THE BLACK LOYALISTS IN NOVA SCOTIA AND SIERRA LEONE

by

James W. St. G. Walker

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From their origin as a group in the American Revolution, the Black Loyalists grew to become a distinct community, determined to preserve a culture that was unique to themselves. Their ideals of security, independence and self-determination, that drew them as runaway slaves to support the Loyalist cause, were not fulfilled by their experience in Nova Scotia after their settlement there in 1783. Few of them received the land and assistance that had been promised to all Loyalist refugees, and they were subjected to economic exploitation, unequal treatment and physical segregation. Isolated in their separate communities, and fostered by a religious revival that converted them to Christianity and then left them to determine their own spiritual relationships, the Black Loyalists acquired an attitude that they were a chosen people. Religion and segregation conditioned their view of race, community and family, and gave them a set of political principles that was characterized by an extreme sensitivity for individual rights.

In search of a Promised Land, 1,196 Black Loyalists accepted an invitation to emigrate to the freed slave colony of Sierra Leone in 1792. There they were able to establish an independent existence, in continuation of historical developments begun in Nova Scotia, that expressed itself in their economic and political activities, moral code; family
and marital relations, and physical style of life. Their Christianity and education won them high municipal and administrative posts, and they became a model to the non-Christian, illiterate Liberated Africans who were settled in the colony after 1808.

As European racism began to dictate Imperial employment practices, and as the Liberated Africans gained the skills to qualify them for the posts available to Black colonial subjects, the Black Loyalists were displaced from their elite position. Yet they retained the values and aspirations they had carried from North America, and they transmitted them to the Liberated Africans who tended to adopt the culture and political attitudes of their former models as they occupied their homes and perquisites. The nineteenth century Afro-European civilization known as "Creole", created by the descendants of the Liberated Africans, was therefore the product not only of colonial West Africa, but of Loyalist Nova Scotia.

This study has set out to treat the Black Loyalists as an identifiable entity, to trace the events and conditions that shaped their development as a people, and to indicate the influence they had over a broad historical process of continuing significance. Though most of the sources used in this study originated outside the Black Loyalist community, an attempt has been made to determine the issues and attitudes that were held most important by the Black Loyalists themselves, and thereby to assess their contribution, and their reaction, to the series of events that make up their history.
ABBREVIATIONS

Adm. Admiralty
AQ Audit Office
BM British Museum
BT Board of Trade
CMS Church Missionary Society
CO Colonial Office
FO Foreign Office
HO Home Office
MMS Methodist Missionary Society
NYPL New York Public Library
PAC Public Archives of Canada
PANB Public Archives of New Brunswick
PANS Public Archives of Nova Scotia
PP Parliamentary Papers
PRO Public Record Office
SLA Sierra Leone Archives
SLS Sierra Leone Studies
SPG Society for the Propagation of the Gospel
WO War Office

First references to printed and manuscript sources are given in their complete form, as appearing in the Bibliography. Second and subsequent references have a short title which
is descriptive of the content or an abbreviation of the full title. Short titles for British Museum manuscript sources omit the Additional Manuscript number, giving only a title or short title for the manuscript collection. The terms "Vol.", "Box", "Folder", "File", are not repeated in short titles if they identify a section of a larger collection or series, nor are dates referring specifically to such volumes, boxes, etc. Thus BM Add. Ms. 41262A, Clarkson Papers, Vol. I, becomes Clarkson Papers, I; MMS, Correspondence, West Africa, Sierra Leone, Box I, 1812-34, File 1, 1812-20, becomes MMS, Sierra Leone, I, 1. For the reader's convenience, titles and short titles for manuscript collections are underlined in footnotes, as in the foregoing examples. Normal bibliographic practice is followed in the Bibliography. Citations of Parliamentary Papers contain two page references. The first is to the page number for the specific report being cited and the second, always in brackets, is to the page number for the volume in which that report appears. Since there are several copies of John Clarkson's diary, each with its own pagination, all references to the diary are followed by the date of the entry in brackets.
INTRODUCTION

In a review of Christopher Fyfe's History of Sierra Leone, Paul Hair drew attention to the tiny area occupied by Sierra Leone on the map of Africa and wondered rhetorically why such an area justified the detailed treatment given it by Mr. Fyfe. If this question can legitimately be directed at a history of Sierra Leone, it seems even more appropriate to ask it of a study that purports to relate the history of the Black Loyalist settlers from Nova Scotia, who never numbered more than twelve hundred persons and, after 1807, constituted a decreasingly significant proportion of Sierra Leone's population.

A response to such a hypothetical challenge might best be framed in terms of the interest Black Loyalist history holds for a variety of historians, for its importance lies less in geographical or numerical significance than in the events, trends and historical developments with which the Black Loyalists were intimately associated, and upon which their activities often had a profound and formative influence. The Black Loyalists originated, as a group, in the collapse of the old British Empire, they participated

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1P. E. H. Hair, review article, "A History of Sierra Leone by Christopher Fyfe", SLS (ns), No. 17, June 1963, pp. 281-96
in the establishment of a new one in North America, and later were fundamental to the initiation of a unique colonial enterprise in Africa. It was Sierra Leone, Britain's first permanent African colony, that caused the British to see Africa "not merely as it was, but as it might be, and with full consideration for the new Africa in the imperial scheme of things"; 2 it was the Black Loyalists who made possible the establishment and continued British occupation of Sierra Leone in its earliest and most vulnerable years. The student of Imperial history can therefore find in the Black Loyalists' story an example of the colonial experience in several locations, and the germinal events leading to the expansion of British involvement in Africa. The settlers from Nova Scotia, however, were far from compliant colonial subjects. The first Africans to live under extended British jurisdiction, they were also the first to offer an ideological challenge to white alien rule. As Mr. Hair has suggested, as part of his answer to his own query, "Students of the development of African nationalism might care to take a longer look at the Nova Scotians, and the Freetown community, they moulded." 3

For the student of Canadian history, as much as for


3Hair, "A History of Sierra Leone by Christopher Fyfe", p. 286.
the Africanist and Imperial historian, the Black Loyalist record offers a new perspective on formative periods and accepted historical concepts. There is a "Loyalist myth" in Canada, that perpetuates a view of the Loyalist immigrants as upper class citizens, devoted to British ideals, who transplanted the best of Colonial American society to British North America. In this view the role of the Black Loyalists, though they represented more than ten percent of the Loyalist influx into the Maritime Provinces, is generally overlooked. An examination of the Black Loyalists in Nova Scotia can contribute to an awareness of the multi-racial and socially heterogeneous nature of the Loyalist establishment and, since the Blacks were at the lowest end of the Loyalist scale, their experiences help to illustrate the hardships and struggles of eighteenth century pioneer life in Atlantic Canada. But above all the Black Loyalists hold significance, in Canada, as the founders of Canada's first free Black community. Their concerns and initiatives, and their responses to the racial discrimination and economic exploitation practised by Loyalist society, shaped the development of separate institutions and a distinct social identity within the Black population of the Maritime Provinces. The Black community, and particularly its founding fathers, deserves the attention of those who would understand the origin and growth of the Canadian

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4 For example, see Jo-Ann Fellows, "The Loyalist Myth in Canada," Canadian Historical Association: Historical Papers 1971 (Ottawa, 1972), pp. 94-111.
The history of the Black Loyalists in Nova Scotia and Sierra Leone has not, of course, been completely neglected by scholars in the past. It is however the case that no single study has attempted to treat the Black Loyalists as a historical entity, and those historians who have examined only certain aspects of their experience, or who have considered them as a part of a larger community, have therefore not had an opportunity to trace the internal evolution and considerable continuity of the Black Loyalists' initiatives and responses. It is only in the context of their overall development as a distinct society that the Black Loyalists' participation in and contribution to a large series of events can be explained, and it is only in that context that the effects upon them of the actions of other people can be understood.

The arrival and settlement of the Black Loyalists in Nova Scotia has been described, in whole or in part, by Robin Winks, George Rawlyk, Bruce Ferguson, Anthony Kirk-Greene and Christopher Fyfe. From any of them the reader can gain a general impression of the hardships and discrimina-
tion suffered by the Black settlers, their inadequate or non-existent farms, and their economic dependence upon white society. And yet, because the motives which first led the Blacks to the British during the American Revolution are overlooked, the dominating urge of the Black Loyalists to acquire land and economic independence does not emerge from a reading of these accounts, and a major theme is lost which could contribute fundamentally to an understanding of Black Loyalist frustration, apparent acquiescence in segregation, and eagerness to join the 1792 exodus to Sierra Leone. In each case the authors' concerns were other than a detailed study of the Black Loyalists—for Winks, Rawlyk and Ferguson they formed only a part of a larger canvas, while Kirk-Greene and Fyfe were concentrating on individual experiences—and therefore, inevitably, they do not offer evidence or interpretations to explain the significance of the Black Loyalists' failure to become self-sufficient landed proprietors.

The difficulty in treating the Black Loyalists as a minor part of a broad history is illustrated by Professor Winks' *The Blacks in Canada*. Though unquestionably a magnificent piece of historical research, the breadth of the enquiry has led its author to disregard the intimate details of the foundation and strength of communal consciousness within the Black Loyalist settlements. Instead, an image of a disunited and even divisive society is portrayed, and the most outstanding single characteristic of Black Loyalist society is submerged in a narrative of events that flows
across Canada as a whole and over a period of several hundred years. Rawlyk and Kirk-Greene both include references to the role of religion in formulating local community ties, but only Andrew Walls, in his perceptive account of the formative influences on Black Loyalist religion in Nova Scotia, draws the implications from a description of the chapels, preachers and doctrines that welded the Blacks together in a community aware of its distinctness and opposed to the interference of outside influences or people. Without an understanding of the community identity felt by the Black Loyalists, the migration to Africa cannot adequately be explained or even accurately described. Fyfe and Kirk-Greene, from their vantage-point of the history of the migrants after their arrival in Sierra Leone, identify the exodus as a mass movement, made up of participating communities, but earlier accounts by Archibald and Haliburton treat it as a movement of individuals, and Winks attributes it to the deliberate lies of John Clarkson which misled individual Blacks into forsaking their Nova Scotian communities.

The Fyfe, Walls and Kirk-Greene examples reveal the advantage that is gained by bringing an awareness of Black

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Loyalist history in Sierra Leone to bear upon an interpretation of Black Loyalist history in Nova Scotia. The reverse also appears to be true. As virtually the entire population of Sierra Leone from 1792 to 1800, and an important segment for at least a dozen years thereafter, the settlers from Nova Scotia have naturally attracted the attention of almost all of Sierra Leone's historians. But few scholars have considered Sierra Leone's early history as the continuation of a development begun even earlier in Nova Scotia, and none isolate the further evolution of Black Loyalist society, within the colony of Sierra Leone, once it ceased to be statistically significant. Christopher Fyfe's exhaustive treatment of Sierra Leone's history includes reference, at least, to every major event and personage in the colony from 1787 to the end of the nineteenth century, but since it was not Mr. Fyfe's purpose to identify and interpret the peculiar characteristics of a small community within Sierra Leone's population, the separate development of the Nova Scotian settlers is not followed thematically throughout the narrative. The only other historical survey even to approach Mr. Fyfe's in scholarship and research is John Peterson's *Province of Freedom*. Professor Peterson includes considerable information on the

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Black Loyalists, particularly as part of his portrait of social life in Freetown, and he recognizes and describes the political and cultural independence of the early settlers, though like Mr. Fyfe his primary concern has been with the history of the colony and especially with the Liberated Africans. In the Fyfe and Peterson works the settlers intrude infrequently upon the narrative after 1807, and when they do it is often as individuals and usually in a context that involves settler participation in what could be regarded as the major events and trends of Sierra Leone history.

In addition to these excellent surveys, that rank with Professor Winks' on the Black Canadians, there is a large journal and monograph literature on Sierra Leone that takes the Nova Scotian settlers into consideration. An article by Paul Hair, following upon themes established in the review article cited previously, examines the political expressions of settler independence in the 1790s and suggests that they influenced the later direction of Sierra Leone's political development. The race-consciousness, or "blancophobia", identified by Mr. Hair is also given attention by N. A. Cox-George, though the latter attributes it specifically to suspicions aroused by land problems in Sierra Leone while Mr. Hair traces it back to the settlers' North Ameri-

can experience. Professor Cox-George sees the disappointment over land as leading directly to the settlers' claim to political sovereignty, and as providing an undercurrent to race relations in Sierra Leone throughout the nineteenth century. More common is a recognition of the settlers' cultural contribution to Freetown society. Arthur Porter acknowledges the Nova Scotians as the chief agents in the cultural transformation of the Créoles, a theory that has been accepted by such scholars as Kenneth Little and Eldred Jones. Three articles by Christopher Fyfe, on the Baptist, Huntingdonian, and Methodist churches, necessarily concentrate on the Black Loyalists, since they dominated the chapels for fifty years.

And yet, despite this considerable historical notice, in their own right the Black Loyalists in Sierra Leone have

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11 N. A. Cox-George; Finance and Development in West Africa: The Sierra Leone Experience (London, 1961), and "Direct Taxation in the Early History of Sierra Leone", SLS (ns), No. 5, December 1955, pp. 20-35.


attracted little attention. Descriptions of settler community life in the early nineteenth century have been employed by the authors to serve an end other than the understanding of the settler community itself, and chiefly to illustrate the origin of traditions, practices and institutions adopted by other groups of people. If the Black Loyalists' contributions to the history of other societies has been deemed important, then it would seem essential to understand the development of their own society, for it was from their historical background that their character and influence grew. It has therefore been the purpose of this present study to examine the Black Loyalists as an identifiable community, to assess the experiences, motivations and beliefs that moulded that community, and to describe the unique expressions of the Black Loyalist identity in Nova Scotia and Sierra Leone. For this purpose it has been necessary to research and analyze the evolving structures of the Black Loyalist community, the events that conditioned their group character, the nature of their daily life, employment, leisure, and relations with neighbouring communities. Such information has been gathered principally from sources that originated outside the community under study. The letters and journals of their European rulers, the dispatches of colonial officials, minutes of local councils, Parliamentary enquiries, missionary reports and local newspapers have afforded contemporary observation and relevant documentation to enable the reconstruction of the framework in which the Black Loyalist
exist. Their wages and occupations, food, housing and
patterns of land-holding, crimes and punishments, churches,
schools and families, political activities, in short, their
physical, economic and ideological environment, must depend
for their description largely upon surviving documents,
 penned by a succession of European administrators and ob-
servers.

This is not to suggest, however, that the Black
Loyalists left no records of their own. Two short memoirs,
by the preachers David George and Boston King, were published
at the end of the eighteenth century, 15 and the collected
papers of John Clarkson, Zachary Macaulay and the missionary
societies contain letters written by Black Loyalists. Offi-
cial dispatches include petitions from Black Loyalists,
Parliamentary enquiries and council minutes record their sub-
missions, and private papers give verbatim reports on their
conversations and mass meetings. There are in addition the
wills, property deeds, chapel records and proclamations left
by the settlers in Sierra Leone. This kind of information
can supplement other descriptive material, and can give alter-
native views on the events reported elsewhere. But by far the
most valuable function of the Black Loyalist-originated docu-

15 David George, "An Account of the Life of Mr. David
George (as told to Brother John Rippon)", Baptist Annual
Register, Vol. I, 1790-93, pp. 473-84; Boston King, "Memoir
of the Life of Boston King, a Black Preacher, Written by Him-
self, During his Residence at Kingswood-School", Arminian
Magazine, Vol. XXI, March, April, May, June, 1798, pp. 105-11,
mentation is that it supplies an insight into the priorities, aspirations and frustrations of the community. From it, it is possible to discern the perspective from which the Black Loyalists approached and reacted to the environment established by others. Relative to their European neighbours the Black Loyalists were inarticulate of their own point of view, and yet an awareness of their basic concerns can turn a recorded event or a string of statistics into an articulation as vivid as any written memoir. It is axiomatic that the answers one receives from historical research depend upon the questions that are asked. The study that follows has not rejected the body of documents used by previous writers, but has subjected them to a different set of questions that were suggested by the few written records and the pattern of activities produced by the Black Loyalists. In this way, it is believed, the relevance of the events described to the people themselves can be determined, and a social history can be written of the Black Loyalist community despite an apparent reliance upon evidence left by alien and even hostile observers.

Every piece of historical writing owes a debt to the guidance, criticism and physical assistance of a wide range of people, and never is this more true than of the work of a graduate student. There is the debt owed to preceding scholars, who provide in their writings theories to be tested and sources to consult, to librarians and archivists, to correspondents and the subjects of interviews, all of whom
facilitate the search for information, and of course to the 
thesis supervisor whose directions and questions inevitably 
shape the course of the research and also the presentation 
of the material. The present writer has been particularly 
fortunate in his selection of creditors. Besides the rich 
collection of secondary literature, to which allusion has 
been made above, this writer has been granted the personal 
assistance of the authors of some of the most valuable items 
from that collection. Mr. Christopher Fyfe of Edinburgh 
University, whose published work alone made the largest 
single contribution to this study, made available the un-
published documentation in his possession, probed and oc-
casionally destroyed nascent interpretive theories, thereby 
strengthening the ones that survived, wrote letters of intro-
duction, suggested source locations, on at least one occasion, 
voluntarily undertook to research an awkward problem, and 
gave constant encouragement to the student while dispensing 
more tangible nourishment. Were it not presumptuous to do 
so, this study could well be dedicated to Mr. Fyfe. Pro-
fessor Robin Winks of Yale University, lately American Cul-
tural Attaché in London, was ready to offer similar assist-
tance on questions arising from the Nova Scotian side of the 
research. Professor Winks freely exchanged footnotes and 
ideas, though his own major work was yet unpublished, and 
cheerfully argued disputed points of interpretation. Mr. 
Fyfe's colleague at Edinburgh, Professor George Shepperson, 
whose acquaintance was made during his year as Canada Council
Visiting Professor at Dalhousie University, kept up a constant and sometimes trans-Atlantic flow of suggestions and references, jotted down in the course of his own scholarly investigations.

To the neophyte scholar, the interest taken in his work by librarians and archivists and fellow-researchers comes as a pleasant surprise. Of the score of individuals in this category, Miss Phyllis Blakeley and Dr. Bruce Fergusson of the Public Archives of Nova Scotia deserve special acknowledgement for their extraordinary consideration. In London Mrs. Pridmore of the SPG archives, with her cups of tea and afternoon chats, typified the kindness that is extended to researchers in the smaller British archives. Professor John Peterson, Dr. E. W. Blyden III and Professor Eldred Jones, of Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone, lent their insights as well as their hospitality to the traveller, and through their references made possible a series of interviews with Black Loyalist descendants in Freetown. Mrs. Ada Elliott-Horton and Mr. J. B. Elliott opened their homes and memories, and their anecdotes and expressions of concern gave an immediacy to the whole research programme. The Canada Council, through the generous support provided by a Doctoral Fellowship, supplied food and lodging for the student and his family and travel funds to finance a year in London and a visit to Freetown. Dalhousie University kindly supplemented the travel fund with a Graduate Fellowship.

And, if it is not so obvious as to become redundant,
the deepest gratitude must be expressed to the thesis supervisor, Professor John E. Flint of Dalhousie University. Plagued by numerous other graduate students, by publishers' deadlines and by administrative duties, Professor Flint's generosity and availability were never exhausted. His constant testing and incisive challenges aborted more than one faltering paragraph and inconsistent conclusion, and, though the writer must accept responsibility for the ideas contained in this thesis, it was during the process of convincing Professor Flint of their validity that many of those ideas were given final form. His help, and the help of all those noted here, can never be repaid except through the assistance, inspired by their example, that will be passed on to another generation of students. Finally, recognition is due to Stephanie, Timothy and Marcus Walker. Without their familial presence this thesis might have been completed three years previously. But without them it might never have been begun.
CHAPTER I

Origin of the Black Loyalists

The Slaves' War for Independence, 1775-83

As an armed conflict between England and her American colonies began to appear inevitable in 1775, attention in some British quarters turned toward the half million slaves in American hands who could be recruited as invaluable allies within the enemy camp. At first the idea of inciting insurrection among the slaves, or even accepting slaves as soldiers, met with resistance from the senior British strategists. But when in November 1775 the Governor of Virginia, Lord Dunmore, found it advisable to declare martial law in his colony, he was unwilling to overlook any potential support. Calling upon "every person capable of bearing arms to resort to his Majesty's standard", Dunmore further declared

all indented servants, negroes, or others (appertaining to Rebels) free, that are able and willing to bear arms, they joining his Majesty's troops, as soon as may be, for the more speedily reducing this Colony to a proper

sense of their duty, to his Majesty's crown and dignity. 2

Within a week of the publication of Dunmore's proclamation, over three hundred Black men joined the Governor's "Ethiopian Regiment." When he met the rebels at Great Bridge on December 9, one half of Dunmore's troops consisted of runaway slaves. Though Great Bridge was a defeat for the Loyalists, and though Dunmore's promise of liberation had apparently been made without reference to higher authority, the success of his tactic as a recruiting device was immediately evident to both sides in the struggle and a precedent had been set which aligned the Loyalist cause with the personal aspirations of the Black twenty percent of the colonial population. In George Washington's opinion Dunmore's appeal made him "the most formidable enemy America has; his strength will increase as a snowball by rolling." The inscription "Liberty to Slaves," emblazoned across the chests of the Ethiopian Regiment, became a British slogan and de facto a British war policy. 3

It was therefore almost by accident that Britain found herself, in July 1776, possessed of a commitment to free any rebel-owned slave who would resort to the Loyalist standard. Of the theories and rationalizations later offered to explain the British stand, it is clear that an abolition--

2Williams, Negro Race, I, pp. 336-37; Quarles, American Revolution, p. 19; Aptheker, American Revolution, p. 16.

3Quarles, American Revolution, pp. 20n, 21-31.
ist sentiment cannot seriously be included among them. The
slaves belonging to Loyalists were never offered their free-
dom and indeed steps were taken to ensure the continued
servitude of such people. It is interesting to note that
one of the counter-measures taken by rebel slaveholders was
to free the slaves found on captured Loyalist estates, yet
no one would accuse them of harbouring abolitionist tenden-
cies. In an Empire still very much determined to maintain
the institution of slavery and the continuation of the slave
trade, the Dunmore proclamation and Britain's subsequent ex-
tension of it can only be viewed in isolation as a desperate
attempt to bring the rebellious colonies to their knees by
any available means. This helps to explain the complete lack
of any consideration, on the part of the British commanders,
of the possible results of their policy, and of any plans
being laid for the future of the slaves attracted by it.

Britain's manpower requirements were pressing and
obvious from the outset of open hostilities in America.

4 Ibid., pp. ix, 32, 101, 138; PANS, White Collection,
Vol. III, 1783-84, Doc. 258, James Carey to Gideon White, 29
February 1784; NYPL (Manuscript Division), Emmet Papers, Doc.
15,615, Alexander Leslie to Sir Guy Carleton, 28 June 1782,
and Doc. 15,659, Leslie to Carleton, 18 October 1782.

5 The Hon. J. W. Fortescue has pointed out that in
1795 West Indian slaves were emancipated for the purpose of
forming a corps to fight against the French. This was a simi-
lar situation to the one under discussion, when an immediate
emergency required a practice which was in no way intended to
undermine slavery as a system. J. W. Fortescue, A History of
Criminals were pardoned at home, mercenaries were hired abroad, Indian allies were solicited along the frontier in an effort to swell the Loyalist ranks. Runaway slaves were also welcomed, but it was with the opening of a southern front that the British practice shifted from a passive acceptance of Black volunteers to an aggressive attempt to enlist the entire slave population in a movement to destroy the rebellion. In July 1779 the British Commander-in-Chief, Sir Henry Clinton, issued his Philipsburg Proclamation in which he promised

疫 every NEGRO who shall desert the Rebel Standard, full security to follow within these Lines, any Occupation which he shall think proper.6

Hitherto only those Blacks capable of active military service had been accepted as refugees, and numbers had been relatively small. Many young men must have hesitated to leave behind, to the full fury of a master's outraged retaliation, their wives, children and friends who were unfit to bear arms. Furthermore there had been no incentive to a general uprising in which slaves might band against their masters or sabotage the rebel war-effort, when only some of the participants could be guaranteed their freedom. Clinton's move, however, aimed to achieve just such a result. Besides the mass of anticipated recruits who could be useful as soldiers and labourers, it was expected that the southern economy

6Quarles, American Revolution, pp. 111, 113-14; Williams, Negro Race, I, p. 157.
would break down as the workers deserted it and that slave-owners would be forced to leave the war in order to protect their families from vengeful slaves. The southern colonies had long been haunted by the spectre of slave rebellion as the ratio of black to white crept up in such states as Maryland, Virginia, Georgia and the Carolinas, and the vast capital investment represented by the 446,000 slaves in these five colonies alone could, when threatened, provide a powerful incentive for a speedy restoration of peace and loyalty.  

Estimates of the number of slaves who found their way to the British lines range up to 100,000, or one-fifth the total Black American population. Even if this is an exaggeration it seems certain that slaves fled their masters in the tens of thousands. Thomas Jefferson declared that Virginia alone lost 30,000, though there is no indication that they all went over to the British after deserting their erstwhile owners. In any case not all the Black people who were attached to the Loyalist forces were escaped slaves. Many were taken from sequestered estates, others were captured in raids, still others were "free persons of colour" who joined

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7Ibid., p. 325; Quarles, American Revolution, pp. 21, 112; Aptheker, American Revolution, p. 5, for an example of the value of the slaves on one estate relative to the capital investment in the estate's total property see Commons Journals, Vol. LXII (1806-07), pp. 954-55, "Report of the Committee considering the petition of Isaac DuBois".

8Aptheker, American Revolution, p. 20.

9Ibid.
the British out of some motive other than a simple desire to leave a condition of servitude. An analysis of the declarations of 1,951 Blacks still with the British in 1783 reveals that 83 admitted to having been brought involuntarily, though not unwillingly, by British troops, 1,410 were acknowledged runaways, 409 claimed to have been legally free already, and a mere 49 declared that they had been recruited directly as soldiers.\[^{10}\] It is essential to note, however, that this example serves to illustrate the origins only of those who remained free at the end of the war. The actual number of captured slaves would probably have been much greater than the small percentage represented here, since this category of person was often sold back into slavery and therefore would not be included in the free Loyalist roll.\[^{11}\]

Whatever their exact numbers, a host of fleeing bondsmen made their way to the haven of Imperial liberty. They swam, they hiked, they stowed away in boats and wagons, they carried each other to safety with the Redcoats. Many took advantage of the temporary presence of a British army in the neighbourhood to make a bid for freedom, others made

\[^{10}\]The figures are taken from evidence given before a Commission in New York and recorded in the "Book of Negroes". At least three copies of this book exist, with slight variations of detail, one in the Public Archives of Nova Scotia (PANS Vol. 423), one in the British Headquarters Papers (Number 10427, microfilmed by the New York Public Library in 1953), and a third in the Public Archives of Canada (PAC, Royal Institution, American Manuscript, Vol. 55).

\[^{11}\]Aptheker, American Revolution, pp. 16-20; Quarles, American Revolution, pp. 114-15, 156-57.
a longer journey to British strongholds such as Charleston and Savannah. Boston King waded out to a British boat, risking a treacherous current as well as the possibility of recapture. David George's master, a rebel, fled when the British neared his plantation, leaving the slaves free to fend for themselves. John Marrant, born free in New York, was pressed into the British navy while working in Charleston. Two others, Moses Reed and Jameson Davis, deliberately headed for Charleston in order to join the Loyal forces. As sequestered estates were abandoned the slaves were often offered passage to the nearest area still in British control. Some, as was the case with Molly Sinclair, were given no choice but were forced to accompany a British evacuation. At least one unwilling slave was captured by Loyalist Indians as he was assisting the escape of his rebel mistress, and later handed over to a British officer. Among the Americans who were prominent in the articulation of the Declara-

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tion of Independence as a charter of human liberty, James Madison, Benjamin Harrison, Arthur Middleton and George Washington himself all lost slaves who fled to the banner of British security, many of them seeing active service against the Republican cause. 13

Although many Black people were wholeheartedly in sympathy with the Americans, and in spite of the threat posed by the British officer, rebel leaders were slow to follow suit in mobilizing Blacks as soldiers or auxiliaries in their armies. Many Americans, especially those from the south, dreaded placing weapons in the hands of people whose loyalty was at least doubtful, and it was felt that a slave who had fought for the freedom of America could hardly be expected to resume his properly submissive position in servitude after the war. Plantation owners who depended on slave labour were not inclined to see that labour expended on the front lines. Encouraged to use slaves as free soldiers, George Washington refused to confiscate the "property" of his fellow Americans or even to endanger their property by giving it arms. Instead he allowed slave-owners to decide for themselves whether or not to make soldiers of their slaves. In New England, where substitutes for required military service could be bought, many slaves found themselves in the state militias. Several states purchased slaves or hired them for the duration of the war in order to put them to direct use on behalf of the

13Quarles, American Revolution, pp. 115-30.
American effort. Numerous Blacks, both slave and free, also served in the Continental Army. But the Americans had nothing to rival the British offer of complete freedom, and there was apparently an almost universal belief in slave society that a British victory would mean the eradication of slavery in America. Evidence indicates that the overriding motivation of the escaped slaves, and one that was shared by free Blacks who became Loyalists, was for security in their freedom. In the confusion of war it must frequently have been easy to desert a master, and thousands of square miles were available to run to, yet the escapees did not simply hide or establish free "maroon" communities; they went to the British and offered their services. Neither the freedom of escape nor the individual freedom possible through cooperation with the rebels contained the degree of security sought by Black Americans. Though mistaken in their interpretation of it, they evidently found in the British policy their only chance for a secure and permanent release from the bonds of colour.

14 For descriptions of the role played by Blacks in the Revolutionary cause and American attitudes and policies see ibid., and Aptheker, American Revolution, passim.

15 Quarles, American Revolution, p. 115.

16 The evidence of Black motivation has been gleaned from testimony given by Black Loyalists after the war, e.g., to the Commissioners in New York ("Book of Negros"), to John Clarkson (BM Add. Ms. 41262B, Clarkson Papers, Vol. II, fols. 8-9), and to the magistrates at Shelburne (Shelburne Records, Special Sessions).
The skills brought by the Black men and women who resorted to the Loyalists were greatly varied. Despite their origins in the southern colonies, particularly Virginia and South Carolina, the number of field hands or common labourers was surprisingly slight.\textsuperscript{17} In one sample of 155 Black Loyalist men, 50 had specialized occupations as blacksmiths, coopers, tailors, carpenters, bakers, etc. Indicative of a similar range is a list of 61 slaves, 41 of whom had specialized skills.\textsuperscript{18} Their occupations, once within British lines, were thus equally varied. Many acted as cooks, orderlies and waiters in British regiments, or were assigned as personal servants to the officers. Sir Guy Carleton had a Black Loyalist valet and Boston King once acted as the body servant of an English captain.\textsuperscript{19} Large numbers were required to work the sequestered estates of rebel landowners, among them David George and his wife. Mrs. George later became laundress to a Loyalist company. During the sieges of Charleston and Savannah thousands were put to work on building fortifications. In

\textsuperscript{17} The "Book of Negroes", listing the names of the Black fugitives in New York in 1783, frequently included the place of birth and the specialized skills of the former slaves.

\textsuperscript{18} CO 217/63, "List of the Blacks of Birch Town who gave in their Names for Sierra Leone in November 1791", noted the birthplace and skills of the Birchtown men; Commons Journals, Vol. LXII (1806-07), pp. 954-55, "Report of the Committee considering the petition of Isaac DuBois", gave the occupations of the slaves on DuBois' estate in North Carolina.

\textsuperscript{19} PRO 30/55/83, Carleton Papers, Doc. 9304, James Peters to Carleton, 5 October 1782; Boston King, "Memoirs", p. 108.
Virginia 250 Loyalist Blacks constructed two dams, drawing from General William Phillips the comment that "These Negroes have undoubtedly been of the greatest use".  

Forage and fatigue duties were frequently carried out by the freed slaves, and almost every regiment had a Black drummer or bugler. A common function of the Blacks was to act as guides and intelligence agents for invading British armies. Instructions were sent out to use the ex-slaves as informants concerning their former home districts. Quamino Dolly led the British through the swamps to attack Savannah, and Boston King delivered a message through enemy lines.

Many saw active combat duty as sailors or soldiers. An entire corps, the Black Pioneers, was formed of fugitive slaves, with their own non-commissioned officers. Dozens served as pilots on coastal vessels, and a Black cavalry troop was created in 1782. Of the 155 Loyalists mentioned above, 66 claimed active military service, 58 as ordinary soldiers with British regiments, 3 as non-commissioned officers, 1 as a sailor and 4 as members of the Black Pioneers.

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22 PRO 30/11/6, Cornwallis Papers, "Instructions to Assistant Commissary of Captures", 30 September 1781; Quarles, American Revolution, p. 144; Boston King, Memoirs", p. 108.

23 Quarles, American Revolution, pp. 155, 148-49, 156; CO 217/63, "List of the Blacks of Ditch Town".
likely that there was more than one group of Pioneers. A pay order for £105.17.10, for two months' service, would suggest only about twenty-one Pioneers at the usual rate of two shillings pay per day. Another list gives twenty-three Black Pioneers by name, including one woman and three sergeants, but these names are not all the same as those on a third list of thirty including three sergeants and six women.²⁴ Analysis of the muster rolls of Black Loyalists in Shelburne and Annapolis Counties, Nova Scotia, shows that 42.6 per cent and 31.2 per cent, respectively, had seen actual military action as members of the British forces.²⁵ It is only possible to state, therefore, that among the Blacks who were eventually to remove with the British in 1783 a significant proportion, perhaps one-third or more, had been enrolled in the British armies. This far exceeded the war record of their fellow Loyalists of a fairer complexion.

Considering the lack of a British policy towards their numerous Black charges, and considering the diverse


nature of the Blacks attached to the royal standard, it is not surprising that the treatment they received at the hands of their "liberators" should vary from time to time and from place to place. Those who fared worst were the slaves taken as booty in war or confiscated from sequestered American plantations. Sequestration was meant to be only a temporary occupation of a piece of land and the other property upon it, but many British officers interpreted this to mean the absolute confiscation of all movable goods, including livestock and slaves. An American official complained to General Leslie:

You know that a great number of the Negroes belonging to those estates [occupied by Lord Cornwallis] are it this day within your lines, and lost to their owners, and on few Plantations is a four-footed animal to be found. . . . One half of some, two thirds of others, and the whole of a few, of the estates, have been deprived of the Negroes and stock that were on them, when put under sequestration. 26

Clinton's policy, announced in June 1780, was that slaves seized in war became public property and should be put to work to serve the public good. When a commission was established to manage sequestered estates, it was authorized to employ all available slaves to keep the plantations working. But they were also often sold back into slavery, especially by Provincial officers not unaware of their value, either to

26 NYPL, Emmet Papers, Doc. 1245, J. Mathews to Leslie, 12 April 1782.
Loyalist planters or into the West Indies. 27

Others of the captured slaves, and some of the voluntary fugitives as well, were simply kept as personal servants by soldiers, officers, or in common ownership by army units. It has been reported that slave bonuses, from the pool of confiscated rebel property, were sometimes paid to individuals or units as a reward for extra duties or a job well done. The Blacks so assigned might be sold immediately or kept for a more compatible market. At least forty-three were taken to Montreal in 1783, where they brought an average price of £33.15.0 each. Untold thousands were reported to have been sold in the British and French West Indian islands. Even when technically free, the status of a Black Loyalist servant was little different from that of a slave. Sir Guy Carleton's servant Pomp, though possessed of a certificate declaring his freedom, was referred to as the general's "property" and was not considered free to leave his service at the end of the war. If a Black escaped the fate of remaining a slave in military hands, he faced the possibility of being handed over as compensation to a Loyalist who had lost his own slaves or other property to the rebels. 28

27 Quailes, American Revolution, p. 138; Aptheker, American Revolution, p. 16; Fortescue, History of the British Army, III, p. 280.

For even those legitimate Black Loyalists, attracted by the promise of freedom and often with a distinguished record of wartime service, the freedom they found was at best tenuous. The first known group of free Black Loyalists to arrive in Nova Scotia was the "Company of Negroes", evacuated from Boston with the other British forces in 1777. No sooner had they arrived in Halifax than the suggestion was made that they should be used as ransom in exchange for Loyalist prisoners held by the Americans. Such was apparently to be their reward for sharing the hazards and hardships of the New England campaign. Though the Council declined to discuss the scheme, still it was evident that some white authorities were not prepared to consider the Black Loyalists as equal claimants to justice and consideration. Estimates range into the thousands of those who died of disease or starvation in the squalid quarters provided for Black labourers. And above all there remained the constant threat that an accommodation with the rebels would require their restoration to their former masters.

Despite the unfortunate conditions awaiting them the flood of refugee slaves continued, and by depriving the Americans of valuable labour the British policy must be considered a success. Though the anticipated mass insurrection

29 PANS, Executive Council Minutes, 1777, fol. 343.
30 Aptheker, American Revolution, pp. 16-20; Quarrie, American Revolution, pp. 26-30; David George, "Life", p. 477.
of slaves never occurred, there were instances of slaves spontaneously assisting the British capture of their plantation, and many initiatives were taken to drive a master and his family from their home or to keep them prisoner in the "Big House" pending the arrival of a Loyalist party. It would be impossible to gauge the value of such Black actions as contributions to the British war effort. General John A. Logan did give the opinion that slavery was a ponderable weakness to the southern rebels, apparently because they could not devote their entire attention to fighting the British but were forced to keep a wary eye fixed to their personal interests. "Thus it was," he wrote, "that the South was overrun by hostile Armies, while in the North—comparatively free from this element of weakness—disaster after disaster" met the British. Certainly the Americans treated the matter seriously, to judge from the harsh countermeasures they enacted in an attempt to keep their slaves at home. Highway and river patrols were instituted on a regular basis to recapture fleeing bondsmen, and a vigorous propaganda campaign was undertaken to convince slaves that life with the British meant perpetual slavery of a kind worse than the American. As British armies approached slaves would be moved

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wholesale to safer territory, sometimes, as in Virginia, to the secure depths of the lead mines. Several southern states brought the death penalty to bear against recaptive runaways. 33

In success the British command could afford to go without any explicit policy regarding the treatment and status of the Blacks in their midst, but in defeat and retreat decisions had to be made, and with some consistency. Deprived Americans expected the restoration of their property when they gained a victory, and the British were forced to consider the honour of their commitment to the Blacks against the politics, let alone the inconvenience, of retaining in their care such vast numbers of rebel-claimed slaves. 34 A precedent had been set in Boston in 1777, when loyal Blacks had been evacuated along with the rest. Faced with a similar situation in Savannah, Colonel Clarke wrote to Lord Cornwallis:

however policy may interfere in favour of the Masters; an attention to Justice, and good faith, must plead strongly in behalf of the Negroes, many of whom have certificates of services performed. 35

Though no definite policy was articulated, and though irate rebels seethed at the gates, Clarke's counsel prevailed and

33Quarles, American Revolution, pp. 24, 25, 123, 126, 128-29; Aptheker, American Revolution, pp. 14-17.

34NYPL, Emmet Papers, Doc. 6743, John Martin to Leslie, 6 November 1782, and Doc. 15,639, Leslie to Carleton, 18 October 1782.

some 2,316 Blacks claiming freedom under Clinton's proclamation were embarked for Jamaica and St. Augustine on 10 August 1782. A further 1,208 later followed the group to St. Augustine. 36

Charleston posed a more serious problem, partly because of the huge numbers of Blacks in the city and partly because a commitment had been made to the Americans to respect their property rights. In one district of Charleston, that commanded by Captain Gideon White, black outnumbered white by 520 to 412. Here were concentrated the largest number of Blacks within British lines, and already problems had been met in trying to feed and organize them. Clinton was forced to issue orders forbidding the reception of any more slaves from the surrounding districts who, in a reversal of the cliche, were fleeing to the sinking ship in a last desperate effort to take advantage of the fading British presence. Aside from the demands of the rebel claimants, Charleston's commander General Alexander Leslie was under pressure from local Loyalists as well, who feared that if American pro-

36 PRO 30/55/46, Carleton Papers, Doc. 5268 (2), "List of Transports Gone from Savannah to St. Augustine", 10 August 1782, enumerating 748 Blacks, and Doc. 5268 (3), "List of Transports gone from Savannah to Jamaica", same date, with 1,568 Blacks; Quarles, American Revolution, p. 163. Aptheker, American Revolution, p. 19, gives the number of Black evacuees from Savannah as 5,000, but it is possible that this includes some of the 3,609 slaves who landed in East Florida from the states of Georgia and South Carolina. See PRO 30/55/57, Carleton Papers, Doc. 6475, "A Return of Refugees and their Slaves arrived in the Province of East Florida", 23 December 1782.
perty were not restored they stood little chance of receiv-
ing any compensation for the lands and goods they were being
forced to leave behind. American victory was now assured,
and the Loyalists were aware that their own futures depended
on the largesse of the home government and the good faith of
the dawning Republic. Finally General Leslie was receiving
delagations from the fugitives themselves, who feared that
they were to be handed back and sought assurance that Britain
would honour the proclamations. 37

To decide upon the conflicting claims and interests
Leslie appointed a commission which would hear appeals from
both owners and slaves. The Republican governors of Georgia
and South Carolina, J. Martin and J. Mathews, named represen-
tatives to the commission. The guiding policy established by
Leslie, and approved by Carleton, was that runaways claiming
the protection of the Philipsburg Proclamation or who had
served in the army should remain free. The commission would
assess their value and compensation would be paid to any
former master who could prove his claim. The Blacks so freed
would then be removed to some other part of the Empire "where
their past services will engage the grateful attention of

37 PANS, White Collection, II, Doc. 172, "Return of the
Men, Women and Children, Black and White--in the District of
the Town of Charlestown whch Captain Gideon White Commands";
Quarles, American Revolution, pp. 137-38; NYP, Emmet Papers,
Doc. 15,659, "Petition In the Name and in behalf of the Royal-
ists of this Province on the Subject of the Registered Negroes
and other rebel property within the Garrison", endorsed to
Leslie to Carleton, 19 October 1782.
Government to which they will continue to be useful." All other Blacks, sequestered or captured as prizes, were to be restored to their American claimants. In the event the British and American commissioners quarrelled, cooperation became impossible, and Governor Mathews dissolved the agreement. When the evacuation from Charleston took place, therefore, there was no supervision of the embarking Blacks and more than 5,000 managed to escape the clutches of their erstwhile masters. The majority of them were taken to Jamaica and St. Augustine in East Florida, others went to New York, London or Halifax, anticipating that "grateful attention of Government" promised by Leslie.

Meanwhile, peace negotiations were proceeding in Paris and on November 30, 1782, a Provisional Peace Agreement was signed between His Majesty's Government and the United States of America. Article VII of the Agreement stipulated that all hostilities both by sea and land shall from henceforth cease all prisoners on both sides shall be set at liberty and His Britannic Majesty shall with all convenient speed and without causing any destruction or carry-

38PRO 30/55/46, Carleton Papers, Doc. 5261, Leslie to Carleton, 10 August 1782; [NPL, Emmet Papers, Doc. 15,659, Leslie to Carleton, 18 October 1782.

New York, the final British stronghold and last refuge for thousands of Loyalist fugitives, had therefore to be given up. On 15 April 1783 the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Guy Carleton, issued an order to the effect that the Provisional Articles were to be "strictly observed", and he promised a board of enquiry to hear claims for any disputed property that should be on the point of embarkation. Refugees who had resided within British lines at least twelve months were free to depart. Many Blacks assumed that they qualified as Loyalists and began boarding the transports with the others, but within a few days of Carleton's orders rebel masters gathered in New York and began petitioning the General for the return of their slaves. Reports circulated that all runaways were to be delivered up to their former owners. "This dreadful rumour filled us all with inexpressible anguish and terror", wrote Boston King.

especially when we saw our old masters coming from Virginia, North-Carolina, and other parts, and seizing

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40 PAC, Chatham Manuscripts, 1790-92, Bundle 344, "Provisional Peace Agreement, 1782"; PAHS Vol. 346, Proclamations, Province of Nova Scotia, 1748-1807, Doc. 89, "Definitive Articles of Peace and Friendship".

41 British Headquarters Papers, No. 10427, Order, dated 15 April 1783.
upon their slaves in the streets of New-York, or even dragging them out of their beds.\footnote{Ibid.; PANS Vol. 369, Dorchester Papers, II, Doc. 145, "The Petition of Sundry Inhabitants of Virginia to Sir G. Carleton", 28 April 1783; Boston King, "Memoirs", p. 157.}

Carleton's interpretation of the Provisional Agreement, and one in which he was supported by Lord North, was that Blacks who were already with the British before 30 November 1782 and who claimed freedom by the proclamations were technically free and therefore could not be considered as American property on that date. Only confiscated slaves and those who came after the Agreement were covered by Article VII.\footnote{PANS Vol. 369, Dorchester Papers, II, Doc. 3, Carleton to Gen. George Washington, 12 May 1783; PRO 30/55/78, Carleton Papers, Doc. 8668, Lord North to Carleton, 8 August 1783.} Since that Article specified that it was those Blacks who were the "Property" of American citizens, rather than all and any Black refugees, that should be given up, Carleton's interpretation was correct according to the strict letter of the treaty. George Washington, on the other hand, considered this an academic point and assured Carleton that what was meant by Article VII was that all slaves who had at any time been owned by Americans must be left behind. The two leaders met, at Washington's insistence, at Orange-town on the Hudson River on 9 May 1783. There Carleton avowed his intention to evacuate any slave pleading the proclamations, and indeed admitted that some had already been embarked.
did concede, however, that he had kept a record of all Blacks being removed so that compensation could be paid to legitimate American claimants. Though Washington expressed his surprise and dismay he was forced to accept, and agreed to appoint American representatives to a board instituted to examine every departing slave whose freedom might be challenged.  

Within the depleting city the commanding officer, Brigadier General Samuel Birch, was issuing certificates upon application to any Black who could prove the minimum residence requirement and status as a refugee under the Philipsburg sanction. The "General Birch Certificate" guaranteed the bearer his freedom and permission "to go to Nova-Scotia or wherever else he may think proper". This, according to Boston King, "dispelled our fears, and filled us with joy and gratitude".  

But before they could avail themselves of that permission the Black Loyalists were liable to be brought before Carleton's "Board to superintend embarkations" which would "assemble at Frances's Tavern every Wednesday at 10 o'clock where they will attend ... till 2 o'clock to receive and settle all claims relative to Negroes."  

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44 PAC, Chatham Manuscripts, 1780-92, Bundle 344, "An Interview Between Lord Dorchester and General Washington at Orange Town, 9 May 1783".


46 British Headquarters Papers, No. 10427, Order, dated 22 May 1783.
Over the succeeding few weeks Carleton's "Book of Negroes" was filled in, recording the name, age and description of every Black desiring to leave New York, the details of his escape or other claim to freedom, his military record, the name of his former master, and the name, commander and destination of the vessel in which he was to remove. Ships' captains were threatened with prosecution for carrying any Black not listed on the inspection roll. Masters were then free to challenge any alleged slave and bring him before the Board for adjudication. Slaves were also permitted to initiate cases before the Board if they believed that they were being held illegally. The Minutes of the Board, which met weekly from 30 May to 7 August, record only fourteen disputed cases. Of these, two were decided in favour of the slaves, nine in favour of the masters, and three were referred to General Birch as the claimants, being Loyalists, had no recourse to a Board established to settle American claims. Several of the reclaimed slaves were in possession of General Birch's Certificate and were already aboard the transport ships. 47 The point was made clear to the anxious refugees that the security they had sought was as yet far from complete. For those enrolled in the "Book of Negroes" and not called before the Board, however, greater

promise was held out for the future. They were led to believe that they were henceforth to be considered full-fledged Loyalists, sharing the same royal protection as all others and entitled to the same rewards. 48

There is considerable difficulty in establishing the total number of Black Loyalists who took refuge in Nova Scotia during and after the War for Independence. The "Book of Negroes" listed a total of 3,000, inspected in New York between 26 April and 30 November 1783, bound for Nova Scotia. 49 Others may well have gone the same route either before or after the roll was taken. It is known that of the more than ten thousand who left from Savannah and Charleston in 1782 only a few went directly to Nova Scotia, among them David George, but hundreds of those who went initially to East Florida removed to Halifax the following year. 50 The exact size of the 1777 group from Boston does not seem to have been recorded. To confuse the issue further, slaves and free Blacks were not always differentiated in the official records.


49 PANS Vol. 423, Book of Negroes, listed 1,336 men, 914 women and 750 children.

50 PANS Vol. 47, Letters to the Secretary of State, 1782-89, Doc. 43; John Parr to Lord Sydney, 24 April 1775; PANS, Shelburne Records, Special Sessions, 5 August 1776.
A Loyalist return dated 12 October 1783 gives a total of 3,360 Black "servants" as having gone from New York to Nova Scotia by that date.\(^{51}\) It is extremely likely that this figure included some or all of the free Blacks then inspected, since a survey taken in Nova Scotia on 31 December 1783 reported only "3000 Negroes" included in a Loyalist total of 23,347. The following spring the same reporter estimated that 1,232 slaves were brought into the province by Loyalists.\(^{52}\) How many of those persons might have been technically free but indentured to white masters for definite periods it would be foolish to estimate. Perhaps, in any case, the exact figures are not relevant. Of importance is the fact that among the 30,000 Loyalists who made their way to Nova Scotia, more than 10 percent were free black men, women and children. To them, Britain's support and protection were as uncompromisingly committed as to any other Loyalist group.


CHAPTER II

Land and Settlement in Nova Scotia

The Establishment of a Free Black Community, 1783-91

Most Black Loyalists were runaway slaves who deliberately sought the British and offered their services to the Loyalist cause. One further characteristic that frequently distinguished the Black Loyalist from other runaway slaves was the ideal he held of the object of his freedom: it was to become self-sufficient and secured by British justice in his rights as a subject of the Crown. The passage to Nova Scotia was therefore regarded not merely as an escape from slavery, but as an entry into a new world where the dignity and independence that came of equal citizenship were to be his.¹

Fundamental to the realization of the Black Loyalist ideal was 'the acquisition of land, for without it no true independence was believed possible. But Nova Scotia was in

¹This sentiment was acknowledged by John Clarkson as being a fundamental motivation driving the Blacks to the British and, later, to the Sierra Leone Company (Clarkson Papers, II, fols. 8-9, "Reasons given by the Free Blacks for wishing to leave Nova Scotia"). Frequent expressions of the Black Loyalists' faith in British justice can be found in the Book of Negroes (PANS Vol. 423). Both these pieces of evidence are confirmed by the pattern of Black Loyalist activities in Nova Scotia and in Sierra Leone, and in particular by their continual search for land and independence, and for their rights as British freemen.
no position to satisfy this demand. By mid-October 1783 some 27,000 Loyalists and troops had sought refuge in the British province, and early in the following year Governor John Parr estimated the total at over 30,000. All these people, of whatever colour, entered a chaotic and inefficient land-granting system, and though many officials individually attempted to see the Blacks treated with justice the priorities and prejudices of the system precluded the possibility that the Blacks should find the land and independence of their ideal. Generally speaking, few Blacks received any land at all, and when they did it was in smaller quantities than promised, containing some of the province's worst soil, and was often located so far from major settlements that establishing a viable farm upon it or even visiting it was extremely difficult.

2 PANS Vol. 369, Dorchester Papers, II, Doc. 198, "Return of Loyalists gone from New York to Nova Scotia", 12 October 1783. The exact numbers and destinations were noted as being:
Port Roseway 8,896 including 1,312 Black servants
Annapolis Royal 2,530 397
Halifax 928 73
River St. John's 14,162 1,578

Though the total shown in the Return is 27,009, these figures indicate a total of 26,516, being 23,156 whites and 3,360 Blacks. For the 1784 estimate see PANS Vol. 367-1/2, Military and Loyalist Documents, Haldimand Collection, Vol. III, Doc. 31, Parr to Haldimand, 14 June 1784.

Definite promises of support and compensation had been given to the Loyalists before their removal from the United States, and besides, the distress of 30,000 British subjects evoked feelings of kinship and humanity from the colonial administrators. Parr, Carleton and Haldimand all gave their full attention to the care and settlement of "those unfortunate Loyalists". Immediate steps were taken to ensure that land was available for the incoming throng. With the exception of various reserves required for naval timber, all Crown land was eligible for distribution, and any plots previously granted but unimproved by their owners, or for which quit-rents were in arrears, were ordered escheated for re-distribution to Loyalists. The usual ten shillings per hundred acres purchase fee was remitted and there would be no quit-rents levied for the first ten years of occupation.

Carleton had advocated the complete abolition of quit-rents, but was forced to accept their temporary suspension. Even the usual fees for surveying and licensing of warrants and grants were waived, the surveyor being paid his expenses and one-half his normal tariff directly from the Treasury. According to this new policy Loyalists were to receive lands with absolutely no charges attached. Though he warned against persons trying to monopolize tracts of land or to take grants.

The Philanthropist, Vol. IV, 1814, pp. 101, 104, "History of the Colony of Sierra Leone". See also the specific references to Black Loyalist land grants throughout this chapter.

which they had no intention of settling, Lord North authorized the Governor to distribute as much land as "the recipient shows desire and ability to cultivate" up to a maximum of 1,000 acres in excess of the regular grant. If the surveyors proved insufficient to handle this immense task, Parr was given access to the Army Engineers who would assist in laying out new homesites for the 30,000 immigrants. ⁵

There was an estimated 26,000,000 acres of land in Nova Scotia, as constituted in 1783, of which 13,722,134 cultivable acres were eligible for distribution to Loyalists. In view of the pressing demand coupled with explicit orders to keep expenses to a minimum, a policy was developed according to which "such as have suffered most" in the American War, that is those who had lost the most property, were to be served first. ⁶ They would be compensated with grants relative to the estates left behind in rebel hands. Thereafter ordinary refugees who had suffered less for their loyalty were to be rewarded with 100 acres for the family head plus 50 acres for every member of his family, be it wife, son, daughter or slave.

⁵PANS Vol. 349, Royal Instructions, 1756-90, Doc. 33, 10 June 1783; PANS Vol. 363, Dorchester Papers, II, Doc. 6, Additional Royal Instructions to Governor John Parr, 10 June 1783; PRO 30/55/33, Carleton Papers, Doc. 9299, Carleton to Lord North, 5 October 1783; CO 217/56, Lord North to Parr, 7 August 1783; PANS Vol. 32, Whitehall Dispatches, 1770-93, Doc. 78, Lord North to Parr, 24 June 1783; PANS Vol. 33, Whitehall Dispatches, 1784-92, Doc. 3, Lord Sydney to Parr, 12 March 1784.

All were eligible, under Lord North's authorization, to apply for additional land if they could actually cultivate and improve it. The grants for disbanded troops ranged downwards from 1,000 acres for a field officer to 100 acres for a private soldier, not including allowances for family members.  

The procedure established for administering Loyalist grants required the initiative to come from the prospective grantee in the form of a petition to the governor. This petition might request a specific parcel of land or simply the maximum for which the petitioner was eligible, to be assigned at the governor's discretion. Since disbanded troops were settled all together only one petition, usually in the senior officer's name, would be submitted. A similar practice was followed by groups of civilian Loyalists desiring to settle in the same location. If he judged the petition worthy of his attention the governor would send a warrant to the Surveyor-General asking that a survey be made. Once made, the survey plan would be returned to the governor and a report was submitted to the Surveyor-General of the King's Woods.

7 CO 217/56, Lord North to Parr, 7 August 1783. Military grants were to be assigned as follows:

- field officer: 1,000 acres
- captain: 700 acres
- subaltern: 500 acres
- non-commissioned officer: 200 acres
- private: 100 acres

General Ruggles, because of his rank and presumably his losses in America, was awarded 10,000 acres. See PANS Vol. 391, Morris' Letter Book, Nov. 25, Charles Morris to Gen. 1783, 2 July 1783.
This latter functionary was required to determine whether timber stands on the land in question made it advisable to reserve it for the Royal Navy. If not he issued a certificate which, with the governor's original warrant, was sent to the Provincial Secretary. He drew up a draft grant for the signature of the Attorney-General. Finally, the actual grant was made out and signed by the governor. All that remained was for the grantee to take the oath of allegiance and subscribe "to the Declaration acknowledging His Majesty in Parliament to be the Supreme Legislature of this Province," and the land was legally his.

Obviously there were far too many Loyalists and the procedure was far too complicated for new homesteads to be processed with any degree of expedition. As early as June 1783 Parr was complaining that more Loyalists were arriving than he had expected or for whom he could hope to provide. In a total population of just over 40,000, three-quarters were thrown on the responsibility of the beleaguered governor and his small coterie of officials, submitting petitions, requesting surveys, and demanding the immediate delivery of their lands. The Nova Scotian administrative structure simply could not cope with this nightmare situation.

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8 PANS Vol. 346, Proclamations, Province of Nova Scotia, 1748-1807, Doc. 91, 1 March 1784; PANS Vol. 369, Dorchester Papers, II, Doc. 6, Additional Royal Instructions, 10 June 1783; Margaret Ellis, Settling the Loyalists in Nova Scotia (Ottawa, 1923), p. 165.

9 PANS Vol. 47, Letters to the Secretary of State and
"Discontent and uneasiness have arisen in several of the New Settlements now forming in this Province", Parr admitted in a 1784-Proclamation, "because they have not hitherto received Grants for the Lands which have been assigned to them". The Chief Engineer of British Forces in America, Colonel Robert Morse, wrote in his 1784 Report on the Loyalists that "a very small proportion, indeed, of these people are yet upon their lands". The reasons assigned by Morse for what he considered to be an unreasonable delay were that the Loyalists had arrived too late in the season for surveyors to operate in 1783, "delays and irregularities" in escheating cleared-land, an insufficient number of surveyors, lack of suitable administrative preparations by the government and, finally, the fact that many Loyalists wasted time clearing town sites and building towns instead of expending that energy and capital on preparing farms for themselves. Despite the distress and anxiety so caused, Whitehall complained of the "accumulating expenses" of settling the Loyalists and


10 PANS Vol. 346, Proclamations, Doc. 89, 22 January 1784.

ordered a reduction in the number of deputy-surveyors, the men who were doing the actual work of laying out the grants. 12

Even if Parr were exaggerating when he reported, in August 1784, that 4,892 grants had been finalized, it must be considered a miraculous accomplishment that so many petitions were in fact processed in so short a time. Taking the governor's estimate of four persons per family, approximately 20,000 people were settled upon their land within their first year in Nova Scotia. 13 Still there remained a further 10,000 as yet unsatisfied, and it would be several years before the governor could spend a day at his desk without receiving a petition from some landless Loyalist. In December 1786 the total of grants issued had crept up to only 5,567, and the estimate of persons settled by these grants had actually declined to some 15,000. 14 That same year Captain Gray of the New York Rangers reminded Parr that his men had not yet been assigned lands, and in 1791 a Loyalist group at Pictou threatened to return to the United States unless their


13 PANS Vol. 47, Letters to the Secretary of State, Doc. 27, Parr to Lord Sydney, 13 August 1784.

14 PANS Vol. 223, Miscellaneous Papers, 1783-88, Doc. 146, "Farm Lots laid out for the Loyal Emigrants and Disbanded Corps, between 1 May 1783 and 31 December 1786".
promised lands were soon forthcoming. Soldiers were frequently picked up in the streets of Halifax and confined to the Poor House, unable to support themselves without farms. John Clarkson reported to William Wilberforce in 1791 that many of the English and German troops disbanded in Nova Scotia had never received a single acre from the government.

In the midst of such confusion and, at times, corruption, it is not surprising that an insignificant group of ex-slaves should be overlooked. They had lost no large estates or high positions to demand for themselves the immediate attention of Nova Scotia's harrassed officials. Though Lord Sydney considered the Black veterans "entitled to some protection and favour", by every rule of priority laid down in Whitehall and in Halifax the Blacks fell rather low in the list. One of the officials partly responsible for loyalist settlement, though well aware of a generally bad situation, later was moved to admit that there had been "an injudicious and unjust mode of assigning [the Blacks] their lands", and that they had "laboured under some disagreeable circumstances."

15 PANS Vol. 137, Inland Letter Book, Parr to Gov. Thomas Carleton, 6 April 1786; SL 21763, Parr to Henry Dundas, 13 August 1791.


17 PANS Vol. 37, Mitchell Library, Ind. 11, 37 to Parr, 5 October 1784.
with respect to their Lands. 18

The largest single group of free Blacks coming to Nova Scotia was settled at Port Roseway, a new Loyalist centre expected to become "the most flourishing Town for Trade of any part of the World," and spiteful proof to the southern Republic that citizens loyal to the Crown could successfully transplant the best elements of colonial society. 19 Agents representing some of the most prominent Loyalists visited Nova Scotia in the final days of the War and decided upon Port Roseway as their future home, largely on the basis of its location which appeared most advantageous for shipping and fisheries. The surrounding countryside, however, with its swamps and forests, was quite unsuited for agriculture. 20 On 21 April 1783 the survey for the proposed townsite was begun at Port Roseway, and two weeks later the first Loyalists arrived. 21 By the time Governor Parr visited there in late July, to initiate a municipal government and to name the

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18 CO 217/68, Alexander Howe to W. D. Quarrell, 9 August 1797.


settlement Shelburne, after the Secretary of State, there was already a population of 7,400. But the site was as yet far from cleared of its forest, and the survey was two years from completion. 22

Among the first arrivals at Shelburne was a group of Black Pioneers who had been enlisted by the Chief Engineer, Colonel Robert Morse, to help with the clearing and subsequent construction of the town itself. Lieutenant Lawson, the engineer in charge of Shelburne's public buildings, was authorized to use the Black labourers in any way he saw fit, "but in His Majesty's service only". 23 In immediate charge of the Black corps was Colonel Stephen Blucke, "a mulatto of good reputation", 24 who organized his people for the construction of Shelburne and also of a town for themselves. Located by the governor's orders on the northwestern outskirts of the white town, the new Black settlement was named Birchtown.


23 Edwards, "The Shelburne that Was", Appendix A, pp. 194-95, "Robert Morse, Chief Engineer, Instructions to Lieut. Lawson; Engineer going to Port Roseway in Nova Scotia, 19 April 1783"; PRO 30/55/78, Carleton Papers, Doc. 8800, Proposals submitted by Lt. Col. Robert Morse to Brig. Gen. Fox, 23 August, 1783; PRO 30/55/79, Carleton Papers, Doc. 8836, Fox to Carleton, 26 August 1783, Doc. 9130, Carleton to Fox, 15 September 1783.

after their old friend and protector, General Birch. On 28 August 1783 Benjamin Marston, the deputy-surveyor for Shelburne and district, recorded that he "went up the North West Arm ashore with Colonel Bluck to show him the ground allotted for his people. They are well satisfied with it." Two days later, Marston was at work "laying out lands for Colonel Bluck's black gentry". When in the summer of 1784 a muster was held in Shelburne County, the roll included 1,521 free Blacks then living at Birchtown, 649 men, 485 women and 387 children. The Blacks were organized in 21 companies, each one under the command of a Black "captain", for their continuing work on the barracks, jails and jetties of Shelburne.

While the Blacks were thus employed, Surveyor Marston was attempting to lay out plots of land for the 6,401 white Loyalists then living in temporary shacks and tents in the town. The inevitable delays occurred, followed by the equally inevitable complaints of the Loyalists. Not only were the surveyors taking too long, according to Loyalist agent James Dole, but the best lands were being reserved for government use and the farm lots were virtually inaccessible. They re-


26 Ibid., p. 228.

27 PANS, Shelburne Records, "A List of those Mustered at Shelburne in the summer of 1784", and "General Sessions, 15 September 1784; PANS, White Collection, III, Doc. 340, "Mustered at Shelburne 1784".
fused to be assured by the argument that the delay was caused by the region's being "a Wilderness covered with deep Swamps and almost impenetrable Woods." People began selling their assigned lands, even before they received grants for them, and moved to greener pastures. The complaints of their purchasers added another complication to the unhappy situation. Others gave up hope and simply left without waiting for the survey to be completed. One "piece of villainy", in Marston's terms, that resulted from the confusion, was an attempt by a surveyor to include Birchtown in the grants to whites. This would "shift the niggers at least two lots", so the fair-minded Marston devoted a day to extracting a promise "to overhaul that business" and preserve Birchtown's integrity as a Black community. Finally a special board was established in Shelburne to process applications for land. When the board was dissolved two years later, in November 1786, all the Loyalists were settled and the lands laid out "except those for the Negroes at Birch Town". Despite Marston's

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28 CO 217/56, Parr to Carleton, 3 February 1784; PANS Vol. 369, Dorchester Papers, II, Doc. 109, James Dole to Carleton, 19 September 1763; CO 217/57, Isaac Wilkins to Parr, 26 June 1785.


30 Raymond, "Marston's Diary", p. 234.

31 PANS Vol. 213, Minutes of His Majesty's Council, 1783-29, Council Minutes for 5 August 1783; Inland Letter Book, Richard Bulkeley to Isaac Wilkins and
best efforts; only small town lots had been given to some of the Birchtowners. Their promised farms still lay unsurveyed beneath the district's "deep Swamps" and "impene- 
trable Woods".

The delays and public disturbances at Shelburne meant that some white settlers had to wait up to three years before receiving their lands. According to the gover-
nor's orders all Shelburne County Loyalists were to receive a town lot, big enough for a house, and fifty acres of coun-
try land suitable for farming. In fact, for 119 whites who received lands near Birchtown, farm lots ranged from 5 to 350 acres in size, and the average farm measured 74 acres. Of the 649 Black men at Birchtown only 184 received any farms at all. This fortunate third had to wait two fur-
ther years after their white colleagues were satisfied, and when their grants were finalized in 1788 they averaged only 34 acres. Colonel Blucke himself was located on 200 acres in April 1786, but he was apparently tardy in submitting a

Members of the Board of Agents for Locating the Loyalists on Lands at Shelburne, 20 November 1786.


33PANS, Land Papers, passim.


Eventually a survey was done for 184 Black Loyalists, in the name of Joseph Raven, on 8 December 1787. Attorney-General S. S. Blowers signed the warrant the following week and on 28 February 1788 the governor authorized the grant.  

Those that had town lots often earned their livelihood in Shelburne, applying their savings toward the purchase of a farm. Blucke reported that 300 were in possession of farms, which would mean that over 100 must have bought them.  

When 151 men applied for passage to Sierra Leone in 1791, 67 claimed to have received government-granted farms and 10 others to have purchased theirs privately. Eighteen had paid for their town lots. The majority, however, remained landless.

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37 PANS Vol. 394A, Abstracts of Surveys, Reports for Grants of Land, 1784 to 1807, J. Raven and 183 others, 12 December 1787, 6,382 acres; PANS, Land Papers, Raven, Joseph and 182 others, Shelburne, 8 December 1787, 6,382 acres; PANS Vol. 459, Docket of Land Grants made out for which Certificates from the Surveyor of King's Woods have been given, September 1783—about 1845, 596, Joseph Raven and 123 others; PANS Vol. 213, Council Minutes, 28 February 1786, "Granted to Joseph Raven and 182 others, 6,382 acres at Shelburne". It will be noted that there is a discrepancy in the above sources with respect to the number of grantees included with Raven in the Shelburne grant. The actual grant, despite the title, listed 184 people by name, including Raven himself.


39 CO 217/63, "List of the Blacks of Birch Town with them in their names for Sierra Leone in November 1791".
less. Even taking the desperate situation of the white Loyalists and their land into consideration, it appears quite evident that the Blacks of Birchtown fared much worse than their white neighbours in Shelburne.

Annapolis County offered better prospects for agriculture. Good sandy soil was present around the town itself and along the banks of the Annapolis River. This proved highly attractive to Loyalist immigrants: over 2,000 arrived in the first wave during the autumn of 1783 and one year later the population was given as 4,000. Over 1,200 of these newcomers settled at Conway, renamed Digby in February 1784, among them a significant proportion of free Blacks. In June 1784 a muster listed 211 then living around Digby, 69 of whom were former Black Pioneers and their families. Two months later 65 families of free Blacks were reported to be living in their own community of Brindley Town, about one mile from Digby itself. Next to Birchtown, Brindley Town was the


41 Isaiah W. Wilson, A Geography and History of the County of Digby, Nova Scotia (Halifax, 1900), pp. 50-51.

42 PANS Vol. 376, Muster Rolls of Loyalists and Military Settlers, Annapolis, Digby and adjacent places, 1784, "Return of Negroes and their families mustered in Annapolis County between 28 May and 30 June 1784".

second largest settlement of Black Loyalists in Nova Scotia. John Robinson, the man responsible for the 1784 Annapolis County muster, reported to General Campbell that many of the Loyalists who have come to this part of the Province are still unsettled. This was owing to the Negligence and dilatory Conduct of the persons who have been appointed to lay out the lands for them. The persons so described were four agents appointed by Governor Parr to assign Loyalist grants, and they seem to have been at least careless and probably corrupt in their parcelling out of the 20,000 acres available in Digby Township. In May and June 1785 some impatient Loyalists took matters into their own hands and moved onto vacant lots, common and glebe lands, refusing to leave until their legitimate allotments were assigned. An enquiry instituted by the governor and council into "the Disorders and unhappy disensions at Digby" found a scapegoat, Major Robert Tempany, who was removed as a justice of the peace.

The problems continued, however, and it was not until 1800 that most Digby Loyalists received secure title to their lands. A commission of enquiry set up by Governor John Wentworth reported that "no accurate plan of the surveys of

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44 PANS Vol. 376, Muster Rolls of Loyalists, John Robinson to Ed. Winslow, Sec'y to Maj-Gen'l Campbell, 16 September 1784.

45 Wilson, County of Digby, p. 52; PANS Vol. 394, Morris' Letter Book, 1783-84, Doc. 159, Morris to Amos Botsford, 6 April 1784.

46 PANS Vol. 213, Council Minutes, 16 June 1784; *ibid.*, County of Digby, p. 77.
[Digby Township] had been made." The commission reprimanded the four original agents for "the improvident and in some cases surreptitious obtaining of special grants", and pointed out that most Digby Loyalists had been forced to pay for their grants "owing to their distance from the place of application at Halifax, and to their want of ability to break through the scene of confusion attending the first forming and settlement by the Agents." 47 To correct this situation the House of Assembly authorized the payment of £200 to re-survey the lands of the 200 Loyalists still in Digby. 48

Stumbling directly into this stormy situation two sergeants of the Black Pioneers, Thomas Peters and Murphy Still, submitted a petition to the governor on 21 August 1784 in the name of their fellow veterans at Digby. In their petition Peters and Still cited the promise of Sir Henry Clinton, made at the time of their enlistment, that Black troops would receive the same allowances of land and provisions as "the Rest of the Disbanded Soldiers of His Majesty's Army". They asked that Clinton's promise now be fulfilled. 49

47 PANS Vol. 287, Legislative Council Papers, 1791-1809, Doc. 107, "Report of the Committee to investigate Digby, 21 April 1800". See also Doc. 104, "Message of Governor Wentworth to His Majesty's Council, 14 April 1800".

48 PANS Vol. 302, House of Assembly Papers, 1788-1800, Doc. 75, "Report of the House Committee on the Governor's message of 14 April 1800".

Surveyor-General Morris added a note to their petition to the effect that if the governor would grant a warrant he would issue immediate orders to his deputy at Digby to begin the survey.\textsuperscript{50} After a second petition had been received from the Digby area Blacks,\textsuperscript{51} Parr wrote to deputy surveyor Thomas Millidge asking him to place the petitioners "in the most advantageous Situation" and to "comply with their wishes, as far as lies in your power".\textsuperscript{52} Unfortunately Millidge was prevented by the snow then on the ground from surveying farm lots, and so contented himself with laying out one acre town lots in Brindley Town for seventy-six Pioneers and other Black Loyalists.\textsuperscript{53}

A third petition for the complete allotment was received in Halifax at the time of the disturbances in Digby. Despite his other preoccupations Charles Morris repeated Parr's earlier desire and wrote to his deputy asking that

\textsuperscript{50}Ibid., note signed by Charles Morris written on cover of the above petition.

\textsuperscript{51}CO 217/63, Richard Bulkeley to Henry Dundas, 19 March 1792, enclosing a petition signed by Solomon Hamilton and Joseph Leonard on behalf of 31 Black Loyalists, n.d. (before April 1785).

\textsuperscript{52}CO 217/63, Bulkeley to Dundas, 19 March 1792, enclosure, Parr to Millidge, 9 April 1785.

"you will pay all due attention, to the Inclosed Memorial, and Accomodate these Black people According to their Wishes, in the best Manner You can". In the meantime a number of the Blacks had moved onto some land belonging to an absentee named Mckenney, where they cleared lots, built houses and prepared small gardens for themselves. Millidge was of the opinion that they should be allowed grants to remain on this land, rather than that they be moved to new lands. Despite this suggestion a new location was selected and a survey completed in June 1785 for 467 acres, giving 23 Black men farm lots of about 20 acres each, located on a peninsula across the Annapolis River from Brindley Town. No sooner had this been done than Charles Morris was informed by an irate "Secretary to the Society for Propogating of the Gospel" that the land in question had been reserved for a glebe and school. He had to tell Millidge to remove the Blacks once again.

Before another survey could be begun the pay of


55 CO 217/63, Bulkeley to Dundas, 19 March 1792, enclosure, Millidge to Parr, March 1785.

56 PANS, Land Papers, Leonard, Joseph, and 148 others, including a "Plan of Negro Farm Lots at Digby", surveyed June 1785. Written on a margin of the survey plan is the note: "This land was reserved for School and Common and ought not to be granted".

57 CO 217/63, Bulkeley to Dundas, 19 March 1792, enclosure, Charles Morris to Thomas Millidge, 26 July 1785.
deputy surveyors was discontinued by the government, and Millidge was informed that if he wanted to proceed with a survey for the Digby Blacks he must "endeavour to procure satisfaction from them for his labour". It was not until October 1788 that anything further was done, when Joseph Leonard approached the governor with yet another request for lands for himself and the other Blacks then subsisting on their one acre town lots. Again Parr proved sympathetic and asked Morris to order one of the surveyors for the district, John Greben, to seek out some available land for them "that these Poor People may be accommodated, and set to work, or they will soon become a Burthen to the Community". Greben, however, misinterpreted this order and rather than simply reporting on whether any land was available he went ahead with an actual survey, laying out 147 lots of 50 acres each and one, for Leonard, of 100 acres. Morris wrote to his unfortunate deputy that "no order for any Survey was implyed or intended . . . and I am in doubt whether you will get anything for your worke." His only hope for payment would be if "Joseph Leonard signifys to the Gvr that the worke is done to the satisfaction of his People". To Millidge,


60 Ibid., Morris to Greben, 4 February 1789.
Morris wrote, "I think [Greben] will in Justice be entitled to any, but it must appear to the Governor that the Negroes are satisfied, and to me, that all these Lots are vacant before we can proceed any Further".  

Greben's superior in the district, Thomas Millidge, assisted in the completion of the survey. The new grant, which was located in Clements Township, was shown to have been granted previously but some of the original grantees had never arrived to take possession of their lands and others had returned to the United States. It was, therefore, available to be granted again. Millidge then took Joseph Leonard, "the Head and Supreme Representative of his Ethiopian Brethren from Digby", to show him the 7,500 acre tract surveyed by Greben. Asked if he approved of the land, Leonard answered in the affirmative, and signed a certificate stating that he and all the Blacks were now satisfied. The official warrant was signed on 11 September 1789 for Joseph Leonard and 148 others, and the Surveyor-General of the King's Woods issued a certificate to allow the grant to proceed.

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61 Ibid., Morris to Millidge, 4 February 1789.

62 PANS, Box of Annapolis County Land Grants, 1732-1827, Doc. 57, Millidge to Morris, 18 May 1789. Also enclosed in CO 21783, Bulkeley to Dundas, 19 March 1792.

Though Millidge, with undoubted sincerity, wrote: "I now hope an end will be put to a piece of business which we have had much trouble about," a sentiment surely shared by the Black Loyalists who had now waited over six years for their lands, no final grant was in fact authorized. The last document in this frustrating episode is the warrant to survey of September 1789. Evidently a road was cleared to their tract by the Blacks themselves, but no further improvements were made and the land was never cleared or occupied. Whether the Blacks, their suspicions alerted from two previous displacements, declined to move onto their lands until a final grant was in their hands, or whether the grant was withheld by the authorities because the Blacks had not occupied the land, the result was the same: the Black Loyalists of Digby were never put in possession of their farms. The seventy-six acres in Brindley Town remained the only land legally deeded to any of Digby's free Black settlers.

64 PANS, Box of Annapolis County Land Grants 1732-1827, Doc. 57, Millidge to Morris, 18 May 1789.


66 Margaret Ellis, Settling the Loyalists in Nova Scotia, p. 108, tables entitled "Dispersion of American Loyalists in Nova Scotia, 1783-1800", lists 149 "Loyalist Loyalist grantees" in Annapolis County. Evidently she is referring to the warrant to survey for Joseph Leonard and 148 others noted in footnote 63 above. Though a warrant was usually taken as being final, and the actual grant a mere formality, it would seem from the other evidence that in this case, at least, the warrant was an untrustworthy indication of what really happened.
Into the rough and isolated regions of Sydney County moved another 2,000 Loyalists. Though the land here was barren, at least their experience in acquiring it was more favourable than those of their compatriots in Shelburne and Annapolis Counties. The 1,200 settled around Chedabucto, for example, were all placed on their farms in early 1785. On a tract of 45,650 acres, 201 white Loyalists received an average grant of almost 300 acres each, and at Guysborough another 104 whites received an average farm of over 200 acres each. At the end of the Chedabucto list appears an anonymous mass of "One hundred and Eighteen Negroes at 50 Acres each. 5900 Acres". Since they were not listed by name it has been impossible to verify this mention as constituting an authentic grant, though it is certain that they did not appear in the final grant for the Chedabucto tract mentioned here.


