamentary seats, thus continuing the tradition of one-party politics that was to last until 1979.

Meanwhile, as Smith was consolidating his position within the both the party and government the rift between ZAPU and ZANU had solidified and sporadic incidents of violence continued unabated. This gave Ian Smith an excuse to prove to his party just how effective he was as an uncompromising leader. Not only did he ban all African political parties, but he also rounded up most of their leaders confining them to camps in isolated parts of the country. By the end of the year, over 2000 Africans were in detention without trial with hundreds more in prison convicted of political offenses. The same year also witnessed the final death of press freedom. Almost all national newspapers supporting African viewpoints incluiding *Chapupu, Zimbabwe Sun,* and *The African Daily News* were proscribed. Only the Catholic and United Methodist controlleu papers, *Moto* and *Umbowo,* respectively, escaped the wrath of the Law and Order Maintenance Act. *Moto* was to remain operational until 1974.[64]

With most nationalist leaders in jail, Smith embarked on a series of negotiations with Britain over "the white independence" issue. When it became evident that there were irreconcilable differences between the two governments, Smith

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quoted in Meredith, The Past Is Another Country, p. 46.

[64] Ian Linden, The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe, London: Longman, 1980, p.70.

announced the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November 1965.

The Africans' reaction to UDI was one of indifference. With most of their political and civil society leaders in jail, organized opposition to UDI was muted. The only organized group that managed to attract attention was the **student movement** at the University College of Rhodesia. Their reaction to the announcement was swift. When their demands that the College Administration officials make a public statement condemning the action of the regime fell on deaf ears, they called for a class boycott. The government reacted by announcing restrictive measures that included the prohibition of any gatherings without police permission. Police were sent in to quell any form of resistance. From 1966 onwards the relationship between the state and the university was one characterized by continual conflict until independence.[65]

Another group that found itself in conflict with the state from 1965 onwards was the Catholic Church.[66] As the

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[65] For an excellent piece on the conflict between the state and the University see, J.L. Cefkin, "A University In Crisis," Africa Report, June 1966, pp 16-20. As noted in chapter 5, the first six post-independence years were ones marked by relative harmony between the state and the students. The honey-moon period ended after revelations of corruption in high government circles. For more on this see chapter five and six.

[66] See also the Catholic Church's opposition to the post-settler regime's authoritarian impulses in chapters 5 and 6.

Smith regime unleashed its military and coercive might on defenceless citizens, it found itself in the role of defender of the downtrodden. Its affiliate organization, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, continued to highlight the atrocities of the settler regime until independence and after (see chapter four and five). In reaction to such criticisms the regime went out of its way to make the operations of the Catholic Church difficult. Not only did it deport suspected "terrorist" sympathizers,[67] it also attempted to increase its control of all Catholic controlled schools.[68]

Britain responded initially by banning all oil imports and eventually in 1968 at its urging, full mandatory sanctions were voted by the United Nations (UN) Security Council.

Far from weakening the economy of Rhodesia, however, sanctions helped whites to close ranks. Isolation from the international community created a siege mentality among white Rhodesians. As Doxey has observed, a siege psychosis once

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[67] This was the very same strategy used by the post-settler regime after the Catholic Church revealed its atrocities during the anti-dissident campaign in Matabeleland. The regime responded to Catholic criticisms by arresting two of its officials (see chapter 5).

[68] The relationship between the Church and the State during the settler era has been extensively documented. Of all the churches the Catholic Church stands out given that it is has the largest following in the country. Its schools have also produced a fairly large percentage of the middle class in Rhodesia. For a detailed discussion on the role of the Catholic Church see, Linden, The Catholic Church and The Struggle for Zimbabwe.

engendered can act as powerful cohesive force.[69] Indeed, in Rhodesia's case, many whites "acquired a sense of nationalism" once the world shunned them. This sense of nationalism propelled the agrarian bourgeoisie, the business elite, the army and the civil servants to form a more cohesive corporatist structure determined to defy the international community.

After a brief economic downturn in the first two years after the declaration of independence the economy grew at an average of 5 per cent from 1967 to 1974.[70] It is evident that far from generating political change, or economic disintegration, sanctions in Rhodesia did the opposite until the late 1970s.

The greatest success of the sanctions period was in the area of industrialization brought about through import substitution methods. Whereas in 1965 only 600 identifiable products were made in the country, that number had risen to over 6,000 by 1980. The products which ranged from canned foods to iron and steel products were not only designed for the local market but for the export market as well.[71] In the words of Strack sanctions were partly responsible for the creation of a "general economic diversification that might

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[69] Doxey, Economic Sanctions, p. 26.

[70] Economist Intelligence Unit, Zimbabwe's First Five Years Economic Prospects Following Independence, 1981, p. 22.

[71] Ibid., p. 22

have taken decades to achieve naturally." [72]

In the midst of all these developments not only was the government's firm control over the economy extended; concerted efforts were well under way to marginalize Africans even further. A new Land Tenure Act was enacted in 1969 increasing the proportion of land reserved for white occupation. The same year also witnessed the adoption of a republican constitution which effectively eliminated the possibility of a common voting role.

Thus, with the banning of all African political activity within the country and faced with no possibility of organizing from within, exiles of both parties set up rival political parties from the late 1960s onwards culminating in the war of liberation ensuing in earnest from the 1970s onwards.

As preparations for the liberation war were under way the international community, led by Britain, engineered some last-ditch attempts aimed at arriving at some compromise solution with the Smith regime. That agreement, as shall become clear later in the next section, did not stop the war from escalating.

FROM CONSULTATION TO ARMED STRUGGLE

In their bid to obviate full-scale armed conflict, the British government and the Smith regime announced in November 1971, that the rebel Rhodesian government and itself had agreed on a "satisfactory" constitutional settlement in which

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[72] Strack, <u>Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia</u>, p 15.

a limited franchise would be extended to Africans. The agreement had provisions in which African representation in the Legislature would increase on a gradual basis as more and more Africans "qualified" to vote. The designed formula was meant to ensure that parity between white and African legislative seats could only be achieved by the year 2035![73] The British had however put a condition that the proposals would only be implemented after full consultation with the Africans. A team was to be dispatched to Rhodesia to sample African opinion on the proposals.

Before the team's arrival, an African pressure group known as the African National Council (ANC) had been formed to spearhead African opposition to the settlement. Led by Bishop Muzorewa, this group was a front for the two proscribed parties whose leaders were either in exile or in jail. The group was so successful in influencing African opinion against the proposals that by the time the British team led by Lord Edward Pearce held its consultations it was left with no doubt as to how unpopular the proposals were.

Buoyed by its successful campaign the ANC leaders decided to transform their organization into a national party a year later. With its formation, the constellation of opposition forces changed shape. After the release of most nationalists in 1974, the nationalist movement split into three factions

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[73] Robert C. Good, U.D.I: The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion, Princeton: Princeton University, 1973, p.306.

divided in their analysis of the political situation and the appropriate strategy to use against the Smith regime. The Mugabe-led faction, influenced by Maoist thought, favoured the prolonged guerrilla war strategy. Nkomo's faction, while in principle supporting armed struggle, preferred a combination of "talks" and force. A third more ideologically eclectic option was represented by the internal faction parties led by the ANC with its strategy of peaceful negotiation with the settler regime.

If the liberal policies of the federal period contributed to mobilizing the new groups of disaffected Zimbabweans, it was the conjunctural circumstances of the 1970s that determined the specific political shape of opposition to the settlers.

After a decade of moral arguments and fruitless endeavour aimed at reforming the settler structure, a stage was reached when armed confrontation was now recognized as the main means to wresting power from the whites. Methods of protest therefore changed from consultations and negotiation to armed resistance. Both ZANU and ZAPU, now exiled parties, changed their strategies from negotiation to armed struggle.

Slowly, the more militant party, ZANU, started sending guerrillas for training overseas. It launched its first guerrilla strike in the northeastern part of the country in the late 1960s. In that first battle at Chinhoyi, all the guerrillas perished. Through painful political and military

learning, ZANU had to reconsider its approach. It focused its attention on building mass support and establishing links between the guerillas and the rural masses. This new tactic would constitute an effective strategy that eventually overthrew the settler regime .

A major turning point in guerrilla warfare occurred in 1975 when Angola and Mozambique attained their independence from Portugal. This offered ZANU a base in Mozambique and also reinforced the isolation of the settler regime. As the war escalated ZANU attracted attention, when in 1978, a group of guerillas blew up oil tanks in Harare. The daring raid gave ZANU instant visibility and shattered the myth that the settler army was invincible and invulnerable.

By the end of 1978, Smith declared martial law that was to last for two years. Under it, the security forces launched numerous campaigns of indiscriminate repression, directed mainly against the rural people. Thousands of innocent defenceless citizens were massacred. This genocide by the security forces had a major effect in intensifying domestic and international opposition to the settler regime.

In the liberated zones, ZANU(PF) organized village committees and defence committees. These committees eventually acted as the cornerstones of ZANU(PF) support in the rural areas that have lasted up to today.

As the war spread to the countryside leaders adopted populist strategies that appealed to the rural masses. The

chief normative appeal was nationalism spiced with an anti-settler thrust that no one could object to. The focus was on inspirations of egalitarianism, humanitarianism and personality cults.[74]

The liberation war was more than just a rebellion against an autocratic racist settler structure. It represented a coalition of African civil society groups that had faced continual frustration in their attempts to reform the system from within. Their appeals were initially moralistic, and were directed to the conscience of the international community. Ideology and commitment to democracy[75] if any, was ad hoc and was only used later to procure assistance and aid.

THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF ZIMBABWE

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[74] An example of the latter was Joshua Nkomo who cultivated himself the image of a father figure, hence his populist slogan-- "father of the nation". At his rallies the masses would respond with vocal enthusiasm to the utterances of the "Father of the Nation" while the "father" rehashed his rehearsed speeches punctated with slogans and promises of a better future. After the meticulous rehearsal the leader would be carried shoulder high to his vehicle and whisked away to yet another smaller ceremony dominated by family friends.

[75] The liberation movements' commitment to democracy was always tenuous and at times questionable. To example, in 1964, ZAPU's official periodical The Zimbabwe Review, hailed the establishment of a one-party state in Kenya as "great victory" for Kenya and pan-Africanism. Africa Report, News In Brief, January 1965, p. 31. Also in ZAPU's listing of national executive members Joshua Nkomo is listed as Life President of the party. See for example, ZAPU's edited volume, Zimbabwe: History of Struggle, Cairo: The Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asia People's Solidarity Organization, p. 8

The combined effect of an economic downturn,[76] guerilla war and international pressure obliged Ian Smith to come, however reluctantly, to accept the principle of majority rule. To forestall a genuine transfer of power, however, he struck a deal with nationalists who had fallen out of favour with both the Front Line States (FLS)[77] and the guerillas. By signing an internal agreement with these parties, Smith hoped that the guerilla forces would be isolated and shunned by the international community.

The document that emerged from the initial talks consisted of an appointed President who acted on the advice of the Prime Minister from the majority party in the Legislature. The bicameral legislature consisted of 100 members on the Lower House while the Upper House had 30 members. White control was assured by a provision that gave the 28 white legislators in the lower house veto power. They could

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[76] Estimates are that between 1974 and 1979 national income fell by 12.5 per cent in real terms.

[77] The Frontline States was a loose coalition of Southern African countries that include Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe and Namibia held together by their opposition to South Africa's apartheid policies. The long term objective of the alliance was the total emancipation of all countries in the region. For more on the history of the alliance see Douglas Anglin, "The Frontline States and the Future of Southern Africa" in William Dowdy and Russel L. Trood eds., The Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a Strategic Arena, Durham: Duke University Press, 1985. For a detailed discussion on the FLS see Abillah H. Omari, "The Rise and Decline of The Front Line States (FLS) Alliance in Southern Africa: 1975-1990," Unpublished Ph.D thesis, Dalhousie University, 1992.

therefore effectively block any legislation which they deemed to be contrary to their interests. White monopoly of the civil service and the judiciary was also guaranteed. The cabinet ministers were virtually stripped of their power which was transferred to permanent secretaries and a special commission staffed by whites.

Undeterred by intensified guerilla incursions and international opposition to the agreement, the Rhodesians and the three party leaders - Abel Muzorewa of the ANC, Ndabaningi Sithole (ZANU)[78] and Chief Jeremiah Chirau of the Zimbabwe Union People's Organization (ZUPO) - signed the infamous Internal Agreement of March 3 1978. In the elections held soon after, the dimunitive bishop, Muzorewa, emerged as the winner. His main campaign promise was that once in power he would stop the war.

The Muzorewa government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia did not last for more than six months. As the war escalated unabated, and as it became obvious that Muzorewa could not stop it, the British called for a constitutional conference to be held in London in September 1979. Both sides to the conflict agreed to attend and after two months of negotiations, a constitutional agreement was reached.[79] On 17 December 1979, the two wings of

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[78] Sithole had lost the leadership of ZANU to Mugabe after their release from detention in 1974. Having fallen out with the guerrillas Sithole returned to Rhodesia in 1977 where he established his rival internal ZANU (Ndonga) party.

[79] See for example Tamarkin, The Making of Zimbabwe.

the Patriotic Front (ZANU under Mugabe and ZAPU) on the one hand and British and the internal factions on the other signed the Lancaster House agreement.

A week before the signing ceremony the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia parliament had voted to revert to colonial rule under the British and a governor by the name of Lord Soames was dispatched to oversee the whole cease-fire arrangement, the election and the granting of independence. In April 1980 Zimbabwe emerged as an independent country with Mugabe as Prime Minister.

CONCLUSION

This chapter reviewed political and economic developments after WWII. It established that from the 1940s onwards national consciousness among Africans emerged as a result of increased industrialization and urbanization thereby affirming the view that there is a direct relationship between industrialization and political consciousness. Slowly, former African civil society groups that had been preoccupied with local issues found their attention shifting from parochial concerns to more pressing issues associated with industrialization; hence the proliferation of welfare societies and later multi-racial societies.

It was also shown that with the rise of nationalism after WWII various African civil society groups fell prey to the state corporatist multi-racial cooptative adventures. Anxious that African civil society if left unchecked and uncoopted

could act as nurseries of democratic life,[80] the state adopted a grand scheme of "multi-racial partnership." In that scheme multi-racial associations were launched under the direction of white liberals thereby denying African civil societies the opportunity to set their own course in an independent manner.

It was not until the late 1950s that African civil society groups only managed to break away from such paternalistic endeavours. That clean break was expressed through the launching of the first African nationalist organization: the ANC. This umbrella group - the creation of major African civil society groups - for the first time set to develop an ideology of Zimbabwean nationalism.

The chapter proceeded to demonstrate that from 1960 onwards, the previously disparate nonconfrontational African civil society groups changed their protest strategies from peaceful petitions to confrontation. As the Africans demanded more political autonomy the whites under the "new organic" right-wing RF regime hardened their stance. From the early 1960s the country went through a tumultuous period as the RF dominated corporatist state suspended all the last vestiges of civil liberties left in the country. Most African leaders were arrested and kept in confinement without trial under the maze of emergency regulations while other opponents of the regime (including a few white clerics) were either detained or

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[80] David Kimble, The Machinery of Self-Government, London: Penguin West Africa Series, 1953, p. 28.

deported. The imposition of sanctions, far from weakening the resolve of white settlers, helped close their ranks thereby cementing relations between the state, agriculture and business on the one hand and other white social groupings on the other.[81] Faced with no possibility of organizing from within the various African political parties took up arms. Having tried unsuccessfully to utilize constitutional means the increased statutory racial discrimination left African civil society groups with no option but to support their umbrella groups waging an armed struggle.

As the war intensified, the former smooth functioning organic white state structure slowly crumbled. Despite its last ditch bid to perpetuate white privileges through the internal settlement agreement, the adverse effect of war, unemployment, falling standards of living, and the lack of democracy all acted as catalysts uniting the majority of the people against it. It was this concerted opposition that led to the formal liberation of Zimbabwe.

In the next chapter we see how all these developments conditioned and shaped state-society relations in the post-settler era.

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[81] Meredith, <u>The Past Is Another Country</u>, pp. 43-66.

CHAPTER FIVE

POST-SETTLER STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS: THE CONTROL AND COOPTATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY FROM 1980 TO THE LATE 1980s

INTRODUCTION

In the last chapter it was shown that authoritarianism dominated the political scene during the entire settler period. Direct political and economic power was buttressed by the physical and psychological repression of civil society. The exclusive racist corporatist structure did not create an environment that nurtured civil society groups. To the contrary, it created an environment in which the state controlled the activities of groups in African civil society through the enactment of legislation aimed at curbing their operations. Only those societies supportive of settler policies were allowed to operate.

In this chapter, I look at the structural configuration and functional relationship of the "new" state and organized interests in the post-settler state's first eight years of independence. My focus is on the main elements in Zimbabwean civil society: business (including agriculture) interests, labour, human rights, student and women's movements, the church, the media and mainly indigenous development NGOs.[1] Opposition political parties will also be included for reasons mentioned earlier in chapter one. This is not necessarily an

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[1] Transnational development NGOs working in Zimbabwe are excluded for reasons already mentioned in chapter one.

exhaustive categorization. It represents however a representative sample of the most salient groups.

In targeting these groups I have taken into account that, although arising as primarily single-issue movements, they share one common feature: if allowed to operate freely their activities can lead to liberatory trends conducive to the construction of a more democratic society. In addition, I have also taken into account their "national" as opposed to ethnic or local character and their ability to mobilize large sections of the population.

A key theme underlying this discussion is how inherited practises and political culture present(ed) elements of continuity rather than change thereby presenting a challenge to democracy. Following this introduction, the next section will analyze some of the intellectual underpinnings of the state-society debate in Zimbabwe. This is followed by an examination of the post-settler state's notion of governance. It starts by looking at some background information that is then used as a spring-board from which I explore the state's various attempts to restructure civil society along lines that posed minimum threats to its hegemonic position. The main argument advanced here is that the new political class used corporatist strategies to coopt, fragment and weaken civil society groups. Like its settler predecessors, it sought to impose its hegemonic position by limiting the level of political space in which groups in civil society could operate

effectively. The last section surveys the ruling party's attempts to create an "enabling environment" conducive to the creation of its stated one-party state objective.

Before examining in detail the state's interaction with society, it is as well to look at some of the conceptual considerations undergirding the state-society relations debate in Zimbabwe.

CONCEPTUALIZING POST-SETTLER STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS.

As demonstrated in chapter 2, the idea of a minimal state has now attracted some scholarly attention in Africa. Disillusioned with the excesses of the African state, state-society relations theorists now associate civil society with the prospects of limiting state power.[2] As one observer puts it:

> "the greater the number, size, autonomy, resourcefulness, variety and democratic orientation of popular organizations in society, the greater will be the prospect for some kind of movement from rigid authoritarianism ... toward... democracy."[3]

There is optimism in Africa that civil society groups that were instrumental in ousting colonial rule if allowed to operate in an unfettered manner can promote the democratization process in the sub-continent.

The local concern in Zimbabwe for civil society stems

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[2] D. Woods, "Civil Society in Europe and Africa: Limiting State Power Through a Public Sphere," African Studies Review, 35 (September 1992), pp. 77-100

[3] Diamond, "Beyond Autocracy: Prospects for Democracy in Africa," in Carter Centre, Beyond Autocracy in Africa, p. 25.

from the course of political struggle in the country. Spurred by the oppressive nature of settler practices, much of civil society's activities centred around their opposition to settler authoritarianism. Although still mired in their traditional loyalties, then, they were united at higher ecumenical levels by their desire to oust settler rule. As shown in the previous chapter, a potpourri of organizations from welfare societies, syncretist churches, labour unions, student movements to internal NGOs, were drawn to the liberation movement.[4]

At independence, civil society now faced a state controlled by its own representatives. The notion of an independent civil society implied a change of roles. Constituted as "vehicles for the assault on state power," they were now to "represent civil society's fight for resources and power" in the post-settler era.[5] This entailed not only breaking ties with its erstwhile allies but also completely

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[4] See also Immanuel Wallerstein's study on "Voluntary Associations" in James Coleman and Carl Rosberg (eds.), Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, pp 346-347, 1964.