68 PANS Vol. 359, Old Townships and Loyalist Settlements, Doc. 66, "A List of the British Legion and other Loyalists at Guysborough, 8 September 1784".

69 PANS, Land Papers, Hubbell, Nathan, and 277 others, 53,850 acres, Chedabucto Bay, Guysborough Township, Sydney County, 1785. This grant contained the names of all those listed on 6 April 1785 plus another 76 names. None of the plots were for 50 acres. It is possible, but not probable, that some or all of the 118 Blacks could have received lands as part of another grant somewhere in the district. There is no record in the Land Papers of any group that size receiving 50 acre farms.
It is known that there were some Black Pioneers in Chedabucto in 1788 who had never received lands at all. Even if these were placed on farm lots, the amounts were much smaller than those given to whites, and in a district where virtually all the white Loyalists received some land there remained a body of landless Blacks.

There were other free Blacks located at Tracadie Harbour on the eastern end of the peninsula, and it has been reported that local authorities planned to move the county's Black people to one large settlement there. Thomas BrownSpriggs, an educated Black Loyalist, was appointed agent by Governor Parr with responsibility for forming the settlement. In the event, however, it was for only seventy-four Black families that BrownSpriggs petitioned for land in September 1787. The survey was duly completed and certified the same day, granting a tract of 3,000 acres at Little Tracadie bordering the Tracadie River. Each family received a farm of forty acres. When in 1788 another 16 former Black Pioneers then landless in Chedabucto petitioned for land at Little Tracadie, a warrant to survey 800 acres for them was can-

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celled and the grant refused. It is only possible to state with any degree of confidence that those 74 families led by Brownspriggs, containing 172 individuals, were actually put in possession of their lands. At least some of this Tracadie grant was re-allocated to white Acadians in April 1799, when 2,720 acres of the total of 3,000 were distributed among 28 "Acadians and Negroes". Possibly the original grantees found that a 40 acre farm was uneconomical, and hence some of them moved away to seek a livelihood elsewhere. What began as one of the most promising experiences for Black Loyalists in Nova Scotia, therefore, ended eventually in a situation little different from that of others of their colour across the province.

Those three communities, Birchtown, Brindley Town and Little Tracadie, were the only all-black settlements in Loyalist Nova Scotia and the only grants of land made directly to free Black people. There were, however, other large concentrations of Black Loyalists contained within general Loyalist communities, the most important being Preston on the eastern side of the harbour near Halifax.

Loyalist refugee Theophilus Chamberlain was appointed deputy-surveyor and agent for laying out and settling Preston

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71 PANS, Land Papers, Gilchrist, Cornelius, and others, warrant approved for 800 acres, 9 December 1788, not granted.

72 PANS, Box of Guysboro County Land Grants, Folder 1, Docs. 29 and 30, 9 April 1793, "Part of 3,000 acres formerly Granted to the Black People of Tracadie"
Township on his arrival in Nova Scotia in 1783. He seems to have attracted to his settlement a particularly hard-working group of people, both Black and white, perhaps reflecting the large proportion of disbanded troops among them who, because of a possible younger average age and less affluent background than many Loyalists, might be expected to perform well as pioneers in a new land. In the opinion of one member of the Legislative Assembly, "there are not better working men, or more honest and sober, than those of the town of Preston", and he was referring particularly to the Black Loyalists then in the settlement. It is possible that this type of Loyalist was attracted by Preston's location. Though unsuited for ocean trade, as Shelburne was, and lacking good quality soil for large agricultural undertakings, as Annapolis had, Preston was close to the Halifax market for small-farm produce such as vegetables and poultry, the lakes, rivers and coasts nearby offered excellent opportunities for fishing, and the timber stands would find an ideal outlet in the Halifax ship-building and construction industries.

73 See Chamberlain's accounts in PANS Vol. 359, Old Townships and Loyalist Settlements, Doc. 56, 25 May 1784 to 15 September 1785, and PANS Vol. 224, Miscellaneous Papers, Docs. 91 and 123, 6 June and 5 October 1785.
74 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 54, quoting Mr. Putman, MLA for Sydney County.
Chamberlain's original settlement consisted of 85 people, 56 of them white and 29 Black. The agent-surveyor recommended grants to them averaging 160.7 acres for each of the whites and 50 acres for each of the Blacks. When the actual grant was made in December 1784 the settlement was larger and the discrepancy between white and Black wider than anticipated in Chamberlain's earlier plan. Thirty-two thousand acres were eventually divided among 164 grantees, the whites receiving an average of 204 acres each, the Blacks remaining at 50. Furthermore there were only 10 Blacks included in the final grant, none of whom had been among the original 29. Two of the 10, British Freedom and John Smith, were also given 1-1/2 acre town lots in Preston in addition to their farms. For some reason the other 29 had to wait, completely landless, for a further two years.

A survey was made in Preston in July 1785 for Ensign Joshua Garratt and 34 others, 22 of whom were from Chamberlain's initial group of Black Loyalists, the other 12 and

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77 PANS, Land Papers, Chamberlain, Theophilus, and 163 others, 32,000 Acres, Preston Township, 3 September 1784 (survey date); PANS Vol. 370, Township of Preston, "Names of Original Grantees." Grants made 14 December 1784, 32,000 acres to Theophilus Chamberlain and 163 others.

Garratt himself being white. Though a final grant was issued for this land, in the confusion of the times it appears that the grantees were not informed of it, for they never occupied the land. All of Garratt's people were included in grants a year later, the whites receiving lands in Dartmouth and the Blacks, this time all 29 of them, finally acquiring their 50 acre farms as part of a grant to Patrick Byrns in March 1786. The 1785 Garratt survey in Preston remained on the books and was escheated for non-occupation in 1810.

In the meantime more Blacks were moving to Preston from Halifax, unable to find decent employment in the capital city and probably encouraged by the success of some 39 of their brethren in winning farms and independence. One unofficial estimate put the latecomers at "50 or 60 families." Twelve of these received 50 acres each included in a grant to white Loyalist Thomas Young in December 1787. One of this

79 PANS, Land Papers, Garratt, Joshua, and 34 others, 3850 acres, Preston Township, 25 July 1785. By this grant the whites were to receive over 200 acres each, the Blacks their usual 50.

80 PANS Vol. 370, Township of Preston. Grants made 23 March 1786, 10,450 acres to Patrick Byrns and others.

81 PANS, Land Papers, Garratt, Joshua, and 34 others, details as above, escheated 1810.


83 PANS, Land Papers, Young, Thomas, and 34 others, 4700 acres, Preston, 1st December 1787; PANS Vol. 37, Town of Preston, Grants made 20 December 1786, 4700 acres, to Thomas Young and 34 others. The date in the Preston Township
group, Sam Elliott, was also assigned a town lot in Preston, as were two more of Chamberlain's Black grantees, Cuff Preston and Brutus Jones. Of 48 original town lots, 5 went to Blacks, though the size of their lots was less than half that granted to the 43 white pioneers in Preston.

Though no grant was made directly to Black Loyalists in Preston Township, 51 of them did receive farms as part of 3 grants to whites. As was the practice in Shelburne and Sydney Counties, the grants when made were considerably smaller than those for whites in the same district. This situation was particularly stark in Preston, where Black and white were part of the same grants, yet the portion allotted to the Blacks was less than one-quarter the average assigned to their white neighbours. There was also a large body of free Blacks living there who received no lands at all. There may have been as many as 100 Black Loyalists and their families in Preston during the 1780s. Of 39 Black Prestonians signing a petition in 1791, 16 of them were landless.

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book is evidently incorrect, since according to the Land Papers the survey was not even ordered until 29 May 1787.

84 PANS Vol. 370, Township of Preston, "Original Entry of the Survey of the Town Lots in Preston", Cuff Preston, Brutus Jones and Sam Elliott, 1-1/2 acres each, 20 February, 21 February and 24 February 1787.

85 The 10 in Chamberlain's grant and 29 in Patrick Byrns', all of whom were there in 1784, plus John Weeks' estimate of 50 or 60 families of newcomers by 1787 which may or may not have included the 12 in Thomas Young's 1787 grant.

called upon for an explanation surveyor. Chamberlain placed the blame directly on the Blacks themselves. By the time most of them arrived in Preston, he claimed, his pay from the government had been discontinued and he was forced to extract his fees and expenses from the grantees themselves. He therefore made a general survey for the Black Loyalists but refused to divide it into individual lots until his money was forthcoming. The Blacks, in their turn, either could not or would not pay the fees. Chamberlain even offered to take them out to show them their proposed lands, "but for this they have been too negligent, and every one knows that Acres of Land are not like a Flock of Sheep that may be drove by Thousands before Peoples Door for them to look on". For about half of Preston's Black population, therefore, the position was similar to that taking place in Digby Township at the same time: the people were kept from their promised lands not so much by any deliberate attempt to deprive them but by the inefficiencies and misplaced priorities inherent in Loyalist land distribution.

Halifax was often the landing place for Black Loyalists arriving in Nova Scotia, and many of them decided to remain there, as servants, labourers or tradesmen, rather than face the risks of pioneer life in uncertain country. About

one hundred free Blacks, while still in New York, accepted an opportunity to enlist for one year in a Black Pioneer labour corps to be employed in the Engineer's Department in Halifax. Theoretically this one year of government service was intended as a stop-gap until proper land grants should be laid out. 89 It is likely, however, that there was little movement from Halifax out to the Black communities, except for those who went to Preston. Indeed, there was a gradual movement into Halifax by those frustrated by the difficulties in obtaining lands elsewhere, and a consequent increase in Halifax's Black population. 90 Later arrivals in the province, for example a group of 194 from St. Augustine in April 1785, 91 also frequently chose to stay in the capital city where they hoped that their familiar occupations could find them employment. The 1791 Halifax census showed 422 Blacks in a total population of 4,897. 92 There is no record that any of these people received any lands.

In late September 1783, a party of Black "Guides and

89 PRO 30/55/78, Carleton Papers, Doc. 8800, Lt. Col. Robt. Morse to Brig. Gen. Fox, 23 August 1783; PRO 30/55/79, Carleton Papers, Doc. 8886, Fox to Carleton, 26 August 1783; PRO 30/55/61, Carleton Papers, Doc. 9130, Carleton to Fox, 15 September 1783.


91 PANs Vol. 47, Letters to the Secretary of State, Doc. 43, Parr to Sydney, 29 April 1785.

92 Akins, "History of Halifax", p. 103.
Fionneers" landed at the St. John River, there, as in Halifax and Shelburne, to be employed in labour and construction of the public works. 93 When the general Loyalist muster was taken exactly one year later, the returns submitted by Deputy Commissary Thomas Knox listed 182 persons in "Black Companies" that had been "Mustered on the River St. John". 94 Others arrived in the area, named New Brunswick in 1784, from other settlements in Nova Scotia. Thomas Peters, in his continuing search for land, left Annapolis County for New Brunswick where he petitioned for a "small lot in the rear of Fredericton." This was discovered to be part of a tract already granted to someone else, so Peters remained landless still. Three Black veterans were given allotments along with the rest of their disbanded corps. Others were granted town lots in St. John, but when it became obvious that they could not support themselves on such tiny pieces of land the local government suggested, in 1785, that they form themselves into companies and apply for tracts of farm land. 95

Eventually three such companies were formed, of 47, 50 and 24 families respectively, and surveys were conducted to lay out a corresponding number of 50 acre lots in 3 separate

93 PANS Vol. 369, Dorchester Papers, II, Doc. 97, Col. Hewlett to Carleton, 29 September 1783.

94 PANB, Raymond Collection, "Return of the Total Number of Men, Women and Children of the Disbanded Loyalists Mustered on the River St. John, 25 September 1774".

95 PANB, Colonial Correspondence, New Brunswick III, 1791-95, Thomas Carleton to Henry Dundas, 12 December 1791.
ate tracts. According to Thomas Peters, however, this land was "so far distant from their Town Lots (being 16 or 18 Miles back) as to be entirely useless to them and indeed worthless in itself from its remote situation". Only five families actually occupied and improved their farms, and the other 116 lots were escheated and reassigned to whites. In 1791 there remained "about 100 Families or more" around St. John, without land or with only small town lots.

The 184 Black Loyalists in Joseph Raven's Birchtown grant were not the only ones in Shelburne County to receive land. David George reported that he was given a one-quarter acre town lot in Shelburne and he later purchased four more town lots and a fifty acre farm. The other seventy Black families living in the North Division of Shelburne city, however, had no government allotments, though it is possible that they too were able to purchase some land. Four Black pilots shared one 50 acre lot on McNutt's Island as part of a 2,000 acre grant to white Loyalists. Characteristically,

96CO 217/63, "The Humble Memorial and Petition of Thomas Peters a free Negro."

97PAUB, Colonial Correspondence, New Brunswick, III, Thomas Carleton to Dunias, 13 December 1791; PAUB, Letter Book, George Sproule, 1783–8, Sproule to Thomas Harper, 9 July 1785.

98CO 217/63, "Petition of Thomas Peters."


100SPG, Begining of the Associates, No. 13, Abstract for 1787, an, December 1787.
all the whites received 50 acres each except Benjamin McNutt, whose share was 250 acres. 101

101 PANS; Land Papers, Pitcher, Moses, and 35 others, 2000 acres, McNutt's Island, 17 June 1785.

Other Blacks went to Windsor, where they remained landless while a neighbouring group of South Carolina whites won farms averaging 418 acres each. 102 In May 1787 Simeon Perkins enumerated 50 Blacks in Queens County, 20 men, 11 women and 19 children, all but 2 of them in the town of Liverpool. 103 None had any land. Scattered families of Black Loyalists were reported to be in Lunenburg, Wamot, Cornwallis, St. Margaret's Bay, Granville and Port d'Hebert. 104 All of them had their land promises unfulfilled. Besides the residents of Brindley Town there were Blacks living in Digby and over 100 in Annapolis. 105 Though none of them had


105 CO 21/63, "Petition of Thomas Peters"; PANS: 1.

105 CO 21/63, "Petition of Thomas Peters"; PANS: 1.

376, muster Rolls of Loyalists.
official grants some occupied lands belonging to others, and one, Liberty Legree, gave his name to the small Black settlement of Liberty Road.  

Nova Scotia offered refuge to at least 3,000 Black Loyalists from New York, undetermined numbers from Boston, Charleston and Savannah, and at least 194 from St. Augustine. A conservative estimate of those whose whereabouts were known in Nova Scotia would place their number at about 3,550. Of these it is certain that 184 received 6,382 acres at Birchtown, 76 received one acre each at Brindley Town, 74 received 3,000 acres at Little Tracadie, and 51 received 2,557½ acres at Preston. Placing the average family membership at 3 persons, this would mean that 1,155 Black Loyalists were actually settled on a total acreage of 12,015½. The grant at Chedabucto, if one were indeed made, would add about 350 people and 5,900 acres to the total.  

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106 Wilson, County of Digby, p. 62.

107 The estimate is based on the following figures:

- Birchtown, 1784: 1,521 individuals
- Brindley Town, 1784: 211 individuals
- Chedabucto, 1785: 110 families or about 350 individuals
- Little Tracadie, 1787: 172 individuals
- St. John, 1784: 182 individuals
- Shelburne, 1787: 70 families or about 200 individuals
- McNutt's Island, 1785: 4 families or about 12 individuals
- Liverpool, 1787: 50 individuals
- Annapolis, 1780s: 100 individuals
- Small centres, 1780s: unknown

Total: 3,552 individuals

108 This Chedabucto grant must be held in serious doubt. See footnotes 67 and 69 above.
The size of the farms occupied by the three Black families near St. John is not known, but judging from experience elsewhere they would probably not have been larger than fifty acres each.

If many Whites suffered delays, were assigned poor land, or had no land at all, it is obvious that the Black Loyalists experienced an even less favourable fate. Their disappointment, and the discrimination with which they were met, indicated that they were not to be treated as equal citizens after all, and encouraged many of them to believe that they would have to look beyond the governor and his surveyors to complete their escape from slavery and to achieve the independence they sought.
CHAPTER III
Freedom Denied
The Bondage of Dependence, 1783-91

The Nova Scotia that offered a haven to fleeing American slaves was not itself innocent of the evils of slavery. It has been reported that slaves participated in the building of Halifax in 1749, and one of them, Peter, with his wife and daughter, was included in the muster of original settlers. A list of settlers there in 1750 contained at least fourteen different persons specified as "Negro". A slave girl named Louisa, the first in Annapolis County, was sold in July 1767 for fifteen pounds. That

1Smith, "The Slave in Canada", p. 9.

2Akins, "History of Halifax City", App. F, p. 246, "List of Families, original settlers, 1749". Peter and his family also appear in PANS Vol. 417, City of Halifax, 1752-9, "A List of the Families which have been Settled in Nova Scotia since the Year 1749", 7 July 1752. They are not, however, contained in an undated list of circa 1754, in the same volume, showing proprietors of land who had built houses on their government allotments.

3Nova Scotia Archives Report, 1941, App. B, pp. 21-45, "A List of Settlers Victual'd at this place Between 13 May and 4 June 1750". Other names on the list appear to be Blacks, e.g. "Coffee", but they do not bear the designation "Negro". The fourteen names so designated are assumed to have been slaves since the general practice at that time was to mention a slave simply as "Negro" and a free Black person as "a free Negro", "a free Black", "a free person of colour", etc.

year throughout Nova Scotia the census showed 104 slaves in
a total population of 3,022, the largest number, 54, being
in the city of Halifax.\(^5\) Returns later in the 1770s in-
cluded small numbers of slaves, one of them owned by the
Reverend James Logon, Nova Scotia's first Presbyterian
minister.\(^6\)

It was only with the arrival of the Loyalists, however,
that slavery assumed any numerical significance in the pro-
vince. An estimated 1,232 slaves, often designated "servants"
or "servants for life", were brought by Loyalists from the
former American colonies.\(^7\) Shelburne in particular, host to
the largest body of Loyalists, received hundreds of slaves
along with the free Blacks being settled there. Shelburne
settler Andrew Barclay brought 57 slaves with him; Stephen
Shakespeare brought 20, and Charles Bruff 15.\(^8\) Simeon Perkins
had 2 male "servants" and later added a female.\(^9\) The new

\(^5\) PANS Vol. 443, Poll Tax and Census Rolls, 1767-1794,
"A General Return of the Several Towns in the Province of
Nova Scotia for the first day of January 1767". See also Col-
lections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, Vol. VII,
1889-91, pp. 45-71, for a reproduction of the 1767 return.

\(^6\) PANS Vol. 443, Poll Tax and Census Rolls, 1767-1776;
and W. R. Riddell, "Slavery in Canada", \(\text{Acadiensis},\)

\(^7\) Smith, "The Slave in Canada", pp. 23, 32. See also
T. Watson Smith, "Loyalist History—John Grant", \(\text{Acadiensis},\)

\(^8\) Edwards, "The Shelburne That Was", p. 182.

C. B. Ferguson, Toronto, 1901), pp. 30, 190, 390.
settlement of Digby counted slave as well as free Blacks among the first pioneers to arrive there in 1783,¹⁰ and some slaves were carried as far as Cape Breton.¹¹ John Wentworth, former governor of New Hampshire, appointed Surveyor-General of the King’s Woods in 1783 and later to become governor of Nova Scotia, included Black slaves among the baggage he salvaged from his American estate. Finding them less useful in Halifax he sent nineteen slaves to his cousin Paul Wentworth to be employed on the latter’s plantation in Dutch Guiana. "They are all American born and well seasoned", Wentworth wrote to his cousin’s agent, "and all are perfectly stout, healthy, sober, industrious and honest. ... The women are stout and able, and promise well to increase their numbers."¹²

Other Halifax residences, unwilling like Wentworth to support uneconomic slaves, would sometimes turn "their slaves out of doors to maintain themselves and family, if the family should be so large as to become burthensome to the Master". Then if the slaves’ services were ever required again, or if an opportunity arose to sell them, the master could reclaim them at will.¹³ Still others sent six slave children, ranging in age from five to nineteen years, to the Black school estab-

¹⁰Wilson, County of Digby, p. 74.
¹¹Vernon, Bicentenary Sketches, p. 237.
¹³PANS, Clarkson’s Mission, p. 230, diary entry for 7 December 1791.
lished by the Associates of the late Dr. Bray. Perhaps they were moved by a genuine humanitarian sentiment, or they may have been seeking to increase their slaves' earning capacity so that they could join that large group of enterprising slave owners who were able to rent their slaves out, particularly if they possessed marketable skills, and pocket the salary that would normally have been paid to the worker. Though many Nova Scotians, most prominent among them Chief Justice Thomas A. Strange and Attorney-General S. S. Blowers, sought to make perpetual bondage illegal, slavery remained a fact throughout the 1780s and 1790s. It was legally recognized that slaves could be bequeathed as part of an estate, and when Provincial Secretary Richard Bulkeley's slave James was married his status was duly recorded in the Halifax Marriage Bonds.

The presence of so many free Blacks in Nova Scotia after 1783 naturally presented a problem to slave owners. With slave and free mingling in schools and markets it was


17 For example, PANS, Shelburne Records, Early Wills 1784-92, p. 4, Will of Thomas Robinson, 17 May 1794.

18 PANS, Marriage Bonds, 1763-99, 20 May 1794.
difficult to maintain the notion, in the slave's own mind, that he deserved to be in servitude because of his colour. It was equally difficult for whites to identify a wandering Black as a runaway, since a Black face could no longer be assumed to be a badge of bondage. Birchtown became a haven to which slaves from all over the province could flee, and once safely hidden there it was extremely unlikely that a master could retrieve them. Advertisements were placed in the newspapers, characteristically accompanied by a representation of a Black fugitive carrying a stick, offering rewards for the return of a runaway. Despite the relative insignificance of slavery in the province, and the difficulties involved in retaining a slave at all and then keeping him economically employed, still Nova Scotia was a slave society displaying the crude traits of all such societies. This placed severe limitations on the freedom and opportunities of the Black Loyalists. In a society conditioned to thinking of Blacks as slaves, their claims for equality were not always to be taken seriously by white individuals or even by white officials. American slavery, fundamentally, had meant the exploitation of Black labour. To the Nova Scotian of European descent therefore Blacks were usually considered to be nothing.

19 Cf. PANS, Shelburne Records, General Sessions, 5 July 1791.

20 For example, Royal Gazette and Nova Scotia Advertiser, 7 September 1791, 1 March, 7 June, 5 July, 19 November and 22 November 1791, 10 January, 17 January and 19 May 1792.
but a source of labour. It was this economic attitude taken by white people, rather than any identifiable belief in racial inferiority, that was to cause the most discriminatory situations experienced by Black Loyalists during the 1780s.

Ironically, labour was in scarce supply during the decade following the Loyalist influx. With most people pioneering their own farms, larger landowners and urban employers were pressed for workers to make their assets productive. As a consequence, wages rose until, according to Legislative Assembly Member Alexander Howe, they were "higher than in any other Part of the World". Governor Parr complained to Lord Sydney of the "High Price" of "Every kind of labour in this Country", and even the Rector of St. Paul's reported the exorbitant price of Labour in a letter to England. A petition to the Secretary of State from a group of large proprietors noted that "The greatest inconvenience which we [we] lie under at present is the scarcity of Labourers", and that the demand had driven wages into the range of two shillings and sixpence to four shillings per day for unskilled workers.

21 CO 217/68, Alexander Howe to W. D. Quarell, 9 August 1797.

22 PANS Vol. 47, Letters to the Secretary of St. 5c, Dec. 51, Parr to Lord Sydney, 17 October 1785.


24 CO 217/64, Proprietor of L.N., to Mr. L.N., 16 May 1793.
The existence of a large body of free Blacks, forced into the labour market through their lack of land or other means of support, appeared to offer a solution to the labour shortage. They had no choice but to offer their skills and muscles to the nearest employer, and as prevailing opinion considered them an exploitable labour pool, in desperate supply from any other source, they were in a poor position to bargain for the privileges and bounties freely accorded to white Loyalists. It will be recalled that corps of Black Pioneers were sent to Halifax, Shelburne and St. John, there to be employed largely as construction workers. Despite the high wages paid to whites, members of Colonel Blucke's Black companies received "for so working, if a Carpenter ... one Shilling, if a Labourer, Eight pence pr. day". Even where organized Black companies did not exist a similar situation developed. "Well knowing that people of their own colour would never engage with them without being paid an equitable price for their labour", white employers came to depend on the cheap services of the Black Loyalists until they formed "in many parts of this Province, the Principal Sources for Labour and Improvement". Besides providing the only group

25 PANS, Shelburne Records, General Sessions, 2 September 1784.

26 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 73, diary entry for 25 October 1791.

27 CO 217/60, Blunt to Quarrel, 2 August 1797. For other comments on the usefulness of cheap Black labour see
of inexpensive workers the Black Loyalists, being landless, had to buy their food in the open market and therefore helped to increase the prices that could be charged for the staple items of their diet. Their value as a buying force in a slim market was noted in the Preston-Dartmouth area, where their departure in 1792 caused a serious decay in local trade, and in Shelburne, where the threat of a Black exodus brought about a decline in the price of potatoes from one shilling and threepence to a mere twopence halfpenny per bushel. It did not escape official notice that the free Blacks, under such circumstances, constituted a valuable addition to the provincial economy.

The intention of the British government had been that no Loyalist should be required to become a wage-labourer in order to survive. Provisions were promised to Loyalists, partly as a reward for their loyalty and a compensation for their losses, but primarily to sustain them during their first few years in Nova Scotia until their new farms should become productive and enable them to support themselves. Official policy was that all Loyalists should receive, free from govern-

28 PANS, Bishop Charles Inglis, Letters, 1791-92, Number 3, p. 58, Memo to the Archbishop of Canterbury, 3 May 1794.

29 PANS, Clarkson, Mission, r. 189, Letter to Henry Thornton, 6 November 1771.
ment, full rations for their first year as refugees, two-thirds rations for the second year, and one-third rations for the third year. In the meantime, it was presumed, they would be clearing their land, planting their first crop and awaiting a harvest of their own.

On 10 June 1783 there were 15,500 Loyalists on full provisions either in or en route to Nova Scotia, and one month later the first general issue of full rations was authorized to 1 May 1784. Governor Parr had been given discretion over the means of distributing these provisions to the destitute Loyalists. Though it does not appear that a specific direction was issued on the priorities he should follow, it would not have been unreasonable for Parr to assume that provisions should be distributed on the same basis as land, i.e. those who had lost most should be served first. Perhaps because of an injudicious scheme for allotting provisions, or because more Loyalists in fact arrived than were anticipated in July 1783, the first year's issue proved insufficient and supplementary rations had to be sent from Quebec.

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31 PANS Vol. 369, Military Correspondence, Dorchester Papers, Vol. II, 1772-74, Doc. 5, Brook Watson to Carleton, 10 June 1783.

32 Ibid., Doc. 37, Carleton to Fox, 18 July 1783.

33 Ibid., Doc. 1, Lord North to Parr, 5 May 1783.
to Halifax in March 1784. 34

Though the Black Loyalists had been given the same
promises of government support, 35 and though their claim for
government protection was subsequently confirmed by White-
hall, 36 generally speaking they fared as badly with provisions
as they had with land. John Clarkson reported to William
Wilberforce in 1791 that he could "bring innumerable witnesses
(all of whom were parties concerned) who have not received
one year's provisions, though they were allowed three
nay, many of these have neither received a mouthful of pro-
visions, or so much as an implement of husbandry. (though
these articles were allowed also)." 37

When the disbanded Black Pioneers first arrived at
Digby in May 1784, Sergeant Thomas Peters was placed in charge
and it was to him that government provisions were to be de-
ivered. 38 Digby Commissary Thomas Williams eventually issued

34 PANS Vol. 367-1/2, Military and Loyalist Documents,
Haldimand Collection, Vol. III, Doc. 33, George Moore vs.
Haldimand, 31 March 1784.

35 PANS Vol. 259, Old Townships and Loyalist Settle-
ments, Doc. 65, "The Humble Petition of the Black Loyali-
tes of Nova Scotia on the 21 August 1784. See also Butt-Thompson, pp. 94
and Letter from John Clarkson to William Dawes, 1793, and D.,
Clarkson's Mission, pp. 93-100, diary entry for 31 October 1791.

36 PANS Vol. 33, Whitehall Dispatch, Doc. 12, Lord Sydney to Parr, 1787.

37 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 108, Clarkson to
Wilberforce, 27 November 1791.

38 Co 217/5, "An inquiry into the Complaint of Thomas Peters, a black man",
given before the enquiry by Thomas Peters, 16 November 1791.
12,096 pounds of flour and 9,352 pounds of pork, representing 80 days' full rations for 160 'Black' adults and 26 children, but this was not done until December 1784 and Williams stated bluntly, "it is all they are to get for the winter". Though Peters may have taken delivery of another 61 days' worth of rations for distribution among the Pioneers, the flour and pork above-mentioned was sent not to Peters but to the Reverend Edward Brudenell. Brudenell, once described as "a particular friend of the Governor's", was one of those Digby agents later to come under criticism for his inefficiency and favouritism. Rather than distributing the rations directly to the Blacks, Brudenell stored them in a cellar belonging to one Richard Hill and gave them out only to those Blacks who performed work on the township's roads. Most of the people, with no other means of support, agreed to do so, and 11,980 pounds of the flour and 9,209 pounds of the pork were eventually

39 Ibid., Appendix E, Thomas Williams to the Secretary to Dr. Brudenell, 11 December 1784.

40 Ibid., evidence given before the enquiry by Thomas Peters, 16 November 1791. The 61 days' worth may have been part of the 80 days' already recorded.

41 PANS Vol. 394, Morris' Letter Book, Doc. 52, Morris to Major Studholme, 20 August 1783.

42 See Chapter II, footnote 47.

43 CO 217/63, "Enquiry into the Complaint of Thomas Peters", evidence given before the enquiry by Thomas Peters, 16 and 19 November 1791.
ally handed over to them by agent John Donnally. 44 No further supplies were ever issued thereafter. The Digby Blacks, therefore, received provisions only for a few months, not for the three years they had a right to expect, and for those they were forced to work. This labour requirement was not a condition placed on white Loyalists in Digby in order to receive their government support.

David George was given six months’ provisions by Governor Parr in July 1784, 45 and if he received no further supplies it may be that he failed to fulfill the labour requirement. In Shelburne all Loyalists, whatever their colour, were expected to perform six days of statute labour annually 46 in exchange for rations that "were issued daily to all and sundry". 47 However since most of the Blacks were already engaged in labour through their companies of Pioneers, and gaining their subsistence thereby, the statutory labour period simply meant that they worked those days without pay. Unlike the whites, they did not receive provisions on the basis of their status as Loyalists plus six days' work. The Blacks of Preston were also expected to "Work a Proportion of Time on

44 Ibid., 19 November 1791; also ibid., Appendix G, "State of the Provisions sent the Rev. Mr. Brudenell for the use of the Blacks at Digby".

45 David George, "Life", p. 478.

46 PANS, Shelburne Records, Special Sessions, 6 August 1787, and 23 September 1789.

47 Edwards, "The Shelburne that Was", p. 189.
and it may have been in exchange for rations inferior to those granted to whites, as was certainly the case in Halifax. "Codfish, molasses and hard biscuit, were the principal items" in the Halifax Loyalist diet, with occasional additions from "a very limited supply of meat". But this was for whites only. "Meal and molasses sustained the negroes." In St. John—at least some of the Blacks evidently were issued with government provisions, though these supplies ceased before 1785.

There were also many disappointed white Loyalists who were inadequately supplied with provisions. They had left most of their possessions in the United States and, some of them, owned little else than the clothes on their backs. In 1785 Parr wrote to General Campbell for "any Kind of Clothing or Blankets in the King's Stores" that could be distributed to the destitute Loyalists in his care. Time and again, the harassed governor had to request extra supplies, since so many of the people were completely dependent on the Royal bounty. The partial allowances issued after the first year

48 PANS, Halifax County Quarter Sessions, 1766-1791, 7 June 1791.


50 PANB, Colonial Correspondence, New Brunswick, III, Thomas Carleton to Henry Dundas, 13 December 1782.

51 PANS Vol. 137, Inland Intcr. 1785, Parr to Campbell, April 1785.
were not enough, as few people were yet in a position to contribute to their own support. Some destitute souls, with no food or clothing but confident in the government's generosity, were actually taking credit with local merchants against the eventual receipt of their provisions. By the time those provisions arrived, the recipients would again be destitute.

In Halifax the earliest Loyalists were housed, in winter, in tents, bark shelters and public buildings, and fed on the streets. Others had to remain in the cramped holds of their transport vessels, unable to find any room ashore.

Every available building in Annapolis, including the church, was used for shelter, yet hundreds of people remained without a roof. Some of the more fortunate families there had "a single apartment, built with sods, where men, women, children, pigs, fleas, bugs, mosquitoes and other domestic insects, mingle in society". Many of those people, moreover, were

52 Cf. ibid., Parr to Commodore Sawyer, 29 June 1785; Parr to Campbell, 18 November 1785; and Parr to Campbell, 30 November 1785.

53 PANS Vol. 367-1/2, Haldimand Collection, III, Doc. 34, Stephen Tuttle to Major Matthews, 26 April 1784.

54 MacDonald, "Memoir of Governor John Parr", pp. 47, 52, 55, 56.

55 SPG Journal, Vol. 23, 1782-84, p. 284, Rev. Jacob Bailey to Society, November 1783. See also Duncan Campbell, Nova Scotia in its Historical, Mercantile and Industrial Relations (Montreal, 1873), pp. 165-71.

56 Vernon, Bicentenary Sketches, p. 145, quoting Jacob Bailey.
not receiving the authorized issue of provisions. From Annapolis in 1785 came a memorial stating that some Loyalists had received only one-third provisions and had consumed not only those but their seed for the next spring's planting. A Digby petition claimed that whites there had received no rations at all in 1784. That year even wounded and disabled veterans perished in the streets of Halifax, for they had "not yet received the allowance of clothing and provisions granted them by Government".

Clearly, the Blacks had no monopoly on poverty and unfulfilled promises. The numbers of Loyalists and the confusion they caused meant that the limited resources of the province could not be strained to satisfy all. But once again the Black Loyalists fared worst in a generally bad situation. Without farms and without provisions they had no choice but to grasp at any opportunity, however unfair, in order to keep themselves alive. Though almost all the whites were settled within three years of their arrival or, if not, they at least had the option in many cases of returning to the United States, the Blacks continued to depend on whatever they could earn in a labor market prepared to take advantage of them. No deliberate conspiracy is suggested but it is pos-

57 PANS Vol. 223, Miscellaneous Papers, Doc. 130, Memorial to Governor Parr signed by 47 Annapolis Loyalists, n.d. [1785].

58 Wilson, County of Digby, p. 59.

59 PANS Vol. 301, House of Assembly Papers, 1776-77, Doc. 57, "Representation of the Overseers of the Poor, Halifax, 1784".
sible that many agents in charge of land and provisions, aware that Black services as labourers might not be available if they were to become self-supporting, were inclined, as Brudenell evidently was, to place them last on the list of recipients in both cases.

One common fate of Black Loyalists with neither land of their own nor government support, was that they were "obliged to live upon white-men's property which the Govr has been liberal in distributing—and for cultivating it they receive half the produce so that they are in short in a state of Slavery." 60 Akin indeed to slavery or serfdom, the system of "share-cropping" tied the tenant to the land of another and to the landowner himself. The proprietor could take his percentage from the gross produce of the land, leaving his tenant with responsibility for seeding and cultivating a new crop and therefore, on the marginal farmlands of Nova Scotia, with no hope of accumulating any savings to begin a farm of his own.

John Clarkson wrote of one such tenant family that the system had "reduced them to such a state of indigence, that in order to satisfy their landlord and maintain themselves, they have been obliged to sell their property, their clothing, even their very beds." 61 Bishop Charles Inglis had one Black tenant, John Brown, whose plot he described as being "in

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60 Clarkson Papers, II, fol. 8.

61 PAMC, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 66-7, diary entry for 22 October 1791.
better order, neater and more flourishing than any of the others". Though Brown had cleared and cultivated two areas totalling eight acres, the Bishop did not hesitate to move his hapless tenant to another part of the estate, there to begin again.  

62 Gideon White had "Eight Negro Families", Tenants—which had each a quantity of my Land—and allowed me rent".  

63 Of that majority of Black Loyalists who received no land or did so only in uneconomic quantities, hundreds became tenants under circumstances such as these.  

For those incapable or unprepared for life as a tenant farmer, a favourite choice was to become a servant or day labourer in an urban centre, particularly Halifax.  

65 Those with enough land on which to build a house, particularly if they were near the sea, would supplement the produce of a small garden with seasonal fishing. This was the case for the Preston Blacks, who contributed to their region’s meagre  

62PANS, Bishop Charles Inglis, Journal, 1785-1940, Number 2, Book 5, 28 July - 7 May 1792, p. 8, 16 August 1791.  

63PANS, White Collection, Vol. VI, 1790s, Doc. 560, Gideon White to Nathaniel Whitworth, n.d. [1792].  

64 There can be no exact accounting of the numbers, but most of the Blacks known to be in rural areas, without land of their own, can probably be assumed to have been tenants (see previous chapter for some estimates and locations). John Clarkson makes mention of many in his diary, PANS, Clarkson’s Mission, passim., and particularly in his "Remarks Halifax" notebook, EM Add. Ms. 41262B, Clarkson Papers, II, where some specific examples are recorded.  

food supply by selling fish in the local markets. At Brindley Town, conveniently located at the water's edge, "most have boats and go fishing in the Bay of Fundy". Stephen Blucke of Birchtown reported that he had built a fishing boat, and added "we have no prospect of a livelihood here, without adventuring on the fishing boats". The Birchtown situation seems to have been somewhat different from Preston and Bigby, however, in that the Blacks joined large fishing vessels as crew members, rather than operating small boats of their own. Boston King was among a group to sign on with a salmon fishing ship. Though no mention is made of fishermen from Little Tracadie, their location on the harbour and the limitations of their farms must have driven some of them onto the sea for a living.

The ever-present Atlantic, of course, offered other opportunities besides fishing. Birchtowners Luke Jordan, Thomas Godfrey and John Thomas were among those from their community to become members of ships' crews. Black Anthony

66 PANS, Bishop Charles Inglis, Letters, 1791-92, Number 3, p. 58, Memo to Archbishop of Canterbury, 3 May 1794.
67 SPG, Bray Associates, Box 7, Canadian Papers, Philip Marchinton to Dr. Breynton, 2 April 1785. See also CO 217/63, "Enquiry into the Complaint of Thomas Peters", Appendix C.
68 SPG, Bray Associates, Box 7, Canadian Papers, Stephen Blucke to Associates, 1 August 1788.
69 Boston King, "Memoirs", p. 211.
70 CO 217/63, "List of the Blacks of Birch Town".
sailed out of Liverpool on the merchant ship *Goodfortune* as a crewman at thirty-five shillings per month. 71 When the schooner *Pilgrim* was lost only one man aboard, Black Jack, "was qualified to Navigate a vessel". 72 Mulatto Jack Peterson commanded forty shillings per month as a ship's cook, a salary matched by ordinary seaman Black Philip. 73 Black Harry, Prince Harris and Black Boston were evidently of exceptional talents, the latter eventually gaining a sailor's salary of seventy-five shillings per month. 74 Small wonder that many graduates of the Shelburne Black school "have taken to follow the sea". 75 Perhaps the experience of so many Black veterans as pilots during the American war qualified them for equal pay afloat. Certainly sailing was one area of employment into which, short of the press gang, Black workers could not be coerced. Joining the ships freely, and their navigational skills in great demand in a maritime province, they were also free to bargain for a just wage.

It was noted previously that large numbers of the former slaves had been trained in specific skills on their

71 *Diary of Simeon Perkins*, III, p. 107, 13 July 1791.
75 *SPO*, Bray Associates' Minute Books, III, minutes for 1 November 1802, T. B. Rowland to Associates, 3 May 1802.
home plantations. In Nova Scotia they often had an opportunity of following their own trades. Boston King was a carpenter and boat-builder in Shelburne, one of twenty-one men in Birchtown who described themselves as carpenters. Twelve more were sawyers, of masons, cooperers and caulkers there were three each, and two blacksmiths, a tailor, a sadler, a baker, a shoemaker, a blockmaker, a barber and a weaver. Samuel Baker acted as a guide through the woods of Queens County. Willis was a caulk in Simeon Perkins' shipyard and Black Boston Wanton hauled Perkins' logs. If Boston King's experiences were at all typical, however, pay rates on shore fell far short of those within a sailor's grasp, and employment was much less regular. Even a skilled carpenter could expect no more than one shilling for a day's work.

There seems to have been considerable resistance on the part of many white people to any Black attempts at equality or self-improvement. When David George first arrived in Shelburne to preach and teach he "found the White people were against me". However he persisted in his efforts "but the White people, the justices, and all, were in an uproar, and

77 CO 217/63, "List of the Blacks of Birch Town."
78 Diary of Simeon Perkins, III, p. 367, 3 October 1795.
79 Ibid., pp. 194, 197, 198-201, 344, 23 November - 26 May 1795; Diary of Simeon Perkins, IV, p. 364, 15 February 1802.
80 PANS, Shelburne Records, General Sessions, 2 September 1784.
said that I might to out into the woods, for I should not stay there. 81 At Tracadie the Acadian Roman Catholics kept both relief and religion from the Blacks, 82 and a white from Digby reported haughtily that the Blacks there "are so wonderfully proud-spirited, that the females think they must dress, when they attend Church, in quite a superior stile to white Ladies". 83 Evidently Loyalist Nova Scotia had a "place" for Black people, and though it was usually an improvement on the condition of slavery still it meant that a Black's true function was as a lowly worker to serve the white establishment. Of course whole classes of white people were in an equivalent position in Europe and North America, but the Blacks of Nova Scotia derived their class from their colour and its associations with slave labour. "It is a Common Custom in this Country to promise a Black so much per Day and in the Evening when his work is almost finished the White man quarrels with him and takes him to a justice of the Peace who gives an order to mulct him of his wages." 84 The vulnerable Blacks were fair game for any exploitive employer, and to keep them so a society dominated by class interests had to restrict

81 David George, "Life", p. 478.
83 SPG, Bray Associates, Box 7, Canadian Papers, Elkana Morton to Associates, 20 June 1817.
84 Clarkson Papers, II, fol. 15.
their independence.

White workers were equally resentful of the Black Loyalists' vulnerability, but as is so often the case they blamed not those responsible for the oppression but the Blacks who accepted the lower wages and thereby monopolized certain categories of work. On 26 July 1784 Benjamin Marston reported from Shelburne:

'Great Riot today. The disbanded soldiers have risen against the Free negroes to drive them out of Town, because they labour cheaper than they—the soldiers. [27 July] Riot continues. The soldiers force the free negroes to quit the town—pulled down about 20 of their houses.'

Two days later Simeon Perkins heard the news "that an Extraordinary mob or Riot has happened at Shelburne. Some thousands of People Assembled with Clubs and Drove the Negroes out of the Town." To David George's Shelburne home "40 or 50 disbanded soldiers ... came with the tackle of ships, and turned my dwelling house, and every one of their houses, quite over." Later they came and beat him with sticks and drove him into a swamp. Along with others of his colour George sought refuge in Birchtown, but even here they were unsafe. While the force of the riot continued in Shelburne for at least ten days, incursions into Birchtown were reported for up to one month.

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85 Raymond, "Marston's Diary", p. 265.
86 Diary of Simeon Perkins, II, p. 238, 29 July 1784.
88 Raymond, "Marston's Diary", p. 265, entry for 4 August 1784.
89 PANS, Shelburne Records, General Sessions, 21 August 1784.
Though they, like other post-war immigrants, were entitled to government support and grants of land, the ordinary soldiers had to wait until their betters were served first. In the meantime they were forced into the labour market with the Blacks, but employers were unwilling to pay standard wages as long as Blacks could be had at one-quarter the price. Governor Parr blamed Nova Scotia's first race riot exclusively on the soldiers' delay in obtaining land, and indeed he placed responsibility directly on Surveyor Marston, who was dismissed for not preparing the grants more quickly. Parr was undoubtedly correct in assessing the riot's cause as the soldiers' inability to support themselves. The incident is important not so much as an illustration of racial hostility than as an indication of how serious was the economic predicament of those Nova Scotians who had not received lands on which to support themselves.

Outside Shelburne, and without its Black companies and organized labour corps, individual Blacks often lacked the opportunity to enter a competitive workforce. For them the choices were between starvation and indentured servitude, sometimes termed apprenticeship. Indenture was an established system in Nova Scotia long before the arrival of free Blacks, and conditions among white indentured servants differed little from that of outright Black slaves. They were liable to the

90 PANS Vol. 47, Letters to the Secretary of State, Doc. 29, Parr to Lord Sydney, 6 September 1784.
same harsh punishments, the same pervasive authority of a master, as were Blacks, but usually for a limited and specified term. James Walch, a white, the indentured servant to Patrick Wall, was sentenced to ten lashes with the cat-o'-nine tails by Shelburne magistrates merely for applying to be discharged from his master's service. Runaways were sought through advertisements and returned to their masters, though the court seems to have presumed the right to punish them, rather than leaving it to the individual who happened to hold the indenture. There is at least one case on record in Shelburne in which a master, Edward Elliott, was charged with maltreating his apprentice.

Mary Black Loyalists had to accept positions as indentured servants since there was often no other way to ensure support. The master might then hire them out, as was done with slaves, and retain his servants' earnings as compensation for the subsistence he guaranteed. For the Blacks, indenture or apprenticeship was not infrequently the route to a return to actual slavery. Impoverished Black parents, unable to sustain their families, would bind their children out.

91 PANS, Shelburne Records, Special Sessions, 8 September 1785.
92 PANS, Shelburne Records, General Sessions, 12 April 1786.
93 Ibid., 5 April 1791.
for limited terms. When the indenture had run its course, however, the master might claim the child as his legitimate slave or demand of the parents payment for the child's board, during the period of indenture, before turning him free. Molly Roach met such a demand from a Mr. Jenkins of Green Harbour when she went to reclaim her child, and Caesar Smith's daughter Phoebe, put to work by a Mr. Newman in the dock yards, was claimed as a slave.

The case of Lydia Jackson is perhaps informative, for it was recorded as a typical example of the experience of many unfortunate Black Loyalists. Lydia was living in great distress in Manchester when Henry Hedley invited her to work for him. After several days he demanded payment for her board or, as an alternative, her indenture to him for seven years. Though Lydia refused the seven year term she was eventually persuaded to place her mark on an agreement for a one year term. Hedley, however, took advantage of her illiteracy to substitute a term of thirty-nine years in the articles of indenture. She was then sold for twenty pounds to a Dr. Bulman of Lunenburg who, with his wife, beat her with fire tongs and kicked her in the stomach, though Lydia was then eight months pregnant. A court case on her behalf, brought by a Lunenburg attorney, was dismissed by the magistrates. After three years with Bulman Lydia learned of his intention

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95 Clarkson Papers, II, fol. 15.
96 Ibid., fol. 19.
to sell her as a slave in the West Indies. To avoid this fate was worth the risk of capture and punishment as an escapee, so she left Bulman's farm and fled to Halifax. John Clarkson, the passionate Abolitionist who interviewed Lydia Jackson, said he had met "many others of a similar nature", and cited five by name. 97

Though it evidently happened on occasion, an inden- tured servant could not legally be sold to anyone outside Nova Scotia. The Shelburne court ordered the cancellation of the indenture of Robert Conner when his master, John Harris, was apprehended in an attempt to sell his Black servant to a non-resident. 98 The courts took a similar stand when whites detained or attempted to sell Black children without holding the properly authorized documents of indenture. Timothy Mahan tried to sell a boy he claimed had been given him by the boy's parents, but the magistrates declared that this did not constitute an indenture. 99 James Cox was ordered to set a boy at liberty whom he claimed but could not prove to be legally indentured. 100

These attempts to enslave free Blacks were stopped by the authorities, but the fact that attempts were made at all

97 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 197-201, diary entry for 30 November 1791.

98 PANS, Shelburne Records, General Sessions, 1 November 1791.

99 Ibid., 1 November and 2 November 1791.

100 Ibid., 1 November and 2 November 1791.
may be taken as an indication of the insecurity in which the Black Loyalists lived. In fact the fear of being returned to slavery was a prominent reason offered by numerous people anxious to leave Nova Scotia in 1791.\(^{101}\) Apprenticeship was only one threat. Direct kidnapping for sale in the United States or the West Indies was another. Shelburne was particularly vulnerable, and many Blacks were seized there illegally and carried off as slaves.\(^{102}\) In 1789 this situation drew the attention of the Legislative Assembly where, in a draft bill, reference was made to the need to prevent the practice of carrying free Blacks "out of the Province, by force and Strategm, for the scandalous purpose of making property of them in the West Indies contrary to their will and consent".\(^{103}\)

Above all there rested the threat of being claimed, in the courts and with the full sanction of the law, as a legal slave. Four Black Loyalists, all of them with war service, were claimed by Captain Hamilton on the grounds that he had owned them years before in North Carolina. In Halifax Michael Wallace granted Hamilton a warrant to seize the four in question and sell them in the Bahamas. Fortunately their

\(^{101}\) Clarkson Papers, II, fol. 8, "Reasons given by the free Blacks for wishing to leave Nova Scotia".

\(^{102}\) Ibid., fols. 8 and 22.

\(^{103}\) PANS, Unpassed Bills, 1789.
ship put in to Shelburne, where they managed to have word carried to the court that they were being held without a hearing. Presiding judge Isaac Wilkins decided that Hamilton's claim was insufficient, and the Blacks were set free.\textsuperscript{104} Black Loyalists Pero and Tom were claimed by Joseph Robins, and though they were not freed at least Robins was required to bring further proof, within one year, of his ownership.\textsuperscript{105} Mary Postell was brought to court and claimed, together with her children, by Jesse Gray. While Black Loyalists Scipio and Dinah Wearing were in court testifying in Mary's behalf, their home was set on fire and one of their children killed. Mary had been the slave of a rebel officer and still had General Birch's Certificate in her possession, but again the court granted the alleged master one year to prove his ownership.\textsuperscript{106} These people had been free for ten or more years and could produce documents and witnesses in their own support, but this was not automatically accepted by the law as constituting free status. If a master could prove a prior claim, of however long standing, the Black was liable to be returned to slavery.

\textsuperscript{104}PANS, Shelburne Records, Special Sessions, 5 August 1786.

\textsuperscript{105}PANS, Shelburne Records, General Sessions, 12 April 1786.

\textsuperscript{106}Ibid., 5 April, 8 July, 11 July and 19 July 1791. See also the cases of "a Negro wench Molly", ibid., 12 April 1786, and "James Singletory, his wife and child," PANS, Shelburne Records, Special Sessions, 25 August 1785.
Such were the sufferings, insecurity and injustice inflicted upon Black Loyalists by their fellow-refugees in the land of their new liberty. As conditions in Nova Scotia became worse during the late 1780s, and all sorts and conditions of men were brought low by famine and disease, the Blacks' position fell correspondingly lower. Hailed as an example of what could be achieved by good and faithful citizens under properly constituted authority, the province failed to develop as quickly or to become as prosperous as most people had expected in 1783. Roads remained unmade and farms uncleared, and trade was not diverted to Halifax and Shelburne in the volume anticipated. In May 1788 the province was still not producing its own food, and a law had to be passed permitting the importation of essential supplies such as food, livestock and lumber, from the United States.  

The governor's proclamation informing the public of this move declared that it was "necessary from Public Emergency, and to prevent Distress to the Settlers of this Province". Initially intended as a temporary measure of six months' duration, the import allowance was extended semi-annually until 1792. By 1789 Nova Scotia, and indeed all

107 PANS Vol. 213, Council Minutes, 19 May 1788.  
108 PANS Vol. 346, Proclamations, Doc. 116, 15 May 1788. Seven Proclamations allowing certain materials to be imported from the United States had been made since 25 April 1785, but the one of 15 May 1788 was the most far-reaching.  
of British North America, was in the grip of a serious famine. Lord Dorchester sought aid from Halifax to relieve starvation in Quebec, but when the Halifax bakers protested that they had flour enough to provide bread only "for three or four days" the council was forced to reject Dorchester's plea. Over the next two years the province earned its nickname, "Nova Scarcity". Special relief measures had to be passed to provide assistance both for Loyalists and for pre-Loyalist settlers whose farms, though longer established, could not produce the necessary amount of food even for their own inhabitants.

Shelburne, meanwhile, was suffering unique problems of its own. The merchants there, in a petition to London, blamed their difficulties on the fact that royal provisions were discontinued too soon, on trade restrictions with the United States, and on the lack of roads and other infrastructural developments in the Loyalist city. In a city of traders, there was no one with whom to trade. Business stagnated, resulting in unemployment and removal to areas with a

110 PANS Vol. 213, Council Minutes, 9 July 1789.
111 MacDonald, "Memoir of Governor John Parr", pp. 51, 75; Akins, "History of Halifax", p. 95.
112 Royal Gazette and Nova Scotia Advertiser, 30 March 1790.
113 PANS Vol. 302, House of Assembly Papers, 1788-1800, Doc. 11, 19 March 1790.
114 CO 217/63, The Merchants of Shelburne to Lord Granville, 16 June 1791.
healthier economy. From its hey-day during the period 1784 to 1787, when its population reached 10,000 and it was not only the largest British-American city but the fourth largest city anywhere in North America, Shelburne experienced a sharp decline. The whale fishery, one of the reasons for the selection of the site, drifted into bankruptcy after 1785. Agriculture never even approached anything like a self-sufficiency level. In 1787 a smallpox epidemic kicked the dispirited city while it was on its knees. During the following year, the Rev. William Walter reported, four-fifths of the original inhabitants returned to the United States.

The conditions of famine in 1789 and the decline of Shelburne naturally struck hardest at the Black people of the district. Unemployment wiped out the Black companies of Birchtown. Many were forced to indenture their families and


118 John Wesley, Letters, Vol. VII, Garrettson to Wesley, 10 March 1787.

119 SPG Journal, Vol. 25, 1787-92, p. 97, Walter to Society, 24 June 1788. To stave up the declining population of the Loyalist city consideration was briefly given to a plan to move the residents of St. Pierre and Monton en masse to Shelburne. Cf. PRO 30/6/183, Challenger Papers, Pergamino Francis Thorne to William Pitt, 4 May 1790.
some even sold themselves as slaves. Blacks died of starvation and exposure after parting with all their belongings in exchange for temporary nourishment. Birchtown, like Shelburne, lost some of its most ambitious residents as they left in search of employment and food.\textsuperscript{120} Always at a bare subsistence wage, the Black labourers had no savings or property to cushion their fall.\textsuperscript{121} Only those with farms or with jobs in the fisheries, and of course the indentured servants and share-croppers, were able to make a meagre living in Shelburne County. Those who drifted to Halifax met conditions scarcely better. The shortage of food and retarded trade affected the capital city too, and few jobs were available. Soon it became impossible for a Halifax resident to walk the streets without being approached by a Black beggar.\textsuperscript{122} No part of Nova Scotia remained unaffected. From Digby Major Millidge wrote of the Blacks in late 1788:

never was distress more apparent than amongst these poor people many of whom are almost without Clothing. Numbers of whom I fear are destitute of the necessaries of Life and before the end of the ensuing Winter will feel the most keen Distress.\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{120}Boston King, "Memoirs", pp. 209-10.
\textsuperscript{121}SPG, Pray Associates, Box 7, Canadian Papers, Stephen Blucke to Associates, 22 December 1787.
\textsuperscript{122}PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 294-95, diary entry for 27 December 1791. See also BM Add. Ms. 41262A, Clarkson Papers, I, John Clarkson to Lawrence Hartshorne, 13 December 1791.
\textsuperscript{123}SPG, Pray Associates Minute Books, III, 5 March 1789, Major Millidge to Associates, 13 October 1788.
But for the charity of their white neighbours and certain well-wishers in England, many more Blacks should have died of starvation or exposure during those harrowing years. David George received a bag of seed potatoes from a white Baptist family named Taylor. That one bag produced thirty-five bushels of potatoes, enough to sustain George and his dependents. In isolated Guysborough County, where the hijacking of a supply ship meant that a whole winter was spent with little or no food from outside, those Blacks to survive became completely dependent on the white inhabitants. In Birchtown blind Methodist preacher Moses Wilkinson received a weekly allowance from an unknown English benefactor. At Brindley Town it was only, "by the Humanity of the White People that several of those helpless black people exist." It was the Associates of the late Dr. Bray, a London-based Anglican charity particularly concerned for Black people in America, that did most in an organized way to assist the destitute Black Loyalists. To Birchtown they sent boxes of blankets, clothing and shoes in 1787 and again in 1789.

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127 SPG, Bray Associates' Minute Books, III, 5 March 1789, Millidge to Associates, 13 October 1788.
128 SPG, Designs of the Associates, Number 13, Abstract for 1787, Blucke to Associates, 22 December 1787, and SPG, Isaac Wilkins to Associates, Box 7, Canadian Papers, Isaac Wilkins to Associates, 10 July 1789.
wise received shoes and clothing and material with which to make their own clothes, including thread, buttons and patterns. 129

Public support was also available to paupers in Nova Scotia, though not always generously. In 1789 the people of Halifax preferred to contribute the passage money for twenty white paupers to return to England, rather than maintain them on relief in Nova Scotia. 130 Various acts were passed by the Assembly during the 1780s and '90s to provide for the support of the poor and the maintenance of a poor house, and commissioners and overseers were appointed to ensure that the allocated budget was wisely spent. 131 That budget for the year ending 31 December 1789 was £1300 13. 7-3/4. 132 In June 1792 the Commissioners were authorized to bind out pauper children who might otherwise require public support. 133 Finally in 1800 a special import duty was added to goods arriving from

129 SPG, Bray Associates' Minute Books, III, 5 March 1789, Millidge to Associates, 13 October 1789, also 7 July and 1 September 1791.

130 PANS Vol. 48, Letters to the Secretary of State, 1789-94, Doc. 7, Parr to Evan Nepean, 4 December 1789.

131 Cf. PANS, Minutes of the Legislative Council, 1782-90, 20 November and 26 November 1784, 27 March, 30 March, 3 April and 21 April 1790, and PANS, Minutes of the Legislative Council, 1791-97, 1 July, 4 July and 5 July 1791.

132 PANS, Minutes of the Legislative Council, 1782-90, 9 March 1790.

the United States to provide revenue for poor relief in each county.\[^{134}\]

Black paupers were often included on the relief rolls. Sometimes Black vagrants in Shelburne were sent by the court to Birchtown, there to subsist on whatever charity that impoverished community might be able to afford them.\[^{135}\] A proclamation of that court in 1786 ordered the overseers to be more attendant to the binding out of poor Black children,\[^{136}\] though some Black adults appear to have been allowed to remain free while on relief.\[^{137}\] It was possible for citizens to take Black paupers from the poor house as indentured servants, if they reimbursed the overseers for their past support by the public.\[^{138}\] In February 1789 the Shelburne Overseers of the Poor informed the magistrates that there are a great number of Black People both in this Town and in Birchtown who are in the most distressing Circumstances. Many of them have been relieved by us, otherwise it is highly probable that some of them, during this inclement Season, must have perished. But as the number of White People, whom we have constantly to supply, are very considerable it is not in our power to afford the Blacks that assistance which their pressing Necessities

\[^{134}\]PANS, Minutes of the Legislative Council, 1792-1802, 2 May 1800.

\[^{135}\]For example, PANS, Shelburne Records, Special Sessions, 25 August 1785.

\[^{136}\]PANS, Shelburne Records, General Sessions, 10 April 1786.

\[^{137}\]Ibid., 6 May 1788.

\[^{138}\]Ibid., 17 July 1793.
loudly call for. And as it is evident they become more and more burdensome every year, we ask that you free this Infant Settlement from a Burden which it is by no means in a Capacity to Bear. 139

The Assembly took up the matter and passed a bill which provided that free Blacks without "fixed abode or a proper means of subsistence" should be bound out for a period of seven years. The Council, however, declined to give its assent and so this discriminatory piece of legislation did not become law. 140 Still the Shelburne officials complained and finally, in 1802, a measure was passed to tax Birchtown separately for the support of its own poor, leaving Shelburne itself free to concentrate on the relief of poor whites. 141

The life of the Black Loyalist was filled with fear, for his continued freedom, for his subsistence, and for his peace from the interference of discriminatory acts by white individuals and officials. A last desperate move on the part of Shelburne merchants to sustain their economy by making their city a free port for trade with the United States, brought the Blacks' fear to a climax in that they expected their former American masters would then be able to enter

139 PAC, Ms. Group A-3, Number 6, Shelburne. From the Overseers of the Poor to the Magistrates of Shelburne, 3 February 1789.

140 PANS, Minutes of the Legislative Council, 1792-90, 1 and 2 April 1789; PANS, Unpassed Bills, 1771, "A Bill Intituted an Act for the Regulation and Relief of the free Negroes within the Province of Nova Scotia." 141

PANS, "Shelburne Records", General Sessions, 12 April 1802.
British territory and reclaim them as slaves. Seldom was it possible, from his very arrival in Nova Scotia, for a Black Loyalist to feel secure in the freedoms and privileges of a British subject.

Either as veterans or as Loyalists, the free Blacks had a right to expect treatment as full citizens. They had been promised as much, and these promises were reinforced by statements of officials in London and Halifax. On the one hand, they were required to perform the duties of citizenship, on the other, their rights fell short of equality. Clarkson recorded that the Blacks were required to pay taxes, and for Sydney County at least the poll tax returns indicate that some of them did so. A Black militia company was formed in Halifax which Governor Wentworth described as "an able, daring, and faithful Body of Men", and he also praised the Black Pioneers attached to the Royal Nova Scotia Regiment. The Digby militia had its Black company as well, "of good able Stature and Countenance as any other Men".

142 Clarkson Papers, I, 29 October 1791; PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 9-5, diary entry for 29 October 1791.

143 Cf. PANS Vol. 33, Whitehall Dispatches, 1784-90, Doc. 12, Lord Sydney to Parr, 5 October 1786; PANS, Minutes of the Legislative Council, 1782-90, 9 October 1783.

144 Clarkson Papers, II, fols. 15 and 21.


While fulfilling these responsibilities, the Blacks were "entirely deprived of the privileges of British subjects, particularly trial by jury". From New Brunswick Governor Thomas Carleton gave the opinion that the Blacks, "having come within the British Lines with no other View than to escape from the service of their American masters, cannot be considered as intitled to claim anything from Government further than personal protection and freedom from servitude" and therefore "they have not been admitted to vote in Elections for Representatives in the General Assembly". In addition to their lack of the vote and jury trial, the Blacks often suffered restrictions on their private lives as well. In Shelburne hand bills were published by the magistrates "forbidding Negro Dances, and Negro Frolicks in this Town". When this by-law was contravened the offending Blacks were charged with "Riotous behaviour" and sent to the house of correction. A second offence might mean being "ordered out of their home for keeping a disorderly house".

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148 PANB, Colonial Correspondence, New Brunswick, III, Thomas Carleton to Henry Dundas, 13 December 1793.
149 PANS, Shelburne Records, Special Sessions, 12 May 1785.
150 Ibid., 19 May 1785.
151 PANS, Shelburne Records, General Sessions, 3 July 1799.
law, the treatment he received at the hands of the justices was not always equal to that for whites convicted of the same crime. In Guysborough County (Lower Sydney County) between 11 October 1785 and February 1791 no white suffered corporal punishment. Theft, slander, assault, "keeping a house of ill fame", even riot, were punished by fines. 152 But when a Black Loyalist woman, Sarah Ringwood, stole some butter, she was "ordered for Punishment to receive Thirty nine stripes on her naked back, at the Public Whipping Post in Manchester". 153 Another Black woman, Eleonar Bourke, received the same punishment plus a week's imprisonment "for being a Vagrant, Idle, Disorderly Person". 154 This was during the famine of 1789. In one year four Black men were whipped for stealing food, and another Black woman "for abusive, Lewd and Indecent behaviour". 155

The Shelburne court records bear cruel testimony to the harsh inhumanity of the late eighteenth century. Prince Frederick received seventy-eight lashes and a month's hard labour for stealing a pair of shoes. 156

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152 PANS, Quarter Sessions, Guysborough County, 1785-1800.
153 Ibid., 10 October 1787.
154 Ibid., 12 August 1789.
155 Ibid., 8 February, 31 March, 11 August, 13 August, 3 November 1791.
156 PANS, Shelburne Records, Special Sessions, 24 February 1785.
nine lashes and John Russel one-hundred lashes for thefts valued at one shilling each. 157 One Black woman named Blanna, convicted on two counts of petty larceny, suffered the incredible sentence of "Two hundred lashes at the Cart's Tail, next Saturday, at 12 o'clock, at noon, for the first offense, and One hundred and fifty lashes on the following Saturday, at the Cart's Tail, for the second offense". 158 The unfortunate Alicia Wiggins received thirty-nine lashes in April 1792 for theft, 159 and in July, for a second offense involving three shillings and eleven pence worth of used clothing, she was sentenced to be hanged. Alicia pleaded a stay of execution on the grounds of pregnancy but "twelve Matrons or discreet women", on examining her, found that she was "not four months gone with child", so she was executed as ordered. 160 All these sentences were inflicted on Black people. As in Guysborough County, Shelburne whites were often, though not always, fined for similar offenses. In one rare instance when two men were convicted of theft, Light House Jack, a white, received one-hundred lashes while his accomplice Negro Will was discharged without sentence on account of

157 Ibid., 9 June 1785.
158 PANS, Shelburne Records, General Sessions, 3 November 1784.
159 Ibid., 12 April 1792.
160 PANS, White Collection, VI, Doc. 553, "Proceedings of the Court of Oyer and Terminer, Shelburne, 3 July 1792".
"good Character and recommendations". In Halifax County punishments generally were milder, and even Blacks were allowed to pay fines for their misdemeanours. The courts there were in fact surprisingly free of cases involving Blacks, though of twenty persons hanged in Halifax in 1785 three were Black, one of them for the theft of a bag of potatoes.

Without doubt the last two decades of the eighteenth century represent a heartless and difficult period in the history of Nova Scotia. No man or woman of low station could avoid the constant threat of physical suffering. It also appears quite evident that for Black Nova Scotians, as a group, the threat was greater and more frequently realized than for any others. In a slave society they took their status not from the body of Loyalists, to which they belonged, but from the mass of slaves whose African race they shared. In many ways their life as freemen was not altogether different from the life of slavery that had left behind. As share-croppers, indentured servants or subsistence day-labourers they were still completely dependent upon white people and subject to the whims and prejudices of their white employers. The

161 PANS, Shelburne Records, General Sessions, 14 April 1789.
162 PANS, Halifax County Quarter Sessions, 1766-1811.
163 Ibid.; and MacDonald, "Memoir of Governor John Parr", p. 64.
law denied them equal privileges and services yet expected as much of them as of any other resident, and when they strayed they were corrected with greater severity. They were regarded as little more than physical beings, whose proper function was to fill the lowest levels of the labour force.

The Black Loyalists faced, with other Loyalists, all the hardships of a pioneering situation in a new country. They were also pioneering in a sense unique to themselves. The vast majority of them had been born and raised in slavery, a condition which sapped their initiative, resourcefulness and self-reliance. An attitude of dependence had developed in these people, long accustomed to direction in labour and sustenance in living. Now they were expected to find some inner spring of resourcefulness within themselves and to fend for themselves in a climate calling for expensive shelter and with a scarcity of food. More than any other group of immigrants the Blacks needed special assistance during a period of transition for their new lives as free and self-supporting citizens. Instead, that same "slave mentality" was perpetuated and reinforced by their experiences in Nova Scotia. They continued to feel dependent on whites, in the economic sphere, neither encouraged nor capable to strike out on their own.
CHAPTER IV
Black Society in Loyalist Nova Scotia
The Growth of a Separate Identity, 1783-91

While the precarious economic climate in Nova Scotia created a peculiar position for the Black Loyalists, which helped to determine their attitudes toward land, labour and liberty, the social environment of the 1780s set the conditions for their development as a distinct and separate community. Dominant among these social influences was a fundamentalist religious revival and its inevitable clash with the entrenched interests of established religion. The free Blacks were thrust into a crackling atmosphere in the 1780s which accounted, on the one hand, for their conversion to Christianity and the subsequent central importance of religion in their character and their lives, and on the other for a decided obstreperousness toward human authority.

Nova Scotia's "Great Awakening" has been traced to the New England mission of George Whitfield in the 1740s,\(^1\) though it does not seem to have become a widespread phenomenon there until the 1760s.\(^2\) During this period, before the


opening of the Ohio Valley for settlement, Nova Scotia constituted a frontier to which land-hungry New England Yankees were attracted in their thousands. Tucked in their baggage were their bibles, and in their hearts the seeds of enthusiastic religion. Still the full impact of the New England revival on Nova Scotia awaited the arrival, in April 1776, of Henry Alline. An uneducated Congregationalist preacher from Rhode Island, Alline thumped the province with his message of sin and salvation until his untimely death, at age thirty-six, in 1784.  

Alline, whose influence in Nova Scotia was later likened to that of John the Baptist in his day, left a definite mark on the religious tenor of the post-revolution province. "Liberty of conscience" was his cry, and a "troubling of the waters" by the Spirit of God was his dedication. Impatient with the externals of religion and decrying "the damage that is done by unconverted ministers, and legal professors", he refused to align himself with any particular denomination, founding instead independent congregations of "New Lights" who owed allegiance to no formal

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3See Henry Alline, The Life and Journal of the Rev. Mr. Henry Alline (Boston, 1808).


5For example, Alline, Journal, pp. 67, 79.


7Ibid., pp. 6, 59.
body and took their authority not from men but directly from God. New Light chapels sprang up in every part of the province, wherever he visited, in which "whoever loved and brought Christ and belonged to him were freely received into full communion". Ordination he regarded only as a witness borne by men to one whom God had already authorized to preach his Word.

His disregard for authority, his attacks on the more settled brands of Christianity and, undoubtedly, his success in converting thousands to his point of view, drew the immediate enmity of the Church of England and of the government establishment to which it was wedded. Indeed the New Lights denied the state any right to interfere in spiritual matters, and it was not simply religious intolerance that caused church and state officials to regard them with some suspicion. Social upheaval joined hands with religious enthusiasm as the New Light preachers poured scorn on the worldly ties of the "unconverted" church, and as Alline charged Anglican clergymen with "destroying souls". Bishop Charles Inglis countered with the claim that the New Lights "threatened to

8 Ibid., p. 36.
9 Ibid., p. 138.
10 Ibid., p. 153.
11 Ibid., pp. 58, 59, 69, 131-33, and Armstrong, Great Awakening, pp. 1-12, 119.
12 Alline, Journal, p. 69.
subvert all order and national religion", 13 accused them of
being "almost to a man, violent Republicans and Democrats",
and suspected they were planning "a total Revolution in
Religion and Civil Government". 14

If New Lights were subversive, they only reinforced
the official trust in the Church of England as a steadying
force conducive to loyalty and submission to duly constituted
authority. According to Inglis the Loyalists, predominantly
Anglican, influenced the establishment of "true religion"
throughout the province.

It will certainly be prudent in Government to cherish
this disposition [he added]—every motive of good
policy calls for it, wherever the principles of our
church prevail, they naturally byass the mind towards
the constitution, and incline it to loyalty; by dif-
fusing those principles, we consequently increase the
number of those who are loyal to the sovereign, and
attached to the constitution. 15

Governor Parr lent his weight to the effort to check
not only New Lights but all deviations from solid Anglicanism,
including Methodism. 16 The Bishop wrote special prayers,
which were authorized by the government to be read through-

13PANS, Memoirs of Bishop Inglis, No. 1, Nova Scotia
and Letters, November 14, 1787 to October 17, 1791, pp. 162-
68, Inglis to Dr. Morice, 16 October 1789.

14PANS, Bishop Charles Inglis, Letters, 1798-1811,
No. 4, pp. 33-36A, Inglis to Dr. Morice, 16 August 1799.
See also pp. 49-51, Inglis to Duke of Kent, 28 July 1800.

15PANS, Memoirs of Bishop Inglis, No. 1, pp. 96-98B,
Inglis to Cumberland, 26 September 1788.

16PANS Vol. 137, Inland Letter Book, Parr to Morice,
6 October 1789.
out the province, "to impress the minds of people with sentiments of reverence—both towards magistrates and their office. . . . These sentiments will when duly impressed contribute much to the peace and order of society and produce a ready obedience to lawful authority for conscience sake."¹⁷ "Owing to the vigilance of the Magistrates", proponents of non-Conformist sects were restricted in their movements around Annapolis County.¹⁸ Methodist preacher William Black, while addressing a meeting in Cumberland County, was arrested by soldiers and his congregation scattered; apparently on suspicion of contributing to disloyalty.¹⁹ It is small wonder that "Nova Scotian Dissenters should harbour resentment against the Church of England, and that the church and government should be identified as a common enemy bent upon their destruction as independent religious bodies.

Religious divisions were given greater importance by coincidental geographical interests. Generally people of one denomination settled together in one location, the Presbyterians in the north and west, Baptists in the southwest, and Roman Catholics in Sydney County, while Halifax and the

¹⁹ Vernon, Bicentenary Sketches, p. 218.
Loyalist settlements contained an Anglican majority. Regional feeling and religious loyalties were therefore bound up, and were aggravated even further by the fact that the Anglican Loyalists, as newcomers, won resentment from the old settlers, who often considered themselves a neglected lower class. Though it may be too early to speak of the development of "party" interests in Nova Scotia, a conflict was building which had local, class and religious differences combining in a common cause against an establishment with similarly-grounded interests of its own.

The Black Loyalists arrived in Nova Scotia with an evident readiness to receive the benefits of religion. From Halifax the rector reported that "they daily crowd to me for Baptism, and seem happy with their prospects of Religion and Freedom". Other clergymen noted the same phenomenon as the Blacks, at the first opportunity to offer itself, flocked to the font for Baptism and full church membership. As slaves in the American Colonies they had been discouraged,

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22 SPG, Bray Associates' Minute Books, III, 11 July 1785, report of Dr. Breynton.

and sometimes even prevented, from embracing the religion of their owners. Most of them, therefore, though probably aware of Christian teachings, had never heard the Gospel message directly or belonged to a formal congregation.\textsuperscript{24} It is possible that this very prohibition, by associating Christianity with the status of freeman, made them anxious to exercise their new liberty in such a manner. It is also necessary to consider, however, that the highly effective slave "underground" communications system may well have made many secret Christians among the slaves, or at least have aroused their curiosity for a religion that offered equality to all men before a welcoming God. For whatever reason it was the case that religious gatherings of any description, and the revival ensured that there were many, attracted the free Blacks in their hundreds.\textsuperscript{25} As a consequence they became involved in, and were influenced by, the prevailing atmosphere of distrust and dissension.

The church with the strongest and most highly organized presence was, of course, the Church of England. The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (SPG), the earliest Anglican missionary society, was established in Nova Scotia


\textsuperscript{25}Cf. David George, \textit{"Life"}, p. 475; Ector, \textit{"Memoirs"}, pp. 157-58.
in 1749, the year of the founding of Halifax. For thirty-five years its attentions were centred more on the garrisons, the Indians, and the capital city, than on the scattered population of Yankee immigrants, but with the arrival of thousands of Anglican Loyalists, among them thirty-one clergymen, the church and the mission acquired a widespread popular base. Eighteen of the refugee ministers received SPG appointments and were supported directly by the Society in England, and most of the others were awarded government positions as chaplains. 26 Such numbers required more local organization than the SPG or the Bishop of London could give, and so in 1787 the "Bishoprick of Nova Scotia and its Dependencies" was created by Royal decree, and Loyalist Charles Inglis was consecrated as its first bishop. 27

The church and bishop showed an early interest in the affairs of the Black Loyalists. The Archbishop of Canterbury wrote to enquire of Inglis how they were progressing as free settlers, and his reply showed that, while he was no abolitionist, he was concerned for them and expected them to prove to be equal to whites of the same rank. 28 Inglis offered assistance not only of a spiritual kind, but more especially in the vital field of

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26 Armstrong, Great Awakening, p. 113.
27 PANS Vol. 433, Papers Relating to the Church of England and School Lands, Doc. 7, Royal Instructions, 9 August 1787.
education. Such attention was, not unnaturally, rewarded with a favourable response from the religion-seeking Blacks.

In Halifax, during the first year of the Loyalist migration, St. Paul's rector Dr. John Breynton baptized "many hundreds" of Blacks, both adults and children, and he too took an immediate interest in their worldly concerns, particularly education and employment. This was still, however, an age of slavery and of belief in the separation of the races. Though the Blacks were welcomed in the church and could attend services, and even take communion, they were not permitted to mingle with whites in the congregation. A special gallery was fitted in St. Paul's church in 1784, to which the Blacks were confined "during divine worship". But the huge number of Loyalist Anglicans made too great a demand on the limited space available, and it became impossible to admit all those wishing to attend on a Sunday. The Blacks, therefore, were excluded, and as an alternative the rector advised them to gather in private homes and he commissioned "several capable Negroes who read the Instructions to the Negroes and other pious Books to as many of them as assemble for that purpose".

29 For example, see below, footnotes 149-53.


of the Church of England, the Blacks living in the integrated Halifax community were in fact segregated into their own Anglican congregations.

Brindley Town offered no such complication, for it already existed as a separate Black community. There too the Blacks showed themselves "heartily disposed to receive any religious instruction that is offered to them," and though the Digby area had its share of "strolling ignorant Newlight and Methodist Preachers" large numbers of Brindley Town Blacks were baptized as Anglicans. Even before Digby was erected into a parish the rector from Cornwallis, on visits in 1784 and 1785, baptized sixteen Blacks there. When the Rev. Roger Viets arrived in 1786 to take charge of the Digby church he found that of forty-nine regular communicants, thirty-one of them were Black. Though the ratio was to change over the next five years, the Black Anglicans at Brindley Town remained a sizable proportion, and often a majority, of the parish of Digby. They did not, however,

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33 SPG Report, 1785, p. 43.
34 SPG, Bray Associates, Box 7, Canadian Papers, Roger Viets to Associates, 30 December 1799.
37 Cf. SPG Journal, Vol. 25, pp. 28 (1787), 95 (1788), 216 (1789), 289 (1790), 376-7 and 405 (1791), and Vol. 26, 1792-95, pp. 22, 100 (1792).
attend the regular services in Viets' church. Rather, as he reported in 1789, "Several times in the year I visit the Negroe Town, and examine the People and preach a plain, practical Sermon." 38

Between visits the Blacks, like their counterparts in Halifax, met in private homes where Joseph Leonard, chosen from among themselves, instructed them in Christian doctrines and ministered to their spiritual needs. Only on special occasions did the Brindley Towners venture into Digby to participate in the communion service. 39 When Bishop Inglis visited the Black community in 1791 he was shocked to find that Leonard was not merely leading services of worship but was actually baptizing children and new converts and was administering the communion sacrament to some sixty Black families. When the bishop "reproved Leonard for these irregularities", the Black leader asked to be ordained and stated that he and his flock wished "to be entirely independent and separate from the whites, and to have a church of their own". "He seems to lean to Methodism", the bishop noted, and refused Leonard's request, admonishing him to instruct the children and to come to church "which was his proper duty". 40 The following day Inglis confirmed twenty-

38 SPG, Bray Associates, Box 7, Canadian Papers, Roger Viets to Associates, 18 April 1789.

39 Ibid.

40 PANS, Bishop Charles Inglis, Journal, 1"²⁴⁴, No. 2, Book 5, p. 15, 10 September 1791.
five Blacks who joined a similar number, confirmed three years previously, as full members of a church which they seldom attended but whose rites and teachings they followed assiduously.

Birchtown, situated like Brindley Town on the outskirts of a larger white settlement, shared a similar relationship with the established church. On 21 November 1783, the Rev. William Walter from Shelburne held a mass baptism for seventy Blacks, adults and children, and the following year he baptized another seventy-nine. Thereafter numbers declined and were largely confined to children, but over a ten year period several hundred Birchtown Blacks were admitted to the Church of England. Especially in the early years they far exceeded the number of whites seeking baptism. Meanwhile another Anglican priest, the Rev. George Pantor, was also visiting Birchtown, where in one seven-month period he baptized 125 Blacks, most of them adults.

"The people", he noted, "were very desirous of the ordinances of religion". As in Digby parish the regular Anglican clergy

41 Ibid, p. 16, 11 September 1791; SPG, Bray Associates, Box 7, Canadian Papers, Viets to Associates, 18 April 1789.
42 Cf. SPG, Bray Associates' Minute Books, IV, 2 November 1809, Viets to Associates, 1 April 1809.
43 PANS, Shelburne Records, Baptisms, 1783-1869, pp. 1-17. For later years see pp. 20-138.
made occasional visits to the neighbouring Black community to administer the sacrament, to preach, and to settle any religious differences among them. 46 Between such visits the Anglican rites were performed by a Black man, Isaac Limerick, "who officiates among them as Reader and Exhorter" and who preached at Sunday services held in Birchtown homes. 47

It may have been the case that the Blacks were kept from the Shelburne churches more by the high pew fees, which ranged from fifteen to forty-five shillings a year, than by any ruling applied against them. 48 Or the Birchtowners may simply have preferred the ministrations of Brother Limerick to the politics and intrigues then carrying on between rival factions in the Shelburne parish. William Walter had been appointed pastor to Shelburne by the SPG, but while he was in England settling his private affairs Governor Parr named another Loyalist clergyman, George Panton, in his place. Over the succeeding eight years, until Walter returned to Boston, partisans of one man would interrupt the services,

46 SPG Journal, Vol. 25, pp. 163 (1788), 229 (1791), 318 (1790); SPG Report, 1791, p. 32, and 1792, p. 42; CG 217/64, George Panton to Lord Sydney, 17 March 1786.


on one occasion even a funeral, being performed by the other petitions went to Halifax and London, temporary churches were built and deserted, as each minister jockeyed to become Shelburne's only parish priest. The dissension delayed the construction of a proper church building until 1789, when Christ Church was opened on Christmas Day, and must have deterred the sibling Anglicans of Birchtown from taking every opportunity to participate in the affairs of their church. Though they continued to receive the visits of both clergymen in their own town, and had their weddings and funerals performed by them, only Colonel Blucke (who could afford to pay twenty shillings for his pew) was a regular attendant at Christ Church in Shelburne.

Little Tracadie was too remote for regular visitations from any neighbouring parish. Even the wandering evangelists of the Dissenting sects gave it a wide berth. In 1786 the SPG missionary at Manchester, Peter de la Roche,


51 PANS, Shelburne Records, Marriages 1783-1869, pp. 2-5, and Burials 1783-1869, p. 4; SPG Journal, Vol. 29, 1804-09, p. 65. Wedding fees were set at five shillings for Blacks, ten shillings for whites.


reported a mass baptism of fifty Blacks there, indicating that despite their isolation the Guysborough-area Blacks were just as anxious as others of their colour to grasp any opportunity for baptism. After the grant was made at Little Tracadie in 1788, Black parents carried their children the twenty miles to Manchester for them to be baptized as Anglicans. Bishop Inglis sent them over a hundred testaments, prayer books and tracts, which were used by Thomas Brown-spriggs to instruct them in the ways of a religion with whose forms they had little direct contact. Forty years later, of 160 Blacks remaining at Little Tracadie, all but one described themselves as Anglican, though in all that time they had had no church building or resident Anglican clergy.

In other districts of the province the Blacks were, as in Halifax, considered part of the parish wherein they resided, and therefore under the care of the local incumbent. Blacks constituted twenty-five percent of the parish at Preston,

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54 PANS, Thomas, Microfilm Collection of the SPG, p. 40, letter 321, de la Roche to SPG, 23 August 1786.

55 PANS, Memoirs of Bishop Inglis, No. 1, pp. 53-6, Inglis to Dr. Morice, 7 April 1788.


58 PANS, Memoirs of Bishop Inglis, No. 1, pp. 212-13, Inglis to Dr. Morice, 7 July 1790.
but as a church building was not even begun until 1788 and
only consecrated in 1791, there was little opportunity for
them to attend services. Eventually they too established
the practice of holding separate services in the home of
Mrs. Catherine Abernathy. 59 At Windsor in 1783 five Blacks
were baptized by the SPG missionary, but others in the 480
square mile parish were "wild enthusiasts" and remained
distant from the Church of England. 60 Jacob Bailey at Annapolis
was approached by only eight Blacks, all adults, for
baptism, 61 and the Lunenburg missionary found only one to
baptize and another to join his catechism class. 62 There
were four Black Anglicans at Wilmot, three in Cornwallis and
three in Granville, their small number perhaps reflecting
the general disenchantment with the established church among
the people of the south and west. Of a population of over
3,000 whites, the area had only 29 communicant Anglicans. 63

A pattern can be discerned from Anglican activities
among the Black Loyalists in their first few years as free
Nova Scotians. The Anglicans were first on the scene in most

59 Charles W. Varick, The Story of Christ Church
Dartmouth (Halifax, 1947), pp. 14, 17, 30; Ferguson, Document-
ary Study, p. 64; Ibid., Vol. 213, Council Minutes, p. 241,
22 November 1792; SPG, Bray Associates' Minute Books, III,
1 September 1791.

60 Ibid., Vol. 23, pp. 169, 303.

61 Ibid., p. 369, and Vol. 24, p. 308.

62 Ibid., Vol. 25, pp. 60-2, 340.

63 Ibid., pp. 71, 157, 308-9, 358, 372.
of the Loyalist settlements and the Blacks, attracted by their availability, sought them for the mark which made them Christians. In areas with concentrated Black populations, i.e. Birchtown, Brindley Town and Little Tracadie, the Blacks were then left largely on their own, with occasional supervision, to develop what were in effect independent Black Anglican churches under Isaac Limerick, Joseph Leonard and Thomas Brownspriggs. Even in Halifax, where they lived only a few minutes' walk from St. Paul's church, the Blacks were forced to hold separate services under their own Black lay-readers. Where Blacks were part of a larger white settlement, in Preston, Shelburne, St. John, and the older Yankee communities of the south and west, no special Anglican efforts were made to enlist them and there was, besides, far more non-Conformist activity taking place in those districts. The Blacks cannot, therefore, be considered as having formed any integral part of the Anglican structure anywhere in the province.

Since even in those places where they called themselves Anglican the free Blacks drifted away from the regularized worship of their church, it is not surprising that Anglican off-shoot sects such as the Huntingdonians and Methodists should enjoy a considerable amount of popularity among them. The Huntingdonians had an added attraction in that their apostle to Nova Scotia, the Rev. John Marrant, was himself a Black man. Born free in the American Colonies, Marrant was
converted under the preaching of George Whitfield in Charleston. Pressed into the Royal Navy during the American war, he was wounded and discharged in London. After the war his brother was one of the Black Loyalists settled in Birchtown, and he wrote to John describing the religious excitement of his fellow Blacks and the shortage of Christian leaders to satisfy their longing for instruction.

John Marrant determined to come himself and contacted the Countess of Huntingdon who arranged for his ordination, at Bath in 1785, as a minister in the Countess of Huntingdon’s Connexion. He left immediately thereafter for Birchtown, accompanied by another Black Loyalist Huntingdonian, William Furmage, as his assistant. 64

The Countess of Huntingdon’s Connexion was not intended, by its founder, to become a separate denomination, but merely to be a grouping of Anglicans of an evangelical bent who would supplement their regular worship with daily prayer meetings, revivalistic services and classes for personal instruction in Christian living. Huntingdonian chapels, however, tended to become more and more independent of the church, a tendency that was reinforced by the Countess’ readiness to recognize as preachers persons who had not

taken Anglican orders. Though they continued to use the Anglican Book of Common Prayer, the Huntingdonians placed more emphasis on the Fifteen Articles of Faith devised by the Countess than on the Thirty-Nine Articles of Bishop Parker. They held daily meetings at five in the morning and again in the evening, for prayers and evangelistic hymn-singing, and the congregation was divided into classes, each under its own lay-leader, for instruction in and discussion of Christian doctrines. 65

If the Blacks of Birchtown wanted deep Christian involvement, it was offered in full by the chapel founded in their midst by John Marrant. He attracted about forty families to his congregation, no doubt including many of those baptized by Walter and Panton, and ordained two local men, Cato Perkins and William Ash, as preachers. 66 Leaving them in charge, Marrant and Furmage went on the mission trail, preaching in New Light chapels. Though they concentrated their efforts on people of their own colour, on several occasions they addressed integrated meetings containing white New Light audiences who, it seems, did not always approve of them. 67 Few new Huntingdonian chapels

65 Cf. ibid., p. 57. See also The Countess of Huntingdon’s New Magazine and The Harbinger, passim.

66 Fyfe, "The Countess of Huntingdon's Connexion", p. 54.

were added to the one at Birchtown, however, though Marrant left behind preachers whom he had designated to service their local communities. After his grand tour Marrant returned to England, where he died in April 1791, having appointed Cato Perkins his successor as chief pastor to Nova Scotia's Black Huntingdonians.

The first sermon ever to be preached in Shelburne was given by Methodist preacher William Black on 8 June 1783, when the population was still in tents and Birchtown little more than a plan in Benjamin Marston's files. In his congregation were many eager Black Loyalists, and in fact "out of them was gathered the greater part of the Society of 200 members in the Shelburne Circuit." William Black later visited Birchtown and Halifax, and within two years 170 of the free Blacks, representing one-third of the total Methodist membership, had joined his church. In 1786 he staged a revival rally in Digby and organized a society at Brindley

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68 PANS, Memoirs of Bishop Inglis, No. 1, pp. 87-93, Inglis to Archbishop of Canterbury, 13 September 1788.


Town comprising sixty-six Black Methodists. 73

William Black, authorized by Wesley to lead the Maritime flock, embarked on the British province's first Methodist crusade in 1780. 74 With the arrival of the Loyalists he was unable to carry the mission alone, and so in response to his plea for assistance the Baltimore Conference of the Wesleyan denomination sent, in February 1785, the Rev. Freeborn Garrettson to share his labours. Until his departure in April 1787 Garrettson conducted a great revival throughout the province, and particularly in the Shelburne district. 75 "Garrettson's influence in Nova Scotia," in the opinion of the editor of John Wesley's letters, "was almost equal to that of Wesley in Europe." 76

The religious enthusiasm of the Birchtown Methodists in particular drew the attention of John Wesley himself. In a letter to James Barry, a white Loyalist at Shelburne, Wesley wrote in July 1784:

The work of God among the blacks in your neighbourhood is a wonderful instance of the power of God; and the little town they have built is, I suppose, the only town of negroes which has been built in America—nay, perhaps in any part of the world, except only in Africa. I doubt not but some of them can read. When, there-

73 Wilson, County of Digby, p. 90.
75 Ibld., I, p. 292ff.
76 John Wesley, Letters, VII, comment of editor John Telford, pp. 275-76.
fore, we send a preacher or two to Nova Scotia, we will send some books to be distributed among them; and they never need want books while I live. It will be well to give them all the assistance you can in every possible way. 77

Wesley's attention was well warranted, for more than twenty-five percent of the province's 800 Methodists in 1790 were Black Loyalists. 78

The Birchtown Methodists were under the pastoral care of Moses Wilkinson, a blind and lame former slave whose meeting house became central to his community's social life. Evidently a fiery preacher, Moses impressed a witness to one of his sermons but who was worried that the blind man's "feelings were so exquisite and he worked himself up into such a pitch that I was fearful something would happen to him." 79 Wilkinson's first convert was Peggy King, wife of Boston King, in 1783, and thereafter his efforts combined with those of William Black and Freeborn Garrettson won the conversion of Birchtown's largest single congregation. 80 King himself later claimed to have been aroused under the influence of Garrettson, 81 and immediately he began to preach to his

77 Ibid., VII, p. 225, Wesley to James Barry, 3 July 1784.
78 Findlay and Holdsworth, Methodist Missionary Society, I, p. 297.
79 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 262, diary entry for 13 December 1791.
81 Ibid., p. 160. He dated his conversion, however, in March 1784, one year before Garrettson arrived in Nova Scotia.
neighbours and to assist in Brother Moses' chapel. 82

After gaining experience in this way Boston King followed William Black on the mission circuit, preaching in many Black settlements from Shelburne to Digby and Halifax. This was strictly a voluntary enterprise, for he worked without pay and supported himself and his wife with a variety of jobs in several parts of the province. His energy and enthusiasm were rewarded in 1791, when William Black appointed him pastor in charge of the Methodist society at Preston. This was almost exclusively a Black Loyalist congregation, though one white family, the Fergusons, were regular attenders. 83

Another of Moses Wilkinson's congregation, John Ball, also became a preacher in his own right, and he too embarked on a crusade. Preaching in school-houses and in Methodist and New Light halls, Ball aimed his sermons at his fellow Black Loyalists. On one occasion his tour intercepted that of William Black. The latter, a white man, held forth to the Methodist meeting during the regular morning service, while Ball was relegated to a separate meeting that afternoon. Though white people were admitted to his rallies, he was not permitted to address their scheduled gatherings. Simeon Perkins attended one of Ball's evening sermons in the Liverpool school-house and felt that "he performed very well con-

82 Ibid., p. 161.
83 Ibid., p. 213.
sidering his Station and Colour. 84

For all their apparent success in enrolling Black members, the Methodists were in fact in a position very similar to that of the Church of England, even to the coincidence that the Archbishop of Canterbury and John Wesley both expressed concern for the free Black Christians. White evangelists made the first contacts, but thereafter most Black societies were left in the care of local Black pastors, such as Wilkinson in Birchtown and King in Preston, or to circuit-riding Black preachers, such as John Ball, who used Methodist facilities at a separated hour. In Halifax the Blacks were regular participants in the Methodist service but even there, as was the first arrangement in St. Paul's, they were confined to a segregated gallery while "in the Pitt were the White ladies &c." 85 Like their Anglican neighbours, the Black Methodists were left without regular white supervision and therefore free to interpret doctrines and to develop along lines peculiar to their own needs and wishes.

The Black Baptist chapels of Nova Scotia were founded and sustained by Black men without white agency, though they were assisted by the New Light enthusiasm roused by Henry Alline. Though he left the province before the Loyalists

85 SPG, Calendar of C Mss, Canada 1752-91, Part II, Nova Scotia, C/Can, Pre-Diocesan, pp. 20-21, B. M. Houseal to Dr. Morice, 21 November 1791; SPG, C/Can/NS 1, 1722-1790, Misc., Houseal to Morice, 21 November 1791.
arrived, Alline had built a considerable following of slaves in Nova Scotia, and like all New Lights they inclined toward the Baptists upon the death of their founder. The first Nova Scotian Baptist minister, Nicholas Pierson of Horton, was in fact ordained by Alline, and "except in the matter of baptism, there was fundamentally no great difference between Alline's 'New Lights' and Baptists." When the Baptist preacher David George arrived with the other Black Loyalists, therefore, there was already a potential flock awaiting his call.

David George was converted to the Baptist brand of Christianity by a fellow slave in Georgia, and was among the group of slaves and free Blacks who founded the Silver Bluff Baptist Church in South Carolina in 1773, North America's first Black church. At the approach of the Revolution, when free Blacks were prevented from mingling with the slaves, George took over as Silver Bluff's pastor, the first slave in that position. During his time with the British forces he continued to preach in his spare time, and on his arrival in

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86 Henry Alline, *Journal*, pp. 90, 118.
Shelburne in 1784 he immediately began holding camp-meetings in the woods bordering the new settlement and invited his fellow Black Loyalists to attend. "The Black people came from far and near, it was so new to them", George recalled, "I kept on so every night in the week . . . and a great number of White and Black people came." When a white sympathizer offered him a lot in Shelburne, George organized his followers to build a chapel and held his crowded meetings there. Then the rioting soldiers, in their attack on the Black homes of Shelburne, tore down George's house and later entered his chapel while he was preaching, beat him with sticks and drove him into a swamp. Like so many of his fellows he fled to Birchtown, and spent the next four months there preaching from house to house and baptizing twenty people.

But his outspoken message, even by the standards of Wilkinson, Marrant and Limerick, won him persecution from the Birchtown Blacks, and they forced him back to Shelburne. Reclaiming his chapel, which had been taken over by a white tavern-keeper, he resumed his Shelburne mission. Gradually, as his congregation grew, his fame spread, and he began to receive invitations to preach in other parts of the province. His first outside visit, to St. John, attracted masses of Black people, including many slaves who "were so full of joy

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90 David George, "Life", p. 478.
91 Ibid., pp. 478-80.
that they ran out from waiting at table on their masters, with knives and forks in their hands, to meet me at the water side." 92 After a communal baptism in the St. John River he left for Fredericton where a similar experience awaited him. George returned to Nova Scotia and a grand preaching tour that took him to Horton, Preston, Halifax, Digby and Liverpool. In each community he founded chapels and appointed elders to take charge of them. One of these elders, Hector Peters of Preston, himself became famous as a preacher and won many more converts to the Baptist sect. 93

Certainly much of David George's success came from his preaching ability. John Clarkson, on attending a George service, commented, "I never remember to have heard the Psalms, sung so charmingly, in my life before." 94 A Shelburne white described approvingly a scene where George's congregation was so overcome that the people could not refrain from crying out "hozannahs and George himself was obliged to interrupt his sermon for the tears streaming down his face. Under the pressure of the preacher's inspiration the visitor's "Soul was upon a Mount Zion." 95 But like Alline, whose style

92 Ibid., pp. 480-81.
93 Ibid.
94 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 250, diary entry for 11 December 1791.
and doctrines he shared to a considerable extent, George undoubtedly benefitted from the social urges of his listeners. A modern Black American scholar has written:

The desire for freedom is the central theme, the motivating force, in the history of the American Negro people. This has always determined their actions, policies and efforts, and has, indeed, permeated their religions, inspired their real and legendary heroes, and filled their incomparably beautiful hymns and spirituals. 96

David George and his Baptist church offered freedom on a scale beyond the reach of the other denominations working among the Black Loyalists. His exciting sermons and rousing hymns promised to wash them white in the Blood of the Lamb, to free them forever from the shackles of sin. Moreover, "because a Baptist church can arise and continue as a self-originating, self-governing body without any consent or approval from without, the work of the denomination rapidly expanded". 97 A people desiring freedom, equality, local democracy and popular participation in the affairs of their church, found those things in the Baptist chapels inspired by David George. His congregation in Shelburne counted fifty of that city's seventy Black families, and his personal following among the Blacks in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia was unmatched by any other preacher, white or Black. Though the other Black churches were to achieve a de facto kind of inde-

96 Aptheker, American Revolution, p. 5.
97 Brooks, "Evolution of the Negro Baptist Church", p. 16.
pendence, even including Joseph Leonard's Anglicans at Brindley Town, only David George proclaimed it and gloried in it from the outset as a positive virtue which kept his followers free from the contaminations of a lost outside world. 98

As David George fell in the Alline tradition of simple faith, total involvement and fiery denunciations of worn-out religious forms, so he drew the fire of the more conservative Christian bodies. And in George's case, because he was Black

98 David George, "Life", passim. It is interesting to note that the Baptist church enjoyed, and continues to enjoy, a similar success throughout the Black communities of North America. Referring to the Black Refugees who arrived in Nova Scotia after the War of 1812, Bishop John Inglis commented: "The majority of the Blacks, however ignorant, are rigid Baptists and will not come to Church nor receive favours through the Church" (SPG, Bray Associates, Box 7, Canadian Papers, John Inglis to Associates, 20 July 1818). From the Bahamas an Anglican missionary reported that the "Anabaptists" were increasing rapidly among the Blacks and claimed the allegiance of a majority there (SPG Journal, Vol. 25, pp. 381). George Icle, a Black Loyalist who had worked with David George at Silver Bluff, developed a congregation of 450 Blacks in Kingston, Jamaica, and churches of a similar size grew up in Savannah: Providence and Augusta (Baptist Annual Register, Vol. I, 1791-93, pp. 332-44, "An Account of several Baptist Churches, consisting chiefly of Negro Slaves"). Moses Baker, another Loyalist Baptist in Jamaica, had a congregation numbering slave and free Blacks (Baptist Annual Register, Vol. IV, 1801-10, pp. 1144-46, "Letter from Jamaica", 9 October 1802). This phenomenon, it is suggested here, grew chiefly from two characteristics of the Baptist crusade: invariably the preachers were themselves Black men, and the chapels they founded offered an opportunity for direct and democratic involvement, owing no allegiance to and requiring no direction from any outside white authority. A modern scholar, in suggesting further reasons for the Baptists' attractiveness for Afro-North Americans, links baptism by total immersion to West African river cults (Melville J. Herskovits, The Myth of the Negro Past [Boston, 1958], p. 232).
in a slave society, the persecution took on definite racial overtones. He met white hostility on his very arrival in Snelburne, where "the white people, the justices, and all, were in an uproar" and at first refused him permission to preach. When, several months later, he baptized a white couple named Holmes, actual rioting broke out. There were already several white members in his congregation and one of his deacons, William Taylor, was white, but George had never flaunted his colour and his faith in quite such a way before. On the day appointed for the Holmes' public immersion,

Their relations, who lived in the town, were very angry, raised a mob, and endeavoured to hinder their being baptized. Her sister especially, she laid hold of her hair to keep her from going down into the water. The situation demanded the intervention of the magistrates, who were forced to conclude that the new converts were free to select their own form of baptism, and the mob was commanded to keep the peace. 99 A white woman who later joined his Snelburne chapel remained unbaptized, fearing the wrath of her family and neighbours. 100

That the intolerance he faced was made up of both racial and religious elements is evident from the fact that George met no interference from Snelburne whites when he baptized Blacks in public, yet in Black Birchtown "my own

99 David George, "Life", p. 479.
100 Ibid., p. 480.
colour persecuted me" for his attacks on their fledgling faith. His first mass baptism in the river at St. John included some whites, but other whites complained to the governor and George was required to take out a license permitting him to preach to Black people only in New Brunswick. And though he was invited to preach to white audiences in Baptist and New Light chapels in Horton and Liverpool, and once even in the Methodist meeting in Halifax, he was not allowed to subvert the regular service but had to set up a special meeting whereat, presumably, only those who wished to listen to a Black man need attend. At Liverpool a committee met to discuss the use of their chapel by outsiders, and decided that New Light preachers would be welcome but "if Black David, a preacher at Shelburne, comes, he is to have Liberty to Speak in the House, on an Evening, but not in the Stated times of Worship."

The Baptists by intent, the Huntingdonians by coincidence, the Methodists and Anglicans by default, all created what were in effect independent Black branches only loosely tied or, in the first instance, completely untied, to any

101 Ibid.
102 Ibid., pp. 480-81. The license was signed, ironically, by slave-owner Jonathan Odell, secretary to Governor Thomas Carleton.
103 Ibid., pp. 479, 481, 483.
104 Diary of Simeon Perkins, III, pp. 4-5.
white hierarchy. The Roman Catholics could neither offer nor allow such a situation: Black Roman Catholics had to be an integral part of the parish and its discipline, or no part at all. In the only Black area with any noticeable Roman Catholic presence - Little Tracadie, some early expressions of interest on their part were rebuffed by the local Acadians who objected to the "bad odour" the newcomers brought to church. The priest suggested that a segregated gallery could overcome this problem but his parishioners decided that the size of their church would not permit it. There was, therefore, "no way to put up with them". On the bishop's insistence efforts were made to convert them but the Blacks had learned another lesson from their contacts with Roman Catholics and showed themselves, with only one exception, immune to any persuasion. They expressly preferred their all-Black meetings in private homes, led by one of their own number. And so, largely forgotten by the church that had baptized them, ignored by the evangelists, and locked in mutual antagonism with the Roman Catholic


107 The Black lay-reader was subsidized by the rector of Manchester to the extent of a £15 annual stipend. See Johnston, Catholic Church, p. 271.
Acadians, the Blacks of Little Tracadie drifted into a self-regulating religious society which was susceptible, later in the nineteenth century, to the message of Baptist preacher David Nutter. 108

The Black religious groups in Nova Scotia, forced to grow separately by white prejudice and indifference, retained the fervour and intense personal involvement that had characterized the crusade for their conversion. Christianity for them was above all an experience, to be shared with others in the fellowship of the chapel to be sure, but still a personal confrontation between the individual and his God. The test of the truth was in the feeling, and every point of doctrine, indeed every preacher, would be judged by the effects produced upon the assembled people. The tears of David George, the tirades of Moses Wilkinson, the "Methodistical" preachments of Joseph Leonard, all served to evoke an immediate spiritual awareness in their listeners. 109 As they regarded the more formalized white churches which had segregated them, they noticed that God did not seem to speak to those older churches in quite the same way as he did to


them, the Blacks. Inevitably this produced a feeling of being closer to God, of being, in fact, a chosen people, an elite group of Christians whom God regularly visited and whose role it was to preserve the truth of the moment of salvation. 110

The belief in themselves as a Christian elite had, from the outset, a somewhat negative aspect: it was in the contrast with other men's religion that they first found their own differences. The separate forms, into which they had been placed circumstantially, allowed the development of a genuine separateness, and one which they felt bound to defend. They were, in one sense, arrested at the point where Alline, William Black and Garrettson had left them, in the emotional excitement that persuaded them to be not as other men were. Moreover the message of those evangelists had been quite specific in its condemnation of many characteristics of the older churches. Henry Alline insisted that the vision of the believer was real, and the teachings of scholars untrustworthy. Before a group of clergymen Alline had once vowed that he "intended to use what influence I could until my dying day to restore that power, which the ministers had robbed the churches of." 111 If the individual did not interpret for himself, then the interpretation was false.

110 For a more complete discussion of this tendency see below, Chapter IX.

William Black, though no admirer of Alline, was no less adamant in his rejection of authority and discipline. Prompted by Black's attacks on the Anglican church, in themselves no doubt a response to the persecution he had met from the "loyalty" campaign instigated by Inglis and Parr, John Wesley felt obliged to warn his Nova Scotian disciple: "By all means proceed by common consent, and think not of separating from the Church of England."112 But separate he did, and the Nova Scotian Methodist body became the first to hold their meetings during the hours of the regular Anglican service, thus precluding the possibility that a good Methodist could retain his membership in the established church.113 Nor were they tied by any real authority either to the British or American Wesleyan conferences. Garrettson came as a missionary, not as an administrator. In 1789 Wesley sent James Wray to act as Superintendent over the Nova Scotian members, but by that time they had already developed their own peculiarities. They quarrelled with Wray and rejected his discipline, forcing him to resign. Thereafter William Black became "Presiding Elder", on Wesley's appointment, and the Nova Scotian church was in effect self-governing.114

113 Findlay and Holdsworth, Methodist Missionary Society, I, p. 296.
114 Ibid., I, pp. 291-98. See also Walls, "Nova Scotian Settlers", pp. 22-3.
An important legacy of the Nova Scotian revival and its conflict with the establishment, therefore, was the tradition of religious anarchy that it passed to its converts. In the case of the Black Loyalists this tendency was further reinforced by their physical separation. Whether they were Anglican, Baptist, Huntingdonian or Methodist, they shared an image of themselves as a select group uncontaminated by the sins of the white world. Had they been delivered from one form of white bondage merely to submit to another? Their answer was an emphatic "no". If their unique position came about by accident and with no initiative from themselves, their preservation of it was conscious and positive. Their chief concerns, as reported by John Clarkson in 1791, were the acquisitions of land and the liberty to practise their own brand of Christianity.  

In a white society, from which the Black Loyalists were alienated by the circumstances of colour and the practices of religion, only the church was Black and pure. Their chapels, therefore, took on an importance in their lives beyond a simple location for religious services. Community meetings were held in the chapels and, in many ways, the community itself was defined by the chapel to which it belonged. And the leaders of those communities were the preachers. David George was a spokesman for the Shelburne Blacks and

115 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 138, diary entry for 17 November 1791.
represented them, when necessary, to the white society. 116

Joseph Leonard and Thomas Brownspriggs were the agents for land settlement in their districts and signed the petitions to the governor. The captains of Birchtown's Black companies were replaced as leaders by Moses Wilkinson, Cato Perkins and John Ball. 117 The case of Leonard and Brownspriggs points out a connection, too, between land and religious leadership, indicating the consuming interest of the Black Loyalists in these concerns. Thomas Peters and Stephen Blucke, both of whom were prominent in the attempt to acquire the promised land, were deputed by their communities to represent their interests in other ways as well. 118

There was another institution, the school, which also helped to create a separate Black identity and which confirmed certain persons in their leadership position. Joseph Leonard, Isaac Limerick, Stephen Blucke, William Furmage and Thomas Brownspriggs all became teachers in Black schools established in their settlements. The schools, like the churches, owed their origin to the initiative of independent white bodies, for there were neither state schools nor government assistance to education when the Loyalists arrived in Nova Scotia. Four

116Ibid., pp. 71-3; diary entry for 25 October 1791.

117Ibid., pp. 79, 250, diary entries for 26 October and 11 December 1791; Clarkson Papers, III, fol. 174, Clarkson to Wilberforce, n.d.

118PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 34, 36, diary entries for 14 and 16 October, 1791; Clarkson Papers, I, petition dated 23 December 1791.
Black schools were founded and sustained by an English philanthropic organization known as the Associates of the late Dr. Bray, and a fifth by the SPG.

The Rev. Dr. Thomas Bray was a member of the founding groups for the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts and the Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge. Charitably minded Anglicans, trusting in his judgement, began taking gifts of books and money for him to distribute among needy people. When he received a £90d bequest in 1729, Bray used the interest from it to support catechists working among the slaves in America and to provide books for converts. A group of associates joined him to assist in encouraging more contributions to the fund and in seeking the most beneficial means of dispensing it. Upon the death of Thomas Bray in 1739 this group, who now called themselves the Associates of the late Dr. Bray, continued to support religious instruction among American Blacks where allowed by their masters and to found schools for their secular instruction.119 William Wilberforce, Henry Thornton and Granville Sharp, all passionately concerned for the welfare of Black people, were numbered among the Associates.120

When the American war prevented the British philanthropists from continuing their work among the slaves, they

120. SPG, Bray Associates' Minute Books, III, 12 January 1791, 3 March 1791, 5 June 1788.
diverted their support to the poor in Britain. Their inclination, however, was to serve the Black people, and not unnaturally their attention was drawn by the thousands of Black Loyalists who removed from the rebel colonies to British territory in North America. In July 1784, the Associates instructed their secretary, the Rev. Thomas Lyttelton, to write to Halifax rector John Breyton requesting his information whether a Negro School fixed in any part of the Country would answer any good purpose: and whether he can recommend a Person properly qualified to superintend such an Establishment. Breyton sought the advice of Governor Parr, who recommended that a school should be established at Digby under the supervision of Colonel Joseph Barton, "a Suffering Loyalist, and zealous Churchman". Breyton also "opened a school in my Neighbourhood at Halifax and committed the Care of it to a capable and serious free Negro-woman". The Associates approved these developments and asked for further favour that a third school be founded at Birchtown. They agreed to give the teachers an allowance of twelve shillings per annum for each pupil, and sent books for the use of the children in their three schools.

121 Ibid., III, 1 April 1777.
122 Ibid., III, 1 July 1784.
123 SPG, Bray Associates, Box 7, Canadian Papers, Breyton to Associates, 15 November 1771; SP, Bray Associates' Minute Books, III, 3 February 1777.
Digitly in fact had a Black school already, though hardly one which either the Associates or Governor Parr could approve. "An enthusiastic teacher of one of the sects" set up shop there, and so anxious were the free Blacks for education that each of his students agreed to his demand that they work one day in six upon his farm, as payment for his instruction. "This, according to the current price of labour, amounts to about £8 sterling per week", a disgusted Roger Viets reported, which would indicate that the ambitious school-master must have attracted at least fifty pupils.\(^{124}\) Whether this school declined under competition from the Bray-assisted establishment or had already ceased to function before then has not been recorded.

Colonel Barton, on his appointment as inspector to the Digby school, assembled all the region's interested Blacks at a meeting in January 1785 to discuss the Associates' proposal. They evidently expressed their enthusiasm for the plan and requested that Joseph Leonard be named as master of the school. Leonard "being a Man of good Character", Barton agreed to employ him at least for the winter. His inspection visits confirmed him in his choice, for he found the Black teacher "very regular in his way of Teaching".\(^{125}\) For the

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\(^{124}\) SPG Journal, Vol. 24, pp. 17-18. "The current price of labour", if the worker was white, ranged from 2d to 4d per day. If Viets was referring to the price of Black labour, the school must have contained more than the pupils.

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thirty-four pupils who initially enrolled in the school, established in Leonard's home in Brindley Town, "the good Consequences" were immediately evident in that they began to "live a sober religious life" and to pay "less attention to strolling ignorant Newlight and Methodist Preachers". 126 In accordance with the Associates' wishes "manual industry" was encouraged and Leonard's daughter instructed the girls in sewing. The pupils also received instruction in spelling, reading and religion. 127

"Leonard is faithful, and his Scholars make very good Progress", Viets reported in 1788, 128 though Colonel Barton noted that many children in the distressed community were unable to attend school for want of adequate clothing. 129 The Associates immediately sent £5.5.0 "to be laid out in the most needful articles of clothing" for their charges and more bundles of clothing were sent by sympathetic English Quakers, but not in time to prevent a decline in enrollment to twenty-

126 SPG, Designs of the Associates, No. 11, Abstract for 1785, p. 14; SPG, Bray Associates, Box 7, Canada: Papers, Philip Marchinton to John Breynton, 5 April 1788, and Roger Viets to Associates, 30 December 1790.

127 Ibid., Viets to Associates, 30 December 1788; Bray Associates' Minute Books, III, 7 February 1786.


129 SPG, Bray Associates' Minute Books, III, February 1788.
eight pupils. In response to a petition from these twenty-eight young Blacks, which lamented that in their entire community there were only three bibles and twelve prayer books, Bishop Inglis sent them a carton of books. More books and funds shortly arrived from the Associates in London. Such emergency aid, though it by no means eliminated the distress, did enable regular attendance to increase and allowed Leonard to conduct special classes for forty-eight adults as well.

The Associates' school in Halifax, established at the same time as Leonard's in Brindley Town, was located in the Halifax Orphan House at Parr's request. Among the thirty-six Black children taught there were six slaves aged between five and nineteen years. The "capable and serious Negroe woman" first appointed as school-mistress was replaced in

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131 SPG, Bray Associates, Box 7, Canadian Papers, Inglis to Associates, 7 December 1789; SPG, Bray Associates' Minute Books, III, 4 February 1790.

132 Ibid., III, 2 September 1790, Viets to Associates, 26 March 1790.

133 Ibid., III, 7 July and 1 September 1791.

134 Ibid., III, 7 July and 3 November 1791.

135 Ibid., III, 3 February and 11 July 1795.

1786 by William Furmage, John Marrant's erstwhile assistant in the Huntingdonian crusade. His curriculum, like Leonard's, included spelling, reading and the Anglican catechism, with knitting and sewing for the girls. Furmage, however, despite his appointment by an Anglican body, remained a Huntingdonian preacher. In 1787, "having rendered himself very obnoxious to Government by marrying persons clandestinely, and having been inattentive to sending the Children to Church", Furmage was dismissed, and in his stead the authorities appointed Isaac Limerick of Birchtown, whose Anglican credentials were well recognized.

Isaac Limerick had actually left Birchtown late in 1786, after some "differences" with his followers there, and was named by Governor Parr "as the Missionary at Brinly Town". His arrival in the Black settlement was resented by Joseph Leonard, who already considered himself the local Anglican representative though his position derived from popular choice rather than from any official appointment. The two men quarreled publicly and caused such a disturbance in the community that, for a time, Anglican activities and even the school were completely disrupted. But Leonard retained the loyalty of the people and he had, besides, an influential

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137 SPG, Bray Associates' Minute Books, III, 26 March 1787.
138 Ibid., III, 5 February 1787 and 12 June 1787.
139 Ibid., III, 3 July 1788.
ally in Colonel Barton who considered Leonard "an honest well-mannered man," but described the newcomer Limerick as "an artful cunning fellow." Though the colonel's assessment of Limerick's character was not accepted the problems with Fumage created the opportunity, in April 1787, to move Limerick from Brindley Town to assume responsibility for the school in Halifax.

Under him the school returned to orthodoxy, with master and pupils attending special church services on Sundays, and Black education in Halifax was described as being "in a flourishing condition." Unfortunately Limerick's own affairs flourished less. For some reason the Orphan House ceased to be used for a classroom and the teacher was expected to rent some other accommodation to serve as a school-house. The building he chose cost him more than his salary, and he was forced into debt. Despite all these problems the Bray school in Halifax continued to instruct from thirty to forty Black children each year, giving them an advantage over poor white children in the city for whom no education was provided at all.

140 SPG, Bray Associates, Box 7, Canadian Papers, Barton to Weeks, 13 December 1786.
141 SPG, Bray Associates' Minute Books, III, 3 December 1789.
142 SPG, Minutes of the Associates, No. 1, Abstract for 1791, pp. 11-12, Week to Associates, 1 October 1790.
143 SPG, Bray Associates, Box 1, Canadian Papers, Robert Stanser to Associates, 24 October 1797.
The Associates had asked officials in Halifax, early in 1785, to organize a school in Birchtown, and since Colonel Blucke was not only a prominent Anglican but also the community's best-educated man it was logical that he should be selected as the school's first master.\textsuperscript{144} Isaac Wilkins, chief magistrate for the Shelburne district, agreed to inspect the school and to offer his guidance to the teacher.\textsuperscript{145} Blucke's thirty-six original pupils made satisfactory progress and he impressed Wilkins with his conduct and efficient management of Birchtown's education.\textsuperscript{146} When Bishop Inglis visited Birchtown in August 1790 Blucke had forty-four Black children under instruction. Though relatively few of the community's several hundred children, therefore, actually attended the school, and none of the Blacks living in Shelburne itself had access to it, the Bishop felt that they were better served than the five hundred white children there whose parents could not afford to pay tuition at any of Shelburne's twelve white schools.\textsuperscript{147}

It was Inglis who took the initiative to form a school at Little Tracadie. In April 1788 he wrote to Dr.

\textsuperscript{144}SPG, Bray Associates' Minute Books, III, 3 February 1785.

\textsuperscript{145}Cf. ibid., III, 3 September 1789.

\textsuperscript{146}Ibid., III, 3 September 1787, 3 April 1789, and 3 September 1789.

\textsuperscript{147}PANS, Bishop Charles Inglis, Journal, 1785-1790, No. 2, Book 4, p. 15, and 4 August 1790. See also SP, B. L. Library of the Associates, No. 14, Abstract for 1790, p. 2; \textit{ibid.}; Bray Associates' Minute Books, III, 3 February 1789.
Moric, secretary to the SPG, recommending that the Society support a school for about seventy-five Black families who had recently settled there. Upon receiving the Society's authorization Inglis appointed as school-master Thomas Brownspriggs, "who bears an excellent character, and is tolerably well qualified for the office", with a salary of ten pounds per year. A year later he was able to report that "Thomass Brownspriggs went on well with the negroe school at Tracadie, and had 23 black scholars". When several months went by without any word from Brownspriggs the Bishop was at first not concerned, for "that place is very remote, and has little communication with Halifax". He was soon to learn, however, that the master had abandoned his school. Brownspriggs' replacement, Patrick Patton, was himself shortly replaced by Dempsey Jordan, who assumed the educational duties and also led the community's Anglican

148 PANS, Memoirs of Bishop Inglis, No. 1, pp. 53-6, Inglis to Morice, 7 April 1788.
149 Ibid., pp. 115-18, Inglis to Bishop Porteus, December 1789.
150 Ibid., p. 125, Memo, Inglis to Morice, 20 December 1789. See also SPG Report, 1790, p. 44.
151 PANS, Bishop Charles Inglis, Letters, 1791-1799, No. 3, pp. 25-6, Inglis to Morice, 25 June 1792.
152 Ibid., pp. 37-41, Inglis to Morice, 25 November 1792. See also SPG Report, 1793, p. 45.
worship in his home. 154

The fourth Bray school, located at Preston, was begun there by the people themselves. They built a log schoolhouse where Mrs. Catherine Abernathy, a Black Loyalist, taught a class of twenty children. 155 In 1787 the Rev. J. W. Weeks wrote to the Associates to ask if he could put the Preston school "upon the same footing with the Associates' other Schools in Nova Scotia." They agreed, if Weeks would consent to inspect the school, and began their support for Mrs. Abernathy in September 1787. 156 Her pay was withheld later, however, because she was found to be "embracing some strange religious Tenets." 157 This chastisement seems to have worked, for shortly thereafter the school-mistress mended her ways and began instructing her pupils in the Anglican catechism and even holding Anglican services in her home on Sundays. The Associates' support was resumed. 158

In 1791, the Bray group had four schools in Nova Scotia with 136 pupils in all, 159 and the SPG had the one at

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156 SPG, Bray Associates' Minute Books, III, 4 June 1787 and 5 June 1788.

157 Ibid., III, 3 December 1789.

158 Ibid., III, 1 September 1791; SPG, Designs of the Associates, No. 15, Abstract for 1791, pp. 31-2; Weeks to Associates, 4 October 1790.

159 Ibid., p. 38.
Little Tracadie with about twenty-five children in attendance. From 1785 to 1791, therefore, it is quite likely that two to three hundred Black children received an elementary education through the aid of the Church of England, and about one hundred adults attended Sunday or evening classes in Halifax and Brindley Town. All their teachers were themselves Black people and were, except for Fumage, involved in the local affairs of the Anglican church. Just as the missionaries paid only infrequent visits to the Black churches, so the schools were left in considerable peace by the inspectors who authorized the payment of salaries and supplied books but rarely interfered in the running of the schools. Each of the five major Black communities in Nova Scotia had its own school which, with church and chapel, introduced the Black Loyalists to the customs and advantages of white society. Yet because they were kept separate these institutions did not lead the Blacks into white society. Rather, they encouraged the development of a parallel society: Black, Christian and to some extent educated, different from their white neighbours but different too from the slave culture they had left behind. It was, in fact, a unique society, and however much they differed over religion or in their experiences with land and employment, still they belonged to a new way of life that began and grew in Loyalist Nova Scotia.

160 SPG, Bray Associates' Minute Books, II, 3 November 1791.
A Halifax official in the 1790s remarked upon "the Attachment of the Blacks to the Whole extent of their Families, impelling them always to act together." John Clarkson also noticed the strength of family ties among the Black Loyalists, and pointed out that "family" went beyond the normal British definition to include "godchildren or simply people from the same community." He found it curious that Black parents would bring up the children of others as if they were their own, without distinction between natural children and ones thus "adopted." This custom, which widely pertained in Black American slave society, has been traced to West African pre-slave origins. In any case it seems entirely likely that many aspects of the familial relationship were well established before the migration to Nova Scotia.

There seems also to have been a casual attitude toward sexual relationships, or at least toward the sacrament of marriage. Common law arrangements were frequent, even among professed Christians, a custom which may have developed in the slave situation when formal marriage was not always


162 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 92-3, diary entry 28 October 1791.

163 Clarkson Papers, II, fol. 11.

possible or, even when it was, the opportunity for a slave husband, wife and children to live together was never assured. It may be assumed that many of these arrangements, particularly with the threat of a family break-up removed with the escape from slavery, were enduring, and remained common law only because of the inaccessibility of ordained ministers to their communities or because of entrenched custom. Weddings performed by their own Black preachers were not considered legal. Children resulting from common law marriages were baptized, and there seems to have been little awareness of shame or sin among them on account of their lack of legal sanction. Whatever their origins the characteristics of the Black Loyalist family, loosely defined but powerfully constructed, had cemented into custom within a very short time of their arrival in Nova Scotia.

Beyond the family were the chapel, and then the others living within the same settlement. The Preston Blacks, on the eve of their departure for Sierra Leone in 1791, petitioned to be allowed to settle together in their new home. Their group, including both Anglicans and Methodists, had "lived

\[165\text{ Cf. SPG, Bray Associates' Minute Books, III, 3 July 1728.}\]

\[166\text{ Cf. PANS, Shelburne Records, Baptisms, 1783-1869. A typical entry: "31 December 1786- Katherine, Daughter of John Moody, by Ann Johnson, Black". Often couples would assume the husband's family name, though they had never been legally married, e.g. George Wise and Peggy Wynn, and their daughter Fanny, all used the name Wise.}\]
neighbours in the Township of Preston between 6 and 7 years, and are all united together and are well acquainted with each other. John Clarkson granted their request because of the affection and loyalty he found evident between husbands, wives, children and neighbours. Migrants from Shelburne, Birchtown, Digby or St. John retained their group identity while temporarily settled in Halifax, identifying themselves by community origin rather than by family or sect. That these ties bore certain responsibilities is shown by the fact that people in debt, who were not welcomed by the Sierra Leone Company, were assisted by their neighbours who had sold property in order that their community might not be broken up.

There were, therefore, certain Black Loyalist social customs that owed their development to the people's pre-Nova Scotian existence. Such things would have influenced the growth of a separate culture even without the segregation they met as Loyalists. Still the foundation of their society, and its most distinctive trait, was religion. Their religion gave much of their vocabulary and determined many of their daily activities but it also, because of circumstances in Loyalist Nova Scotia, conditioned their attitudes toward themselves and toward other people. Religion made them aware of race.

168 Ibid., p. 264.
169 Ibid., p. 245.
to a greater extent even than their luckless experience with land had done, for it bound them together as a select all-Black group against the encroachments of outsiders, considered sinful or at least less pure. Religion also influenced their political outlook, which was anti-establishment and anti-authoritarian, and made them fearful that state power would somehow interfere with the independence that guaranteed their living a Christian life. From all this came a rather envious attitude toward white people in general. Though they admired whites to the point of emulation in certain things, they looked down upon them for their laxness and injustice. Confident in their own spiritual superiority, the blacks continued to feel uncomfortably inferior in the presence of whites. Even so gentle a man as Boston King considered all whites to be his enemies and was unable to trust them. 170 Though there was some faith in the good intentions of the British government in London, they learned that local officials ignored their interests and posed a threat to their pursuit of happiness. 171

In all but economic terms the Black Loyalists were isolated from the rest of Nova Scotian society. They were settled, most of them, in segregated communities, they suffered from cruelty and injustice at the hands of officials.

171 Clarkson Papers, II, fol. 9.
who treated them differently in allocating lands and provisions, and even before the law. They attended segregated churches and schools, and they had their own social mores which were often at variance with those of the greater society. Under such conditions the Blacks began to feel not only different but exclusive. From the very outset their greatest urge had been the acquisition of land, a small farm which would afford them their independence and security. After seven or eight years in Nova Scotia this urge was generally unfulfilled and undiminished, and with the emergence of their belief in their own exclusiveness the promise of land took on the meaning of a Promised Land, a place where their spiritual and temporal security would be realized. By 1791 many of them had come to doubt that Nova Scotia could be that Promised Land.
CHAPTER V

Foundation of Sierra Leone

The Province of Freedom and the British Philanthropists, 1787-92

When the Brindley Town Black Loyalists were removed a second time from their farm lots in July 1785, Thomas Peters became discouraged of ever having his land promises fulfilled in Nova Scotia. He had been a sergeant in the Black Pioneers and had assumed a leadership position among the Digby-area Blacks, organizing their first petition for lands in August 1784 and taking charge of the distribution of provisions later that year. In search of better treatment for his people Peters crossed over to New Brunswick in the autumn of 1785 and approached the governor, Thomas Cagleton, with a request for lands on behalf of the Blacks of Annapolis County. He was told that they would be given equal treatment with all other Loyalists and disbanded soldiers. However when Peters petitioned for a grant of land near Fredericton, which to him appeared vacant and available, he was informed that the land in question was

1PAMS Vol. 359, Old Townships and Loyalist Documents, Doc. 65, "The Humble Petition of the Black Pioneers", Thomas Peters and Murphy Still to Governor Parr, 21 August 1784; CO 217/63, Bulkeley to Dundas, 19 March 1792, enclosure, Charles Morris to Thomas Millidge, 26 July 1792.
part of a tract already granted to white Loyalists.  

Unsuccessful once again in obtaining farms for himself or his people, Peters decided not to return to Brindley Town. Instead he remained with the Black community of St. John, perhaps hoping to be included in the companies that were then being formed to apply for three large blocks of land. Though 121 lots were surveyed, they were so remote from St. John that only five Black families actually occupied them; over 100 families stayed in St. John, subsisting on their town lots or working as labourers.

In 1790, after six years of waiting for land and what he considered the unjust rejection of three petitions by local officials, Thomas Peters determined to bypass Fredericton and Halifax with a petition to the British cabinet. As did most Black Loyalists, he had faith that the British government had every intention of fulfilling its promises to the Blacks, but believed that those intentions were thwarted by the provincial authorities. He therefore organized a new petition to Secretary of State William Grenville, setting out the grievances of the landless Blacks in the St. John and Annapolis districts. Travelling between those two centres he was given...
power of attorney by 100 Black families in St. John and another 102 families in Annapolis County, and was authorized by them to go personally to England to deliver the petition.

The document Peters bore contained an account of the Brindley Town people's removal from the lands said to be reserved for a gleece and school, and a description of the remote and inaccessible lands granted to the St. John Blacks. It claimed that none of the people had received more than a one-acre town lot, that many were completely without land, and that Peters had been deputed "to procure for himself and his Fellow Sufferers some Establishment where they may obtain a competent Settlement for themselves and be enabled by their industrious Exertions to become useful Subjects to his Majesty". Evidently their experiences since 1783 had taught some of the Black Loyalists that Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were unlikely to provide them with that opportunity. The petition stated that "some Part of the said Black People are earnestly desirous of obtaining their due Allotment of Land and remaining in America but others are ready and willing to go wherever the Wisdom of Government may think proper to provide for them as free Subjects of the British Empire".

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5Also, it is possible that the alternative to remaining in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick was added to the petition after Peters arrived in England. See below, footnote 89.
"At much Trouble and Risk" Peters made his way to Halifax and obtained a passage to London. He reached the Imperial capital early in 1791 with little more in his pockets than his petition. Being Black and poor he gravitated towards a large group of former slaves then living in London, some of them Black Loyalists, known collectively as "the Black Poor". Peters left no record of his early experiences in London, and it is not known how he intended to present his petition to the government. Evidently he explained his mission to other Black paupers and they arranged for his introduction to their patron, Granville Sharp.

The Black Poor owed their freedom to a judgement of Lord Chief Justice Mansfield in 1772. In the case of James Somerset, an escaped slave whose erstwhile master had seized him with the intention of returning him to the West Indies, Lord Mansfield decided that:

The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or political, but only by positive law. Whatever inconveniences, therefore, may follow from the decision, I cannot say this case is allowed or approved by the

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6 Ibid. P. W. Butt-Thompson, Sierra Leone in History and Tradition (London, 1926), p. 93, claims that the captain of the ship taking Peters to England refused to believe that his ticket was valid, and forced him to work for his passage.

7 Fyfe, "Thomas Peters", p. 7, suggests that it may have been Hotohab Cugoano who acted as the liaison between Peters and Sharp. (Cugoano, alias John Stuart, was himself an escaped slave who had written a book about his experiences and was in 1791 a leader of the London Black Poor.
law of England; and therefore the black must be discharged." 9

Though the effect of the Mansfield decision may have been exaggerated by some later writers, the evidence of contemporary observers indicates that hundreds of slaves obtained their freedom as a result of it. 10 Cut loose from their only security and lacking either the means or the skills for self-support, large mobs of unemployed Blacks gathered in London where they sought their livelihood as beggars. Their numbers were augmented in 1783 by demobilized Black sailors and soldiers from the American War and other Black Loyalists who


10 E. M. Howse, Saints in Politics (London, 1953), p. 45; R. Coupland, "The Abolition of the Slave Trade", Cambridge History of the British Empire (Cambridge, 1929), Vol. II, p. 259; Butt-Thompson, Sierra Leone in History and Tradition, p. 70; and K. L. Little, Negroes in Britain (London, 1949), p. 178, claim that slavery was henceforth prohibited in England and that some 14,000 slaves were immediately set free. Ian Wilson cites this as one of the abolitionist myths in "Legal Attitudes to Slavery in 18th Century Britain; English Myths: Scottish Social Realism and Their Wider Comparative Context", Race, Vol. XI, No. 4, April 1970, pp. 466-67. According to this article the only definite decision made by Mansfield was that a slave could not be forcibly removed from England; though legal doubts were raised, most slaves in fact remained as slaves after the Somerset case. If Wilson's version is correct then it seems likely that those slaves who obtained freedom did so when their masters returned to the West Indies and were unable to carry their slaves with them.

had been evacuated directly to England. In their distress they turned to Granville Sharp, who had pioneered the English abolitionist movement in 1765 and had been instrumental in bringing the Somerset case to court. Sharp "considered them as orphans, who had some title to his care", and organized charity relief for their immediate needs.

As a member of the Associates of the late Dr. Bray, Granville Sharp was already familiar with the general circumstances of Nova Scotia's Black Loyalists, and on hearing Thomas Peters' story he took up their cause. He gave his support to the petition, arranged for its presentation to Secretary of State Henry Dundas, and introduced Peters to an influential group of merchants, bankers and politicians. Among them were the Directors of the Sierra Leone Company, a philanthropic and commercial organization that had recently been invested with a colony in West Africa. No longer a friendless Black pauper, Peters mixed with London's society, and had a ready audience for his descriptions and complaints.

11Ibid., pp. 261-64; Henry Smeathman, Plan of a Settlement to be Made near Sierra Leona, on the Coast of Africa (London, 1786), pp. 16-17; PP 1789, Vol. 24, "Papers Respecting Free Negroes Sent to Africa", No. 679, Lord Sydney to the Admiralty, 7 December 1789.


13Ibid., p. 259.

14Some accounts of Peters' London visit decorate it with appearances in London salons, Parliamentary committees, and the society columns of the daily newspapers, e.g. Haliburton, "The Nova Scotia Settlers of 1742", LLS (n.s.), No. 9, December 1957, p. 16; Anthony Kirk-Saunder, "David
The Sierra Leone Company, and the African colony, that gave it its name, had grown out of Granville Sharp's relationship with the Black Poor. Each Monday morning Sharp habitually met the most destitute Blacks of London and gave them a weekly allowance, but by 1788 their numbers and desperation had grown and he was no longer able to organize their support on his own. With a group of wealthy philanthropists Sharp formed a Committee for the Relief of the Black Poor. This Committee, chaired by merchant Jonas Hanway, and including bankers Samuel Hoare and Henry Thornton in its membership, undertook to dispense charity on a more regular basis to the Blacks. In addition the Committee sought ways and means to alleviate their condition more permanently. According to the Poor Law then in practice paupers were left to the support of their parish of origin. London's Poor Law authorities therefore recognized no responsibility for the Blacks, for their place of origin was

George, the Nova Scotian Experience, SLS (ns), No. 14, December 1967, p. 197; E. D. Jones, "Some Aspects of the Sierra Leone Patois or Krio", SLS (ns), No. 6, 1956, p. 97; and Butt-Thompson, Sierra Leone in History and Tradition, p. 94. No contemporary evidence, however, could be found to substantiate the claim that Peters was lionized or became a fashionable craze as these writers suggest. There is also some confusion over the actual sequence of events and the order of Peters' introduction to various groups of people. See below, footnote 1.

considered to be Africa. This suggested a plan to the Committee of resettling the Black Poor in Africa where they could sustain themselves as free people.

Though the specific proposal to form a colony for freed slaves in Sierra Leone came from outside the Committee, the idea of African resettlement was already in the mind of Sharp and the others. In 1783 Sharp had drawn up a memorandum detailing the purchase of land in Africa for former slaves and even the form of government the settlement should follow. At one point the Committee considered the possibility of assisting London's Blacks to join their brethren in Nova Scotia, "but this plan is laid aside, as that country is unfit and improper for the said Blacks". It was therefore to a receptive audience that Henry Smeathman, a botanist who had visited the district of Sierra Leone in West Africa, expressed his willingness personally to transport the Black Poor to Africa and there to establish a free colony for them. Sharp had heard rumours of Smeathman's plan, and the feasibility of his scheme was confirmed by a native of Sierra Leone whom Sharp "happily saved just at that time from slavery".

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18 Smeathman, Plan of a Settlement, pp. 2-4.

19 Hoare, Memoirs of Granville Sharp, p. 261, "..."
Through Sharp's initiative Smeathman and the Committee came together and finalized a colonization programme to be located in Sierra Leone. 20

Smeathman had spent four years in Sierra Leone and had undertaken a government commission to explore the possibilities of the African coast for use as a convict settlement after the American Revolution deprived Britain of one convenient dumping-ground for unwanted citizens. 21 His evidence before a House of Commons committee rejected West Africa as a new home for British miscreants for, he said, "not one in a hundred would be left alive in six months". The possibility of native African hostility and interference with Britain's existing trade in the district were also considered to militate against the settlement proposal. 22 In 1785, however, Smeathman was "in a most miserable state of doubt, fear and anxiety", caused by the numerous creditors at his door. 23 His desperate mind conceived of a scheme, at which he apparently arrived independently, to conduct Black paupers to

20 The Philanthropist, III, 1813, p. 390, "Notices Respecting the late Mr. Granville Sharp".


22 HO 7/1, "Minutes of the Committee of the House of Commons respecting a Plan for Transporting Folons to the Island of Lee Maine in the River Gambia".

23 Ibid.

24 BM Add. Ms. 36495, Cumberland Papers, Vol. V, Henry Smeathman to George Cumberland, 8 August 1785.
Sierra Leone for a *per capita* fee. Smeathman's necessity thus coincided with the Black Poor Committee's deliberations over a solution to their problem, and they grasped his suggestion with enthusiasm.

Sharp and the Committee set about raising funds for the project and they were able to convince the government, which "had long regarded the numerous Negroes who begged in the streets as a nuisance", to lend financial support to the extent of £12 for each Black pauper willing to emigrate. Smeathman was engaged as Agent-Conductor to oversee the transport and settlement of the Blacks in Africa, and he published a *Plan of a Settlement to be Made near Sierra Leone* (1786) which gave a glowing account of Sierra Leone and its native population.

Such are the mildness and fertility of the climate and country [Smeathman wrote], that a man possessed of a change of clothing, an axe, a hoe, and a pocket knife, may soon place himself in an easy situation.

To assuage any consciences, he asserted that the region

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26 Smeathman seems to have had contacts with several prominent London Quakers with whom Sharp was also acquainted, and it may have been through them that Sharp first heard of the plan. Cf. Cumberland Papers, V, Smeathman to Cumberland, 8 August 1785.


around the Sierra Leone River was "but thinly populated", and that the local people "could not be inconvenienced by new-comers". The settlement was, furthermore, to be under the protection of the British government, and all civil and religious liberties were guaranteed. The Committee itself published a recruitment Handbill inviting any Blacks so disposed to apply. Transportation to Africa, three months' provisions and farming implements were offered to prospective emigrants at the government's expense. In response to the Handbill over 600 ex-slaves presented themselves at the Committee's headquarters in London and were conveyed to Plymouth to await transport for Africa. An indication of their desperate condition is given in the fact that some 50 of them died during the Plymouth waiting-period. Others decided at the last minute to desert, though their numbers were partly replaced by some 60 white women of ill-repute who, they later testified, were made drunk, carried aboard the transport ships and, while still in

29 Ibid., p. 9.
30 Ibid., p. 15.
32 PP 1789, Vol. 24, "Free Negroes", No. 626, states that 669 Black Poor were collected in London but only 411 actually embarked at Plymouth. The Sierra Leone Company, Directors' Report, 1791, p. 9, attributed this attrition to the death of fifty and the desertion of the others.
a drunken state, married to single Black men. It was therefore an unlikely party, numbering 411 persons, that boarded three transport ships in December 1786 prepared to establish a new home in Africa.

The Admiralty provided HMS Nautilus, commanded by Captain Thomas Thompson, to escort the three transports to Sierra Leone. Since Smeathman died before their departure Captain Thompson was also charged with the responsibility of acting as agent in the purchase of land in Africa and the settlement of the colonists upon it. Poor weather delayed their sailing from Plymouth, and it was not until 9 May 1787 that the convoy reached the Sierra Leone River. No prior arrangements had been made for their reception; indeed the

33 The story of the white prostitutes is given in almost every account of early Sierra Leone. The Sierra Leone Company's Directors' Report, 1791, p. 3, admitted that "sixty Whites, chiefly women of the lowest sort", were included in the 1787 expedition. Wadstrom, Essay on Colonization, II, p. 220, described the white women as "strumpets". Mrs. Ann Maria Falconbridge personally talked with several of the women involved, and recorded in her Two Voyages to Sierra Leone During the Years 1791-2-3 (London, 1794), p. 65, their testimony concerning their inebriated weddings in Plymouth. The inclusion of the women, evidently without Sharp's knowledge, suggests that the government's primary motive was to rid England of various sorts of unwanted characters.


35 PP 1789, Vol. 24, "Free Negroes", No. 627; Adm. 1/2594, T. B. Thompson to the Principal Officers and Commissioners of H. M. Navy, 21 March 1787; Adm. 1/2594, "Instructions", 4 December 1796 and S. Par. 13; S. Par. 13, Mr. F. H. Correspondence of Sir J. Fordham, 21 July 1787.
exact location for the attempted settlement had not been
determined before they left England. Fortunately for the
colonists the natives of Sierra Leone were no strangers to
European visitors. British contact with the area went back
to 1562, and it had become a regular watering-place for
British ships engaged in the coastal trade. Eight fortified
posts had been established in the region, chiefly for the
conduct of trade in camwood and ivory, and when Thompson's
fleet arrived there were several British merchant ships al-
ready in the harbour. Though the outright purchase of
African land had been unknown before, chiefs were accustomed
to making concessions of land to European traders in exchange
for regular payments of tribute.

On 14 May 1787 Thompson went ashore to negotiate the
purchase of some territory for his colonists. An agreement,
previously drawn up by London lawyers, was signed by King Tom,
the local chief, on 11 June. By it King Tom ceded to the
settlers, "their Heirs and Successors, for ever", a tract of

37PP 1789, Vol. 24, "Free Negroes", No. 628, Thompson
to Stevens, 4 February 1787 and Lord Sydney to the Lords' Com-
missioners of the Admiralty, 21 February 1787; Adm. 3/162,
Minutes of 21 February 1787.

38Adm. 51/627, Nautilus Log Books, 5 May 1787;
Eveline C. Martin, The British West African Settlements 1500-
1821, A Study in Local Administration (London, 1977), p. 127;
Fyfe, History, pp. 2-7; Harry C. Luke, A Bibliography of
Sierra Leone (London, 1982), pp. 34-50; T. N. Goddard, The

land bordering the harbour measuring twenty miles by twenty miles square. In exchange Tom received £59.1.5 worth of trade goods. It seems likely that the chief's willingness to depart from African tradition and to alienate permanently a portion of his territory was a result of his not understanding the nature of the transaction. Other Europeans living in Africa occupied their posts as tenants of the regional authorities, not as "owners" of the land. The Sierra Leone colonists' failure to behave as tenants was to lead to future disputes with the local Africans who, despite the purchase agreement, continued to regard the land as their own.

One of the settlers' first acts on disembarking was to elect one of their number, Richard Weaver, as "chief in command". Thompson's mission had been limited to the safe transport and settlement of the emigrants; once in Africa they were free to regulate themselves. Sharp had drawn up "Orders and Regulations", which were adopted by the settlers before their departure from England, for the democratic government of the new colony. His system, "a curious mixture


of communism, and "of Anglo-Saxon customs", divided the population into "tythings" of ten families each, and "hundreds", consisting of ten tythings. The tythingmen and hundredors were elected by their constituencies and were responsible for organizing defense, labour, and public order. An elected chief justice sat over a court in which trial by jury was practised. The settlers called their new home, again on Sharp's suggestion, the "Province of Freedom", and the village they built on the harbour shore they christened "Granville Town".

Some land was cleared and temporary huts were built, but the new community ran into serious difficulties almost immediately. The rains, which began shortly after their arrival, prevented farming or even the building of adequate shelter. The settlers themselves were not equipped by skill or temperament for a life as pioneer farmers: they squabbled, indulged in alcohol, and cheated each other. By the time Thompson left in September 1787 only 268 settlers were left.

42 Evans, "Early Constitution", p. 28.


in the Province of Freedom. The others had died or had taken up jobs with neighbouring slave-traders where their literacy enabled them to support themselves as clerks. Six months later the population had declined to 130. The white settlers, including the three surgeons and the SPG chaplain, the Rev. Patrick Frazer, were also forced to seek refuge among the slave-traders.

Decimated by disease and desertion, their supplies consumed or destroyed by the weather; their implements exchanged with the native people for food, the settlers were unable to carry on without assistance from England. When he heard of their difficulties Sharp chartered a ship and sent, at his own expense, a new supply of livestock, utensils and provisions. Still it was evident to the plan's sponsors, and to the settlers still remaining at Granville Town, that the Province of Freedom needed a more suitable economic base for it to survive. In September 1788 the new chief in command, James Reid, wrote to Sharp requesting


47 Hoare, Memoirs of Granville Sharp, p. 313; Sharp to Lettsom, 13 October 1788 and pp. 354-57; Sharp to "the worthy Inhabitants of Sierra Leone", 16 May 1748.
an agent or two out here with us, to carry on some sort of business with regard to trade, so that we could rely a little sometimes on them for a small assistance, until our crops were fit to dispose of and then pay them. It would be of infinite service to all the poor settlers, as provisions are scarce to be got.\textsuperscript{48}

During the first two years of the Sierra Leone experiment Sharp had expended over £1700, "much more money", he wrote, than a private person in my situation ought to have done.\textsuperscript{49} The chartering of the ship in 1788 took the last of his resources.\textsuperscript{50} Personally never a rich man, most of the funds he made available for Sierra Leone, and earlier for Black Poor relief, were donations from friends, relatives and admirers.\textsuperscript{51} Like Dr. Bray he served as a "clearing house" for charitable contributions by wealthier people who trusted his discretion and approved of his programmes. But these sources seem to have been exhausted by the time Reid's request reached London, and so Sharp was forced to devise

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p. 322, James Reid to Sharp, September 1788.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., p. 315, Sharp to Lettsom, 13 October 1788.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., pp. 359-61, Sharp to the Sierra Leone settlers, 22 January 1791.

\textsuperscript{51} Prince Hoare, Memoirs of Granville Sharp, p. 383, writes, "it is not immediately evident from what sources [Sharp] drew his supplies". In 1780 he had received a legacy of £550 from a relative, and his brothers William and James were frequent contributors. A wealthy female admirer left him a manor in Essex in 1787 (ibid., pp. 383-84). Samuel Whitbread, the brewer, was another donor (ibid., p. 324), and Sharp wrote as far as America seeking financial support for his various charities (ibid., pp. 313-14, Sharp to Mrs. \textemdash at New York, 12 January 1788).
some new method to encourage assistance for the Province of Freedom. In July 1789 he wrote to the government asking for two small ships and promising that he would endeavour to prevail on a few respectable merchants in the City to undertake the charge of them as a public Board or Company in order to commence an honourable free trade [with Sierra Leone].

He then asked William Wilberforce to assist with the acquisition of a vessel "in the condemned hold" and "to propose such of your friends as you think would approve of being included in the Corporation" that would be formed to conduct the trade with Africa.

Sharp spent several months seeking out likely supporters and urging further government assistance, and he drew up a petition for the incorporation of the St. George's Bay Company "to enable them to send proper factors and agents to St. George's Bay, the principal harbour of the new English territory, in order to promote and carry on trade". On 17 February 1790 the first meeting was held of "the Gentlemen disposed to encourage a free trade to St. George's Harbour",

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52 Ibid., pp. 339-40, Sharp to Thomas Steele, 23 July 1789.


54 Ibid., pp. 357-59, Sharp to "the Settlers at Sierra Leone", 27 September 1790, pp. 351-56, Sharp to Pitt, 26 April 1790, 10 June 1790 and 28 August 1790.

55 Ibid., p. 350, "The Memorial of Granville Sharp, Citizen of London, in behalf of Himself and Others".
and shares were sold at £50 each to the twenty-two original members of the Company.\textsuperscript{56} The meeting selected Henry Thornton, a prominent banker and Member of Parliament, as chairman of the new Company.

Thornton's credentials for his post were impeccable. A successful businessman, he lent credibility to the scheme as a commercial venture; a philanthropist and participant in worthy causes, including the Bray Associates, the Black Poor Committee and the Abolition Committee, he was able to attract those supporters more interested in the Company's idealistic objects.\textsuperscript{57} Sharp, Wilberforce and Thomas Clarkson were among the twelve Directors elected to Thornton's board.\textsuperscript{58}

It fell to Thornton to present a petition of incorporation to Parliament and to guide the bill through the Commons. The


\textsuperscript{57} Thornton's charitable activities are outlined by F. A. V. Hayle in his introduction to the 1939 edition of Henry Thornton, \textit{An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britain} (London, 1802). For example, from 1790 to 1793 Thornton spent £20,408 on various charities and only £6,964 on all his other living expenses (p. 25).

\textsuperscript{58} The others were Philip Sansom, Sir Charles Middleton, Sir George Young, Joseph HARDCASTLE, John Kingston, Samuel PARKER, William Sandford, VICKERIS Taylor and George Wolff, \textit{Directors' Report, 1791}, introduction. "In the election of the Company's officers", Prince Hoare wrote, "his compliment, so often paid to Mr. Sharp on other occasions, of placing him in the chair, was here omitted; as the philanthropic object of the settlement had by many been deemed, so highly visionary, that it was judged advisable to elect a chairman, whose ordinary connections with concerns of a more acknowledged substantial foundation might seem to authorize the expectation of success", (\textit{Memoirs of Granville} Sharp, p. 364.)
petition, introduced in February 1791, sought incorporation to enable the St. George's Bay Company to conduct trade with Africa and to possess the land previously vested in the settlers but now assumed to have reverted to the British Crown. During the Commons deliberations the bill came to be called the "Sierra Leone Settlement Bill", and when it was passed on 30 May it incorporated the "Sierra Leone Company", empowered to hold the land ceded by King Tom in 1787, to establish a government there, and to trade with the colony and its hinterland. The Company's charter was to extend for thirty-one years from 1 July 1791.

Sharp's objects in initiating the Company were subtly but substantially amended by the new chairman and directors. In his 1789 proposal he stressed that a company was being formed at the request of the settlers and to serve their interests. His own interest was primarily in the provision of a free homeland for free men, an experiment in self-determination and cooperation for people who had known

59 PRO 30/8/3, 'Chatham Papers, fols. 1 and 2, "Proposition for establishing a St. George's Bay Company"; Commons Journals, Vol. XLVI (1790-91), pp. 245-46, 28 February 1791. The desertion of the land by the original settlers was considered to relinquish their title.

60 Ibid., p. 356, 28 March, p. 405, 12 April, p. 455, 3 May 1791; Times, 29 March, 13 April, 18 May and 31 May 1791.

61 31 Geo. III, cap. 55.

only slavery and coercion. The failure of the Province of Freedom to attain any real security, however, and the necessity to bring in outside supporters who had to be encouraged with other goals, meant that Sharp's influence was diminished. The re-establishment in Africa of Black freemen, which had been Sharp's original ambition for the colony, became for the Sierra Leone Company an instrument toward the realization of a series of quite different goals.

Most of the men whom Sharp and Wilberforce brought into the Sierra Leone Company were members of the Committee for the Abolition of the African Slave Trade, founded in 1787 under Sharp's chairmanship. Paced by the indefatiguable efforts of Thomas Clarkson, the Committee investigated conditions in the slave trade and its effects on Africa and on England, conducted a lobbying campaign in Parliament, and distributed information to the British public. The Sierra

63 Sharp's crusade for individual liberties went far beyond the abolition question. See Granville Sharp, A Declaration of the People's Natural Right to a Share in the Legislature (London, 1774), and Granville Sharp, The Law of Liberty (London, 1776).


Leone colonization scheme suggested itself as a powerful weapon in the Abolitionist campaign, and this proved to be a primary attraction not only for the Directors but for the individuals who purchased shares in the Company.\textsuperscript{66} In a report to the proprietors the Directors stated that "the subversion of the iniquitous trade in slaves" was one of the motives which led to the institution of the Sierra Leone Company,\textsuperscript{67} and the Times interpreted the Company's establishment as being "for the purpose of undermining the Slave Trade".\textsuperscript{68}

This object was to be effected by substituting "legitimate" trade, i.e. trade in natural products and handicrafts, for the "illegitimate" slave trade. The Abolitionists felt that once the Africans saw an alternative they would voluntarily desist from selling each other. It was also hoped that English merchants would be drawn away from the slave trade and into other lines of merchandise when they discovered that an African as customer created more profit.

\textsuperscript{66} Cf. Wadstrom, Essay on Colonization, II, pp. 341-53; Clarkson Papers, I, Henry Thornton to John Clarkson, 30 December 1791; National Register of Archives, HW 87/452, Richard How to Granville Sharp, 7 April 1792.

\textsuperscript{67} Directors' Report, 1794, p. 161.

\textsuperscript{68} Times, 27 October 1791. The slave trade interests also acknowledged that the Company and its colony threatened their operations in West Africa, e.g., see Petitions of the Merchants of Lancaster, Liverpool, London and Bristol against the Sierra Leona Settlement Bill, Commons Journals, Vol. XLVI (1790-91), p. 414, 15 April, pp. 442-43, 20 April, pp. 454-55, 3 May, and p. 457, 4 May 1791.
than an African as commodity. The Sierra Leone Company was therefore to be used as an instrument to encourage the development of a flourishing trade between England and Africa. If it were to be cited as a reasonable alternative, that trade would have to show a profit. Though the Directors and shareholders expected no immediate personal gain from the Company, the venture had at least to pay for itself in the short run and in the long run it had to pay greater dividends than the slave trade.

Commerce would furthermore introduce to Africa the benefits of European civilization, and thereby make the continent receptive to the teachings of the Christian religion. A demand for African products would encourage the African people to cultivate their land, develop their industries, and lead a more settled life. European manufactures and


70 Clarkson Papers, I, Thomas Clarkson to John Clarkson, 28 August 1791, Henry Thornton to John Clarkson, 30 December 1791; Parliamentary Debates, Vol. II (1804), col. 965-68, Henry Thornton, 9 July 1804.

business practices would reveal the superiority of the English way of life. Confident in their own values, the Abolitionists in the Company believed that such a process would make amends for the depredations committed by the slave trade and would besides ensure the Christian salvation of a heathen continent. Thomas Clarkson summarized the Company's objects as "the Abolition of the Slave-Trade, the Civilization of Africa, and the Introduction of the Gospel there."—

Conscious that their great aims could be subverted by shareholders over-anxious for an immediate profit, the Directors took steps to provide for a cooperative body of proprietors. Shares could be sold only to someone recommended by a member of the Company, and then he had to be elected by a two-thirds majority of all current proprietors. There was no doubt that these methods successfully supplanted Smith's notion that the colony existed for the sake of the colorists. In December 1791 Chairman Thornton noted that "the civilization and cultivation of Africa", "the propaga-


73 Clarkson Papers, I, Thomas Clarkson to John Clarkson, 2 January 1792.

74 Directors' Report, 1791, pp. 56-8.
tion of Christianity there" and the "Abolition of the Slave Trade" were the motivations and aims shared by the Company's five-hundred proprietors. 75

"In order to introduce either a safe trade, or any considerable degree of civilization and cultivation", the Directors decided, "it must be an especial object of the Company to provide effectually for the protection of property, and for the personal security of the settlers on their district." 76 The Province of Freedom, plainly, had to cease. The achievement of the Directors' goals depended just as much on the care and regulation of the colony as it did on the cooperation of the proprietors; in the Company's scheme, the colonists' role was to ensure the success of the colony and hence of the African regeneration that was expected to emanate from it. "A respectable establishment" of European officials, teachers, planters and commercial agents, was, in the Directors' opinion, "the best security" that could be provided. 77 All settlers would be required to submit to the governing body established by the Company, consisting of a superintendent and councillors appointed by and responsible only to the Directors in London. "All matters, civil, military, political and commercial", previously under the demo-
cratic control of the settlers, were assigned to the Company council. Granville Sharp considered this an unfortunate, but inevitable, result of the colony’s early problems.