[5] This observation by Steven Friedman in his study on social movements in South Africa is a good characterization of the problems facing Zimbabwean social movements during the early post-independence era. For more on this see, Friedman, "An Unlikely Utopia: State and Civil Society in South Africa," Politikon, 19 (1) (December 1991), p.9

transforming themselves from "allies" to "watchdogs".[6]

Prospects for a strong civil society were constrained by the lack of common binding interests and the settler legacy. From the standpoint of democratic theory, the lack of a common link or solidarity among civil society groups and the inability of civil society to confront their former allies within a defined "common civic domain" constituted a major stumbling block to the development of democracy, formal, sustainable or otherwise.[7]

Also, at independence, the settler legacy still weighed heavily in the form of inherited authoritarian structures and oppressive laws that greatly limited the "level of political space" in which civil society could operate. It was this legacy that the new rulers perpetuated. It differed however from that of the settlers in its cooptive character. Thus rather than expand the "political space" to reflect the new democratic order, the new government adopted a system in which organized interests were unilaterally defined and sanctioned by the party-state. Such a policy environment effectively

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[6] The accomplishment of that goal was of course inhibited by a traditional political culture in which the ruled offer obeisance to those in positions of authority. This "culture of silence" was rooted in pre-settler political society (see chapter 3).

[7] See for example, Jean-Francois Bayart, "Civil Society in Africa," in Chabal, ed., Political Domination in Africa, pp. 119-20; and also Goran Hyden, "Governance and the Study of Politics," in Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton eds., Governance and Politics in Africa, Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1992, p. 6.

limited the autonomy of organized interests as comparative studies elsewhere have shown.[8]

BACKGROUND: FROM REBELS TO RULERS

With the signing of the Lancaster House Constitution in 1979, a new multi-racial democratic period was inaugurated in Zimbabwe. Apart from the anomaly of the separate white voters' role, which gave the former settlers a disproportionate number of parliamentary seats for the first independence decade, the 1979 Constitution ushered in a new era in which Zimbabwe would officially operate within a liberal democratic constitutional framework as an independent country. The political arrangement included a popularly and nationally elected prime minister, a titular president appointed by the prime minister, and a two chamber Parliament with 130 members. The traditional institution of chieftaincy was maintained with some powers removed, especially those regarding land allocation. Given the historically rocky relations between the nationalists and the chiefs, it would seem that the former's approach to the institution of chieftaincy was guided primarily by regard to

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[8] See the works of Bratton, "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa,"; Fowler, "The Role of NGOs in Changing State-Society Relations,"; Peter Lewis, "Political Transition and the Dilemma of Civil Society in Africa," Journal of International Affairs, 46 (1), 1992; and also N. Chazan, "Africa's Democratic Challenge: Strengthening Civil Society and the State," World Policy Journal, Spring 1992.

its instrumental role.[9] Other provisions included an independent judiciary and a Bill of Rights guaranteeing basic civil liberties.

In terms of social pluralism, the country's political landscape was littered with not less ،han ten political parties (in addition to the two major political parties central to the liberation struggle), and a plethora of civil society organizations and NGOs, all operating under the Lancaster House constitution. Although not immune from partisan political pressures, these demands in civil society constituted a significant and continuous source of pressure for democratic and accountable government.

Certain provisions in the constitution did little to accelerate a break with the past, though. Continuity was stressed not only through the adoption of a prime ministerial as opposed to the Patriotic Front's (PF)[10] preferred presidential executive system but also through the adoption of the disproportionate number of reserved white seats, land compensation clause, remittance of state pensions, and the right to citizenship for former settlers. Most of these elements had earlier been enshrined in the defunct and discredited 1979 Zimbabwe-Rhodesia constitution.

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[9] Since chiefs still wielded some power and influence in some rural areas, their inclusion could only enhance the winning party's image and legitimacy.

[10] ZANU and ZAPU led by Mugabe and Nkomo respectively, formed a loose coalition under the umbrella name of the Patriotic Front in 1976.

After putting their signatures to the Lancaster House Agreement on 17 December 1979, the various contending factions committed themselves to peace. A week before the signing ceremony, the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian parliament had voted to revert to "direct" British colonial rule thereby ending the fifteen year era of UDI. With the return of a British Governor, Lord Soames, to oversee cease-fire and election arrangements all parties officially launched their election campaigns.

Rather than campaign as a united front, the two exiled parties, (ZANU-PF and ZAPU [now PF]) agreed to contest the election separately. The two, led by Mugabe and Nkomo respectively, were facing challenges from Muzorewa's UANC, Sithole's ZANU and a number of minor parties that had supported the short-lived internal settlement.

In the elections that ensued, ZANU-PF won no less than 57 of the 80 "African" seats, obtaining 63 per cent of the African vote. Joshua Nkomo's Patriotic Front (PF) won 20 seats, while the party that formed the government under the discredited Zimbabwe-Rhodesia interregnum won only 3. The UDI-advocate Rhodesia Front (RF) won all the 20 reserved white seats.

Various explications have been proffered to explain why ZANU-PF emerged victorious against all the odds.[11] Ethnic

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[11] See, for example, reports of attempts on Mugabe's life in The Herald, 10 February 1980.

considerations did play a part.[12] In the predominantly Ndebele-speaking areas the PF won 15 of the 20 seats while in the Shona-speaking areas, ZANU-PF won 48 out of 57 seats. A more compelling explanation, however, lies in the latter's strategies. As noted in chapter 3, ZANU-PF had already established close links with the voters in its "liberated zones." through its various village and defence committees.[13] The masses in those areas simply voted for the party whose policies they were acquainted with and one that, in their opinion, was capable of ending the war.[14] Additional factors that propelled ZANU-PF to the forefront were its decisive military actions[15], wavering on the part of the internal opposition parties, and ill-timed open biases displayed by South African and Western governments for the pro-capitalist parties of Joshua Nkomo and Abel Muzorewa. Such bias in a sense made ZANU-PF appear to the average voter as a "popular front" that stood for the interests of the unpropertied class.

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[12] Sithole, "The General Elections," in Mandaza ed., Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, p.84

[13] These committees, in fact, have continued to act as the cornerstones of ZANU-PF support that lasted up to today.

[14] The ZANU-Ndonga opposition leader, the Rev Ndabaningi Sithole, in an interview was adamant that people did not vote for any ideological or economic issues at all. He maintained that they voted guerilla leaders into power in order to stop the war. Interview, Harare, July 10, 1992.

[15] Gregory Martin, "Zimbabwe 1980: politicisation through armed struggle and electoral mobilization," Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Volume 19 (1) 1981, p. 67

Its election manifesto envisaging a mixed economy with extensive state power to redistribute surplus further enhanced that notion.

Although there were various charges and counter-charges of intimidation by all parties,[16] the 1980 election results were generally considered free and fair by both the Governor and the external foreign observers.[17] The newly-elected government was inaugurated on 18 April 1980, with Robert Mugabe assuming the premiership and Canaan Banana, a Ndebele, the non-executive president portfolio. It is pertinent to note that the former Shona prime minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Muzorewa, had also appointed a Ndebele as non-executive President in 1978: Josia Gumede. That Mugabe would also appoint another Ndebele was therefore a practice in line with post-settler political tradition: ethnic balancing.

With the ascendancy of Mugabe to power the expectation was that the political and economic focus would change. Unlike the settler state, which had been designed to perpetuate the exploitation of indigenous people and their natural resources for the benefit of the settlers, the new state was expected to advance a new ethos, reflecting popular aspirations demanded by its citizens. Also unlike the settler regimes, the new government was now not only expected to deal with the maintenance of law and order but also with the consolidation

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[16] See, for example, Bishop Able Muzorewa's letter to Ambassador Dayal of the Commonwealth Observer Group, in Southern Rhodesia Elections, February 1980, pp. 132-133.

[17] The Herald, 5 March 1980.

of national sovereignty and democracy. Concretely at issue was the dismantling of inherited discriminatory and unequal settler structures.

However, rather than dismantle the old system to reflect not only nationalist ambitions but also the new "political" order, Robert Mugabe astounded his critics and supporters alike when a few days after his party had been declared victorious, he informed the nation that:

> We will ensure that there is a place for everyone in this country. We want to ensure a sense of security for both the winners and the losers. There will be no sweeping nationalization; the pensions and jobs of civil servants were guaranteed; **farmers would keep their land. Let us forgive and forget.** Let us join hands in a new amity.[18]

With this reconciliatory speech of 4 March 1980, the then prime minister-designate Mugabe reassured the nation and the world at large that no radical changes would be made in the political economy following his victory.

To those who still had any lingering doubts about the government's commitment to maintaining the status quo, assurances were given in writing. In a foreword to the first government's comprehensive economic plan, Mugabe assured the nation that his regime

> "recognize(d) the existing phenomenon of capitalism as an historical reality which because it cannot be avoided has to be **purposefully harnessed, regulated and transformed as a partner** in the overall

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[18] David Caute, <u>Under the Skin: The Death of White Rhodesia</u>, quoted in Mandaza (ed.), <u>Zimbabwe</u>, (the emphasis is mine) p. 42.

national endeavour to achieve set national goals.[19]

Thus, rather than dismantle the old order to reflect new nationalist and/or socialist ambitions the new government committed itself to retaining the status quo. Contrary to expectations, the party dɨd little to alter the nature and basic structure of ownership. Unlike its predecessors, who were preoccupied with the need for unfettered control by their own race, the ZANU government was predisposed towards an arrangement in which white economic clout would remain intact, with little or no competition from its own black supporters, at least initially. This meant that not only would whites remain on top economically but, just as they did during the settler era, they would continue to own the best agricultural lands and the major business interests.[20]

In the following sections, I look at ZANU-PF's endeavours in the 1980s to create an inclusionary corporatist structure encompassing the state, bureaucrats, army, business and agricultural interests on the one hand and labour, student and women's movements, NGOs and the media on the other. I will highlight how the state used various corporatist strategies to coopt, fragment and weaken those groups in civil society it

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[19] R.G. Mugabe, "Foreword", Transitional National Development Plan, Harare: Government Printers, 1983, Vol. 1, p.i (the emphasis is mine).

[20] Historically, the major interest groups representing white economic interests include the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI), the Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU), the Chamber of Mines, and the National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC). All these were established before independence (see Chapter 3).

(the state) perceived as posing a threat to its hegemonic endeavour.

THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF AN INCLUSIONARY POST-SETTLER CORPORATIST STRUCTURE

The Government of National Unity (GNU)

In line with the enunciated policy of reconciliation, no recrimination followed the ZANU-PF victory. The composition of the first inclusionary **Government of National Unity** (GNU) with 22 cabinet members reflected that compromise. It exhibited a striking combination of forces that had allied to overthrow the settler regime and those that had opposed change. ZANU-PF's wartime ally, ZAPU was invited to join the coalition with its leader being offered the largely ceremonial post of president, which he turned down in preference for a more politically active cabinet post of Home Affairs. White interests were represented by David Smith, a former deputy premier in Smith's government and Dennis Norman, then leader of the powerful and influential Commercial Farmers Union. Labour was also coopted with some of its members offered junior positions in government and parastatal boards. Cooptive and paternalistic strategies were also extended to other civil society groups as the ensuing discourse will explicate.

Once the Government of National Unity was in place, the new regime moved swiftly to ensure that the previously white-controlled bureaucracy and the army were effectively under its control and authority.

As in other African countries after independence, controlling the bureaucracy was considered a top priority if only to reflect the changing of the guard. To that end the Presidential Directive to the Public Service Commission was invoked in May 1980. It empowered the President to 'give general directions of policy with the object of achieving a suitable representation in the Public Service and Prison Service.'[21] The general terms of the affirmative action directives were that Africans had to be recruited to all grades and had to be promoted to higher grades more rapidly than their white counterparts.[22] By 1983 when the Africanisation of the public service was completed, academics and other professionals had been coopted, with most appointed to senior positions in both bureaucracy and parastatal units.

While the Africanization process was under way, endeavours to create a united army under a fragile structure headed by General Peter Walls, the Rhodesian army commander, were taking place with the assistance of Britain. These efforts entailed integrating three main armies that included the Rhodesian army (including the black auxiliary forces loyal to the internal leaders), the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army

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[21] "Directive from the President to the Public Service Commission", Harare: Department of Information, May 1980.

[22] In an interview the then Chair of the Public Service Commission, Malcolm Thomson, confirmed that the Africanisation process was expedited by the voluntary retirement of whites, most of whom ended up in the private sector. Interview, Harare, January 17, 1991.

(ZIPRA). The method involved disarming both former guerillas and other forces not included in the integrated new command structure.

After some initial success the whole operation encountered a series of hiccups, however. First, ZANLA fighters took exception to the use of old Rhodesian Police and other settler law and order agencies, resulting in various skirmishes taking place between the two.[23] ZIPRA fighters, reeling from their electoral defeat, did not hesitate to translate their displeasure with the new order through armed attacks on their perceived adversaries.[24] In addition, white backlash was manifested through various attacks on military targets and the ruling party's headquarters.[25] These animosities marked antagonistic continuities that dated back to the settler era.

Nevertheless, despite these initial setbacks, the final integration exercise was achieved by the end of 1981. The end

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[23] See issues of the Herald, of 7 October 1980, 18 December, 1980 and also The Chronicle, 12 November 1980. There were also cases in which ZANLA forces with the overt support of their leadership simply took the law in their own hands. See for example events leading to the murder of one commercial farmer in Acturus, The Herald, January 15 1981 and some rural whites in Masvingo, The Chronicle, 5 February 1981.

[24] For an analysis of the various ZIPRA/ZANLA skirmishes, see The Herald, 17 October 1980 and ZIPRA attacks on ZANU sympathizers, The Chronicle, 18 November 1980, The Herald , issues of 27 October and 30 October, 1980 and finally The Chronicle, 3 December, 1980.

[25] The Herald, January 8 1981; Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, and also Hanlon, Apartheid's Second Front: South Africa's War Against its Neighbours, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986, pp 55 and 61.

of the integration was accompanied with new personnel changes. After the sacking of Walls, Lt General Maclean took over as Commander of the Combined Operations while former guerrilla leader Rex Nhongo (ZANLA) assumed the post of Commander with Lookout Masuku (ZIPRA) as his deputy.

Once assured of its control of the bureaucracy and the army, the state began the process of creating a context in which the "level of space" available to the range of organized interests would be determined by the state. As shall became clear later, the state itself became the sponsor, creator and controller of major civil society groups.

The state-business nexus

While Mugabe extolled the values of socialism to his own African supporters, no exhortations of that nature were preached to white capitalists. To their pleasant surprise the whites discovered that the hegemonic control they had attained through military and political means could still be retained via the forces of economics. Thus, although less than 1 per cent of the population, whites continued to dominate the mines, the banks the farms and the mills.[26]

To be sure, whites realized after 1980 that the old racist corporatist arrangements had to be slightly refined if only to reflect the fact that there was a change of political guards. This meant that a few "well-connected" Africans would be coopted and catapulted into top "ceremonial" positions

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[26] Sibanda, "The Political Situation," in Stoneman ed., _Zimbabwe's Prospects_, p. 271.

either as board members or chairs of various companies.[27] Such appointments were useful in that they connected white owners to the new black ruling elite. Other than these cosmetic changes, however, the configuration of the corporatist structure (the state, agriculture, bureaucracy, business and army) persisted as before, at least until the late-1980s.

With the same old economic guards in the driver's seat, the statist policies of the new regime differed little from the past. The inherited statist economy was maintained with its rigid controls on foreign exchange, imports and prices. New controls were introduced on wages and salaries for all employees from agricultural and domestic workers right up to managerial staff in both the public and private sectors. Further controls were put on labour to protect workers from retrenchments.[28] Industry remained overprotected from outside competition as before. That the economy should be integrated with the rest of the world after 15 years of UDI isolation and sanctions was disregarded and so was the fact that overprotective measures lend themselves to monopolistic practices. New state-owned enterprises were created, adding to a plethora of already existing ones. They ranged from large national mineral marketing monopolies to state-owned development banks down to ZANU-PF owned companies. Public

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[27] Ibid, pp. 277-279; and also Brian Raftopoulos, "The Dilemma of Black Advancement in Zimbabwe," SAPEM, (3) 9 1990.

[28] Tor Skalnes,"The State, Interest Groups and Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe," Journal of Development Studies, 29 (3), 1993, p. 415.

expenditure increased exponentially as the state financed social services programmes, education and health. Between 45-53% of GDP was being committed to servicing recurrent expenditure from 1980 to 1990.[29]

It is interesting to note that these statist measures were taking place against a background in which the ideological thrust had shifted from statism to privatization in the international political economy with its emphasis on "rolling back the state," after the election of conservative governments in England, the United States and West Germany in the late 1970s and early 1980s. That the new ruling elite would opt to "go it alone" was very much in line with inherited political tradition dating back to the 1960s when Ian Smith defied international opinion by declaring UDI.

With regard to organized agricultural interests, campaigns highlighting the indispensability of white agriculture had started well before independence.[30] By the

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[29] A cursory examination of economic developments over the first ten years of independence show that the average annual growth was 3.2%m a rate slightly above the population growth rate of 2.9%. This was below the 8% growth rate envisaged in the Transitional National Development Plan and the First Five Year National Development Plan. During the same period only 10,000 jobs per years were created in the formal sector - a far cry from the 200,000 high school leavers joining the labour force every year. The conclusion to be derived from this is that unemployment remained as high as it was before independence. The high levels of unemployment put workers in a vulnerable position as they could easily be replaced if they went on strike. No efforts were also made to create a proletariat. Most workers continued to maintain strong links to their rural homes in the villages.

[30] See for example various studies initiated by commercial farmers; J. R. Tattersfield, "The Role of Research in Increasing Food Crop Potential in Zimbabwe," Zimbabwe Science

time the new government took over that argument had won

converts in ZANU-PF. Immediately after coming to power

various policies were put in place to create a good rapport

with the white farmers.[31] The first major gesture of goodwill

to farmers was the appointment of its Union's president in

1980 as the first post-settler agricultural minister.[32] That

move went a long way to reassure white farmers that they had

a key role to play in the economy. Since then, the Commercial

Farmers' Union continued to enjoy access to key decision

News, Vol 16 (1) 1982, pp. 6-10; Modern Farming Publications, Zimbabwe Agricultural and Economic Review, Harare, Modern Farming Publications, 1982); The World Bank, Zimbabwe Agricultural Sector Study, Report No 4401- Zimbabwe, 1983; and also B.H. Kinsey, "Emerging Policy Issues in Zimbabwe's Land Resettlement Programmes," Development Policy Review, Vol 1 (2) November 1983.

This literature, the dominant theme of which highlights the indispensability of white agriculture, obscures the fact that peasant agriculture had been retarded from developing by settler policies (see chapter 3) and was therefore not inherently unproductive.

Some studies that have supported the latter observation include for example, Michael Bratton and K. Trustcott, "Fertilizer Packages, Maize Yields and Economic Returns: An Evaluation in Wedza Communal Area", Zimbabwe Agricultural Journal, Vol 82 (1), 1985; M. Bratton, "Farmer Organizations and Food Production in Zimbabwe," World Development, 14 (3) 1986

[31] See for example Sam Moyo, "The Land Question," and Clever Mumbengegwi, "Continuity and Change in Agricultural Policy," in Mandaza (ed), Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition 1980-1986.