The Community of settlers, [Sharp wrote] ... are no longer proprietors of the whole district as before, as the land has been granted, since they were driven out, to the Sierra Leone Company; so that they can no longer enjoy the privileges of granting land by the free vote of their own Common Council, as before, nor the benefits of their former Agrarian Law, nor the choice of their own Governor and other officers, nor any other circumstances of perfect freedom proposed in the Regulations: all these privileges are now submitted to the appointment and control of the Company, and no settler can trade independently of it.

... I could not prevent this humiliating change: the settlement must have remained desolate if I had not thus far submitted to the opinions of the associated subscribers.79

In the meantime the Directors learned of an event in Africa that emphasized the necessity for greater control and security in Sierra Leone. In December 1789 the Temne chief King Jimmy raided Granville Town and literally destroyed the settlement. Since he gave three days’ notice of his intentions all but four old people had time to seek refuge with neighbouring slave traders; those four Jimmy seized and sold into slavery. Relations with the indigenous inhabitants had never been particularly cordial. Piqued at the settlers’ refusal to behave as other tenants did, King Tom had kid-

78Evans, "Early Constitution", p. 47, Article 17, and p. 59, Article 35.

napped several of them as slaves. The watering place, formerly a source of considerable revenue for the Temne, fell within the ceded area, and they began to demand its return. The dispute was aggravated by the fact that the chief who considered the watering place to be within his own territory, King Jimmy, had not been a signatory to the 1787 agreement. He too began to demand tribute, and, when it was not forthcoming, to enslave settlers as compensation. The elected representatives of the settlement approached Captain Henry Savage, of HMS Pomona, with their complaints and a plea for assistance. Evidently a local slave trader, James Bowie, also had his differences with King Jimmy, for he added his complaints against Jimmy and suggested that Captain Savage deliver a chastisement to the threatening Temne. In November 1789 Savage sent a small party ashore, accompanied by Bowie and several settlers, to set fire to a Temne hut as a warning and a punishment. When Jimmy resisted the party withdrew and Savage bombarded the African village with the Pomona's guns.

On 3 December Savage left Sierra Leone, believing the matter closed, and Jimmy immediately issued his warning to Granville Town in retaliation. Eighty-seven settlers fled to the slave traders, where most of their original companions were already

80 Ibid., p. 322, Weaver to Sharp, 23 April 1788.

81 Ibid., pp. 331-33, "the Old Settlers at Sira Leone" to Sharp, 3 September 1788.
employed, and were given shelter and protection. 82

It was therefore a completely dépopulated colony
that the Sierra Leone Company inherited. The Directors en-
gaged Alexander Falconbridge, formerly a surgeon in the
slave trade but more recently an ally in the Abolitionist
movement, as their agent to gather the scattered settlers
together in a new settlement, to provide for their security,
and to initiate a friendly trade with the neighbouring
Africans. On his arrival in February 1791 Falconbridge took
over an abandoned African village about one-and-a-half miles
from the original settlement, and was able to entice some
sixty-four settlers to take up residence in the new Granville
Town. When Falconbridge returned to England shortly there-
after he left his servant, a Greek named Theodore Kallingee,
in charge of the colony. Granville Town was resurrected,
but the Province of Freedom was no more. 83

It was evident that a larger population was necessary
in Sierra Leone if it were to serve the Company's ambitious
ends. In 1788 Sharp had written that "a larger body of set-
tlers is wanted, to oppose the treachery of the natives,

82 Adm. 51/707, Pomona Log Books, 21 November, 25–27
November, 3 December 1791; PRO 30/8/363, Chatham Papers,
John Tilley to John and Alexander Anderson, 20 December 1789,
and James Bowie to John and Alexander Anderson, 22 December
1789.

83 Falconbridge, Two Voyages, pp. 10, 63–4; Directors' 
Report, 1791, pp. 7–8; PRO 30/78310, Chatham Papers, John 
William Ramsay to Sharp, 22 March 1791, and Alexander Falcon-
bridge to Sharp, 18 April 1791.
instigated by the English slave dealers in the neighbouring factories", 84 and he later suggested that such a population could come from North America and the West Indies as well as from England. 85 The difficulties of the Province of Freedom were, at least in part, attributed to the bad behaviour of the 1787 group, so the Directors were dissuaded from recruiting any more settlers from among the Black Poor. 86 A party of 119 whites was selected in 1791, made up of a "respectable establishment" of administrators, artisans, soldiers, and ten settlers with their families, 87 but the continuing ideal of a home for freed slaves, and a belief that Africa would be more effectively converted through Blacks, meant that the Company was in search of a free Black Christian group to repopulate Sierra Leone. 88

The arrival of Thomas Peters in London seemed to

84 Hoare, Memoirs of Granville Sharp, p. 328, Sharp to Pitt, June (or July) 1788.

85 Ibid., pp. 334-36, Sharp to John Jay, 7 March 1789.

86 Ibid., p. 313, Sharp to Mrs. ----, 12 January 1788; PP 1789, Vol. 24, "Free Negroes", No. 628, Thompson to Stevens, 26 May 1787, 23 July 1787, 23 January 1788; Times, 10 February 1792; Directors' Report, 1794, p. 2.

87 Directors' Report, 1791, p. 46; Directors' Report, 1794, p. 7. The 119 whites were to be occupied as follows: Company "upper servants" (councillors, chaplain, medical officers, secretary, etc.) including families--26; Company "lower servants" (clerks, overseers, artisans) including families--59; settlers including families--18; soldiers--16.

offer the Directors a solution to their problem. Though, there are some contradictions and minor confusions in the various accounts dealing with Peters' London mission, it appears most likely that the initiative was taken by the Directors and, after hearing Peters' story of the ill-treated Black Loyalists of Nova Scotia and their desire to win land and independence somewhere in the British Empire, they extended their invitation to accept as many as might choose to emigrate to the colony of Sierra Leone.  

89 John Clarkson wrote that on his arrival in London Peters heard of the Sierra Leone Company from other Blacks and applied to the Directors for information concerning their new African colony (Clarkson Papers, III, fol. 157, Clarkson to Wilberforce, n.d.). Wilberforce claimed in the House of Commons that Peters went first to the government and that after reading his petition the government itself approached the Sierra Leone Company on his behalf (Parliamentary Debates, Vol. IX [1807], col. 1001-1005, Wilberforce, 29 July 1807). Secretary of State Henry Dundas explained in a letter to John Parr, "it has appeared to the Petitioner Peters' on a consideration of the encouragement held out by the Gentlemen [of the Sierra Leone Company] ... that the proposed Settlement would be likely to afford to him and to Persons of the like description an Asylum much better suited to their constitutions than Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and he has in consequence expressed a desire that he and his Family, and such other Blacks as may be disposed to become Settlers at Sierra Leona may be removed thither". (CO 217/63, Dundas to Parr, 6 August 1791. Emphasis is mine, JW.)

The Directors in their 1794 Report implied that Peters came to England already familiar with the Sierra Leone experiment, and that his petition was intended to win the Black Loyalists a home in Africa (Directors' Report, 1794, p. 2). This last interpretation is also given in Viscountess Knutsford, Life and Letters of Zachary Macaulay (London, 1900), p. 21. It must be remembered that by 1794 it was in the Directors' interest to claim that the initiative came from the Nova Scotian Blacks, for by that date serious problems existed between the Company and the settlers and it would
The Company arranged for a government promise to pay the costs of transportation from Nova Scotia to Sierra Leone, and John Clarkson volunteered to accompany Peters to Nova Scotia to recruit emigrants and to organize their safe conduct to Africa. Clarkson was a member of the Abolition Committee and the younger brother of Thomas Clarkson. He had been quite active already in furthering the Abolitionist crusade and had recently decided to devote two years of his full-time efforts not appear fair if the Company had indeed encouraged the Black Loyalists to migrate (see Chapter VIII below). Similarly in 1807 the Directors were hoping to place responsibility for the Nova Scotian Blacks on the Government of England, and Wilberforce was reinforcing this policy by stating in Parliament that the Company only accepted the new settlers on the government's insistence (see also Chapter XI below). Since both these versions had political motivations, the truth probably lies between the Clarkson and Dundas statements: Peters heard of the Company, and of Sharp, from some of the Black Poor, Sharp took him to his fellow Directors, and they introduced the idea of settlement in Sierra Leone to him. The paragraph in Peters' petition referring to the Black Loyalists' willingness to settle elsewhere in the British Empire need not imply that his original intention was to apply for land in Africa. It is in fact quite possible that the 1790 petition was re-written in England, for the correctness of his spelling and grammar are in contrast to his 1784 petition to Governor Parr. Furthermore the only signature on the 1790 petition was Peters' own, which would suggest that it could have been written after he left Nova Scotia. If it was re-written in England, it was undoubtedly done in consultation with his educated friends, and the "British Empire" paragraph could have been added at that time. Regardless of the exact sequence of events it appears obvious that Sierra Leone offered new hope to the Black Loyalists and they offered Sierra Leone what it most needed and wanted: free Black Christians. Nothing could be more natural than that both parties to the agreement in 1791 should have been enthusiastic about the proposition.

90PAMS, Clarkson’s Mission, p. 1 (6 August 1791).
Both Clarksons had already seen in the Sierra Leone scheme an effective weapon against the slave trade; in 1788 they had been prevented from becoming settlers there themselves only by the insistence of their friends that their presence in England was "indispensably necessary" for the Abolitionists' success. When he heard of the Peters' mission in 1791, and of the Directors' apprehension that the recruitment plan could be sabotaged by uncooperative white officials in Nova Scotia if left in the hands of a friendless Black man, John Clarkson "thought I could not serve the cause [of Abolition] in a more effectual way ... than by offering my services".

John Clarkson was an ideal choice for the mission to Nova Scotia. He had left the Royal Navy because war conflicted "with the principles of the gospel", but he still carried the rank, and the prestige, of a naval lieutenant, and this would be a decided asset in his negotiations with hesitant Nova Scotian officials. At age twenty-five he was already noted in London circles for his charm and manners.

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91 Clarkson Papers, I, Thomas Clarkson to John Clarkson, 13 May 1792; T. Clarkson, History of Abolition, II, p. 343.
92 Hoare, Memoirs of Granville Sharp, p. 326, Sharp to "the worthy Inhabitants of Sierra Leone", 16 May 1788.
93 Clarkson Papers, III, fol. 158, Clarkson to Wilberforce, n.d.
94 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, appendix, Thomas Clarkson, "Sketch of John Clarkson, late Lieutenant, RN" (Ms., 1828), p. 3.
and was on terms of easy familiarity with Members of Parliament and other highly-placed dignitaries. 96 His gentleness, devotion and Christian sincerity would add to his reputation as an Abolitionist to recommend him to the Black Loyalists. If the Blacks had reason to distrust white men, one Company member wrote, then John Clarkson was the one white man they could believe. 97 His credentials were such that he could move freely and confidently between the unhappy Blacks and the suspicious whites of Nova Scotia.

When Clarkson left London for Halifax on 19 August 1791 the Sierra Leone Company had not received explicit authority over Sierra Leone. Though the incorporation bill passed Parliament in May, the objections of the slave trade interests and the hesitation of the Attorney-General's department over certain provisions in it caused a delay in its implementation by the Crown. Thornton wrote in December 1791:

We have not yet got either Charter or Grant of Land from the Crown, but the Grant is I hope in train. ... We may perhaps get an Act of Parliament forming a more effective and a more regularly legal Government in this or the following year's session of Parliament. 98

96 Wilberforce usually addressed John Clarkson in his letters as "my dear Admiral", and once wrote to Clarkson's mother expressing his deep affection for John. Clarkson Papers, I, Wilberforce to Mrs. Clarkson, 1 September 1792.


98 Clarkson Papers, I, Thornton to Clarkson, 30 December 1791. See also to 267/9, Henry Thornton to Evan Nepean, 3 August 1791.
Nevertheless the urgency of the situation forced the Directors to proceed as if they had already received the government's full sanction, and they gave Clarkson their authority to offer the Black Loyalists a new home in Africa with free land and complete racial equality. It was left to Clarkson's discretion to accept or reject any applicants, and to set any necessary terms upon their acceptance.\(^9^9\) Thus, though the Company's power rested on no more than the Directors' faith that Parliament would confirm it in time, Clarkson sailed to Nova Scotia on the assumption that he enjoyed the Company's confidence and authority to establish the conditions of settlement with the Nova Scotian Blacks.

\(^9^9\) PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 14-15, J. R. Williams to John Clarkson, 12 August 1791; Clarkson Papers, I, Orders of the Directors of the Sierra Leone Company to John Clarkson, 12 August 1791.
CHAPTER VI
Black Exodus
Clarkson's Mission to America, 1791-92

After receiving Thomas Peters' petition, Secretary of State Henry Dundas wrote to Governors John Parr and Thomas Carleton advising them that the government intended to correct the Blacks' situation in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Enclosing Peters' memorial, Dundas commented: "If what the Petitioner represents be true, they have certainly strong grounds for complaint." He ordered that an enquiry be held immediately to determine the truth of the charges made by Peters, and if it shall appear that the Engagements made on the part of the Government with respect to the said Grants of Land have not been fulfilled, that you give directions that the full proportions of Lands promised to them may immediately be located, and in a situation so advantageous as may make them some atonement for the injury they have suffered by this unaccountable delay.1

Dundas offered an alternative to placing the Blacks on good lands in the Maritime colonies. He described the agreement between Peters and the Sierra Leone Company Directors, and stated that the government was willing to bear the

1CO 217/63, Henry Dundas to John Parr, 6 August 1791. Also printed in Royal Gazette and Nova Scotia Advertiser, 27 September 1791.
expense of transporting any Blacks who "may be disposed to become Settlers at Sierra Leone". This decision was made, Dundas explained, because "His Majesty, in consideration of their Services [during the American War], is anxious that they should be gratified". He therefore directed the local authorities to appoint agents who would visit the Black settlements and lay the Sierra Leone offer before the people. Those inclined to accept should be assembled in Halifax and from thence conveyed to Sierra Leone "where they are to be put on Shore". Dundas added the cautionary note that the government was not interested in promoting the African scheme, but merely in providing an opportunity to those Blacks who might be dissatisfied with their present situation.  

As a third alternative Dundas requested Parr and Carleton to encourage the Black veterans to re-enlist in the army for service in the West Indies. It had long been the government’s intention, he stated, "to embody a certain number of Negroes to serve in the West Indies, either as a separate Corps, or to be attached to the different Regiments in service there." The agents assigned to advertise the Sierra Leone project were also to induce able-bodied Blacks to enlist for this service by offering them a bounty of one guinea each and "a promise of British Pay" once

2 Ibid.
on duty.  

John Clarkson arrived in Halifax on 7 October 1791, and presented himself that same afternoon before Governor Parr with a request for his cooperation. He was preceded, about one week earlier, by Lieutenant Francis Miller, the recruiting officer for the West Indian Black Carolina Corps. Clarkson learned that the governor had already made arrangements to conduct an enquiry into Black Loyalist lands and to announce the Sierra Leone and West Indian recruitment opportunities. The complete text of Dundas' August dispatch was published in the local press, together with instructions to the Blacks concerning application procedures. Four agents had been appointed to inform the people and to collect the names of prospective emigrants. For Shelburne district the agent was Major Stephen Skinner, a Loyalist magistrate in that county. Annapolis and its neighbourhood were to be the responsibility of Alexander Howe, an "old Settler", ardent anti-Loyalist and Member of the Legislative Assembly for Annapolis County. Another Legislative Assemblyman, James Putman, was appointed for

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3 Ibid.

4 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 28 (7 October 1791); CO.217/63, Parr to Dundas, 17 October 1791; Royal Gazette and Nova Scotia Advertiser, 11 October 1791.

5 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 31 (11 October).

6 Royal Gazette and Nova Scotia Advertiser, 27 September 1791.
Manchester and the Eastern Shore. Halifax and district came under a prominent Quaker merchant and Loyalist magistrate, Lawrence Hartshorne.\footnote{CO 217/63, Parr to Dundas, 27 September 1791; Royal Gazette and Nova Scotia Advertiser, 4 October 1791; C. Bruce Ferguson, A Directory of the Members of the Legislative Assembly of Nova Scotia, 1758-1958 (Halifax, 1958), pp. 153, 163, 317, 395; David Allison, History of Nova Scotia (3 vols., Halifax, 1916), Vol. II, pp. 532, 543.} Hartshorne was the only agent known previously to the Sierra Leone Company, and the only one who had acted upon his assignment before Clarkson's arrival in Halifax.\footnote{Clarkson Papers, III, fol. 164.}

Soon after presenting his credentials to the Halifax establishment\footnote{PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 29 (8 October).} Clarkson published a more precise statement of the Company's offer and terms of acceptance. The Black Loyalists were invited to appear before either Clarkson or Hartshorne, bearing "satisfactory testimonials of their character; (more particularly as to honesty, sobriety, and industry)". If acceptable to the Company's representatives the Blacks would be transported free to Sierra Leone where they would receive grants of not less than twenty acres for a man, ten for his wife and five for each child. These lands were granted upon such terms, and subject to such charges, and obligations, with a view to the general prosperity of the Company, as shall hereafter be settled by the Company, in respect to Grants of Land to be made by them to all settlers,
whether Black, or White". Racial equality was guaranteed in that "the civil, military, personal, and commercial rights and duties of Blacks and Whites shall be the same, and secured in the same manner", and slavery was absolutely forbidden in the new colony. The Company further offered to assist with the sale of any properties belonging to prospective emigrants, and to remit the proceeds to the settlers after their arrival in Sierra Leone.  

The terms were distributed in Halifax, and Clarkson and Hartshorne began visiting the homes of free Blacks so that they could explain personally the Company's offer. Their first visit was to Preston, a community of about one-hundred Black families on the outskirts of Halifax, where on 12 October they went from hut to hut describing their project. The next week was spent in Halifax itself, stopping at Black homes and conversing with as many free Blacks as they encountered. On 19 October, the first day appointed for examining and enrolling prospective emigrants, they received applications from seventy-nine Halifax and Preston people. One month later the number of Halifax and Preston applicants had grown to 220.

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10 Clarkson Papers, III, fol. 158; Directors' Report, 1794, pp. 4-6.
11 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 32 (12 October).
12 Ibid., pp. 33, 37-45, 55-56 (13, 18, 19 and 20 October); Clarkson Papers, III, fol. 165.
13 Ibid., fol. 169.
Before Clarkson's arrival in Halifax Lawrence Hartshorne had written to Shelburne and Birchtown with news of the Sierra Leone opportunity. He received a reply from Colonel Blucke on 14 October stating that many people in Birchtown were anxious to participate in the scheme and requesting more information. As soon as his duties were completed in Halifax, therefore, Clarkson set sail for Shelburne. Constantly the recruiter, when his ship was forced to shelter at Port d'Hebert for a night Clarkson went ashore and visited the huts of some Black share-croppers nearby. On landing at Shelburne he was met on the wharf by David George, who had been deputed by his congregation to meet with Clarkson, and was then on the point of embarking for Halifax. Recruitment in Halifax and Preston had largely been based on personal contact between Clarkson and the Blacks, but in Shelburne he decided to let George carry the message to the people and to limit himself to answering questions and providing more complete explanations when necessary.

The success of his Shelburne experience suggested to Clarkson the efficacy of using the agency of the Black

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14 Ibid., fol. 164-65.
15 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 34-5, Stephen Blucke to Lawrence Hartshorne, 10 October 1791.
16 Ibid., pp. 59-67 (22 October 1791).
17 Ibid., pp. 70-3 (25 October), and pp. 106-09, Clarkson to Henry Thorson, 6 November 1791; David George, "Life", p. 482.
preachers to read information and attract large audiences. When he travelled out to Birchtown he repeated this success by holding a meeting in Moses Wilkinson's Methodist chapel. Mounting the pulpit to address the three to four hundred people gathered to hear him, Clarkson described Peters' mission to London and the three alternatives offered by the government in response to it. He stressed the uncertainty and danger of life in a new colony, urging those who were relatively settled to remain in Nova Scotia and accept the government's offer of better land. Those inclined to leave he asked to withhold their final decision for three days, so that they might consult with one another and come to a more reasoned decision than was possible at that emotion-packed meeting. Despite his warnings, the assembly decided unanimously to emigrate to Sierra Leone. During the next three days Clarkson and Major Skinner were engaged in enrolling some six-hundred Blacks from Shelburne and Birchtown. So great was the response that Clarkson feared there would not be enough shipping available, and he decided to cancel any further recruitment. He also published an advertisement, and had it read in all the Black chapels, inviting people who had reconsidered to withdraw their names and assuring them all of the government's care if they decided to stay in

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Warned that his success had aroused the resentment of the white population and that violence against his person was being threatened, Clarkson decided not to continue to Digby and Annapolis as had been his original plan. Instead he returned directly to Halifax on 6 December to begin making arrangements for the reception of the Blacks and their transport to Africa. He had asked Parr to appoint a special agent to procure shipping, purchase provisions for the voyage, and locate billets in Halifax, and the governor had selected Halifax merchant and Legislative Assembly Member Michael Wallace. To supervise the removal of the Shelburne and Birchtown Blacks to Halifax Clarkson sent his friend Henry Wickham, advising him to allow only those whose names had already been taken to embark for Halifax, but to record any others desirous of leaving and if the government's budget would permit it they should be brought later.

Thomas Peters was meanwhile travelling through the St. John Valley and Annapolis regions spreading the news. On

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\text{\footnotemark[19]} \text{PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 90-8 (27, 28, 29 and 31 October), and pp. 107, 116, Clarkson to Thornton, 6 November. 1791.}\n
\text{\footnotemark[20]} \text{Ibid., pp. 73, 116-17 (25 October, 6 and 7 November).}\n
\text{\footnotemark[21]} \text{Ibid., pp. 119-20 (10 November); Clarkson Papers, III, fol. 169; Akins, "History of Halifax", p. 88; CO 217/83, Richard Bulkeley to Dundas, 29 November 1791.}\n
\text{\footnotemark[22]} \text{PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 141-44, Instructions, Clarkson to Wickham, 18 November 1791.}\n
his return from London he had been refused cooperation from Governor Parr in Halifax\textsuperscript{23} and so proceeded to St. John, where he announced the results of his mission to the people whose cause he had been pleading. His report put them "in high spirits" and they were eager to participate in the plan, but like Clarkson he warned them to consider it carefully before enrolling. Though harrassed by New Brunswick officials, Peters managed to contact the Blacks living in St. John and Fredericton.\textsuperscript{24} He was operating on a credit provided by Hartshorne and Clarkson, for without an official appointment he received no expenses from either provincial government. Governor Carleton had given the assignment as recruiting agent to his secretary, Jonathan O'dell, assisted by St. John Mayor Ludlow and Henry Wittroff of Fredericton. It was to them that Blacks wishing to emigrate had to apply, and under their supervision 222 New Brunswick Blacks were sent to Annapolis\textsuperscript{25} where they were met by Job Bennet Clark, the Nova Scotian agent responsible for collecting and transporting the emigrants to Halifax.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., p. 207, Clarkson to Thornton, 1 December 1791.

\textsuperscript{24}Ibid., p. 36, Thomas Peters to Lawrence Hartshorne, 10 October 1791, pp. 205-06, Clarkson to Thornton, 1 December 1791, p. 435 (17 March 1792); Clarkson Papers, I, Peters to Hartshorne, 10 October 1791.

\textsuperscript{25}PANB, Colonial Correspondence, New Brunswick, IXI, Carleton to Dundas, 2 March 1792.

\textsuperscript{26}Clark had been appointed "special agent" by Parr
Accompanied by a group of Black Loyalists, including his own family, Peters left New Brunswick for Annapolis. Again he met with official opposition, and in Digby was attacked physically by an outraged white citizen. Still he visited Brindley Town and his fellow Pioneers in and around Annapolis, encouraging them to apply to the government recruiting agents. He personally gathered some of them together, and, with those who had followed him from New Brunswick, brought a party of over ninety persons to Halifax in late November. 27

The resistance met by Peters was typical of the response the white population gave to the emigration scheme. 28 Though Parr could not refuse to communicate with Clarkson as he had with Peters, still he was distinctly cool and expressed his hesitation about the wisdom of the plan. 29 Clarkson in fact discovered that Parr "received a letter by the same conveyance as brought him his dispatches relative to our

for Annapolis and New Brunswick, to assist Alexander Howe who had already received an appointment for the Annapolis area. PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 58 (21 October 1791).

27 Ibid., p. 193 (28 November), p. 205, Clarkson to Thornton, 1 December 1791; Clarkson Papers, IIT, f. 169.

28 The opposition of white people, including provincial officials, had been anticipated by the Sierra Leone Company, and Clarkson was warned before leaving England to tread softly in Nova Scotia. Cf. Clarkson Papers, I, Wilberforce to Clarkson, 8 August 1791.

29 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 29-31 (8 October), pp. 44-7, Clarkson to Thornton, 19 October, p. 207, Clarkson to Thornton, 1 December 1791.
business, desiring him to do all in his power to retard it". The letter, signed by "E. N." in Dundas' office, contradicted the Secretary's official advice and left Parr "irresolute, ... not knowing which way to act". 30 Clarkson attached no motive to this advice, but it is possible that the British government was conscious of the expense involved and wished to keep the exodus to a minimum on that account. They may also have preferred to encourage the West Indian army recruitment programme, but could not do so openly because of the Sierra Leone Company's political influence. The official dispatch of 6 August had been seen and commented upon by Wilberforce and Thornton before it was sent to Parr; 31 it could not therefore contain any orders that could be construed as contrary to the Company's interests. The same opposition that withheld the granting of a charter for Sierra Leone may have caused Dundas, at best a lukewarm abolitionist, covertly to attempt to retard Clarkson's mission. 32

If the British government, or at least the Secretary of State, had private reasons for wishing Clarkson a limited success, Parr had others of his own that were shared by his


31 CO 267/9, Henry Thornton to Evan Nepean, 3 August 1791.

Halifax administration. "I could plainly see", Clarkson recorded, "that the Governor would rather I should not succeed in my business than otherwise, probably from the idea, that if the people were averse to leaving the province, it would be a good argument to prove that they were content, and that their complaints were groundless."\(^{33}\) Peters' charges brought into doubt the good faith of the Nova Scotian government; whatever Dundas' real feelings may have been, his dispatch clearly stated that if the British promises to the Blacks had not been fulfilled then Nova Scotia was at fault. It was in Parr's interest, and in the interest of his province's reputation, to discredit those charges. A mass exodus of unhappy Blacks would only corroborate them, and expose the local officials as dishonourable men. Carleton in New Brunswick, evidently for similar motives, also was anxious to give the impression that the majority of Blacks was perfectly satisfied in his province.\(^{34}\)

Nova Scotia had already experienced the problem of supporting the landless and jobless Black Loyalists,\(^{35}\) and many whites were fearful that if Clarkson removed the most "honest, sober and industrious" of them, the crippled, the lazy and the objectionable would be left in the province's

\(^{33}\) PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 30-1 (8 October).
\(^{34}\) PANB, Colonial Correspondence, New Brunswick, III Carleton to Dundas, 13 December 1791.
\(^{35}\) See Chapter III, footnotes 124-141.
care without any assistance from their employed compatriots. 36 The "principal gentlemen in Halifax" gave Clarkson to understand that they would "prevent the greatest part of the Black people from accepting the offers of the Company" unless he accepted "indiscriminately every one that offered". 37 It is unlikely that this threat was meant to encourage Clarkson to lead all the Blacks from Nova Scotia; rather it was intended to prevent the industrious ones from leaving. The province had come to depend to a considerable extent on cheap Black labour, 38 and "the principal inhabitants ... were averse to any plan that tended to deprive them of the assistance of the Blacks in the cultivation of their Lands". 39 In the opinion of one large landowner, of all Shelburne County's many problems, the most damaging was the "serious loss" of the Black Loyalist share-croppers. "This last stroke-", wrote Gideon White, "has completely knock'd-down this Settlement." 40 Labour, a scarce and expensive resource from among the white community, was only one side of the Blacks' value to Nova Scotia. Despite the welfare burden

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36 Cf. SPG, C/Can/NS 1, 1722-1790, Miscellaneous, Bernard M. Houseal to Morice, 21 November 1791.
37 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 39-40, Clarkson to Thornton, 19 October 1791.
38 See Chapter III, footnotes 25-27.
40 PANS, White Collection, Vol. VI, 1790s, Doc. 560, Gideon White to Nathaniel Whitworth, n.d.
for the unemployed, those Blacks with incomes provided a consumers' market for local produce. Clarkson's visit to Shelburne precipitated a drastic decline in the price of provisions when merchants realized that a large proportion of this "captive" market was determined to leave.\textsuperscript{41} A similar disruption occurred in the Dartmouth region when Preston was virtually depopulated after Clarkson's visit there.\textsuperscript{42}

Generally, the wealthy, and influential, class of white Nova Scotians was interested in retaining the Blacks for their own purposes of exploitation. They therefore added their opposition to that of the governor and his officials, for Clarkson's mission posed a threat to them all. Without the help of certain well placed individuals who supported him from abolitionist or humanitarian motives, Clarkson would undoubtedly have fared less well in the face of such resistance. The Quaker Hartshorne was an invaluable asset, both as an energetic assistant and as a source of influence. His position within the Halifax establishment enabled Clarkson to win the cooperation of the Council and Assembly, or at least to avoid their overt opposition.\textsuperscript{43} Another ally was

\textsuperscript{41}PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 109, Clarkson to Thornton, 6 November 1791.

\textsuperscript{42}PANS, Bishop Charles Inglis, Letters, 1791-99, Number 3, p. 58, Memo to Archbishop of Canterbury, 3 May 1794.

\textsuperscript{43}PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 39-40, Clarkson to Thornton, 19 October 1791, pp. 378-79 (15 January 1792).
Attorney-General Sampson S. Blowers, a pioneer in the attempt to abolish slavery in the province. "Some gentlemen of the Swedenburg persuasion" were also ready to offer support. These few friends, Clarkson's own dedicated efforts, and the mounting desire of the Black Loyalists to leave Nova Scotia, prevented the white opposition from destroying completely the Sierra Leone venture.

That opposition was determined, "making use of every artful devise" to keep the Blacks in their state of dependence in Nova Scotia. False debts were concocted to prevent them from leaving, and employers withheld salaries. Local white dignitaries refused the character certificates demanded by Clarkson. Some even offered bribes to the Blacks to make their staying in Nova Scotia appear more attractive. A propaganda campaign was mounted in order to throw the Company's motives into doubt and to paint a horrifying picture of the colony to which the Blacks were being invited to emigrate. An advertisement appeared in the local press, signed by "Philanthropos", which pointed out that the

44 Clarkson Papers, II, fol. 12.
45 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 28-9 (7 October 1791).
46 Ibid., p. 109, Clarkson to Thornton, 6 November 1791.
47 Ibid., p. 206, Clarkson to Thornton, 1 December 1791.
48 Ibid., p. 53, Clarkson to Thornton, 19 October 1791.
49 Clarkson Papers, II, fol. 15.
Company's terms were too indefinite to guarantee any security for the settlers in Sierra Leone and warned that the unhealthy African climate would be the death of the emigrants. The "Philanthropos" article was distributed in the Black settlements by interested whites, as was an extract from the SPG Report for 1789 in which the Rev. Patrick Frazer described the mortality of the 1787 settlers in the Province of Freedom.

Rumours and speculations accompanied the publicity. The Company's offer left the settlers' obligations uncertain: land would be granted "subject to such charges... as shall hereafter be settled by the Company". What, the opponents asked, was the Company going to decide? They suggested to the Blacks that it would be an annual rent and taxes at exorbitant rates, and that the Company's plan was nothing less than to inveigle the free Blacks back into slavery. After Clarkson's doubts about the amount of available shipping, this point was seized upon and Blacks were told that they would be stranded in Halifax. When rumour failed, violence was

50 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 120 (10 November); SPG C/Can/NS 1, 1722-1790, Miscellaneous, Houseal to Morice, 21 November 1791.
52 Clarkson Papers, III, fol. 158; Directors' Report, 1794, pp. 4-6.
53 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 75 (25 October); Clarkson Papers, III, fol. 165; David George, "Life", p. 482.
54 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 170, Clarkson to Thornton, 28 November 1791.
threatened to keep people away from Clarkson. In Shelburne, David Georgé's life was threatened, and menaces were thrown out to any Blacks known to have attended a Clarkson meeting. There were even suggestions that Clarkson himself would be attacked, as was Thomas Peters in Digby. 55

Officially the province could not indulge in such methods as were practised by private citizens. Parr and the agents appointed by him, all but Hartshorne being less than anxious for the project to succeed, had to be content with vacillation and non-cooperation. Parr sent orders to Shelburne cancelling the enlistment of emigrants there, and then cancelled his order. 56 Stephen Skinner, the official recruiting agent for Shelburne, was "on the whole disinclined to the present undertaking". 57 Though in Clarkson's presence he performed his duties by assisting with the registration of applicants, he was also one of those "principal inhabitants" who offered bribes to keep the Blacks in Nova Scotia, and he "did everything in his power to prevent their going". 58 Skinner wrote to Henry Dundas denouncing the Sierra Leone exodus, "the bad consequences of which are already severely

56 Ibid., pp. 122-23 (12 November).
57 Ibid., pp. 77-8 (25 October).
58 Clarkson Papers, II, fol. 15.
felt in this, and every other part of the Province". 

Annapolis agent Clark, whose father was the author of the "Philanthropos" advertisement, was "very much against the place [Sierra Leone]", and therefore simply declined to announce or explain the Company's proposals.

Had Peters not visited Annapolis, and had Clarkson not been to Shelburne, it is possible that neither place should have sent any emigrants at all. This was indeed the case for one large area. From the northern half of the province, which included large Black populations at Little Tracadie, Manchester and Chedabucto, no applications were received.

Since Clarkson, Hartshorne and Peters limited their activities to the Halifax-Shelburne-Annapolis triangle, the north was left in the hands of agent Putnam. He may have decided upon inaction for personal motives or he may, like Michael Wallace, have received advice from Parr not to encourage the scheme.

On appointing Wallace as "Agent for the removal of the Blacks", Parr explained that "my motive was to give you a little employment, and put a little Cash in your Pocket, which I mean this shall do". And, Parr added, "You need not be over anxious in procuring or persuading the Blacks to remove".

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59 CO 217/63, Stephen Skinner to Dundas, n.d. (received April 1792).

60 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 171-72, Clarkson to Thornton, 28 November 1791; The Philanthropist, IV, 1814, p. 115.

61 PANS Vol. 224, Miscellaneous Papers, 1788-1806, Doc. 77, Parr to Michael Wallace, 22 October 1791.
In New Brunswick agent O'dell and his assistants were less subtle in their opposition. After Peters' tour had aroused excitement among the Blacks, many of them approached the agents to apply for emigration. But before allowing them to go O'dell, Ludlow and Wittroff demanded to see their certificates of freedom. Since many certificates had been lost since General Birch issued them nine years earlier, and others had become illegible from age and frequent handling, this move effectively rendered numbers of New Brunswicks Blacks ineligible for emigration. The white officials were also guilty of outright forgery, producing false indenture agreements and debts which would keep the Blacks occupied at least until after the Sierra Leone opportunity had passed. Blacks presenting themselves before the agents were told that the Company intended to sell them into slavery and that Peters was to receive a fee for each slave so procured. At dinner one evening in Halifax, Clarkson was interrupted by the arrival of four Black Loyalists who had walked all the way from St. John, having been prevented by the recruiting agents from embarking with Peters.

Despite these threats and obstacles the Black Loyal-

62 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 204-06, Clarkson to Thornton, 1 December 1791, p. 231 (7 December 1791).
63 Ibid., pp. 240-43 (7 December).
ists flocked to Clarkson to accept the Company’s invitation. From Shelburne and Birchtown over 600 were accepted, and of these 518 were brought to Halifax by Wickham in early December. Another 26 “got to Halifax by stealth”. The total of 544 from Shelburne County represented between one-third and one-half of the county’s Black population. Among the emigrants were David George’s Baptist congregation, virtually intact, Cato Perkins’ Huntingdonians and most of Moses Wilkinson’s Methodists. Writing from Preston, Weeks reported to the SPG that the Blacks there had “almost to a Man entered into an association to go to Sierra Leone”, and he was closing the school and mission there. A year later Bishop Inglis wrote: “The Blacks are all gone from Preston. Most of them went to Sierra Leone, the remainder settled at Halifax.”

64 Ibid., p. 125, Clarkson to Thornton, 12 November 1791; Clarkson Papers, III, fol. 169; Diary of Simeon Perkins, III, p. 130 (5 and 6 December 1791); CO 217/63, “List of the Blacks of Birchtown who gave in their names for Sierra Leone, November 1791”.

65 In 1784 there were about 1,700 Blacks in Shelburne County (see Chapter II, footnote 107), but many of them had drifted away to Halifax and other places in search of employment, especially during the famine of 1799.


68 Ibid., minutes for 7 February 1793, Inglis to Associates, 30 November 1792.
in the African exodus, including Adam Abernathy and his
schoolteacher wife Catherine, and most of their followers. The members of Boston King's Methodist chapel and Hector
Peters' Baptist chapel likewise chose the African alterna-
tive. They joined with others from Halifax County to form
a total of about 250 emigrants. Evidently the city of
Halifax itself sent a relatively small proportion of its
Black citizens, though some of the most prominent, including
Isaac Limerick, were among the ones who left.

The exact figures for Annapolis County are confused,
since the Blacks from St. John and Fredericton were sent
first to Annapolis and from there to Halifax, and so they all
appear as arrivals from Annapolis. It does seem that a total
of about 420 individuals reached Halifax via Annapolis in
November and December 1791, and as it is known that 222 went

69 Two petitions to Clarkson "from the Preston people"
(PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 217-18, 3 December 1791, and p. 293,
26 December 1791), bore four and thirty-nine names, respectively,
of male family heads. None of the names was repeated in the
petitions, indicating a total of forty-three families. However
some names of known Preston emigrants were on neither petition,
e.g. in particular Boston King. This suggests that forty-three
families was not a total but a minimum, and that the real
total was around fifty families.

70 SPG, Bray Associates' Minute Books, III, Weeks to
Associates, 1 December 1791; PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 125,
Clarkson to Thornton, 12 November 1791; Clarkson Papers, III
fol. 169.

71 Thomas Peters brought about ninety with him in
November 1791 (PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 193, 28 November,
and p. 205, Clarkson to Thornton, 1 December 1791; Clarkson
Papers, III, fol. 169), and official agent Clark sent at least
150 others that month (PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 179,
Clarkson to Thornton, 28 November 1791). In December another
officially from New Brunswick, this would leave approximately 200 emigrants who originated in the Annapolis district. Most of them apparently came from Brindley Town. In December 1791 Joseph Leonard wrote to his London benefactors that "He and most of the Negroes in Brindley Town were then preparing to embark for Sierra Leona, and only 15 Families with 7 Children intended continuing there." Roger Viets had only eight Black Anglican communicants remaining in 1792, of a total of fifty in 1791. The Methodist society at Brindley Town, with sixty-six members in 1786, was closed in 1792, presumably because a large number of them left for Africa. One unofficial observer stated that thirty-nine families joined the exodus from Brindley Town, but he may 180 arrived from St. John via Annapolis (ibid., p. 296, 28 December 1791). This would give a total of 420 from New Brunswick and Annapolis County combined.

PANB, Colonial Correspondence, New Brunswick, III, Carleton to Dundas, 2 March 1792, enclosure, "Return of Free Blacks desiring of settling in Sierra Leone removed to Annapolis from New Brunswick", dated 14 December 1791. This number would not include five men who walked from St. John to Halifax. See PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 240-43 (9 December 1791).

SPG, Bray Associates' Minute Books, III, minutes for 5 July 1792, quoting Joseph Leonard to Associates, 30 December 1791.

Ibid., IV, Viets to Associates, 1 April 1809.

PANS, Bishop Charles Inglis, Journal, 1785-1810, No. 2, Book 5, p. 16, 11 September 1791; SPG, Bray Associates, Box 9, Canadian Papers, Viets to Associates, 18 April 1789. The figure fifty refers to the number of confirmed Anglicans. There were not necessarily fifty Black persons regularly attending Viets' communion services.

Wilson, County of Digby, pp. 90-91.
have been referring only to Anglican families. It seems probable that of the 200 Annapolis emigrants, about 150 were from Brindley Town. This would have represented approximately three-quarters of the total Brindley Town population in 1791.

The official reasons assigned to explain the huge Black response were that they had been unable to adapt to the cold Nova Scotian climate and that a life of servitude had left them ill-equipped to support themselves by their own initiative and labour. Both these reasons absolved Nova Scotia's officials of any blame, for they could hardly

77 SPG, Bray Associates' Minute Books, IV, Viets to Associates, 1 April 1809.
78 This proportion is reflected on a list of Annapolis Blacks whose names were given to Richard Bulkeley on 8 December 1791 "to be exposed in his office for a certain time"; PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 237-38 (8 December). Of twenty-nine family heads listed there, twenty-one were included either in the one acre Brindley Town lots or in Joseph Leonard's 1789 petition for farm grants. See PANS, Nova Scotia Land Grants, Index to Land Grants 1730-1950, 1785, Leonard, Joseph, and others, 76 acres, Digby Township; PANS, Crown Land Grants, Old Book 16, p. 35; PANS, Land Papers, Leonard, Joseph, and 148 others, 11 September 1789.
79 If both Viets' and Leonard's family estimates are accurate, then thirty-nine families left for Sierra Leone and fifteen stayed behind, i.e. 72 percent of the families emigrated. In 1784 there were 211 people in Brindley Town (PANS Vol. 376, Muster Rolls of Loyalists and Military Settlers, Annapolis, Digby and adjacent places, 1784). While some natural increase must have occurred between 1784 and 1791, there was also some movement from Annapolis County to New Brunswick after the failure of the petitions for land. In the absence of more accurate records it is only possible to assume that the population figure remained in the vicinity of 200 people.
80 PANS Vol. 48, Letters to the Secretary of State, 1789-94, Doc. 67, Bulkeley to Dundas, 3 February 1792.
be held responsible either for the weather or for the past. While there may have been some truth in such contentions, they cannot be accepted as full explanations. A simple desire to escape the Nova Scotian cold could be expected to have driven some Blacks to accept the Black Carolina Corps' recruitment offer. Yet during the period when Clarkson attracted over 1,000 emigrants to Sierra Leone, Lieutenant Miller enlisted only 14 for service in the West Indies.  

Peters' petition, asking for lands in Nova Scotia or elsewhere in the British Empire, did not specify climate at all. And the fact that so many Blacks had survived with little or no government assistance for eight years, a feat matched by few white Loyalists, would tend to detract from the charge that their economic problems derived solely from their inability to fend for themselves. "With respect to their industry", Clarkson reported to Henry Thornton, "their neighbours have declared to me their surprise at their being able to support themselves upon such barren and stony land as they have done, which could never have been brought to the state their Lots are now in, but from great industry."  

81PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 116 (6 November). New Brunswick, which sent 222 Blacks to Sierra Leone, sent none at all to the West Indies. PANB, Colonial Correspondence, New Brunswick, III, Carleton to Dundas, 13 December 1791. 

82CO 217/63, "The Humble Memorial and Petition of Thomas Peters". 

83PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 209-10, Clarkson to Thornton, 1 December 1791.
The emigrants themselves mentioned other reasons for their wanting to leave. Prominent among them was a desire for land. Clarkson recorded that the Blacks did not believe Parr would grant them land in Nova Scotia, for the governor had disobeyed the King's orders before. And even if he did, they said, they would be unable to begin cultivating their farms without some interim provisions to support them until the land became productive. Since no promise of provisions accompanied Dundas' offer of land, they felt that they would be left effectively landless as before. There was, furthermore, an intense resentment at the non-fulfillment of the promises made to them during the Revolution. This left them bitter and distrustful, and unwilling to subject themselves to further disappointments at the same hands. 84

A second reason expressed by the Blacks, and one intimately connected with land, was their desire for independence. According to John Clarkson, who questioned them on their "Reasons for wishing to leave Nova Scotia", they considered themselves to be still in a state of slavery to whites, dependent upon the whims and avarice of employers or, if they were share-croppers, of landowners. They believed that in the African colony, with land of their own and a guarantee of full civil rights, they would break the chains of dependence and become truly free men. In Nova Scotia, 84 Clarkson Papers, II, fols. 8-9; "Reasons given by the free Blacks for wishing to leave Nova Scotia".
their experience had taught them, they would continue to be regarded as slaves and treated as less than equal citizens. Security in their independence was a third reason the Blacks gave Clarkson for their desire to leave North America. Many were fearful of being seized by their former American masters, or even of being tricked into slavery in Nova Scotia itself. Africa was far enough removed from the United States to make reclamation unlikely, and the possibility of being kidnapped and sold again was prevented by the law making slavery illegal in Sierra Leone.  

These three things, land, independence and security, had in fact been among the chief attractions drawing the fleeing slaves to the British during the American War. At that time they had believed their goals were realizable within a predominantly white society. But after a decade of frustration in Nova Scotia many Black Loyalists had evidently come to recognize that the achievement of those goals demanded a new opportunity in a land of their own. The picture John Clarkson gave of Sierra Leone led them to think that it would be the homeland they sought, for he promised not only land but popular control of colonial affairs and the full rights and protection of British subjects.  

85 Ibid.  
86 See Chapter I, footnote 16.  
87 See footnote 10 above.
Religion and the society that had developed around the Black chapels provided a further force behind emigration. Though they did not cite religious freedom specifically as a reason for leaving, individual Blacks did seek Clarkson's assurance that they would be able to worship in their own way in the new colony, and the Black preachers must have been conscious of the restrictions placed on them in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. But the role of religion in the exodus is suggested by more convincing indications than this. The place of the chapels in helping to create and maintain a sense of community and a Black identity has already been described. This community consciousness was reflected in the emigration statistics, for it was most often the case that an entire congregation would decide to accept the Company's offer. Evidently it was not an individual decision: unwilling to break up the society, everyone free to leave would do so if the majority in that particular community so decided. Annapolis agent Alexander Howe remarked that the Blacks were impelled "always to act together", and to this tendency he attributed great significance for the Sierra Leone Company's success. Most of the Black preachers who had become important since 1783 took part in the exodus, and

\[88\] PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 138 (28 November).
\[89\] See Chapter IV, footnotes 116-118.
\[90\] CO 217/68, Alexander Howe to William Dawes Quarrell, 9 August 1797.
they were joined by those members of their congregations who were not restricted by debt or indenture. From Shelburne County went David George, Moses Wilkinson, John Ball and Cato Perkins. George's converts in New Brunswick were also persuaded to leave by his example after consulting among themselves.91 Joseph Leonard's Anglicans and the Brindley Town Methodists left as intact as conditions would permit,92 as did the Halifax County churches led by Boston King, Hector Peters and Catherine Abernathy.

Such common action by the chapel communities suggests both the strength of their religious and group awareness, and the motivation provided for emigration by their desire to achieve the freedom to practise and to maintain the identity of their own religion. The differences between the various chapels, though not inconsiderable, do not seem to have blinded them to their common concerns. In Birchtown and in St. John joint meetings were held between different sects to discuss emigration.93 Though their worship services were not the same, the independent Black Anglican, Baptist, Methodist and Huntingdonian chapels had two essentials in common: their independence and their Blackness. They all resisted incursions of white control; they all considered the purity of

91 David George, "Life", p. 482.
92 See footnote 73 above.
93 David George, "Life", p. 482; PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 79-90 (26 October).
their Christian faith to be dependent upon separation from external corruptions. These interests could be well served by their removal as a body to a separate Black homeland, and if this were not evident then at least it must have been obvious that the integrity of their chapels would be destroyed if some members left for Africa and others remained to face white Nova Scotia in a weakened state. The most effective resistance to the bribes, threats and duplicities of the white opposition was therefore provided by the Black community identity, which had been fostered by segregation since 1783.

Land was mentioned by the Black Loyalists themselves as a major inducement to join the Sierra Leone scheme. It would be misleading, however, to explain the exodus simply in terms of the Company's offer of free land, for a large proportion of the migration was made up of families who had already received or purchased land in Nova Scotia. Of 151 men from Shelburne and Birchtown who were accepted by Clarkson, 105 were owners of some property. At least half the Preston emigrants had been granted 50 acre farm lots there by the government, before 1787. The Brindley Town Black

94 CO 217/63, "List of the Blacks of Birch Town who gave in their names for Sierra Leone, November 1791".

95 This figure was reached by comparing the signatures of Preston emigrants (PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 293-94, Petition from the Preston people, 26 December 1791) with those of the Blacks included in: PANS, Land Papers, Chamberlain, Theophilus, and 163 others, 3 September 1784;
Loyalists, though their grant had not been finalized in 1791, at least had the prospect of fifty acre farms in Clements Township for which the warrant was issued in 1789. If the non-possession of this tract caused frustration among the people which would make emigration more likely, it must also be considered that land which they had expressly approved was still potentially available to them, a potential made more promising by Dundas' order to Parr concerning Black Loyalist lands and the government enquiry directed particularly at Thomas Peters' experiences in Annapolis County. Even for the New Brunswick Blacks it would have been easier and safer to occupy the lands already granted sixteen miles from St. John than to cross an ocean in the hope of getting more. Those Black Loyalists who remained hopelessly landless in 1791 would have found in Clarkson's message the answer to their problem, but evidently there was something more in the Sierra Leone opportunity than a twenty acre farm in Africa. Land had always been significant as an instrument for equality and independence, not as an end in itself. The Blacks'

PANS Vol. 370, Township of Preston, Names of Original Grantees, Original Entry of the Survey of the Town Lotts in Preston, and Grants, 23 March 1786; PANS, Land Papers, Young, Thomas, and 34 others, 5 December 1787.


97 CO 217/63, "The Humble Memorial and Petition of Thomas Peters"; PANB, Colonial Correspondence, New Brunswick, III, Carleton to Dundas, 13 December 1791.
own testimony, and the evidence of their community-oriented response to Clarkson, suggests that the over-riding factor was independence. Clarkson offered not only land but the Promised Land. A farm in Nova Scotia was no substitute for an entire country in Africa.

In all, 1,196 Black Loyalists embarked for Africa.\(^98\) That this amounted to one-third or less of the free Black population should not imply that the other two-thirds were satisfied in Nova Scotia, or that Sierra Leone was an unattractive alternative for them. In Birchtown it seems that a large group made a positive decision to stay in Nova Scotia. On 1 November 1791, fifty-two family heads signed a petition to Parr in which they cast scorn on their brethren who "are so infatuated, as to embrace the proposals of the Sierra Leone Company which (with all due Submission) we conceive to be their utter annihilation".\(^99\) Since the King was prepared to bear certain expenses for the sake of his Black subjects, they asked to receive their share of the royal bounty in the form of a grant "as may enable us to purchase a Cow and two Sheep, which (if obtained) will make us comfortable on our little farms". This petition was organized during Clarkson's

\(^{98}\) PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 353-54, "General Embarkation List of Free Blacks on board the Fleet for Sierra Leone". Clarkson recorded the total as 1,190, but the figures in his columns add to 1,196.

\(^{99}\) CO 217/63, Stephen Skinner to Henry Dundas, n.d. (received April, 1792), enclosing Petition to Governor Parr, by Stephen Blucke and Fifty others, 1 November 1791.
visit to Birchtown, at the time when Blacks were rushing to apply and many whites were trying to stop them from doing so. It is conceivable that it was instigated or encouraged by the white opposition, particularly as it was Major Skinner who collected and forwarded the signatures to Halifax and London. The signatories were headed by Colonel Stephen Blucke, who just three weeks previously had written to Hartshorne at the wish of the Birchtown people to enquire further into the scheme. Perhaps the explanations he received convinced him of its folly, and he convinced his followers of the same. Perhaps as the Black man with the closest ties to the provincial establishment Blucke was susceptible to the pressures of Skinner and others of his fellow pew-owners at St. George's. Taken at its face value the Birchtown petition would indicate that emigration was discussed among the people and that some of them, all 'land-owners and none members of the Baptist, Methodist or Huntingdonian chapels, had determined to preserve the advantages they had in Nova Scotia rather than participate in a speculative venture.

The Birchtown memorial is the only piece of documentary evidence to show that a group of Blacks who were free to leave deliberately chose the alternative to remain in Nova

100 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 34-5, Stephen Blucke to Lawrence Hartshorne, 10 October 1791.

Scotia. Elsewhere in the province the choice was less obvious. Large categories were ineligible to apply, even had they so wished. Debtors were not allowed to go, and in this category fell many share-croppers who had borrowed the initial seed from their landlords and had never accumulated a surplus large enough to pay it back. Provincial authorities in both Nova Scotia and New Brunswick took pains to ensure that no creditors were being deprived of their property. 102 Indentured servants were even more rigorously bound to Nova Scotia. Debtors could receive the assistance of their more affluent brethren, as occurred in Shelburne where those who had sold their property used the proceeds to absolve their friends of debt, 103 but an indenture could not be cancelled without the consent of both parties. Clarkson spent hours writing to holders of indenture agreements and visiting them in the hope of obtaining release for the Blacks. Some of

102 PANS, Clarkson’s Mission, p. 204ff, Clarkson to Thornton, 1 December 1791, pp. 237-38 and 240-43 (8 and 9 December 1791). Clarkson had in fact been authorized by the Directors to pay the debts of those Black Loyalists who otherwise promised to be desirable settlers for Sierra Leone (Clarkson Papers, I, Wilberforce to Clarkson, 8 August 1791). He declined to inform the Blacks of this, however, until 11 January 1792, when they were already on board the ships and preparing to leave (PANS, Clarkson’s Mission, p. 357). Most debtors would therefore not have applied, believing themselves to be disqualified (which was, of course, Clarkson’s motive for withholding the information). Even when some people already enrolled were seized for debt, Clarkson gave them over rather than reveal “prematurely” his intention to pay their debts (ibid., p. 292, 26 December 1791, p. 317, 4 January 1792. The individual involved in the latter incident was actually removed from the ship).

103 Ibid., p. 245 (10 December 1791).
these servants were young children, whose free parents hesitated to leave them behind knowing that they might be sold into slavery. Most masters refused to release their servants, despite Clarkson's pleas and, on occasion, his offer of a cash settlement. In at least one case the parents stole their own child from a recalcitrant master, but most free families decided to remain close to their indentured relative and let the Sierra Leone opportunity pass. 104

It is impossible to estimate how many more Blacks might have joined the exodus had they been free of such restrictions, though as these people would have the most to gain from the move it is not unlikely that their numbers should have been considerable. Since landowners were the most independent and able to support themselves, they were the least susceptible to the shackles of debt and indenture; it should not therefore be surprising that so many of the emigrants came from the relatively small land-owning group. Similarly the effects of the overt opposition and the uncooperative officials cannot be gauged with any accuracy. Thomas Peters gave the opinion that but for the agents' irresponsibility and lies the migration should have been much greater, 105 and Clarkson

104 Ibid., pp. 79, 92-4, 101, 139, 147, 163, 230, 244-47 (26, 28, 29 October, 17, 18, 27 November, 7, 10 December 1791).
105 CO 267/9, Thomas Peters to Henry Dundas, n.d. (received 6 July 1792).
shared this opinion. The threats and subterfuges do not seem to have succeeded to any great extent, however, for New Brunswick and Shelburne, where the opposition was strongest, sent the largest contingents to Africa. But the refusal of many officials even to inform the Blacks that the Company’s offer had been made clearly reduced the number of applicants. As has been mentioned, all the emigrants came from areas visited personally by Clarkson or Peters. This fact either pays great tribute to the persuasive powers of these two men, or reveals that the agents appointed by the governor were delinquent in performing their duties. It appears from the available evidence that the 1,196 who actually quitted Nova Scotia were not so much a discontented minority of the Black population, but rather an overwhelming majority of the ones who had a choice.

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106 PANS, Clarkson’s Mission, pp. 170-71, Clarkson to Thornton, 28 November 1791.

107 From Birchtown-Shelburne, 544, and from New Brunswick 222, representing two-thirds of the total migration.

108 See above, footnotes 11-19, 23-27 and 64-79.

109 About 20 to 25 percent of the free Blacks lived outside the Preston-Halifax, Birchtown-Shelburne and Annapolis-Brindley Town-St. John areas visited by Peters and Clarkson. It is assumed that this percentage was either uninformed or misinformed of the Sierra Leone offer, since no applications were received from them. It is possible that they unanimously declined to emigrate after being given the facts, but this possibility is rejected as highly unlikely, especially considering the declared sentiments of several of the official agents. The fact that group decisions were made in many cases cannot account for the absence of applications from outside the major Black settlements, for individual Blacks in
Furthermore the 1,196 who boarded the ships in January 1792 were not, in fact, the only ones to have made the decision to leave. The government, and the Company, intended Clarkson's mission to be the first of several Black migrations from North America to Sierra Leone.\textsuperscript{110} When Clarkson was in Nova Scotia there was no urgency on his part to ensure that every Black Loyalist willing to emigrate should grasp at this immediate opportunity, for he believed that others should follow. At Shelburne, when he ordered the recruitment cancelled, he asked his assistant Wickham to keep a record of those who were still waiting to apply.\textsuperscript{111} There was therefore a number of Shelburne Blacks who remained in Nova Scotia but who had chosen to leave and expected to be able to do so at a later date. Some of them indeed had sold their property and were simply waiting for further shipping to be made available.\textsuperscript{112}

Outlying districts, for example the Port d'Hebert families accidentally visited by Clarkson, did decide to go when they were informed of the opportunity. It is interesting to note that Halifax, with a Black population in excess of 400, sent only about 50 emigrants. No Halifax Blacks were landowners. Most were either servants or day-labourers, the categories most restricted by debt or legal obligations. The conclusion is that the above-mentioned 20 - 25 percent were given no choice at all, and that the majority of Halifax people and others in their situation had no effective choice.

\textsuperscript{110} Clarkson Papers, I, Wilberforce to Clarkson, 12 January 1792, Thomas Clarkson to John Clarkson, 17 July 1792, Thornton to Clarkson, 23 July 1792; CO 267/31, Zachary Macaulay to Robert Peel, 23 August 1811.

\textsuperscript{111} PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 107-08, Clarkson to Thornton, 6 November 1791, Clarkson to Wickham, 18 November 1791.

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
In January 1792, when the mission's high expenses prompted Dundas to withdraw the government offer of financial assistance, Provincial Secretary Bulkeley and Governor Carleton were told to encourage those Blacks still preparing to emigrate to enlist instead in the Black Carolina Corps. How many people this affected must remain unknown; it is however significant that the opportunity was removed before everyone disposed to emigrate could avail himself of it.

Clarkson deliberately dissuaded many people from leaving if he found them in a relatively comfortable position, and on the other hand he refused to accept any applicants of whom he doubted the ability to become useful citizens in Africa. Frequently he requested that prospective emigrants consider their decision for a few days before enrolling, he warned that life in Sierra Leone would be hard, and he offered to use his influence to see that their proper land grants were made according to Dundas' order if they chose to

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113 CO 218/27, Dundas to Bulkeley, 15 January 1792; PANB, Colonial Correspondence, New Brunswick, III, Dundas to Carleton, 15 January 1792. Governor Parr died "of the gout" on 25 November 1791. Provincial Secretary Richard Bulkeley assumed the administration of the government until a successor was appointed by the Crown. PANS Vol. 213, Minutes of His Majesty's Council, 25 November 1791; PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 161-62, 25 November 1791; Royal Gazette and Nova Scotia Advertiser, 29 November 1791.

114 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 43, Clarkson to Thornton, 19 October 1791, pp. 80-84 (26 October 1791).

115 Ibid., pp. 86-7, 98 (26, 31 October), p. 219, Clarkson to Thornton, 1 December 1791.
remain in Nova Scotia. One share-cropper who walked miles to see Clarkson was told that his present situation was better than what he could expect in Africa. Everywhere Clarkson demanded certificates that convinced him of the bearer's high character. When he received a bundle of twenty-one certificates that described the people as "sober and industrious", "sober and honest" or "honest and industrious", he sent them all back to the referee claiming that they "appear deficient in character", since the Company would admit only those who possessed all three virtues. A woman whose daughter "had been unsteady for some time past" was required to wait until Clarkson had an opportunity to judge her conduct for himself. Single women were not accepted unless they could find a man who would guarantee their maintenance in Sierra Leone. "Those that are lame and cannot work for a living", regardless of age or sex, were similarly required to produce a guarantor. It was therefore not the most desperate elements of Black society that were induced

116 Ibid., pp. 84, 96-7 (26, 29 October).
117 Ibid., pp. 160-61 (23 November).
118 Ibid., pp. 128-29 (13 November).
120 Ibid., pp. 210-11, Clarkson to Thornton, 1 December 1791.
121 Ibid., pp. 143-44, Clarkson to Wickham, 18 November 1791.
to leave by promises of future support, nor persons persuaded of immediate economic improvement. The choice to leave was a deliberate one, based on a desire to build a new life in a new land. Clarkson offered them nothing less.

John Clarkson believed himself to be possessed of the Directors' full authority to make commitments on their behalf and to interpret the settlement terms, which were undecided on his departure from London. In August 1791 the new constitution had not been written, and Clarkson was apparently under the impression that the freedoms and settler participation provided under Sharp's 1787 constitution would continue. Accordingly he referred to Sierra Leone as "the Land of Freedom," and he made promises to the Black Loyalists and described their new home as if it were still the old Province of Freedom. At the meeting in Moses Wilkinson's Birchtown chapel Clarkson was asked the meaning of the phrase "subject to such charges and obligations . . . as shall hereafter be settled" with regard to the grants of land in Africa. Specifically, the people asked, did this mean rents and taxes as "Philanthropos" and others were suggesting? His answer was to interpret "free" land as being land with no charges attached. The Company was required, as were Parr and Carleton,


123 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 208, Clarkson to Thornton, 1 December 1791.
to place the people in an "advantageous situation", and this could not be so if the settlers were merely tenants upon Company-owned land, Clarkson told them. Any taxes paid by the settlers would be "for charitable purposes, such as the maintenance of their poor, the care of their sick, and the education of their children". No revenue was to be raised from them directly for the Company's sake, but only "for the support of the community itself". 124 Again with the Province of Freedom in mind, Clarkson suggested that the settlers would have control over such things as wages and prices, and that they would have full rights to participate in the government of the colony, including the right to act as magistrates. 125 The Black Loyalists, in short, were given the distinct impression that the new colony was to be effectively their own, a place where the inequities, exploitation and white domination of Nova Scotia would be no more and the Black people would realize the independence they sought as they interpreted it themselves. 126

But unknown to Clarkson, at the very time when he was

124 Ibid., p. 87 (26 October); Clarkson Papers, III, fol. 165-67; The Philanthropist, IV, 1814, pp. 106-07.

125 Clarkson Papers, III, Thornton to Clarkson, 16 September 1793; CO 267/92, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix B-5, John Kizell to Commissioners, March 1826, Appendix B-6, "Statement given to the Commissioners by Eli Ackim, one of the Original Settlers", Appendix B-7, Memorandum by Lazarus Jones, 8 June 1826.

126 Cf. Directors' Report, 1794, p. 91.
making these promises the Directors and shareholders met to fill in the blanks in the Company's offer and to revise the colonial constitution. The original, and incomplete, Company proposal to the Blacks had been written on 2 August 1791, just a few days before Clarkson embarked for Nova Scotia.  

From the time of his departure from London until he arrived in Sierra Leone in March 1792 Clarkson received no communications whatsoever from the Company or any individuals connected with it. No one, including Thomas Clarkson, explained to him the Company's plans for their new colony or the situation that awaited the Blacks there. Astonishingly, he was not even informed of King Jimmy's raid of 1789 and the virtual destruction of the Province of Freedom. When told of it in Nova Scotia Clarkson refused to believe the story, unable to conceive that his brother and his close friends should have left him ignorant of so important a fact.  

Obviously his mission was undertaken with haste and without adequate consultation with Company officials. All he had upon which to base his message to the Black Loyalists were the indefinite proposals of 2 August, his own familiarity with Sharp's original settlement, and his trust

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127 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 15 (6 August 1791).
128 Ibid., p. 182, Clarkson to Thornton, 28 November 1791, p. 359, Clarkson to Henry Hew Dalrymple, 11 January 1792.
129 Ibid., pp. 20-21, 29-31 (19 August, 8 October), pp. 44-6, Clarkson to Thornton, 19 October 1791.
in the Directors' good faith. 130

The day that Clarkson accepted the first applications from Halifax Blacks, the Sierra Leone Company held its first annual meeting in London. It was clear to the assembled Directors and proprietors that a simple trading post would not suffice to achieve the goals they set for their Company: closer regulation and more intimate involvement would be necessary. They decided to grant provisions to new settlers for their first six months in the colony, to ensure that they were well established on their farms, and they set out a series of articles and conditions by which colonial affairs would be conducted. 131 The laws established by this new constitution were liberal by contemporary English standards. Capital punishment was abolished, fines were to be substituted for corporal punishment whenever possible, and imprisonment for debt was limited. At least half the jury was to be the same race as the accused, and trial was to follow within two weeks of committal. Constitutionally all powers were vested in the Directors, and in local affairs "all matters civil, military, political and commercial" were delegated to a council of eight members, including a superintendent, responsible to the Directors. The councillors would also act as justices of the peace, with appeal allowed to the Court of

130 Hoare, Memoirs of Granville Sharp, p. 326; Clarkson Papers, I, Directors' Orders to John Clarkson, 12 August 1791.
131 Directors' Report, 1791, pp. 41-3, 47, 51-3.
Directors. Settlers were promised "a due share in [the colony's] internal Legislation" at some future date; in the meantime they could elect their own constables.\(^{132}\)

The 1791 constitution also detailed commercial regulations and the responsibilities of settlers to the Company. The Company hoped for profits from trade with the colony and with neighbouring Africans, from import and export duties, and from "extensive and spirited cultivation" on its own account. Goods would be sold to settlers at a profit of 10 percent, and settler produce would be marketed in England for a 2-1/2 percent commission plus costs. Customs duties were not to exceed 2-1/2 percent in either direction. Settlers would be required to assist with the clearing of land for a town and Company plantations or pay a commutation fee in money. Individual lots would be forfeited unless one-third of the grant were cleared within two years and two-thirds within three years of assignment. Finally, the Company imposed a quit-rent of one shilling per acre for the first two years, a tax of 2 percent on all produce of the land for each of the succeeding three years, and after that a produce tax of 4 percent per year, regardless of where, or even whether, that produce was sold.\(^{133}\)


That these regulations conflicted with the promises being extended by Clarkson is immediately evident, particularly the quit-rent provisions. The principles to be incorporated in the new constitution were decided at a meeting on 19 October and the articles were published on 3 November 1791. It was not until 30 December that Chairman Thornton informed Clarkson of the changes.

We have proposed [Thornton wrote], rather to indemnify ourselves for all our huge expenses at the first, by a rent on the lands, which will be more easy to collect, than by high profits on trade.

I trust the Blacks will not consider this as a grievance.\textsuperscript{134}

If the quit-rent and other obligations were being planned earlier than October 1791 then the Directors must be considered to have been irresponsible in not making them known during the Nova Scotian recruitment. It seems more likely that the specific decisions were taken after the appeal had been made to the Blacks, and may indeed have been prompted by the prospect of a large and taxable Black population. In this case the Directors were giving the Black Loyalists no opportunity to consider the actual terms of settlement.

Thornton's letter describing the final conditions was addressed to Clarkson in Sierra Leone, not in Nova Scotia, and was sent two-and-a-half months after the annual meeting decided them.

\textsuperscript{134}Clarkson Papers, I, Thornton to Clarkson, 30 December 1791.
For his part Clarkson kept the Directors' fully informed of his activities in Nova Scotia, writing regularly to Thornton and Wilberforce. They were surprised and pleased at his great success, having expected at most one-hundred families willing to go to Africa. The huge population being assembled in Halifax suggested a more secure colony, more trade, and more revenue from the settlers themselves.\(^{135}\)

As Clarkson's news reached England the entire initial capitalization of £42,000 was subscribed. The Directors increased the Company's capital to £100,000, then to £150,000, and finally to £235,000. In all 1,100 individuals purchased shares in the Sierra Leone Company.\(^{136}\) Their motive was apparently to further the cause of abolition, but the investors' faith was based on the acquisition of 1,200 Black Loyalists of whose character an extremely good account had been received; . . . and on whom, considering their numbers, their race, their habits of industry, and their being familiarized to the English language and manners, the Directors have reckoned on forming the strength of the Infant Colony.\(^{137}\)

\(^{135}\) *Directors' Report, 1794*, pp. 4, 7; PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 183, Clarkson to Thornton, 28 November 1791; CO 217/63, Skinner to Dundas, n.d. (November 1791); PANS Vol. 48, Letters to the Secretary of State, Doc. 67, Bulkeley to Dundas, 3 February 1792.


\(^{137}\) *Times*, 10 February 1792.
Clearly the hopes of the Directors and of the proprietors were placed on the Blacks from Nova Scotia: they were expected to provide the foundation for the successful, commercial and humanitarian, of the Sierra Leone venture.

Meanwhile the enquiry instituted by Parr into Thomas Peters' complaint about land was proceeding during the recruitment. Anticipating its conclusions, the governor wrote to Dundas in September: "Concerning the Complaint of Peters, I apprehend it to be a Misrepresentation... I have at all times peculiarly attended to their Settlements [and] I think I may with safety say, that these People were put on lands and in a situation then much envied."\(^{138}\) The commissioners appointed by the governor, Alexander Howe and Job Bennet Clarke, were not directed to enquire into the whole pattern of Black Loyalist land grants, but merely to examine and explain the situation in Annapolis-Digby where Peters claimed to have been refused land.\(^{139}\) The enquiry met at Annapolis on 16 November 1791, and Peters was invited to submit proof in support of his contentions. He produced the warrant for twenty-one Black Pioneer farms, and repeated the charge that after the land was surveyed it was found to have been laid out by mistake. Letters from Parr and Morris were introduced which showed that this had in fact been the case.

\(^{138}\) Co 217/63, Parr to Dundas, 27 September 1791.

\(^{139}\) Ibid., Bulkeley to Dundas, 19 March 1792, enclos- ing "Enquiry into the Complaint of Thomas Peters a Black Man".
Asked if he had then applied for other land in Annapolis County, Peters replied that he had not. With regard to provisions Peters made the charge that supplies due the Blacks had been detained, but again he admitted that he had left for St. John without collecting all the provisions available to him. That to do so he should have been required to work on the roads was mentioned in the commissioners' report, but not offered as a valid reason for Peters' declining to take them. The enquiry concluded that land and provisions had been offered to the complainant, and that he only missed receiving them by his departure from the province. Peters signed a declaration expressing his gratitude to Governor Parr and admitting that those Blacks who persevered had been granted satisfactory lands. 140 This probably referred to the Leonard tract surveyed in 1789, in which case the declaration is misleading for no final grant was issued for that land. 141

In submitting the report to Dundas, Richard Bulkeley wrote:

> it appears that every attention was paid to this Man, and his people in general, and that they had lands granted to them wherever they chose to settle in this Province— and that if he had not hastily quitted it, he would have received his full share of Provisions and Lands with the others. 142

140 Ibid. The declaration was signed with Peters' mark, though he was literate enough to sign personal correspondence with his name. Cf. Clarkson Papers, I, Thomas Peters to Lawrence Hartshorne, 10 October 1791.

141 See Chapter II, footnotes 59–60.

142 CO 217/63, Bulkeley to Dundas, 19 March 1792, and PANS Vol. 48, Letters to the Secretary of State, Doc. 70.
Thus, so far as the province was concerned, ended the Peters affair. Since Peters was found personally to blame for his failure to receive his promised land, it was unnecessary to amend the process of granting lands to Blacks or to consider making any "attornment", as Dundas had requested, for their having suffered from an "unaccountable delay". If any Blacks had decided to remain in Nova Scotia in the hope of having their promises fulfilled, the enquiry report effectively quashed that possibility.  

His own recruitment activities brought to an abrupt end at Shelburne, Clarkson began to prepare for the voyage of the 1,200 Black Loyalists already gathering in Halifax. The governor's appointee for "conveying and victualling" the migration, Michael Wallace, advertised for shipping and contracted for a fleet of 15 vessels. But the high prices Wallace agreed to pay and the poor quality of many of the

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143 On the narrowest basis of the facts presented, the Commissioners were entitled to conclude that Peters became discouraged rather quickly in 1784-5, and that he may have been successful in obtaining lands if he had not left for New Brunswick when he did. The experience of those Black Loyalists who remained in Brindley Town until 1791, however, does not encourage the belief that Peters could have fared any better. In the light of the total picture (see for example the evidence offered above in Chapters II and III concerning lands and provisions) the implications of the Enquiry conclusion, i.e. that the Blacks had been well served except for this one case, and that the man involved was responsible for his own problems, appear unjust and even dishonest.

144 Royal Gazette and Nova Scotia Advertiser, 15, 22, 29 November 1791; CO 217/63, Bulkeley to Dundas, 29 November 1791, 3 February 1792; Clarkson Papers, III, fol. 169; PANS Vol. 213, Council Minutes, 26 January 1792.
ships caused quarrels and recriminations between him and Clarkson, until a committee of three Provincial Council members was appointed to facilitate and inspect the embarkation of the Blacks. Still Clarkson was not satisfied. With Thomas Peters he inspected every ship personally, ordering decks removed and ventilation holes made, arranging for holds to be scrubbed and properly ballasted, and instructing carpenters on the construction of berths. Costs mounted quickly, for there was not only the charter fee to pay and the cost of Clarkson's alterations but demurrage in Halifax harbour for a period of up to two months. The total expenses for shipping alone came to £9,592, and combined with the charges incurred for accommodating the Blacks in Halifax prior to their departure, and for their maintenance ashore and during the voyage, the entire exodus cost the British government almost £16,000. This amounted to three times


146 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 173, Clarkson to Thornton, 28 November 1791, pp. 219, 228, 233-35 (5, 6, 8 December).

147 CO 217/63, Bulkeley to Dundas, 3 February 1792, enclosing "Return of Tonnage and Freight", 16 January 1792; PANS Vol. 213, Council Minutes, 26 January, 8 February, 15 March 1792; PANS Vol. 48, Letters to the Secretary of State, Doc. 69, Bulkeley to Dundas, 6 February 1792. The total expenses were £15,592.13. Clarkson's own expenses amounted to only £287. This included all his travel and incidental re-
the estimate for Nova Scotia's civil establishment in 1792. 148

Despite these apparent extravagances conditions among the Blacks waiting in Halifax were poor and even dangerous. Most of the migrants were quite destitute, having left all their belongings in order to follow Clarkson. The storehouses that were used as barracks were overcrowded and did not provide adequate shelter against the inclement winter weather. Sickness became so general that Clarkson was obliged to deny a rumour that an epidemic had broken out. Eight people died of disease or exposure, and one man was suffocated. 149 Until proper provisions and clothing were issued many Blacks wandered the winter streets almost naked begging for food. 150 They naturally looked to Clarkson for support and assistance, and he found himself overwhelmed with re-

ruitment costs, office and house rents, stationery, advertisements, etc., and the money advanced to Peters for his expenses in New Brunswick and Annapolis. PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 434-35 (17 March 1792).

148 PANS Vol. 344, Accounts and Estimates, 1751-1834, Doc. 9, Estimate for 1792, £5,376.17.6. 1792 was not an unusual year. Between 1783 and 1799 the estimate ranged from £5,415 to £5,943. Ibid., Docs. 6-17, Estimates, 1783 to 1800.

149 Clarkson Papers, IV, Dr. Taylor's Diary, fols. 1-5. Taylor was the physician appointed to accompany Clarkson from London to Nova Scotia and Sierra Leone. See also PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 250, 257, 261-62, 264, 273-74, 283, 290-94, 308, 628 (11-15, 21, 25, 27 December 1791, 1, 3 January 1792).

150 Ibid., pp. 220-28; 272-73 (6, 15 December); PANS Vol. 213, Council Minutes, 6 December 1791; Clarkson Papers, I, Clarkson and Hartshorne to Bulkeley, 13 December 1791.
quests and complaints.\footnote{151} In such a situation it was inevitable that he should develop a paternalistic attitude toward them, and that they should look to him as a protector. Clarkson’s position became such that he was asked to arbitrate in religious disputes and on several occasions to "ordain" Black preachers.\footnote{152}

A structure did exist for some form of self-regulation among the Blacks in that Clarkson had organized them into companies headed by captains. The captains, usually preachers, were primarily responsible for maintaining discipline and relaying information between Clarkson and the people. They were expected to select juries and conduct trials to punish minor offences, and to act as constables in apprehending more serious offenders.\footnote{153} But the twenty-seven captains did not form an effective administrative level, and Clarkson found himself fatigued and irritated at the amount of petty business to which


\footnote{152}Ibid., p. 132 (14 November), p. 211, Clarkson to Thorntop, 1 December 1791, pp. 217-18 (3 December).

\footnote{153}Ibid., pp. 296, 309-10, 314, 349-50 (29 December 1791, 2, 3, 9 January 1792); Clarkson Papers, I, fol. 231, "List of Nova Scotian Captains"; Clarkson Papers, III, fol. 174. Clarkson included one Company list in his journal (pp. 351-52), to "serve as a specimen for the others". The captain was David George and in his company were 17 men, 3 female family heads, 14 wives, 7 women "going with families" (i.e. whose support was guaranteed by a family head), 1 child over ten years and 24 children under ten years of age.
he was forced to attend. To streamline his administration and to free himself for more important concerns he appointed Thomas Peters, David George and John Ball "to superintend the whole, and to communicate to me their wants and complaints, desiring them to inform the people at the different Barracks, not to come to me with their particular complaints, but to inform me through them." 154

Thomas Peters was in a rather peculiar position, an unofficial second in command to Clarkson and the unannounced leader of the Black hosts. Even before his selection as a superintendent he had been in charge of the Annapolis-New Brunswick contingent, with other captains ranked beneath him, and he had assisted Clarkson with many of the details attending the selection and preparation of ships for the voyage to Africa. 155 As the man who had initiated the whole project and had been responsible for recruiting over a third of the emigrants, it was not unnatural that Peters should consider himself worthy of special attention. He was therefore less prepared than the others to acknowledge Clarkson as a "Guardian and Protector", and to award him his automatic "obedience and good behaviour". 156 This led inevitably to a conflict between the two men. In making final arrangements for boarding the

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155 Ibid., p. 219 (5 December).
156 Cf. Ibid., p. 43, Clarkson to Thornton, 19 October 1791.
vessels, Peters evidently refused to accept Clarkson's decisions or to "comprehend how necessary it was for regularity and subordination on board the ships". Unfortunately for the future peace of Sierra Leone the conflict was not resolved. Peters "persisted in his obstinacy" and Clarkson "went to bed, much indisposed". 157 They continued to cooperate for the success of the mission but their relations, from Clarkson's standpoint at least, were strained.

In final preparation for the voyage Clarkson, assisted by the superintendents and captains, distributed over 1,000 items of clothing and paid the legitimate debts of those Black Loyalists who were suddenly confronted with creditors. Satisfied that their obligations to the province had been fulfilled, Bulkeley then issued passports permitting the Blacks to depart. 158 Clarkson and the Black leaders also made out land certificates entitling the recipients to obtain free grants on arrival in Africa. Each certificate specified the name of the individual and the number of acres he was to receive. 159 If Clarkson's use of Black assistants indicated

157 Ibid., p. 284 (22 December).

158 Ibid., pp. 356-57, 365-67 (11, 12 January 1792); Clarkson Papers, III, fol. 171. Omitting Peters' expense money for recruitment purposes, the debts totalled £23,16.0-1/2.

159 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 314-17, 342 (4, 10 January 1792). The certificates read:

"Sierra Leone Company

The bearer having produced to us a satisfactory Certificate of Character, as required by the
his readiness to share responsibility with the colonists, his Instructions to the Free Blacks, issued immediately prior to their departure, showed that he still regarded them as "ignorant misinformed people." The Instructions, which were read aloud, posted, and ordered to be read weekly during the voyage, advised the people to be patient and soft spoken, to avoid fraternizing with the white seamen, to help each other, to pay particular attention to divine worship, and personal cleanliness, to guard against improper behaviour, and to display their gratitude by accepting Clarkson's advice.

On 15 January 1792 the Sierra Leone fleet of fifteen ships, bearing 1,196 Black Loyalists, sailed from Halifax. The voyage was a difficult one and the fleet was divided dur-

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Company, we do hereby certify that upon arrival at Sierra Leone, shall receive free of expense, 500 acres of land for each family consisting of 5 men, being the proportion entitled to, agreeable to the printed proposals of the Company.

Men received 20 acres, with an additional 10 for a wife and 5 for each child. Unmarried women "going with families" received 10 acres, while female family heads were eligible for the full male allotment. Cf. PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 50, Clarkson to Thornton, 19 October 1791. 

160 Cf. PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 50, Clarkson to Thornton, 19 October 1791.


162 Ibid., pp. 353–54, "General Embarkation List", p. 377 (15 January 1792); Clarkson Papers, III, fol. 170; CO 217/63, Bulkeley to Dundas, 3 February 1792; Lawrence Hartshorne to Henry Thornton, 9 February 1792; Royal Gazette and Nova Scotia Advertiser, 10 and 17 January 1792; PANS Vol. 213, Council Minutes, 26 January 1792.
ing the crossing, but by early March they had all dropped anchor in St. George's Bay at the mouth of the Sierra Leone River. Though they passed from the history of Nova Scotia at this point, the Sierra Leone colonists carried with them common religious characteristics, a way of life and a set of attitudes that had been born during their brief stay in the Loyalist province. Appropriately they and their descendants continued to call themselves "Nova Scotians". For the past eight or nine years the Black Loyalists had been on the periphery of an alien society; for the next generation the "Nova Scotians" would be at the centre of a new historical development in Africa.

163 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 380-406 (15 January - 7 March 1792); CO 267/9, Thomas Peters to Dundas, n.d. (received 6 July 1792); Royal Gazette and Nova Scotia Advertiser, 29 May 1792; Diary of Simeon Perkins, III, pp. 156-57 (21 May 1792).
CHAPTER VII
The Year of Jubilee

The Nova Scotian Settlers in Sierra Leone, 1792

Clarkson's ship, the Lucretia, entered the harbour at the mouth of the Sierra Leone River on 7 March 1792. Some of the fleet carrying the Nova Scotian settlers had preceded him by a week, though the people had remained aboard their transports. On Clarkson's arrival a party accompanied him ashore to view their promised land. The prospect that faced them was indeed pleasing. Mountains rose suddenly from the sea, covered with a luxuriant forest that promised timber for the construction of settler homes. The strip of coastal plain appeared fertile, and the river mouth abounded with fish. The forest harboured a plentiful supply of tropical fruit trees and a variety of game animals. The new land was, as Clarkson wrote, "most rich and beautiful." 

A townsite was selected on the location of the original Granville Town, now deserted and overgrown, and imme-

1 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 404-06 (6 and 7 March 1792); Clarkson Papers, IV, Dr. Taylor's Diary, 7 March 1792; SPG, Designs of the Associates, Abstract for 1792, pp. 44-5, Joseph Leonard to Associates, 9 April 1792.

2 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 411 (8 March); Falconbridge, Two Voyages, pp. 18, 67; Sierra Leone Papers, Mr. A. Afzelius's Report Respecting several Natural Productions of Sierra Leone, 14 November 1793; Directors' Report, 1794, pp. 225-41.
diately the Black captains organized their companies and began clearing an area for the new settlement. About 70 to 80 acres were cleared to provide town lots for each of the 400 families. Nine broad streets paralleled the river along the southern bank, crossed by three streets running at right angles to it. The streets were named after the twelve Directors of the Sierra Leone Company. The labour parties began building huts of grass and clay, averaging eight by twelve feet in size, though many of the people continued to live in makeshift tents put together from the sails of their transport ships. By 11 March, their first Sunday in Africa, the Nova Scotians were able to assemble ashore beneath a large cotton tree to hear the English chaplain preach a sermon on the text: "Except the Lord build the house, the labour is but lost that build it", and a thousand voices joined to sing a hymn

The Year of Jubilee has come
Return ye ransomed sinners home.

The new town was dedicated and, following the instructions of the Directors, it was named Freetown.

Despite their enthusiasm the Nova Scotians did not escape the natural difficulties that had defeated the first colonists five years previously. Temperatures rising to 114 degrees made physical work discomforting, and within less

3 PAMS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 412-15 (~11 March); Directors' Report, 1794, pp. 51, 68-9; Clarkson Papers, IV, Dr. Taylor's Diary, 7-11 March 1792; Evans, "Early Constitution", pp. 33-4.
than a month of their arrival tornadoes interrupted the clearing and building operations. The tornadoes were merely a prelude to four months of violent and almost incessant rain. Leather went mouldy, cloth rotted, utensils of iron and steel became rusty and useless. Snakes, some of them eighteen feet long, haunted the Nova Scotian huts and tents by night, while plagues of insects made their lives miserable and spoiled their food. One night a large baboon seized a twelve-year-old girl and dragged her from her tent; another night a leopard was chased from a settler's hut. All the hardships of the pioneer were visited upon them. And while the inhospitable weather prevented their clearing land and planting crops, it ruined the food supplies provided by the Company. The Directors had sent provisions believed sufficient for three months of full rations and a further three months on half-rations, and Clarkson had retrieved from the transport ships several thousand pounds of beef, pork, bread, rice and other foodstuffs not consumed in the voyage from

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4Sierra Leone Papers, Afzelius to Clarkson, 29 December 1792, enclosing journal extracts, May-December 1792; Directors' Report, 1794, p. 9; E. G. Ingham, Sierra Leone After a Hundred Years (London, 1894), pp. 36-8, Clarkson's diary, 1-8 April 1792; Clarkson Papers, IV, Dr. Taylor's Diary, 16 March – 18 April 1792.

5Directors' Report, 1794, pp. 226, 228; Sierra Leone Papers, Mr. A. Afzelius's Report, 14 November 1793; Ingham, Sierra Leone, pp. 26, 137; Clarkson Papers, IV, Dr. Taylor's Diary, 8, 19, 22 and 27 March 1792.
Halifax. Nevertheless by the end of March provisions were short, and on 7 April, only one month after their landing, the settlers were put on half-rations with little local production to supplement them. Bread was all consumed by 30 April, leaving little else than "indifferent salt provisions" in their diet. The ransomed sinners faced the very real prospect of famine in their new home.

Most of the people were still living exposed in their flimsy tents when the rains struck the colony, and even the families relatively fortunate enough to have completed their huts had little protection from the weather. These huts, inferior to those occupied by the neighbouring Africans, allowed the rain to come in and yet retained the damp. The difficulty in gathering thatch left most of them with unfinished roofs or walls. Not even the storehouse was secure from the wind and rain, causing a further deterioration in food supplies. Sickness and death were the inevitable result. A fever that had killed sixty-five of the emigrants

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7 Falconbridge, Two Voyages, p. 139; Ingham, Sierra Leone, p. 33; Clarkson Papers, III, fols. 183-84, "History of Sierra Leone", fragment written by Thomas Clarkson from John Clarkson's notes.

8 Ingham, Sierra Leone, p. 46 (12 April 1792); Directors' Report, 1794, pp. 9, 19; Falconbridge, Two Voyages, p. 139; B. Add. Ms. 33979, Banks Correspondence, 1765-1821, Vol. III, 1790-94, A. Afzelius to Joseph Banks, 2 July 1792.
during the voyage continued to spread among the cold and hungry settlers. Within a month another forty had died, and five hundred were ill. In July, at the height of the rainy season, eight hundred settlers were incapacitated with disease at one time, and people died before anyone knew they were ill. All the medical personnel, the storekeeper and the surveyor were too sick to work. No one was left to care for the suffering. Boston King's wife died in April, and in June he was likewise taken ill of the putrid fever. It was an universal complaint, and the people died so fast, that it was difficult to procure a burial for them. This affliction continued among us for three months. It was during this period, Mrs. Falconbridge wrote, that "it is quite customary of a morning to ask 'how many died last night?'. By the time the rains ended in September and the damp mud floors and clothing were dried out, 57 of the Colony's 119 white officials were dead, and fewer than 1,000 of the Nova Scotian settlers remained alive in their promised land.

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9 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 431-33, "Clarkson to Dundas, 17 March 1792; Clarkson Papers, IV, Dr. Taylor's Diary, 11 April 1792.

10 Banks Correspondence, III, Afzelius to Banks, 2 July 1792; Ingham, Sierra Leone, pp. 46-7, 100-01 (12 April and -- July, 1792); Directors' Report, 1794, pp. 12-3; Falconbridge, Two Voyages, p. 148; Times, 24 August 1794.


12 Falconbridge, Two Voyages, p. 148.

13 A breakdown of the white deaths suggests that expos-
The difficulties met by the settlers were not entirely attributable to the climate. With adequate preparation and a moderate measure of efficiency most of them could have been avoided. But there was neither preparation nor efficiency. Clarkson had expected to hand over responsibility for the Black Loyalists to Henry New Dalrymple, the Directors' appointee as superintendent, on his arrival in Africa. From Halifax Clarkson had written to both Dalrymple and Thornton urging them to have lands cleared and grants

ure and perhaps inadequate nourishment contributed to the mortality:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number of Deaths</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Upper servants of the Company'</td>
<td>4 died of 26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Lower servants'</td>
<td>29 died of 59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White settlers</td>
<td>13 died of 18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers (white)</td>
<td>11 died of 16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Directors' Report, 1794, pp. 47-9). The upper servants lived aboard a ship in the harbour or in the most secure lodgings ashore, and were the best-sheltered and fed people in the colony. The soldiers and white settlers shared the conditions of the Nova Scotians. The "fever", to which so many eighteenth and early nineteenth century deaths were attributed, was probably consequent to exposure, chill and malnutrition as much as it was caused by malaria or any other tropical disease.

Statistics on Nova Scotian deaths are less reliable. On 22 September Clarkson reported 995 alive "subject to correction" ("Diary of Lieutenant Clarkson, R.N.", SLS, Vol. VIII, No. 31, 1927, p. 52). In March 1,131 Blacks landed, and by 11 April there had been 40 deaths and 14 births (Clarkson Papers, IV; Dr. Taylor's Diary, 11 April 1792). Presumably more were born between April and September. It is therefore probable that at least 150 Nova Scotians died during the rains. Disregarding the upper servants, about 57 percent of the whites living ashore died against only about 13 percent of the Blacks. In December Clarkson stated that only 101 Black settlers had died since March (Ingham, Sierra Leone, p. 151). If so his September figure must have been incorrect, and the percentage of deaths to the total Black population would be less than 10 percent. The Black settlers' relative health could have derived from an ancestral resistance to African diseases or to a hardier constitution developed over nine Nova Scotian winters spent in unsatisfactory housing.
made ready for the settlers, and cautioning them on the racial sensitivities of the Black Loyalists. 14 But when his ship dropped anchor in the Sierra Leone River Clarkson received on board a delegation from the Company's council which informed him that he was to be superintendent and that no steps had been taken to prepare for the settlers' arrival. His appointment as superintendent was confirmed by two letters awaiting him from the Directors, asking him to accept the post temporarily until a permanent replacement could be found. 15

According to the 1791 Constitution, the seven councillors and the superintendent shared all the colonial powers, and no single person had any greater authority than the rest. 1 The councillors arrived in Sierra Leone in February 1792, among a group of over one-hundred white officials, artisans and settlers sent out by the Company, but they had remained on board their ships with no thought for making plans to receive the Nova Scotians. 17 Since Clarkson had no authority

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15 Clarkson Papers, I, Joseph Hardcastle to Clarkson, 9 November 1791, and Thornton to Clarkson, 28 December 1791, PAiS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 407 (7 March 1792).

16 Evans, "Early Constitution", p. 47. The original councillors were John Clarkson (superintendent), Alexander Falconbridge, James Cocks, Dr. John Bell, John Wakereil, Richard Pepys, James Watt and Dr. Charles Taylor.

17 Directors' Report, 1794, p. 7; CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 14, 17 and 21 February 1792.
to make decisions on his own, every step in the settlement operation had first to be approved at a meeting of the council, "and those opinionated upstarts thwart him in all his attempts." Jealous of their power, their "weak minds" deluded with "wrong notions of their rank", the councillors and their wives insisted upon proper respect being shown them by Company officials and Black settlers alike. Few of them attended to their proper duties, preferring the pomp of official receptions and the deliberations of the council-room. The surveyor considered himself above the servile tasks assigned to him, and as a councillor refused to conduct a survey of the Nova Scotian allotments. Confusion, disorder and neglect prevailed in every department of the colonial establishment.

Quarrelling broke out among the councillors as they jockeyed for place, sometimes resulting in an exchange of blows. Tempers were not calmed by indulgence in excessive drinking, a habit that eventually killed the colonial physician.

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18 Falconbridge, Two Voyages, p. 140; Ingham, Sierra Leone, pp. 31-3, 56-7 (29 and 30 March, 18 April 1792); Clarkson Papers, I, Clarkson to Thornton, 18 April 1792.

19 Falconbridge, Two Voyages, pp. 133-35; Clarkson Papers, III, Clarkson to Hartshorne, 4 August 1793; Ingham, Sierra Leone, p. 12 (29 March 1792).

20 Falconbridge, Two Voyages, pp. 139, 152; Ingham, Sierra Leone, pp. 31-2, 53-4 (29 March, 18 April); Clarkson Papers, I, Clarkson to Thornton, 18 April 1792.

21 Falconbridge, Two Voyages, p. 140; PAHS, Clarkson's
given a burial at sea with full military honours, suitable, in their view, to their colleague in the exalted ranks of the Sierra Leone Council. 22 Anxious to display their authority, they would order provisions brought from the ships, only to leave them on the shore to be spoiled by the weather or washed away by the waves. One would countermand the orders of another, for no motive but pique or jealousy. Different councillors would offer different rates of pay or conditions of work, causing the labour parties to switch from one job to another leaving both incomplete. 23 "To their inefficiency", the Directors admitted with understatement, "during the first three or four most important months, a part at least of the subsequent calamity is evidently to be traced." 24

The Directors themselves were not entirely free of the charge of mismanagement and inefficiency. Steeled in the values of the eighteenth century Enlightenment and engaged in their personal "quest for the perfect society," 25 they

Mission, p. 407 (7 March 1792); Clarkson Papers, I, Thornton to Clarkson, 30 December 1791 and Clarkson to Thornton, 18 April 1792; Clarkson Papers, III, Clarkson to Hartshorne, 4 August 1793.


23 CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 12 May 1792; Clarkson Papers, III, Clarkson to Hartshorne, 4 August 1793; Falconbridge, Two Voyages, p. 140; Ingham, Sierra Leone, pp. 54-67 (18 April).


25 John Peterson, "The Enlightenment and the Founding
could not recognize the unworkable nature of their constitution and defended it on the grounds that "the principles of liberty are against giving arbitrary government to one man". The Company founders were "more intent upon nonsensical forms of Courts", Clarkson wrote to a Halifax friend, "than real business". While private ship-owners and slave traders were using every influence to penetrate the government's wartime embargo, the Company, for all its highly placed friends, refused to do so. To Clarkson this was hypocrisy, and made him ashamed "of being at the Head of their Employ". When ships were sent through their cargoes contained trade goods and implements for establishing plantation industry rather than provisions and tools useful for making the Nova Scotians self-sufficient. On one occasion, after months with no supplies from England, a ship arrived full of "garden watering pots". "The Felicity's cargo", the superintendent noted, "does not appear to be well selected, considering our wants." The Directors blamed their ignorance.

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26 Clarkson Papers, I, Thornton to Clarkson, 14 September 1792.

27 Clarkson Papers, III, Clarkson to Hortshore, September 1793, second draft.

28 Ibid., first draft.

29 Ibid., second draft.

30 Ingham, Sierra Leone, p. 144 (21 November 1792).
ance on the poor advice they received from Falconbridge and Clarkson, but maintained their belief that trade with the Africans, not a settlement of self-supporting proprietors, would result in the civilization of Africa. 31

The Nova Scotians therefore found themselves subordinate to a white governing class and subjected to the experiments of non-resident controllers. The councillors' arrogance and the racial insults that were hurled by petty officials full of their own position only accentuated the fact that the body of Black settlers was under the rule of a small and inefficient group whose only apparent credentials were the colour of their skins. 32 Racial resentment, disappointment, and frustration at the confused situation caused rumblings of discontent among the settlers. Clarkson had led them to expect that they would be able to occupy their lands almost immediately, and that some initial preparations would have been made. Instead, they found uncleared forest, no buildings and a shortage of all essential supplies. Anxious to begin a new life, they met only delay and confusion not of their own making. As early as 27 March "dissatisfaction" became open among them and some became "very troublesome." 33

31 Directors' Report, 1794, p. 9; Clarkson Papers, I, Thornton to Clarkson, 17 August and 14 September 1792.
32 Clarkson Papers, III, Clarkson to Hartshorne, 4 August 1792; The Philanthropist, Vol. V, 1815, p. 35.
33 Ingham, Sierra Leone, pp. 26-7, 33 (27, 30 March, 1792).
By early April most of the people were "murmurring and discontented". The general sickness was debilitating, the continual rain depressing, "the obnoxious arrogance of their rulers" infuriating. Hunger became common after 7 April when rations were reduced to half, and "with hunger", Councillor Watt reminded his colleagues, "comes Mutiny".

Clarkson became "greatly fatigued" and was unable to receive the settlers' requests and complaints personally. Instead he asked them to communicate with him only by letter. But another structure existed for the channelling of grievances from the people to their white leader: the three Black superintendents appointed by Clarkson for just such a purpose while they were still in Halifax. Thomas Peters, one of those superintendents and the natural leader of the Annapolis County and New Brunswick Black Loyalists, quickly became a focus for the discontent. At Methodist evening prayer meetings he stood before the people and berated the white clique which he saw as the cause of their problems, and he reminded them of the promises, all unfulfilled, that had been given.

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34 Ibid., pp. 36, 38 (1, 8 April); Clarkson Papers, I, Clarkson to Thornton, 18 April 1792.
35 Falconbridge, Two Voyages, p. 141.
36 Clarkson Papers, III, fol. 184, "History of Sierra Leone," fragment written by Thomas Clarkson, quoting Watt to Clarkson, 27 April 1792.
37 Ingham, Sierra Leone, p. 38 (8 April).
38 PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 250 (11 December 1791).
them in Nova Scotia.\textsuperscript{39} The Baptist preacher David George opposed Peters' "move and preached against him, and was "threatened with assassination for so doing".\textsuperscript{40} Though the division among the settlers was basically along religious lines, with the Methodists strongest in Peters' support, Clarkson saw that the issue was essentially racial and between Black and white.\textsuperscript{41}

On 7 April, the day that rations were reduced, a meeting of the settlers elected Peters to act as their "Speaker-General" in representing their wants before Superintendent Clarkson. A petition to that effect had already been drawn up and signed by 132 of the settlers, but it had not been presented to Clarkson due to his illness and indisposition.\textsuperscript{42} After church services on 8 April, Easter Day, two settlers handed Clarkson a letter warning him that a disaffected group was planning to rebel and place Peters in the position of governor over the settlement. "With a

\textsuperscript{39} Clarkson Papers, III, Clarkson to Hartshorne, 4 August 1793.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., Clarkson to Hartshorne, September 1793, first draft; Zachary Macaulay, Letters, Macaulay to Thornton, 20 December 1797.


\textsuperscript{42} Clarkson Papers, III, fols. 181-84, "History of Sierra Leone", fragment written by Thomas Clarkson. The petition itself has not been preserved. In his diary Clarkson reported that the petition had been written and signed on 23 March.
trembling hand", the writers of the letter assured Clarkson that "the Preston people have no hand in the affair at all", probably indicating that it was Peters' personal following from Annapolis and St. John that had elected him.

Clarkson retired to bed for the afternoon without reading the letter, but when he opened it after supper he was immediately struck with its implications. Going ashore from his quarters aboard a Company ship, he had a bell rung and assembled all the settlers around the cotton tree. He addressed Peters as a traitor, and announced that "either one or other of us would be hanged upon that tree before the palaver was settled". The Company, he reminded them, had made great sacrifices for them and would do so yet, and they depended upon the Directors' good will and assistance. Acknowledging their frustrations, he made a solemn pledge that their lots of land should be laid out as quickly as possible to enable them to become self-supporting, as was their wish. When he challenged the people to choose between himself and Peters, not one settler moved to Peters' side. The signatories to the petition explained that their intention had been far from supplanting Clarkson as their lawful leader; they had only wanted to ease his responsibilities by making one of their own number their chairman in dealing with their over-wrought superintendent. Though unconvinced.

43 Ingham, Sierra Leone, pp. 38-9, J. H. and J. d. to Clarkson, 8 April 1792.
that this was in fact the case, Clarkson was "very glad to
close the business with this explanation, for had matters
appeared stronger against Peters, I should not have known
what to have done with him". 44

The matter was dropped officially, but Clarkson,
and the Company interpreted the "Peters rebellion" as an
attempt to replace the Company-appointed white government
with a popularly-elected Black one. The subsequent division
within settler ranks lent some credence to this view. The
Preston informers were threatened by Peters' supporters, and
a Baptist-Methodist split, already caused by the racial
issue, grew more pronounced. If it were no more than a ques-
tion of channelling complaints through Peters, it is unlikely
that tempers should have reached such a pitch that lives were
in danger. 45 It would not have been surprising for Peters to
resent his position beneath a band of white incompetents, or
for many people, expecting self-government, to look to him
as a logical choice to be their first Black governor. Further-
more the Easter Day confrontation did not end Peters' activ-
ities as an unofficial opposition to the government. He con-
tinued to address the all-night prayer meetings and to har-

44 Ibid., pp. 39-42 (8 April); Clarkson Papers, III,
"History of Sierra Leone", fragment written by Thomas Clark-
son, and Clarkson to Hartshorne, 4 August 1793; Sierra Leone
Papers; James Strand's journal, 30 May 1792; The Philanthro-
pist, IV, 1814, p. 253.

45 Ingham, Sierra Leone, p. 43; Zacharay Macaulay,
Letters, Macaulay to Thornton, 20 December 1797.
argue the settlers with charges against the councillors and even against Clarkson himself. 46 Whether he may have succeeded eventually in inspiring some kind of rebellion cannot be known, for his credibility among his peers was shattered when, on 1 May, he was accused of stealing from a dead man. His defense, that the money he took was owing to him by the deceased settler, was not accepted by the all-Black jury, and he was sentenced to receive a public reprimand and to restore the property to the widow. 47 Shortly thereafter Peters himself died, though his ghost was reported abroad in the colony for several months. 48

John Clarkson was convinced that the chief grievance was the council itself, and he wrote to the Directors threatening to resign unless he were given authority to make decisions independently for the good order of the colony. A meeting of the Directors in May resolved to abolish the council government, and to replace it with a governor and two councillors, the governor being empowered to act without the advice of his councillors when necessary. 49 After the

46 Sierra Leone Papers, James Strand's journal, 30 May 1792; Clarkson Papers, III, Clarkson to Hartsorne, 4 August 1793.

47 Ibid.; Sierra Leone Papers, James Strand's journal, 1 May 1792.

48 Ibid., 25 July 1792.

49 Clarkson Papers, I, Clarkson to Thornton, 1 April, and Thornton to Clarkson, 22 May 1792; "Diary of Lieutenant Clarkson", p. 26 (27 August); Ingham, Sierra Leone, pp. 95 (July).
new orders arrived in Sierra Leone, in August 1792, confidence was restored to some extent, but it was still an essentially despotic form of government with no settler participation. Though the undisputed ruler of the colony, Governor Clarkson headed a dissatisfied host, for if the Nova Scotians' faith in him was affirmed during the "Peters rebellion", the delay in the assignment of their land grants soon changed their attitude.

Land had long been the Black Loyalists' desired object, the symbol of independence and security, and had been a major motive for their emigration from Nova Scotia. Any delay in Sierra Leone was bound to remind them of how they had been served once before, and would besides keep them from establishing farms and becoming productive. But problems of insufficient contiguous land for a complete allotment to all the settlers, a thick undergrowth which prevented the clearing of a large area, delays caused by the rains and the illness of the surveyor, and interference from the indigenous inhabitants when surveying parties strayed too far from the shore, meant that no farms were laid out during the first season in Africa. Expecting to be placed in immedi-

50 Falconbridge, Two Voyages, p. 158.

51 Cf. Wadstrom, Essay on Colonization, 11, p. 265; "Diary of Lieutenant Clarkson", p. 29; Clarkson Papers, 1, Granville Sharp to Clarkson, 24 July 1792; Clarkson Papers, 111, "History of Sierra Leone", fragment written by Thomas Clarkson.

52 Clarkson Papers, 1, Thornton to Clarkson, 14 Sep-
ate possession of their lands, the Nova Scotians began grumbling to Clarkson at the delay on 1 April 1792. The importance of this issue was evident at the Easter Day meeting with Peters and his supporters, when Clarkson promised that lands should be assigned in the near future. This promise may have been a determining factor in the settlers' decision to remain loyal to the Company government.

The settlers' patience was firm for another six or eight weeks before murmurings were resumed. On 21 May a special council meeting was held because the Nova Scotians’ minds are now greatly alarmed at the continued delay in laying out their Lots of Land: by which means they are incapacitated from providing means of subsistence for them and their families. Clarkson extracted a promise from the surveyor to begin work "as soon as possible". This kept the people still a month longer. By July it began to dawn on them that perhaps this was no mere delay, but evidence that they had been misled and were not, after all, to receive the farms that drew them from Nova Scotia. A profound change occurred in the settlers' attitude. They became suspicious and sullen, refusing to trust any longer in the Sierra Leone

tember 1792; Falconbridge, Two Voyages, p. 139; Hoare, Memoirs of Granville Sharp, pp. 280-81; Ingham, Sierra Leone, p. 173 (Secretary).

53 Ibid., p. 36 (1 April).

54 Clarkson Papers, III, "History of Sierra Leone", fragment written by Thomas Clarkson.

55 CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 21 May 1792.
Company's motives. To Councillor Strand they appeared "a different people", and Clarkson felt it "doubtful if I shall ever be able to bring the Nova Scotians back to their original simplicity and tractability". The people refused to accept the excuses offered to explain the delay, and preferred to attribute racial implications to it. "If there had been no white man here", they maintained, "we could have laid out all the Lots in Two Months." Only the re-form in government, which placed power in the hands of the one white man they still trusted, kept them from driving all the whites from the colony.

When the Nova Scotians first arrived in March 1792, they occupied the town lands as they were cleared with no organization or assignment of proper grants. According to the constitution, they were to draw lots both for their town and farm lands, and so it was recognized that the original occupation was merely a temporary one to enable the people to leave the ships. Even the huts that were built were

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56 Sierra Leone Papers, James Strand's journal, 28 July 1792.

57 Ingham, Sierra Leone, p. 98 (July).

58 Clarkson Papers, III, Petition to the Directors from the "Hundreds and Tythngs and Preachers of the Gospel in Behalf of all the Settlers in this Place", 1793.

59 Sierra Leone Papers, James Strand's journal, 28 July 1792.

60 Evans, "Early Constitution", pp. 69-70, Article 73.
only expected to provide temporary shelter, for the people would build more adequate homes when placed upon a permanent piece of town land. On the very day of arrival Clarkson gave orders to the surveyor to begin assigning the town lots, but no plans were set out until 4 August. It was only on 13 November that the draw actually took place for as much town land as was available at that time. Some people were forced to remain on their temporary lots and others refused to give them up, arguing that they had cleared them themselves and had developed them during their eight months' occupation. This added confusion to an already confused situation, and it required a court case to resolve it, in the settlers' favour, two years later. Nevertheless about 450 town lots measuring 48 by 76 feet were surveyed and occupied within a year of the settlers' landing in Africa.

The farm lands, supposed to be twenty acres for a man, ten for his wife and five for each child, were even less readily forthcoming. It was found impractical to lay out

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61 *Sierra Leone Papers, James Strand's journal*, 4 August 1792; *The Philanthropist*, IV, 1814, p. 248.
62 *Clarkson Papers*, I, toasts given at celebration dinner for the first town grants, 13 November 1792.
63 CO 270/2, *Council Minutes*, 13 May 1792.
64 See Chapter X, footnote 36.
the full allotments, since it would have placed many settlers far from the town, and besides it was difficult to clear so much land as would be required for a population of one thousand. In January 1793, therefore, the governor decided to assign farms one-fifth the promised size, with the remaining four-fifths to be granted as soon as conditions should permit. The first draw took place on 10 April 1793, though the survey was yet far from complete. Even of those grants that were made most remained uncleared and unoccupied, for another rainy season began just as the land became available. A total area of four square miles surrounding Freetown, containing some 2,600 acres, was divided into 17 blocks of about 130 acres each. The blocks were in turn divided into 500 individual farms, averaging 5 acres each, of which 490 were assigned to specific settlers and their families. Only 16 grants were ever finalized with formal registration, though some others were occupied without Company authorization.

Obviously the delay in assigning the farms, and the


67 CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 9 April 1793.

size and condition of the plots when assigned, made it impossible for the Nova Scotians to sustain themselves by agriculture. To earn wages, they had to work for the Company. At first Clarkson required them to join labouring parties in order to receive the Company-supplied rations, but in May 1792 he changed the system so that wages were paid and then the workers were charged for the rations at the Company store. A day's labour was valued at two shillings and a week's rations cost four shillings, enabling workers to support their families or to save the surplus. The difference was not actually paid in cash, but in the form of a credit at the Company store.

The settler-labourers cleared roads, built a church, warehouse, hospital and other official buildings of frames sent from England, constructed a wharf, and cultivated an experimental garden and a Company plantation. According to the Company, their services were not actually required; they were simply an excuse to enable the Company to continue giving

69 Ingham, Sierra Leone, pp. 31-2 (28-29 March 1792); Clarkson Papers, III, Clarkson to Hartshorne, 4 August 1793.
70 CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 12 May 1792.
71 Ibid.; Falconbridge, Two Voyages, p. 159.
72 "Diary of Lieutenant Clarkson", p. 106 (19 November 1792).
73 Directors' Report, 1794, pp. 51, 161; Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 26 September 1793; Sierra Leone Papers, James Strand's Journal, 3, 6 and 17 May 1792.
them rations until their farms were prepared. However, a vicious circle was established, for as long as the men were working for the Company they could not spend time in clearing land for farms. When lands did become available, in April 1793, the rains prevented their being cultivated for another entire year, forcing the settlers to continue working for the Company as before. For at least two years, therefore, almost the entire settler population depended upon the Company for support. Their economic situation was not very different from what it had been in Nova Scotia or even in slavery. As they complained to the Directors, "we have no Place to Work but in the Company's Works and we are just at the mercy of the People you send here to give us what Wages they Please."

In 1794 those wages, for a full day from sunrise to sunset, were three shillings for a skilled worker and one shilling and sixpence for an ordinary labourer, barely enough to purchase basic provisions at the only store, owned by the Company.

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74 Directors' Report, 1794, p. 19.

75 Clarkson Papers, III, Petition to the Directors from the "Hundreds and Tythings and Preachers of the Gospel", 1793.

76 Ibid., Luke Jordan and Isaac Anderson to Clarkson, 28 June 1794; A. P. Kup, "Freetown in 1794", SLG (ms), No. 11, 1958, p. 164; Boston King, "Memoirs", p. 263. About half the original Nova Scotian men had specialized trades. On 17 April 1792 Clarkson took a census which showed 330 men alive at that date, of whom 162 were qualified tradesmen, 127 experienced agricultural labourers, and 41 general labourers. The specific qualifications were listed as:
The "slave" parallel was not lost on the Nova Scotians themselves. Wages and prices being set by the Company, they pointed out, left them with less freedom than they had enjoyed in Loyalist Nova Scotia where at least there was an opportunity to bargain among competitors for their labour and their custom. But their sensitivity to anything suggestive of slavery went beyond this objection. Accustomed by experience to regard all restrictions on their freedom as aspects of a slave-like condition, they reacted with fear and hostility against any regulation or requirement. Moreover the kind of work they were required to perform was, in their opinion, suited for slaves and not for freemen. Their definition of

| Blacksmiths 8 | Carpenters 27 | Sail Maker 1 |
| Bakers 4 | Coopers 11 | Sawyers 50 |
| Broon Makers 1 | Caulkers 5 | Shingle Maker 1 |
| Basket Makers 3 | Cooks 2 | Shipwrights 3 |
| Brewers 1 | Chimney Sweeps 1 | Shoe Maker 1 |
| Butchers 2 | Fishermen 6 | Sailors 2 |
| Braziers 1 | Gardeners 3 | Tailors 5 |
| Bricklayers 3 | Hairdressers 2 | Tanner 1 |
| Brick & Tile Makers 2 | Pot Ash Maker 1 | Weavers 2 |
| Block Makers 1 | Pilots 2 | Wine Cooper 1 |
| Ingham, Sierra Leone, pp. 45-6 (11 April). |

77 Clarkson Papers, III, Petition to the Directors from the "Hundreds and Tythings and Preachers of the Gospel", 1793.


"independence" centred around the ideal of the peasant proprietor, self-supporting upon his own lands and selling his produce in a free market. Anything less they considered to be slavery. 80

The Nova Scotian sense of independence was frustrated by their continued economic dependence on the Sierra Leone Company and by the Company's paternalism, which refused to allow them to feed for themselves. Confident that their way was best, and feeling a Christian responsibility to care for the weak and oppressed, the Directors saw no contradiction in imposing their goals and their methods upon the settlers. 81 Referring to another group of Black immigrants, Henry Thornton wrote that "It will be our Object . . . to raise [them] in the Scale of human Beings by taking them under our Wing." 82 It was no doubt an enlightened despotism, but a despotism nonetheless. The system of laws they established was more humane than that practised in England, the advantages of education were made more readily available to all the people, and they guaranteed the civil rights of Black

80 African Institution, Special Report, 1815, p. 16; Directors' Report, 1794, p. 87; Sierra Leone Papers, James Strand's Journal, 1 May 1792; Clarkson Papers, III, John Clarkson to Thomas Clarkson, 5 May 1793. See also Peterson, "Enlightenment and Founding", pp. 10-11, and Hair, "Africanism", p. 524.

81 Clarkson Papers, I, Wilberforce to Clarkson, 27 April 1792; Evans, "Early Constitution", p. 68, Article 71; T. Clarkson, History of Abolition, II, pp. 585-86.

82 CO 217/70, Thornton to John King, 11 March 1799.
people at a time when most Europeans considered them fit only for slavery. But although they foresaw a time when the settlers might participate in their own government, it could only come after a period of tutelage. 93 In an early report to the proprietors the Directors observed that "both with a view to their own happiness and to the Company's great object of extending civilization in Africa, it is of the highest consequence that they should neither be left without instructors from hence, nor without a government consisting of Europeans". 94 They accepted without question the right, indeed the duty, of superior people to rule over the less fortunate "provided that this happy dominion be confined as a paternal Yoke". 95 There was no doubt in their minds that they were the superior party and had that obligation, and if the settlers should prove ungrateful and inclined towards independent action it only showed "but too plainly, the importance of bestowing on them an intelligent and protecting government". 96

The Company had been instituted to achieve three great goals, all of them intertwined and complementary. The

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94 Directors' Report, 1794, p. 94.
95 Wadstrom, Observations on the Slave Trade, p. 60.
96 Directors' Report, 1794, p. 28.
The immediate and fundamental objective was the abolition of the slave trade in Africa. The colony of Sierra Leone would assist in this process by developing commerce with Africa, thereby drawing the African people into other forms of trade and indicating to Europeans an alternative source of African profit. To encourage local production the colony would establish plantations on the West Indian model, but worked by free labourers, to teach the Africans how to farm for export. Both the trade and the settled agricultural existence would introduce European standards and a higher form of civilization, making the Africans more receptive to the Christian religion.

87 Ibid., p. 161; Clarkson Papers, I, Thornton to Clarkson, 30 December 1791 and Thomas Clarkson to John Clarkson, 2 January 1792; Parliamentary History, Vol. XXVIII, col. 41-67, Wilberforce, 12 May 1789.


89 National Register of Archives (London), Report 10924, H.W. 87/452, Richard How (Aspley) to Granville Sharp, 7 April 1792; CO 267/92, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix B-5, John Kizell to the Commissioners, March 1826; Clarkson Papers, I, Thornton to Clarkson, 14 September 1792; Evans, "Early Constitution", p. 44, Articles 6, 7 and 8; Wadstrom, Essay on Colonization, I, pp. 23-4.

90 Directors' Report, 1791, pp. 50-2; Directors' Report, 1804, p. 4; Clarkson Papers, I, Thornton to Clarkson, 30 December 1791, Thomas Clarkson to John Clarkson, 2 January
life and salvation in the next would make amends to Africa, for all the evil perpetrated there by European slave traders. 91 Abolition, commerce and civilization each depended on the other for success, and all depended on a flourishing and tractable colony in Sierra Leone.

The arrival of the Nova Scotians in Sierra Léone, however, "gave a new Character to the Undertaking", 92 added a whole new range of responsibilities, and threw the original goals into conflict. The settlers were to be partners in the enterprise; their presence would ensure a larger and more secure colony, more cultivation, and a realistic example for the native Africans. They would also serve as living proof to a skeptical white world that free Black people could produce and prosper without the presence of a whip-bearing overseer. 93 For the Nova Scotians to provide

1792, Wilberforce to Clarkson, 27 April 1792; CO 268/5, Governor and Council to Thomas Cooper, 8 April 1795; WO 1/352, Zachary Macaulay to John Sullivan, 17 June 1802; Evans, "Early Constitution", p. 45, Article 10.


such a service, their own needs would first have to be met;
before they could civilize Africa they would require assis-
tance in establishing themselves as a viable society in
Africa. But from the very beginning the Company's ultimate
goals took precedence over the settlers' immediate needs.\footnote{94}
The development of plantations for export production dis-
placed their efforts at peasant farming.\footnote{95} Their farms and
their labour were expected to provide the Company with the
profit so necessary to prove the venture a success.\footnote{96}
They had, in short, to operate in behalf of the Company share-
holders and of the people of Africa.

Under these circumstances the Directors could not
allow the Nova Scotians to substitute their own needs and
wishes for the colony's greater objectives. The Blacks'
personal aspirations had of necessity to be smothered under
white control. This tended to create a division, perhaps
circumstantially as far as the Company was concerned, between
a restricting white government and a freedom-seeking Black

\footnote{94}A. F. Walls, "The Nova Scotian Settlers and their
Religion", Sierra Leone Bulletin of Religion, No. 1, June
1959, pp. 21-2; Peterson, "Enlightenment and Founding", pp.
11-12; The Philanthropist, IV, 1814, p. 89; PRO 30/6/310,
Chatham Papers, Granville Sharp to Joseph Smith, 30 May 1791.

\footnote{95}Wadstrom, Essay on Colonization, II, p. 266; CO
267/92, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix B-5, John
Kizzell to Commissioners, March 1826; Clarkson Papers, I,
Thornton to Clarkson, 14 September 1792.

\footnote{96}Ibid., Thornton to Clarkson, 30 December 1791;
Wadstrom, Essay on Colonization, I, p. 22; Directors' Report,
1791, p. 53.
population. In slavery, and again in Nova Scotia, the settlers had felt themselves oppressed by white people, and a profound suspicion of whites had taken root in their minds. Then Sierra Leone had promised a new society, free of racial qualifications. They were being offered, they believed, an opportunity at last "of enjoying the Privileges of Freemen", and of being served "far better than we ever had before from White People". Their expectations, and their notion of what constituted a freeman's privilege, were destined to conflict with any order established by their white governors. And because of their past experience, that conflict was bound to be interpreted in racial terms.

Their experiences during the first few months in Africa merely confirmed their suspicions and gave meat to the skeleton of prejudice. When the promises Clarkson had made were not fulfilled, they felt it was evidence that they had


98 Clarkson Papers, III, Petition to the Directors from the "Hundreds and Tythnings and Preachers of the Gospel", 1793.

99 Cf. 217/70, John Gray and Thomas Ludlam to Sir John Wentworth, 24 June 1799.
been betrayed by white men. This was especially true in the case of land, for to them it seemed obvious that white men were deliberately keeping them from their farms and their only hope of achieving self-support. The bunglings of the white council, when added to the insults they suffered from the councillors, were considered to be inspired by racial motives, and their reaction against the Company government derived as much from the fact that their rulers were white as that they were incompetent. One result of the period of confusion, therefore, was that the colour feelings the settlers brought with them from Nova Scotia quickly became entrenched in their character. The expression of these feelings could only lead them to seek independence from white control.

With the exception of Thomas Peters and his closest associates, the Nova Scotians' racial suspicions were not applied to John Clarkson. They never believed him responsible for their betrayal; rather, they looked to him as their

100 Clarkson Papers, III, Isaac DuBois' journal, 7 February 1793.

101 "Diary of Lieutenant Clarkson", pp. 35, 40 (2 and 9 September 1792); Ingham, Sierra Leone, p. 120 (9 September); N. A. Cox-George, Finance and Development in West Africa, The Sierra Leone Experience (London, 1961), pp. 133-34; N. A. Cox-George, "Direct Taxation in the Early History of Sierra Leone", SLS (ns), No. 5, December 1955, p. 33.

102 Ingham, Sierra Leone, p. 47 (12 April); PANS, Clarkson's Mission, p. 439 (18 March); Falconbridge, Two Voyages, p. 141; Sierra Leone Papers, James Strand's journal, 1 May 1792; Clarkson Papers, I, Clarkson to Thornton, 18 April 1792, and III, Clarkson to Hartshorne, 4 August 1793.
champion to assist in overcoming the obstacles set by his white colleagues. Clarkson enjoyed the position of the Moses who had led them from their bondage in alien Nova Scotia, and the relationship he had developed with them in Halifax survived the transplantation intact. He considered them, and treated them, as children who required his constant attention and instruction. His motive for taking the full government upon himself was to give them the paternalistic care he was sure they needed. He personally superintended their construction of the public buildings, and when dissatisfied with their efforts he threatened to return to England and leave them alone. "Here they all took alarm and begged him ardently not to desert them." The fear that he might withdraw his tender care was "a check upon them, when from their ignorance they otherwise would have launched out into licentiousness, of which under the name of liberty part of them are very fond."  

103 Ibid., Isaac DuBois' journal, 7 February 1793.  
104 See "Diary of Lieutenant Clarkson", p. 13 (18 August), and pp. 79-83, Clarkson to Dawes, 5 October 1792, for examples of his reluctance to trust the Nova Scotians with control over their own food supplies; Clarkson Papers, III, Clarkson to DuBois, 1 July 1793, where he likens himself to their schoolmaster; M. F. C. Easmon (ed.), Eminent Sierra Leoneans (Freetown, 1961), pp. 7-8, "Clarkson's Departing Prayer, 1792", in which he informed the Lord: "I fear they may not be governed by my advice, and that they may ruin themselves and their children forever, by their perverse and ignorant behaviour."  
105 Sierra Leone Papers, James Strand's journal, 3 May 1792.
For all their aspirations, the Nova Scotians had been conditioned to accepting orders and to abdicating responsibility to an overseer. When an overseer combined the rhetoric of freedom with a careful concern for their best interests, as Clarkson did, they looked upon him "as if he was our Father". They were not, however, prepared to accept unquestioningly Clarkson's every act, nor did he reject their will when they expressed it forcefully. In July 1792 he proposed that the best waterfront lots be reserved to the Company for public buildings. After months of frustration, rain, hunger and sickness the settlers were in no mood to acquiesce. A public meeting denounced the Superintendent's proposal, and in view of their reaction he withdrew it. By appearing to be firm yet reasonable, Clarkson retained their trust, and even their love, to the extent that fifty years later they still looked back on his governorship with gratitude.

106 Clarkson Papers, III, Petition to the Directors from the "Hundreds and Tythings and Preachers of the Gospel", 1793.

107 Ingham, 'Sierra Leone', pp. 99-100 (July); Directors' Report, 1794, p. 17; The Philanthropist, IV, 1814, p. 256; Falconbridge, Two Voyages, pp. 206-7; Clarkson Papers, III, "History of Sierra Leone", fragment written by Thomas Clarkson.

Africa.

109 In December 1792 John Clarkson returned to England, ostensibly for a short holiday and for consultation with the Directors.110 Expectations were high among the settlers, for on his departure Clarkson promised that their farm lands should be distributed within two weeks.111 They had survived their first and worst season in Sierra Leone. Small gardens planted on their town lots were beginning to produce vegetables, and the end of the rains had meant that they could gather fruit in the forest. A dozen settler-owned fishing boats brought a regular supply of fresh fish to Freetown tables. More permanent homes were replacing the grass shacks, and no one in the colony was sick. A school had been opened attended not only by the children but by their parents during the mid-day break. A new system of settler representation was about to be introduced "to make them feel themselves as Men". To Clarkson, and no doubt to the settlers as well, the situation appeared promising. Though saddened by his leaving them, they expected his early return to a prosperous colony.112

109 Falconbridge, Two Voyages, p. 139; Sierra Leone Papers, James Strand's journal, 1 May 1792.
110 Clarkson Papers, III, Clarkson to DuBois, 1 July 1793.
111 Ibid., John Gray to Clarkson, 15 February 1793.
112 Ibid., Clarkson to Hartshorne, 4 August 1793; and I, Memo, 25 December 1792, Clarkson to Thornton, 26 December 1792; Falconbridge, Two Voyages, p. 159; Ingham, Sierra Leone pp. 122, 140 (10 September, 6 November 1792).
CHAPTER VIII
A New Captivity
Restrictions and Conflict, 1793-94

Richard Dawes, who replaced Clarkson as governor on 30 December 1792, was in a precarious position. Inevitably he would be measured against his predecessor in the settlers' eyes, and whatever he did it would be found different and therefore wanting. Furthermore Clarkson had compromised his successor by making a specific date, for the first time, for land distribution: he told the people they would have their farms within a fortnight. Dawes' experience as a Lieutenant of Marines and surveyor in the convict-settlement of Botany Bay did not render him popular with the settlers. Used to an arbitrary system of government, he was not prepared as Clarkson had been to consult the people on important measures or to convince and cajole rather than simply to state a command. On Dawes' arrival in the colony in September 1792, as first councillor under the reconstituted government, Clarkson had taken steps to make him more acceptable to the people. The governor took it upon himself to chastise, and allowed his councillor to distribute the favours. He spoke to the

1 "Diary of Lieutenant Clarkson", p. 31 (29 August 1792); Clarkson Papers, I, Thornton to Clarkson, 12 July 1792, II, Clarkson to DuBois, 1 July 1793.
people, urging them to give Dawes the same loyalty they had accorded him. Had he not done so, Clarkson wrote, Dawes "would not have been suffered to remain one week in the Colony." Still, as far as the settlers were concerned, the "honeymoon period" between themselves and a white administration was over by December 1792. Affection for Clarkson and the possibility of blaming their problems on other members of the government had given them patience. Dawes enjoyed no such advantages.

The new governor quickly showed himself to be deserving of their suspicion. On 2 January 1793, when Clarkson's ship was scarcely out of the harbour bound for England, Dawes ordered the surveyor to cease laying out the settlers' lots and instead to turn his attention to fortifications and public works. A former engineer and military man, fortification "seemed to be the hobby-horse of Mr. Dawes", according to Mrs. Falconbridge, and DuBois considered him "Fort Mad". Construction of a stone store-house, so necessary to preserve food in the African climate, was cancelled in order to free masons and labourers for work upon the new fort and a house for Company officials. Ground-clearing operations

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2Ibid.; "Diary of Lieutenant Clarkson", pp. 45-6, 79-83 (8, 9 September, 5 October).

3Falconbridge, Two Voyages, p. 188.

4Clarkson Papers, III, Isaac DuBois' journal, 14 January 1793.
were limited to an area for a Company cotton plantation. "All idea of laying off the lotts of land seem to be vanished." This was followed, on 7 January, by the decision to distribute farms only one-fifth the promised size.

The euphoria of the previous month turned sour, and the people again began to grumble and complain. Discontent was enhanced by a Company decision "to adopt a most ruinous system of economy" which reduced aid from England. When Zachary Macaulay, the second new council member, arrived in Freetown on 15 January, "the colonists were turbulent and disorderly, and the colony exhibited constant scenes of lamentable riot and licentiousness." With no farms to produce food and few supplies from abroad, the colony depended upon trade with the neighbouring Africans for their fresh provisions. Again famine threatened the settlers. The settler gardens, fishing boats and forest fruit were useful only as a supplement to a regular food supply, and the African trade was far from secure.

The first confrontation between the people and their governor occurred on 24 February, when Dawes attempted to take over a settler's town lot to be used for his fortifica-

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5 Ibid., 8, 7 and 14 January 1793.
6 CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 7 January 1793.
8 Ibid., p. 760.
tions. Dawes argued that the lot was only temporarily assigned to the settler, and until town land was permanently granted to individuals it all belonged to the Company and therefore could be used at the governor's discretion. The settlers saw otherwise. A huge crowd surrounded the lot in question, preventing Dawes from taking possession, and they threatened to destroy any enclosures or fences erected by the Company until they all had received their permanent town and farm lots. Angered, Dawes tried Clarkson's old trick of threatening to leave the colony, but instead of quavering compliance he met with cries of "Go! Go! go! we do not want you here, we cannot get a worse after you." Superficially the settlers' confrontation was successful, for Dawes withdrew his demand. But two weeks later, on 6 February, Dawes and Macaulay as the council made a decision to delay the assignment of settler land for one full year and to reserve the waterfront lots for Company use.

That night the settlers met in an all-night "palaver" to discuss their next move. Speakers complained that "none of the promises made them in Nova Scotia were performed". They had been promised equality with whites, they claimed,

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10 Ibid., 6 February 1793, also John Gray to Patrick Dunkin, 11 February 1793, John Gray to Clarkson, 15 February 1793.

11 Ibid., Isaac DuBois' journal, 7 February 1793.
and the right to participate in their own government and to be appointed as magistrates. Instead, only whites were placed in official positions. They had been guaranteed possession of their lands by mid-January, and now a year's delay had been proclaimed. Last July Clarkson had conceded that waterfront lots would be put into the draw and made available to individual settlers, yet Dawes decreed that no settler lots were to be within five-hundred feet of the river. The assembled settlers drew up a town plan of their own, for submission to the governor, and vowed that they would not be dispossessed from their temporary lots, most or all of which were within the five-hundred foot-broad Company reserve, unless their plan were adopted.\textsuperscript{12} "I think the event will be", John Gray reported, "that if the People cannot get the Lotts of Land intended for them, they will go and take Possession of Land where they like."\textsuperscript{13}

Richard Pepys, the company surveyor, happened upon the meeting and found himself obliged to explain the current policies. Pepys reiterated Dawes' contention that all land in the colony belonged to the Company until formally ceded to private individuals, and it was perfectly justified in

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., 7 and 8 February 1793, also John Gray to Patrick Dunkin, 11 February 1793, John Gray to Clarkson, 15 February 1793; Falconbridge, Two Voyages, pp. 204-06; CO 267/92, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix B-5, John Kizell to Commissioners, March 1826.

\textsuperscript{13}Clarkson Papers, III, John Gray to Patrick Dunkin, 11 February 1793.
planning the town as it saw fit. As for Clarkson's promises, he informed them that their beloved governor had no authority to commit the Company in any way "and that he believed Mr. Clarkson was drunk at the time he made them". An earlier survey conducted by DuBois under Clarkson's authority was equally without Company approval and the lots so surveyed were to be nullified. Finally, he advised them that Clarkson would not be returning to Sierra Leone, that Dawes was their permanent governor and that his decisions would remain in force.\textsuperscript{14} The people could only murmur their disbelief, and they determined to learn from the Directors themselves whether Pepys' words were true.\textsuperscript{15} In the meantime they could hope that Dawes would leave the colony voluntarily, and to encourage that event some settlers wrote their governor reminding him "of the recent melancholy fate of Louis XVI and threatening something similar to him".\textsuperscript{16}

In contrast to his arbitrary decrees concerning land, Richard Dawes did take steps to organize the ad hoc system of settler participation initiated by Clarkson. Aside from the Black captains selected in Halifax, the only elected officials

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., Isaac DuBois' journal, 7 February 1793, John Gray to Patrick Dunkin, 11 February 1793, John Gray to Clarkson, 15 February 1793; Falconbridge, Two Voyages, pp. 204-06.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., p. 225 (September 1793).
in Sierra Leone were ten constables. When he wished to learn the people's views on any matter Clarkson had to call a public meeting or wait for petitions from the most concerned and outspoken settlers; he showed very little sympathy for the Easter Day attempt to establish a representative system to express the settlers' wishes. But on 12 December 1792 Dawes suggested that every ten Nova Scotian households should annually elect a tythingman, and every ten tythingmen should choose one hundredor, whose duties would be "to keep the peace and decide causes of less importance". On 31 December, the day after Clarkson sailed, the new system became law in the colony.

The terms "tythingman" and "hundredor" came from Granville Sharp's Province of Freedom, and were offices which he had developed out of the Anglo-Saxon "frank-pledge" law which gave responsibility for internal order and external defence to family heads elected in this manner. Dawes, however, did not envisage the individuals elected in Sierra Leone assuming anything like that degree of authority. In fact the tythingmen were little more than an elaboration on Clarkson's constables, for their chief concern was the en-

17 "Diary of Lieutenant Clarkson", p. 9 (13 August 1792); Evans, "Early Constitution", p. 54, Article 35.
18 CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 12 and 31 December 1792.
19 Clarkson Papers, I, Granville Sharp to Clarkson, 24 July 1792.
forcement of Company-made rules, and the hundredors would relieve the pressure on the Company courts by hearing petty cases and administering those same rules. Still, because they were popularly elected, Dawes did expect that the hundredors and tythingmen would serve as a regular contact between the council and the people on any matters of mutual concern.\textsuperscript{20} He also hoped, or at least Clarkson did in giving his concurrence to the plan, that the elections would give the Nova Scotians a feeling that their views were not to be ignored by the council and that they were contributing to the government of the colony.\textsuperscript{21}

Freetown was duly divided into thirty tythings and all adults in the colony, both men and women, were eligible to vote in the elections. But if the tythingmen were intended as an instrument of Company control and the interpretation of Company policies to the people, their role developed into something quite the opposite. The tythingmen and the hundredors they chose became the representatives of Nova Scotian interests to the Company-appointed council; the annual elections became expressions of the popular will. Candidates for office were not selected solely on the basis of their worth as constables, but on issues that were hotly debated during

\textsuperscript{20}CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 12 December 1792; Directors' Report, 1794, p. 76. See also John Peterson, Province of Freedom. A History of Sierra Leone, 1787-1870 (London, 1969), pp. 40-41.

\textsuperscript{21}Clarkson Papers, III, Clarkson to Hartshorne, 4 August 1793.
each campaign. They made representation to the governor "in the name of the people", and strongly stated popular demands for such things as lower food prices, higher wages and less taxation. Soon after the first election their representative role was recognized by the council, who consulted them on all "such occasions as concern the general interests of the Nova Scotians". Zachary Macaulay, when he succeeded Dawes as governor, submitted all council resolutions to the elected group for their approval before declaring them law. The tythingmen and hundredors on occasion also proposed laws for the council to pass. In May 1793 Dawes approved a law passed by them which required settlers to confine their hogs, sheep and goats on their own property, and the following month he approved a schedule of maximum prices which they had drawn up. Two years later the tythingmen and hundredors initiated a resolution, subsequently confirmed by the council, whereby all males over sixteen were liable to six days' labour each year for maintaining the colony's roads, and female landowners were to pay a cash equi-

22 For example, see Chapter X, below.

23 Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 22 August 1793; CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 15 June 1794.


26 CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 27 May and 4 June 1793.
The Nova Scotians participated in other administrative functions in the colony. The hundredors were, in a sense, junior magistrates as well as junior legislators, and they performed their duties satisfactorily enough that when a Petty Debts Court was instituted in 1795 the justices appointed to it were Nova Scotians with hundredor experience. Juries in all courts were made up from the settler population. Though the judge and magistrates were the governor and councillors, the jurors' role was quite significant: at Thomas Peters' trial for theft it was the jury that passed the sentence, a practice that was followed frequently without white interference even to the infliction of corporal punishment, imprisonment and banishment. The town clerk, marshall and gaoler, visibly responsible for the maintaining of law and order, were Nova Scotians, and the settler population was entrusted with the colony's defence.  

27 CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 12 October 1795.  
29 Evans, "Early Constitution", p. 32; Directors' Report, 1794, p. 75.  
30 Sierra Leone Papers, James Strand's journal, 1 May 1792; Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 9 August 1793.  
31 CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 1 April and 27 May 1793; Directors' Report, 1794, p. 75.
vince of Freedom, where the governor and chief justice were elected by the people, and although it failed to meet the expectations of the Nova Scotians, there were many opportunities for them to play a part in the administration of the colony, and offices existed for which the powers could gradually be extended. Unfortunately Dawes' personality prevented the potential of their powers from being evident to the settlers. To them, the governor presented an obstacle against which to struggle and a threat against which to guard.

The Nova Scotians held a similar feeling for the native Temne who shared with them the Sierra Leone peninsula, for the Temne, like Dawes, presented an apparent obstacle and threat. King Jimmy's raid on the Province of Freedom in 1789 was a warning of what might happen to them if they lowered their guard. Jimmy's town, consisting of forty or fifty huts, was located only "about a musquet shot distant" from the Free-town clearing in March 1792.\footnote{Clarkson Papers, IV, Dr. Taylor's Diary, 8 March 1792.} The Temne watched the settlement take root with some awe, and they expressed an early fear that the colony would eventually subjugate the indigenous people or drive them from their land entirely.\footnote{Ibid., 9 March 1792; Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 30 July 1793.} The tension, therefore, was mutual. Alarm spread among the settlers during that first month concerning an imminent attack,
and though Temne families flocked to the colony every day to trade peacefully or simply to gaze in friendly curiosity, the immigrants asked for arms to defend themselves and seemed anxious for the inevitable conflict to begin.  

Tension was not eased when the colony learned in April of an attempt by Jimmy, evidently unsuccessful, to win allies among neighbouring slave-traders for an attack on the settlement. In September surveyor Pepys was "molested by the natives" for trespassing on their land, though the survey fell within the area ceded to Captain Thompson and confirmed in an agreement with Falconbridge in 1791. Clarkson arranged an immediate "palaver" with Jimmy and his overlord, the Temne chief King Waimbanna. Jimmy maintained that those who accepted the original payment had no authority to sell land permanently, a sentiment Clarkson privately shared. Refusing to re-purchase the land, for such an act would imply acceptance of the Temne claim, Clarkson however did agree to present gifts to the various chiefs and to guarantee access to the "watering place", a holy ground to the Temne and now located within the settlement. The palaver concluded with

34 Clarkson Papers, IV, Dr. Taylor's Diary, 17 and 29 March 1792.

35 Sierra Leone Papers, James Strand's Journal, 21 April 1792.

36 Ingham, Sierra Leone, p. 123 (September 1792).

37 Ibid.; Clarkson Papers, I, Thornton to Clarkson, 14 September 1792.
an agreement on new colonial boundaries. Originally twenty miles by twenty miles square, the colony emerged from the September negotiation measuring only about two miles along the coast with a depth inland to "as far as the district of Sierra Leone may be, which is generally supposed not to exceed five or six miles". 38 The issue, however, remained unsettled. The Temne continued to live within the area formally considered part of the colony, and they objected when labour parties began clearing the forest near their homes. It was unsafe for settlers to stray too far from the town, and there were frequent panics, once occasioned by a drunken celebration in Jimmy's village, when the people were armed against an expected Temne raid. 40

Good relations with the Africans were a sine qua non for the Sierra Leone Company. They could not civilize Africa or end the slave trade in isolation from the African people. They therefore instructed their agents in Freetown to use local labour on the Company plantations, to admit Africans as settlers when advisable, and to conduct an extensive trade with local chiefs. 41 Moreover the colony depended to

38 Falconbridge, Two Voyages, p. 165; Ingham, Sierra Leone, p. 123; "Diary of Lieutenant Clarkson", pp. 62-3 (27 September 1792).

39 Clarkson Papers, III, Isaac DuBois' journal, 14 February 1793.

40 Ibid., 13 and 16 January 1793.

41 Clarkson Papers, I, Thornton to Clarkson, 30 December 1791; Directors' Report, 1794, pp. 169-92.
a considerable extent on trade with the Africans for its
daily food supply. King Naimbanna proved quite friendly,
sending presents of food from time to time and restraining
his more suspicious lieutenant. 42 He sent his son to England
to be educated by the Company, where the young African be-
came a Christian and was baptized Henry Granville after his
two sponsors, Thornton and Sharp. 43 Naimbanna's death in
January 1793 inconvenienced the settlement seriously, but an
even more serious problem arose with the death of Henry
Granville aboard a Company ship just as it reached Freetown
from London. Company officials were suspected of complicity
in the death, and another of Naimbanna's sons threatened a
punitive drive against the colony. Armed Nova Scotian
patrols discouraged the attack, but not before several
colonists had been murdered by vengeful Temne. 44

Some peaceful contact was maintained, through local
day-labourers or 'grumettas' who worked the Company planta-
tions and through the activities of several Nova Scotians.

As part of its civilization campaign the Company invited
African chiefs to send their children to the colony for edu-
cation, and in September 1793 Mingo Jordan, a Nova Scotian,

42 Falconbridge, Two Voyages, p. 189.

43 Hoare, Memoirs of Granville Sharp, pp. 365-71;
Times, 27 October 1791; Clarkson Papers I, Thornton to
Clarkson, 30 December 1791.

44 CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 24 July 1793; Knutsford,
Zachary Macaulay, p. 37.
was appointed schoolmaster in Freetown's African school. 45 When the Bullom people on the river shore opposite Freetown asked for an resident instructor, Boston King went to live among them as missionary and schoolmaster. Under his care they learned to read English and displayed a rapid advance in "civilization", one indication of which was their abstention from Sunday labour. 46 David George, too, conducted missionary work among the Temne, baptizing several in September and October 1793. 47 Still, relations were never easy between the Africans, particularly the Temne, and the colonists. Nova Scotian traders in the interior were occasionally seized by local people and sold as slaves, and land was ever a point of contention. The Temne became a laughing stock among other Africans for having sold away their homeland. A permanent night watch had to be established to guard against any Temne incursion and palavers over the extent of the Company's jurisdiction continued for almost a decade. 48

Besides their fear and insecurity over a possible

45 CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 19 September 1793; Directors' Report, 1794, pp. 180-82, 210-11.

46 Boston King, "Memoirs", p. 263; CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 3 August 1793; Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 28 September 1793; Directors' Report, 1794, p. 211.

47 Baptist Annual Register, Vol. II, 1794-1797, pp. 94-6, "Extracts of letters from Mr. David George, dated from September 13 to October 10 1793".

48 Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 30 July and 3 September 1793; CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 11 December 1794, 7 March and 18 April 1795.
war with their neighbours, the Nova Scotians were under a constant threat of being kidnapped back into slavery. On 4 March 1792, just three days off Sierra Leone, the Nova Scotian fleet passed the slave ship Mary of Bristol, a symbolic reminder that as long as the slave trade continued they could never be truly safe in Africa. No one leaving the immediate vicinity of Freetown could be sure that he would not be carried off as a slave, for it happened frequently enough to pose another source of settler tension. The attitude of the white officials in Sierra Leone, which seemed accommodating toward the slave-traders, increased settler insecurity in this regard and, perhaps of even more significance, gave the settlers yet another reason to resent and distrust the Company government. Of course it was impossible for the Company to exist in West Africa without some intercourse with slave-traders. One of Clarkson’s first acts on landing in Sierra Leone was to write to the owners of the Mary to inform them that their slave ship was safe, for, he explained, “I conceived it my duty for the sake of the Colonists to be civil and courteous. [The slave traders] had it in their power to do us much injury in a variety of ways, and also to render us essential services, should they be

49 PANS, Clarkson’s Mission, p. 401 (4 March 1792).

In September 1792 Clarkson borrowed some building materials from slaver William Ballingall, and sent his "compliments to Captain Bowie and the gentlemen at Bance Island". Bowie was the slave trader who had inspired King Jimmy's retaliatory raid in 1789, and Bance Island was the principal slave depot in the Sierra Leone district. Frequently Clarkson interceded in quarrels between slave captains and the Temne. Zachary Macaulay made a special trip to Bance Island "principally with the view of cultivating a good understanding with Tilley", the new chief factor there. The shortage of food and other supplies often made the colony dependent on the slavers. In September 1793 Macaulay was "under the necessity of applying to Bance Island for rice, and received three-and-a-half tons, which may with some care serve the Colony for ten days". On one occasion the governor paid Tilley £370 "in part payment of balance of account due him", an indication of the extent of their trade. Since slave ships visited the colony more

52 "Diary of Lieutenant Clarkson", p. 40 (3 September).
53 Ibid., p. 5.
55 Ibid., 11 September 1793.
56 Ibid., 3 June 1797.
regularly than Company ships, they were used to carry mail and even for transportation. 57

Many settlers objected to this familiarity, however necessary; between their rulers and their enemies. Two of them complained to Clarkson in 1794 that "our present governor allows the Slave Traders to come here", a hospitality they considered insulting to themselves and a threat to their security. 58 Their reaction may be attributed to their sensitivity and ignorance of their precarious position as free settlers in a slave trading territory, but they also witnessed exchanges in which Company agents knowingly contributed to the enslavement or re-enslavement of Africans. The Act of Parliament incorporating the Company stated that it should not "directly, or indirectly, traffic in slaves", 59 yet in January 1793 Dawes purchased some supplies from a French slave ship with an order on slaves from Renaud, the slave dealer on Gambia Island. To some in the colony this action "borders on an infringement of the Act of Parliament". 60 That October several settlers submitted evidence against a

57 Ibid., 29 July 1794, 6 May 1795.

58 Clarkson Papers, III, Luke Jordan and Isaac Anderson to Clarkson, 28 June 1794. The force of the settlers' argument was somewhat mitigated by the fact that several of their Nova Scotian brethren accepted employment, particularly as clerks and carpenters, in neighbouring slave depots.


60 Falconbridge, Two Voyages, p. 191.
Company officials who were supplementing their income by trading surreptitiously in slaves. 61

Most irritating to the Nova Scotians were incidents involving the return of runaway slaves who had sought refuge in Freetown. Official Company policy was explicit on this point, for Article 50 of the 1791 constitution stated: "We wish you in adherance to the great principle of our institution not to surrender up any persons who are claimed merely as being slaves". 62 Article 50 was qualified to some extent, however, by Henry Thornton's advice to Clarkson to use his discretion "whether to harbour or give up runaway slaves". 63 Clarkson's discretion was expressed in a proclamation, reminiscent of Lord Mansfield, to the effect that "the moment a man set his foot on the company's territory, he became free". 64 On this authority the Nova Scotians encouraged slaves to escape to Freetown, either from native territory or from visiting slave ships, and to harbour them in their homes. Then on 31 July 1793, after five slaves had been assisted in their escape from a ship anchored at Freetown, the captain lodged a complaint with acting-Governor

62 Evans, "Early Constitution", p. 60, Article 50.
63 Clarkson Papers, I, Thornton to Clarkson, 30 December 1791.
Macaulay and demanded the return of his property. Macaulay ordered the slaves returned to the ship, and called on the hundredors to explain their behaviour. When they cited Clarkson's policy Macaulay "could scarcely give credit to their assurances that Clarkson had made so rash and unnecessary a proclamation until it was confirmed to us by Watt and Gray". Despite Article 50 and the Clarkson precedent Macaulay upheld his order and severely reprimanded the settlers for violating property rights, adding that "we had no more power to detain a slave than we had to detain a bale of goods".65

The settlers, however, were not chastened; they continued to aid and shelter escaped slaves in the colony and to defy the administrators' efforts to stop them. On Sunday 8 September 1793 chaplain Horne invoked Divine approval for Macaulay's policy in a sermon "on the duty of servants under the yoke, from St. Paul's epistle to Philimon, which he applied to the present circumstances of the colony, showing how inconsonant to the dictates of policy, justice, and Christianity were the late transactions with regard to slaves".66

Shortly thereafter a slaver accused of kidnapping had to be rescued twice by the governor and council from an angry mob of Temne and settlers. In an ironic shift of logic Horne


66 Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 8 September 1793.
again held forth from the pulpit on "how unbecoming it would be if any stranger, however culpable he might have been, who had come into the settlement imagining he was under our protection, should have his person seized while he was in it". 67 Part of the issue was resolved a few days later when Macaulay discovered that according to native law, a runaway slave became "the property of him in whose town he takes refuge": slaves escaping to Freetown therefore became the property of the colony and could be emancipated. 68 Thenceforth the government did not force slaves to return to their masters, though the settlers were still discouraged from enticing slaves to escape. 69 Settler passions were aroused, however, over the Company's concern for the safety of white slave traders and apparent disregard for the freedom of Black slaves. The Rev. Mr. Horne was compromised both for himself and for the religion he represented. Conflict soon broke out between the Chaplain and the people, and there were to be more serious incidents involving friction between the colonists, the Company and the slavers. 70

Insecurity and betrayal seemed, to the settlers, to

67 Directors' Report, 1794, p. 164.
be their lot in Sierra Leone. The land fiasco, the white-dominated government, the fear of an African attack, the issue of the slave traders, all represented a reality contrary to their expectations, and all presented barriers against the realization of their expectations in the future. Deriving from these conditions and creating even more resentment was the absolute dependence of the settlers upon the Sierra Leone Company. Economically, they were completely at the mercy of the Company and its government. There was only one employer in Sierra Leone: the Company. Without land of their own the Nova Scotians needed employment, and only the Company could assign them their lands. And the Company used its monopoly power over employment to keep the settlers in line: workers could be, and were, dismissed from Company employ for criticizing the government. The insecurity resulting from this relationship quickly drew the people's resentment. Among the early issues pressed by the hundredors and tythingmen were wages and conditions of Company employment.

The Company similarly enjoyed a monopoly over all trade and the supply of goods in the colony. Prices were determined by the Company, and without competition those prices

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72 CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 15 June 1794; Directors' Report, 1794, p. 82.
had to be accepted by the population. The Company's monoply was enforced by law and also by the fact that currency in Sierra Leone was issued by the Company and could be spent only at the Company store. A labourer's wages, therefore, which were paid by the Company in Company currency, could not be used to purchase goods from a competitor even had such a competitor been allowed to exist. 73 Theoretically the price structure of goods sold by the Company was limited: the price in Sierra Leone was to consist of the prime cost in England, a ten percent profit to the Company, plus incidental expenses such as freight charges and insurance premiums. 74 In practice, however, the Company profit far exceeded the theoretical ten percent on the prime cost. In calculating its percentage, the Company agents in London took the total cost of the goods plus expenses into account, and since freight and insurance could represent as much as one-third the total cost, this meant that the Company rate of profit was in actuality twelve to fifteen percent of the prime cost. Then the Company agents in Freetown added another two-and-one-half percent commission for their services, and this was calculated on the total landed cost, i.e. the prime cost, the expenses and the London profit. By the time a settler purchased an item in Freetown, its price

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73 Evans, "Early Constitution", pp. 61-2, Article 54; Cox-George, Finance and Development, pp. 95-7, 144-45.
74 Directors' Report, 1794, p. 82.
had increased more than fifty percent over its original London cost, and the Company's total profit exceeded seventeen percent. Again the people reacted against the Company's monopoly, which they considered exploitive, and they sought to exercise some control over prices and even claimed a right to share in the profits.  

Two examples of calculations for determining selling prices are contained in the Council Minutes for this period, and they are assumed to be typical. In December 1795 the cargo of the brig Eliza was calculated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime cost of goods</td>
<td>£4747.12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses (freight, insurance, &amp;c)</td>
<td>1462.12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost landed at Freetown</td>
<td>6210.5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company profit @ 10%</td>
<td>621.0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6831.5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange</td>
<td>759.0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7590.6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freetown commission @ 2-1/2%</td>
<td>189.15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final selling price</td>
<td>7780.1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 3 December 1795.)

The second example, also for an Eliza cargo, is similar except that the Company's ten percent was levied against the prime cost, expenses and exchange rates, giving an even more inflated Company profit on the original cost:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime cost of goods</td>
<td>£8069.19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses (freight, insurance, &amp;c)</td>
<td>1879.1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost</td>
<td>9949.1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange</td>
<td>1105.9.0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11054.10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company profit @ 10%</td>
<td>1105.9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12159.19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freetown commission @ 2-1/2%</td>
<td>304.0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final selling price</td>
<td>12463.19.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 11 February 1797.)

In the first example above, the final price was two-thirds again the prime cost, and Company profit represented more than 17 percent on the prime cost. In the second example the selling price was only 55 percent higher than the prime cost, since freight charges were lower, but Company profit remained at more than 17 percent.

(CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 4 June 1793 and 15 June 1794; CO 270/1, Council Minutes, 9 June 1795; Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 22 August 1793.)
The Nova Scotians came to believe that without Company restrictions they could remove their various problems and realize their goal of complete independence. At first they attempted to assert themselves within the framework of Company control, and they attacked the most immediate and frustrating economic issues. Behind their complaints against high prices and low wages was a demand to share in the Company's power. In March 1793 a strike by the carpenters for higher wages was broken within a week, since the strikers had no other means of subsistence. Frustration over their impotence in this case, increased by their equally defenseless position only a month before over the land question, determined the settlers to elect representatives to go to London and present their claims to the Directors personally. They were confident, as Thomas Peters once had been, that the motives of those in London were good, but that they were thwarted by self-seeking local officials. To rid themselves of the oppressive restrictions surrounding them, they felt that they had only to describe the true situation to their English benefactors.

A meeting of the entire Nova Scotian body was held and two delegates, Isaac Anderson and Cato Perkins, were

77 Clarkson Papers, III, DuBois to Clarkson, 7 March 1793; Directors' Report, 1794, pp. 18, 22. DuBois attributed the strike to general dissatisfaction: the wages issue was incidental. The Directors found DuBois guilty of instigating the strike in an effort to increase Company wages, and recalled him to England.
elected to represent the settlers before the Court of Directors. Anderson was one of the settlers who had led the resistance against Dawes' attempted occupation of the town lots, and Perkins, the Huntingdonian pastor and a carpenter, had been active in the carpenters' strike. With them the delegates carried a petition, signed by thirty-one of the most prominent settlers, which set out the whole range of their problems and frustrations. They listed their expectations on leaving Nova Scotia, based on the promises of John Clarkson, and the betrayal of each one in turn. They were not, they felt, treated equally with whites; the land delay they declared unnecessary; the prices at the Company store were judged exploitative and employment practices unjust. They absolved the Directors and John Clarkson of all responsibility for the situation, laying blame squarely on Dawes, Macaulay and Pepys the surveyor. "Mr. Dawes seems to wish to rule us as if we were all Slaves which we cannot bear", the petition stated, and it concluded: "we feel ourselves so distressed because we are not treated as Freemen".

78 Clarkson Papers, III, DuBois to Clarkson, 9 June 1793; Directors' Report, 1794, p. 23.


The Directors, however, were not prepared to take the petition seriously. They kept the delegates waiting several months for an answer, a period not wasted by Cato Perkins who was "put to Collidge" by Lady Ann Huntington.\(^{81}\) The delegates and their petition, the Directors believed, were not approved by the majority of the Nova Scotians nor did they accurately represent the feelings of the colony.\(^{82}\) What discontent existed they attributed to the shortage of food and other supplies, not to any fundamental conflict in the colony, and they expected it to disappear as soon as a new shipment should reach Freetown.\(^{83}\) Evidently Dawes had written privately to England to discredit the delegates and to explain away the charges in the petition.\(^{84}\)


\(^{81}\) *Clarkson Papers*, III, Cato Perkins and Isaac Anderson to Clarkson, 30 October 1793; Falconbridge, *Two Voyages*, p. 225.