[32] Needless to mention, this move effectively coopted an important ally. It also laid bare the fact that the ruling party had not framed any radical land policy despite the fact that one of the key rallying points during the liberation struggle was the land question!

makers in government at least until the late-1980s.[33]

These developments led to a situation in which the poorly funded and organized National Farmers Association of Zimbabwe (NFAZ), representing close to a million peasant farmers, fell prey to the government's paternalistic controls.[34] As Herbst correctly observed "the potential advantage that the NFAZ (had) in representing a large number of Africans (could) not be transformed into strength. The government (saw) itself...(as) representing the same people that the NFAZ (did)"[35] The state felt that that since it represented the interests of blacks it had the right to control the operations of the NFAZ. Thus although the NFAZ had access to government, it was operating from a position of political weakness.

Whereas the government had estimated that 162,000 families required land for resettlement when it came to power in 1980, only 51,235 families were resettled from 1980-1983. And from 1983 onwards, no concerted efforts were made to resettle land-less peasants. The government's "go slow" policy on resettlement represented a triumph for the largely white Commercial Farmers' Union.[36] Conversely, it constituted, however, a betrayal to the peasants eking out an existence on

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[33] Herbst, State Politics in Zimbabwe, chapter 3-5.

[34] See for example Michael Bratton, "Micro-Democracy? The Merger of Farmer Unions in Zimbabwe," African Studies Review, Volume 37 (1), April 1994, p. 13.

[35] Herbst, State Politics in Zimbabwe, p. 62.

[36] Ibid., pp 37-109.

the very same lands to which they had been forcibly banished by the settlers.

At this point it is appropriate to ask: why did an avowed Marxist regime allow the inherited capitalist economic structure to persist? Why were there no appropriate strategies put in place to Africanise the private sector? Myriad interpretations were advanced in the early years of independence to explain what propelled the ruling party to maintain the status quo. Colin Stoneman's edited volume offers a good summary of the intellectual mood of the time:

> A debate... emerged between the advocates of policies of 'reform'(limited transfer of white land to blacks, with full compensation, the elimination of racial obstacles to black peasants, businessmen, skilled workers and professional, but with an economy still largely in the hands of large companies and geared to the outside world) as opposed to those who advocate 'radical' change.[37]

As it turned out, radical scholars perceived the ruling party as having abandoned its earlier stated objectives of establishing a democratic socialist state, with one observer castigating Zimbabwe's revolution as one that had "lost its way".[38] For him, the petit bourgeoisie of the nationalist movement had derailed the revolution by failing to mobilize their natural allies, the militant masses. Another local observer went a step further, viewing the whole post-independence situation as a neo-colonial arrangment in which the state had become hostage to international capital

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[37] Lionel Cliffe, 'Zimbabwe's Political Inheritance,' in Colin Stoneman, ed., Zimbabwe's Inheritance, p. 9.

[38] Astrow, Zimbabwe: A Revolution that Lost its Way.

intrigues.[39] As a way out of this "neo-colonial" arrangement, Carol Thompson saw the long term solution as lying in the post-settler's ability to gain effective control of the organs of the state.[40]

A more informed corporatist perspective by Tim Shaw focused on the dialectics between change and continuity. It differed from the ones reviewed above in that it viewed the constraints facing the post-settler state as originating from inherited 'state capitalist' structures. As he puts it, the 'Zimbabwean transition (wa)s hardly a revolution because of continuities at the level of economics which constrain(ed) changes at the level of politics.'[41]

In general, scholars recognised that the revolutionary zeal that had characterized ZANU-PF's liberation struggle dissipated after independence. A common theme pervading these prognostications, with the exception of Shaw perhaps, is the notion steeped in the dependency school of thought which views the ruling elites as too weak and reliant on foreign capital. As such they were merely a "neo-colonial" governing African petit-bourgeoisie pliantly serving the goals of their "colonial" masters.

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[39] See for example, Ibbo Mandaza, 'The State and Politics in the Post-White Settler Colonial Situation' in Mandaza (ed.), Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition: 1980-1986. p. 30.

[40] Carol Thompson, Challenge to Imperialism: The Frontline States and the Liberation of Zimbabwe, Boulder: Westview Press, p.30.

[41] Shaw "Corporatism in Zimbabwe," p. 150.

This school of thought not only ignores the new range of concerns and differences within the new ruling elite.[42] It also underestimates the level of political consciousness created by the nationalist struggle for independence in Zimbabwe, the 15 year guerilla war. The reasons for the reluctance to dismantle inherited structures are found in ZANU-PF's strategy.

Given that a major objective throughout the first independence decade was the effort by the state to exert control over civil society, a weak black bourgeoisie dovetailed neatly with its desire to maintain an upper hand in its interaction with African civil society.[43] Perpetuating white control of the economy was therefore one effective way of minimizing the growth of alternative centres of power among Africans. A white bourgeois class was tolerated as it was viewed as "politically" irrelevant.

Once the white business and farming community was coopted the ruling party embarked on a combination of paternalistic and repressive measures designed to control other significant players in civil society: labour, students, women, NGOs and

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[42] In fact various instance can be cited in which the new government moved swiftly to purchase controlling interests in existing foreign companies with ties to South Africa with a view to curtailing their influence. The list includes the Zimbabwe Banking Corporation (Zimbank), Delta Corporation, and the Central Africa Pharmaceutical Service (CAPS).

[43] Despite the presence of a petit bourgeoisie engaged in retailing and other petty commercial activities inherited from the settler era, there were virtually no policies put in place after independence to encourage the growth of a black bourgeoisie outside the state's corporatist structure.

the media. These shall become the focus of my next discussion.

The labour movement

As shown in the previous chapter, the labour movement was historically weak largely due to the lack of proletarianization and the repressive measures of the successive settler regimes. Rather than change this state of affairs at independence, the new regime sought to perpetuate it. As it turned out, its first goal was to promote a unitary workers' movement along corporatist lines.[44] A month after assuming office, the new Minister of Labour and Social Services, Kumbirai Kangai, told the National Trade Union seminar in May 1980 that:

> I firmly believe that the regulated system of labour relations which we have here in Zimbabwe is more beneficial for the community as a whole, rather than the dog-eat-dog philosophy of the so-called free labour movement which operates in some countries held to be more developed than our own.[45]

As one commentator observed, rather amusingly, Minister Kangai did not know that except for the substitution of Rhodesia by Zimbabwe, he was using word for word a speech delivered by the former Rhodesian Minister of Labour, Ian Maclean, in 1970! This speech not only demonstrated continuity in corporatist strategies: it also indicated the new government's aversion to pluralism and its preference for institutionally structured and sanctioned associational groups.

The first test of government's tendency towards

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[44] Wood, "Trade Union Organization and the Working Class," p. 288.

[45] Ibid., p. 289.

intolerance of labour was the manner in which the early 1980 wave of strikes by workers demanding better working conditions and better wages was greeted by the new regime. In a reaction not dissimilar to that of the settlers, Mugabe strongly attacked the strike at a bakery in Harare as "nothing short of criminal"[46] Although the government did not use force to quell such strikes, it hastily called a meeting of leading trade unions a few months later. At that meeting, a new state-sponsored labour umbrella organization--the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), was launched at the behest of the state in 1981, with Albert Mugabe, a relation of the prime minister, as Secretary-General![47] Needless to mention, the lack of democratic involvement discouraged many workers from joining the newly-formed union.

Since its creation, the ZCTU has always been subordinate to the ruling party. Collective bargaining functions were transferred to the labour ministry which assumed the contradictory roles of both "defender" of workers and mediator. A system of regulated wage and salary controls was

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[46] Quoted in Stoneman and Cliffe, p. 1C6. On yet another occasion, Mugabe's reaction to the teachers and nurses' strike in late 1981 was characteristically one of intolerance. At a rally in Bulawayo he reminded his audience that:
> "When we were fighting the war these people were supporting Smith's government and today that they have true freedom they want to start their own little war."

The Sunday Mail, 25 October, 1981, Harare, Zimbabwe, p.1.

[47] The creation of the ZCTU did not only fulfil the government's wish to create a unitary labour movement but was also designed as a strategy to counter the influence of rival party affiliated unions.

instituted in consultation with business and agricultural interest groups with the ZCTU playing a minor role.[48]

Other than hijacking the functions of trade unions per se, carrot and stick methods were used to coopt and cajole their officials. As rewards, the party granted unions direct subsidies in addition to offering some senior labour officials top government posts and appointments to various parastatal boards.[49] As punishment, leaders and organizations that did not toe the party line were harassed.[50]

After the 1985 elections union autonomy was further curtailed when government introduced more restrictive labour laws. The Labour Relations Act of 1985 - similar in many respects to previous legislation enacted during the settler era - weakened the bargaining power of workers by removing the 'right-to-strike' clause. Also, by categorizing almost all occupations as "essential services" and in requiring that ministerial consent from the labour department be sought before striking, the bill effectively made strikes illegal.

It is clear from the above discussion that the new state was determined to carry the legacy of a weak labour movement

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[48] International Labour Organization, Structural Change and Adjustment in Zimbabwe, Geneva: Occasional Paper 16, 1993, p. 144

[49] The cooptation of Florence Chitauro, a former ZCTU senior union official, to the government as Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Welfare is a case in point. Labour is also represented, albeit in a subordinate way, in most major parastatal boards.

[50] A case in point is the detention without trial of the ZCTU leader in 1989.

just like its settler predecessor. In the next section I explore the state's relations with the student movement.

The student movement

This section examines the role of the student movement after independence. Given the diversity of the student body, the focus will be mainly on university students.

The state's relationship with the student movement dates back to the 1960s (see Chapter 4) when practically all black and a cluster of white students were ipso facto nationalists.[51] Most of their demands then were directed towards the emancipation of the African majority. After 1980 the new order demanded that their concerns not only encompass the widening of democratic freedoms but also act as "watchdogs" on their former allies, the nationalists.

That transformation was gradual and this largely explains why the first seven years of independence were marked by a non-conflictual relationship between the state and the students. That phase can be aptly categorized as a "honeymoon period" for the ruling party in so far as its relationship to the student movement is concerned. Confrontational politics which occurred only after 1987, as the next chapter will show, did not ensue during this initial period for various reasons.

First, the student movement was split in its support for the major liberation parties: ZANU-PF and ZAPU-PF. As one observer has cogently observed after the unity agreement in

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[51] Lloyd Sachikonye,"The Dilemma of the Student Movement," SAPEM, August 1991.

1987 a new opening was created for the expression of political criticism, since such dissent could no longer be denounced as support for the rebels, as discussed earlier.[52] A second explanation is found in ZANU-PF's cooptive strategy. Most student leaders were assured of lucrative jobs both in the public and private sectors upon graduation. For example, one former student leader was invited to join the party as an MP and became the youngest member of parliament a few months after graduation. Finally, almost all university students were assured of jobs upon after graduation as the bureaucracy was still expanding.

However, by the late 1980s the relationship between the student movement and the state was marked by conflict. The rise of unemployment and the subsequent revelations of high levels of corruption in government circles brought about the end of the non-conflictual phase.

An interesting feature of the student movement was that despite a stated commitment to Marxism, it has always been conservative rather than radical. To many observers, university students have always been viewed as a privileged elite group which only made its commitment to socialism as a reaction to the ruling party's stated socialist objective. Although students naturally opposed the settler regime from the 1960s to the late 1970s, the scale and character of their protest was always reformist rather than revolutionary.

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[52] Welshman Ncube, "The Post-Unity Period: Developments, Benefits and Problems," in Banana (ed.), _Turmoil and Tenacity_, p. 309.

The women's movement

Zimbabwean women have played an extraordinary role in nationalist politics. Their legacies date back to the 1890s when the legendary Mbuya Nehanda led the Shona uprising in the 1890s (see Chapter 3). Their role in the liberation struggle has been well-documented.[53] As we saw in the previous chapter, with the onset of setter rule, women were forced to be the major cultivators as the men drifted to the urban areas in search of employment.[54] With time, what emerged was a society in which males were gainfully employed outside the home while women continued to engage in their traditional roles inside the home. While women's traditional roles were acknowledged, very little recognition was given to their actual and potential contribution to broader economic development. The situation was further exacerbated by settler economic policies that required that males be formally educated to provide a literate workforce on the farms, factories and industries. All these developments had the effect of reducing women to heightened dependence on men, as most lacked independent sources of income.[55]

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[53] See for example the works of Ranger, Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe, 1985; and Irene Staunton, Mothers of a Revolution, Harare: Baobab Books, 1990.

[54] For some background information see, Joyce Kazembe, "The Women Issue" in Mandaza (ed.), Zimbabwe; and also World Bank, The Informal Sector in Zimbabwe: The Role of Women, Occassional Paper, Washington D.C., 1991

[55] "Changes to Women's Status in Zimbabwe Since Independence," Harare: Department of Women's Affairs, Harare, p.1. 1991.

With the change of political guards in 1980 a Department of Women's Affairs under the Ministry of Community and Cooperative Development was created in 1981 to cater specifically for women's issues. To improve literacy rates among women, adult schools were set up while enrolments for girls in primary education rose from 300,000 in 1978 to 1,104,887 by 1986.[56] Also legislation aimed at improving the status of women was enacted and from 1980 to 1990 over ten major legislative changes to that effect were made.[57]

These laudable developments notwithstanding, what is perhaps unnerving about them was that it was really the central government which set the agenda through its partisan Women's League organ led by the president's non-Zimbabwean wife.[58] This has made it difficult for other women's NGOs outside of the ruling party to effectively determine the specific course and direction of their movements.[59] As long as

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[56] Ibid, p.5.

[57] Ibid., pp.3-5.

[58] Sally Mugabe passed away in 1992. She became the first woman to be buried at the Heroes' Acre in the capital.

[59] A common theme running through NGOs dealing with women's issues in Zimbabwe is that most of them tend to lack grassroots support hence; their almost total reliance on foreign funding for their activities. See for example Salina Mumbengegwi, "Empowering Women Through Knowledge: The Role of Women's Action Group in Zimbabwe," in Richard Sandbrook and Mohamed Halfani eds, Empowering People: Building Community, Civil Associations, and Legality in Africa, p. 90; and also Joyce Kazembe, "Women and Law in Southern Africa," in Ibid, pp 92-93. While the lack of grassroots support can be alluded to apathy among rural women, it can also be argued that these organizations cannot compete with the well-funded and - organized ruling party's Women's League.

the ruling party continues to control the women's agenda the temptation to use women as "voting fodder" is always there.[60]

Development NGOs

Stimulated by the new political environment the number of development NGOs increased substantially after independence. While NGOs are considered the "exclusive domain" of individuals outside the state machinery, in Zimbabwe as in many African states, they fell prey to the paternalistic controls of the state as during the settler period. Their cooption and appropriation took a discernable pattern -- one in which individual politicians initiated their own NGOs. Almost all the Development Associations (DAs) were inaugurated and controlled by politicians. The cases in point include the Manicaland Development Association (MDA), the Child Survival and Development Foundation (CSFD) and the Kutama Old Boys Association (KOBA).

An excellent example of political arrogation of NGOs is that of the CSFD led by the president's late wife. Located in the posh suburb of Belgravia in the capital, this "indigenous" NGO organization attracted a lot of attention and funding from both local and foreign companies. It cannot be denied that many companies found the association with this organization

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[60] There are various instances in which women have been mobilized for specific purposes only to be left to fall back into their traditional roles once the party's objectives were met. A common occurrence in Zimbabwe is the busing of women to the airport whenever the president is leaving the country or coming back from a trip.

beneficial in terms of "local politics."

Another illustration of political appropriation is that of the MDA, founded and led by Didymus Mutasa, a former key figure in the Cold Comfort Farm adventure of the late 1960s -- and now senior minister in the Mugabe regime.[61] This organization was designed to coordinate all development projects in Manicaland. As Alan Fowler has correctly observed, the formation of this organization has enabled Mutasa to "dominate all institutional space - political governmental, and civic - in his home area".[62]

The final case is that of Old Boys Associations which mushroomed during the same period. Most were intitiated and led by senior government officials. The most prominent is KOBA of which the president is the chief patron. Compared to other high schools in the country, Kutama is one of the best equipped in terms of computers and laboratory facilities.

The media

In democractic "discourse" an independent press widens

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[61] The Cold Comfort Society was launched in July 13, 1965. The Society headed by Didymus Mutasa and Guy-Clutton Brock, a former Saint Faith missionary as treasurer, was launched with a view to advance understanding, cooperation and development among different races. With grants from the World Council of Churches, the Foundation for Development and Partnership in Africa, the Cold Comfort Society acquired an 88 acre farm seven miles from the capital alongside the Bulawayo Road. Members of the Society started organizing seminars in which they spoke out against racism and injustice in the country. At its peak it boasted of twenty members with about seven whites and thirteen Africans living and working in harmony and peace. For a detailed discussion on this society see Guy and Molly Brock, Cold Comfort Confronted, 1972.

[62] Fowler, "The Role of NGOs in Changing State-Society Relations," 1991, p. 68.

the scope for the expression of views and opinions outside the realm of the state.[63] It must help set the agenda for the evolution of democracy and must guard against corruption and abuse of power. As Vicky Randal has cogently observed, in situations where "political parties fail to provide an effective opposition to the ruling party, whether through fragmentation or inexperience, such opposition may need to come from the media."[64]

In the case of Zimbabwe, government maintained its monopoly over radio and television broadcasting, renamed *The Voice of Zimbabwe* after independence. To ensure its control of other media, the state acquired controlling interests in the Argus Group of Companies through a government owned company called the Mass Media Trust (MMT). The Trust ran three dailies - The Herald, The Chronicle, and The Mutare Post and a major weekly, The Sunday Mail, in addition to a horde of other provincial newspapers. It controlled close to 90% of total circulation if not more and a similar percentage of advertising revenue. Only two independent monthlies (one of which was run by the Catholic Church) and a business weekly offered alternative views.

To all intents and purposes, then, it appeared as if ZANU-PF had at least accomplished its goal of incorporating the major civil society associations into its corporatist-

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[63] Healey and Robinson, Democracy, Governance and Economic Policy, p. 72.

[64] Vicky Randal, "The Media and Democratization in the Third World," Third World Quarterly, Vol. 14 (3), 1993 p. 642

party structure. Through this structure it had effectively weakened the operations of all the major civic institutions in the country from 1980 to the late 1980s.

At this point I will now turn on the ruling party's attempts to annihilate opposition political parties in the country. Although they fall outside the framework of "civil society" for reasons explained earlier in chapter one, their organizational weakness made them fall prey to the same paternalistic strategies employed to weaken civil society.

MOVES TOWARDS NEUTRALIZING THE OPPOSITION

It is commonplace to acknowledge that post-settler Mugabe's whole tenure has been marked by attempts to absorb and eliminate the opposition.[65] His campaign to annihilate opposition parties dates back to late 1981, when in his first "meet the people" tour, Prime Minister Mugabe told his supporters that:

> A one-party state is the concept we
> have... ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU (should) come
> together and form the basis for a
> government...(O)ther parties of Muzorewa
> (UANC) and Sithole (ZANU) are not
> consequential.[66]

Throughout that first national tour Mugabe harped on the instability in the country, including threats from South Africa and disgruntled elements within the country as

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[65] See for example, Mandaza and Sachikonye eds, The One-Party State and Democracy: the Zimbabwe Debate, and also Brian Raftopoulos, "Beyond the House of Hunger: Democratic Struggle in Zimbabwe," Review of African Political Economy, 55, 1992.

[66] "Unity of Parties the Key," The Sunday Mail, 25 October 1981.

justification for the creation of a one party state.