\(^{82}\) Directors' Report, 1794, p. 29.

\(^{83}\) Ibid., pp. 30-31; *Clarkson Papers*, III, Thornton to Clarkson, 16 September 1793.

\(^{84}\) Butt-Thompson, *Sierra Leone in History and Tradition*, p. 101, quotes an alleged letter from Dawes to the Directors to this effect, but the whole account is so riddled with inaccuracies that it is dangerous to trust it in any one instance (for example Butt-Thompson names the delegates as Thomas Peters and David George, and he later has Peters winning the settlers back to their allegiance to the Company government, pp. 101-03). The Directors themselves, however, did suggest that they had been forewarned, for they stated that they had "some reason to think" that the delegates and petition were unrepresentative (Directors' Report,
therefore dismissed the Nova Scotian petition as "hasty, and the facts therein mentioned as chiefly founded on mistake and misinformation." There was no need for any corrective action nor for a personal meeting with the delegates. 85

Unable to confront the Directors or to explain their case, Anderson and Perkins contacted Isaac DuBois who told them how to write to John Clarkson. On hearing their story Clarkson immediately offered his assistance in arranging an interview with Thornton and his colleagues. 86 Though Clarkson had been dismissed in April 1793 and informed that he would not be returning to Freetown, a decision that left him "thunderstruck", still he believed that his friendship and influence with many Company members, and the basic merits of the Nova Scotian charges, would result in a serious examination of the delegates' evidence. 87 He therefore wrote to Thornton confirming that he had indeed made the promises alluded to in the petition, and asked that he and the delegates be allowed to appear before the whole Court of Directors. The

1794, p. 29), and Mrs. Falconbridge refers to "mis-representations" by the council to explain their conduct before the arrival of the delegates in England (Two Voyages, p. 216).


86Clarkson Papers, III, Clarkson to Perkins and Anderson, 18 October 1793, Perkins and Anderson to Clarkson, 26 October 1793. DuBois had been fired for supporting the carpenters' strike and had returned to England on the same ship which carried the delegates. Ibid., DuBois to Clarkson, 9 June 1793.

87Ibid., Clarkson to Thornton, 23 April 1793, Clarkson to DuBois, 1 July 1793.
Directors repeated their refusal to meet the delegates and likewise declined to admit any supporting evidence from their former governor. 88

Clarkson's failure to effect a meeting, and the Directors' dismissal of all their claims, discouraged the delegates and made them realize that their mission was hopeless. Deciding to return home to Freetown, they wrote to Clarkson that the Directors

will not give us any answer but send us back like Fools and we are certain Sir that if they serve us so that the Company will loose their Colony as nothing kept the People quiet but thoughts that when the Company heard their Grievance they would see justice done them. 89

In a final and more hostile petition to the Directors, which also remained unanswered, the delegates rejected the government of Dawes and Macaulay and claimed a right to select their own governor. They also expressed their disgust at their reception in London, for "the manner you have treated us, has been just the same as if we were Slaves, come to tell our masters, of the cruelties and severe behaviour of an Overseer". 90 From this point, according to Mrs. Falconbridge, confidence between the Company and colonists was

88 Ibid., Clarkson to Thornton, 24 September 1793, Clarkson to Perkins and Anderson, 3 and 11 November 1793; The Harbinger, July 1852, pp. 221-24.

89 Clarkson Papers, III, Anderson and Perkins to Clarkson, 9 November 1793.

90 The Harbinger, July 1852, pp. 221-24; Falconbridge, Two Voyages, pp. 260-65.
destroyed. 91

As Perkins and Anderson waited in London, warning of the alienation of the people from their government, an incident occurred in Freetown that revealed how far the Nova Scotians were from their original cooperative attitude. The provision ship, which the Directors had hoped would dispel all feelings of discontent, arrived in Sierra Leone on 30 October 1793. Since no rations had been available for months, Dawes had issued "memorandums" in lieu of wages. The settlers were now invited to produce those memoranda and claim their back pay. Most of the settlers, apparently, maintained that they had lost their papers and attempted to cheat the Company by claiming extra rations. Even Methodist preacher Luke Jordan was detected submitting a fraudulent claim. When Dawes refused to pay any rations without the proper forms, the "lost" memoranda miraculously appeared. The incident was given significance by Councillor Macaulay for, he concluded, it was evidence of the general disposition of the settlers toward the Company. Their sense of loyalty and gratitude had already evaporated. 92

A second incident only a month later provided further evidence of the Nova Scotians' alienation. The Company ship York had been sent out in 1792 to be used as a floating hos-

91 Ibid., p. 273.
92 Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 1 or 3 November 1793.
pital during the first rainy season. However the original councillors subverted it to their own use, turning it into a hotel for senior white officials.\(^{93}\) After the government reform it became a warehouse in which local products were stored awaiting shipment to London. On 30 November a fire in the York's galley quickly spread to threaten the whole ship and its £15,000 cargo, and an attempt was made to raise a fire brigade to extinguish it. The Nova Scotians absolutely refused to volunteer, expressing a fear of gunpowder in the ship's hold. This refusal in itself cannot be assigned much significance, since the crew of the York itself immediately deserted and the English crew of another Company ship, the Harpy, also declined to offer assistance. Of greater importance was the Nova Scotians' jubilant attitude that at last the Company was being made to suffer. They were, Macaulay reported

rejoicing in the calamity as a just judgement of heaven on their oppressors. Some said it was but right that the goods, withheld unjustly from them by the Governor and Council, should be thus destroyed, and that their sinister aims should be thus frustrated. They declared the York to be the repository where Mr. Dawes' gains and mine were stored.\(^{94}\)

Equally revealing of the state of Nova Scotian society was an offer, by a group of repentant settlers later in the day, to inform on "such as seemed to rejoice in the misfortune.

\(^{93}\) Directors' Report, 1794, pp. 8-9.

\(^{94}\) Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 30 November 1793.
and such as by their insinuations would have vilified Mr. Dawes' character, so that the ingrates could be prosecuted. They did so, they said, to win the Directors' approval.95 Nova Scotian unity, already tenuous since the "Peters' rebellion" had divided them on the loyalty issue, was evidently being eroded by the conflicting pressures of the desire for freedom and the fact of dependence.

The London delegates returned in June 1794 to announce the failure of their mission, and found the colony on the verge of rebellion. The immediate origin of the insurrection in that month was a conflict between settler Robert Keeling and a slave trader named Grierson. Captain Grierson had insulted some Nova Scotians, "saying in what manner he would use them if he had them in the West Indies."96 Keeling and another settler, Scipio Channel, organized a crowd of Nova Scotians to harrass and threaten Grierson. On 16 June Zachary Macaulay, acting-governor since Dawes' return to England in March, dismissed Keeling and Channel from the Company's service "on account of disrespectful conduct."97 To the Nova Scotians two vital issues were involved: arbitrary dismissal from the only available employment, and the

95 Ibid.
96 Clarkson Papers, III, Jordan and Anderson to Clarkson, 28 June 1794.
97 CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 16 June 1794; Director's Report, 1794, p. 60.
governor's preferential treatment of a slave captain. The hundredors and tythingmen met and passed resolutions warmly critical of Macaulay's action. They demanded, on the threat of a mass resignation, the reinstatement of Keeling and Channel, and proposed that no one should be fired except by the verdict of his peers. Macaulay responded with equal warmth. "No one within the Company", he retorted, "has a right to censure the Governor and Council or to interfere with them, in regard to their employing or discharging the Company's servants." Furthermore the hundredors and tythingmen could not resign without giving "timely notice".

On the morning of 20 June six settlers, including Scipio Channel, approached Macaulay for an explanation of Channel's discharge. They were not satisfied with his answer and "they proceeded to insult and abuse and even threatened [his] life". Settlers gathered in knots to grumble and threaten, and when Richard Crankapone, the Nova Scotian town marshall, attempted to break up a mob he was beaten by Lewis Kirby and Simon Johnson, who threatened to hang him if he interfered further. Crankapone secured a warrant for their arrest, but a mob prevented its execution. His request for assistance from the tythingmen and hundredors

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98 Ibid.; CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 18 June 1794. The hundredors and tythingmen also complained that Macaulay prevented Nova Scotian sailors on Company ships from trading on their own account during coastal voyages.

99 Ibid.
was refused. Law and order had broken down, for the elected
officials provided the only effective police force in the
colony. Emboldened by this refusal, angry settlers "approach-
ed to the gate of the Governor's yard bidding defiance to all
law and authority and threatening instant destruction to who-
ever should oppose them". Macaulay learned that an attack
was planned for that night on his house. 100

An emergency session of the council, consisting of
Macaulay and James Watt, passed a series of resolutions de-
signed to squash the growing rebellion. From the first act
of violence, they declared, all Company salaries would be
stopped. 101 The Company's white employees were armed and
told to proceed immediately to the governor's house, and the
English crews of the Company vessels were advised to be ready
to intervene. David George, of whose loyalty Macaulay was
sure, was instructed to prepare "such of the Settlers who are
known to be well affected to Government and can be confided
in, to join in suppressing any commotion". 102 During the
night armed patrols of whites, under the command of surveyor
Pepys, arrested three of the Nova Scotian leaders, but riot-
ing continued. mobs attacked those settlers who voiced sup-

100 Ibid., Council Minutes, 20 June 1794.

101 That this should have been the Council's initial
counter-measure is indicative of the extent to which the set-
tlers were dependent upon the Company for their subsistence.

102 Ibid.
port for the Company, and a canon was mounted at Macaulay's gate to intimidate the crowds that gathered there demanding the release of the arrested men and hurling denunciations and threats against the governor.103

The two sides remained poised throughout the second day, and though mobs surged through the settler districts venting their frustrations against their fellow Nova Scotians, no attack was attempted against the government party itself. On Sunday 22 June tempers had subsided sufficiently for Macaulay to issue a lengthy proclamation and have it read in all the churches. It warned the people that the destruction of the Company government would expose them to the treacheries of the slave traders, and they and their children would be destined "to drag out a miserable life under the smart of a West Indian Whip". All the advantages of education and civilization would be removed, and they would suffer the righteous vengeance of God for destroying this opportunity for the salvation of Africa. To prevent this happening Macaulay offered free transportation back to Halifax for any settlers unable to abide by the Company's law. Sierra Leone's problems, the proclamation continued, were common to all countries in time of war, and while many of the settler complaints were real they must be suffered in patience until international peace should allow a more regular supply of British goods.

103 Ibid., Council Minutes, 21 June 1794.
Moving from persuasion to intimidation, the proclamation declared all labour for the Company ended and the Company stores closed, and dismissed permanently anyone "who has had an active share in the late riots".\textsuperscript{104}

By Monday 23 June peace had been restored, and the hundredors and tythingmen agreed to arrest the chief insurgents. Macaulay purchased the brig Venus to carry any disaffected settlers back to Nova Scotia, but it remained empty in the harbour.\textsuperscript{105} The events of 20/21 June had amounted to insurrection, for a considerable proportion of the Black population, and the Directors later admitted that it came very close to overthrowing the Company government.\textsuperscript{106} Rallied by their preachers, almost all the Methodists were involved, including the women, and they outnumbered the Baptists whom David George managed to win to Macaulay's support.\textsuperscript{107} Furthermore the Temne chief Bai Firama claimed the right as "landlord" to interfere in the colony's internal dispute, and had he done so on the side of the insurgents, as he threatened, the Company's forces should surely have been overwhelmed.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{104}Ibid., Proclamation of the Governor and Council, 22 June 1794.

\textsuperscript{105}Ibid., Council Minutes, 23, 24 and 25 June 1794.

\textsuperscript{106}Directors' Report, 1801, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{107}Zachary Macaulay, Lelici, Macaulay to Thornton, 20 December 1797, and Journal, 23 July 1794; CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 25 June 1794.

\textsuperscript{108}CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 26 December 1796.
Fortunately for the Company peace returned before this could happen. The insurrection was, quite obviously, a spontaneous reaction, and though it was founded upon a long series of complaints and frustrations it was totally unplanned and had no programme other than the removal of the Company-appointed government.

Macaulay's prompt measures to defend himself forced a pause long enough to enable the settlers to see that their situation was precarious, and the proclamation provided the incentive for them to return to loyalty in their own self-interest. There was no protest when eight ring-leaders were sent to England for trial on a charge of instigating rebellion, accompanied by seven settlers who agreed to act as Company witnesses. 109 The eight accused were convicted as charged by the British courts and sentenced to banishment for life, 110 though Granville Sharp pleaded on their behalf and asked for leniency. 111 Lesser offenders were dismissed forever from the Company's employ, a punishment hardly less

109 The Directors' Report, 1801, p. 2, noted that nine insurgents were tried and convicted in England. The names of the accused, however, are listed identically in Macaulay's Journal and in the Council Minutes, and they amount to eight only, viz: Scipio Chennell, Ralph How, Lewis Kirby, John Jackson, Simon Johnson, Joseph Tylce, Samuel Goodall, and John Manuel. Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 4 August 1796, p. 270/2; Council Minutes, 30 June and 1 August 1794.

110 Director's Report, 1801, p. 2; Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 26 August 1796.

111 Sharp to Thornton, 6 November 1794.
effective than banishment under the circumstances then existing in Freetown. Another man was fined by the local court and three women were sentenced to receive a public whipping for their part in the rioting. 112 But if a face of loyalty was spread over the colony, there was still little satisfaction with the government of Zachary Macaulay. Described as "inflexible" by Thornton and "iliberal" by John Clarkson, 113 Macaulay expressed the opinion immediately after his arrival in January 1793 that the colonists would be better served by strict government than by persuasion. 114 He bluntly informed the settlers that they had no rights but those conferred voluntarily by the Directors, and that he considered himself beyond either "the approbation or censure of the Inhabitants of Freetown." 115 The Nova Scotians accused him of "misconduct" over his use of Company employment as a weapon to control colonial life, 116 and described Freetown as a "town of Slavery" under his governorship. 117


113 Clarkson Papers, I, Thornton to Clarkson, 26 November 1792, III, Clarkson to DuBois, 1 July 1793.

114 Ibid.

115 CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 7 March 1795.

116 Clarkson Papers, III, Jordan and Anderson to Clarkson, 28 June 1794.

117 Ibid., Petition to Clarkson from Luke Jordan et al., 19 November 1794.
These disputes between the governor and the colonists were interrupted, in September 1794, by the arrival in Freetown of a hostile French force. On the morning of 28 September the colony awoke to find a fleet of eight ships, showing English colours, entering the harbour. The whole population gathered at the waterfront to welcome their arrival, when suddenly the fleet began firing on the town. At the first shot Macaulay ran up a flag of truce, but the bombardment continued until the French were convinced it was safe to come ashore. Most of the people fled to the forest, leaving the town virtually deserted, whereupon the French proceeded to destroy or steal everything in Freetown belonging to the English Company. The next day the in-

118 CO 267/92, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix B-6, "Statement given to the Commissioners by Eli Ackim, one of the Original Settlers from Nova Scotia". Before war between England and France had been declared John Clarkson had written to General LaFayette asking immunity for the colony, in the event that hostilities should break out, since it was based on the best principles of the French Revolution (Clarkson Papers, I, Clarkson to LaFayette, 2 July 1792). The letter, however, was not forwarded by Thornton as LaFayette was then a prisoner in Austria (ibid., Thornton to Clarkson, 14 September 1792). The raid was not intended by the French government, it was later learned, and a pamphlet was published in France apologizing for the destruction of Sierra Leone (Hoare, Memoirs of Granville Sharp, p. 372).

119 Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 28 September 1794; Banks Correspondence, III, A. Afzelius to J. Banks, 13 November 1794; Baptist Annual Register, II, p. 215, David George to Dr. Rippon, 17 November 1794.

120 CO 268/4, Macaulay to Thornton, 23 December 1794; Sierra Leone Papers, A. Afzelius, "An Account of the State of the Public Gardens before the arrival of the French and after their departure", 27 November 1794.
vaders began plundering the Nova Scotian farms and homes, killing all the livestock and burning about a dozen houses to the ground. Until they left on 13 October the French had absolute control of Freetown. The Company ship Harpy arrived during the occupation and it too was captured and looted. Settler John Cuthbert, who was aboard the Harpy, was robbed of the gifts of some English Baptists that he was carrying to his brethren and of all his belongings, even his spectacles.

Fearful of angering the French, Macaulay made no efforts to restrain them. The only resistance the invaders met occurred when looting parties ventured into the forest and were set upon by settlers in ambush. Generally, however, the Blacks were left alone by the French; they were at war with England, not with former slaves. The settlers were therefore in a position to assist the European officials who bore the brunt of the French beatings and property damage. They took the unfortunate Englishmen into their homes and shared their food with them. Without their aid, the Company botanist admitted, "I am afraid we should actually have

121 Directors' Report, 1795, pp. 4-9; Banks Correspondence, III, Afzelius to Banks, 13 November 1794; Baptist Annual Register, II, p. 215, David George to Dr. Rippon, 12 November 1794.

122 Ibid., p. 216, John Cuthbert to Dr. Rippon, n.d.

starved. At the same time many settlers took advantage of their relative immunity to save much Company property from French destruction or looting. They removed "great quantities of lumber" stripped the linings and even the frames of several buildings before they were burned, saved two or three boats and some iron ware, molasses and rum. These items were stored in their homes or in forest hiding-places. In addition the French were persuaded by some settlers, who pointed out that they were really Americans, to share some of the loot with them or to allow them to remove it before it was burned.

After a two-week occupation the French departed, leaving behind over a hundred English prisoners captured elsewhere and carrying off two Nova Scotian boys, presumably as slaves. Macaulay's first thought was for the Company property that had been saved by the Nova-Scotians. He called the hundredors and tythingmen together, demanding its return and offering a salvage fee of twenty percent. Admitting that

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124 Banks Correspondence, III, Afzelius to Banks, 13 November 1794; Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 13 October 1794; CO 267/92, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix B-6, "Statement by Eli Ackim".


126 Ibid.; CO 267/92, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix B-6, "Statement by Eli Ackim".

127 CO 268/5, Macaulay to Thornton, 23 December 1794; WO 1/352, pp. 57-64, "List of Nova Scotians in Freetown, 1802".
the Company’s claim was debatable, the governor argued that the colonists owed this favour to the Company in return for the numerous favours done them. Anyone who did not make immediate restitution of any Company property in his possession would be deprived of all Company employment, support or services, including the schools and the medical facilities. 128 A declaration was drawn up, which settlers were required to sign before receiving any Company services, committing the people to return salvaged goods or pay a penalty of twice their value. 129

Only 120 people agreed to sign Macaulay’s declaration. 130 The vast majority refused, claiming the goods were rightfully theirs and declining to recognize any obligation to bestow favours on the Company. The Company’s title, they maintained, had been annulled by Macaulay’s absolute surrender to the French. Anything the settlers then held had therefore been taken from the French, not from the Company. 131 Some had been given them voluntarily by the invaders, and the rest had been saved, at great personal risk,

128 Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 14 October 1794; CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 14 October 1794.


130 Ibid., 15 November 1794.

131 CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 28 April 1795; Directors’ Report, 1801, p. 2.
from certain destruction or theft.\[132\] They were encouraged in their resistance by several Methodist preachers, who regarded the French raid as another judgement of God against their evil oppressors. The goods they salvaged, like those destroyed in the York fire, were intended for them, but had been withheld illegally by the governor.\[133\] The settlers' position was so adamant that when they believed Macaulay was planning to reclaim the goods by force they armed themselves and were prepared to resist him with violence.\[134\] As a result most of the people were dismissed from Company employment and deprived of all services. Banned from the Company school, they hired their own teacher and formed a private school of their own.\[135\] Though he never dropped the Company's claim Macaulay did compromise to the extent that he allowed the offending settlers access to the Company doctor, and later to the school, but only on payment of a fee. Those who signed the declaration received these services free.\[136\] The colony was divided over £1,000 worth of goods, the Directors' esti-


135 Ibid.

136 CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 7 April 1795; CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 29 April 1797.
mate of the amount salvaged by the settlers. 137

Land, independence and security had been the chief factors motivating the exodus from Nova Scotia in 1792. After more than two years in Africa most settlers were still without cultivable farms, their independence was severely qualified by economic conditions and by a white government, and their security was threatened by their African neighbours, slave traders, and the arbitrary exercise of monopoly power. The Promised Land had not fulfilled their expectations, and they attributed its failure to a deliberate betrayal by the Company and its agents. Sierra Leone became another Egypt, and after the insurrection and the salvage issue Macaulay was likened to Pharaoh, oppressing the chosen people in their captivity. 138 And like the "Children of Esaral" with whom the Nova Scotians identified themselves, 139 some of them felt that a new exodus was necessary.

137 Directors' Report, 1794, pp. 20, 24-5, and 1795, p. 18; Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 17 October and 3 November 1794. Interestingly, the Company later paid compensation to the European officials for losses sustained during the raid, but not to the Nova Scotians, even the ones who signed the declaration. The settlers had offered the only resistance to the French, had much of their own property destroyed, and had suffered the only deaths and maimings during the bombardment, a woman and child being killed and several others wounded, one man having his legs shot off. CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 30 June 1795; Baptist Annual Register, II, p. 215, David George to Dr. Rumph, 12 November 1794.

138 Clarkson Papers, III, James Hutchinson and Moses Murray to Clarkson, 24 May 1796.

139 Ibid., James Lister to Clarkson, 30 March 1796.
The most disaffected among the colonists, having lost hope for any real independence under Macaulay, began to move outside the Company's jurisdiction. Some went into the slave trade, to take jobs as clerks or assistants to the European traders, for it seemed to offer the only viable alternative to remaining in the colony. Others, including Robert Keeling, simply went to live among friendly Africans, where they farmed land freely given them or made themselves valuable to chiefs for their trading or educational skills. A group of Methodists led by Nathaniel Snowball and Luke Jordan moved en masse to land surrounding Susan's Bay, and when the Company claimed the land and ejected them from it they arranged for a grant at Pirates' Bay directly from an African chief. There they cleared land, elected Snowball as their governor and formed a free


141 Zachary Macaulay, Letters, Macaulay to Selina, 1 December 1797.

142 Directors' Report, 1794, pp. 152-53; WO 1/352, "List of Nova Scotians in Sierra Leone, 1802".

143 CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 21 and 28 April 1795; CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 8 July 1796; CO 268/5, Governor and Council to Directors, 16 May 1796; Clarkson Papers, III, James Lister to Clarkson, 30 March 1796, Nathaniel Snowball and James Hutchinson to Clarkson, 24 May 1796. Susan's Bay seems to have remained a favourite spot for squatters unable to obtain adequate land within the colony. In the 1850s the government ejected forty-six families from the area and moved them to proper grants nearer Freetown (SLA, General Entry Book, 1853-55, p. 100, "List of Squatters on the Crown Land, Susan's Bay").
settlement "as the Ezerlites did". Physical removal, however, attracted but few of the settlers. The majority remained in the colony, where they attempted to develop a sphere of independence within the overall framework of Company control.

144 Clarkson Papers, III, Nathaniel Snowball and James Hutchinson to Clarkson, 24 May 1796; Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 5 January 1799.
CHAPTER IX

The Promised Land

The Development of an Independent Existence, 1794-96

Though the Company in 1794 explicitly rejected the settlers' claim for a greater participation in the control of the colony, events over the succeeding two years were to create a situation in which the Black population was enabled to carve out a sphere of independence of considerable significance. Partly this development derived from the Company's inability or disinclination to supervise every intimate aspect of settler life; and partly it derived from the settlers' own positive decision to recognize the Company's jurisdiction in constitutional matters provided it did not conflict with their social and religious integrity as a separate people.

A spirit of cooperation was immediately inspired by the continuing threat of another French attack. Mutual security demanded that people and council work together, for neither welcomed the prospect of further destruction and foreign occupation particularly after rumours were received to the effect that the French intended to sell all the Nova Scotians into slavery. Frequent alarms as French ships were sighted along the coast "seemed for a time to unite us into one mass", the governor noted, and the settlers and official
jointly worked on defenses and in the militia. The settlers seemed to realize that, at least as long as the war with France continued, they were not capable of standing on their own. Indicative of their change in attitude was their ready response to assist in extinguishing a fire aboard the Company brig Beginning in October 1795. Whereas the York had been left to burn, the Beginning was saved by a group of Nova Scotians who volunteered immediately; eighteen settlers received rewards from the Company for their bravery and loyalty.

The French war also had a restricting effect on the Company's trade between England and Africa. Fear of enemy interference dissuaded the Directors from sending out supplies, with the result that the colony was increasingly forced into self-sufficiency. The prohibitive cost of wartime insurance left Company cargoes uninsured; ships captured by the French, therefore, represented an absolute loss to the


2CO 268/5, Governor and Council to Directors, 23 October 1795; CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 17 October, 5 November 1795.

Company and a drain on its fixed capital. The unexpectedly high costs of the establishment of the colony in its first two years had already consumed more than one-quarter of the Company's capital, and to this were added the extraordinary losses from the York fire and the French occupation in 1794. Government subsidies, anticipated in 1792, failed to materialize. The Directors accordingly ordered a reduction in their colonial commitments. Several posts were abolished and the salaries for others were reduced; in compensation, Company servants were enabled to engage in trade on their own account subject to certain restrictions and the payment of duties to the Company. Services to the settlers, including education,


5Directors' Report, 1794, pp. 29-33. The total expenses, 1792-4, were itemized as:

"Two exploratory ships- £1200.
Charges of incorporation- 650.
Home establishment to Christmas 1793- 3250.
Provisions to Company servants- 3250.
Passage for Company servants- 5000.
Servants' expenses in England- 390.
Two years' salaries to servants- 7500.
Incidentals- 3530.
Provisions to colonists-
Shipping costs- 20000.
17940.
Total expenses- 64,620.
Capital stock- 235,000."

The York loss was £15,000 and other damage from the fire was estimated at £3,000. The French destruction was given a value of £55,000.

6Clarkson Papers, I, Thomas Clarkson to John Clarkson, 3 May 1792, Thornton to Clarkson, 6 and 8 June 1792.
suffered a corresponding decline.\footnote{Christian Observer, Vol. 39, No. 24 (ns), 1839, p. 761, "Memoir of Zachary Macaulay"; CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 8 December 1797, 29 December 1798; Directors' Report, 1796, p. 1.}

Of most significance to the Nova Scotian population, they ceased as a group to be regarded as employees of the Company. Instead of keeping the settlers on their regular payroll, as had been the case since 1792, the Company issued contracts to individual settlers who then hired others to perform various tasks such as unloading Company ships, clearing land, and transporting goods. Skilled tradesmen were hired by the job to practise their crafts as and when required.\footnote{CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 19 November, 31 December 1794, 3 August, 7 September, 1 October, 9 December 1795, 1 January 1796. In April 1792 Clarkson had listed a total of 162 skilled craftsmen and 168 unskilled labourers. Ingham, Sierra Leone, pp. 45-6, Register, 11 April 1792.}

The Blacks were encouraged to enter trade, with Company loans for boat construction and the purchase of trade goods. The Company also made food supplies available to Nova Scotian retailers for resale to their fellow settlers at a stipulated mark-up.\footnote{CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 13 December 1794.}

The reduction in the white establishment meant that more Blacks could be hired for some of the responsible positions in the colony. Hitherto the highest posts open to Nova Scotians, in terms of prestige and salary, were teaching positions in the Company-supported schools. Mingo Jordan drew
forty pounds and Mrs. Lucas twenty-four pounds annually as schoolteachers. But in 1795 Macaulay made it his policy not to hire a European for any work that could be performed as effectively by a Nova Scotian. In order to ensure that Nova Scotians would be qualified the governor instituted a programme of apprenticing young settlers to white artisans and supervisors with the expressed intention that, when trained, they should take over those positions from the whites. Jesse George and Eli Ackim became assistant apothecaries at an initial salary of forty-eight pounds a year, raised in January 1796 to fifty pounds. James Edmonds was placed under the direction of the Company surgeons. William Pitcher understudied the Master of Works, and Scipio Lucas the master shipwright. Nathaniel Snowball, junior, was given command of the Company ship Dawes, trading in the Rio Pongas region where another settler, Thomas Cooper, had been appointed as the superintendent of the Company’s factory. 11

With Black faces occupying more senior positions the racial divisions were lessened, and a core group of educated and influential Nova Scotians was created with a vested

10 CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 19 September 1793; CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 2 March 1795. Most other Company positions carried a salary of less than forty pounds, e.g. ibid., 1 January 1796, CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 18 January, 1 July 1797.

11 CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 7 March 1796, 1 January 1796; CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 8 October 1796, 13 March, 24 August, 8 December 1797, 14 September 1798; Directors’ Report, 1796, p. 17; CO’26A/5, Governor and Council to Thomas Cooper, 8 April 1795.
interest in Company rule. Macaulay's reorganized militia had a similar psychological effect. According to the constitution and the Directors' orders all settlers, Black and white, were liable for militia duty, and Nova Scotians were given firing practice on the Company's guns.\textsuperscript{12} The possibility of another French attack convinced Macaulay that the militia should be organized on a regular basis with stated duty periods and a constant guard mounted. With the cooperation of the hundredors and tythingmen, all male residents were organized into companies of thirty-five men, and each company elected its own captain, a lieutenant and three sergeants from among its members. This meant that Black officers were in several instances commanding white troops within their companies. When some European officials protested, Macaulay pointed out that many Nova Scotians had military experience in the American War whereas most of the whites had never fired a gun before.\textsuperscript{13} In the militia, as in the Company's service, Blacks were receiving honours and official positions of influence that had earlier been reserved for whites.

Since no income from Company employment was available for the majority of settlers, the months after the French raid saw a general move onto the partial farms that had been

\textsuperscript{12} Evans, "Early Constitution", p. 71, Article 77; Directors' Report, 1794, p. 75.

\textsuperscript{13} Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 19, 25, 28 November, 5 December 1796; Knutsford, Zachary Macaulay, pp. 131-32.
surveyed, where the people hoped to support themselves by agriculture. The Nova Scotians now realized, Macaulay reported, that living in Freetown was less desirable than rural security, and their eyes were opened to the folly of economic dependence upon the father vulnerable Company. About fifty new farms were immediately occupied, and when Dawes returned to Sierra Leone in March 1795 he found several of them in a flourishing state and estimated that some could be valued at over fifty pounds. To encourage the exodus from Freetown the council established a premium of forty dollars for anyone constructing a house more than one mile distant from the town. More effective than the premiums was the discovery of wild coffee beans, in February 1796, by settler Andrew Moore. The council immediately scheduled prizes for finding more coffee and for attempting to cultivate it on settler farms. The prospect of a cash crop tempted more Nova Scotians onto the land than had simple subsistence agriculture. Once on their farms the Nova Scotians' temper improved noticeably.


15 CO 268/5, Dawes to Directors, 11 April 1795, Governor and Council to Directors, 5 June 1798; Directors' Report, 1796, pp. 9-10.

16 Ibid., p. 10; CO 268/5 Governor and Council to Directors, 3 June 1795.

17 Ibid., Governor and Council to Directors, 5 February, 15 February, 16 May 1796; CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 16 February, 1 March 1796; Times, 4 September 1796.
and there were fewer complaints. The expectation of self-
sufficiency and the sense of independence that came from
escaping Company employment, even though it had been in-
voluntary, seemed to restore their confidence both in them-
selves and in their government. 18

Agriculture, however, soon proved to be an unsatis-
factory vehicle for economic independence. The poor laterite
soil of the peninsula, its nitrates lost to the sea over
generations of rainy seasons, was incapable of supporting
peasant proprietors on tiny plots averaging less than four
acres each, at least not in the manner to which the Nova
Scotians felt themselves entitled. 19 Furthermore many Nova
Scotians displayed a "fatal prejudice" against agricultural
labour, perhaps because it was reminiscent of plantation
slavery, as local whites believed, 20 or simply because it was
less profitable than the commercial pursuits of the resident
European elite. The settlers themselves cited insecurity of
tenure, caused by African and Company claims to the land, as

18 CO 268/5, Governor and Council to Directors, 31
January, 12 July 1795; Directors' Report, 1796, pp. 9-12;

XXI, January 1939, pp. 101-02; CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 17
October 1793.

20 Cf. 267/24, Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 4, 2 Novem-
ber 1808; African Institution Report, 1807, pp. 33-4; Hoare,
obstacles to agricultural progress. After the initial enthusiastic occupation of the land, disappointed settlers gradually drifted into other endeavours where they hoped to achieve more appropriate compensation for their efforts.

Trade with surrounding indigenous nations offered an obvious and attractive alternative to agriculture and to Company employment. This had been evident to the Nova Scotians as early as October 1792, when the delay in assigning their farms had led several of them into commercial contacts with the Africans. John Clarkson considered such a development to be in opposition to the colony's best interests and he made every effort to discourage it. "The spirit of trade, which ensures gain and laziness to the settlers", the young governor wrote, "will not only be injurious to the Company, but very detrimental to the morals and happiness of the public." In the interests of Company monopoly and popular morality Clarkson's successors adhered to a policy prohibiting independent settler trade, and the settlers continued to agitate against the restriction and to circumvent it whenever possible. Then the disruptions caused by the


22 Ingham, Sierra Leone, pp. 135-36 (11 October 1792).

23 Cf. CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 18 June 1794. During the attempted insurrection of June 1794 the hundredors and tythingmen included among their complaints Macaulay's rule
French war brought a reversal in this policy. The council began actively to encourage settler trade with the native Africans, both for the sake of acquiring needed provisions and for the exports the Company itself was unable to obtain. Credit was made available to settlers wishing to trade on terms more generous than those for farmers, and in at least one instance a Nova Scotian, John Kizell, was awarded a protected trading territory free of competition even from the Company. 24

Within a few months a settler fleet had been built and a growing trade was in evidence along the coasts and up the larger rivers neighbouring the colony. 25 Initially the trade was in rice, cattle and other foodstuffs, but by 1796 camwood and ivory had been added to the incoming flow of African

preventing Nova Scotian seamen in Company boats from trading on their own account. Ibid., Joseph Leonard and Miles Dixon to Governor and Council, 17 June 1794.

24CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 5 November 1795; CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 8 December 1797; CO 268/5, Governor and Council to Directors, 6 February, 7 October 1796; CO 267/92, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix B-5 John Kizell to Commissioners, March 1826; Directors' Report, 1801, p. 31.

25Baptist Annual Register, II, pp. 255-56, "Sierra Leone, 1795"; CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 9 December 1795, 1 February 1796; CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 4 May 1799; Cox-George, Finance and Development, pp. 138-47; Butt-Thompson, Sierra Leone in History and Tradition, p. 109; M. P. C. Easmon, "A Nova Scotian Family", in Eminent Sierra Leoneans, p. 57; Christopher Fye, "European and Creole Influence in the Hinterland of Sierra Leone before 1896", SLS (ns), No. 6, June 1956, p. 114.
produce. In May 1796 one settler boat landed with five tons of rice. "This will show not only the progress they make in trading with the natives", Macaulay pointed out, "but also how rapidly the size of their vessels increases."

Every day settlers came in with boats loaded with yams, rice, sheep, cattle, goats and fowl, and others supplied fresh fish caught in the river mouths. As a result the colony abounded with provisions for the first time in its history, individual traders were setting a new standard of settler prosperity, and the Company profited by virtue of the fact that all trade goods were purchased at the Company store. The Company's retail operation in Freetown had never been particularly profitable and had long been a source of settler grievance against the government. Having accepted the principle of popular commercial activity, the council opened the retail

26CO 268/5, Governor and Council to Directors, April 1795; Zachary Macaulay, Letters, Macaulay to ______, 6 October 1796.

27Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 16 May 1796. Macaul later reported settler boats averaged between two and three tons' capacity, ibid., 11 May 1797.

28Ibid., 3 November 1796.

29Ibid., 3 November 1796, 11 May 1797; CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 8 December 1797. Some of the trade sold in the Company store were purchased by the Company from the slave traders. Evidently the slavers were fortunate in running the French blockade than were the ships. See CO 268/5, John Gray to John Tilley, 11 June 1796.

30CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 29 October 1795; 270/3, Council Minutes, 27 March 1795.
trade to Nova Scotian entrepreneurs. In December 1794 six settlers were licensed to purchase wholesale provisions from the Company warehouse, to be retailed at a price established by the Company. \footnote{Ibid., 13 December 1794. The Company storehouse sold provisions to them at wholesale prices, e.g.: "pork @ £7.11.3 per barrel, butter @ £7.11.3 per cwt., tongues @ £3.15.6 per firkin." The retail prices set by the Company were: "Pork @ 10-1/2 d. per lb., butter @ 1s 6-1/2d. per lb., tongues @ 5s 1ld. each." If a shopkeeper charged more than the regulation price he was required to pay an equivalent amount as a fine to the Benevolent Society. CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 10 November, 14 December 1797. The profit on butter, the only item for which calculation is possible, amounted to only 3s 1ld. per cwt. or less than 1/2d. per lb. This mark-up of 2-1/2 percent allowed to Black merchants contrasted with the demand that for white Company servants engaged in trade "the rate of profit shall in no case fall below 7-1/2%" (CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 6 December 1797). Since wholesale prices to the white merchants are unknown, it is impossible to determine whether this difference in profit margins gave Nova Scotian shopkeepers a retail price advantage over their white competitors.} Six months later three licenses to keep taverns and two to retail spiritous liquors were issued to Nova Scotians, an area of business that increased more rapidly than the provisions trade, presumably because more profitable. \footnote{CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 5 May 1795; Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 5 October 1796, Letters, Macaulay to -----, 6 October 1796; CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 13 August 1798.}
Increasingly the Nova Scotian farms were abandoned in favour of the prestige, profit and adventure afforded by trade. Land had always had a symbolic value for the Black Loyalists, representing independence and security; there had
however never been a genuine tradition of the soil among them for they had no opportunity to develop one. As a symbol land was to remain predominant for several generations of Nova Scotians in Sierra Leone, but in practice the independence expected from land in fact came from trade. Between 1794 and 1796 a new direction was taken in the search for the Promised Land. The experience of their first few years in Africa had taught them that their economic salvation lay not in peasant proprietorship but in commerce and the crafts.

The economic development of the colony, however partly in terms of the Company's capital investment, was reflected in a rising standard of living for the colonists. Food prices declined with the increased flow of provisions from neighbouring territories and wages, at least for the skilled tradesman, improved by about fifty percent. In 1794 salt sold at ten-and-a-half pence per pound and venison at six pence. In 1796 fresh beef could be had at four pence a pound or less. Salaries rose for those still in regular Company employ, partly, no doubt, because responsibilities were greater, but even the Company's messenger received an increase almost one-hundred percent by 1797. Though employment no longer guaranteed, as it had been when every resident...
in automatic receipt of a government wage, the fact that salaries in the free labour market advanced would seem to indicate that there was no large body of unemployed actively seeking work.

Paralleling the growth in the settlers' economic independence was a retrenchment of the social distinctions and peculiarities brought from North America. There was little social intercourse between Black and white in Freetown, though the European example may have influenced settler daily life. The council was too preoccupied with other concerns, such as the Company's accounts and gathering information to be used in the Abolitionist campaign at home, to attend to the details of settler affairs. 34 The Nova Scotian acceptance of themselves as an elite, the elect of God, was allowed to develop unmolested. 35 This belief was reinforced by the Nova Scotians' relationship with the native Africans. There were African servants in the more affluent settler homes, and most of the farm-labour and land clearing was performed by African "grumettas" under Nova Scotian super-

34 For example Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 15 November 1794. CO 266, containing the letters of the Governor and Council to the Directors, and CO 270, the Council Minutes, pay astonishingly little attention to the settler population during the period 1792-96. The colonial government in Freetown evidently considered itself to be primarily the Company's commercial arm and an ally in abolition.

35 Cf. Clarkson Papers, III, James Lister to Clarkson, 30 March 1796, James Hutchinson and Moses Murray to Clarkson, 24 May 1796, Nathaniel Snowball and James Hutchinson to Clarkson, 24 May 1796.
vision. With their strange dress, non-Christian religion and unintelligible speech the Africans could be regarded by the Nova Scotians, as by most Europeans, as the products of an inferior civilization. Nova Scotians taught Africans in school, preached to them and punished them when, as often happened, they stole settler cattle or failed to fulfil a contractual obligation. According to most of their social and occupational criteria, the Nova Scotians were convinced that they stood apart from other Blacks as much as they did from whites. 36

The foundation, and the most vivid expression, of Nova Scotian distinction was of course their religion. Despite denominational labels, the common origin and experience of the Black Loyalist sects had created almost identical doctrines, styles and organizations. Apart from the practice of adult baptism among the Baptists, all the chapels displayed a theology that was closer to Henry Alline's New Light teaching than to the orthodox denominations whose names they bore. "Experimental knowledge" was considered more important than the study of authority, including even the Bible; inspiration came directly from God to the preacher and his congregation.

through visions, dreams, and the physiological experiences of the prayer-meeting.\textsuperscript{37} This reliance on faith and redemption rather than scriptural interpretations bore some similarity to John Wesley's pronouncement that "the image of God stamped upon the heart" was more central to salvation than "orthodoxy or right opinions", which were, he felt, "at best but a very slender part of religion".\textsuperscript{38} However Nova Scotian religion incorporated characteristics that were expressly condemned by Wesley,\textsuperscript{39} particularly the Calvinistic doctrine of the elect and the Antinomian belief that grace obliterates any obligation to moral law for the converted Christian. All the Black Nova Scotian sects were considered


\textsuperscript{39}Wesley, \textit{Letters}, Vol. VII, p. 169, Wesley to William Black, 26 February 1783. "Of Calvinism, Mysticism and Antinomianism have a care;" Wesley wrote, "for they are the bane of true religion, and one or the other of them has been the grand hindrance of the work of God wherever it has broke out."
to hold these unorthodoxies, as had Henry Alline before them. Descriptive evidence confirms that the "elect" doctrine was indeed a part of Nova Scotian belief, though it may have derived as much from racial segregation in Nova Scotia as from the influence of John Calvin. Their apparent Antinomianism may have been no more than a moral code, similarly developed in Nova Scotian isolation, that conflicted with the eighteenth century British interpretation of "moral law". But whether religious aberrations or cultural expressions of their own historical experience, these traits set the Nova Scotians apart from their white mentors and at the same time bound them together in a set of beliefs that were shared by all their sects.

Similarly all Nova Scotian chapels were noted for their pious devotion and attendance to religious duties, often contrasted to the laxity of European Christians. Sabbath observance was meticulous, and there were in addition daily services both morning and evening in each of the meeting houses. These services continued even when the people


41 Wesley, Letters, VII, p. 169, Wesley to Black, 26 February 1783, pp. 199-200, Wesley to Benjamin Chappel, 27 November 1783.

42 Ingham, Sierra Leone, p. 36 (1 April 1792); Directors' Report, 1794, pp. 58-9; Evangelical Magazine, IV, p. 419-23, "A Letter from Africa", 22 April 1796; Christopher
had taken refuge in the forest during the French occupation. Mrs. Falconbridge wrote in 1793 that she had never met with, heard, or read of, any set of people observing the same appearance of godliness; for I do not remember, since they first landed here, my ever awakening (and I have awoke at every hour of the night), without hearing preachings from some quarter or other.

A similar opinion was expressed by a well-travelled British official thirty years later. Corporate worship was supplemented in many homes with family prayer circles around a private altar. The prayers and preachings of the Nova Scotian chapels exhibited a passion and vigor that often horrified European observers. James Strand expected that the Black preachers would suffocate in their violent expositions, and John Clarke echoed Clarkson's fear that a sermon would endanger the health of the preacher delivering it.


44 Falconbridge, Two Voyages, p. 201.


46 Fox, Wesleyan Missions, p. 218; Trevelyan, Lord Macaulay, I, p. 23.
The services were filled with singing, the hymns, prayers and sermons alike being punctuated with "amens" and "hozannahs," hand-clapping and embracing, as the congregation participated in the experience with "apostolic simplicity". 48

Typically, the Nova Scotian chapels were divided into classes, each under a lay leader, which met weekly to discuss the state of their souls, to describe their temptations and victories, and to foster Christian fellowship and mutual care. Of Methodist origin, the class-system was adopted by the Huntingdonians in Sierra Leone, though not by the denomination in England. 49 Chapel affairs were governed democratically, the members being considered the proprietors, but once decisions were taken the entire congregation was expected to adhere to them. 50 The class system, the democracy

47 Sierra Leone Papers, James Strand's journal, 9 September 1792; Evangelical Magazine, IV, p. 419, "A Letter from Africa", 22 April 1796. See also CO 267/92, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix C-21, Henry Williams to Commissioners, 15 May 1826.


49 Wesley, Letters, II, pp. 296-97, Wesley to Vincent Perronet, 1748; The Harbinger, May 1856, pp. 77-8; Fyfe, "Countess of Huntingdon's Connexion", p. 57. There is no direct evidence to suggest that the Baptists also adopted the class system, though its success among the Methodists and Huntingdonians may have influenced them to do so.

and the mutual responsibility that developed from them gave the chapels an organizational unity that sustained their theoretical positions and that provided a basis for joint activity whenever their primary concerns demanded it. In seeming contradiction to this tendency, the chapels' organization also facilitated division, for those dissatisfied with a particular decision and refusing to follow it out had no option but to secede and form a separate chapel of their own. Identity with a class group might be stronger than loyalty to the congregation as a whole, so that when a preacher and a class leader disagreed the latter might take his class out of the chapel and establish an independent group. Still it should be recognized that even the frequent divisions and separations bore witness to the essential theological and cultural homogeneity of Nova Scotian Christians: personality conflicts and specific disputes led to a proliferation of chapels, but the new groups continued to share the doctrines, devotional style and organization of the parent groups. In a period of less than two years the number of preachers almost doubled from eleven to twenty, yet not one of them adopted a line of religious belief or practice that was in any way distinguishable from the others. 51

51 Evangelical Magazine, IV, p. 419, "A Letter from Africa", 7 April 1796; Zachary Macaulay, Letters, Macaulay to Thornton, 28 December 1797. See also Hair, "Sierra Leone and the Buluma", p. 31, quoting Horne to Havelis, 28 January 1794. The exception, as always, were the Baptists, distinguishable by the practice of adult baptism. Since the Baptist
The largest denomination in Freetown was the Methodist, incorporating the congregations of Moses Wilkinson and Boston King as well as the erstwhile Anglicans led by Joseph Leonard, now openly Methodist. In the mid-1790s the Methodists claimed the allegiance of between one-half and two-thirds of all Nova Scotian Christians, the remainder divided between Cato Perkins' Huntingdonians and David George's Baptists. Initially under the superintendence of Moses Wilkinson, the Methodists suffered a series of splits, blamed by Wilkinson and Stephen Peters on interference in their affairs by the Company chaplain and school-teacher.

In 1793 preacher Henry Beverhout conducted an Alline-type revival among the Old Settlers at Granville Town, producing a substantial increase in the Methodist ranks. Another revival was held in 1796 with equal success. The Baptists and Huntingdonians, less rent by separatism, seem to have been less energetic in seeking converts within the settler membership did not increase in this period it seems obvious that baptismal doctrine played no part in the divisions.


population, though all denominations sent missionaries among the African people. 55

Inevitably the chapels were far more than centres of religious worship. Political opinions were formed and debated, mutual assistance was generated, and social bonds were confirmed in the class and chapel meetings. 56 And as the chapel was the most important institution in settler life, so their preachers were the true leaders of the colonial population. None of the preachers received any financial renumeration for his religious duties, and none had been educated for his post; several, indeed, were illiterate, and many read the Bible with difficulty. 57 A preacher's license and ordination came directly from God, but God's appointment did not include a congregation. Recognition had to be given freely by a chapel grouping before a man with a vocation could be considered a pastor over a congregation. Once confirmed in his position

55 See Chapter VIII, footnotes 45-47.


the preacher's influence was considerable: he was responsible for the spiritual guidance and the Christian discipline of his flock, even to the point of holding special "courts" and imposing penalties on "backsliders". 58 John Clarkson, recognizing the preachers' authority, had ruled through them and admitted that without their cooperation his own influence in the colony should have been severely restricted. 59

From the very beginning of the Sierra Leone venture the preachers exercised a leadership that went beyond the confines of their meeting houses. Most of the preachers were appointed captains for the voyage from Halifax in 1792, and two of the three Black superintendents were preachers. 60 After the tythingman system was introduced the elected offices were frequently filled by chapel leaders. When they were not themselves preachers the hundreds and tythingmen always submitted their proposals to the "Junto of preachers", as Macaulay termed it, and only after receiving their approval would they pass measures on to the governor and council. 61 Even when...


59 "Diary of Lieutenant Clarkson", p. 146; Ingham, Sierra Leone, pp. 111-12.

60 Clarkson Papers, I, fol. 231, "List of Nova Scotia Captains aboard the Sierra Leone fleet"; Sierra Leone Papers, James Strond's Journal, 6 May 1792. See also Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 1 or 3 November 1793.

61 CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 11 July 1796, 7 December 1797; Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 7 July 1796, Letters, Macaulay to Thornton, 28 December 1797.
in an expressly political position, therefore, the preachers wielded a direct influence over political decisions, and their indirect power through the minds of their congregations was overlooked with peril by European officials well into the nineteenth century. In Sierra Leone, Macaulay complained, "a religious society is erected into a kind of Jâcobin Club for controlling Government." 62

The encompassing importance of religion in their lives meant that party politics among the Nova Scotians were expressed as denominational politics. Loyalty to a particular congregation implied the acceptance of certain political attitudes, especially with regard to postures taken for or against the Company government. His fellow Methodists gave Thomas Peters their support during the Easter "rebellion" of 1792, and then attempted to coerce the others to their point of view. 63 Support for John Clarkson had been rallied by David George and his Baptists, causing a division between those two denominations over the issue of cooperation with the white establishment. 64 George's personal friendship and loyalty for Clarkson established a Baptist tradition that

62 Ibid.; and Journal, 11 July 1796; CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 11 July 1796; CMS, CA 1/M1, Fitzgerald to CMS, 3 May 1821.

63 Zachary Macaulay, Letters, Macaulay to Thornton, 28 December 1797.

64 Ingham, Sierra Leone, p. 43; Clarkson Papers, III, Clarkson to Hartshorne, September 1793.
kept them closer to the Company than any other settler congregation. Their loyalty was well-rewarded: the number of contracts, licenses, commercial privileges and Company positions awarded to Baptists was far out of proportion to their numerical significance in the colony. And such rewards served to increase their identification with the government and to link their personal interests with it.

The threats to Dawes in 1793 were delivered by Methodists; the insurrection of June 1794 was headed and manned by them; the campaign against returning Company property after the French raid was inspired by their preachers. On each occasion the government had turned to the Baptists for support, and their loyalty proved indispensable for the maintenance

65 Ibid; David George, "Life", pp. 483-84; Fyfe, "Baptist Churches", p. 56. It is interesting to note that Baptists were often more inclined to cooperate with established authority than were Methodists. In the West Indies Baptist preachers always sought the permission of slave-owners before propagating the faith among the Black slaves, and even required a recommendation of good behaviour from the owner before baptizing a slave. The Methodists on the other hand were prepared to preach and teach without regard for the owners' sensitivities. See Baptist Annual Register, I, pp. 332-38, "An Account of several Baptist Churches consisting chiefly of Negro Slaves".

66 For example CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 1 April, September 1793; CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 7, 13 November, 13, 31 December 1794, 1 January 1796; CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 18 January 1797; CO 268/5, Governor and Council to Directors, 6 February 1796; Baptist Annual Register, II, pp. 216, "Letters from two Negro Brethren"; and p. 255, "Genuine Letters, 1797".

67 CO 270/7, Council Minutes, 18 June 1794; Zachary Macaulay, Letters, Macaulay to Thornton, 28 December 1797.
of Company authority. 68 During the 1796 agitation against John Clarke, the Company's chaplain, it was the Methodists who organized and enforced a boycott of official services while George and the Baptists spoke publicly in favour of both chaplain and governor, an effort that won George the title "Macaulay's tool". 69 There was no doctrinal reason for Baptist complicity and Methodist disaffection, though the settlers themselves attributed their political divisions to their religious differences. 70 It was in fact the case that chapel unity both created and enforced a common stand on major issues. It was inconceivable that a chapel member could long remain in opposition to his preacher and others in the congregation on any matter of vital concern. The only alternative to conformity was secession. Each chapel therefore tended to become more exclusive and to represent more completely the feelings of its members.

Exclusiveness had always been a characteristic of Black Nova Scotian religion. They were resentful of outside authority and particularly suspicious of white "corrup-


69 Zachary Macaulay, Letters, Macaulay to Thornton, 28 December 1797; Journal, 9 April, 3, 30 May, 26 July, 17, 24 August, 1796; CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 25 February, 19 July 1797; Baptist Annual Register, II, pp. 531-32, "Sierra Leone".

70 Clarkson Papers, III, Jordan and Snowball to Clarkson, 29 July 1796.
tion. The sectarian Blacks had learned to regard the Anglican establishment as a threat to their independence, and white clergy generally as a potential source of destruction. This attitude continued in Sierra Leone, where association with white ministers could compromise the credibility of a Black preacher among the more exclusive Black chapel members. The easy identification of the white Company-appointed chaplains with the unpopular Company government further contributed to the likelihood of conflict between the people and the chaplains.

Though freedom of religion was guaranteed by the Directors, all colonists were expected to attend the Anglican services conducted by the chaplain or, in his absence, by the governor. The Methodists and Huntingdonians already used the Anglican liturgy in their own services, and the official ritual was expressly "bowdlerized" for African use. "The Directors, with the aid of Gisborne and other eminent and liberal Divines, have altered the Church Service for Sierra Leone", Thomas Clarkson reported, "taking out those parts..."

71 See Chapter IV, footnotes 111-115.


73 African Institution, Special Report, 1915, pp. 9; Times, 6 February 1792, reporting on a Sierra Leone Company meeting at which the resolution was passed "that there shall be no religious distinction in that Colony, but that every man shall be left to the unbiased dictates of his own conscience"
which all unprejudiced men have deemed exceptionable. 74

Attendance at Anglican services was therefore not considered too great a burden, as long as the settlers remained unmolested in their own separate meetings held at a separate time. 75 Then in January 1793 the Rev. Melvill Horne and Governor Dawes ordered that Anglican services were to be held each day in the morning and again in the evening, taking the time normally utilized by the chapel meetings. Horne also claimed the right to preach in each Nova Scotian chapel once a fortnight. 76

The people began to fear that the chaplain and governor were embarked upon a programme to convert them to Anglicanism and to destroy their independent chapels, a fear that was not lessened by a Horne sermon on the text: "Come with us and we will do thee good". 77 The chaplain's use of the pulpit to support Macaulay's policy with regard

74 Clarkson Papers, I, Thomas Clarkson to John Clarkson, 13 May 1792.

75 Falconbridge, Two Voyages, p. 201; Baptist Annual Register, II, p. 410; Zachary Macaulay, Letters, Macaulay to Thornton, 20 December 1797; Charles Marke, Origin of Wesleyan Methodism in Sierra Leone and History of Its Missions (London, 1913), pp. 18-19; Fyfe, "West African Methodists", p. 25; Sierra Leone Papers, James Strand's journal, 1 May 1792.

76 Clarkson Papers, II, Isaac DuBois' journal, 23 January 1793, and John Gray to Patrick Dunkin, 11 February 1793; Falconbridge, Two Voyages, p. 201; Hair, "Sierra Leone and the Bulama", p. 31, quoting Horne to Hawes, 28 January 1794.

The text is from Numbers 10:29.
to slave traders, in September 1793, drove another bitter wedge between himself and the settlers. That same month doctrinal conflict, merged with racial resentment, broke out in the midst of a church service. Henry Beverhout, a Methodist preacher noted for his exclusivist opinions, "had been appointed Precentor in the Church by Mr. Clarkson with a view to silencing him and destroying his influence." If this had been Clarkson's motive it was apparently being fulfilled, for Beverhout "began to be regarded as of the white party, and his clamour [against white interference in settler religion] was suspected by his countrymen to be insincere". Perhaps in an effort to restore his own position, Beverhout chose to interrupt a sermon in which Horne was preaching against the use of dreams as a valid source of divine inspiration. The sermon attacked a fundamental Nova Scotian belief, and so Beverhout, from his own prayer-desk, rose to denounce Horne's position as "the doctrine of Satan" and to compare Governor Dawes to "Pharaoh whom the just judgement of God would sooner or later overtake". "God in his own time would deliver Israel", Beverhout concluded, identifying the Nova Scotian settlers with the Chosen People. In symbolic deliverance he then led the settler Methodists from the church.

78 Ibid., 8 September 1793; Directors' Report, 1794, p. 164.


80 Ibid.
A year later Horne returned to England, never having regained the settlers' confidence. To replace him the company appointed their European schoolmaster, Jones, as acting-chaplain. On the first day of his new appointment Jones came into conflict with David George over "general and particular redemption". The new chaplain preached universal atonement, a doctrine that threatened the Nova Scotian Belief in themselves as a particular elect. 81 Later Jones insulted the Methodists by calling them "a rotten Society", whereupon the chaplain was declared to be unwelcome at any Methodist meeting. 82 Jones' persistent interference in Methodist affairs was blamed, by the Methodist preachers, for the splits that appeared in their body, and led to the organization of a complete boycott—against all Anglican services. 83 The Nova Scotian fear that intimate contact with whites would compromise their spiritual purity, and the exclusiveness that resulted from that fear, were being reinforced by their early experience in Africa.

The Directors' inability to find a suitable clergyman, acceptable to themselves and to the settlers, left the colony without a chaplain for more than a year. During his home

81 Knutsford, Zachary Macaulay, p. 54.
leave in 1795-6, Macaulay undertook to find one, and in the course of his search he met the Rev. John Clarke, a Presbyterian. Though he refused to take Anglican orders, Clarke's evangelical manner was deemed satisfactory for his appointment by the Directors in January 1796. The new spirit of cooperation then prevalent in Freetown assured him of a warm welcome on his arrival there two months later. The Black preachers accepted him as an ally in winning the Africans to Christianity and in enforcing Christian discipline among their own people; Clarke consulted them and won their approval for a visitation to each settler home, and they encouraged attendance at his Saturday evening catechism classes.

Clarke's open admiration for Nova Scotian piety, so different from the denunciations of his predecessors, won him ready access to the settler pulpits and the people returned to the church for Sunday worship.

However, Clarke's Presbyterian orthodoxy compelled him, once he became more familiar with Nova Scotian doctrine.  

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84 Evangelical Magazine, IV, April 1796, pp. 163-64.
to express his opposition to "those ruinous notions whereby the people are misled", particularly their apparent antinomianism. His attacks on Nova Scotian "blasphemy" barred him from the settler chapels and, in the people's eyes, identified Clarke with Horne, Jones and all others who would encroach upon their independence. At a meeting of the Black preachers, held on 30 May 1796, Clarke was denounced as "the Company's Chaplain, and no Pastor to the Settlers". Sectarian jealousies were inflamed by two Europeans in the colony, a Baptist missionary named Grigg and the Company's non-Conformist schoolmaster, Garvin, who reintroduced fears of an Anglican plot by recounting tales of the problems faced by Dissenters in England. Garvin in particular pointed to Macaulay's support for the chaplain as evidence that church and state were to be united in Sierra Leone unless the settlers took action to prevent it. Alarm spread through the colony when Garvin and Grigg interpreted literally a sermon preached by Clarke on the text: "Compel them to come in that my house may be filled". A boycott of catechism classes led Macaulay to close a settler school, run by a Black Methodist teacher but dependent upon Company funds, an action which

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88 Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 30 May, 5 October 1796.
90 Ibid., 30 May 1796; CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 19 July 1797.
seemed to confirm that collaboration existed between chaplain and governor. The preachers changed their chapel hours to the time of Clarke's services, to prevent their congregations from attending the church, and the Methodists threatened to excommunicate any of their members who broke an anti-Anglican boycott. Within three months of his arrival Clark's favourable beginning had been reversed, and any possibility that settler religion could be tempered or sophisticated by his influence was destroyed.

The mainspring of an independent settler existence was, clearly, the chapel, but education in the colony also contributed to the creation of a Black Nova Scotian identity and feeling of separateness. Formal schooling began, for most of the Black Loyalists, in Nova Scotia, where several hundred had attended institutions assisted by the Associates of the late Dr. Bray. The Sierra Leone Company recognized the necessity of improving settler education if they were to become collaborators in the civilization of Africa, and so the Company sent a European schoolmaster to the colony and made funds available for the support of settler-run schools. Joseph Leonard, formerly teacher at Brindley Town, brought the schoolbooks with

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91 Ibid., 28 November 1796, Letters, Macaulay to Thornton, 20 December 1797.

92 Ibid., and Journal, 4 October 1796.

93 See Chapter IV, footnotes 122-147.

94 Directors' Report, 1794, pp. 34-5.
him to Africa and "at the wish of the people" established a
school in Freetown, with a salary for himself provided by
the Company.  

Boston King, Methodist preacher from Preston,
was appointed schoolmaster for African children, then for
Granville Town, and finally for Freetown.  

For many Nova
Scotian children, therefore, their education continued with
relatively little interruption from the Atlantic crossing.
The general desire for education continued unabated, stimu-
lated by Zachary Macaulay's policy of "alotting the lightest
work to the negroes who could read and write".  

By the end of 1793 all the colony's children of
school age, numbering over three-hundred, were receiving a
formal education in one of Freetown's eight schools. Seven
of the teachers were themselves Nova Scotian, the eighth a
European sent out from England.  

In addition most adults
attended evening classes, instructed by the regular teachers
or by their literate neighbours, for Macaulay had "made a
schoolmaster of almost every black man in the colony who reads
well enough".  

As in Nova Scotia classes were held in the

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95 SEG, Designs of the Associates, No. 16, Abstract
for 1792, pp. 44-5, Joseph Leonard to Associates, 9 April
1792; CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 30 December 1799.

96 Boston King, "Memoirs", p. 265; CO 270/4, Council
Minutes, 29 March, 10 November 1797.

97 Trevelyan, Lord Macaulay, I, p. 15.

98 Directors' Report, 1794, p. 94; Zachary Macaulay,
Journal, 3 October 1793; Christian Observer, Vol. 39, No. 4
(ns), 1849, p. 762.

99 Ibid.
teachers' homes, though to ensure some uniformity of standards all students were examined together once each month. The children attended from nine until twelve in the morning and from two to five in the afternoon, the boys receiving instruction in reading, writing, arithmetic and church music, the girls in reading, singing and needlework. Adult education was directed toward teaching the people to read their Bibles. 100

Most of the children attended schools taught by Black teachers, and the teachers were often preachers or leaders in the independent chapels. The schools therefore tended to reinforce the lessons and attitudes taught in the chapels, especially since parents were free to enrol their children in the school of their choice. Political opinion drifted into the regular curriculum, so that "disorder" and "opposition" were being propagated. 101 Henry Beverhout and Miles Dixon, both preachers and actively anti-establishment, were Company-supported teachers until their politics won them dismissal. 102 Joseph Leonard, teacher, preacher and tythingman, delivered the people's protest to Macaulay over the dismissals of

100 Ibid.; Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 5 December 1793; CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 2 January 1794; Kup, "Freetown in 1794", p. 164.

101 CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 2 January 1794; Ye 270/4, Council Minutes, 4 November 1799; Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 3 October, 5 December 1793.

102 CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 14, 16 June 1794; 270/4, Council Minutes, 10 November 1797.
Keeling and Channel in June 1794. The Methodist teacher at Granville Town organized his students to boycott the chaplain's catechism classes. Even the white teachers sent out by the Company were non-Confomists who often encouraged their students' resistance to Anglican and establishment influences.

The Company, too, attempted to use the schools to buttress its own political position. Macaulay was not averse to removing support from a non-cooperative teacher or even to closing a school completely, and an apolitical education was not fostered by making the chaplain superintendent of all schools. In order to encourage the return of Company goods "salvaged" by settlers during the French raid, the governor banned children from school whose parents refused to sign a declaration that they were in possession of no Company property. Almost three years later Macaulay

103 CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 18 June 1794.
105 The outstanding example was Garvin, schoolmaster from 1793 until his dismissal, on political grounds, in 1797. CO 268/5, Governor and Council to Directors, 30 July 1796, 9 March 1797; CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 25 February, 19 July 1797, "Report of Enquiry into charges against John Garvin" (held 22 January 1797). His successors, McMillan and Smith, were likewise non-Confomists, CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 28 March 1796.
107 CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 26 March 1796.
relented to the extent of re-admitting such children on a
teaching basis, but in the meantime their parents had
united their resources to hire a private teacher for a
settler-managed independent school and they were not anxious
to return them to teachers loyal to the Company. Political
differences, combined with the economies instituted late in
1794, reduced the number of teachers to four, one white and
three black, and the number of students in Company schools to
150. Governors John Gray and Thomas Ludlam later required
school fees from quit-rent defaulters, whereupon official
school attendance declined to only thirty children. The
others attended private schools, and pressure was brought to
bear on those remaining in Company schools by charging them
with "opposing themselves to the voice of the people; and
courting the favour of the Europeans." The settlers' suc-
cess in providing instruction for virtually all children in
the colony, and the Company's concern that this education
was inferior, led to the removal of all political restrictions
from education in December 1799.

109 Ibid.; CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 7 April 1794; CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 29 April 1797.
110 Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 15 November 1794.
111 CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 16 January, 4
November 1799.
112 c.f. SP, Bray Associates' Minute Book, 111 ;
Macaulay to Associates, 3 October 1799.
113 CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 4
November, December 1799.
Though the ideal of universal literacy was not achieved, and one may doubt the adequacy of the private school instruction, still the Nova Scotian settlers were ahead of their contemporaries in England in terms of mass education. A printing press, established in July 1794, was "in constant operation", and the Company's lending library was in regular use. The impact of European learning and practices further distinguished the Nova Scotians from the native Africans, and at the same time, since much of that learning was filtered through and interpreted by Nova Scotian teachers, it served to extend the gulf between themselves and the colony's white governing class. This latter tendency was especially true of the independent schools between 1794 and 1799, when the settlers were conscious that they were setting up an educational system in opposition to the government's and one that, they avowed, should be the "voice of the people" serving their own interests as a separate community and not those of the Europeans.

114 Half the tythingmen elected in 1796 signed their oaths of office with a mark (CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 3 January 1797). It is of course quite possible that all were able to read, and as adults, and therefore ineligible for regular daily instruction in the schools, the tythingmen cannot be taken as representative of the level of education among the younger Nova Scotians.


117 Cf. CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 4 November 1799.
chapel, the school contributed to an awareness that Nova Scotians were different from others; within the isolated atmosphere of their independent institutions the Nova Scotians' character as a people was protected and enhanced.

Most of the Black Loyalists had been slaves in the American colonies, and all had suffered from injustice and discrimination in Nova Scotia. The oppressor in both instances had worn a white face. Not surprisingly, the Nova Scotians carried with them to Africa what chaplain Horne called a "rooted hatred of whites". Their experiences at the hands of the inept Council in 1792, and their alleged betrayal by the Company thereafter, did little to dispel a suspicion that they could never fully trust a white man. This distrust was a frequently-noted aspect of their group character during the 1790s and was passed on to the children at home and school. The same slave background and their exaggerated notions of the rights of a freeman made them extremely sensitive to anything reminiscent of slavery in the treatment they received. The delegates to England in 1799 claimed the Directors dismissed them as if they were slaves, the settlers saw slavery in taxes, militia duty and even in

118 Hair, "Sierra Leone and the Bulama", p. 31, quoting Horne to Hawes, 28 January 1794.

formal land grants; long deprived of self-determination, they considered any restriction on their whim or will to be an injustice. They their quick sense of outraged injustice led them to resent anyone assuming a position of superiority and contributed to the democracy upon which they insisted in their own institutions. It also contributed to a proliferation of petty lawsuits among the settlers, which one colonial official attributed "to the vast importance each individual attaches to their own little self." The council in 1793 tried to discourage the "multiplication of trivial suits," usually instituted for insults received or over debts of only a few shillings, by levying a fine of five shillings against the loser in any civil action. The settlers were not discouraged, however, and their refusal to broach any wrong against themselves gave them a reputation for "a spirit of litigation" for several generations.

120 Falconbridge, Two Voyages, pp. 269-85; The Hubinger, July 1852, pp. 221-24; Zachary Macaulay, Letters, Macaulay to ———, 5 October 1796; PP 1801-2, II, "Report from the Committee", p. 8 (346); PP 1826-7, VII, "Report of the Commissioners", p. 11 (277); Directors' Report, 1771, 81; CO 217/70, Directors to Governor and Council, 2 March 1799, Gray and Ludlam to Wentworth, 24 June 1799.

121 Zachary Macaulay, Letters, Macaulay to ———, October 1796, Journal, 7 June 1797.


123 CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 1 March, 3 April 1831.

The violent passions of chapel, meeting and court room were repeated in other areas of settler lives. They were reportedly robust in their pleasures, and quick to flare into a raging temper.\textsuperscript{125} They were fond of drink, and liquor had no social stigma attached to it--even David George managed an ale-house--but they seldom became drunk.\textsuperscript{126} The Directors considered them "superior to the generality of people of the same order" in England.\textsuperscript{127} But one aspect of the Nova Scotian character was disconcerting to the evangelical Company personnel: their relatively free sexual morality. Macaulay found them "loose", "immoderate" and "shockingly irregular", and Melvill Horne stated that "a woman who has preserved a character for chastity as maid and wife is hardly to be found".\textsuperscript{128} A lack of concern for formal conjugality was not limited to the young or the irreligious. Some of the colony's

p. 99 (365); CO 267/92, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix C-19, Evidence of G. Rendall; J. J. Crooks, The History of the Colony of Sierra Leone, West Africa (Dublin, 1903), p. 84; CO 270/12, Proclamation, 8 March 1811.

\textsuperscript{125} Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 7 June 1797, Letters, Macaulay to ----, 6 October 1796; Directors' Report, 1794, p. 59; CO 217/70, Gray and Ludlam to Wentworth, 24 June 1799.


\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{128} Zachary Macaulay, \textit{Letters}, Macaulay to ----, 6 October 1796, Macaulay to Thornton, 20 December 1797; Hair, "Sierra Leone and the Bulama", p. 31, quoting Horne to Haweis, 28 January 1794.
most devout citizens lived quite openly in illegal marriages or indulged in affairs. Baptist preacher Hector Peters, Methodist preacher Henry Beverhout, the wife of preacher Lazarus Jones, and schoolmaster Thomas Cowling all had "illicit" relationships. Conventional morality as enforced by the chapels could even regard common-law marriages as having precedence over legal ones. One member of the Methodist chapel, Robinson, claimed that his bride of three months had been seduced by fellow-Methodist Cheeseman. Cheeseman's defense was that he had lived with the woman for five years before her marriage to Robinson, and the Methodist "court" supported him and gave Cheeseman, not the legal husband, right to continue a sexual relationship with her. In such circumstances there could be no disgrace to illegitimacy; bastards were honestly declared and listed as such in the census returns. When a lawyer in 1838 challenged a bastard's right to inherit his father's property the chief justice dismissed such a doctrine on the grounds that "it would endanger the title of two-thirds of the property of the colony".


130 Zachary Macaulay, Letters, fragment dated 30 May 1798.

131 Cf. WO 1/352, "List of Nova Scotians in Sierra Leone, 1802".

The colonial authorities, apparently unaware that settler traditions of sex and marriage dated from slavery and had received the sanction of religion in Nova Scotia, considered these customs to be the result of bad influences in the colony. Certain individuals were pointed out to young girls as "loose and immodest", and they were forbidden to associate with them. In an effort to make examples of those who strayed from British standards John Clarke refused to baptise bastard children, and Macaulay regularly prosecuted those he discovered living in sin, the usual punishment being a fine of five pounds for the man and a flogging for the woman. Company employees were dismissed. When he heard of the Robinson-Cheeseman case Macaulay advised Robinson to bring a charge before the regular colonial court. There, sitting as judge, the governor reversed the chapel decision, fined Cheeseman and awarded the woman a month's imprisonment and a swift whipping. The severity of the official reaction seems merely to have confirmed the Nova

133 Zachary Macaulay, Letters, Macaulay to ----, 6 October 1796. The bad characters included European seamen visiting Freetown, an unnecessary warning considering that not one mulatto bastard had been born prior to this; CO 268/5, Governor and Council to Directors, 5 June 1798; Hair, "Sierra Leone and the Bulama", p. 30, quoting Horne to Hawes, 28 January 1794.


135 Zachary Macaulay, Letters, fragment dated 30 May 1798.
Scotians in their practices, however, and to have provided them with one more instance of white misunderstanding of a state of affairs they deemed quite proper. 136

Extra- or pre-marital irregularities, in any case, do not seem to have weakened family and community ties any more than they had in Nova Scotia. 137 The slave family in America had long been used to informality and to the independence of women. Women in Freetown were free to become preachers and teachers, shopkeepers and traders. 138 Until the Directors ruled against it in 1797 women voted in the tything elections, and female participation in the 1794 insurrection was indicative of their political awareness. 139 Almost every Nova Scotian woman had an occupation, and therefore an income independent of her husband's, and an extremely high proportion of settler families were headed by females. 140 The nature of settler society and the position of women within it created a stark contrast to the English system familiar to Company

136 See Chapter XIII, below.


139 Ibid., 13 December 1796, 16 December 1797.

140 See CO 267/111. Freetown census, 1831, in Findlay to Hay, 3 November 1831. The 1802 census, WO 1/342, showed 93 of 291 Nova Scotian families headed by females.
directors and officials. In European eyes the settlers were immoral and their women brazen; the settlers could see only that their situation had developed in response to a series of experiences that constituted their own unique heritage.

The Nova Scotian heritage included elements that were African, British, and colonial North American, combined in such a fashion that it came to represent a new culture that was specific to the settlers. Their pronunciation and grammar was carried with them from the southern colonies, was perpetuated as the language of their preachers and teachers, and was regarded, in the nineteenth century, as a distinct dialect. Architectural style duplicated the southern colonial, adapted to the African environment and to the restrictions of Freetown's rectilinear layout. Settler homes were two-storeyed and shingled, unlike native African houses, and

141 See A. B. C. Sibthorpe, The History of Sierra Leone (2nd ed., London, n.d. [1881]), p. 22; The Artisan, 27 May, 1885; John Bowen, Memorials of John Bowen (London, 1862), pp. 526-27; E. D. Jones, "Some Aspects of the Sierra Leone Patois, or Krio", SLS (ns), No. 65, 1956, p. 97. M. J. Herskovits, The Myth of the Negro Past (Boston, 1941), p. 22, writes: "since grammar and idiom are the last aspects of a new language to be learned, the Negroes who reached the New World acquired as much of the vocabulary of their masters as was initially needed or was later taught to them, pronounced these words as best they were able, but organized them into aboriginal speech patterns. Thus arose the various forms of Negro-English, Negro-French, Negro-Spanish and Negro-Portuguese spoken in the New World, their 'peculiarities' being due to the fact that they comprise European words cast into an African grammatical mold." In the case of the Nova Scotians the vocabulary was heavily peppered with biblical phrases, a result of their education in Nova Scotia and the central position of religion in their group life.
cooking was done outside, a possible cultural residue from the slave situation or even from Africa. In dress the settlers were English-Nova Scotian, even to the wearing of beaver hats by both sexes, yet the faith they placed in dreams and the "country-fashion" trials by ordeal in which they often indulged in their private courts were distinctly a part of African tradition. English culture had an obvious affect on them, but only insofar as it became a part of their own experience, tempered by slavery, the chapel and the African scene.

The one place where the Nova Scotians could truly be themselves, where their various peculiarities could be protected and appreciated, was the chapel. Governors Dawes and Macaulay, and the various chaplains, frequently criticized settler religion but never overtly attacked the chapels or preachers. The settlers were prepared to accept the Company's presence as necessary, under the circumstances, in the fields of defence, trade and general government security, but they

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could recognize no Company role in their chapel affairs. It was fear of such an eventuality that inspired the reaction against John Clarke in May and June 1796.

In the midst of the controversy over Clark Governor Macaulay decided that the time had come to correct the sexual irregularities so prevalent in Freetown. On 4 July 1796 he drew up a proposal that all marriages should henceforth be performed only by a person in Holy Orders or by the governor, after banns had been published in church, and that unmarried fathers should be responsible for the support of their bastard children. The proposals were sent to the hundreds and tythingmen who approved them, the only opposition coming from "one or two preachers in the list of Tythingmen". This meant that the proposals were now part of the law of the colony, and they were printed and posted on 8 July.

The publication of the new marriage law brought an immediate and violent reaction from the settlers. They "talked loudly of the violation of their religious rights, of their liberty of Conscience being infringed, and of the call there was to resist such acts even to blood". They considered it an insult to their preachers and an assault on the integrity of their independent chapels, and they vowed to die

145 Zachary Macaulay, Letters, Macaulay to Thornton, 20 December 1797.

146 Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 4, 7, 8 July 1796; CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 8 July 1796.
before seeing it enforced. David George was just as agitated as the Methodists. He attended a meeting of the settler preachers where a violent demonstration was planned for Sunday 10 July. The Methodist factions reunited under Moses Wilkinson "to make a better stand for their rights". After two years of relative peace and cooperation the colony stood once again on the verge of insurrection, for the settlers believed that it was the survival of their chapels that was at stake.