At a practical level, Mugabe's fixation with centralism can be explained by the political milieu that he hailed from as discussed in chapter 4: the fifteen year liberation struggle. The transformation of a guerilla leader into a politician, and a guerilla movement into a political party is not that simple. After fifteen years of armed struggle, the metamorphosis from a quasi-military movement to an established party set to operate within a democratic environment was bound to be difficult as comparative literature on liberation movements has shown.[67] That is why in the early post-independent period, the prestige of "socialism" was much more of an uncontestable value to the Mugabe-led faction than the values of liberal democracy entrenched in the Lancaster House derived constitution. The new leaders tended to seek legitimacy by calling themselves "revolutionaries" rather than "democrats" with the Marxist-Leninist ideology serving as a substitute for inherited oppressive "Western-type liberal democracy." Ironically, it was the exposure to those "Western liberal sentiments" that sparked the nationalist fervour in the first place (see chapter 4). The nationalists garnered the support of the masses with promises of establishing a true democratic order. Paradoxically, once in power though, there

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[67] See for example Mathew Stugart, "Guerrillas and Elections: An Institutionalist Analysis on the Cost of Conflicts and Competition," International Studies Quarterly, 36 (2) 1992; and James Peeler, Latin American Democracies: Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1985.

was little incentive on their part to develop a self-reliant decentralized political system.

At a more theoretical level, Mugabe's centralist tendencies were steeped not only in liberation ideology but also in the developmentalist school of thought reviewed earlier. Advocates of this view generally subordinate the case for democracy to other development imperatives like order and stability.[68] A cohesive unitary developmentalist state is therefore considered essential in the early stages of development.

Many of the reasons advanced to support this school of thought can be dismissed in retrospect as self-serving and misconceived as they are premised on the assumption that the ruling elite will necessarily be so development oriented. The experience of other African countries belies this prognosis. Few one-party systems in Africa have been development oriented as the study on liberal democracy reviewed in chapter two established.[69]

Even if the "ruling elites" were development oriented, is one to assume that individual liberties must be sacrificed on the altar of economic development? Such views giving primacy to development cloud unsavoury characteristics associated with the pursuit of development as an end in itself.

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[68] See for example, Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968

[69] Sandbrook, "The State and Economic Stagnation in Tropical Africa."

In early 1982, Mugabe's plans for a merger with ZAPU were diverted off-course with the discovery of illegal arms caches on properties owned by ZAPU.[70] In reaction to the arms discovery, Nkomo and some of his colleagues were sacked amidst allegations that ZAPU had secretly hoarded the arms for eventual use in a planned coup against the government.[71] Several top ZAPU party leaders, including former ZIPRA commanders Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku, were arrested, charged with treason, acquitted, and then held without charges under the inherited emergency measures act.[72] A few selected "loyalist" ZAPU members were retained in the Cabinet.[73]

Following the dismissal of Nkomo, former ZIPRA combatants began deserting from the national army and returning to the bush, where they carried cut numerous indiscriminate acts of

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[70] The Herald, February 8 1982

[71] The Herald, 18 February 1982

[72] Until its scrapping in 1992, one of the repressive laws that had been continuously in force since 1965 is the "state of emergency." Under the state of emergency, the Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) Regulations permitted the Minister of Home Affairs to order the administrative detention without charge or trial of any person for an unlimited period. Under this law, opposition party members and individuals critical of government have suffered repeated harassment and detention. In addition to some of the highlighted inherited repressive laws reviewed so far, see also Africa Watch, Zimbabwe: A Break with the Past? Human Rights and Political Unity.

[73] This was simply a divide and rule tactic. Also not only did Mugabe need contact people from ZAPU; their retention was also meant to send some positive signals to ZAPU that those members who cooperated with the ruling party would be well-rewarded.

violence. In response, the government utilized the newly-created Fifth Brigade, a North Korean trained unit of ZANU-PF loyalists, to quell the disturbances in the Western part of the country. As the crisis worsened, Nkomo fled to London in March 1983 - just as he had done in the past - where he was to spend the next five months in self-imposed exile.

Meanwhile, moves were under way to create a personality cult around Mugabe. Like his predecessor, Ian Smith, his war record would be highlighted while the legend of "au' \entic and consistent" leader was sustained with some degree of success. Attempts were also made to create a "father image." That task was made easier given Zimbabwe's patriarchal tendencies dating back to the pre-colonial era.[74]

As the anti-dissident campaign intensified, and as the government sought to protect white farmers[75] from dissident activity, allegations of atrocities against civilians were

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[74] In traditional patriarchal society organic unity is emphasised with everyone knowing their place and what is expected of them. This reduces the need for much forthright direct communication between the rulers and their subjects.

Against such a background, government is viewed as a national provider and its leaders as "fathers of the nation." In that scheme of things government takes the role of an extended family spreading its largesse every now and then to the most loyal. The leader is revered and party cadres offer their full loyalty. Adversarial politics is a peculiar phenomenon and is taken to mean confrontation. Traditional values of deference to seniority and obeisance to those in authority take precedence leading individuals to opt for mediation over "confrontation". Those who do not agree with the views of "the father figure" are viewed not so much as citizens with a right to disagree but as renegades who have decided to desert the "harmonious family."

[75] Compare, for example, Ian Smith's protection of the same from guerrilla fighters in the 1970s.

made against the Fifth Brigade by the Roman Catholic Church and its affliate the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP). The latter denounced the government's campaign as one designed to create a "reign of terror" among the people of Matabeleland[76] while the former exposed some of the atrocities just as it had done previously under the tyrannical rule of Ian Smith. The revelations animated the authorities who responded in a manner not dissimilar to that of Smith by arresting two of its leaders under the continued emergency powers regulations.

As these developments were taking place, Mugabe continued his pattern of systematically eliminating and absorbing the opposition. With the split of the RF in 1983 (now renamed the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe [CAZ]), a new faction sympathetic to the government calling itself the Independent Zimbabwe Group (IZG) emerged. A few months later an olive branch was extended to this group with two of its members appointed to the government. Thus, by the time Nkomo returned from self-imposed exile in August 1983, it was clear that Mugabe had emerged from the crisis in a stronger political position. Not only had the RF split, some of the remaining ZAPU cabinet members had actually been promoted. Contrary to Nkomo's wishes, none of the remaining ZAPU cabinet members had resigned.

By mid-1984, the reorganization of the party structures

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[76] See pastoral letter to the government by the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference in The Herald, March 30 1983.

which had started shortly after ZANU-PF came to power had reached an advanced stage and ZANU-PF was ready to hold its second Congress.[77] At its Congress held in Harare in August 1984, a new 15 member Politburo was introduced with the party leaders' powers extended.[78] The party reaffirmed its commitment to Marxism and the creation of a one-party state. It also urged all its leaders to commit themselves to observing a Tanzanian-type leadership code in which they were not allowed to own private property nor any land holdings exceeding fifty acres.[79] After the Congress, the Party was ready to launch its campaign in the next general elections to be held in July 1985.

When the second election was finally held, ZANU-PF won 64 seats thereby increasing its representation in the lower House by six seats. The list of ZANU-PF members of parliament included whites who ran on the party's ticket. The fielding of

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[77] Its first congress was held at its launching in August 1963.

[78] Nominations to the politburo were left to the discretion of the party leader.

[79] The writer's father, the late Albert Tazvivinga Nhema, who was a delegate to the Congress offered his resignation immediately after the Congress. In a letter addressed to me, he wrote: "I am at a loss as to why some of us who supported the guerillas financially should now be urged to give up the very same business interests that sustained the war effort." *Personal letter, 18 September, 1984.* Subsequently the confusion surrounding those who had business interests prior to independence was clarified. These leaders were exempted from the leadership code. My father was reinstated and continued to be an active party member in Chivi South, Masvingo, until his death in March 1985.

white candidates by ZANU-PF was in keeping with the multi-racial ethos of Zimbabwean politics dating back to the federal period and earlier. Conversely, ZANU-PF however failed to gain a single seat in Matabeleland, Nkomo's stronghold. Likewise, ZAPU lost the five seats it had previously won outside Matabeleland whilst Bishop Muzorewa's UANC failed to gain any representation. ZANU-Sithole secured one seat in Chipinge, the party leader's home area. To the disappointment of Mugabe,[80] the CAZ which was pitied against the IZG, won 15 of the 20 reserved "white seats." Far from accepting the new order, these election results showed that white racism still persisted.

Yet following the elections, ZANU-PF supporters stunned the nation by carrying out reprisals against minority party supporters especially those of ZAPU. These violent acts, akin in many respects to the early 1960s schisms between the two parties, resulted in the death of several innocent people in the high density suburbs.[81]

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[80] Mugabe reacted by dropping one white cabinet minister from government. His argument was that by voting yet again for Ian Smith whites had spurned his government's hand of reconciliation. As he put it "the vote (for the CAZ)...proved that they (whites) had not repented in any way." The Herald, 1 July 1985.

[81] When asked why Zimbabwe was prone to violence during elections the lone ZANU(Ndonga) MP, Mabaudi Zengeni, argued that
> The zero sum nature of Zimbabwean politics gives rise to career politicians who look up to politics as their only source of livelihood. To some it means owning a house for the first time. Until such a time that people get into politics knowing that it is a part-time job, we will never have a mature democracy in Zimbabwe.

Despite these clashes and the disident problems in Matabeleland, unity talks between ZAPU and ZANU-PF were resumed in September 1985.[82] The negotiations were on and off for almost two years before a final agreement was reached in December 1987. The "new" ZANU-PF party under Mugabe, with Nkomo as one of the two vice-presidents, committed itself to the establishment of a one party state.

Subsequently all detainees were released and an amnesty was extended to all the dissidents. Reaction to the unity agreement was mixed. Some ZAPU supporters felt that Nkomo had capitulated to ZANU-PF. Foreign observers were also critical. The Financial Times of London characterized the merger as "a shotgun marriage...entrench(ing) ZANU-PF hegemony (thereby) undermining democracy."[83] All in all, the incorporation of the remaining major opposition party marked the last stage in the progressive deterioration of oppositional strength in the country.

Moves towards the creation of a one-party state were bolstered by constitutional changes. With the expiry of the seven year period clause in the Constitution prohibiting any changes to the provisions of the Lancaster House Constitution,

Interview, Harare, July 10, 1992

[82] For a detailed chronology of events leading to the signing of the Unity Accord see Willard Chiwewe, "Unity Negotiations," in Banana ed., Turmoil and Tenacity,

[83] The Financial Times, London, December 1987, quoted in Didymus Mutasa, "The Signing of the Unity Accord - a step forward in Zimbabwe's national political development," in Banana ed, Turmoil and Tenacity, p. 295.

various changes were made. In September 1987, the reserved 20 white seats in the Lower House and 10 in the Upper were abolished. The 80 African members elected 20 party nominees that included 11 whites to fill the vacant seats. The following month witnessed the abolition of the non-executive presidency which was replaced by the executive presidency that incorporated the former functions of the prime ministerial portfolio.[84] The outgoing non-executive president, Banana, who had played a major role in uniting the two parties was retired and pensioned off. By the end of the year a unicameral system had been adopted with the single chamber enlarged from 100 to 150 with effect from the next general election. At that stage, it appeared as if the ZANU-PF one party state agenda was close to being realized.

After the unity accord then, it seemed as if all was well for the ruling party. The threat of disident violence had subsided and almost all the rebels had surrendered under the amnesty programme. The drought that had hit the country with particular fury in 1987 had ended. The economy was picking up and a growth rate of 6% was expected in 1988.

CONCLUSION

I have shown in this chapter that the post-settler regime managed to assert its control along corporatist lines through the 1980s. I have also highlighted that, for, the most part,

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[84] This Bill gave unbridled powers to the office of the presidency.

ZANU-PF's goals, from one-party creation to hegemonic control, dovetailed nicely with the corporatist arrangement in place from the settler era. The regime responded to dissent, both within and outside of official mass organizations, with a combination of concessions, co-optation, and repression, and acted to prevent the development of autonomous organizations that could define and represent interests differently from the way the regime carried out those tasks.

After the unity agreement it seemed as if the ruling party would achieve its goal of creating a one party state. However, that objective was never in fact realized. The corporatist system began to break-down as it could no longer deal effectively with a changing economy or with growing demands for greater political accountability demanded by civil society. As shall become clear in chapter five, the former smooth-functioning corporatist arrangement was under stress from mid-1988 onwards.

CHAPTER SIX

POST-SETTLER STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS: THE RISE OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE DECLINE OF THE STATE CORPORATIST STRUCTURE

INTRODUCTION

As explained in the last chapter, the post-independence corporatist state used its cooptative powers to muzzle a fragile civil society. Despite this assault, civil society organizations weathered its ubiquitous controls and emerged with some degree of independence by the end of the first independence decade. Indeed, in the late 1980s Zimbabwe witnessed an historic awakening of new forms of social creativity and resistance in virtually all components of civil society. It is these "new" forms of political mobilization which this chapter will address.

The argument in this chapter is that civil society militancy rose in direct response to the state's desire to create a one-party state and to unfavourable changes in the inherited economic structure. Stagnant economic performance during the initial ten year period and the subsequent embrace of SAP threw vast numbers of people into a state of indigence. With the collapse of welfare policies and the rising cost of living, many in the middle and working classes only recently accustomed to a stable way of life, found themselves worse off economically than they were at independence. The combined collapse of a way of life and the state's desire to impose a one-party state acted as push factors propelling civil society

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to adopt a more militant stance than heretofore. Although differing ideologically, the new "movements" demanded a new way of conceiving and doing politics: they opposed corruption and favoured transparency in politics.

The chapter also asserts that the media played a "catalytic role" and continued to be at the forefront of the political liberalization "putsch." Opposition political parties and other groups in civil society found refuge in a sympathetic, critical media which managed to act as an avenue through which they could accelerate political communication with the state and their own followers.

Following this introductory part, the ensuing section recaps briefy the theoretical and practical underpinnings of the economic and political liberalization process. This is followed by a review of the economic policies of the Mugabe regime from independence to the late 1980s thereby proffering some explanations of why the regime ended up adopting International Financial Institutions (IFIs) prescriptions after a decade of debating and rejecting them. The fourth section is devoted to analyzing the domestic, regional and international factors behind the democratization push from the late 1980s onwards. This provides a good background to our understanding in section five of the factors explaining the rise of civil society from the late 1980s and beyond. Faced with the onslaught for more political space from civil society, the regime increasingly found itself unable to

control and manipulate civil society groups. This decline of the state corporatist stratagem is the focus of the last segment.

LIBERALIZATION

As explained in chapter two, **economic** liberalization refers to a more open as opposed to a highly regulated economy while **political** liberalization denotes a mixed bag of regime led policies that range from the tolerance of political opposition, less censorship of the press, and greater latitude and autonomy for associational groups. The latter's focus is largely on the relationship between the state and civil society.[1]

In our context, Zimbabwe's process of economic and political liberalization has its origins in not only the heavily statist nature of the inherited economy but also in the "corporatist authoritarian tendencies" of the new state over the first independence decade (see chapter 5). The sluggishness of the economy called into question the effectiveness of state intervention in the market while its authoritarian impulses invited demands from civil society for

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[1] Extracted and improved upon by author from Alfred Stepan ed, Democratizing Brazil, Problems of Transition and Consolidation, New York, Oxford University Press, 1989, p.ix. See also Shahid Qadir, Christopher Clapham and Barry Gills "Sustainable Democracy: Formalism vs Substance" in Third World Quarterly, Volume 14 (3) 1993, pp. 416-417 and also Elly Rijnierse, "Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa? in ibid., pp 652-653.

more political space.

In the next section I examine the economic policies of the new state from the early independence years to the late 1980s. Such a review is necessary as it gives some background information that helps explain why the regime ultimately embraced SAP prescriptions after almost ten years of debating and rejecting them.

ECONOMIC POLICIES PRIOR TO THE LATE 1980s

With the lifting of sanctions following majority rule, high levels of economic growth were recorded in the first two years of independence. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew in real terms by 11% and 9.7% in 1980 and 1981, respectively. With the onset of the 1982/83 drought however, the economic growth rate fell sharply to 1.5% attaining a negative growth rate of 3.6% in 1984. Recovery started in 1984 but only at a low positive growth rate of 2.3%. As the country emerged from the drought, real GDP growth accelerated to 7.3% in 1985.

When the first Five Year National Development Plan (FYNDL) was introduced in 1986, it forecast an average annual real GDP growth of 5.1% for the period 1986-90. As events turned out, these figures were overly optimistic. Growth slowed down to 2% by the end of 1986, trickling to a mere 0.7% in 1987 before picking up to a somewhat lacklustre performance of 3.8% at the end of the first independence decade.

From the early 1980s to the late 1980s the regime

financed its huge recurrent expenditure by short-term loans from international private creditors. However that "honey-moon" period with international financiers ended in 1987. Matters came to a head in early 1987 when the central bank, faced with severe foreign currency shortages, simultaneously reduced foreign currency remittances and allocations to the private sector.[2] Remittances for foreign companies were halved from 50 to 25 per cent while foreign currency allocations to the industrial and commercial sectors were reduced to their lowest levels since UDI, leading business interests that had prospered under state protection during both UDI and the post-independence era to demand the opening up of the economy. When quizzed about the cuts in foreign currency allocations and remittances, the Finance Minister sincerely acknowledged that he had no choice but to take such a drastic move in order "to meet (the country's) debt obligation(s)."[3] Such developments heightened lenders' fears about the country's repayment ability.

The regime also ran into a multitude of other economic problems by the end of the 1980s. At the macro-economic level, GDP per capita had remained stagnant for much of the first

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[2] For a discussion on some suggested proposals aimed at redressing the foreign currency plight then see, Alfred Nhema "The state must create an off-shore arm of the Reserve Bank," in The Sunday Mail, 18 January 1987.

[3] African Economic Digest, 'Special Report: Zimbabwe," 1987 April, p 1.

independence decade.[4] The balance of payments sank into deficit[5] while the foreign debt-service ratio ballooned.[6] Subsidies to inefficient parastatals rose from around 40% of the budget deficit to 60% by 1987,[7] leading one local observer to call for a serious re-evaluation of the nature and operations of state-owned enterprises in the country.[8] Corruption thrived while the public payroll swelled several times its previous size. The quality of administration declined because party sympathizers, qualified or not, occupied key positions in both state-owned enterprises and government ministries.[9]

At the micro-level, unemployment rates reached crisis proportions. Estimates are that only 10,000 jobs were created annually in the formal sector from 1980 to 1990 with the

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[4] ILO, Structural Change and Adjustment in Zimbabwe, Occasional Paper 16, Geneva: ILO, p. 22.

[5] See for example Institute of International Finance, Zimbabwe Country Report, Washington DC., 1991.

[6] Institute of International Finance, Zimbabwe, 1988.

[7] See for example, Anthony Hawkins, "Public Policy and the Zimbabwe Economy," Harare, USAID, 1985 and also "S ecial Report: Zimbabwe," African Economic Digest, April 1987.

[8] As early as 1986 one local observer was already lamenting about the negative effects of the huge budget deficit created for the most part by the huge subsidies extended to most inefficient and loss making state-owned enterprises. See for example, Alfred Nhema, "For how long must we subsidise parastatals?," The Sunday Mail, 22 June 1986.

[9] There is a common perception in Zimbabwe that the bureaucratic payroll is a sort of dole for the educated but otherwise perhaps unemployable.

figure declining further after the introduction of SAP. When compared to the estimated 200,000 to 300,000 high school leavers joining the labour force every year, the question of unemployment became the most serious problem facing the nation.

Those fortunate enough to be employed did not fare well either. Real wages, which rose somewhat in the early years of independence, fell sharply over the years under the impact of inflation and shortages. By the early 1990s workers found themselves actually worse-off than they were in the early 1980s.

As the economy continued to register a downward trend and as funds from private lenders dried up the regime found itself in a precarious position. Some donor funds that had been promised at the ZIMCORD[10] conference did not materialize.[11] Disillusioned with the country's political and economic policies, the United States terminated aid funds after a diplomatic debacle in 1986 while Britain, following the US lead, stopped its Commodity Import Program the same year. Given that trade with these two countries constituted 20

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[10] The first major post-independence Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD) was held in 1981 with a view to soliciting funds from donors for its reconstruction projects. At that conference pledges of Z$2 billion were made by various international donors. However, over the years those pledges were not matched with deeds. Only a tiny amount of the pledge was ever disbursed.