Alarmed at the prospect of an armed rebellion, David George withdrew from the attack and advised moderation. Without his cooperation unanimity was destroyed and the Sunday demonstration had to be cancelled, but the Methodists proceeded with a protest meeting of their own. Henry Beverhout advised the gathering "that the rights of our society are to be taken away, vizt the right of Baptism and Marrying. Let all those who are to stand by the Society go to one side; and those who are for the Church go to the other". All present chose to support the society. Beverhout then dictated a letter, transcribed by Elliott Griffiths, inform-

147 Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 8 July 1796, Letter, Macaulay to Thornton, 20 December 1797.
149 Ibid., 9 July 1796, Letter, Macaulay to Thornton, 20 December 1797.
150 CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 12 July 1796, quoting Keeling to Macaulay, n.d.
ing the Governor that the people intended to defy the new law. "We consider ourselves a perfect Church", the letter proceeded, "having no need of the assistance of any worldly power to appoint or perform religious ceremonies for us. ... We cannot persuade ourselves that politics and religion have any connection, and therefore think it not right for a Governor of the one to be meddling with the other". The letter was then signed by 127 settlers, including ten preachers, in the name of the "Independent Methodist Church of Freetown". 151

The Methodist letter, an explicit statement of the settler position on chapel independence, was carried to the governor the following day. Macaulay had been warned in advance, and he met the Methodist delegation with a charge of treason. "Marriage", he said, "was not a religious but a civil ordinance", and their defiance was therefore not a question of religious liberty but a threat to the legal constitution of a British colony. When Beverhout demanded the recall of the hundredors and tythingmen who had approved the offending proposals, Macaulay advised him that preachers had no right to interfere in political issues. To ensure subordination the governor then called the whole population to

a special Court of Sessions, where he read the marriage section from Blackstone and threatened to punish anyone not complying with it on a charge of sedition and rebellion. 152

Faced with hanging, the Methodist leaders backed down. David George's defection and the governor's assurance that no threat was intended to their genuine religious rights dissipated the anger and the unity displayed a few days earlier, and there was no real desire, even on Beverhout's part, to remove completely the British connection provided by the Company. "Thus did the storm blow over", Macaulay concluded, and the Nova Scotians returned to peaceful co-existence with their government. 153 But strong passions had been aroused, and the event, with its implications for settler independence, was not to be forgotten.

152 Ibid., 11, 12 July, 1796.

153 Ibid., 12 July, 1796.
CHAPTER X

Black Nationalism

The Political Expression of Settler Independence, 1796-1800

The Nova Scotian's sense of a separate identity, based on race, religion and cultural peculiarities, contained the elements for an expression of nationhood. The widespread alienation from their Company rulers, brought to the fore by Macaulay's apparent interference in their chapel affairs, led many settler leaders to revive the ideal of self-determination for the people of Freetown. What was missing, after the marriage controversy failed to provide it, was an issue that would unite all the people in one cause and reveal that their identity could not be retained intact under a European government. In 1796 the Company conveniently provided that issue by imposing "quit-rents" on the lands granted to the settlers.

Quit-rents were a medieval invention whereby a peasant proprietor was quit of any other obligation to his lord by paying an annual fee.¹ Though no longer levied in England, the principle of the Crown's ownership of colonial land had led to the demand for quit-rents in Britain's colonies of

settlement. Since they seemed to constitute a perpetual mortgage and to compromise the freehold nature of colonial land grants, quit-rents were generally resisted and always resented. Concerning the government's plan to extract quit-rents from Loyalists in Nova Scotia, Sir Guy Carleton had written that

"Quit-rents will, in all cases, sooner or later become a source of popular disquiet in this country. They will never . . . be either willingly paid or faithfully collected: They will be considered by the People not like taxes levied from time to time with the free consent of their own Representatives, but as a perpetual tribute, exacted by the crown, and at the least as a proof that they are Tenants only and not Proprietors of the Lands they possess. At the same time it will furnish topics of Declaration, which may contribute to propagate the Spirit of revolt; and when the minds of the people are once inflamed, they who join the cry of Tyranny and oppression . . . will find a popular pretense for alarm in these rents which the People are bound to pay to the Crown."

If quit-rents were a mistake elsewhere in the British system, in Sierra Leone they were a multiple error. To the assembled Black Loyalists of Birchtown John Clarkson had promised from the pulpit that no rents would be levied in Sierra Leone and that taxes would be paid only for the support of education and the poor. Since the white opponents of the emigration scheme had seized on the unspecified "obligations" in the Company's offer to discredit Clarkson, the Blacks had

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3 PRO 30/55/83, Carleton Papers, No. 9299, Sir Guy Carleton to Lord North, 5 October 1783.
been particularly fearful of charges for land and had demanded his assurance that none would be applied before they agreed to join in the exodus. 4 Almost at the same time the Directors were meeting in London to devise means for raising a revenue in Sierra Leone, and they decided upon quit-rents and "a gradually increasing tax upon the produce" of settler farms. 5 In reporting the quit-rent decision to Clarkson, Thornton had written apprehensively, "I trust the Blacks will not consider this as a grievance". 6 The afterthought imposition of the quit-rent was, therefore, open to a charge of injustice, a charge with which a Company governor and a British government commission were later to agree. 7 And as Henry Thornton feared, the Nova Scotians themselves decidedly considered the quit-rent a serious grievance.

Furthermore, it contributed to the settlers' sense of insecurity and retarded the colony's agricultural development. Since non-payment resulted in forfeiture, the people were disinclined to invest time and energy in improving land which might be lost in a lean year. At one shilling an acre the

4 Clarkson Papers, III, fol. 165-67, Clarkson to Wilberforce, n.d. Clarkson later reconfirmed that he had made such a promise, CO 267/41, John Clarkson to Lord Bathurst, 22 June 1815.

5 Directors' Report, 1791, p. 53. The meeting was held on 19 October 1791.

6 Clarkson Papers, I, Thornton to Clarkson, 30 December 1791.

7 CO 270/6, Council Minutes, 17 November 1801, Thomas Ludlam to Council, 11 November 1801; PP 1826-7, VII, "Report of the Commissioners", p. 10 (276).
Sierra Leone quit-rent was fifty times higher than that demanded in Australia and, as Thomas Ludlam computed, it meant that every twenty years the settlers paid full value for their land. "It is a plain matter of fact that to purchase land not subject to the quit-rent, or to receive land as a free gift but subject to it, come in point of expense to one and the same thing." 8 Free land had been a primary factor drawing the people away from Loyalist Nova Scotia; 9 it had become a symbol of their freedom and as an issue had contributed fundamentally to the peoples' distrust of their government since Clarkson's departure in 1792. 10 "The suspicion that the white man was going to dispossess the Africans of their land runs throughout the history of the colony", a modern Sierra Leone scholar has concluded. "It is largely responsible for race relations in it." 11

Though originally intended to be applied in 1792, the delay in issuing land grants prevented the quit-rent from being put into effect for several years. Then in 1796 the directors gave notice that the first semi-annual payment of

8 CO 270/6, Ludlam to Council, 11 November 1801; Cox-George, Finance and Development, p. 133, and "Direct Taxation", pp. 31, 33; Clark and Pryor, Select Documents, p. 270.

9 Clarkson Papers, II, fols. 8 and 9, "Reasons given by the Free Blacks for wishing to leave Nova Scotia".

10 Clarkson Papers, III, Isaac DuBois' journal, 3 January, 7 February 1793, John Gray to Patrick Dunkin, 11 February 1793, John Gray to Clarkson, 15 February 1793.

11 Cox-George, "Direct Taxation", p. 33.
sixpence per acre was due in July 1797, chargeable from 1 January of that year. Since many original grants had been lost or damaged during the French occupation, Macaulay announced on 1 August 1796 that new printed grants were to be provided. The new grants contained the quit-rent provision and acceptance of the grant bound the grantee to pay it or forfeit his land to the Company.\(^{12}\) Coming thus close upon the heels of the July marriage dispute, the quit-rent order, land, race and religion became entwined. Many people immediately saw in the quit-rent final proof that they were slaves to a white tyranny.\(^{13}\) Discontent extended to some ninety percent of the Freetown population: they were at last convinced that their own interests were far from those of the Company, and were united in their determination to resist the quit-rents.\(^{14}\)

For two years previous to July 1796 a spirit of mutual co-existence had presided over race relations in Freetown. The 1795 elections, held during the period of cooperation, had produced hundreds and tythingmen who were prepared to allow the Company its own sphere of influence as long as the settlers could retain their own. To their favourable disposition the

\(^{12}\) CO 268/5, Governor and Council to Directors, 7 October 1796.

\(^{13}\) Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 16 September 1796, Letters, Macaulay to ----, 6 October 1796.

\(^{14}\) CO 270/6, Ludlam to Council, 11 November 1801; Clarkson Papers, III, Boston King to Clarkson, 1 June 1797.
Company attributed the tranquility of their twenty-two month term of office. But in December 1796 new elections were necessary, and with the issuing of the writs it became obvious that tranquility was at an end. The elections were turbulent, with mass meetings and violent denunciations of the government, and the central electoral issue was the odious quit-rent. This was combined with an overt campaign against white influence in the colony. One group of candidates even challenged the right of white people to vote, a matter that was settled by a council resolution confirming eleven whites in possession of land grants. Ishmael York and Stephen Peters, persuading the people not to vote for white candidates, anticipated in their public speeches "the pleasure that will arise from retaliating a little on whites"

15 Directors' Report, 1796, p. 12, and 1801, p. 3; CO 268/5, Macaulay to Directors, 8 March 1795; CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 23 January, 26 February, 2, 7 March, 1795, and Governor and Council to Directors, 13 July 1795. Six tythingmen, apparently containing those settlers most annoyed over the governor's insistence that salvaged Company property be returned, had boycotted the elections of February 1795, thus preventing the election of representatives hostile to the government. As a result almost all the tythingmen and hundreders were moderates. Macaulay's return to England, on 12 April 1795, may have removed a focal point for dissatisfaction.


17 CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 27 March 1797; Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 10 December 1796. The franchise was restricted to land owners.
the oppressions they were formerly made to endure". "There was something so unique in making a white face a civil disqualification", Macaulay wrote, "that it really provoked one to laughter". 18

When the returns were counted, however, Macaulay was not amused. Not one white man had been elected, a fact that aroused three stout cheers from the settlers when it was announced, and the thirty Black tythingmen-elect declared their intention "to frustrate and oppose as far as they can every measure proposed by a White". 19 Ishmael York, Stephen Peters, Nathaniel Snowball and Isaac Anderson, longstanding opponents of government policies, were among the six new hundredors. 20

In a list describing each newly-elected representative in turn, the governor accounted them "factious", "perverse", "pestilent", "disaffected" and "ignorant". Only ten of the total of thirty-six officials had not been identified as agitators in the past, but these ten were "timid and irresolute and easily led away". 21

Despite the warning contained in the election campaign and its results, the council was determined to enforce the quit-rent. On 4 January it was announced that quit-rents

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid., 15 December 1796, 3 January 1797.

20 CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 15 December 1796, 3 January 1797. The hundredors were elected by the new tythingmen.

were now in effect and that the first payment was payable in July. This evoked from the new hundredors and tythingmen a resolution condemning the quit-rent and a vow to refuse its payment. Macaulay felt that by disregarding the hundredors and tythingmen he could "reduce them to insignificance" and remove the threat of their opposition, but such a policy failed to recognize that the elections had reflected widespread public opinion. The Methodists, soon followed by the Huntingdonians, required their members to refuse the Company grants or return them if already accepted. "Taking Lands on condition of paying Rents, was selling themselves to Slavery", the preachers maintained, and those who disregarded the chapel order were excommunicated. The Methodist and Huntingdonian chapels established special courts to try members whose payment of quit-rents contributed, in the popular view, to the enslavement of the Nova Scotian people.

On 1 July Macaulay posted notice that quit-rents must now be paid. This inspired meetings of the hundredors and tythingmen and all the religious societies. Meetings all

22 CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 4 January 1797.
24 Ibid., 21 December 1796.
25 Zachary Macaulay, Letters, Macaulay to ----, 1 December 1797.
26 Ibid., Macaulay to Thornton, 20 December 1797, Journal, 8 August, 30 September 1797.
over town" were held to discuss the issue. People gathered in the streets in whispered debate, while in the chapels denunciations poured from the pulpits. Only the faithful Baptists voted to accept the Company's conditions. Again spear-heading the resistance, the hundredors and tythingmen wrote to the governor charitably interpreting the situation as an evident misunderstanding "and if we be ignorant of the matter, we wish that the Governor would show to us as we may show to the people". But if they had really been deceived, they wrote, they would reject the Company's jurisdiction and apply to the British government or to the African chiefs for a truly free grant of land.

In response Macaulay informed the representatives that they would henceforth be responsible for paying the town guard, and he sent accounts of all debts to the Company for immediate payment. He also instructed them to begin construction on a town jail and reminded them of their duty to preserve law and order. He declined to answer their letter on the quit-rents "as they'll pervert it", and instead called a public meeting to inform the people directly of the Company's land policy. His address to the people, delivered

27 Ibid., 8, 21 August 1797.

28 CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 17 August 1797; Isaac Streeter and George Carroll, chairmen of the Hundredors and Tythingmen, to Macaulay, 5 August 1797.

29 Ibid., 17, 19 August 1797.
on 21 August, dwelt on the Company's kindness to the settlers and on their moral and legal obligation deriving from their acceptance of lands "subject to such charges and obligations as the Company decided". "O. foolish people and unwise", he added, "May I not say, what can have so bewitched you?" Contrary to their deluded notion, quit-rents were paid by freemen, not by slaves, and so the Company's requirement of them merely confirmed their free status.  

The hundredors and tythingmen, however, were not convinced, and may in addition have been resentful of the intimidation contained in the reply they received to their letter. They continued to believe that Macaulay was perverting the Directors' purposes, and they drew up a petition, signed by two-thirds of the Nova Scotian body, asking the Company to clarify its position. Meanwhile a delegation of less patient settlers approached the Temne king Bai Firama with a plan to collaborate in restoring native African sovereignty over the colony, after which an African-style government consisting of Nova Scotian leaders would be established. When he learned of the insurrection plan Macaulay armed the Europeans and about fifty loyal settlers, and then warned the plotters that he would hang them all at the first sign of violence, even if it meant "holding up my hand at the Old

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30 Ibid., "To the Colonists of Sierra Leone", 21 August 1797.
31 Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 30 September 1797.
Bailey. The threat had its desired effect. "A face of loyalty was spread over the place for a few days", long enough for tempers to cool and for the Directors realistically to suspend temporarily the collection of quit-rents then due.\footnote{Ibid., 30 September, 2 October 1797, Letters, Macaulay to ______, 1 December 1797.}

The public campaign had been successful in delaying the immediate implementation of quit-rents, but the Company did not withdraw on the principle or cancel their collection for the future. The Company position was that the colony and all the land within it fell under its ownership, and the settlers were there only on the Directors' sufferance. The Company therefore felt entitled to impose any conditions or charges upon the land that it desired.\footnote{CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 7 March 1795. CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 26 December 1796, 20 July 1797, 6, 26 January 1798; Clarkson Papers, I, Thornton to Clarkson, 14 September 1792.} This claim was in conflict with the native African belief that they retained ultimate ownership, and many settlers, and even John Clarkson, were inclined to recognize the native right.\footnote{Martin, \textit{West African Settlements}, p. 130.} According to British law, the colonial land in fact belonged to the Crown by virtue of Captain Thompson's 1787 purchase and the 1791 Constitution.\footnote{Martin, \textit{West African Settlements}, p. 130.} Then during the quit-rent controversy the actual occupants of the land, the Nova Scotian settlers, began to articulate a claim for themselves. In rejecting the
Company's right, they were led to assume that right on their own account. The settlers had always considered that individual farms were theirs without further Company permission on the grounds that land grants were part of their primary contract with the Company before the departure from Nova Scotia. The refusal of several settlers to vacate their temporary town lots was sustained by a Nova Scotian jury that regarded Clarkson's promise as legally binding and as constituting a Company commitment to provide free land in Africa. 36

In 1797 the hundredors and tythingmen went beyond the "contract" argument to claim to be the legal recipients of authority over land from the British Crown and the native kings. From there they proceeded to assert their exclusive right to legislate for the colony. 37

Though without constitutional support 38 the hundredor and tythingman assertion of legislative authority was based on the gradual development of their office since 1792.

36 Cf. CO 268/5, Governor and Council to Directors, 11 April, 31 December 1794; CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 13 May, 15 June 1794; Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 12, 20, 22 July 1796.

37 CO 270/4, Isaac Streeter and George Carrol to Macaulay, 5 August 1797; Directors' Report, 1801, p. 4. The hundredors and tythingmen did not delineate the legal foundation for their land claim, but it could conceivably have been based on the belief that the Crown had purchased native land in 1787 for an independent Black settlement, and not for the private use of a British company.

38 But see Granville Sharp to Richard Dawes, 13 November 1800, in which he maintains that the hundredor and tythingman system was "enjoined as a part of the English Constitution by Magna Charta" (Hoare, Memoirs of Granville Sharp, p. 373).
Originally intended to serve as constables and petty magistrates to enforce Company rules, the elected hundredors and tythingmen became recognized as representative of settler opinion and were consulted on any legislation concerning the general interests of the population. Macaulay followed the practice of declaring regulations as law only after the elected bodies had given their approval. While retaining their responsibility to maintain the peace of the colony, they held sessions to examine alleged grievances and passed them on to the governor with recommendations for appropriate action. Since all landowners, both male and female, were qualified to vote for them, the hundredors and tythingmen could reasonably claim to be spokesmen for the whole colonial population, particularly when elections were fought on specific issues and those elected could consider themselves in possession of a popular mandate to pursue a definite programme.

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39 Evans, "Early Constitution", p. 54, Article 35; CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 12, 31 December 1792; Directors' Report, 1794, p. 76.


41 CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 2 March, 12 May 1795; Directors' Report, 1801, p. 3; Zachary Macaulay, Letters, Macaulay to ----, 6 October 1796.

42 Ibid.; CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 13 December 1796. During the July 1796 marriage dispute a demand was made for the recall of the hundredors and tythingmen on the grounds that they had failed to represent the population's best interests, Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 11 July 1796.
The hundredors and tythingmen role developed in one direction as a protest organization, presenting settler dissatisfaction to the council over such things as prices, employment conditions and quit-rents. In another direction they grew as an institution of settler self-government, especially after the French occupation of 1794 and the Company's subsequent withdrawal from a ubiquitous paternalism. It was they who enrolled and mobilized the militia to fend off repeated French threats, they imposed and collected taxes and organized the population for labour duty. The appointments of certain officials was within their authority, they sat as a court to try violators of colonial by-laws, and they had the power to grant a divorce. It became common for them to initiate laws, in addition to reviewing those suggested by the Company, though their recommendations had legal force only after they were passed by the governor and council.

On at least one occasion the governor placed himself in the position of a civil servant beneath an elected legislature, when he asked the hundredors and tythingmen to bring in

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\[43\] Ibid., 22 August 1793, 9 January, 14, 26 August 1797; CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 3, 15, 18 June 1794; CO 270/4 Council Minutes, 17 August 1797.

\[44\] Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 3 May, 19 November 1796; CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 12 October 1795, 7 March 1796; CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 19 November 1796, 13 March 1797.

\[45\] CO 270/2, Council Minutes, 27 May, 4 June 1793; CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 12 May, 9 June 1795; CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 19 August 1797.
strict regulations to discourage slave trading which he promised to enforce with vigour. Their recognized authority even came to be extended over the colony's policy as a whole, and not just over the details of Nova Scotian life, when they placed restrictions on the right of non-citizens to purchase land, engage in trade, vote or serve on juries.

In 1795 Macaulay envisioned that the hundredors and tythingmen would evolve into a House of Commons "to give Laws to Africa." To that end he sketched out a new constitution for the colony in which supreme power was to be "lodged in the general assembly of Sierra Leone, composed of three distinct and separate councils viz. the Govr and Council, the Senate and House of Commons each having a negative on the other two." The principles of Macaulay's constitution were distinctly democratic. It proposed universal suffrage, three year terms of office with one-third of the members retiring each year, guaranteed rights of bail and limitations to imprisonment before trial, freedom of religion for all Christians, and freedom to the citizen from arbitrary arrest or interference from the government. The various clauses were

46 Ibid.
47 CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 9 June 1797; CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 8 July 1796.
48 CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 7 March 1795.
49 Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 30 November 1796.
discussed with the tythingmen and hundredors elected in 1795, and it was the governor's expressed intention to bring in the new constitution after the 1796 elections. Had it been put into effect, it seems likely that even the most disaffected settlers would have continued to work with the Company system for the constitution placed all power within the colony itself and gave an opportunity to abolish quit-rents or any other requirement coming from London. Unfortunately Macaulay's commitment to democratic principle was more theoretical than real. When the people chose hundredors and tythingmen in 1796 who demanded popular control over certain aspects of colony policy, particularly the land regulations, Macaulay dropped his constitutional reform. There was never another opportunity to introduce it, for the initiative had passed to the elected representatives who began to demand many reforms identical to those withdrawn by the governor.

The results of the 1797 elections were no more encour-

50 CO 268/5, Governor and Council to Directors, 2 December 1796; Zachary Macaulay, Letters, Macaulay to ----, 6 October 1795, Journal, 19, 30 November 1796.

51 Ibid., 15 December 1796.

52 In January 1798 Macaulay did approve a motion from the hundredors and tythingmen to establish a bicameral system with each body meeting separately, and a special committee of both groups to meet with the governor "for the purpose of forming Rules and Regulations for the use of the Colony", CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 29 January 1798. This was, however, no more than a rationalization of the existing system, for the powers and duties of the elected representatives remained unchanged.
aging to the Company Council than the previous year's. Since the women's franchise was abolished on orders from London, the number of tything was reduced from thirty to twenty-five, but this did not prevent the re-election of most of the opposition leaders. Ishmael York and Stephen Peters, who had again campaigned on an anti-white platform, retained their seats. Macaulay's only comfort was that the re-organized third tything, now containing the district where most white Company employees lived, had elected James Carr, a white trader and former council member. One of the first actions of the new representatives was to write to Captain Ball of HMS Dandalus, who was then in Freetown. Again displaying their faith in Whitehall's good intentions, the letter asked Ball to represent their case before the government in London. "We are not used here as free Settlers", they complained, for they supported all the colony's expenses through their taxes and labour requirements and yet were in addition being "shamefully Called upon to pay a quit rent of a Shilling a actr for the land which we hold". Ball merely handed their letter over to Macaulay.

53 Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 16 December 1797.
54 Ibid., 20 December 1797, 17 January 1798.
55 Ibid., 20 December 1797, 17 January 1798; CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 28 December 1797, 3 February 1798. The only person among the representatives-elect to be designated "Mr." in Macaulay's list was James Carr, the white man.
56 CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 16 January 1798, Ishmael York, Stephen Peters and Isaac Anderson to Captain Ball, 15 January 1798.
The appeal to Captain Ball would indicate that quit-rents continued to be regarded as the central issue in Freetown. It was so regarded by the Company Directors as well, for to them the dispute questioned their right to be the real government in their own colony. In October 1798, therefore, the Directors sent Councillor John Gray back to the colony with orders to enforce the collection of quit-rents. The council published a notice that new printed grants, containing the quit-rent provision, would have to be taken out by 16 December or all land would revert to the Company. When the deadline arrived, only a dozen settlers had come forward to claim their grants. The others remained defiantly on their lots, refusing either to accept a grant or to return the land. The council lamented that only force could ensure the payment of quit-rents or the vacating of land theoretically belonging to the Company.

Political disputes did not, of course, interrupt every other aspect of Nova Scotian life in Sierra Leone. In those activities where Company influence penetrated minimally, the settlers' separate existence continued much as it had been.

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57 CO 270/6, Ludlam to Council, 11 November 1801.
58 Ibid.
59 CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 15 November, 18 December 1798.
60 CO 268/5, Governor and Council to Directors, 22 January 1798.
fore. Preachers continued to preach, traders to trade, farmers to farm (albeit illegally), and craftsmen to practise their crafts. Freetown in 1798 contained 300 houses and a population of 1,200, and about half the families lived on or commuted to nearby farms. Fifteen Nova Scotians kept shops in town, another fifteen were engaged in coastal trade in their own vessels, and about twenty-five fished the river in boats owned by themselves. The others worked for Nova Scotian entrepreneurs, as paid employees, or worked on contract as skilled "mechanics" on settler- or Company-initiated projects. Only twenty settlers were regularly employed by the Company as labourers. Three to four hundred grumettas worked the Nova Scotian farms, other Africans were servants in settler homes, and an additional two hundred visited the colony daily to trade, some coming in canoes from distances up to a hundred miles. 61 Though Company trade was completely stagnant, 62 settler activities in agriculture and trade made the colony "abundantly self-sufficient" in all its needs. 63 French alarms, the feared hostility of the Temne, and a "dreadful conflagration" that destroyed twenty-two settler


62CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 1 March 1799. At that time no goods were in the Company store and a Company ship, had not visited Freetown for fourteen months.

63WO 1/352, "Queries Proposed by Commodore Hallowell, with the Governor and Council's Answers, 12 January 1803".
homes in April occupied settler minds far more than their relations with the Company government. 64

But at election-time politics intruded, and in December 1798, with the election coming only a week after the quit-rent deadline, another re-assessment of their relationship to the Company was forced upon the voters. They responded, as in 1796 and 1797, by re-electing the men most vehement in their opposition to white interference in settler affairs. Racial division was underlined by the election, by the whites in the third tything, of James Wilson, a white man and the Company-appointed Collector of Quit-rents. 65 Persistently, the council ordered payment of all quit-rent arrears to Wilson by 21 January 1799. To enforce the order, quit-rent defaulters were charged fees for Company services, including medicine and education. 66 Still the Nova Scotians refused payment, and for almost a year, until school admission was, dissociated from politics, the parents formed private schools for the instruction of their children. 67 Even a Company compromise, whereby all quit-rent revenues were to be "exclusively appropriated to objects of colonial utility", failed to

64 CO 270/4 Council Minutes, 5, 23 March, 5, 23, 26 April 1798.

65 Ibid., 29 December 1798.

66 Ibid., 4, 16 January 1799.

67 Ibid., 4 November, 20 December 1799.
bring a favourable response. By December the new governor, Thomas Ludlam, had to admit that quit-rents were uncollectable. The office of Collector was abolished, and the collection of arrears had to be abandoned. Again without acknowledging any limitation on their right to quit-rents, the Company was forced by public resistance to forego their payment.

During the three years succeeding the quit-rent order of 1796, the most outspoken Nova Scotian leadership was led from a demand for free land through a rejection of Company ownership to a claim that the settlers had proprietary rights in the colony, and finally to a declaration of settler sovereignty. Participation in Sierra Leone’s government was no longer satisfactory; they wanted complete self-rule, with a democratically elected legislature. It is not possible to determine the exact approval such claims had from the population at large, but it is significant that the men who articulated them were repeatedly elected as hundredors and tythingmen. In September 1799 those two bodies passed a joint resolution that

the Nova Scotia who come with Mr. Clarkston adjoining the Granville People with them, they are the Propriatives of the Colenney and No foreners shall com in as a right of making Lawes with ought the consent of the

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68 Directors’ Report, 1801, pp. 7-8.
69 CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 30 December 1799.
70 Directors’ Report, 1801, pp. 4-5.
Hundredors and tythingmon. Nor shall they have a vote with ought their consent. 71

Rejecting this claim and reasserting the Company’s position as proprietor, the Company-appointed Council noted that from the present temper and disposition of the Settlers and their avowed antipathy to all white People it is evident that a principal object of the... Resolution is to enable the Hundredors and Tythingmen to exclude all Europeans from the colony in future—or if admitted, to with-hold from them all participation in the power of making laws and of administering justice. 72

For more than seven years the Nova Scotian settlers in Sierra Leone had been trying to give political expression to the independence they thought they had won in the American War and again, when that proved illusory, in transplanting their society to a new African homeland. Ideologically, their demand for sovereignty was a logical culmination of the grievances they had been expressing since Thomas Peters' "rebellion" of Easter 1792, for the essence of each grievance had been that they believed themselves worthy of freedom yet not treated as freemen. In every restriction placed on them by white men they saw slavery, and to complete their escape from slavery they had to remove all white-imposed restrictions. They could with some justification consider themselves a "nation" in all but the political sense: their language, moral codes, dress, living style, religion, even their diet,

71 CO 270/4 Council Minutes, 10 September 1799.

72 Ibid.
were sufficiently distinct to require a set of distinct institutions. The chapel and school, the nocturnal "love feasts" and the denominational courts, satisfied that requirement until the implications of what they defined as slavery could no longer be ignored. The events of summer 1796 made all the implications clear. Their freedom as individuals, they felt, depended upon their freedom as a people.

Whether the Sierra Leone Company government justified such a reaction or not, it is evident that Nova Scotian "nationalism", like most modern African nationalisms, was a response to external subordination. They possessed a national sentiment, that is a consciousness that they shared a homeland, common tradition, culture and destiny. They were, furthermore, proud of their society, for by their standards it was unmatched by any others they had seen, and in Sierra Leone they saw a Promised Land given by God as a reward for their virtue. The "state of mind" of Hans Kohn's definition of nationalism existed from the time the fleet landed in March 1792. The frustration of the sentiment, and the expectancy of the society they could create if left truly free, turned national sentiment into African nationalism. 73 "The attain-

ment of a government dominated by Africans and expressing in its institutions the characteristic spirit of Africa as interpreted by the . . . African. It was the stated goal of the Nova Scotian leadership by 1799, and to this extent it was an expression of nationalism. The first Black community to experience European colonialism in Africa, the Nova Scotians became Africa's first modern nationalists.

The core issue selected to test the sovereignty assertion contained in the 1799 demands was the right of the people to choose their own Nova Scotian judges. It came first as a request to the council to appoint two Black justices of the peace and one Black judge, "this being obviously the readiest means", the Directors interpreted, "of obtaining both the power and the profit at which they aimed, without appearing directly to violate their allegiance to


74 Hair, "Africanism", p. 521, quoting Hailey.

75 CO 270/4 Council Minutes, 18 February 1799; Directors' Report, 1801, pp. 4-7.
the English Government." With a Nova Scotian judiciary to interpret and enforce the laws, it was felt, de facto independence would be achieved without the necessity of rebellion. But when the council rejected the request, on the apparently reasonable grounds that no settlers were qualified in English law, public meetings heard the more rebellious suggestion that all Europeans in Freetown "be put into an open boat, without sails, oars, or compass, and turned adrift." The inevitable petition was sent off to the Directors to seek approval for Black judges, but without waiting for a reply the hundredors and tythingmen seized the initiative by appointing Mingo Jordan as judge and John Cuthbert and Isaac Anderson as justices of the peace.

When the Directors' answer, upholding the council's refusal to appoint Black judges, was received in the colony, the newly-arrived Governor Ludlam feared an outbreak of violence and therefore concealed the news. It was not until a month later that Ludlam published the Directors' ruling that British law applied in the colony and English law did not provide for the election of justices. A delegation of

76 Ibid., p. 11.

77 CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 18 February 1799. John Gray, the Company's Commercial Agent and acting-Governor at the time, had no legal training either, but as chief executive in the colony he presided over the courts.

78 Directors' Report, 1801, p. 11.

79 CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 4 March, 4 June 1799.

80 Ibid., 4 November, 16 December 1799.
hundreds and tythingmen hotly insisted on the right and declared their determination to appoint judges and make laws "without asking the concurrence of the Governor and Council".\textsuperscript{81} The debate, however, was cut short by the immediate issuing of the writs for a new election.\textsuperscript{82}

Quit-rents, dimmed as an issue by non-enforcement, were overshadowed in the 1799 election by the claim to democratically-elected judges. The "betrayal syndrome" was resurrected by candidates recalling that Clarkson had promised them the "right to be magistrates" and full equality when he had addressed them in Nova Scotia.\textsuperscript{83} The people returned all the proponents of a Black judiciary, including Isaac Anderson, Nathaniel Wansey and James Robinson,\textsuperscript{84} who had declared their intention to exercise the settlers' independent rights regardless of the council's actions.\textsuperscript{85} The first list of grievances the new representatives presented to the council included cases of racial discrimination in Company courts, Company stores, and at public auctions conducted by the Company: to all these problems the solution was Nova Scotian

\textsuperscript{81}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{82}Ibid., 13, 16 December 1799.

\textsuperscript{83}CO 267/92, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix. B-5, John Kizell, to Commissioners, March 1826.

\textsuperscript{84}Also spelled Robertson and Roberson.

\textsuperscript{85}CO 270/5, Council Minutes, 25 January, 11 February 1800.
judges. The hundredors and tythingmen thereupon elected James Robinson as judge and John Cuthbert as justice of the peace. When Ludlam again refused to recognize their appointment, repeating its incompatibility with English law, a group of Nova Scotians proclaimed that they were Africans, not Englishmen, and therefore could not be bound by English law.

Meanwhile the Company Directors and council were engaged in preparations to receive a new group of almost six-hundred immigrant Blacks. The Maroons of Jamaica, runaway slaves who had established an independent community in that country's interior, were exiled by the Jamaican legislature after the Maroon War of 1795-96. They were placed in transports and shipped to Halifax to await a cabinet decision on their ultimate destination. The Duke of Portland, then Secretary of State, proposed to the Sierra Leone Company that

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86 Ibid., 4 March 1800.
87 Ibid., 16 April 1800.
88 Ibid., Council Minutes, 1800, Appendix I.
they might receive these unwanted Blacks in their colony, but the Directors, in the throes of the July 1796 marriage dispute, were not anxious to admit more mutinous settlers, fearing "that the Maroons would make common cause with their brethren", the Nova Scotians. By the time the Directors had reconsidered, agreeing to accept the Maroons "provided they are sent thither, at different times, and not exceeding twenty families at once", the province of Nova Scotia had seen several advantages in their remaining in North America. Anticipating a French attack, Governor Wentworth of Nova Scotia found a use for the Jamaican exiles in the construction of fortifications and as a reserve militia, and since the Jamaican legislature was assuming the expenses for the Maroon establishment, Wentworth was loath to see them go. The Secretary of State, too, began to doubt the wisdom of sending more discontented Blacks to Freetown; the earlier experiment with the Black Loyalists, he wrote, had never been successful. The Sierra Leone proposal was quietly dropped, and the Maroons' official destination remained as Nova Scotia.

If the authorities considered Africa to be an unlikely home for the Maroons, the Maroons themselves did not.

92 CO 217/67, Portland to Wentworth, 15 July 1796.
93 Ibid., Wentworth to Portland, 20 September 1796.
94 Ibid., Portland to Wentworth, 7 September 1796.
Smiling under the maritime winter, they began to agitate for removal to a more compatible climate, suggesting at various times the West Indies, India and South Africa. Finally towards the end of 1798 they again hit upon Sierra Leone. In a petition to the Company Directors, they asked for support in their attempt to leave Nova Scotia. This time the Company did not let the matter drop; as the threat from the indigenous Africans, the French and the settlers themselves became more serious, the Directors too began to see some advantages in having the Maroons in Africa. Since the Maroons would remain the charges of His Majesty, the Directors believed that their presence would encourage the British government to assist in Sierra Leone's defence and other expenses. They therefore proposed to arrange for an African home for the Maroons in the neighbourhood of Sierra Leone: not in Freetown itself, where they might combine with the other settlers against the Company government, yet close enough that "they can be used to intimidate each other to keep the peace". Portland, impatient at the high expenses

95 CO 217/68, Wentworth to Portland, 2 June 1797, Wentworth to the Maroon Captains, 28 May 1797; CO 217/69, "The Humble Petition of the Unfortunate Maroons" to King George III, 1798, the Maroon Captains to the Duke of Portland, 4 November 1797, 12 August 1798; CO 217/70, Maroon Petition to King George III, 1798.

96 Ibid., Petition of the Maroon Captains to Samuel Thornton, enclosed in Thornton to Portland, 4 January 1799.

97 Ibid., Henry Thornton to John King, 11 March 1799.

98 Ibid., Henry Thornton to Portland, 4 January, 24 February 1799, Directors to Governor and Council at Sierra Leone, 5 March 1799.
incurred on behalf of the Maroons in Halifax, asked the Company to make appropriate arrangements and ordered Wentworth to prepare the Maroons for a trans-Atlantic crossing. 99

It fell to Thomas Ludlam and John Gray to purchase land, construct buildings and gather provisions for the imminent arrival of a population more than half that of Freetown's, and this during the settler campaign for elected judges. At first they tried to negotiate for the Banana Islands, thirty-six miles south of Freetown, but jurisdictional disputes between African owners and a native African fear, "excited by the slavetraders", that the Maroons would prove troublesome neighbours, caused the plan to fail. 100 Subsequent plans to settle the Maroons on the northern Bullom Shore of the Sierra Leone River and at Pirate's Bay similarly failed through the Africans' refusal to sell the land. 101 Without waiting for the purchase of a specific parcel of land, the Company hastened to establish the terms on which the Maroons would receive their individual farms. Taking a lesson from experience, they promised the Maroons only four acres

99 Ibid., Portland to Thornton, 5 March 1799, Portland to Wentworth, 10 June 1799.

100 CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 13 May, 5 June, 30 September 1799; Directors' Report, 1801, pp. 23-4; CO 217/70, Gray and Ludlam to Wentworth, 24 June 1799, Zachary Macaulay to John King, 9 November 1799.

101 CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 30 September, 5 November, 10 December 1799; Directors' Report, 1801, p. 24.
for a man, two for his wife and one for each child, and this was to be provided within three years of their arrival in Africa if the Maroons cleared and cultivated it, built a home upon it, and paid an annual quit-rent of twenty cents per acre. When the Maroons departed from Halifax on 3 August 1800, therefore, after a year's delay caused by shipping difficulties, the terms of their acceptance were well understood but no destination had been settled. The Directors stipulated only that their transport ship, the Asia, could come to anchor in Freetown and remain there until permanent arrangements were made.

Faced with imminent rebellion from the Nova Scotian settlers, and the addition of new and possibly uncooperative Maroon subjects, the Sierra Leone Company Directors felt that greater "express authority from the Crown" would be necessary for them to continue governing the colony. Their lack of legal power hitherto to control the settlers was regarded as a chief cause of the Company's failure to create a model community engaging in trade and cultivation profitable to the investors. In British law, the Sierra Leone Company

102 CO 217/70, Gray and Ludlam to Wentworth, 24 June 1799. Twenty cents currency was then worth approximately one shilling sterling.

103 Ibid., Wentworth to Portland, 6 August 1800.

104 Directors' Report, 1801, pp. 5-9.

Act of 1791 had merely incorporated the Company, enabling it to trade and to own land; government powers were not granted, and the Company's authority was based on their expectation that such powers were shortly forthcoming. It had come as a considerable surprise to Zachary Macaulay when, in 1793, he learned that the Company had no legal judicial powers. After sentencing a European sailor to thirty-nine lashes for theft, he was informed by the ship's captain that his action had been illegal. A scrutiny of the incorporating Act proved the captain correct. The situation was not rectified, and it was for this reason that Macaulay risked a charge of murder against himself if he had hanged the leaders of the 1797 insurrection plot, as he threatened to do.

Such vagueness made the Company's position impossible in 1799, and so in July of that year the Directors applied "for a charter which should convey to them a clear, formal, well-grounded authority, to maintain the peace of the settlement, and to execute the laws within the territory". Explaining the need for a Royal Charter, Company Director William Wilberforce wrote that the Nova Scotians "have made

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106 Clarkson Papers, I, Thornton to Clarkson, 30 December 1791; Directors' Report, 1794, p. 55; Evans, "Early Constitution", p. 35; Martin, West African Settlements, p. 130.

107 Falconbridge, Two Voyages, pp. 218, 222-23.

108 Zachary Macaulay, Journal, 2 October 1797.

the worst of all possible Subjects, as thorough Jacobins as if they had been trained and educated in Paris. . . . They have lately become more unmanageable than Ever." He also asked for a navy ship, to be posted in the Freetown harbour, to uphold the Company government, and for the right to call on British troops in case of a settler rebellion.\(^{110}\) When Ludlam rejected the Nova Scotians' right to elect judges, he warned the tythingmen and hundreds that a new Charter of Justice and a naval force would soon be in the colony to uphold the Company's authority.\(^{111}\) This warning, evidently meant to deter precipitate action on the settlers' part, merely served to inspire them to action before the legal and military re-enforcements could arrive.

A condition perhaps describable as "phoney revolution" then applied in Freetown. Open defiance and explicit rejection of Company rule had gone unpunished, but attacks on the Company had been limited to verbal abuse. The leaders of the disaffected party were courting an alliance with the Temne King Tom, an alliance made more likely by Ludlam's protection of a slave-ship captain detained by a group of Temne and Noya Scotians.\(^{112}\) Ludlam appointed six new constables

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\(^{111}\) CO 270/5, Council Minutes, 1800, Appendix I.

\(^{112}\) Directors' Report, 1801, pp. 10-11. In an attempt to mediate in a quarrel between the slaver and King Tom, Ludlam had granted the slaver a safe-conduct in Freetown. Dur-
in Company pay and gathered twenty-seven loyal settlers for a discussion of the merits of the Company position on Black judges. At the same time other settlers were meeting to decide on a plan to disrupt further courts until Black judges were appointed. The governor was powerless, for he knew that he could not win a conviction from a Nova Scotian jury on any political charge. 113

On 10 September 1800 the hundredors and tythingmen, having ejected their moderate colleagues and replaced them with committed Company opponents, posted a handbill on a settler home proclaiming that a new constitution would be in force from 25 September. The owner of the house, Abram Smith, removed the poster when warned by Councillor Richard Bright that it was a treasonous act. 114 On the evening of 25 September a new poster appeared bearing the settler constitution, signed by James Robinson, Ansel Zizer, Isaac Anderson, and Nathaniel Wansey. 115 The new constitution was a declaration

ing the meeting the slaver was seized by some natives and settlers, and since this was in violation of the safeconduct Ludlam protected the slaver and opposed the angry Blacks.

113 Ibid., p. 12; CO 270/5, Council Minutes, 19, 20 May 1800.


115 The constitution was dated 3 September 1800, but was not unveiled to the public until three weeks later. The announcement of 10 September, therefore, was made after the constitution was written. It seems possible that the 10 September announcement was intended to force the Company to make concessions and avoid an open confrontation.
of Nova Scotian independence from the Company government. It set maximum prices for foodstuffs at rates that would not allow a Company profit, and established fines for commercial and other infractions such as theft, sabbath breaking, scandalizing, and disobedience to parents. No debts to the Company were payable without hundredor and tythingmen approval, and in any case no interest was to be paid on pain of banishment from the colony. Serving a summons or warrant without an order from the hundredors and tythingmen was made a criminal offense. Finally, the constitution declared that the Sierra Leone Company was to be limited to commercial affairs only, and the Company-appointed governor and council had no further civil authority.\textsuperscript{116}

It is doubtful that the hundredors and tythingmen either intended or anticipated that their rebellion should lead to an armed clash with the Company forces. One of the participants, Eli Ackim, later claimed that the plan was for a peaceful reform, and that violence erupted only when the rebels were attacked and had to defend themselves.\textsuperscript{117} There is some reinforcement of this view in the fact that the constitution was actually written on 3 September, announced on 10 September, and then unveiled to the public on 25 September.

\textsuperscript{116}CO 270/5, Council Minutes, 1800, Appendix II; Directors' Report, 1801, pp. 13-14.

\textsuperscript{117}CO 267/92, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix B-6, "Statement by Eli Ackim".
It seems possible that the 10 September announcement was intended as a warning to encourage the Company to make concessions and avoid an open confrontation. This is not to suggest that the rebellion was unreal, for the settlers had established a parallel organization to the Company's, with their own judges, constables and elected government ready to assume control, but only that they expected the Company officials to give in to their demands. Certainly nothing in the council's recent actions would have indicated that they would respond with force: quit-rents had been allowed to lapse, schools had been re-opened, and verbal pronouncements more seditious than the constitution had been ignored or only mildly reprimanded. But on 26 September Ludlam determined to take a stand. He counted on the neutrality of the settler majority since the chief issue at the time, the election of Black judges, did not have unanimous support from the people. Had a rebellion emerged directly out of the quit-rent dispute, the Company acknowledged, the entire population would have joined it. 118

Ludlam therefore called all the Europeans, Company employees and settlers on whose loyalty he could rely to his residence on Thornton Hill, where he armed them as a special guard to assist the civil power. They were then despatched to arrest the four signatories to the rebellious constitution.

118 Directors' Report, 1801, p. 12; CO 270/6, Council Minutes, 17 November 1801; Ludlam to Council, 11 November 1801.
A skirmish ensued between the arresting party and the rebels: Robinson was captured, Zizer surrendered, and the others escaped. The next morning, 27 September, the rebels elected Isaac Anderson as their new governor and took up a position, with fifty armed men, at Buckle's Bridge—just outside Freetown on the Granville Town road. For three days there was stalemate. Ludlam had eleven Europeans, thirty loyal Nova Scotians and about forty native African employees under arms, facing the fifty active rebels. Though about half the colony's three-hundred householders sympathized with the rebellion, the majority stayed in their homes to await events. Ludlam tried to convince the rebels to surrender, using settler intermediaries, but they refused unless the Company first released its prisoners. Meanwhile the rebels ruled the countryside, plundering the farms of those who supported the Company, and Anderson wrote a letter to Ludlam, left unsigned, saying that he intended to attack the Company fort. 119

The break in the stalemate was precipitated by King Tom, when he warned that if the dispute were not settled soon, he would intervene to impose a solution of his own. Since relations between the Temne and insurgents were friendly, Ludlam had no doubts as to the nature of Tom's prospective solution. On the thirtieth the governor decided he had no alternative but to attack the rebels before the Temne were

119 CO 270/5, Council Minutes, 25, 26 September 1800, and Appendix III; Directors' Report, 1801, pp. 15-16.
organized to assist them, and he prepared his supporters accordingly. Just as they were being mustered, the transport ship Asia appeared in the harbour, bearing forty-seven officers and men of the 24th Regiment who were escorting 550 Maroons from Nova Scotia. 120 Lieutenant Smith immediately offered the governor the assistance of his men, so the attack was delayed for them to join the government party. A last invitation to the rebels to surrender, on 1 October, received a reply that they would give their answer the following day. During the delay some 150 Maroon men, anxious to stretch their legs after a trans-Atlantic confinement and four years of inactivity in Nova Scotia, volunteered their services to the government as well. 121

Without waiting for the insurgents' decision on the surrender ultimatum, Lieutenant Smith led his troops and the Maroons in a surprise attack on Buckle's Bridge on the morning of 2 October. The result was a rout of the overwhelmed rebels. Only a sudden tornado provided cover for some of the rebels to escape: two were killed, and over thirty taken prisoner. Outparties continued to search the woods for over a week, and a reward for the capture of remaining escapees

120 The troops were intended to see the Maroons settled in Africa without incident, but also to crew the Asia which was undermanned. CO 217/74, Wentworth to Portland, 6 August 1800.

121 CO 270/5, Council Minutes, 30 September, 2 October 1800, and Appendix III; Directors' Report, 1801, pp. 16-17.
brought three more prisoners back from the local Africans with whom they had taken refuge. A military court under the officers of the 24th Regiment sentenced two prisoners, including Isaac Anderson, to be hanged, seven were exiled to Goree and another twenty-five were banished to the Bullom shore. The rebellion was over, and within a few weeks the new Charter arrived abolishing representative institutions for the settlers. 122

The nineteenth century opened on a new Sierra Leone. The most disaffected settlers, including many hundredors, tythingmen and elected judges, were dead, banished or discredited. Though half the population had given the rebels silent support, including the whole of Cato Perkins' Huntingdonian congregation, 123 and even those who were neutral on the judge question had aspirations contrary to the Company's plans for the colony, the spokesmen for a Nova Scotian nationalism were silenced. The nationalist cause was further damaged by the new form of government introduced by the Charter, which did not admit Black participation in the legislative process. Above all, the notion of Sierra Leone

122 Ibid., pp. 16-19; CO 270/5, Council Minutes, 24 December 1800 and Appendix III; Times, 6 March 1801. Anderson's capital offense was the sending of an anonymous letter threatening the governor. Francis Patrick, the other man hanged, was convicted of stealing a gun. The banishments were for "breaking engagements to the Company". The charge of treason or rebellion was not laid on any of the prisoners, since at the time of their offense the new Charter had not been put into effect.

123CO 270/5, Council Minutes, 1800, Appendix III.
as a Nova Scotian homeland was destroyed by the arrival of the Maroons. Henceforth the Nova Scotians could neither claim nor hope to be the colony's proprietors or the inheritors of constitutional authority. For a separate existence they would be forced back into their chapels and cultural societies, while they shared their Promised Land with a new and unfriendly population of alien Blacks.
CHAPTER XI

Black and White

Reconciliation with the Sierra Leone Company, 1800-08

The new Charter of Justice for Sierra Leone arrived in Freetown on 15 October 1800. With the soldiers who had accompanied the Maroons, the Charter gave the Company full authority over the colony and the strength to enforce it. By the Charter, Sierra Leone was constituted as an independent colony, and all lands on the Sierra Leone peninsula previously vested in the Crown were granted to the Company. The Directors were authorized to appoint a governor and council to make laws and maintain peace in the colony consistent with the laws of England. Judicial powers rested with the council, though a Mayor's Court and a Court of Requests were instituted by the Charter for civil suits. Trial by jury was provided whenever the case would warrant it in Britain. The council was to "elect" a mayor, three aldermen and a sheriff annually, and to appoint commissioners for the Court of Requests from among Freetown's "principal Inhabitants".

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1 CO 270/5, Council Minutes, 12 October 1800. The Charter "formally" arrived on 6 November, when it was presented to Ldlam by a British naval Captain. Ibid., 6 November 1800.

2 BT 6/70, Board of Trade, Sierra Leone Papers, Zachary Macaulay to Lord Auckland, 2 September 1806, Enclos-
Since the Company had applied for the Charter with the express purpose of gaining greater control over the colonists, the new provision did not allow for any popular institutions to rival the council's authority. The hundredors, tythingmen and town marshall, all of whom had been Nova Scotian, were replaced by a white mayor and alderman and a white sheriff. The council itself took on many of the functions formerly performed by the hundredors and tythingmen. The six days' annual labour requirement, initially introduced by the settler representatives, was reenacted and enforced by the council. This simple act underlined the separation of the government and even the duties of citizenship from any notion of popular support or participation. While expeditions went out against the re-

ure 1, "Grant of Land and Charter of Justice from His Majesty to the Sierra Leone Company"; Directors' Report, 1801, Appendix I; Montague, Ordinances, Vol. III (London, 1868), pp. 144-61. In November Dundas ordered the transfer of another fifty troops from Goree to Sierra Leone "as an additional Means of Security to that interesting Settlement". WO 1/351, Dundas to Lt. Col. John Fraser, 17 November 1800.

3 Directors' Report, 1801, pp. 5-6.

4 The first mayor, 3 aldermen and sheriff were named in the Charter, and all were white Company employees (Thomas Cox, George Ross, Alexander Smith, Peregrine Francis Thorne and James Wilson, respectively). In 1801 the officials were again all white Company officials (CO 270/6, Council Minutes, 7 September 1801), though in 1802 the mayor was James Cair, a white trader resident in Freetown (CO 270/8, Council Minutes, 6 September 1802). There was, however, no reference in the constitution to the colour of the municipal officeholders.

5 CO 270/6, Council Minutes, 9 October 1801.
maining rebel escapees, in Freetown itself the last vestiges of Nova Scotian proprietorship and self-government were being rooted out and destroyed.⁶

Even more significant in its impact on the Nova Scotians’ life and position in Sierra Leone was the settlement of over five-hundred Maroons in their midst. Originally the Maroons were destined for some nearby territory, but the difficulty the Company met in purchasing new lands and the usefulness and cooperation displayed by the Maroons during the rebellion encouraged the council to locate the newcomers within the colony. Town lots were laid out for them in Granville Town, where they moved with their Company-appointed superintendent, George Ross, in November 1800, and the surveyors were ordered to select suitable farmlands for them in the Company’s territory.⁷ Until the farms were ready the Maroons were kept on rations provided by the Company. But as had happened with the Nova Scotians, there were innumerable delays in assigning the lands and the rationing period had to be extended.⁸ Also paralleling the Nova Scotian experience was the refusal, by a delegation of sixteen Maroons, to

⁶CO 270/8, "Journal of Mr. Bright’s Expedition"; CO 270/9, Council Minutes, 12 January 1803.

⁷Directors’ Report, 1801, pp. 23-4, and Appendix III, pp. 55-7; CO 270/5, Council Minutes, 3 November 1800.

⁸Ibid., 6 January 1801; CO 270/6, Council Minutes, 29 April, 3 November 1801; WO 1/352, "Queries Proposed by Commodore Hallowell, with the Governor and Council’s Answers, 12 January 1803".
accept land if a quit-rent accompanied it.\textsuperscript{9}

When farms were finally allotted in March 1801 the majority of the Maroons declined to occupy them. Averaging about two acres each of uncleared forest, the new farms were not considered sufficiently attractive to take the people away from their jobs as labourers in Freetown, where they could earn two shillings to two shillings and sixpence for a day's work for the Company. They argued further that it was too late in the year to plant a crop, and therefore if they gave up their jobs they would have no means of subsistence.\textsuperscript{10} Then, in a familiar development, because they had no farms they continued to depend on Company employment.\textsuperscript{11} In September 1801 some of the Maroons were granted the Freetown homes forfeited by the rebels, making permanent their addition to the town's population and labour force.\textsuperscript{12}

Under these circumstances the Nova Scotians' resentment of the Maroons, occasioned by their very arrival in a hitherto homogeneous settlement, was exacerbated. The earlier settlers were aware that the newcomers were intended to serve as a counterpoise to their own aspirations,\textsuperscript{13} and the Maroons'\textsuperscript{9} CO 270/5, \textit{Council Minutes}, 27 January 1801.

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 31 March, 28 April 1801.

\textsuperscript{11} WO 1/352, "Queries Proposed by Commodore Hallowell, with the Governor and Council's Answers, 12 January 1803".

\textsuperscript{12} CO 270/6, \textit{Council Minutes}, 15 September 1801.

\textsuperscript{13} Directors' Report, 1804, p. 10.
voluntary participation in the defeat of the rebellion indicated that it was a role the Maroons themselves were content to play. The council was full of praise for the Maroon character, particularly their wholehearted support for the government and their willingness to perform hard labour, and it was described in contrast to the Nova Scotian character.\footnote{WO 1/352, "Queries Proposed by Commodore Hallowell, with the Governor and Council's Answers, 12 January 1803"; Directors' Report, 1801, Postscript, p. 38.}

The Maroons, it seemed, were to be the favoured subjects in Sierra Leone, and the discredited Nova Scotians were to fill a secondary position. Even Freetown itself, built from the forest by the Nova Scotians, was no longer their own preserve. Then, as if as a reminder of the new order of things, the council resolved to make 30 September an annual holiday and day of thanksgiving, with church services and appropriate prayers, to express the colony's gratitude to God for the arrival of the Maroons or that date and the consequent "providential deliverance of this colony from the late unnatural rebellion".\footnote{CO 270/6, Council Minutes, 22 September 1801.}

With the Maroon arrival attributed to divine intervention, the Nova Scotians could expect no concurrence, outside their own chapels, with the claim that Sierra Leone was their divinely appointed Promised Land.

New pressures were placed on the Company and people as hostility toward them grew among the native Temne. Rela-
tions with the Temne had often been uneasy in the past, and attacks from them were narrowly avoided in 1794, 1797, and 1798, yet trade had continued and several hundred African grumettas had remained at work in the colony despite the feelings of their chiefs. It should therefore have served as a warning that the situation was more serious when, in October 1801, the chiefs called upon their people in the colony to return home. Yet the Directors were so disillusioned with the Nova Scotians that they were prepared to believe that they had instigated the Temne withdrawal in order to increase the value of settler labour, and Dawes, who had returned as governor in January, simply believed that the grumettas were needed at home for the rice harvest. Only when a settler woman reported seeing a body of armed Temne in town at midnight did the council think of preventive action, and forbade "natives" to carry arms in the colony. A month later the colony suffered its first African attack since King Jimmy's raid of 1789.

Evidently fearful that the increased colonial establishment foreshadowed their own displacement from the land, the Temne chiefs King Tom and Bai Firama determined to drive

16 CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 26 December 1796, 20 July 1797, 6 January 1798.

17 Directors' Report, 1801, pp. 28-9; CO 270/6, Council Minutes, 6 October 1801.

18 Ibid., 9 October 1801.
the foreigners out before they grew too powerful. At day-break on 18 November 1801 they attacked, accompanied by Nathaniel Wansey and another escaped Nova Scotian rebel, and with the advantage of surprise managed to occupy the partly-finished Fort Thornton. A Nova Scotian group spear-headed the counter-attack, led by Governor Dawes, and dislodged the invaders from the fort, but only to a position of safety just outside the town, where they appeared to be awaiting reinforcements. Twenty-two Freetown residents were dead, including Thomas Cox, the first mayor, and Nova Scotian Richard Crankapone, the former town marshall. For their own security, and so that they might contribute to the defense of the capital, the entire Maroon body was quickly evacuated from Granville Town and housed temporarily with the Nova Scotians in Freetown.

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19 BT 6/70, George Lee to Stephen Cottrell, 6 September 1806, Enclosure 1, "Report from the Committee on the Petition of the Court of Directors of the Sierra Leone Company, 1804", Appendix C, "Examination of Captain Hallowell". In his evidence to the committee (ibid., Appendix E), Zachary Macaulay attributed the Temne attack to "The Hope of Plunder, or partly, perhaps, to the Jealousy of the growing Power of the Colony". In July 1797 five chiefs had written to Macaulay: "We understand that... Mr. Macaulay has sent letters to Europe for the purpose of importing Soldiers to drive us out of our Country" (CO 270/4, Council Minutes, 20 July 1797). The arrival of the 24th Regiment in September 1800 must have led the Temne to believe that their information had been correct.

20 CO 270/6, Council Minutes, 18 November 1801; WO 1/352, Henry Thornton to John Sullivan, 13 February 1802; Directors' Report, 1804, pp. 10-11.

21 CO 270/6, Council Minutes, 20 November 1801; WO 1/352, Henry Thornton to Lord Hobart, 26 February 1802.
and Nova Scotians, reinforced by the guns and crew of H.M.S. Wasp, which arrived at the critical moment, then set out to destroy the Temne position. Encouraged by rewards of twenty-five dollars for each prisoner and fifty dollars for each native town or "plantation" destroyed, the colonial forces were efficient in their duty. King Tom's town and several others were put to the torch, crops were ruined and dozens of prisoners taken. By 4 December, Temne resistance was shattered, and as a condition of peace Tom was required to cede his territory, the part of the peninsula lying west of Freetown, to the Company government.  

The colony could not rest secure, however, for the indigenous Africans greatly outnumbered the settlers and soldiers in Freetown. In January, when rumours were received that a local confederacy was forming to overwhelm them, Captain Bullen of the Wasp agreed to remain in the harbour as added security. But a truce concluded with King Tom in March led Bullen to think the danger was past, and he withdrew. 23 On Sunday 11 April the Temne staged a second attack with over four-hundred Africans and eleven rebel Nova Scotians. Again the defenders were successful, forcing the Temne to re-

22CO 270/9, Council Minutes, 14 March 1803; Adm. 1/1526, Captain Charles Bullen to Evan Nepean, 13 December 1801; Adm. 51/1421, Log Book, HMS Wasp, Captain Bullen, 2 December 1801; WO 1/352, Thornton to Sullivan, 13 February 1802.

23CO 270/8, Council Minutes, 24 January, 17 March 1802; Directors' Report, 1804, p. 11.
treat leaving a hundred of their dead on the Freetown streets. Still there was no assurance that the final attack had been made. King Tom had taken refuge with the Bullom people and was reportedly arranging an alliance with them for another attempt against Freetown. All the European women in the colony were evacuated to England, and a constant guard was mounted to patrol the town, with half the able-bodied men on duty each night.

Freetown was under siege, or at least believed itself to be. Constant fear filled the colonists, and there was a general feeling that the colony would have to be evacuated. Local trade almost ceased since the settlers' area of safety did not extend further than three miles beyond Freetown. Farmers were afraid to visit their farms, and the woodcutters had to be accompanied by an armed guard of twenty Maroons when they left the protection of Fort Thornton. The Nova Scotian farms, located along the landward frontier of Freetown, were left uncultivated in 1802, and

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24 CO 270/8, Council Minutes, 11 April 1802; Directors' Report, 1804, pp. 40-41, Times, 11 June 1802. Five colonists were killed and nine wounded in the April attack. Defending forces numbered forty-five soldiers, one-hundred Nova Scotians and about 140 Maroons capable of bearing arms. The previous November there had been an additional forty-five men under arms from the Wasp.

25 CO 270/9, Council Minutes, 12 January 1803; WO 1/352, Governor and Council to Hallowell, 12 January 1803, and Zachary Macaulay to John Sullivan, 5 September 1803.

26 Ibid.; CO 270/8, Council Minutes, 2, 11 February, 8 June 1802; CO 270/9, Council Minutes, 5 March 1803, Henry Odlum to Governor Day, 5 March 1803.
standing crops were plundered by bands of African marauders. Only a hundred head of cattle were left to supply meat to a population of 1,500 people. 27

The result, not unnaturally, was a serious food shortage in Sierra Leone. Beef prices rose to a record high of eleven pence a pound, and a bowl of beans served as a typical meal. Settler boats brought rice from friendlier districts along the coast, but since most of the population depended upon imports the supplies were never satisfactory. Then a failure of the native rice crop in 1803 deprived the colony of even that source of food. Famine conditions stalked Freetown; government-provided Maroon rations had to be limited, and the Nova Scotians, still required to pay for their food, were restricted in their purchases from the Company store. Fixed prices to Nova Scotian suppliers, who managed to bring in food from outlying African territories or who had stores from pre-war cultivation, prevented the exploitation of the situation, but also served as a discouragement to facing the risks of more ambitious trade. The colony once again became dependent upon the shipment of sup-

plies from England. 28

The Nova Scotians' relationship with the Company had in effect reverted to its 1792-94 position. The intervening condition of economic security and self-sufficiency was shattered, and the people were forced to seek Company employment once more. But this time there could be no demands for popular control of jobs and wages. Morale was low, the most outspoken settlers were gone, and above all the presence of the Maroons undermined the theoretical basis of Nova Scotian sovereignty. In November 1801 the Maroons had been relocated in Freetown as a temporary defensive measure, but the continuing Temne threat caused the council to resolve, in March 1803, to make the move permanent. Granville Town was abandoned to the forest, and new town lots in the western section of Freetown were laid out for them. 29 Meanwhile, with the Maroons all living amongst the rest of the population, the office of Superintendent of Maroons was abolished, and they came under the direct supervision of the governor and council. 30 With this change the legal distinction between Maroon and Nova Scotian was removed; all were subjects of the Company.

28 CO 270/8, Council Minutes, 17 July 1802; CO 270/9, Council Minutes, 18 February 1803; WO 1/352, "Queries Proposed by Commodore Hallowell, with the Governor and Council's Answers, 12 January 1803", and Macaulay to Sullivan, 5 September 1803; Times, 6 September 1803.

29 WO 1/352, Thornton to Hobart, 26 February 1802; CO 270/9, Council Minutes, 10 March 1803.

30 CO 270/8, Council Minutes, 29 September 1802.
and residents of Freetown, sharing equal responsibilities and
rights and under the same laws and government.

The new situation made extraordinary demands upon
the Company, and at a time when its income was practically
non-existent. There was no revenue to be raised from the
stagnant colonial economy, and interior trade in all but the
essentials of life disappeared during the Temne troubles.
Eventually the Company was maintaining its commercial esta-
blishment for the sole purpose of ensuring an adequate food
supply. In April 1803 the office of Company commercial
agent had to be abolished, and the Directors faced the possi-
bility of being required to abandon the colony for want of
financial resources. Prospects had appeared good in 1802,
when the colony was virtually self-supporting, but the insur-
rection and defenses against the Temne drew £8,700 from the
Company’s fixed capital, and wages alone for those working
on the fortifications totalled £14,469 from 1802 to 1804. All
hope of trading profits had evaporated, no locally-
cultivated exports were being produced, and the Company was
burdened with administrative costs averaging over £7,000

31 WO 1/352, “Queries Proposed by Commodore Hallowell, with the Governor and Council’s Answers, 12 January 1803”; CO 270/8, Council Minutes, 17 September, 15 October 1802.

32 CO 270/9, Council Minutes, 18 April 1803; WO 1/3*, Macaulay to Sullivan, 17 June 1802.

a year.  

The colony was clearly not destined to fulfil the hopes of its founders. The slave trade, with its easier profits, continued to attract more African attention than the "legitimate commerce" offered by the Company. The extraordinary costs of settling the Noya Scotians was never replaced, since the people refused to engage in plantation cultivation. The French war caused the direct losses of the 1794 occupation and innumerable indirect losses through the interruption of trade and shipping. The inexperience and, occasionally, maladministration of local officials meant that funds were not expended to their best advantage. The civil government, the necessity of keeping the settlers on a Company payroll, and the military need of the colony, all had to be financed from the proprietors' original investment. By 31 December 1803 the Company's total assets, including land, buildings, and outstanding debts, were valued at only £31,643. 

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Administrative expenses, excluding defense, labour and fortifications, were: 1800—£5,364; 1801—£5,270; 1802—£7,393; 1803—£9,278; 1804—£9,175. This totalled £36,400 or an average of £7,296 per year.


**Directors' Report, 1804, p. 59.**
Apparent relief for the Company began in 1800 with a British government grant of £4,000 towards the costs of administration and £7,000 towards the building of fortifications, and with an additional £10,000 indemnification for the expenses incurred in settling the Nova Scotians.  

Though far from matching the actual sums laid out by the Company, at least the government subsidies made it possible for the Directors to continue their operation. The administrative grant of £4,000 was repeated in 1801 and increased to £10,000 in 1802, on the grounds that the support of the Maroons, a British responsibility, was costing the Company the latter amount annually. However welcome, the government allowance had to be re-negotiated each year; there was never any assurance that it would be renewed, and no colonial planning could be based upon its expectation.

The insecurity deriving from the ad hoc nature of government funding was evident in 1803, when no grant was voted by Parliament. Soon after the 1802 grant was awarded the government sent Captain (later Commodore) Benjamin Hallowell to examine the administration of Sierra Leone. His unfavourable report led Addington, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to postpone further grants until a more complete

37 Directors' Report, 1801, pp. 33-5.

38 Directors' Report, 1804, p. 37; PP 1806, XII, "An Account of all Monies", p. 511. Approximately 2-1/2 percent was deducted from the grant each year in government fees.
enquiry could take place. The Parliamentary Committee conducting the enquiry recognised "that the British Government is bound by every consideration of justice and good faith, to continue its protection and support to this numerous description of colonists", and voted in July 1804 a total grant of £28,000, including £10,000 annually for 1803 and 1804 and £8,000 for defenses. With this principle established the government grant was not challenged thereafter, though its exact amount was subject to deliberation. By 31 December 1807 the Company had received a total of £96,516.8 from the British government, but to put this sum in perspective it should be noted that the Company itself had expended twice that amount from its own sources. Company assets were only £11,111.13 by that time, and its shares were selling in London at a ninety-five percent discount. British public funds made it possible for the colony to exist, and were particularly useful in providing wages for Nova Scotian and


40. The £96,519.8 represents the total votes less the discount of fees, i.e. the actual amount received by the Company. PP 1810-11, Vol. X, "An Account of all Sums granted by Parliament to the Colony of Sierra Leone", p. 485; Parliamentary Debates, II (1804), col. 965-968, 9 July 1804; Directors' Report, 1808, pp. 14-15; African Institution, Special Report, 1815, pp. 139-41. Total expenses for the colonial establishment from January 1792 to December 1807 were £279,223.10.4, of which the Company provided £182,704.2.4. The Company contribution is exclusive of commercial losses, representing only the costs of settling, defending and administering the colony.
Maroon settlers when no other subsistence was possible, but they did not make the Sierra Leone Company solvent.

The Nova Scotian farmlands, as has been noted, lay generally idle during the troubled period from 1800 to 1803. One of the first acts of the council under its new Charter was to declare the lands of the rebels forfeit to the Company. All other settlers were advised to apply for new grants, and thereby agree to pay the quit-rent, or their land would likewise revert to Company ownership and could be sold or reassigned. But though humbled after the rebellion, the settlers had not lost their resentment of the quit-rent. Land under Nova Scotian ownership declined from an original 2,509 acres, of which about 650 were cultivated in 1799, to 1,528 acres in 1802, with cultivation almost ceased. The best cultivators, according to Hallowell’s report, had been numbered among the rebels, and their removal from the land accounted for a sharp decrease in farming activity. Temne and escaped rebels alike harrassed the outlying farms and


43 WO 1/352, “Queries Proposed by Commodore Hallowell, with the Governor and Council’s Answers, 12 January, 1803”,
forced their owners to abandon them. 44

Perhaps using the logical excuse that they could not pay duties on farms impossible to occupy, even those Nova Scotians who accepted the new grants in January 1801 paid no quit-rent despite reminders that they were due. 45 Councillor Thomas Ludlam made a strong case against their enforcement, noting that they would forever cause ill-feeling between the people and the government and would only result in all colonial lands being surrendered to the Company. 46

Then, on 18 April 1803 the council resolved

that to avoid all further disputes on that subject, and in consideration of the good conduct of all descriptions of persons during the present war, the lands both of the Maroons and Nova Scotians shall be granted to them free of quit-rent. 47

The new policy coincided with an improvement in relations with the local African peoples, and cultivation was cautiously resumed. But rather than work the land themselves, most of the Nova Scotian owners preferred to rent it to Maroons, or to enter a share-cropping agreement with them. 48 For the Maroons, there were advantages in farming the Nova Scotian lands rather,

44 CO 270/6, Council Minutes, 5 August 1801; CO 270/9, Council Minutes, 10 March 1803.


46 CO 270/6, Ludlam to Council, 11 November 1801.

47 CO 270/9, Council Minutes, 18 April 1803.

48 BT 6/70, "1804 Committee Report", Appendix F, "Extracts from the Letters of Governor Day".
than their own, for they were often cleared and were in every case closer to the protection of Freetown. For the Nova Scotians it meant a source of additional revenue to supplement their income from their regular occupations.

As had been the case in 1794, the Nova Scotians showed a greater inclination toward trade than for agriculture. Even during the Temne troubles settler traders continued to take their boats up the coast for provisions. But in January 1803 the Company's financial difficulties forced the cancellation of any further credit at the Company stores to Nova Scotian traders, and since few of them had sufficient capital to operate independently this caused a serious curtailment in their activities. The poor native rice crop that year and the dearth of trade goods in the colony contributed to the starvation of the interior trade. Most of the Nova Scotians fell back on their mechanical skills and took employment on the fortification and construction projects financed by the British government grants.

Common adversity caused the Nova Scotians and the Company to move closer together, for mutual support, than

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49 WO 1/352, "Queries Proposed by Commodore Hallowell, with the Governor and Council's Answers, 12 January 1803".

50 CO 270/9, Council Minutes, 31 January 1803.

51 WO 1/352, Macaulay to Sullivan, 5 September 1803, Macaulay to Edward Cooke, 13 July 1807, and "Queries Proposed by Commodore Hallowell, with the Governor and Council's Answers, 12 January 1803".
had been the case since their arrival in Sierra Leone. Awed
by the Maroons, threatened by the Temne, and faced with
economic disaster, the settlers began to recognize the ad-
vantages of cooperation with their local government.\textsuperscript{52} The
arrival of a new governor, Captain William Day, in February
1803 seemed to herald a new era in Company-settler relations.\textsuperscript{53}
Day was not associated with the difficulties and animosities
of the previous decade, and the removal of the quit-rent in
April served as an act of good faith on the Company's part.
Thomas Ludlam, who remained as councillor and eventually suc-
cceeded Day as governor, was a known Nova Scotian sympathizer
on the quit-rent issue and had been instrumental in its can-
cellation.\textsuperscript{54}

Besides the quit-rent, other causes of friction were
being removed. Political conflict ended with the rebellion,
and though its result was a defeat for Nova Scotian aspira-
tions it did mean that one area of overt and often energetic
contention had been laid to rest. The most rebellious set-
tlers had been banished and dozens more voluntarily withdrew
from the colony after October 1800,\textsuperscript{55} leaving behind the

\textsuperscript{52}Directors’ Report, 1804, pp. 24-6, 48.
\textsuperscript{53}CO 270/9, Council Minutes, 15 February 1803.
\textsuperscript{54}CO 270/16, Council Minutes, 17 November 1801; BT
6/70, Thornton to Vansittart, 13 May 1806.
\textsuperscript{55}WO 1/352, "List of Nova Scotians in Sierra Leone,
1802"; BT 6/70, Governor and Council to Directors, 29
October 1806.
Company's active supporters and those who were most prepared to accept Company jurisdiction. As a result the Directors' opinion of the settlers showed a favourable shift. In 1804 the Directors reported that the Nova Scotians "are most of them orderly, some of the exemplary, in the discharge of their social duties. More benefit therefore may now be expected from the Nova Scotians than has hitherto been experienced." And upon closer observation the Maroons, with their pagan and polygamous habits, seemed less obviously superior to the earlier settlers. The Nova Scotians were "more reliable" and "more meritorious" after all, the council decided, and there was some fear that physical restraint might have to be placed on Maroon activities.

It is a common principle of community development that people who work together successfully on one project are thereafter amenable to increasingly cooperative efforts. That initial project in Freetown was provided by Governor Day's defense programme in 1803. When Day became governor Fort Thornton was still unfinished and the Temne-Bullom confederacy was showing signs of an imminent attack. Day gave de-

56 Directors' Report, 1804, p. 25.
57 CO 270/8, Council Minutes, 24 January 1802; Directors' Report, 1804, p. 34.
58 WO 1/352, Thornton to Hobart, 6 October 1802.
59 CO 270/9, Council Minutes, 12 January 1803; WO 1/352, Governor and Council to Hallowell, 12 January 1803, Thornton to Hobart, 12 February 1803.
fense preparations his immediate attention and top priority. He built a line of blockhouses and resumed construction on the fort and a tower, began walls around Thornton Hill and along the waterfront, and erected a battery of eight guns commanding the harbour and approaches to the town. He organized a Volunteer Corps, to patrol the town and man the defences, and paid the "volunteers" thirty cents, or about one shilling and sixpence, for each day on duty. Eventually the Corps contained 270 men, virtually the entire military-aged male population of the colony. Morale in Freetown took a sudden leap. The utter dejection of the early part of the year gave way to confidence and optimism. The Temne, too, noticed the change, and the confederacy against the colony collapsed. Day's apparent miracle showed the value of cooperation with the government. It was no longer possible to think of life in Freetown without the British presence, for it seemed likely that there could be no life at all.

Defences meant not only security against the indigenous Africans, but employment as well in an otherwise stark situation. In view of the alternative, dependence did not seem to rankle as it had in the 1790s. Government grants beginning in 1800 created "abundant means of employment". 61


61 CO 270/5, Council Minutes, 28 April 1801.
Even in grantless, 1803 the public works inspired by Day kept the people occupied, and with renewed and larger grants from 1804 there was more work to be done than people to do it. One-hundred masons were on the job, and over a hundred carpenters, the very skills possessed by the Nova Scotian artisans. An unskilled labourer could earn thirty-six cents a day, and though scarcity made food prices extremely high this wage was supplemented by pay from the Volunteer Corps. War conditions also created a shortage of Europeans in the colony, leaving available some higher positions. Salaries were not equivalent to those paid to whites doing the same job, but by 1808 it was possible for a Nova Scotian in company employ to earn over £100 a year, and there were a dozen or fifteen earning from £40 to £100 as clerks, teachers, and supervisors.

Increasingly the Nova Scotians' interests were being identified with those of their government. In November 1802 they re-established themselves as allies in the British cause by participating in the annexation of Gambia Island from the

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62 WO 1/352, Macaulay to Sullivan, 5 September 1803, Thornton to Castlereagh, 6 December 1805, Macaulay to Cooke, 13 July 1807; CO 267/24, Ludlam to Macaulay, 13 April 1808, and Sierra Leone Gazette, 15 August 1808.

63 CO 270/5, Council Minutes, 14 January 1801; CO 270/6, Council Minutes, 17 November 1801; WO 1/352, Macaulay to Cooke, 13 July 1807; CO 267/24, Macaulay to J. Chapman, 7 October 1808; SLA, Governor's Letter Book, 1808-11, 1, 7 January, 27 April, 10 June, 2 August, 1, 30 September, 10 November 1808.
French. Internally, they participated in the administration of British law and public order. From 1801 to 1808 they supplied most of the jurors in colonial courts and the majority of commissioners on the Court of Requests. Richard Crankapone served as under-sheriff until his death in April 1802, and he was succeeded by a fellow-Nova Scotian, Warwick Francis. Under the circumstances, their role in the colonial and Company establishments seemed to satisfy the Nova Scotians' desire for some form of self-determination. Certainly the Company's trust in them had been re-established, and they no longer expressed a belief in the divergence of their own and the Company's plans for the colony.

A barrier to a harmonious colonial relationship was provided by the Maroons. Though they outnumbered the Maroons by about 900 to 500 in 1802, the strength of the Nova

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64 CO 270/8, Council Minutes, 24 November 1802; WO 1/352, Thornton to Hobart, 12 February 1803. Gambia Island, in the Sierra Leone River, had been unoccupied for nine years when the armed force from Freetown took possession on 25 November 1802, but it was feared at the time that the French intended to use it as a base of operations against British property in West Africa.


66 WO 1/352, "List of the Inhabitants of Freetown, 1802", showed 891 Nova Scotians, 515 Maroons, 27 civilian whites, 92 soldiers, 58 local natives and 90 Krumen. These figures differed slightly from the 1804 Committee Report, BT 6/70, Appendix V, which listed 904 Nova Scotians, 515 Maroons, 27 white civilians, 95 soldiers, 40 local natives and 60 Krumen.
Scotians, in terms of able-bodied manpower, was in fact inferior. Those who left the colony as a result of the rebellion were generally active and young, leaving the women and older men in an unusually high proportion of the population. For the 100 men whom the Nova Scotian community could supply for active defense, the Maroons had 140. The Maroons were further strengthened by their quasi-military social organization, deriving from their life in the Jamaican wilderness, which divided them into twenty-two companies under officers who assumed ranks of lieutenant, captain, major, colonel, and general. The proud demeanour and self-confidence of the Maroons contributed to a feeling of uncertainty and even intimidation among the Nova Scotians, a feeling that was shared to some extent by the white governors, particularly as the Maroons habitually carried their muskets with them and on occasion fired them in the Freetown streets.