[11] Howard Lehman, "The Paradox of State Power in Africa: Debt Management Policies in Kenya and Zimbabwe" African Studies Review, 35 (2) 1992, p. 23.

percent of Zimbabwe's total,[12] the country had no option but to try and cement friendlier ties with these key donors. As it reached out to them, however, it conceded to their demands to open up its economy before further credit facilities could be extended. Reluctantly, the regime found itself knocking on the doors of the IMF and the World Bank -- a move it had resisted before. An agreement was reached in Washington in 1990 culminating in the adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1991, thereby ending a twenty-five year era of excessive state intervention.

The specific reforms agreed and effected are now quite familiar. They include, among others: stream-lining of the public sector investment programmes; privatization; reduction of public sector employment through freezes on hiring; relaxation of controls on prices, exchange rates and interest rates; and the introduction of incentives for the increased role of the private sector.[13]

It must be emphasized that discussion and policies related to SAP were largely confined to the ruling clique and business interests. Popular groups encompassing unions, churches, NGOs, student movements, and community groups were not consulted. As we shall see in the last chapter this autocratic pattern of decision making largely explains why

[12] International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade, Washington D.C.: IMF, 1988.

[13] Zimbabwe Government, Zimbabwe: A Framework for Economic Reform, 1991-95, Harare: Government Printer, 18 January 1991.

there is a lot of resentment to the programme.

THE DEMOCRATIZATION "PUTSCH"

As Zimbabwe's society moved progressively toward a higher degree of pluralism from the late 1980s onwards, multi-partyism became the catchword of movements which sprung up in opposition to Mugabe's one-party state tendencies and his regime's adoption of SAP. The movements which were primarily urban based represented a coalition of interests in civil society. Obviously it is not possible for a study such as this to look at the roles played by all reconstituted organized interests. Rather the focus in this section shall be on civil society groups already dealt with in the previous section. The intention here is to show how their activities changed over time. Two new social movements - the Forum for Democratic Reform (FORUM) and Zimbabwe Human Rights Organization (ZIMRIGHTS) - formed at the height of the democratization push are also examined. The two were propelled to the front by the new wave of democratization sweeping across the country.

Explaining the democratization push

By mid-1988, a series of problems and scandals embroiled the Mugabe regime. These started when a group of angry student demonstrators were barred from marching into the city centre to demonstrate against the one party state agenda and the growing number of corruption scandals and crimes within both the party and government.

In typical settler style, the police were sent over to

prevent the protesters from leaving campus, prompting the students to react by throwing stones at law enforcement officers. In the scuffle that followed, student leaders and some lecturers were arrested, with one Kenyan lecturer deported. The scenes of the riot police officers in full military regalia fighting against students who at best were armed with rocks, were graphic manifestations of an oppressive regime. This crackdown-- similar in many respects to the settler era -- [14] fuelled public opinion against the state.

A year later yet another scuffle between the state and the students took place. When again the state stopped students from commemorating the first anniversary of what they called "The Great Anti-Corruption Demonstration of 1988," physical confrontation with the police ensued. Several student leaders were arrested without charge under the same draconian emergency powers used by a different state in the 1960s. The university was subsequently closed for several months.[15] This move led the ZCTU secretary-general, Morgan Tsvangirai, to

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[14] What is interesting in this crackdown is the continuity in some aspects of the state-student conflict. When in 1966 the black students refused to sign a pledge that banned them from participating in political activities following the declaration of UDI, the police responded by arresting nine lectures and nine student leaders who were detained without charge. As the unrest persisted, the University was eventually closed for several months.

[15] For further readings on post-settler state and student relationship see for example, Sachikonye, "The Dilemma of Zimbabwe Student Movement," SAPEM August 1991; Andrew Meldrum "The Corruption Controversy," January/February 1989, pp. 36-37; and also Meldrum, "Campus Criticism," Africa Report, November/December 1989, pp. 42-44.

issue a statement supporting the students. The state reacted by detaining him for six weeks without trial under the continuing emergency regulations.

After the mid-1989 clash, the government hurriedly passed a severely criticized University of Zimbabwe Amendment Act in December 1990 giving more power to the regime and the university administration to deal with dissent. Despite protests from both the students and academic staff the bill was gazetted in 1991.

Meanwhile, political debate was intensifying on the issue of the one-party proposal following the merger of ZANU-PF and ZAPU-PF at levels of both state and civil society. Within the party itself the debate on the one-party state was gaining momentum. One outstanding critic, Edgar Tekere, former ZANU-PF Secretary-General, had won support with the students over his opposition to the creation of a one-party state. When, in 1988, he charged that corruption within government and the party had reached corrosive levels, he only helped to fuel student unrest further. In response to his outbursts, the party reacted by expelling Tekere.

A few months after his expulsion, revelations came to light about high level corruption involving senior government officials in the purchase and sale of motor vehicles. Cashing in on the shortage of vehicles in the country, government officials used their influence to purchase vehicles at the listed price from a government-owned assembly plant to resell

them on the black market at inflated prices. Embarrassed by these revelations, Mugabe appointed a Commission to look into the allegations.

The investigation triggered a series of resignations of ministers implicated in the scandal, the first time government officials had ever resigned on their own accord.[16] One implicated senior minister, Maurice Nyagumbo, a veteran of the nationalist struggle felt so dishonoured that he committed suicide.

A few months after the findings of the judicial commission had been made public, Edgar Tekere opportunely launched his Zimbabwe United Movement (ZUM) in 1989. Formed at the height of ZANU-PF's campaign to impose a one-party state, ZUM's manifesto opposed such a state. It stated that

> a multi-party state facilitates the competition of ideas on public policy and on how society is going to achieve its goals. The one-party state tends to make leaders complacent because there is no opposition to fear.[17]

As the first serious opposition party to be formed after nine years of independence, ZUM's formation was welcomed by most groups and individuals opposed to the introduction of a one-party state. The emergence of ZUM further complicated the situation for ZANU-PF. The former's commitment to

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[16] "The Commission of Inquiry into the Distribution of Motor Vehicles," under the Chairmanship of Justice Sandura, Harare: Government Publications, 1989.

[17] Financial Gazette, 16 March, 1990.

democratization undermined the latter's continuing efforts to assert its hegemonic control.

In the county's third open election, held in March 1990, ZUM's performance demonstrated that the party enjoyed a lot of support among civil society organizations opposed to the ruling party's one-party agenda. Although it won only two out of the 120 seats, the party managed to act as a rallying point for civil society groups challenging the state's attempts to further monopolize power.

Before proceeding to the next section, it is as well at this point that a crucial question be posed: what specific events triggered the old and new civil society groups to adopt a more militant stance against the regime at the end of the 1980s than before? Three factors that account for the new "glasnost" can be identified.

First, events external to Zimbabwe were important. The decline of superpower rivalry, and the subsequent collapse of authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe demonstrated to the people that public opposition could force autocratic regimes to give way to democratic pluralism.[18] As the winds of democratization swept across the continent more and more countries found themselves opening up their political systems. For example, Benin found itself embracing pluralism while

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[18] Events in Eastern Europe highlighted that the vital challenge to the ruling class came from intellectuals, churches, trade unions, intellectuals and other civil society groups. It was the concerted efforts of these groups that forced the autocrats to succumb to democratic rule.

Mozambique had done so well before the upheavals in Eastern Europe.

In Benin, the late 1989 mass uprisings were sparked-off by civil servants and teachers who had not been paid for some months. Students and workers joined in and this forced president Kerekou to promise free-market reforms and to discard the official Marxist-Leninist ideology introduced in 1974, two years after the military coup in 1972. In February 1990, the president convened a conference attended by 500 delegates to draft a new constitution for the country. By the time the conference ended, dramatic events had taken place. Kerekou was stripped of most of his powers and a fresh team of ministers led by the new prime minister Nicephore Soglo, a former World Bank executive, took over. Opposition parties were legalized and elections that took place in January 1991 brought Soglo to power.[19]

By contrast, the former Portuguese colony of Mozambique and a key ally of Zimbabwe formally abandoned Marxism as its official ideology at the Frelimo party congress in July 1989. Since then President Joaquim Chissano has introduced a new constitution which allows separation of powers. Elections are scheduled to take place by the end of 1994.

In addition, in the space of one week, the Presidents of

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[19] For some discussion on the transition from authoritarianism to pluralism in Benin see C. Allen, "Restructuring an Authoritarian State: Democratic Renewal in Benin," Review of African Political Economy, No. 54, 1992.

Cote d'Ivore and Zaire both declared that they were abandoning their single party systems. In Cote d'Ivore the government had announced sweeping income tax hikes to offset the public sector deficit in mid- February 1990. This sparked off a wave of street demonstrations which eventually forced the late octogenarian, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, to agree to multi-party elections. Opposition parties which had been banned for decades were allowed to operate. As for Zaire, belated pressure from the United States forced Mobutu to allow other parties besides his own to compete for power in elections whose date is still yet to be fixed. And, the once prosperous African nation of Gabon was hit by a wave of strikes that forced President Omar Bongo, in power for over twenty years, to chart a new political course for the country's 1.2 million inhabitants.

Mwalimu Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, a former staunch supporter of the one-party system joined the African democracy bandwagon with his famous pronouncement that the people of Africa should not dogmatically assume that 'a single party is God's wish.'[20] Pressure from him as the ruling party chair led current President Ali Hassan Mwinyi of Tanzania to accept the multi-party concept.

The winds of change did not spare the East African country of Kenya, that was still grappling with the mysterious murder of foreign minister Robert Ouko. Elections were

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[20] The *Economist*, 7 April, 1990, p. 15.

subsequently held which saw the ruling party returned to power as a result of regional schisms within the opposition parties.

Closer to home, developments in Southern Africa with the emergence of an independent Namibia in March 1990 combined with the fast changing political situation in South African were also influential. Namibia pioneered what looked like a model constitution for the sub-continent of Africa. Its new constitution espoused democracy, recognized the opposition, provided for an independent judiciary and, above all, limited the President's term to two five year terms. It was the first constitution on the mainland of Africa that had such limits.[21] With the release of Nelson Mandela from prison in South Africa and the commencement of negotiations to end apartheid, the Mugabe regime was robbed of one convenient shield which for a decade had been used to cover its abuses. The impending end of apartheid deprived the Zimbabwe regime of its often cited excuse that nothing else could be achieved as long as apartheid contir:ed.

Second, with the introduction of SAP the vast majority of people only recently accustomed to a decent standard of living were thrown into a state of indigence. Although it is too early to assess the effects of SAP given that the programme has only been in operation for four years certain general

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[21] For a succinct analysis of democratic developments in Namibia, please see for example, Joshua Forrest, "A Promising Start: The Inauguration and Consolidation of Democracy in Namibia," World Policy Journal, Volume IX, (4), 1992.

observations can be made in the areas of subsidy reductions, devaluation, and cost recovery measures in education and health. Each will be briefly examined in turn in the ensuing discussion.

The rapid withdrawal of subsidies in 1991 was not accompanied by policies that sought to break down the oligopolistic nature of the market. Thus, when subsidies on basic commodities were removed in such a non-competitive environment the result was steep rise in the prices of most basic commodities.[22]

Devaluation measures created a predicament whereby all imports became expensive when transposed in local currency terms. Thus local industries that needed to import new equipment to replace the antiquated and inefficient UDI technology, found themselves unable to acquire new capital goods. With the removal of protectionist measures, a deluge of imported products flooded the market. Unable to compete, many local industries, particularly the small-scale ones, closed down. Although retrenchment figures are hard to authenticate, two years after the introduction of SAP, the ZCTU estimated that over 25,000 workers had been retrenched in the private sector alone with the numbers increasing at an "alarming rate

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[22] See, for example the various price rises affecting most staple food items following the removal of subsidies in the country in The Herald, of the 6th and 28th August 1992.

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each day"[23].

Other sectoral areas reeling under the effects of SAP are education and health. The quality of health services deteriorated due to shortages of imported essential drugs, and the loss of doctors leaving for better remuneration in neighbouring countries, especially Botswana and South Africa. Expenditure per capita that reached a peak in 1990/91 of Z18,17 fell to Z$13,73 the following fiscal year. As a percentage of the total budget, the allocation fell from 7.4% in 1991 to 6.4% in 1992. The net result has been that the introduction of cost recovery measures has led to a situation in which vulnerable groups are shying away from seeking medical attention until the late stages of their illnesses.

With regard to education, per capita expenditure fell from Z$28,70 in 1990/91 to $23,71 in the 1992/93 budget while the teacher-pupil ratio has increased. Lack of adequate funding has given rise to shortages of teaching materials while cost recovery measures have caused a drop in school enrolment for the 6-12 year age group. Figures show that only 83% of this age group were in school tw years after the introduction of SAP.[24]

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[23] Gibson Sibanda, ZCTU president quoted in The Sunday News, 13 December, 1992. See also "Zimbabwe's Time Bomb," in the Daily Gazette, of November 25, 1993 for details on the serious unemployment situation in the country.

[24] These statistics are from an analysis on the social os SAP in an article titled "Social Costs of ESAP," High Density Mirror, May 1994.

In sum, then, the introduction of cost recovery measures in the education and health sectors has led to a reversal of the great strides made in the 1980s thereby shattering the promises and dreams of independence. Faced with declining popularity across the board, the regime was much more accommodating than before and was unable therefore to draw the limits on what was permissible and what was not any more. And third, the Zimbabwean mass media and in particular the newspaper industry played a prominent role in the liberalization process -- a topic that shall constitute the opening discussion of the next section.

Civil society takes centre stage

To help elucidate the key role played by the media, a review of how it helped to trigger the political liberalization process is in order. A good starting point is the newspaper coverage of the "Willowgate" scandal in 1988 as it provides a framework for understanding what later transpired.

A government-owned newspaper revealed the high level of corruption involving senior government officials in the purchase and sale of motor vehicles already referred to above. The excellent investigative journalism and the fearless manner with which the reporters pursued the matter marked a watershed in the development of the standards for a professional media. Events after the scandal took on a momentum of their own, however. Taking advantage of the newly-found freedom, the

media became much more aggressive while government, shaken by the corruption revelations and the subsequent suicide of a senior minister over the corruption charges, became less willing and able to put its foot down on civil society. For the first time since independence, government officials were made aware that as public officials they "lived" in a gold fish bowl!.

Since then, the frenzied media and a voyeuristic public craving for more uncensored information managed to break-down the veil of secrecy surrounding government operations. Even the activities of the much-feared Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) which had operated in the "black box" before were no longer immune from scrutiny.[25]

After the unity pact of ZANU-PF and ZAPU-PF in 1987 newspapers adopted a critical stance. In the absence of a viable and strong opposition party, the independent newspapers and magazines provided the most informed and effective opposition to ZANU-PF policies. Although the regime controlled the local television and radio networks to prevent people from receiving alternative information, shortwave radio, satellite television, computers and fax made it increasingly difficult

[25] It was through the investigative reporting of the media that the Midlands Central Intelligence Organization chief, Alias Kanengoni, and a provincial party leader were eventually taken to court and convicted to seven years each for shooting a Gweru businessman, Patrick Kombayi in the heat of the campaign on the eve of the 1990 elections. The judgement by the regional magistrate Wilbert Mapombere, was seen as a victory for the press. For details see Moto, June 1993.

to control information reaching the middle class about developments in other countries.

While the dominance of the government-owned MMT explained earlier in chapter four has continued, this had not acted as a major impediment to the liberalization process. In fact, the MMT itself has had to liberalize, in view of the competition from independent newspapers. Although its papers continue reflect the views of those in power as they did in the days of Rhodesian rule,[26] after the Willowgate scandal they too have had to take a more critical stance. Since then, there have been several instances in which even MMT newspapers have offered blunt criticisms of the government. In some instances the editors were victimized.[27]

A significant independent media player has become the Modus Group run by media mogul, Elias Rusike. It now runs the Daily Gazette, the Sunday Times and the weekly Financial Gazette. Given its incessant opposition to state policies, government officials often refer to it as the "opposition

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[26] For an analysis of the Mass Media Trust's operations see for example, Veronica Rosario, "Media Development in 21st Century Africa," SAPEM, December/January 1993/94, p. 29.

[27] A widely publicised case is that of Jeoff Nyarota of The Chronicle, who was relieved of his duties as editor after his revelations of the corruption involving government officials in the sale of motor vehicles at the government-owned plant treated earlier.

paper." Despite occasional threats from such officials[28] the paper has maintained a stance critical of government operations since the late 1980s. Many other magazines and newspapers have mushroomed since then.

As the number of private newspapers increased so did the competition for readership. Topics which were previously off-limits came to be extensively covered. Today, newspapers treat a whole range of issues from national affairs, international events, labour, women and religious issues in a "no holds barred" approach.

It cannot be denied that the media managed effectively to mobilize and orchestrate popular protest against the regime. It provided a forum through which civil society could debate issues affecting them. Other than providing the forum for public discussion it also acted as an avenue through which groups in civil society made their demands known to the state. During much of that period the major newspapers and magazines contained regular contributions on democracy and democratization from individuals and civil society groups.

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[28] In September 1992, two journalists from the Financial Gazette were summoned under the inherited 1971 Parliamentary Privileges, Immunities and Powers Act before a parliamentary committee to name the sources of a story alleging that senior members of the government had received favours from a corrupt business executive in deals involving the state owned Zimbabwe Banking Corporation and the Lorac groups of companies. Despite the public outcry from members of the public and newspapers across the country, parliament went ahead with the hearing. This action by parliament is an indication that that the rights and privileges of journalists are constantly contested in Zimbabwe.

Letters to the editor were also very common with authors offering a diversity of views in a candid and forthright manner.

Why did the government fail to control this new "glasnost" in the media? The first obvious reason is that, with the new wave of democratization sweeping across the world, most of the ruling elites were forced to commit themselves to the process of democratization. Any attempts to muzzle the press would have called into question their commitment to democracy both domestically and internationally. Furthermore, after its unsuccessful attempts to establish a dejure one-party state as a result of the formation of ZUM and the FORUM the momentum created by the wave of democratization was difficult to halt. In other words, once the "floodgates" of democracy were opened, the tides of autocracy could not control them.

ZANU-PF's ties to social movements under strain

Along with the emergence of new opposition parties was the shift of alliances as civil society took a more combative position in its opposition to the regime's economic and political policies. The trade union movement which had previously closely associated itself with the regime, called for a redefinition of relations between the state and civil society along lines differing from official corporatism.[29]

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[29] See for example, "Affiliation Out - ZCTU," The Chronicle, 26 September, 1990.

Buoyed by the change in leadership through democratic elections in 1988, the union was more than ever before willing to transform itself from a fractured organization to a dynamic one with increased control over the functioning of its affiliates.

The new secretary's general energy and drive left an indelible mark in all spheres of the labour movement. At a conference attended by 204 delegates from 29 affiliates in 1990, Tsvangirai declared that the new leadership sought to

> launch the ZCTU (o)nto a path of complete change...
> enabl(ing) it to overcome its weakness and
> irreversibly assume (its) role of being the key
> defender of working class rights and interests in
> Zimbabwe."[30]

True to his utterances, at the end of the conference he managed to secure the adoption of new resolutions obliging the ZCTU to establish its independence and to launch a labour newspaper, The Worker. The latter was to devote its attention to all issues of interest to workers in the country.

Predictably, the ZCTU's new stance sent shock waves through to the regime. Realizing that their erstwhile grip on the ZCTU was crumbling they coopted one of its vice-presidents appointing her a junior minister in the labour ministry. This move marked a last-ditch attempt by a beleaguered regime to maintain its atavistic corporatist controls on labour.

But these last minute efforts did not stop the

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[30] For details on the congress deliberations see Rene Loewenson, "ZCTU Congress," Parade, November 1990.

corporatist stratagem from crumbling. Massive unemployment,
adverse effects of SAP, falling real wages, and the lack of
democracy all acted as new stimuli uniting labour against the
state. Under such conditions, the state failed to secure the
continued loyalty of its erstwhile allies including civil
servants.[31] The latter who had been excluded from unionizing
by inherited legislation demanded that they be allowed to
operate their own unions. The formation of unions in this
sector of over 200,000 employees boosted the strength and
image of the labour movement.

Faced with this increased opposition from the labour
movement from the late 1980s onwards concerted efforts were
made by the state to weaken it through various methods. First,
following the May 1989 strike by medical doctors, new
regulations were promulgated making it an offence punishable
by up to two years' imprisonment for workers in "essential
services" to strike. Since the definition of essential
services was based on the Minister's judgement, what it meant
was that in effect every worker in the country who went on
strike could be charged under the Maintenance of Essential
Services emergency regulation.[32]

Second, a new Labour Relations Amendment Bill was

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[31] All these factors emboldened workers to shed their
traditional deference and demand a part of their national
cake. For a more detailed discussion on this see Sachikonye,
"Worker Mobilization," SAPEM, April 1990

[32] Amnesty International Report, 1990, p. 271.

legislated in mid-1992 without any consultations with the
unions. The Bill sought to neutralize the ZCTU by giving the
minister sweeping powers aimed at controlling union
activities. In addition it also sought to give more power to
the employers in an future negotiating procedures. Also by
encouraging the formation of multiple competing unions the
bill sought to undermine the ZCTU.[33]

Despite protestations by the government that the amended
Labour Bill is meant "to democratize the trade union
movement," the ZCTU castigated it as an abridged version of
"1903 Master and Servant Act"[34] designed "to giv(e) government
and business greater power and control over the labour
process."[35]

Finally, third, outright intimidatory tactics were
adopted. When in June 1992 the ZCTU planned to stage a
demonstration in protest against the provision of the new bill
and the negative effects of SAP the government moved its
authoritarian state machinery into high gear. The government
charged that the ZCTU wanted to test its support before
turning itself into a political party. It declared the
demonstration illegal and warned that "the police as the

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[33] For an analysis of the provisions of the new bill see
for example, Rene Loewenson's article titled "Labour Act," in
The Sunday Mail, 10 May 1992.

[34] ZCTU President Gibson Sibanda quoted in The Chronicle,
September 8 1992.

[35] Horizon, September 1992.

custodian of the law, w(ould) deal with all those people who participate(d), join(ed) in or facilitate(d) the... nationwide demonstration." [36]

The ZCTU's reaction was one of defiance. Denying that it wanted to turn itself into a political party, the ZCTU President Gibson Sibanda charged that the actions by the regime marked "the failure of democracy in Zimbabwe." He also maintained that the ruling party was gripped by fear of civil society and thus perceived any action by civil society groups "as a threat to political power." Under such an environment he concluded, "there was no room for the growth of civic organization and democracy in Zimbabwe"[37]

Although the demonstrations eventually took off in defiance of the ban, the turn-out was not as large as expected given the high levels of intimidation by government.[38]

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[36] "Police urge workers not to demonstrate against Government," The Herald, June 13 1992.

[37] The quotes are excerpts from the remarks made by the ZCTU president in the piece "Police urge workers not to demonstrate against Government" The Herald, June 13 1992.

[38] For a report on the ZCTU demonstration see "ZCTU Mass Demo Fails to take-off," The Sunday Mail, June 14, 1992. Expectedly the demonstration did not receive headline coverage in this government-owned newspaper. Presumably under pressure from government, The Sunday Mail, despite covering the story did not publish pictures of the demonstration. Aware that its readers would wonder why not it had this addendum at the end of the story:
"We are unable to publish pictures of yesterday's demonstrations by the ZCTU in Harare because of technical problems in our photographic department. The omission is sincerely regretted!" (the exclamation mark is mine).

Since then, the tango between labour and the state has continued unabated. The strength of the labour movement will be largely determined by the performance of the economy. As the situation stands, labour seems to be gaining an upper hand if the recent spate of strikes that almost ground the country to a halt are anything to go by.[39]

The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace continued to be at the forefront of protest movements campaigning for the creation of the institutionalization of rules and procedures guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms, party competition and government accountability. In one of its placed advertisement in a major daily, it urged the ruling party to abandon all plans to establish a legislated one-party state and to seek a mandate to govern from the people based on

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[39] Following the 64 percent salary hikes of the president, ministers and parliamentarians in January 1994, the ZCTU economist Tapiwa Mashakada issued the following statement in the union's monthly:

> The government has set a precedent which it has to honour. Workers cannot continue to tighten their belts while politicians are having a field day. The burden of adjustment must be shared equally and by awarding hefty salary increases for themselves the politicians have shown the nation that none other than themselves are self-centred and greedy. The Worker, February 1994,

The calls by the ZCTU for workers to demand similar increases were heeded and since then Zimbabwe has been reeling under a spate of strikes involving doctors, nurses, government law officers, postal worker to mention only a few. Reacting to veiled go-slow threats from the civil service at large the government recently awarded extended salary increases of up to 20 per cent to all public servants, in addition to housing and transport allowances of up $Z250,00 a month.

real freedom of choice.[40] Its views were supported by other mainstream church groups across the country.[41]

Other groups in civil society joining the "fight" against the one-party state included the intelligentsia and business organized interests. The former made their opposition to the one-party state objective known[42] while the latter group, that had hitherto been mute about its opposition to a legislated one-party state, joined the ranks of other civil society groups by highlighting the effects that such a move would have on investment. [43]

Faced with heavy opposition from civil society the state was forced to abandon its goal of establishing a one-party state by the end of 1990.[44] It also was compelled to repeal the

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[40] The Herald, 17 April, 1990

[41] See, for example, the Zimbabwe Council of Churches' advertisement in the Herald, issue of 13 July 1990 supporting the CJPC's position in addition to stating why it opposed a one party state.

[42] For a summary of some of the views of academics and professionals see for example, "Perestroika, Glasnost and the Zimbabwean Intelligentsia," Moto, June 1990 and also "Honest Debate," Zimbabwe Press Mirror, 24 September, 1990.

[43] See for example, "Business Call,"Financial Gazette, 12 April, 1990

[44] For the official announcement of the ruling party's decision not to declare a de-jure one-party state, see for example, "No one-party state by law - President" The Herald, 28 September 1990. It is interesting to note that although it was already a public secret in the local media that the one party state objective had been rejected by both the central committee and politburo party organs a few days before the President's trip abroad, the formal announcement of this decision was made outside the country when the president was on a state visit to Canada. See note 1 in chapter one.

the notorious emergency regulations that had been in force
from 1965 as pressure mounted especially after white ruled
South Africa had upstaged the regime by repealing its own in
mid-1990. Previous controls on organized interests were also
relaxed.

THE DECLINE OF THE CORPORATIST SUBTERFUGE AND THE RISE OF NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND ALLIANCES

Populist strategies tend to prosper as long as both
redistribution of wealth and increased production tally in the
Zimbabwean case. As long as the peasants in the countryside
are happy on the land, and the middle classes are prosperous,
opposition to the populist regime was reticent. The classical
Marxian community of interests of workers and peasants is also
maintained when the economy is experiencing positive growth.

However, under worsening economic conditions, the regime
failed to secure the continued loyalty of its former allies in
the corporatist subterfuge. It ran into difficulties faced by
populist regimes everywhere. Its popular support crumbled as
economic decline undercut its welfare policies of free health,
free education and the land redistribution programme. While
talk of getting lean and mean goes down well in rich
industrialized countries, in places like Zimbabwe the SAP
knife cut to the bone.

As the corporatist structure collapsed, new movements
sprung up in opposition to the regime's economic and political

policies. Capitalizing on the unpopularity of the regime, a new movement that started as an NGO is the Forum For Democratic Reform Trust (FORUM) organization (now FORUM Party) initially formed in 1992. With its launching, history was once again repeating itself in Zimbabwe. That the multi-racial organization would be appropriately named the FORUM -- invoking memories of the FAWS's "Open Forum" (see chapter 4) of the 1950s -- and that such an organization would just like its predecessors be "part think-tank, part pressure group, part debating society"[45], is indicative of continuities with the past. It differed from other NGOs discussed in chapter four in its independence.

Like previous multi-racial societies its membership would constitute an amalgam of blacks, whites and coloureds. That its chief patrons -- Enoch Dumbutshena, Garfied Todd, Diana Mitchell -- were all veterans of multi-racial adventures is indicative of continuities with the past. The launching of the FORUM on May 30, 1992 in Bulawayo was also significant in that it reinforced Bulawayo's status as the birth place of major opposition civil society organizations (see chapter 4 and note below).[46]

While the launching of the FORUM marked a new beginning

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[45] "Misinformation and the Forum," The Financial Gazette, 9 July 1992, p.10.

[46] Bulawayo was the centre of "opposition" politics up until the late-1950s. As mentioned in chapter 4 at that time Bulawayo was the industrial capital in the country before being overtaken by Harare from the 1960s onwards.

in not only opposition politics but also civil society independence, appropriation tactics by politicians on NGOs persisted, as the case of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Society (ZIMRIGHTS) launched in mid-1992 has shown. The organization is led by the ruling party member of parliament, Reginald Matchaba-Hove, a ZANU-PF stalwart. Although committed to campaigning against the repressive laws that violate human rights in the country, the organization fails "the independence" test given its close association with the regime.

The "hijacking" of women's issues by the state also persisted. The women's league now under an enlarged ministry of women's affairs continued to play its partisan role as before. Its dominance notwithstanding, new women's NGOs sprung up. These included among many others the Women's Action Group (WAG), whose main objective was to attend to all issues concerning women's rights. Its quarterly magazine Speak Out, was used as a vehicle through which it could disseminate information to its supporters. Another female civil society group of significance launched in the late 1980s is the Women and Law in southern Africa (WLSA). Made up of mostly female academics with Law backgrounds, the organization, headquartered in Harare has offices in Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zambia. Its focus is primarily on legal issues affecting women and over the years it has produced legal educational materials in the vernacular of each

country in its bid to involve the less formally educated women. A disturbing feature of the women NGOs is that, in general, they are still subordinate to the partisan women's league and are run by people closely associated with the regime.[47] In the case of the WLSA, one of its coordinating members is a senior law officer in the Zimbabwe justice ministry.

As dissatisfaction with the ruling party policies spread and middle and working class support fell, the regime was forced to turn back to its unwavering allies: the peasants and other marginalized classes for support. To boost its support with the peasants, the previously abandoned land issue was revived culminating in the hurried passage of a Land Acquisition Bill in 1991.

The ruling party's move to closely align itself with peasants in face of opposition from the urban-based movements pushed workers, students and middle classes closer together than they had been for many years. These classes did not hesitate to show their protests by aligning themselves with the new parties if only to express their disdain for ZANU-PF's economic and political policies.[48]

Another interesting feature resulting from liberalization

[47] Salina Mumbengegwi,"Empowering Women Through Knowledge: The Role of the Women's Action Group in Zimbabwe," in Sandbrook and Halfani eds., Empowering People, 1993 p. 88.

[48]See Raftopolous, "Beyond the House of Hunger: Democratic Struggles in Zimbabwe," and also Moyo, Voting for Democracy, 1992

is the existence of the continued system of competing parties, but with one party dominating. Today the political landscape in Zimbabwe is littered with not less than ten political parties. The major ones are the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)[Ndonga]), Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), Democratic Party (DP), United African National Council (UANC), and the recently launched FORUM Party. The latter -- the creation of civil society groups opposed to the regime -- is the most organized and all indications are that it will offer a serious challenge to the ruling party in the upcoming 1995 elections.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown how with the changing domestic and international context favouring economic and political liberalization, the regime found its capacity to control civil society greatly limited. Once the yearning for liberalization started in earnest in the late-1980s the erstwhile corporatist arrangement that had operated so smoothly for the first seven years of independence crumbled. The state that had shown such a high degree of insulation from civil society could no longer ignore the demands of social movements.

From the late 1980s the tango has been between civil society groups seeking to expand their political space and the cooptive regime seeking to control the liberalization process. Despite the latter's desire to control the process Zimbabwe's society moved progressively toward a higher degree of

pluralism by the end of the first independence decade.

While it is too early to predict what effect ESAP will have on civil society given that it has only been in operation for three years it is clear that, as the regime tries to balance different/incompatible interests -- its desire to extend its presence and power on the one hand and the IFIs' economic liberalization schemes on the other -- the pressure for political liberalization will continue.

Undoubtedly the late 1980s and beyond marked a new era in which civil society groups that had been emasculated by the cooptive state rose against the regime in a manner akin to the rise of nationalism from the 1960s to the late 1970s. The only difference is that,

> (w)hereas the anti-(settler) movement spearheaded a
> revolt against alien rule, the present targets are
> the post-independence African ruling classes...[49]

The new era is one in which civil society is demanding constitutional and institutional changes that guarantee freedom of expression, and the accountability of political leaders.

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[49] Colin Legum, "The Coming of Africa's Second Independence," The Washington Quarterly, 13 (1) Winter 1989, p. 129.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter attempts to tie together the several analytical and theoretical constructs advanced in the preceding six chapters. It seeks to proffer not only a summary of the main arguments but also to highlight the thesis's main contributions at levels of both theory and praxis. In addition, it also looks at possible future democracy and civil society development scenarios, both existential and theoretical.

It is divided into five parts. Following the section outlining the conceptual frameworks employed in the study, the second segment examines the theoretical and practical implications of the settler legacy. The third part constitutes a summation of how inherited policies and practices presented elements of continuity, posing serious theoretical challenges to those seeking democratic consolidation while the fourth section looks at factors impeding the development of a stable democracy. The fifth part examines the prospects for a sustainable democracy in Zimbabwe in particular and Africa in general.

THE SETTING

This thesis represents an original study of the development of civil society over time in Zimbabwe, from the settler era through to the 1990s. Guided by the research

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questions posed in its first chapter, I have employed a wide range of compatible analytical frameworks that included statism, democratic theory and corporatism.

The apparent ascendance of the latter framework is justified by the fact that it provided a superior setting for explaining a "state constructed order" based on the control and incorporation of major social groups along officially sanctioned lines. As shown in many ways in the study, both settler and post-settler elites promoted such corporatist policies based on the control and manipulation of civil society. The settler regime with its racist exclusionary ideology established an uneven and unequal tripartite arrangement between state and capital with mainly African labour playing an insignificant role. As demonstrated repeatedly, however, the structure of interest representation from 1980 to the late-1980s differed little from the one inherited from the settlers.

In line with this inherited corporatist tradition, the structural configuration and functional relationship of ZANU-PF, the state, and organized groups in Zimbabwe were essentially corporatist in the first independence decade. Not only did the party and state form closely interlocking ties like their RF predecessor; they also served as the principal focus that directed the organizations and activities of various civil society groups.

The new corporatist stratagem like its settler era

correlative consisted of the ruling elite (including those in the top echelons of the army and bureaucracy), agricultural and business interests with labour playing a minor role (see chapter 5). Under this arrangement labour clearly bore much of the burden of the corporatist system. Wages were kept low, and there was lack of compensation in the form of either improved employment opportunities or extension of social welfare services. In so far as there were any benefits these were extended mainly to some business interests through protective statist measures until the introduction of SAP.

MAJOR FINDINGS

Settler rule and its legacy

It has been demonstrated in chapters 3 and 4 that although the records of the various settler administrations differed somewhat from each other, the many cumulative negative effects of settler rule on economic, social and political development are evident. First, at the **economic** level, the economic structures failed to nurture and develop an industrial society in which a vibrant "modern" civil society could thrive because of racial inequalities and exclusionary policies.

In the West, capitalist economic structures gave rise to the emergence of a robust middle class over time, in Rhodesia, except among the whites, such a class could hardly exist, especially before independence. In fact, it can be safely argued that class solidarities based on occupational status

and income levels were and are still in their embryonic stages.[1] After WWII, the African working class consisted of a core of mainly migrant male workers[2] who in times of financial crisis drifted to the city in search of employment only to return to their villages of origin when their financial needs were met. Such workers must actually be viewed as migrant labourers since a majority of them still retained rights to land in their villages of origin where the majority of the people were subsistence farmers. Occasionally these rural folks were mobilized for particular events, after which they were left to lapse back into their traditional loyalties.

As shown in the thesis, Rhodesia lacked this "precondition" of 'a vigorous and independent class of town dwellers (that) has been an indispensable element in the

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[1] This observation confirms a study that has highlighted the nascence and fluidity of class structures on the continent by Michael Schatzberg. In his study, he found that a primary school teacher was in a different class when he/she was working in the capital, Kinshasa, from the one which he occupied when transferred to a remote rural village in the southern part of the country. The teacher was found to unconsciously engage in different patterns of class action when he was in the rural areas. For all its oversimplification, the example highlights the fluid nature of class structures in Africa. For details see, Michael Schatzberg, Politics and Class in Zaire, New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1980.

[2] As shown in Chapter 4, female workers constituted a tiny percentage of the workforce then. Most were confined to the rural areas where they were engaged in subsistence agriculture.

growth of parliamentary democracy'[3] in industrial societies. In liberal democracy parlance, the absence of such a key precondition serves to highlight the bumpy terrain impeding the spread of democracy in Zimbabwe.

At the societal level, settler rule failed to create a cohesive organic nation. A nation can be defined as an aggregation of people(s) developing solidarity on the basis of shared customs and institutions. A state on the other hand is:

> an organization within the society where it coexists and interacts with other formal and informal organizations from families to economic enterprises or religious organizations. It is, however, distinguished from the myriad of other organizations in seeking predominance over them and in aiming to institute binding rules regarding the other organizations' activities.[4]

In situations where nation and state are coterminous, ethnic allegiance fuses with state loyalty, giving rise to an environment where the state acquires legitimacy and political authority. Settlers failed to create a firm foundation for the building of a strong post-settler state in which nationalism and not localism[5] was the norm.

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[3] Moore, <u>Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy</u>, p. 418.

[4] Victor Azarya, "Reor.ering State-Society Relations: Incorporation and Disengagement," cited in Michael Bratton, "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa," <u>World Politics</u>, Volume XLI, 3, April 1989, p. 408.

[5] Localism can be defined a tradition in which the individuals feel they owe primary allegiance to their ethnic or racial group rather than the nation.

Second, at the **political** level, the majority of Africans were deprived of practically all civil and political liberties. They were in the state, so to speak, but not part of it.[6] Nevertheless, much of the day-to-day administration of 'native affairs' was left in the hands of traditional African leaders. In situations where they failed to identify leaders, settlers imposed their own hand-picked ones.[7] Although communication existed between the chiefs and the administrators, decision-making rested with the settler establishment. The appointed chiefs were accountable to the colonial authorities rather than to their own people. This had the effect of eroding the "democratic" content of traditional societies. It meant that political survival for the chiefs and their surrogates had nothing to do with how responsive they were to the needs of their subjects, but rather how well they satisfied the machinations of their colonial masters.

Although political relations within the white community were relatively "liberal", during the settler era, one-party tendencies always manifested themselves. After twenty three years of company rule, Godfrey Huggins was in power for a further twenty years - from 1933 to 1953, when he became the federal premier - followed by Ian Smith who was at the helm of

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[6] Rogers and Frantz, <u>Racial Themes in Southern Rhodesia: The Attitudes and Behaviour of the White Population</u>.

[7] See Weinrich, <u>Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia</u>.

Rhodesian politics from 1964 to 1979. During the latter's rule, civil liberties were sacrificed on the alter of tyranny especially after the declaration of UDI. Those opposed to the government were either detained or deported.[8] That is why it is theoretically and practically inappropriate to use the term "intra-white democracy"[9] to describe the nature of white politics during the settler era. Rhodesia never met the test for the existence of democracy even within its own 250,000 settler members.[10]

Finally, the traditional communitarian political cultures remained side-by-side with Western political culture, giving rise to a situation in which there was little reciprocal relationship between "modern" and "traditional" political institutions.[11] By contrast, in industrial democracies, a

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[8] Examples include former premier Garfield Todd who was put under house arrest several times during Smith's reign and several clerics were either deported or detained simply for expressing views contrary to those of the ruling clique. For details see, Linden, The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe.

[9] See for example, Sithole, "In Search of a Stable Democracy."

[10] Even at its peak the European population never exceeded this figure.

[11] It can be safely argued that the majority of the people do not relate to the institutions governing them even up today. The symbols and Victorian values that pervade the whole institutional framework is not related to indigenous frameworks. One can argue of course that people's beliefs and perceptions change over time and that culture is not static. That is true when genuine attempts are made to involve the populace in the political system governing them. Since the majority of Africans were excluded it is inconceivable that

shared common political culture has been a prerequisite for democracy.

The implications of the preceding observations are that, while the new state adopted a constitutional framework with some liberal democratic semblances in 1980, the content and key preconditions of that form of democracy were missing. It is remarkable that not much regard was given to the adoption of a system better understood by the majority of the people that it was designed to serve. Without any practice or experience, the formerly disenfranchised masses were now suddenly expected to grapple with foreign-derive constitutional arrangements unrelated to their specific cultural and social norms.

Historical continuities

It has also been established that the inherited economy, policies and political culture presented elements of continuity that posed a serious challenge to those seeking democratic consolidation during the post-settler period.

By way of summarizing, a good starting position would be to point out that central elements of the old state were inherited almost lock, stock and barrel. Not only was the new state bequeathed the repressive and commandist state

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they could have fully inculcated Western inspired values over time during the settler period.

apparatus, it also "inherited all kinds of people"[12] including the settler police, the judiciary, and the intelligence services, to mention just a few (see chapter 5).

At the state level, the new ZANU-PF regime like its predecessors favoured organizational hegemony. Its emphasis lay in making its party so entrenched that other parties become irrelevant and simply withered away. As established in the preceding section, though political relations within the white minority were relatively democratic, one-party tendencies always manifested themselves during the entire settler period. That such practices would persist after independence was therefore consistent with inherited tradition.

At the institutional level, the judges and lawyers still don colonial wigs and apply court symbols unrelated to local society just like they did before independence. The code of dressing in parliament is still in effect from the settler days. English still remains the official langauge and the lingua franca of everyday confabulation.

At the economic level, both states utilized statist measures in the running of the economy. Under settlerism the state planned the economy, allocated capital and provided labour. Under Mugabe's "state capitalist approach" the state planned the economy, allocated capital and perpetuated the

[12] R.G. Mugabe, "Mugabe on Socialist Transformation," Journal on Social Change and Development, Vol 1, No 6, 1984 p. 4.

same economic policies pursued by its predecessors until the late 1980s (see chapter 5). In both cases, the command economy was complemented by a command political system in which the state regulated everything from business organizations to trade unions.

In their interactions with organized interests, both pursued interest mediation strategies. The only difference was that whereas settler state corporatist arrangements were exclusionary, those of ZANU-PF were largely inclusionary. As a senior party official put it the post-independent ruling party was:

> not the same organization that grew out of ZAPU in 1963, but a new body with the experience of the 1970s incorporated into it... [In it] we ... have people who joined ... after independence because they saw the Party as route to greater personal wealth. [W]e have others who joined it as a genuine response to the Prime Minister's call for national reconciliation... (W)e have some who joined because they wished to safeguard their economic gains accrued prior to 1980. In ZANU-PF we have elements from the past whose struggle was for independence so that black Africans could replace European settlers without changing the economic structure. But in ZANU-PF, we still have militants - young and old - who wish to see a socially just society for all Zimbabweans. Therefore, the ZANU-PF of today is...a front for all...nationals of Zimbabwe who are united by their desire for national liberation. The Party draws its membership from all the various ethnic groups...and from all the political movements with tendencies that developed over the last eighty years. It is this unity of patriotic nationals of Zimbabwe that is leading a Government of National Unity where all parties working in Zimbabwe's interests are represented.[13]

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[13] Herbert Ushewokunze, An Agenda for Zimbabwe, Harare: College Press, 1984, p. 22 (the emphasis is mine).

All in all, the new governing coalition was an inclusionary corporatist one, encompassing a broad set of ethnic groups and organized interests. The broad base accorded the ruling elite with options to build coalitions with elements within the ruling party and with some outside it.

The emphasis on ~ corporatist ideology emphasizing cooptation of civil society groups meant that the successors like their predecessors had little regard or sympathy for the arrangements let alone constraints of a pluralist democracy.

The state in both cases was able to maintain its control over major groups in civil society through recognizing and licensing them. Thus each organization's right to exist, at least in an official capacity, was dependent on maintaining a "good" relationship with the state. Authority under such a corporatist arrangement flowed downwards with the state not only intervening in the affairs of civil society, but also adopting legislation with prescriptions for its conduct. Civil society representation was therefore restricted to an advisory function in line with envisaged corporatist inclinations.

A major element of continuity manifested itself in the assertive role played by the state in its interactions with labour. "While the corporatist labour controls of the pre independence period (were) deracialised, (they were nevertheless) rationalized and extended" after independence.[14]

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[14] Wood, "Trade Union Organization and the Working Class," p. 304. Whereas settler labour controls were motivated by racism those of the new regime were guided by its inclinations

The emphasis on unitary movements was maintained with Mugabe setting the tone in his 1980 post-election speech:

> It has always been, and it is necessary to promote a unitary movement rather than a multiplicity of national movements." [15]

Other than these echoes of the past, the various corporatist labour controls were maintained, if not extended. The Labour Relations Act of 1985 amended in 1992 like the Rhodesian Industrial Conciliation Act before it (see chapter 5), limited the right of workers to strike through its designation of almost all occupations as "essential." Such a clause not only weakened the labour movement, it also removed the unions' major bargaining chip: the right to strike.

Whereas in general, white civil society was given a boost with the development of white capitalism during the settler era, the same cannot be said for African civil society in either settler or post-settler periods. If the settler's racist disposition prevented the emergence of a Central African political community with a "coherent societal realm" that cut across race and tribal affiliations, those contours of limited state-society relations persisted after independence.

While market political economies in industrial countries engendered the formation of new social movements and provided

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to establish a one-party "socialist" state.

[15] Ibid, p. 288.

a basis for societal affiliation divorced from ascriptive tendencies, in this study, both settler and post-settler regimes failed to develop a capitalist pluralistic society with non-ascriptive characteristics.

The tenuous spread of market relations that characterized the settler state persisted after independence giving rise to an unstable albeit multi-racial middle class. Despite the ambiguous efforts made through the partnership scheme during the 1950s (see chapter 4) to create a multi-racial middle class, the majority of Africans remained outside the state capitalist sector and continued to be outside it after independence. The end result was that a civil society emerged characterized by a lack of collective class interests. This, coupled with the inability of organized interests to confront the state within an agreed collective civic domain comprised a major hindrance to the consolidation of African civil society.

Just as the exclusive corporatist settler arrangement was an authoritarian structure unrestrained by the masses it governed until the late-1970s, so too was its post-settler counterpart at least until the late 1980s. In both cases, a commandist culture with strict adherence to illiberal norms permeated the political milieu. In different ways, much of the activities of African civil society centred around their opposition to political authoritarianism in both periods.

All in all, both the settler and post-settler regimes

failed to engender a vibrant African civil society. If the settlers' largely exclusionary policies did not engender the development of a vibrant black civil society with a coherent class structure, the inclusionary cooptative policies of its post-settler counterpart also failed to provide a strong basis for the aggregation of private interests. In both instances, the majority of the people remained outside the state capitalist machinery with the end result that "two publics" which had emerged during the settler era persisted: one black with blurred "inchoate class identities and hazy functional linkages"[16] and the other white with fairly developed class structures.[17]

Although overt vestiges of racism were removed after independence, black and white continued to be polarised economically and socially. With the economic conditions that bolstered the settler state still intact the former racist state apparatus was simply replaced by a more subtle and

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[16] Lewis, "Political Transition and the Dilemma of Civil Society in Africa," p. 45.

[17] Buttressing this settler legacy of white economic clout and exclusivism were the financial institutions and social institutions unwilling to extend credit facilities to African business interests or sponsor African related social activities. While white-owned lending companies and financial institutions fell over each other in their scramble to sponsor "white" sports like golf, bowling and cricket that support was less enthusiastic when it comes to mass games like soccer.

For a detailed discussion on these issues, see for example "Racism: has anything changed yet?" Moto, May 1993 and also I. Barr's rebuttal titled "Racism: A white granny retorts," Moto, June, 1993

powerful economic apartheid system.

By maintaining the status quo put in place during the settler period, the new ruling elite ensured that alternative centres of power were prevented from developing. Major groups in civil society were offered rewards and concessions in return for loyalty to the Mugabe regime. It was however made crystal clear that the post-independent regime would not tolerate any alternative strong centres of power that were outside of its corporatist configuration.

As demonstrated in chapter 5, this observation challenged most of the literature on Zimbabwe that has tended to view the failure to restructure the economy within classical dependency frameworks. Within that genre ruling elites were perceived as too weak and overly reliant on foreign capital to act independently in their efforts to transform inherited economic structures.

I established that this Fanonist[18] notion of a neo-colonial governing African petit-bourgeoisie pliantly serving the goals of their foreign masters[19] not only ignored the new range of concerns of the governing elite but also overlooked the fact that the new ruling class did have some autonomy and agendas of their own. They were not merely `robots (reacting)

[18] See for example, Frantz Fanon, Towards the African Revolution, London: Writers and Readers, 1980.

[19] See for example Astrow, Zimbabwe: A Revolution that Lost its Way, and also Mandaza, "The State and Politics in the Post-White Settler Colonial Situation," in Mandaza (ed.), Zimbabwe, p. 30.

to external inputs and instructions."[20] To the contrary, the post-in.'ependent regime's unwillingness to restructure the economy has to be viewed within its whole strategy of controlling and curbing the rise of alternative centres of power. As established in chapter 5, white economic clout was condoned as it was opined that as a social grouping it had become electorally insignificant.

From the remarks in the foregoing discussion, lessons from Zimbabwe for South Africa are apparent. At present, despite the evolution of South Africa from its settler status authoritative conclusions as to whether the established corporatist arrangements would break-up and be replaced by "new alliances" are not clear. Nor indeed is it clear how the new regime can balance the seemingly contradictory interests - the ANC's desire to extend its presence and power on the one hand and the creation of a facilitative decentralized socio-economic framework conducive to economic growth on the other.

The kind of cleavages and alliances that will yet emerge are also not apparent. In between the dialectics of transformations and continuities lies a political space overshadowed by a war-weary civil society displaying division along colour, class, ethnic, religious and gender lines. To be sure, the agricultural, industrial and mining interests will continue to be dominant as in the Zimbabwean case. How these

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[20] Shaw, 'Beyond Neo-Colonialism: Varieties of Corporatism in Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies, 20 (2) 1982, p. 241.

extra-bourgeois forces will coalesce and pursue their interests will largely be determined by the tempo set by the new regime.

Given that the post-settler arrangement is based on compromise and that the emerging "hegemonic project (is) structurally weak, precarious, (and) vulnerable to fluctuating political battles and confrontations"[21] the post-settler regime may lack both the resolve and the wherewithal to redress the rampant inequalities in the country. As in Zimbabwe where the London-derived Lancaster House Constitution set the initial policy parameters guiding the social and economic transformation South Africa's compromise pact may compel the Government of National Unity (GNU) to pander to the vested interests of the hegemonic economic groups. In the likely event that such a scenario transpires, various social groups unable to count on state support, may be marginalized even further.

If the experiences of Zimbabwe are anything to go by, democracy in South Africa cannot be secure in an environment in which past corporatist policies prevail. There is a need to move away from past hierarchical settler arrangements to more nuanced egalitarian and benign post-Fordist arrangements that provide a political setting in which groups in civil society

[21] Pierre Beaudet,"South and Southern Africa into the 1990s," in Nancy Thede & Pierre Beaudet (eds.), A Post-Apartheid Southern Africa? London: Macmillan, 1993. p. 153

can thrive.[22]

In the next section I focus on the contemporary period and highlight some of the major barriers inhibiting the consolidation of democracy in Zimbabwe.

Obstacles to democracy.

First, there is a background culture in Zimbabwean politics that if not addressed, can hinder the process of democratization. That culture is embedded in Zimbabwe's patriarchal hierarchy (see chapter 3). At its utopian level, this system is one in which the father must provide basic needs, security, cohesion and love whilst the son in turn must respect and submit to his father's authority.

Against such a backdrop, government is perceived as a national provider and leaders as "fathers" of the nation. In that scheme of things government takes the role of an extended family spreading its largesse every now and then to the most loyal. The leader is revered with party cadres offering their

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[22] For further references to future scenarios in South Africa see for example, Patrick Bond, "Economics: Scenario Plundering," Southern African Review of Books, 5: 3-8, 1993; James Chipasula, and Alifeyo Chilivumbo, eds., South Africa's Dilemmas in the Post-Apartheid Era, Lanham: University Press of America, 1993; Steven Friedman, ed., The Long Journey: South Africa's Quest for a Negotiated Settlement, Johannesburg: Ravan for Centre for Policy Studies, 1993; IDS Bulletin, "A Policy Agenda for Post-Apartheid South Africa", 25: 1-73, 1994; Dean McHenry, "Review Essay: The South African Debate Over the Democratic Transition," African Studies Review, 36: 95-101, 1993 and finally, Third World Quarterly, "Special Issue on Post-Apartheid South Africa," 15 (2) June 1994.

full loyalty. Given the system's emphasis on organic unity, adversarial politics is taken to mean confrontation. Traditional values of deference to seniority and obeisance to those in authority lead individuals to prefer mediation over confrontation. This leads to a situation in which those who do not agree with the views of a particular party are viewed not so much as citizens with a right to disagree amicably but as renegades who have decided to desert the "harmonious family." For example, a ZANU-PF MP Lazarus Nzarayebani, well-respected for his sustained criticism of some party's policies disappointed his admirers when in a volte face manner he succumbed to pressure from the party to toe the party line in an unquestionable way.[23]

Reinforcing this emphasis on group harmony is the absence of a developed country-wide political culture. The lack of such an established political culture in which there is a

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[23] Reacting to consistent criticism from Nzarayebani, the president threatened that he would personally campaign against him in the 1995 election. In response to this threat the MP was forced to issue a statement in the ruling party paper in which he apologized for maintaining his independent stance. He further went on to reassure all and sundry that Mugabe was his "supreme leader both in the party and in Parliament and can do whatever he wants with me as a party cadre," The People's Voice, October 18-24, 1992.

Such intimidatory tactics by senior party leaders have led to a situation where parliamentarians simply rubber stamp decisions made at the politburo level without debating them for fear that they may be accused of deserting the "harmonious" family. Given the fact that opposition parties hold only 3 seats out of 150, then one can understand why there is really no serious debate taking place in parliament.

collective orientation of people toward the basic elements of the political system governing them worked to the advantage of the post-independent ruling party which as "the sole" and "authentic" people's voice rode "roughshod" over the aspirations of those it was elected to serve. Civil society groups that had been active during the liberation struggle became accomodationist vis-a-vis the new regime rather than confrontational. Many fell prey to exhortations by the new ruling elite that the next stage of development needed to be tackled under the aegis of only one political cohesive group in which the former guerilla leaders would act as unrivalled 'Platonic Guardians' of society.

During that period the regime exercised social and political control through state-sponsored mass organization of peasants, workers, and middle-class groups on the one hand, and through a set of implicit agreements regarding the state's role in stimulating private-sector growth, on the other. However from the late-1980 onwards, the regime's ties to social movements was under great strain, with the ruling party now subject to almost as much criticism from its one-time allies as it was from its "traditional" foes.[24]

Second, although the former coopted civil society groups have become a thorn in the "political flesh" of the state they

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[24] These included the media, university students, workers' movements, church groups, and human rights and the business organizations.

have failed to woo rural movements to their side.[25] Up to now they have not made any genuine attempts to involve the masses in the formulation of their strategies. Systematic attempts need to be made to garner the support of these rural based movements as they represent the majority of voters.

Over 60 per cent of Zimbabwe's population live and work in the rural areas. If participation is to be enhanced, it is essential that the various village and peasant league organizations be actively involved in the liberalization process. Currently, the civil structures in the rural areas are very local in orientation. This is not surprising because among the ordinary rural folk, especially the peasant community, class identity stems not from class consciousness but from kinship and traditional norms and customs. These are concerns that they understand and identify with.

However, the tragedy of such a state of affairs is that the intensity of concern with local issues has led to a situation where peasants view events at the national level

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[25] Even among themselves, the new movements have failed to cement strong ties with each other as the case of university students and workers shows. When a few weeks after labour day celebrations in May 1992, the students staged a demonstration demanding an increase in their allowances, the ZCTU did not issue any statement in support of their grievances.

This was surprising given the fact that a few days earlier, the student movement had actually participated in the labour day celebration for the first time in its history. The image of students as a "privileged" lot dating back to the settler era is still strong among workers.

These observations are based on the writer's perceptions during his research visit in Zimbabwe in the summer of 1992.

with a certain level of disinterestedness. To them anywhere beyond their district is somewhat 'remote and somehow menacing'[26] This apathy can be redressed through the strengthening of ties between the urban and rural movements. The formation of development oriented NGOs can be one effective way of linking urban civil society groups with their rural counterparts. Apart from acting as agents for community development projects, the development associations would,

> pursue economic, social, and cultural goals or more explicitly political ones, such as protecting civil liberties, guarding against electoral fraud, and educating and turning out voters... Through their internal structure and functioning, they may serve as training grounds in democracy, increasing the political efficacy and capacities of citizens, recruiting new political leaders, stimulating participation in the larger political system and enhancing citizen commitment to democracy.[27]

It is assumed that through such interaction, the traditional customary ties of obeisance to rulers (see chapter 3) can be eradicated. The development associations could be encouraged to adopt a more confrontational (but not necessarily violent) stance in which they demand their right to participate in the economic and political process.

Third, in most mature democracies, the stability of democratic regimes has depended on the leadership's ability to work together with major groups in civil society with a view

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[26] Sandbrook, The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation, p. 65.

[27] Diamond, "Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: Strategies for Democratization," The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1989, p. 148.

to ironing out the problems confronting their society in a manner that refrains from exploiting perceived problems for their own immediate material or political advantage.[28] In Zimbabwe that task has been made difficult by the fact that the middle classes do not take the views of the masses, especially rural ones, seriously. While they will accept the tradition of social hierarchy they nevertheless regard their own class position as inherently superior. They will accept in principle the need for land resettlement but at the same time reject radical measures that may proletarianize them. It is not only the white bourgeoisie of Zimbabwe that has been alarmed by the Land Bill, the black elites also are equally loathsome of its effects.[29] Even if there is no direct threat to its class standing, the well-off regard the bill as unnecessary.

Also, the middle class, especially the well-educated, resent "men of the people" being elected to positions of power. The attitude is not entirely snobbish. Their view is that those who come from the masses are less educated

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[28] Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 259.

[29] See for example the FORUM's "Blueprint For Zimbabwe: Proposals for Constitutional Amendments and Changes in Overall Government Structure and Policies," Paper 1, Harare, 16 March 1992 pp 12-14. Although reference is made to the need to consult peasants in the party's envisaged land reform policy the emphasis is on the promotion of commercial farming rather than the traditional peasant agricultural format envisaged in the Land Acquisition Bill.

regarding the use and abuse of power and are less imbued with genteel values essential in a "democratic" society. Arguably, they resist sharing power with the masses: they play to the masses's sensitivities without conceding to them full participation in the economic and political arenas.

So far ˙ ⇒ new political class has failed to make genuine attempts aimed at creating a sustainable democratic system in which the masses are sincerely involved. By perpetuating the inherited coercive and cooptative corporatist system, the current leadership extended the legacy of a weak and undeveloped civil society, especially among the Africans.

Fourth, with Mugabe at the helm for the last fourteen years, the political hierarchy has become clientelistic and uncompetitive.[30] While there is nothing inherently amiss with politicians surrounding themselves with loyalists and friends, there is a danger that in an environment like Zimbabwe, where there are "no checks and balances" or vetting processes through which the competence and integrity of appointed officials can be deciphered, clientelistic relations can lead to political lethargy. Where appointments to virtually every public office are made on clientelist grounds, the dangers are apparent. A clientelist system gives rise not only to

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[30] In a move that surprised many observers, an influential provincial chair of the ruling party, Herbert Ushewokunze recently pointed out that Mugabe "has surrounded himself with dead-wood and sycophants who...spice their stories instead of telling him the truth." Wire Service, Reuters World Report, July 18, 1994.

political lethargy but also to incompetent and dishonest economic managers. Yet for democracy to be stable, public institutions must achieve at least a minimum standard of service delivery acceptable to the general populace.

Fifth, it is an open secret that given the restrictive political environment under which opposition parties operate, Zimbabwe has not yet developed strong opposition groups that offer a serious challenge to the ruling party. Also, as in many other African countries, the ethnic scourge continues to mar the political landscape of the country. Most parties are still tribally based and only ZANU-PF at the moment can profess to resemble a truly national party. [31]

The major opposition parties in order of their popular appeal are the FORUM, ZUM, UANC, and ZANU-Ndonga. Launched in 1992, the multi-racial FORUM party is led by a former chief justice and veteran multi-racial association activist, Enock Dumbutshena (see chapter 4). Propelled to the front by civil society groups disenchanted with ZANU-PF policies, the party has a large support base in the urban areas. At 75 years of age, however, Dumbutshena is too ancient and may find the hurry and strife of politics too exacting. Despite its

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[31] Its weakness though is that it is an umbrella alliance of ethnically and ideologically diverse forces, held together almost exclusively by a fragile unity between Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo. That unity will likely fall away once one or both leave the political scene. The form the fragmentation takes will have a decisive impact on the political order in the post-Mugabe/Nkomo era.

popularity the party has yet to make some inroads into the rural areas where the majority of voters are located.

ZUM, formed in 1989 at the height of ZANU-PF's campaign to impose a one party state, has two seats in parliament. Its leader, Edgar Tekere, former secretary-general of the ruling party has lost support over the past few years. His autocratic and temperamental modes of behaviour have alienated many while his lack of organizational skills has weighed heavily against him. For example, despite the fact that ZUM garnered almost twenty per cent of the vote in the 1990 presidential elections, the party still does not have a campaign headquarters nor offices in various parts of the country. Although still a popular figure, Tekere's party trails badly behind the FORUM.

The UANC and ZANU-Ndonga, led by Muzorewa and Sithole respectively, are still smarting from their association with Ian Smith during the short-lived, discredited Zimbabwe-Rhodesia interregnum. In the past few years the two parties have been united under a loose umbrella group called the United Front in which the CAZ led by Ian Smith is also a participant. That after a decade of silence, the very same players of the internal settlement agreement of 1978 would emerge as a United Front to challenge the same old adversaries goes a long way to highlight continuities in the Zimbabwean

body politic.[32] It is however doubtful that any of this trio of parties will attract a lot of attention during the next elections. They are still viewed as "sell out" parties that collaborated to perpetuate white control in the late-1970s.

All in all, then, politics in Zimbabwe has not yet fully developed to a point where opposition parties offer a serious challenge to the ruling party. The inability of parties to organize themselves into serious governments in waiting, if continued could impede or even thwart the consolidation of lasting democracy in Zimbabwe.

A final impediment to the emergence of a stable democracy is that despite the proliferation of independent newspapers and magazines (see chapter 6), the regime has yet to yield control over broadcasting. Up to now it has continued to maintain a tight grip on both radio and television broadcasting.[33] What this effectively means is that opposition parties are not accorded enough access time to the major

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[32] Their concerns differ little from their late 1970s ones. For example, in one of their advertisement in a weekly paper the United Front alliance promised that if elected they would reinstate the non-executive presidential system complemented by a bi-cameral system, and restore the prestige, dignity and status of traditional chiefs. For details see their placed advertisement in The Financial Gazette, of September 17 1992.

[33] When asked whether the state monopoly on broadcasting would be removed President Mugabe said that:

> The issue of a broadcasting station that
> runs parallel to our own is a ticklish
> point because you don't know what
> propaganda they are going to broadcast.

The Financial Gazette, 3 July 1993

information disseminator.

With regard to the future of the press, I can only speculate that the local press will continue to play a prominent role in the democratic development of Zimbabwe. As the liberalization process consolidates, the press will assist in exposing society to a multiplicity of ideas and views from which society can learn from.

SAP and liberalization

It has been shown that as the winds of political liberalization now blowing across Zimbabwe maintain their unabated onslaught, the ruling party's decreasing iron grip on organized interests will dwindle further. Also, as the army of privatization, ever on the march, continues its search for new fields to conquer, statist policies that have been the cornerstone of a command political structure will have to grapple with the chill winds of the market (see chapter six).

The question of how far political liberalization is compatible with the new thrust of economic liberalization is an overarching one. On the economic front, liberalization measures are intended to force the state sector through privatization measures to shrink thereby creating an "enabling environment" in which private initiatives should flourish. As one observer puts it:

> as the state (becomes) smaller and more positive ,
> it will no longer be playing its largely negative
> role in directing the economy and because of a new
> accountability, it will be forced to renounce its
> role as defender of the interests of an

unproductive class.[34]

No one can deny that, far from pursuing the objectives they were set up to achieve, public enterprises have been used to further the political and material interests of ruling elites.[35] To the extent that managers are appointed not because of their competence but on the basis of their political affiliation, tney are likely to owe their allegiance to the minister who appointed them. Under such conditions, managers are likely to be congenial gentlepersons, not dynamic enterprising executives determined to run efficient operations. Consequently, employment, investment and pricing decisions are made without due consideration for their financial consequences resulting in a situation in which the public enterprise sector becomes a source of financial haemorrhage with an aggravating impact on national budget deficits.[36]

The preceding empirical observations notwithstanding though, a cautionary disclaimer is in order here. There is one important variable which greatly impedes the success of

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[34] John Wiseman,"Democracy and the New Political Pluralism in Africa: Causes, Consequences and Significance," Third World Quarterly, Volume 14 (3), 1993 p. 447

[35] The persistent tendency of government to use public enterprises as conduits for political patronage has been a major cause of losses and inefficiency. For more on this see, for example, "Key Posts," Zimbabwe Press Mirror, 23 April 1994, p. 5.

[36] See for example Nhema, "For how long must we subsidize parastatals?"

privatization measures: the uncompetitive nature of the Zimbabwean market.[37] At the level of praxis, before privatization endeavours are embarked upon in earnest, efforts must be made to create an environment where there is more competition.

Unless divesture triggers more competition, it can produce the intended increase in emphasis on profitability without any corresponding increase in efficiency.[38] The sale of large public enterprises to oligopolists will result in a situation where white and foreign-owned companies solidify their position in the private sector and reduce competition further. In the final analysis, then, economic liberalization measures should not be treated in isolation, but ratner as integral parts of the whole process of replacing the huge public sector with decentralized market forces.

Any attempts to privatize public enterprises without ensuring that competition exists has adverse effects on consumers. The choice becomes one of choosing between state and private monopolies. Needless to say, private monopolies will tend to exploit monopoly power even more ferociously than state-managed enterprises as illustrated below.[39] Before SAP,

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[37] Less than a dozen multi-national corporations control a large segment of the Zimbabwean economy.

[38] World Bank, World Development Report 1983, p. 75.

[39] See also, E.A. Brett, 'States, Markets and Private Power: Problems and Possibilities,' in Paul Cook and Colin Kirkpatrick, (eds.), Privatization in Less Developed Countries, New York: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988.

most state-owned enterprises were able to charge below the market price for essential commodities because they were cushioned by government subsidies. When such enterprises are sold to private concerns operating as monopolies, they will resort to market price determination and this leads to higher prices for the consumer.

These observations do not in any way suggest that Zimbabwe must be saddled with inefficient money-losing enterprises. Rather "privatization must be undertaken cautiously and carefully, not rushed through as a newly fashionable shibboleth."[40] Economic liberalization ideologues who view the privatization doctrine as some kind of apolitical managerialist technique "replete with fountains of technological creativity, wells of customer services, and streams of production innovation",[41] fail to understand the genesis and nature of Zimbabwe's market.

Thus while it may be necessary to ensure that dirigiste policies do not crowd out private initiatives, it is nevertheless sensible to avoid policies that advocate unbridled capitalism. At the level of praxis, this cautious view would be supported by the experiences of the East Asian

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[40] Yash Ghai, "The State and the Market in the Management of Public Enterprises in Africa: Ideology and False Comparison," Public Enterprise, Volume. 6 (1) 1985, p. 23.

[41] Management Today, quoted in Hershell Hardin, The Privatization Putsch, Nova Scotia, Halifax: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1989, p, 25.

tigers where economic growth was achieved not by the strict application of free market textbook economics, but rather by combining both statist and dirigiste interventionist strategies.[42] Such prognostications of course, run counter to classical International Financial Institutions' (IFIs') emphasis on "rolling back the frontiers of the state" while enhancing the scope of private ownership and the private sector.

The above caveat notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that economic liberalization measures may obliterate the noxious effects that a command political system induces. The million dollar question however is: are the current SAP measures the answer?

From the remarks in chapter 6 it is apparent that to dat SAP has failed to engender the development of a buoyant economic base conducive to the development of a democratic society. To the contrary, it is driving a wedge between the government and its people.[43] Although there is a modicum of tranquillity in the country at the moment, there is real threat of civil disturbances that could be sparked off by the worsening economic situation: galloping inflation, price rises

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[42] The World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Growth and Public Policy, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, p.9.

[43] It should be noted that the undemocratic manner with which the SAP programme was introduced made it unpopular with major groups in civil society from its inception. As shown in chapter 6, with the exception of business groups, no other groups in civil society were consulted.

for basic foodstuffs, transport and shelter and renewed droughts. [44]

This looming threat of civil strife calls for a radical reappraisal of the realist notions of security in the country and the Southern African region as a whole. With the end of apartheid in South Africa and the Cold War, the realist conception of security as one confined to the military sphere, i.e. regime survival, the policing of national borders, and the identification of external enemies, must give way to new more nuanced conceptions of security. While militarization will not decline in importance at levels of either theory and praxis, a more realistic future assessment is that security threats for the region will not come from without but from within. New conceptions of security should therefore be not be separated from issues pertaining to the provision of basic needs, the protection of human rights and finally, the guaranteeing of social and democratic needs. These elements will constitute the new forms of destabilisation for Zimbabwe and the whole region.[45] To wit, the "peace problematic" is therefore not unrelated to the extant economic and social

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[44] Also the relative deprivation of the masses, next to the splendid luxury of the fortunate few is potential fuel for political polarization and conflagration.

[45] Given the dominance of South Africa in the region, a declining economy in that country will have serious negative impacts for Zimbabwe. If violence erupts as the majority of people that have been denied basic needs for centuries are increasingly unable to count on state support, its effects will be felt all over the region.

conditions.

FUTURE PROSPECTS OF DEMOCRACY

From the foregoing discussion some general observations can be made. "Mature" liberal democracies have been associated with a number of prerequisites that are considered essential for the emergence of a stable democratic polity. These include: a certain degree of wealth or level of capitalist development; the emergence of a strong bourgeois class; and finally the existence of autonomous groups that comprise civil society.[46]

The assumption is that a relatively affluent economy makes higher levels of literacy, education, urbanization, and mass media exposure possible. Seymour Martin Lipset was adamant that the 'more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy,'[47] while Barrington Moore saw no hope of democracy thriving in a society where a strong independent bourgeois class did not exist.[48]

These arguments, steeped in established, paradigmatic

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[46] It was Barrington Moore who concluded that without a large bourgeois class there was no hope for aemocracy in his widely-read book, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, See, also, Sandbrook, "Taming The African Leviathan," World Policy Journal, Fall 1990, pp. 673-701.

[47] Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review, Volume 53, March 1959.

[48] Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, p. 418.

modernization theory,[49] further established that with increased industrialization a strong middle class emerges over time. Through the commercialization of agriculture the peasantry is transformed into either a class of small farmers or a rural proletariat. Once these conditions are met autonomous groups that comprise civil society would thrive.

True, democracies in the West are sustained by the bourgeois class, but in the case of Zimbabwe does such a class demand democracy? The answer is an unqualified yes. After independence the business elite wanted a system that worked. It was not worried about what form of government it had as

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[49] Post-WWII modernization theorists envisaged the restructuring of the global order based upon Fordist arrangements whereby Western countries had established a pattern of development that developing countries should emulate. One such eminent theorist, Walt Rostow posited that all societies progressed through five distinct phases that included (i), "traditional society", (ii) pre-take-off period, (iii) take-off period, (iv) the drive to maturity stage; and finally (v) the high mass consumption stage; a phase at which most of the developed countries are supposedly in today.

Over the last twenty years modernization theories have come under criticisms given their focus on Fordist provisions. There is mounting concern everywhere about economic development strategies that do not take into account environmental issues: degradation, deforestation, desertification, and depletion. New strategies are now beginning to focus their attention on not only economic growth strategies that characterized the Fordist era but also on the creation of conditions in which the majority of people in both the formal and informal sectors participate productively in the economy in a sustainable manner.

For a more detailed discussion on post-Fordist concerns see for example, Timothy M. Shaw and Alfred Nhema, "Directions and Debates in South(ern) Africa's First Post-Apartheid Decade," Mershon International Studies Review, Volume 3 (1) 1995; and for a discussion on the "stages of growth" theory see W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Growth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.

long as its members were making money.[50] It is doubtful that the rich Africans were equally worried, at least until the late 1980s. Nor should it be thought that the marginalized masses could come to terms with liberal assumptions like freedom of expression, an independent judiciary, strong middle class, and a free press to name only a few, in an environment characterized by scarcity. While such liberal axioms may well constitute a seductive political challenge in rich industrial countries, in a relatively less endowed country like Zimbabwe, such admonitions are notoriously difficult to explain to the impoverished and poor. In terms of importance such masses would probably place democracy well below housing, electricity, clean water and a decent job.

The theoretical implication of the above assertion is that unlike in the West where the bourgeoisie has been "custodians" of liberal democratic ideals, in Zimbabwe the masses cannot rely on such a class given that its historical commitment to democracy so far has been a chequered one.

This observation suggests the need for important revisions in the way democracy is understood not only in Zimbabwe but in developing countries in general. What the literature considered in the past to be preconditions of

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[50] As I established earlier in the thesis it was in the interests of capital to join the corporatist structure, because in that way they ensured the continued subordination of labour; i.e. they stood to gain if labour continued to operate from a position of weakness.

democracy could be better conceived in the future as outcor :s of democracy.

To be sure, it cannot be denied that economic conditions act as factors that can be supportive or non-supportive c^ democracy. However, if the level of economic development is the major determinant of democratization then most oil-producing states (OPEC) and the NICs should be "clothing" themselves in some form of formal democratic garb by now. The point here is that: individuals aspire to freedom at any level of economic development. There is no empirical evidence suggesting that improved prospects for accelerated economic growth under settler rule would have been an acceptable substitute for political democracy in Zimbabwe, for example. Economic development and democracy constitute separate challenges which should be treated independently. To put aside the quest for freedom with the excuse that it will be the eventual by-product of economic development is to deny individuals their inalienable right to be free at any level of economic development. This view challenges SAP conditionalities that posit political and economic liberalization as mutually inclusive processes.[51]

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[51] SAP conditionalities stress the need for developing countries to move away from the tradition of one-partyism, to Western-style democratic pluralism: a policy constantly made conditional for access to IFI's credits.

This stance is based on two interrelated neoclassical assumptions: first, economic and political liberalization are mutually reinforcing processes; second, a symbiotic logic ties the two processes - economic liberalism leads to sustained economic development; growth produces a stable middle class

As established in chapter two, it must be noted that there are some unresolved contradictions with economic liberalization postulations. Economic liberalism accepts economic inequality in its defence of the right to own property. Under the notion of private property the proprietorship of a good constitutes a right to exclude others from it, thereby creating economic inequalities. Is it therefore not the duty of the state to prevent the concentration of economic power in order to preserve meaningful political equality?[52]

Political liberalization, viewed in strictly bourgeois terms is not the answer. As noted earlier, the bourgeoisie in Zimbabwe was the last to join the political liberalization bandwagon. At no time before the late 1980s did it perceive it necessary to demand more political space in which the masses would be involved.

There is a need therefore for a new praxis whose focus is on finding new developmental democratic paths that avoid the atomization and exclusion of people from the development

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that will organize to defend its interests hence the liberal dictum 'no bourgeoisie, no democracy.' To wit, an economically active middle class is a necessary precondition for sustainable political liberalization.

[52] As established in chapter two, this juxtaposition of human equality and economic inequalities that stems from property ownership is one major weakness within liberal democracy theory that earlier critics of liberal democracy have highlighted. For a detailed discussion see for example, Macpherson's, Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval, and The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy; and also Gamble, An Introduction to Modern Social and Political Thought.

process. Such a process calls for the state not to shirk from its responsibilities of providing a sound economic base whilst simultaneously nurturing local spaces in which civil society can thrive. *Pari passu*, any strategies that do not take into account the developmental needs of the people in addition to according citizens greater freedoms, are bound to create a further rift between the rulers and the governed.

That noted, democracy in Zimbabwe is still not secure. If the historical evidence supporting the hypothesis linking a vibrant civil society and a stable democracy is taken as a valid thesis, then one can understand why the Zimbabwean political system of more than twelve years standing has been unable to fully legitimate itself. It needs to be continuously managed and defended or else it will decay.

This is not so much a function of inherited political and social structures as it is of political will. No matter how well structured political institutions are, they cannot act as insurance against natural "despotic" Hobbesian tendencies. These can only be tempered when those in positions to change things start to battle in earnest for a decent political system that cherishes space for organized interests.

By way of concluding, it is necessary that we examine future possible "democratic" scenarios. In other words, is Zimbabwe heading for an authoritarian, a corporatist or a more pluralistic society? To be sure, at present Zimbabwe sits firmly outside the label of an "authoritarian regime," but yet

it still fails the criteria required to make it "democratic."

The sceptre of authoritarianism still looms large. The trademarks of tyranny which limit individual rights and freedoms are still present. While the ordinary formally educated citizen can read free and independent local newspapers, he or she cannot demonstrate without fear of police intervention. In addition, authoritarian pieces of legislation dating back to the settler era still deny the majority of the people freedoms and protection accorded by the rule of law. In that respect, Zimbabwe has yet to succeed in subordinating politics to law and provide secure legal safeguards for individual rights and liberties consistent with a sustainable democratic order.

A realistic assessment is that Zimbabwe's transition to democratization will still be dictated and conditioned by contradictions between the pluralism of social and economic life and the state's corporatist tendencies. However, as the liberalization putsch continues, the corporatist structures will gradually disintegrate thereby paving the way for the emergence of a political system that gives greater latitude and autonomy to civil society groups. The assumption is that as the process of liberalization persists and becomes entrenched in society, democratization and democracy would be the end and sustainable result of that transformation.

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