By right of conquest and the December 1801 truce with King Tom, the Company had claimed the whole Sierra Leone peninsula, and in April 1803 with the possibility of an immediate Bullom-Temne attack apparently dissipated, the former Temne land was distributed as farms to the Maroons. But,

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67 WO 1/352, Governor and Council to Hallowell, 12 January 1803.
68 Ibid., “List of Maroons, 1802”.
69 Directors’ Report, 1804, pp. 24-5, 33-4; BT 6/70, Governor and Council to Directors, 29 October 1796.
70 GO 270/9, Council Minutes, 18 April 1803; WO 1/347, WO 1/347.
following the Nova Scotian example, the Maroons saw more advantage and profit in working for secure wages in Freetown than in risky speculations upon uncleared land exposed to Africán attack. Those disposed to agriculture chose to rent Nova Scotian-owned land closer to town; the majority turned their attention toward acquiring the construction skills most in demand, and with their greater energy offered competition to the better-skilled but less enthusiastic Nova Scotian craftsmen. The abundance of employment prevented the displacement of the Nova Scotians for the time being, but by accepting lower wages and offering to perform the hardest labour the Maroons were gaining a reputation that the Nova Scotians could not match. 71

Such developments were not likely to relieve the resentment felt by the Nova Scotians. They felt displaced, and yet "in point of Morals and Manners" considered themselves a substantial cut above the Maroons "in the Scale of


Culturally there were obvious differences between the two groups of immigrants. The Maroons were rough and loud, laughingly pointing their guns at the Nova Scotians. The government hesitated to suppress polygamy among them for fear of a violent reaction. Few Maroons attended church, and though the children were sent to school their parents showed no inclination for literacy or formal education for themselves. Maroon women were kept dependent and subordinate. Because of their different experience with whites, having never been slaves, the Maroons were far less suspicious of European intentions toward them. 73 All this was in contrast to the Nova Scotians, with their chapels, appreciation for education, independent women and suspicion of whites. The cultural contrasts confirmed the Nova Scotians in their exclusiveness and belief in the superiority of their own society. Each group had its own distinct section of town, separate schools, and social mixing was minimal. The one area in which they came together was religion, through Nova Scotian mission work among the pagan newcomers. As committed Christians the settlers could not ignore the sins of their neighbours and Nova Scotian children subscribed two cents a week for the work of evangelizing the Maroons. But though this had some effect in lessening ten-

72 BT 6/70, Governor and Council to Directors, 29 October 1806.

73 Ibid.; Directors' Report, 1804, p. 25.
sions, it too served to reinforce the Nova Scotian attitude of superiority: they were attempting to convince the Maroons to give up their old ways and to become more like them.

If the Maroon way of life offered the Nova Scotians evidence of their own superiority, relations with the local Africans seemed to provide the final proof. The Temne wars placed the indigenous peoples on the opposite side to the Nova Scotians and their white governors. The Nova Scotians were willing allies and active participants in defending the colony against African attack, a point that was not missed by Company officials. The territorial expansion during and after the wars, when the Temne were displaced from the Sierra Leone peninsula, was to the settlers' advantage and therefore they identified themselves with the extension of white control over Black territory. Far from the feelings of the 1790s, when settler representatives had been prepared to support African territorial claims over the colony, they

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75 For example CO 270/8, Council Minutes, 25, 29 January 1802; CO 270/9, Council Minutes, 31 January 1803.

now rejected any native rights there. In 1806 a settler jury upheld the Company's ownership in a case brought against a Feme group for continuing to occupy colonial land. 77

Those Africans who did continue to live peacefully within the colony, on the council's sufferance, were often there as servants, employees or apprentices of the Nova Scotian settlers. The largest number of Africans were Krumen from the Cape Palmas region in the south of modern Liberia. The Kru worked up and down the west coast as labourers and boatmen for the European traders. In the colony they were hired as agricultural labour to clear and cultivate settler farms, and it was common for Nova Scotian washerwomen to have Kru assistants carry the baskets of wet laundry. The settlers also hired local labourers, known as "grumettas", to cultivate their land for them. 78 Most of the Kru and grumettas were in the colony for short periods of time, being replaced by others as the need arose. But there were also Africans in the colony who lived in Nova Scotian homes as servants and "apprentices". Sometimes these were children sent by their parents for an education, and others were

77 CMS CA 1/E1, No. 86, Butcher to CMS, 12 December 1806

slaves redeemed by the Company and then bound as apprentices to Nova Scotian artisans.\footnote{79}

"The difference between apprenticeship and slavery was a subtle one. In 1801 the Directors ordered the council to prohibit settlers from owning slaves, but the council replied that "slavery" was difficult to define in the circumstances and besides the Nova Scotians would never submit to such a law.\footnote{80} Apprentices were bought and sold, they were considered the property of their masters during the "indenture" period and they were subjected to harsh and even sadistic punishments, all with the full knowledge of the Company government.\footnote{81} In 1805 a new law was passed to prevent the education or employment of persons in a state of slavery, but it was found to be "unsufficient and useless" for control-

\footnote{79} African Institution, Special Report, 1815, pp. 42-6.

\footnote{80} CO 270/5, Council Minutes, 28 April 1801; SLA, Acts of Governor and Council, 1800-31, 28 April 1801, 29 January 1872.

\footnote{81} African Institution, Special Report, 1815, pp. 49-57; CO 267/24, T. P. Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 2, 2 August 1808, No. 3, 9 August 1808, No. 4, 2 November 1808, the latter enclosing sworn statements from ten settlers declaring that during 1805 and 1806 they had purchased apprentices brought as slaves from the interior, with the consent of the governor; CO 267/25, African Herald, 29 July 1809, reporting that Nova Scotian Susanah Caulker "did beat and evil entreat", and perform "other enormous things" upon a twelve year-old apprentice girl, including the infusion of a mixture of salt and pepper into the girl's sexual organs; Times, 6 October 1808. The census of 1802, WD 1/352, showed only fourteen Africans living as apprentices in Nova Scotian homes, but this number evidently increased after the improvement in native relations in 1803, and it did not include grumettas or Kru hired as casual labour.
ling the evils of apprenticeship. Slavery disguised as apprenticeship, labelled by one governor "one of the clumsiest deceptions ever practised upon the world", continued to flourish in Freetown. Such practices suggest that the Nova Scotians recognized a gulf between themselves and the indigenous Africans; treatment they could not abide for themselves was openly perpetrated upon local Black people. They evidently considered that their interests and attitudes were shared with the whites rather than with their fellow Blacks, for the Company government did not take effective steps against them. In any case the native African in Sierra Leone was obviously the social inferior of the Nova Scotian; whether grumettas, servants, or apprentices, they were in a subservient role, enabling the Nova Scotians to identify themselves with the colony's controlling elite.

One other group in Freetown ironically contributed to the entrenchment of Nova Scotian self-awareness as an elite: the early missionaries sent out by the Church Missionary Society. The Anglican Church had not shown itself to be particularly interested in African mission activity until 1799, when the Church Missionary Society was founded.  

82SLA, Acts of Governor and Council, 1800-31, 1st August 1808, repealing the 1805 act; CO 270/10, Council Minutes, 13 August 1808.
83CO 267/2/4, Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 3, 9 August 1808.
84Cf. Melvill Horne, Letters on Missions Addressed
With Granville Sharp, Henry Thornton, William Wilberforce, and Zachary Macaulay among its founding members, it was natural that the CMS should look to Sierra Leone as "a way of easy access into Africa." But general Anglican feeling was still not enthusiastic about missions, and the Society had difficulty obtaining ordained clergymen in the Established Church to undertake the project. When no Anglican offers had been received by late 1801, they were forced to turn to the Lutheran Berlin Seminary for suitable protestant missionaries. The first two recruits, Melchior Renner and Peter Hartwig, were sent to England for training, and from thence to Freetown in April 1804. Their instructions were to acclimatize themselves to Africa during a brief stay in Freetown, and then to initiate a programme to convert the heathen Africans. They quickly ran into difficulties, how-


58 Ibid., Report of the Committee, 1805, pp. 433-34; Eugene Stock, The History of the Church Missionary Society,
ever, that prevented their working among the Africans, who resisted all attempts at conversion and refused to accept them in their midst. The Company government evidently did little to assist their efforts. They therefore decided to remain indefinitely in Freetown, to act as colonial chaplains.

Many Nova Scotians attended the CMS services, the first official church services in many years, and both Renner and Hartwig held joint services with Black preachers in the Nova Scotian chapels, but none were converted to the Anglican faith and no Nova Scotian children were baptized. In fact the CMS presence in Freetown had an opposite effect from that intended, for the missionaries were ridiculed by the settlers. They laughed at Hartwig's German accent and imperfect English, derided his indolence, and when he tried to teach the people they insisted on teaching him instead.

"The weakest of our Black Settlers have eyes sufficient to discern his failings", Ludlam reported to Henry Venn. His "unfortunate wife" did little to win settler admiration. The 

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89 CMS, CA 1/El, No. 17, Renner to CMS, 18 October 1804, No. 30, Hartwig to CMS, 17 February 1806, No. 89, Ludlam to Pratt, 20 December 1806.

90 Ibid., No. 115A, Renner's Journal, 14 September, 14 October 1804; CMS, Proceedings, 1, Report of the Committee, 1805, Appendix II. Six Maroon children were baptized between 25 September 1804 and 27 February 1805.

91 CMS, CA 1/El, No. 41, Ludlam to Venn, Mar 1805.
people stood in the streets listening to Hartwig and Renner quarrel over which should have the best room in the house, and when Hartwig gave up his preaching to become a slave trader it only seemed to confirm the low opinion the settlers had already formed of him and his original colleague. In 1806 the CMS sent out three more Germans, Leopold Butsher, Gustavus Nylander and Johann Prasse, and though Nylander in particular was to become popular with the settlers, in part from his marriage to a Nova Scotian girl and in part from his adoption of the "Methodistical" tenets of settler religion, the missionaries' strange preachings and stranger manner of speaking evoked more amusement than respect. Furthermore when Renner, Butsher and Prasse eventually went to live outside the colony, in 1808, it appeared that their object was to turn the Africans into carbon-copies of the Nova Scotians. Their experience with the early CMS missionaries therefore allowed the Nova Scotians to retain a belief in their own superiority, for the strange European clergymen could not initially be regarded as equals any more than could the Africans who were being converted.

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92 Ibid., No. 105, Nylander to CMS, 29 April 1807, and No. 107, Minutes of the Corresponding Committee, Freetown, 29 June 1807.

93 Ibid., No. 114, Pratt to Nylander et al., 27 August 1808.

94 Ibid., CA 1/E2, No. 30, Renner to CMS, 13 March 1810, and No. 110, Nylander to CMS, 9 December 1811.
Though they had given up all claim to political proprietorship the Nova Scotian community could, for all these reasons, consider itself the proprietor of righteousness and advanced civilization. The Maroons, the local Africans, the CMS missionaries, were in various ways becoming more like them; they were the ideal to which others aspired. The white governing class of course remained above the rest of the colonial population, but through their identification of interests it was possible for the Nova Scotians to share vicariously their elite status and power. Without betraying the principles of their own exclusiveness, they were meeting the whites on equal terms. For once again the Nova Scotians were being regarded by the Company as allies in the conversion of Africa; they were living according to standards much closer to those of the evangelical Directors than any other colonial inhabitants, and they had the outright support and encouragement of local Company officials in their dealings with non-Nova Scotians in Freetown.

Social mixing between Nova Scotians and the Company government occurred for the first time, as governor and council occupied the head table at Nova Scotian wedding feasts and 

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95 Cf. A l/E1, No. 30, Hartwig to CMS, 17 February 1806.

96 CO 270/11, Council Minutes, 20 February 1806, "Report to Lord Castlereagh", same date; 20 February, Atri ar Herald, 20 July 1809; CO 270/11, letter to Thomas Ludmil, 8 July 1809 (see footnote 31, a prentice girl, 8 July 1809;
Company government sponsored the Nova Scotian-style "frolics" to which only the white officials and the Nova Scotians themselves were invited. In the absence of white women in the colony it was to the Nova Scotians that the white officials turned for mistresses, and the white missionaries for wives. These intimacies, and their mulatto offspring, served to cement the elite white and Nova Scotian communities socially and make of them a new community of interest that recognized its distinction from other blacks and whites in the colony.

Through cooperation on such diverse levels as the political, judicial and the sexual, the Nova Scotians con-

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97 Ibid., Council Minutes, 25 October 1809; CO 267/25, Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 6, 17 February 1809.

98 On early CMS marriages with Nova Scotian daughters see CMS, Proceedings, III, Report of the Committee, 1810, p. 72, and Report of the Committee, 1812, p. 406, CA 1/E2, No. 30, Renner to CMS, 13 March 1810, No. 135, Klein to CMS, 14 February 1812. On Company officials' common-law relationships see CA 1/E2, No. 138, Nylander to CMS, 28 February 1812, in which he wrote "it is almost a shame if a European does not get children by a black person in an unlawful manner"; CO 270/11, Council Minutes, 25 October 1809, 6 April 1810; CO 270/25, Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 6, 11 February 1809, No. 9, 15 August 1809; and African Herald, 25 February; 27 May 1809; SLA, Governor's Letter Book, 1808-11, 19 February 1809. All the latter references, dated 1809 and 1810, mention incidents that occurred before 1 January 1808. When the first Crown Governor, Thompson, tried to arrest Nova Scotian Jane Nicol as a common scold, the ranks of the Nova Scotians and remaining Company officials closed to protect her. Thomas Liddam and William Dawes, both former governors, helped organize a petition for her release and participated in arousing public opinion against Thompson's "tyrannical" behavior. CO 270/11, Council Minutes, 21 July 1809; CO 267/25, Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 10, 2 October 1809.
solidated a privileged position for themselves in Freetown. Economically, too, Nova Scotian entrepreneurs, traders, artisans and gentleman farmers began to realize increasing prosperity as the effects of the government grants and the improvement in native relations were felt. When William Day arrived as governor in early 1803 economic activity was almost at a standstill, sickness and scarcity prevailed; and settler spirits were low. By 1805 the situation was giving cause for new optimism. Day's energetic defenses instilled settler security and disposed the Africans toward peace. Grumetfas came back to work, cultivation was resumed, health improved, and trade became possible once again. A fifteen acre sugar plantation was opened at Fourah Bay to produce a cash export crop.99 Reflecting the new atmosphere was a colourful ceremony on 11 April 1805 to mark the official opening of the new tower on Wansey Hill, renamed Tower Hill because of the seditious connotations of Nathaniel Wansey's name. After a parade of the Volunteer Corps, a "cold Collation" was served for Europeans and the Volunteer officers atop the Hill, while enlisted men were entertained in the market place.100 Such celebrations could hardly have been imagined two years earlier.

99 WO 1/352, Thornton to Castlereagh, 6 December 1805.

100 Ibid., enclosing extracts from letters of Captain Day.
The chief beneficiaries of the return to normalcy were the Nova Scotian settlers. Their farms, cultivated for the most part by hired grumettas, apprentices, or Maroon share-croppers, were once more producing sufficient food to provision the colony, and their fishing vessels added a touch of delicacy to Freetown plates. Salaries, created by government spending, were sufficient that the colonists could afford to buy all they needed.\textsuperscript{101} There was more than enough work for skilled men of all descriptions, and Nova Scotian clerks and artisans found themselves in demand and in a position to earn substantial wages in addition to their share from the profits of their farmlands.\textsuperscript{102} Because of the signs of self-sufficiency in food the Company in 1806 gave over "the greatest part of the Colonial Trade" to Nova Scotian licensees, who purchased rice and cattle and exportable products from the Africans.\textsuperscript{103} Even the surgeon's report of 1807 reflected the new situation, for it showed a healthy population and an increase in Nova Scotian numbers.\textsuperscript{104}

"Ah! dem were de good times!" a Nova Scotian lady exclaimed, forty years later, referring to life in Freetown just before

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., Macaulay to Cooke, 13 July 1807.
\textsuperscript{102} BT 6/70, Governor and Council to Directors, 29 October 1806; CO 267/24, Ludlam to Macarthy, 13 April 1808.
\textsuperscript{103} BT 6/70, Governor and Council to Directors, 29 October 1806.
\textsuperscript{104} CO 267/24, "Surgeon's Report", 1807.
1808. 105

The major problems of the colony seemed to be overcome by 1807. On 10 July a final peace was signed with the Temne, confirming cession of the peninsula but permitting Africans to remain as subjects of the colony. 106 For the first time in seven years Freetown enjoyed "a sense of complete security: its internal order had gone on improving; the confidence of the natives had been restored: and the number of native children sent to Sierra Leone for education continued to increase: the Colonists were building houses and shewed other marks of growing prosperity: cultivation was reviving: and a considerable amendment had taken place in the general appearance of the Settlement." 107 The abolition of the slave trade that year promised to remove one of the major obstacles to the Company's efforts at commerce and civilisation; the CMS missionaries and the colonial economy seemed prepared to step into the vacuum.

Though a commercial failure from the outset, the Company's colonization venture had made considerable progress toward its other goals by 1807. The Directors felt that their

105 Elizabeth Melville, A Residence at Sierra Leone (London, 1849), p. 239.

106 CO 270/11, Council Minutes, 11 November 1802; Directors' Report, 1808, p. 8.

107 Ibid., p. 10.
capital had been expended to good effect. The myth that Africans were intellectually inferior, they claimed, had been soundly refuted by their colony's experiences with both settler and native. They had proved that Black men could labour and produce profit without the necessity of chains and whips, and Africa's potential as a market and a source of tropical agricultural products had been indicated. 108 The Company had contributed to the successful Abolition campaign by providing factual information on African and slave trade conditions and by showing that a viable alternative did exist. 109 Even in its failure Sierra Leone had been a comparative success: faced with unusual difficulties of climate, ill-prepared settlers, the French and Temne wars and limited financial resources, the colony's great achievement has been its survival.

It has been proverbial that the first settlers generally fail [the African Institution reported in 1807,] though their successors rise on their ruins: and if such is the fate of adventurers in the fertile, well known and well defended field of our own Sugar Colonies, where they have few or no public establishments to maintain, it would surely be unjust to regard the losses of the Sierra Leone Company... as a proof that colonization in Africa can never be carried on to advantage... [If] the course of events at Sierra Leone be compared with the conduct of the first European settlers


in the Antilles and on the American continent, whether English, French, or Spaniards, the result will be highly advantageous to the African character.\textsuperscript{110}

Considering all the obstacles, Thomas Ludlam concluded, "the wonder is that the Colony exists, rather than that it has not flourished."\textsuperscript{111}

Then, when the colony's existence seemed no longer in doubt, when the successors seemed ready to emerge from the early ruins, when it promised to continue healthy and even to flourish, Henry Thornton introduced to the House of Commons a petition "That leave may be given to bring in a Bill, for revesting in His Majesty the lands and possessions which have been granted to the Sierra Leone Company, and for limiting the duration of the Company."\textsuperscript{112} The Crown was being asked to assume government responsibility in Freetown; the Company would continue in existence as a trading and land-holding concern only until it could clear up its accounts, liquidate its property and pay its debts.\textsuperscript{113} Because the Company's major objective, the abolition of the slave trade, had been achieved, Thornton argued that it no longer justified the

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\item \textsuperscript{110} \textit{African Institution Report}, 1807, pp. 49-50, 51-2.
\item \textsuperscript{111} BT 6/70, Ludlam to Directors, 29 October 1806.
\item \textsuperscript{112} Commons Journal, Vol. LXII (1806-7), pp. 71-2.
\item \textsuperscript{113} Ibid.; BT 6/70, Macaulay to William Fawcener, 29 November 1806; John Reeves to the Lords of the Committee of Council for Trade and Plantations, 24 November 1806; Directors' Report, 1808, p. 6.
\end{itemize}
expense of its continued existence.114

The Directors' decision was not a sudden one and, despite Thornton's argument, was not occasioned by the Abolition Act. In 1803 the Directors had suggested that the objects for which the colony was instituted, may be more easily and effectually attained by transferring the civil and military Authority to the Crown.115 Financially strapped and with no guarantee of a government subsidy, the Directors feared that the Company was bound for insolvency, and if that were to happen the colony itself would disappear as it had in 1789. Verbal negotiations were conducted with the Secretary of State, Lord Hobart, who seemed inclined to accept the government's responsibility to support the Maroons and Nova Scotians and to recognize the navigational importance of Sierra Leone to Britain's West African interests.116

114 Times, 22 November 1806, reporting on a meeting of the Company proprietors. Though abolition had not been confirmed at that time, Thornton considered it as "being in a fair train of being accomplished".

115 WO 1/352, Thornton to Castlereagh, 6 December 1805, Enclosure, "Statement of the Court of Directors of the Sierra Leone Company of the present State of the Colony of Sierra Leone and of the reasons for proposing an early Transfer of the Civil and Military Authority into the hands of Government".

The Company sought to retain its property and commercial rights, and asked for assurance that the slave trade would continue to be outlawed in Sierra Leone. A But the renewal of the war with France drew Hobart's attention elsewhere, and the matter was not brought to any conclusion.Abortive negotiations were begun in 1804 and again in 1805 as the Directors saw "permanency" as the only cure for the colony's ills, and Crown control as the only guarantee of permanency. As long as settler rights were maintained and slavery interests did not assume influence over the colony, the Directors felt that no disadvantages would result from their surrender of authority. In case the government's hesitation arose from the Company's conditions of transfer, the Directors decided to offer Sierra Leone to the Crown on any terms the government itself "deemed advisable". No compensation was demanded for colonial lands, and if any profits derived from the sale of Company buildings and land actually in use, those profits would be donated for the promotion of agriculture and civilization in the colony. A petition was accordingly presented in parliament, and after

117 WO 1/352, Thornton to Hobart, 15 April 1803.
118 Directors' Report, 1804, p. 44.
119 WO 1/352, Thornton to Castlereagh, 6 December 1805; BT 6/70, Thornton to William Pitt, 9 October 1805.
120 Ibid., Thornton to Fawcett, 4 October, 17 November 1806.
six months of debate the Sierra Leone Transfer Act received Royal assent on 8 August 1807. 121

On 1 January 1808 the Company flag was replaced by the Union Jack amidst full ceremonies in Freetown. 122 All government rights were assumed by the crown and government buildings were transferred without compensation, and though the Company was entitled under the Act to continue as a commercial operation for another seven years, the Directors voluntarily dissolved the Company and instructed its officials to liquidate all its property in Sierra Leone. 123 The occasion, a modern scholar has noted, "is one to be remembered as marking the establishment of the first Crown Colony— if the fiasco of Senegambia be excluded—in tropical Africa." 124 Yet the impact of the event went relatively unfelt in Freetown. Thomas Ludlam, who had succeeded the governorship on Day's death in 1806, was asked to remain as the Crown's governor, and other Company officials retained their posts until replacements could be sent from England. 125 Nor was the

121 Times, 21 January, 30 July 1807; Commons Journals, LXII (1806-7), 20 January, 3 February, 21 April, 29 July 1807; Directors' Report, 1808, p. 3.

122 Adm. 51/4435, Log Book, HMS Derwent, Captain Parker, 1 January 1808.

123 Directors' Report, 1808, p. 6. The Company's commercial property, consisting of lands, buildings and their contents, was sold to the Crown for just over £2,000 in January 1809. CO 270/11, Council Minutes, 2 January 1809.

124 Hallet, Penetration of Africa, p. 347.

125 CO 268/6, Castlereagh to Ludlam, 24 October 1807; CO 1/352, Directors to Governor and Council, 4 November 1807.
Directors' influence in the colony noticeably diminished. They regrouped themselves, with some important additions, as the African Institution, to promote commerce and civilization in Africa without becoming directly involved in trade or government. 126 Though he was now the Crown's representative, Ludlam continued to report to the former Directors and asked them to extract information from his dispatches and pass it on to the British government as they saw fit. 127

The government seemed willing to let the Company retain rule Sierra Leone. "I have no doubt", Macaulay advised Ludlam, that Government will be disposed to adopt almost any plan which we may propose to them with respect to Africa provided we will but save them the trouble of thinking. 128

Government officials discussed policy matters with Thornton, Wilberforce and Macaulay, and sought their advice on every move. 129 As one Scottish wag was moved to remark: "If a convoy was to sail for Africa, the merchants at Lloyd's, were referred to Mr. Macaulay, to ascertain the time of its sailing."

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127 Cf. CO 267/24, Ludlam to Thornton, 13 May 1808.
128 CO 267/25, Macaulay to Ludlam, 4 November 1807.
129 CO 267/24, Macaulay to Cooke, 11 April, 26 August, 6, 10 September 1808, Wilberforce to Castlereagh, December 1808; CO 267/31, Macaulay to Robert Peel, 13 June 1811, Macaulay to Chapman, 17 June 1811, Macaulay to Peel, 22, 23 August 1811.
departure.\textsuperscript{130} The African Institution contained an extremely influential body of men, including a royal duke, thirteen lords, four bishops, and twenty-seven Members of Parliament,\textsuperscript{131} in addition to the only men with direct experience of African colonization. Macaulay felt free to draw up a blueprint for British colonial policy in Africa, all of whose points were eventually adopted, suggesting to Castlereagh that the government should assume control of the various private forces on the west coast and unite them under a presidency at Sierra Leone, establish a Vice-Admiralty Court at Freetown to adjudicate captured slave-ships, and appoint consuls to native chiefs to promote abolition and encourage legitimate commerce.\textsuperscript{132}

Since 1803 the Nova Scotians had come to an accommodation with the Sierra Leone Company that appeared to give them as much influence and independence as they could possibly expect in Sierra Leone's current situation. Even the transfer to the Crown, for the above-mentioned reasons, failed to disrupt the new relationship. As long as their Company allies retained the real power, they could expect to continue as an elite community, favoured from above and emulated from

\textsuperscript{130}James MacQueen, \textit{The Colonial Controversy} (Glasgow, 1825), p. 94.

\textsuperscript{131}\textit{African Institution Report}, 1807, first page, list of Committee members, 15 July 1807.

\textsuperscript{132}WO 1/352, Macaulay to Castlereagh, 8 May 1807.
below. Then in April 1808 the Crown, acting on Wilberforce's advice, appointed as its new governor Thomas Perronet Thompson.\footnote{133} Thompson, like Day five years before him, was a newcomer and therefore not involved in the intricacies of the situation that awaited him. But whereas Day had brought fresh air to a tension-charged atmosphere, Thompson was disturbing a comfortable arrangement.

In his first dispatch to Castlereagh Thompson revealed a favourable impression of Freetown:

> I found the appearance of the colony in many respects more favourable than I had any reason to expect. The quantity of stock of all kinds which fill the streets of the Settlement, and the very respectable appearance of the inhabitants, are strong indications of prosperity and of the increase of domestic industry. . . .

> The loyalty and spirit of His Majesty's Maroon subjects has been conspicuous from the time of their arrival in this Colony; and the settlers from Nova Scotia have more than once exhibited great resolution in the defence of the Colony.\footnote{134}

But he also found the "seeds of evil" in the apprenticeship of native Africans, including some Africans liberated from a slave ship by HMS \textit{Derwent} in March 1808 who had been released in the Company's custody and bound, for a twenty dollar fee, to Nova Scotian settlers.\footnote{135} Thompson's anger increased when he discovered some of the "Liberated Africans" from the \textit{Derwent}

\footnote{133}{CO 268/6, Castlereagh to T. P. Thompson, 11 April 1808.}
\footnote{134}{CO 267/24, Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 1, 27 July 1808.}
\footnote{135}{\textit{Ibid.}; CO 270/10, Council Minutes, 15 August 1808.}
chained in Fort Thornton for trying to escape their new masters.\textsuperscript{136} Releasing the captives, Thompson embarked on an attack upon the colonial system that had enslaved them. "Supposed apprenticeships" were immediately declared null and void, and with a new council, having removed all Company hold-overs, Thompson made slave dealing under any disguise a capital offense without benefit of clergy.\textsuperscript{137} At the basis of the problem, he felt, was the cozy relationship between the Company and the Nova Scotians. The settlers had grown to expect government support and to claim it as a right. The high wages paid by the Company had resulted in a surplus of "skilled artisans and "a perfect Famine" of common labourers; to perform the more basic work in the colony, including the cultivation of the settler farms, the colonial establishment had had recourse to the apprenticeship of free Africans. To correct the situation Thompson lowered wages for the artisans and gave the Liberated Africans part-time government employment and lands upon which to build farms for themselves.\textsuperscript{138}

For all its haste and bitterness, Thompson's attack was accurate, for the Nova Scotians' prosperity was built on

\textsuperscript{136} CO 267/24, Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 2, 2 August 1808; CO 270/10, Council Minutes, 15, 18 August 1808.

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., 15, 18 August 1808.

\textsuperscript{138} CO 267/24, Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 2, 2 August, No. 3, 8 August, No. 4, 2 November 1808, \textit{Sierra Leone Gazette}, 15 August 1808.
an artificial foundation. Only the government-sponsored construction projects and the availability of inexpensive apprentice labour kept them in a favourable economic position. As the new governor pointed out, the fortifications and public improvements would soon be completed and the artificers would then be forced to compete with African labourers for the very work which they most abhorred. 139 But Thompson was led beyond his economic analysis to a direct attack on the Nova Scotian culture. He criticized their apparent materialism as it was displayed in the building of ostentatious homes, and the relationships their daughters had with the Europeans disgusted him, 140 The Maroon he saw as "fearless", "honest" and "vigorous", "a savage half-reclaimed, the Spartan of Africa", and much to be preferred to the Nova Scotian whom he described as vain, loquacious, full of the idea of his own importance, insidious, fawning, and suspicious, with all the vices of civilization and none of the greatness of the savage, an Athenian in everything except his knowledge and his virtues. 141

As a military man, Thompson regarded the Spartan more favourably than he did the Athenian.

Symbolic of the old colonial relationship, in Thompson's view, was the Volunteer Corps, with its pomp and colour.

139 Ibid.

140 Ibid., Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 4, 2 November 1808.

141 Ibid.
ful uniforms, its proud Nova Scotian officers, and its incentive-destroying pay. Using a rumoured African threat as a pretext, Thompson pronounced the Volunteers "more dangerous to themselves than to their Enemies", and disbanded the Corps. In its place he created a new militia, to be called the African Brigade, which would include all males in the colony over age twelve. 142 Apparently misunderstanding the nature of the new militia, perhaps deliberately, a mass meeting of the Nova Scotians appointed ten delegates to inform the governor that after considering the Militia Act they had decided that they "could not comply with it." 143

Thompson's reaction was immediate and hostile. He assembled all the Nova Scotians together, publicly reduced their officers to the ranks, and appointed new officers over

142 Ibid.; CO 270/10, Council Minutes, 15 October 1808, Defence of the Colony Act; CO 267/24, Sierra Leone Gazette, 15 October 1808. By August 1808 privates in the Volunteer Corps were receiving three shillings and corporals 4 shillings per day on duty. Ibid., Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 3, 8 August 1808.

143 Ibid., Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 4, 2 November 1808. The Nova Scotian meeting was informed that the Militia Act made them liable for service outside the colony, including the West Indies, for corporal punishment, and for military discipline in their daily lives, CO 267/25, Sierra Leone Gazette, 17 December 1808. In actual fact, however, the Act expressly stated that the Militia was to be used for colonial security only and was never to be sent elsewhere, and that corporal punishment was forbidden. According to Thompson the speakers at the meeting claimed to have read the Act, and may therefore have been using it as an excuse to win opposition to the governor.
them "entirely from the white inhabitants". The ten delegates were disqualified from holding any civil or military office in the colony and told "that they might consider themselves as men under a charge of high treason". Belabouring the assembled settlers as "obstinate", "degraded and disgraced", Thompson proceeded to decry "the baseness of the Nova Scotian character" which included "everything that is vile in the American and all that is contemptible in the European". Thrusting at the very heart of the Nova Scotian identity, he dismissed their religion as "the most absurd enthusiasm", and their political principles as "the most ignorant and wild notions of liberty". 144

Nova Scotian resistance was not to be dissolved by insult, however. Meetings continued at which the Militia Act was denounced and the people were urged not to enrol, and "placards of the most inflammatory nature" were posted in Freetown. 145 To meet the threat Thompson embodied all whites in the colony into a special constabulary, and he mobilized the Liberated Africans to be prepared for any sign of open violence from the Nova Scotians. By using the whites to oppose and control the settlers, Thompson was re-introducing a racial division into the colony that had been absent for five years. The Nova Scotian reaction was predictable: they

144 CO 267/24, Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 4, 2 November 1808.

145 CO 267/25, Sierra Leone Gazette, 17 December 1808.
"called upon each other to remember that they were black men
and had a common cause to support against the Europeans."¹⁴⁶

The power of the opposition ranged against them
proved too much for the Nova Scotians. With whites, Maroons,
and Africans supporting the governor, they had to harbour
their resentment internally while they outwardly complied
with the Militia Act. The governor was under no such con-
straint to hide his true feelings. The colony would be a
better place, he maintained, if the Nova Scotians were
exiled in a body. They owned all the best land in Sierra
Leone, yet were too idle to cultivate it themselves and too
obstinate to sell it; in the interests of the other inhabi-
tants they should be given their precious land grants on some
remote island. At the very least, Thompson advised Cast-
leaght, the Nova Scotians' "contaminating" influence should
be removed from the Maroons and Liberated Africans.¹⁴⁷ They
had been taught and encouraged by the Company government "to
follow European manners of living", something Thompson con-
sidered "utterly unnecessary". As an antidote, he announced
his intention to incorporate the Liberated Africans with the
Maroons, the people he found most compatible and least pre-

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.; CO 267/24, Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 4,
2 November 1808, No. 6, 17 February 1809; CO 270/11, Council
Minutes, 20 December 1808; SLA, Governor’s Letter Book, 1808-
11, "Circular to all Europeans in the Colony", 19 December
1808.

¹⁴⁷ CO 267/24, Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 4, 2
November 1808.
sumptuous, and to rely on their combined strength to "swallow up" the Nova Scotians and their "ignorant enthusiasm and republican frenzy". With the Nova Scotians removed from their former position and quarantined from the more innocent colonial inhabitants, the prosperity and demeanour of the colony could not fail to advance.148

After several years of cooperation and favoured status, the Nova Scotians were rejected and humiliated by their government. "De good times" seemed to be at an end. Their bitterness and sense of injustice were increased by the fact that the very people to whom they had considered themselves superior were now raised over them. Their well-paid jobs had been destroyed by Thompson's fifty percent reduction in wages, their trading monopolies and licenses were cancelled, their apprentice labour was free to compete with them in government and private employment, their influence was deliberately shunned, their way of life was belittled and condemned.149 Completely disaffected from the Thompson regime, they withdrew once again into their own society.150 They could no longer hope to ensure their communal survival through an alliance with an outside group. As

148 Ibid., Thompson to Castlereagh, 31 December 1808; CO 267/25, Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 9, 15 August 1809; CO 270/11, Council Minutes, 8 February 1809, Petition to Lord Castlereagh.

149 Ibid.

150 CO 267/24, Thompson to Castlereagh, 31 December 1808.
had been the case in the past, the settlers found that for the security and independence they so desired they would have to segregate themselves in an enclosed and exclusive community.
CHAPTER XII
The Ransomed Sinners
The Restoration of Confidence, 1808-15

After his militia re-organization Thomas Perronet Thompson initiated a series of reforms intended to correct the administrative weaknesses inherited from the Sierra Leone Company, and to displace the Nova Scotians from their dominant position in Sierra Leone and its culture. The settlers, he decided, had been left unregulated and undisciplined; they felt free to insult European traders and even to defy their government on the grounds that "This is Free-Town". Determined to eradicate such "abuses", Thompson seized upon "the Name of Freetown" which, he wrote, "has been found to have been perverted to Purposes of Insubordination and Rebellion". He therefore decreed that from 31 December 1808 the subversive name should be replaced with the more aggressively loyal "Georgetown".  

The American terminology "dollars and cents" had also to be removed as a threat to constituted British authority, and proper British currency returned to colonial usage. Since the Nova Scotian chapels perpetuated

1 CO 270/10, Council Minutes, 11 November 1808; CO 267/25, Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 6, 17 February 1809.

2 CO 270/10, Council Minutes, 11 November 1808. The old dollar was converted to four shillings and sixpence sterling.
notions of independence, he requested funds for a new Church of England building and establishment and hoped to entice the settlers away from their "absurd enthusiasm". Public works, government apprenticeships and trading licenses, on which Nova Scotian prosperity was dependent, were reduced, and rates of pay declined to less than one-half the former level.

To "swamp" the Nova Scotians and "smother" their degenerative influence, Thompson took steps to raise the Maroons to a favoured position in the colony. To that end he introduced a law, with the apparent concurrence of the Maroons themselves, to regulate Maroon marriages and to legitimize their "bastard" offspring. Hitherto the Maroons had followed their own customary form of marriage, and though Thompson declined to condemn the practice, he did find that "great uncertainty hath arisen with respect to the rightful title to lands and other property now in the possession of the said Maroons". Maroon marriages and children were to be registered by 1 December 1808 to be considered lawful, and thereafter they were to "conform to the custom of His Majesty's European subjects in the matter of marriage". As a

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4 CO 270/11, Council Minutes, 8 February 1809, Petition to Lord Castlereagh.

5 CO 270/10, Council Minutes, 8 October 1808.
further step Thompson tried to convince the British government to bring more Maroons from Jamaica, an event that "would be of incalculable advantage to this Colony." When he left Georgetown briefly in October 1809, Thompson appointed the Maroon's acknowledged headman, Montagu James, as a one-man "provisional government . . . to execute the office of Governor and Council." A peace treaty with the Temne in 1808 contained provisions to encourage African settlement in the colony, as British subjects, and their marriage to favoured colonists; the Maroon, Charles Shaw, but no Nova Scotian, was a signatory to the Treaty. Shaw was later placed in charge of all grumetts and Liberated Africans hired by the government.

By such positive actions Thompson hoped to unite the Maroons, indigenous peoples and Liberated Africans in a community of interest with himself. They were accompanied by the more negative tactic of an attack on the former Company government and its relationship with the erstwhile Nova Scotian elite. Thompson condemned the Company-settler "frolics" as orgies and charged that Davies and Ludlam had encouraged immoral relationships between European men and

6 CO 267/25, Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 7, 7 March 1809.
7 CO 270/11, Council Minutes, 17 October 1809.
8 CO 270/10, Council Minutes, 11 November 1808.
9 CO 270/11, Council Minutes, 21 March 1809.
Nova Scotian women. Abortion and even infant murder were common, he added, in an attempt by the government and the settlers to remove any mulatto evidence of their sexual irregularities and thereby to "maintain uninjured the religious reputation of their Colony". The Nova Scotian women so used were then married off to unsuspecting Maroon men, a double debasement in Thompson's view for it introduced moral corruption into the Maroon society by nature of the women involved and it brought the simple Maroons into close association with the politically and religiously diseased Nova Scotian community.

To support his general contentions Thompson brought forward evidence of one specific case. Anne Edmonds, daughter of David Edmonds "of the first family among the religious part of the black population", was accused of giving birth to a mulatto male child on 10 August 1807. According to Thompson this was the third mulatto bastard produced by daughters of that prominent family. On the day of delivery the children of Edmond's relatives were brought to play outside the home, so that Anne's cries might not be heard. The baby was immediately taken away and murdered. The Company government tried Anne for murder, but the case was dismissed for lack of evi-

10 Ibid., 25 October 1809, 6 April 1810; CO 267/25, Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 6, 17 February 1809.
11 Ibid., Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 9, 15 August 1809.
dence. Soon afterwards Anne Edmonds was married to John Morgan, a promising young Maroon employed in the government service. Despite the cloud of suspicion hanging over the bride, Dawes and Ludlam had promoted the marriage and attended the wedding feast. 12

In a dramatic resurrection of the case in 1809, Thompson erected a gallows at Fort Thornton inscribed "To the memory of a Mulatto male child found murdered in this Colony August 10, 1807, to remain till the execution of the guilty." A reward of one-hundred guineas was offered for information leading to a conviction. Thompson asked the CMS missionary Nylander, who was himself married to a Nova Scotian, to announce the purpose of the gallows and reward from the pulpit. When Nylander refused Thompson went personally to the church and read his announcement; Dawes and Ludlam abruptly walked out of the service, the latter sheltering Anne under his arm. 13 Thompson then indicted the recently-married Anne Morgan "for concealing the death of a bastard child." A "Jury of Matrons", all Nova Scotian, examined her and found that she had indeed given birth to a child, and

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12 CO 270/11, Council Minutes, 25 October 1809; CO 267/25, Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 6, 17 February 1809. The details of the birth and disappearance of the baby were corroborated by Thomas Ludlam, but he maintained that Anne was personally ignorant of the fate of her child and that no proof could be found to indicate the perpetrator of the murder.

the trial jury thereupon found her guilty and sentenced her
to death.\textsuperscript{14} On the appointed day of execution Anne was
brought to the gallows but at the last minute Thompson
commuted her sentence to banishment for life.\textsuperscript{15} The maligned
Company officials demanded an immediate and full enquiry
into Thompson's charges and in particular their alleged con-
nivance at immorality, infanticide and the enslavement of
free Africans. The public enquiry, which reported after
Thompson's replacement as governor, declared that Thompson's
allegations were unsupported; Dawes and Ludlam were cleared
of all suspicion and Anne Morgan received a free pardon and
permission to return to the colony.\textsuperscript{16}

Though ultimately unsuccessful in punishing or even,
apparently, humiliating those involved, Thompson's revival
of the Anne Edmonds-Morgan case did provide a striking illus-
tration of the close alliance between the Company and the
Nova Scotians in the latter days of Company rule, and of the
toleration shown by the Nova Scotia community toward sexual
liaisons with white officials. According to evidence at the
second trial Mrs. Edmonds had sat in her parlour while her
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\textsuperscript{14} CO 267/25, African Herald, 27 May 1809. The trial
jury consisted of three Nova Scotians, three Europeans and
six Maroons. There was no attempt to prove that Anne had
murdered the baby, but only that she had given birth and had
connived at the concealment of it, evidently a capital offense.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.; CO 270/11, Council Minutes, 3 April 1809.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 8 March, 3, 6 April 1810; CO 267/27,
Columbine to Liverpool, 13 April 1810.
\end{flushleft}
daughters Anne, Martha and Nancy had revelled in the next room with various European gentlemen. Two former governors, Ludlam and Dawes, had graced Anne's wedding in February 1809, though the fact of the illegitimate birth had been well established in the first trial. Ludlam's gesture of comfort during Thompson's tirade from the pulpit indicated sympathy at least for the victim, and when Anne returned from her banishment in 1810 she was welcomed by a joyful Nova Scotian community and the blessings of the CMS missionary.\footnote{CMS, CA 1/E2, No. 31, Nylander to Pratt, 11 April 1810; CO 267/25, Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 6, 17 February 1809, African Herald, 25 February, 27 May 1809; CO 270/11, Council Minutes, 25 October 1809.} In an equally forceful but less exotic incident, the Company-Nova Scotian alliance again formed ranks to ward off Thompson's attacks. In July 1809 Jane Nicol, the Nova Scotian wife of the former European Company carpenter, was arrested and jailed by Thompson as a common scold. The familiar Dawes and Ludlam team intervened on her behalf, and when they were rejected they organized a petition for Jane's release. "Popular agitation" resulted in the Nova Scotian camp. Thompson was denounced as a tyrant, and violence was expected, at least by the governor. To forestall it he created a special constabulary from the colony's Europeans, but the Company veterans refused to participate.\footnote{Ibid., 21 July 1809; CO 267/25, Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 10, 2 October 1809.} The anticipated outbreak did not occur, but the Company role in supporting or even seeding the
Nova Scotian expressions of disloyalty was an indication of how well buried were the memories of February 1793 and September 1800.19

Unfortunately, for his own comfort, Thompson underestimated his opponent. If the objects of his attacks in Sierra Leone remained relatively unstung, his charges of mismanagement, corruption and slavery were an embarrassment to the former Directors of the Company. Wilberforce, Thornton and Macaulay were shown Thompson's dispatches by the Secretary of State's office, and they began agitation for his recall. In April 1809, scarcely eight months since his arrival, Thompson was advised by Lord Castlereagh to hand over the government to Captain Edward Columbine and to return to England.20 A member of the African Institution, Columbine arrived in February 1810 and began to dismantle Thompson's "reforms".—Georgetown reverted to Freetown, Thompson's appointments as mayor, aldermen, and councillors were removed, and the former Company clique including the resilient Dawes and Ludlam were exonerated and restored to office.21

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19 In February 1793, soon after the commencement of Dawes' governorship, the people had threatened to run him out of the colony over the delay in granting their farmlands. In September 1800, while Ludlam was governor, an attempt was made to fulfil the threat. See Chapters VIII and X.

20 CO 267/24, Wilberforce to Castlereagh, 7 December 1808; CO 268/6, Castlereagh to Thompson, 3 April 1809.

parting humiliation Thompson was arrested for debt arising out of his reorganization of the colonial currency. In August 1809 Thompson had issued a paper currency, without proper authority from the Treasury, and the holders of the notes discovered that they could not legally be redeemed. Though the new governor and council quashed his arrest, Thompson left Freetown in a flurry of resentment and recrimination. 22

By 1810, however, it was too late to recapture the comfortable pre-Thompson atmosphere in Freetown, even had Columbine been so inclined. The abolition of the slave trade and the settlement of the Liberated Africans in Sierra Leone had changed the face of the colony. Following Zachary Macaulay's suggestion, the government stationed the West Africa Squadron off the coast to intercept illegal slave ships and to bring their human cargoes to Freetown for adjudication. 23 The slaves who were landed, if the Vice-Admiralty Court determined that they were legally free, were settled in the colony according to the policies of the governor in office at the time. Each succeeding governor had his own conception of the best way to dispose of the Liberated

22 CO 270/10, Council Minutes, 8 August 1808; CO 268/6, Liverpool to Columbine, 19 December 1809; CO 267/27, Columbine to Liverpool, 6 March 1810.

Africans. Ludlam, during his brief term as Crown governor, had apprenticed over 150 freed slaves to various colonists and to the colonial government for a fee of twenty dollars. Thompson, though he declared all Ludlam's apprenticeships null and void, and disavowed the practice as thinly disguised slavery, continued to allow a few of the newcomers to be apprenticed, but the majority were set free unconditionally and were offered land and employment.

Thompson's reaction against the Nova Scotians determined his Liberated African policy. He did not want them exposed to the vices and corruptions of settler society, and besides he felt that there were already too many skilled artisans in Freetown. He therefore gave them part-time employment clearing vacant land for new farms, and in the meantime granted small plots for them to begin cultivation immediately. Finding that the new farmlands were too far from Free-

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24 For a summary to 1827 see Kenneth Macaulay, The Colony of Sierra Leone Vindicated (London, 1827), pp. 5, 18. The term "Liberated African", though it was not adopted for official use until 1821, will be used here to designate all Africans not indigenous to Sierra Leone who were enslaved, re-captured at sea by the Royal Navy, and declared legally free at Freetown. Contemporary usage included the terms "captives", "recaptives", and "recaptured Negroes".

25 CO 267/24, Sierra Leone Gazette, 1 August 1808.

26 Ibid., "Liberated Africans held by Colonists as free servants or Apprentices", 31 December 1808; CO 270/11, "Report on Apprentices", 8 February 1809.

27 CO 267/24, Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 4, 2 November 1808, 31 December 1808; CO 270/11, Council Minutes, 8 February, 21 March 1809. Wages paid by Thompson were nine-pence per day, and the farming plots averaged two acres each.
town, he decided that another "settlement nucleus" was needed, which would have the multiple function of providing administrative efficiency, maintaining the segregation of the unsullied newcomers, creating new sources of provisions for Freetown itself, and establishing a line of defense against possible African attack. Accordingly, he laid the first stone for a "Kingston in Africa", on 10 April 1809, at Hog Brook five miles from Freetown.28 Ten years later, this practice having been followed by later governors, Freetown was ringed by a dozen such Liberated African villages.

Captain Columbine, in his general reversal of Thompson's policies, returned to apprenticeship for Liberated Africans, and some were employed in the public service as labourers. But by 1810 the increasing number of freed slaves being spilled into the colony made it impossible for them all to be effectively employed as labour, either for private citizens or for the government. Columbine's permanent successor, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Maxwell, began the practice of enrolling the strongest Liberated Africans in the Royal African Corps or in the Royal Navy. This took the top one-third of the total number landed during his term of office. The second-rank from among the Liberated Africans was then made available for local apprenticeship. The remainder, about half the total, were allowed to settle in rural villages.

28 Ibid., 8, 10 April 1809.
surrounding Freetown. It was the villages that attracted the attention of Lieutenant-Colonel Charles MacCarthy who followed Maxwell as governor. He saw in them an opportunity to train, civilize and Christianize the Liberated Africans and, through them, the African continent. With the Rev. Edward Bickersteth, Secretary to the CMS in England, MacCarthy arranged for resident CMS superintendents in each Liberated African village where the people, as government apprentices, would be trained as carpenters, masons, blacksmiths or other trades, as well as in agriculture, and generally educated to become self-supporting, Christian British subjects.

29 Cf. PP 1812, Vol. X, "Papers Relating to a Recruiting Depot on the Coast of Africa", pp. 1-9 (301-09); PP 1813-14, Vol. XII, "Papers Relative to the Slave Trade", pp. 322-23; African Institution Report, 1815, pp. 53-63. CO 267/91. Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix A-12, contains an inaccurate list of Liberated Africans landed in the colony, but it may be taken as an indication of their numbers, and probably as a minimum, since it can be assumed to have included all those whose exact disposal was noted. The list shows for 1808-78, 1809-280, 1810-1,087, 1811-545, 1812-2,230, 1813-446, 1814-1,903, 1815-1,296, or a total of 7,885. Maxwell submitted a detailed "Statement of the Disposal of Captured Negroes received into the Colony to 9 July 1814" (CO 267/38): "Settled in the Colony (i.e. the villages)— 2757 Royal Africa Corps— 1861 Women married to soldiers— 65 Left the Colony— 419 Apprentices in the Colony— 347 Royal Navy— 107 Apprentices outside the Colony— 68 Servants at Goree— 12 At the Lancashire School in England— 3 Stolen from the Colony— 3 Died— 283 Total received— 5925."

30 CO 267/42, MacCarthy to Bathurst, No. 74, 31 May 1816; CO 267/44, Pratt to Bathurst, 31 August 1816; CMS, Pro-
Thompson's efforts to displace the Nova Scotians were both enhanced and discouraged by the arrival of the Liberated Africans. On the one hand, with an average influx of about 1,000 new citizens a year, the Nova Scotians were becoming a decreasingly significant numerical proportion of the colonial population. But on the other hand, the Liberated Africans were treated in special ways and kept distinct from the older Black community, and Nova Scotian contact with them was almost exclusively in the master-servant context as Liberated Africans were apprenticed to settler farmers, traders and artisans. That superiority and exclusiveness, by now characteristic of the Nova Scotians, was therefore extended toward the Liberated Africans. At the same time the Liberated African presence replaced the economic opportunities that Thompson had tried so hard to remove. The newcomers had to be fed, clothed and housed, new streets, buildings and barracks were necessary, the bureaucracy had to expand to service a larger population and, above all, abundant cheap labour was available. All this meant contracts to suppliers, jobs for artisans, and apprentices to perform the basic labour for the additional profit of the skilled tradesman or entrepreneur employing them. For more than a decade following Thompson's recall the Nova Scotians were in a position to

take advantage of the activity inspired by the Liberated African Department. Though "swamped" statistically and politically impotent, their economic and social position was not immediately damaged. 31

It was that architect of early British African policy, Zachary Macaulay, who first proposed the apprenticeship of the Liberated Africans, an idea that may have arisen from the Company and settler experience with local Africans before the Abolition Act. 32 As Secretary to the Company in England, Macaulay advised Ludlam in May 1807 to apprentice freed slaves arriving in the Company's territory. 33 The people so apprenticed, as has been noted, were sold to settlers, placed in chains, at least occasionally, when they tried to escape, and were subjected to harsh punishments by their Nova Scotian masters and mistresses. 34 The principle behind apprenticeship, as proclaimed in Macaulay's original proposal, was that it was intended to train the Liberated

31 From 1812 to 1822 the Liberated African Department expended a total of £410,118 in Sierra Leone, CO 267/91, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix A-16. Much of the enterprise thus created was captured by Nova Scotians already established as artisans and traders.

32 WO 1/352, Macaulay to Castlereagh, 8 May 1807. On the apprenticeship of local Africans see Chapter XI, footnotes 80-83.

33 CO 267/25, Macaulay to Ludlam, 1 May 1807, enclosed in Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 9, 15 August 1809.

34 CO 267/24, Sierra Leone Gazette, 1 August 1809; CO 267/25, African Herald, 29 July 1809; CO 270/11, Council Minutes, 8 February, 8 July 1809, 3 February 1810.
Africans in useful skills and expose them to the superior civilization of settler society. In practice apprenticeship was looked upon, by the colonial government, as a convenient means of providing subsistence for the Liberated Africans, and by the settler masters as a source of unpaid bound labour, often house servants or woodcutters who gained no new skills from the experience. Thompson tried to put the principle into practice in 1808–09 by offering male apprentices only to skilled persons, and in keeping with his anti-Nova Scotian policy all but one of them went to Maroons. A few female apprentices were placed as servants, but Thompson kept an eye on their treatment.\textsuperscript{35} As Liberated African numbers increased Thompson had to allow more apprentices to Nova Scotians, though most still went to Maroons, and he tried to maintain the principle that the purpose of apprenticeship was the training of the man, not the benefit of the master.\textsuperscript{36}

Under Columbine the training principle was, charac-

\textsuperscript{35}Ibid., 8 February, 25 October 1809; CO 267/24, Sierra Leone Gazette, 31 December 1808. Only four Liberated Africans were apprenticed to Nova Scotians by Thompson, compared to sixteen to Maroons. Three of the Nova Scotians were women, receiving female apprentices as servants. The Maroon recipients were farmers, carpenters and masons, and some women. Thompson evidently wanted to give the free labour to Maroon artisans as an advantage over their Nova Scotian rivals.

\textsuperscript{36}Cf. CO 267/27, "Report on Apprentices", 1 January 1810. Strangely, Thompson gave an apprentice to David Edmonds, father of the then-banished Anne, and to Susannah Caulker, who had lost one girl apprentice and had been sentenced to jail for mistreating her.
teristically, once again lost from sight, perhaps an inevitability when so many Liberated Africans had to be found homes and employment. Of nine-hundred apprentices placed before 1812, only three-hundred were apprenticed to trades. When a captured slave ship was brought into the harbour the settlers made application to the governor and, if approved, received indentures on the freed slaves for three to fourteen years, depending on their age, and could employ them as they saw fit in their houses, farms or businesses. "There is scarcely a family among the settlers, however poor, that has not one or more of the taptives", a Methodist missionary reported in 1811. "Some indeed have twenty". Apprentices fetched and chopped wood, cleared and cultivated land, pounded rice, carried water and swept floors. Nova Scotian washerwomen had Liberated African girls to carry and beat the laundry, leaving the mistresses free to negotiate the business end of the operation. Nova Scotian contractors directed apprentice labour on the public works, merchants and traders had apprentice porters to carry their goods, and fishermen were rowed by apprentices to their fishing grounds, and undoubtedly relied on their assistance to haul up the nets. Support had of course to be provided, but for the businessman or farmer this support cost less than half the income that could be

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37 African Institution Report, 1815, pp. 53-5.
gained from a hardworking apprentice. 39 Though new apprentice numbers declined as Maxwell recruited for the army and McCarthy established rural villages under CMS supervision, several hundred were added to Columbine's total and they continued to serve the settlers as before. 40

Despite their apparent cooperation in the disposal of Liberated Africans, the Nova Scotians' progressive alienation from the government did not end with Thompson's recall and the discrediting of his policies. After only fourteen months in Freetown, Columbine's dysentery forced him to resign. His departure, the death of Ludlam and the resignation of Dawes, deprived the Nova Scotians of their closest friends in power. 41 Columbine's replacement, after a brief interlude, was Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Maxwell, formerly commander at Senegal, who brought his own council members with him.


40 As above on apprentice conditions. Maxwell apprenticed 347 Liberated Africans in the three year period ending July 1814. CO 267/38, "Statement of the Disposal of Captured Negroes received into the Colony to 9 July 1814", signed by Charles Maxwell.

41 CO 267/27, Columbine to Liverpool, 24 July 1810; CO 270/11, Council Minutes, 10 October 1810; CO 270/12, Council Minutes, 30 April 1811; CMS, CA 1/E2, No. 32, Nylander to CMS, 25 July 1810.
from outside the colony. Though favourably impressed with physical conditions in Freetown, Maxwell was distressed by the state of defences and the disposition of neighbouring Africans who, he feared, were planning an attack. Like Thompson before him he saw salvation in a new militia, and in November 1811 he duly proclaimed his new Militia Act. Maxwell's Act contained all the provisions erroneously attributed to Thompson's: British military discipline, including corporal punishment, would be enforced; militiamen could be sent out of the colony for exercises or duty; and penalties were set for non-enrollment or non-attendance at defensive exercises. This time the Maroons were united in opposition with the Nova Scotians; indeed, Maxwell reported that the Jamaicans inspired and led the resistance. A petition from nine Maroon leaders advised the Governor that they would gladly fight for Britain but would not submit to military discipline, particularly the humiliation of flogging.

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42 CO 270/13, Council Minutes, 1 July 1811; CO 267/30, Maxwell to Liverpool, No. 1, 29 July 1811.
43 Ibid.; CO 267/34, Maxwell to Bathurst, No. 22, 4 November 1812.
44 CO 270/13, Council Minutes, 20 November 1811; CO 267/30, Hopkins to Liverpool, 10 December 1811. (On Thompson's Act and the specific fears of the settlers, cf. above, Chapter XI, footnote 143.
46 CO 267/34, Maxwell to Bathurst, No. 22, 24 November
Meetings, murmurings and rumours of disloyalty spread through Freetown. Of twelve Commissioners of the Court of Requests, only one took the Oath of Allegiance required by the Militia Act; the others, six Maroons and five Nova Scotians, refused and were dismissed.\textsuperscript{47} Because he had "a sufficient force of the captured Negroes, completely organized, to overawe, and repress their turbulence", Maxwell did not fear overt violence, but he was galled by the "insolence" and "insubordination" of the population.\textsuperscript{48} At first he merely dismissed any militia evaders from the public service and deprived them of Liberated African apprentices, but when their "arrogance" continued he proclaimed that all males from thirteen to sixty who were not enrolled were outlaws, and their property forfeit to the Crown.\textsuperscript{49} This action appeared to humble the colonists, and most consented to swear the Oath and join the Militia, but almost one-hundred Maroons and fourteen Nova Scotians gave up at least £5,515 worth of Freetown property in addition to twelve cultivated farms rather than submit to Maxwell's "tyranny".\textsuperscript{50} "The broad arrow" was

1812, enclosing Maroon Petition, 27 June 1812.

\textsuperscript{47} CO 270/13, Council Minutes, 16 January 1812. The one to take the oath was Warwick Francis, a Nova Scotian.

\textsuperscript{48} CO 267/34, Maxwell to Bathurst, No. 22, 24 November 1812. "Captured Negroes" was Maxwell's term for Liberated Africans.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.; CO 270/13, Proclamation, 26 September 1812.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., "List of Houses and Lands forfeited for eva-
painted on their doors, and many of them left Freetown and established a separate settlement just outside the colonial boundary. A delegation of Maroons not content to abandon their property and homeland went to England, where they won the active support and sympathy of Granville Sharp, the African Institution, The Philanthropist magazine, and several prominent Quakers.

Most of the Militia "non-Conformists", as Maxwell termed them, found bush-living incompatible, and began drifting back to Freetown in 1813 to take the Oath and be restored of their property. Maxwell's successor quietly revoked the

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51 CO 267/92, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix B-6, "Statement by Eli Ackim"; CO 267/34, Maxwell to Bathurst, No. 26, 1 December 1812; CO 270/14, Council Minutes, 6 September 1813. "The broad arrow" comes from Ackim's evidence. The Philanthropist, IV, 1814, p. 91, described it as "The broad R".


53 CO 270/14, Council Minutes, 29 March 1813; MMS,
proclamation and allowed the remainder to return without penalty. Yet the Militia controversy of 1812 was not without lasting significance. The joint reaction of the Maroons and Nova Scotians, as even Maxwell recognized, bound the two groups together as they had never been since 1800. Their unity was based on a common fear of government interference in their private lives, and their determination to be treated as "freemen" according to their own definition. Opposed to them and united with the governor were the Liberated African troops, on whom Maxwell, as had Thompson, relied for security. Better prepared as soldiers to accept the government's authority, and as yet unfamiliar with the democratic ideology of the trans-Atlantic immigrants, the Black troops won a reputation for loyalty that the Maroons and Nova Scotians had surrendered. The latter had revived the practice of looking to England for redress of grievances imposed by local officials, a tradition that dated back to Thomas Peters.

Correspondence, West Africa, Sierra Leone, Box I, 1812-34, File 1, 1812-20, J. Healey and T. Hirst to Dr. Coke, 24 April 1813; CO 267/36, Maxwell to Bathurst, No. 41, 12 May 1813, No. 43, 15 June 1813.

54 For example, CO 270/14, Council Minutes, 23 May 1816.

55 CO 267/36, Maxwell to Bathurst, No. 43, 15 June 1813.

56 CO 267/34, Maxwell to Bathurst, No. 22, 24 November 1812. By Maxwell's account the Maroons had learned "outrageous deportment and extravagant pretentions" from their Nova Scotian neighbours, particularly concerning their rights and dignities as free citizens.

57 Ibid., and No. 28, 1 December 1812.
In however much favour he held the Liberated Africans, Maxwell could not rely on them to fill the administrative ranks or service positions available to Black colonists. Only the Nova Scotians, and an increasing number of younger Maroons, possessed the education and literacy in English that were required of clerks, teachers, jurors and policemen. Thompson had promoted the careers of several Maroons, and by the end of his governorship there were in fact more Maroons than Nova Scotians serving as clerks in the colonial service. Maroons John Thorpe, Herbert Williams, Stephen Gabbidon and John Morgan were earning over £100 a year under Thompson, and Morgan became acting-Clerk of the Crown, the senior position available. Nova Scotians continued to dominate the teaching profession, filling four of the six posts in Freetown, but their salaries were less than half those of the senior clerks. As a result of their militia "non-conformity" Maxwell dismissed the highest ranking Maroon clerks, including Thorpe, Williams, Gabbidon and Morgan, but he could only replace them with Nova Scotians. Loyal Nova Scotian Warwick Francis replaced non-conformist Maroon Charles.

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58 CO 270/11, Council Minutes, 16 August, 1 September, 31 December 1808, 1, 21 March, 1 April, 1 May, 30 September, 1 October 1809; CO 267/24, Sierra Leone Gazette, 14, 27 August 1808; SLA, Governor's Letter Book, 1808-11; George Rickards to the Schoolmasters of Freetown, 7 July 1818, to John Thorpe, 2 August 1808, to John Morgan, 1 September 1808, to Phillis Hazeley, 1 September 1808, to Thomas Ludlam, 10 September 1808, to Mr. Robertson, 29 April 1809, to John Duncan, 30 September 1809, to Mr. Robertson, 31 October 1809, Memo to S. Curry, 27 February 1810.
Shaw as the governor's liaison with the indigenous nations.\(^{59}\)

To form a jury Columbine, Maxwell and MacCarthy habitually selected four members each from the Nova Scotian, Maroon and European communities. While this practice may have reflected communal suspicion, as one chief justice suggested, it also indicated that the two coloured groups contained sufficient numbers of people qualified by education and property to act as jurors.\(^{60}\) The Police Court was chaired by a European, with two Maroon and two Nova Scotian officers who had additional responsibilities as constables.\(^{61}\) The Court of Requests, hearing minor civil cases, contained six commissioners from each of the Nova Scotian and Maroon communities until the 1812 militia dispute, when a complete slate of Nova Scotians was appointed. Governor MacCarthy later restored the Maroon Commissioners to the Court.\(^{62}\) But if their participation was essential at the lower levels of the colonial administration, the Nova Scotians were never intimately in-

\(^{59}\) CO 267/35, Treasury to Henry Goulburn, 8 September 1812, Enclosure, Governor Maxwell's Accounts, 1 July - 31 December 1811; CO 270/13, Council Minutes, 5 January 1813.

\(^{60}\) CMS, CA 1/M1, Edward Fitzgerald to CMS, 3 May 1821; PP 1826-7, VII, "Report of the Commissioners", p. 92 (358); CO/267/92, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix C-17, Hamilton to Rowan, 1 June 1826; Walker, Church of England Mission, p. 152.

\(^{61}\) CO 270/11, Police Court Act, 29 May 1810.

\(^{62}\) Ibid., Council Minutes, 1 September 1810; CO 270/13, Council Minutes, 1 September 1811, 12 January 1812; CO 270/14, Council Minutes, 17 September 1814, 6 September 1816; SLA, Acts of Governor and Council, 1800-31, 26 September 1812.
volved in their government, and certainly never in a capacity with effective power or influence. The mayors and aldermen were all European throughout this period, as were the magistrates and presidents of the courts. Furthermore the Nova Scotian role was matched by an identical Maroon contribution, a fact that prevented any feeling of uniqueness or proprietorship on the Nova Scotians' part with regard to their position as citizens of the colony.

The political isolation of the Nova Scotians was enhanced by the concerns and issues that attracted the attention of the governor and council. Local matters, of import to Freetown residents, were largely ignored as European officeholders jockeyed for place and engaged in political or personality disputes of their own making. 63 Except for the militia resistance, which was in a way a result of his major interest, Maxwell tended to treat the people of Freetown as a background to his serious concern: the defence of the colony and the development of the Royal Africa Corps. 64 McCarthy, too, gave scant space in his dispatches to the Freetown population, devoting his energies to the effective abolition of the slave

63 For example, CO 270/11, Council Minutes, 17, 24 March, 6, 10, 11, 12 and 15 April 1810; CO 267/28, Columbine to Liverpool, 5 September 1810. But for occasional references to appointments and criminal cases, the coloured citizens of Freetown were almost completely ignored by Columbine, who was taken up with challenges to his authority from among the "Thompson party" and from his chief justice, Robert Horpe.

64 Cf. Maxwell's dispatches, CO 267/34 - /38, and Council Minutes, CO 270/11 - /14, passim.
trade, the settlement of the Liberated Africans and, for a time, the transfer of Senegal and Goree to the French. The British government issued few directives, being content to let this insignificant hip-pocket of empire solve its own problems. It took two years for MacCarthy to receive a reply from Lord Bathurst on an urgent matter of currency reform. As a consequence the Nova Scotians were less governed than kept under control. Their role in government may have been minimal, but the government's role in their lives was almost equally slight.

The situation was in many ways reminiscent of 1794 when, after the French occupation, the council had left the settlers their own sphere of activity and the Directors had rejected the opportunity to become involved in internal politics. Adding to the similarity, in November 1811 Lord Liverpool instructed Maxwell to enforce strict economy, and public expenditures were reduced. As they had when the Directors issued those orders in 1794, the Nova Scotians became "convinced... that they must depend entirely on their own exertions". Their intention, and that of their government, was that agriculture should become the means to a

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66 CO 267/42, MacCarthy to Bathurst, No. 71, 23 April 1816.
67 See Chapter IX, above.
69 Ibid.
viable and independent economic existence. 70

But by 1811 the ownership of land in the colony was hopelessly confused. At the time of the transfer to the Crown there was practically no active cultivation by Nova Scotian settlers and few of them even had accurate descriptions of the land they owned. 71 Of five-hundred allotments made during the 1790s, only sixteen were registered formally with the Company government. The rest were claimed, and some were occupied, but largely because of the quit-rent provision the people declined to accept official grants. As a further complication, many Nova Scotians had received no land at all, and none had received the full allotment, promised by Clarkson, of twenty acres per man plus ten for his wife and five for each child. The farms that were allotted represented a one-fifth part of the amount due to each family, and averaged slightly less than 5-1/4 acres in size. 72 By 1802 the amount of land claimed by individual Nova Scotians had declined by 40 per cent, from 2,559 to 1,528 acres, and the

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70 Ibid.; CO 267/34, Maxwell to Bathurst, No. 26, 1 December 1818; The Philanthropist, V, 1815, "Colony of Sierra Leone", p. 245, "Number of Acres under Cultivation, 18 December 1814".

71 CO 267/24, Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 4, 2 November 1808.

average claim measured about 6 acres, but of these only 650 acres were cultivated. Governor Day's dropping of the quit-rent in 1903 made little practical impact, despite its symbolic importance and the goodwill it inspired, since the uncertainty then prevalent in the colony dissuaded the people from registering lands threatened by hostile Temne.

The situation in 1808 was therefore such that Freetown was ringed with lands claimed by Nova Scotians, largely idle and uncleared, for which no formal proof of ownership was available. During the preceding fifteen years lands had been sold and bequeathed, forfeited and left intestate, all without a record having been kept. Even the town lots in Freetown were not always registered, though 200 Nova Scotians did have legal title from the Company to their original town lots, valued in 1808 at £24 to £100 each. In an effort to bring some order and legality into a confusion which, he discerned, was a restricting influence on agricultural development, Thompson appointed a commission in October 1808 to hear land claims and issue final deeds whenever pos-

73 Montague, Ordinances, IV, "Names of Settlers Located on the first Nova Scotian Allotment"; WO 1/352, "Queries Proposed by Commodore Hallowell, with the Governor and Council's Answers, 12 January 1803"; CO 267/91, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix A-1, "Comparative Statement of Nova Scotians settled in Sierra Leone as returned in 1802, and as existing in March 1826".

74 CO 267/34, Macaulay to Peel, 15 January 1812.

75 CO 267/27, Columbine to Liverpool, 27 February 1810; CO 267/91, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix A-26, "Register of Town Lots", 1826.
sible. Disputes between claimants were to be decided by a jury of twelve settlers. The work was long and slow, however, and the two commissioners were far from completed when Thompson learned of his recall. Many grants were filled in so hastily that they were left unsigned or neglected to specify the grantee. As a final gesture Thompson declared in April 1809 that anyone planting a crop on unoccupied land before 1 January 1810 should automatically become the freehold owner of that property.

Columbine, according to pattern, declared all Thompson's grants null and void, an act that could be interpreted as favourable to the Nova Scotians since it freed them from the necessity of cultivating the lands they claimed. Though he kept the Thompson commission in operation, Columbine's efforts were no more satisfactory than his predecessor's in bringing any final order to the land-grant chaos. Often

76 CO 270/10, Council Minutes, 17 October 1808, Bill for regulating and regularizing Grants of Land; SLA, Acts of Governor and Council, 1800-31, 17 October 1808; CO 267/24, Sierra Leone Gazette, 22 October 1808.

77 CO 267/27, Columbine to Liverpool, 27 February 1807, Enclosure, "Report of the Land Commissioners"; CO 267/34, Macaulay to Peel, 15 January 1812, Enclosure, Memo by George Rickards, December 1809. One of the commissioners had a crippled writing-hand, a handicap that was bound to militate against speed and efficiency in the land-granting operation.


79 Ibid., 1 January 1811; SLA, Acts of Governor and Council, 1800-31, 1 January 1811.
he simply re-issued old un-registered Company grants, im-
patiently stroking out the quit-rent provision and handing
it back to the claimant without further record being kept. When the people in November 1811 looked to their farms for a
livelihood, they found that they were still not possessed of
grants that could be recognized in a British court.

In an uncharacteristic move the British government
ordered that all land claims in Sierra Leone be settled and
ratified once and for all. This was to include the full Nova
Scotian allotment as promised by Clarkson, since, as Liver-
pool wrote to Governor Maxwell, "the Government feel bound
to fulfil the contract entered into by the Sierra Leone
Company". Receiving Liverpool's order in the midst of the
Militia controversy, Maxwell was not inclined to be liberal.
He could not avoid offering the Nova Scotians their complete
measure of twenty or more acres per family, but he could add
conditions to those grants. First he declared that no grants
would be issued to militia evaders, and then he set quit-
rents, surveyor's fees and other requirements on the new
grants. Town lots were to carry quit-rents ranging from ten
shillings to two shillings and sixpence annually, depending

80 CO 270/11, Council Minutes, 9 May 1810; CO 267/27,
Columbine to Liverpool, 27 February 1810, Enclosure; "Report
of the Land Commissioners"; CO 267/34, Macaulay to Peel, 15
January 1812.

81 CO 268/6, Liverpool to Maxwell, 18 January 1812;
also contained in CO 267/34, Liverpool to Maxwell, No. 6,
18 January 1812 and CO 270/13, Council Minutes, 1 June 1812.
on location, and for country lots the quit-rent was set at threepence per acre. Twenty-nine shillings and sixpence were charged as fees for surveying, printing and recording town grants, with an additional shilling per acre for farmlands. Furthermore all lands granted had to be cleared and fenced and a habitable dwelling built upon them or the grant would be forfeit.\textsuperscript{82} Two-hundred and twenty-two Nova Scotians came forward to register their Freetown homes, including several children of the original settlers making posthumous claims on behalf of their parents, but few sought a secure title to their country lands and there is no record of any claim for the full "Clarkson" allotment.\textsuperscript{83} There were at least fourteen forfeitures, the most outstanding being the loss of 525 acres of country land for refusal, evidently on principle, to pay a quit-rent due of only £3 5 7 1/2.\textsuperscript{84} According to Chief Justice Robert Thorpe, Maxwell took over 260 acres of cultivated land belonging to Nova Scotians for use as a private plantation.\textsuperscript{85} Most of the Nova Scotians, though they were afraid to risk the loss of their Freetown property, were content to let their farms remain unregistered,

\textsuperscript{82}SLA, Acts of Governor and Council, 1802-31, 1 June 1812; CO 270/13, Council Minutes, 1 June 1812.

\textsuperscript{83}CO 270/13 - /14, Council Minutes, 7 July 1812 - 31 December 1813, passim.

\textsuperscript{84}CO 270/14, Council Minutes, 16 May, 15 November.

\textsuperscript{85}CO 267/65, Petition of Robert Thorpe, Esq., n.d. item 2.
perhaps confident that a later governor would reverse the current policy as every preceding governor had done. Since no surveyor was available to define the country lots in any case, it must have been difficult to take Maxwell's proclamations seriously.

Maxwell's governorship did not, therefore, see the fulfilment of that long-sought goal, the establishment of the Nova Scotian settlers as yeoman farmers on self-sufficient plots of land. A survey in 1814 showed only 36 Nova Scotian farms under cultivation, with an average size of less than 4-1/2 acres. Even these few farmers resided in Free-town, visiting their farms occasionally or leaving it to the care of their Liberated African apprentices. Only two Nova Scotian farms were producing export crops, owned by George Carroll and Lazarus Jones, and they measured but fourteen and six acres respectively in 1814. "On account of one governor revoking what a former one has granted," William Allen ex-

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86 CO 267/34, Maxwell to Liverpool, No. 8, 1 May 1812; CO 267/38, Maxwell to Bathurst, personal, 23 December 1814.

87 The Philanthropist, V, 1815, "Colony of Sierra Leone", p. 245, "Number of Acres under Cultivation, 18 December 1814". Total cultivated acreage was 593-1/2, of which more than half was owned by Europeans. Maxwell himself was listed as owner of 250 cultivated acres.

88 CO 267/34, Maxwell to Bathurst, No. 22, 24 November 1812; CO 267/53, MacCarthy to Goulburn, 28 May 1821.

plained, "confidence in the security of property was weakened". That insecurity, the general resentment at the revival of quit-rents, and the association of physical labour with slavery or at least with lower-class status, kept the Nova Scotians from cultivating even the twenty percent allotments granted by the Company. The full allotment remained a political issue and a symbolic grievance against the government, but until it was offered without any conditions attached the Nova Scotian settlers refused to accept it.

Only one serious attempt was made by the Nova Scotians to stimulate agricultural activity and to promote export production. In 1811, a free Black American, Paul Cuffe, arrived in Freetown aboard his own boat with an all-Black crew. An energetic and entrepreneurial spirit, Captain Cuffe was seeking information in Sierra Leone with a view to organizing another colonization movement for freed slaves from the United States. It was on Cuffe's suggestion that "some of the most respectable of the settlers" formed The Friendly Society, a

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90 Allen, Life, I, p. 185.


92 See Chapter XIV and Epilogue, below.

cooperative endeavour that would share agricultural information, encourage cultivation, and market Nova Scotian crops in England. When Cuffe proceeded to London he met Thomas Clarkson, William Allen, William Wilberforce, and others of the former Abolition Committee, and informed them of the existence of the Friendly Society. The English group had always seen agriculture as the foundation of African regeneration, and in the Friendly Society they found new hope for that object. In January 1814 therefore they founded the "Society for the Purpose of Encouraging the Black Settlers at Sierra Leone, and the Natives of Africa generally, in the Cultivation of their Soil, and by the Sale of their Produce." Under the chairmanship of Thomas Clarkson, the English society was organized to provide seeds, information and equipment to the Friendly Society, and to act as agents in England for the disposal of settler-grown produce. A fund of £500 was raised for the purpose, to be given in free grants to support settler production, with John Clarkson and William Allen responsible for the dispersal of the money. In addition the Englishmen lobbied members of the British cabinet for the unconditional granting of full allotments to the Nova Scotians and for preferential trade terms to assist imports from Sierra Leone.94

By 1818 the Friendly Society, and the English society formed to succour it, passed out of existence. The obstacles to successful commercial agriculture were too great. The government declined to revise the land grant scheme, evidently believing that Liverpool's order of January 1812 was sufficient, and therefore no incentive was powerful enough to move the Nova Scotians onto the land. Chancellor of the Exchequer Vansittart sponsored a Bill through the Commons to set preferential tariffs on Sierra Leone imports, but it was rejected in the House of Lords. African coffee continued to carry a duty eight times that imposed on West Indian coffee, African pepper was burdened with a tariff of 150 percent, the price of ginger was more than doubled as it passed through customs, and foreign tallow was given preference over African palm oil for the use of British soap-makers.\textsuperscript{95} But more than anything else, agriculture had to compete with other more profitable activities among the Nova Scotians. The kind of cultivation intended by the Friendly Society was plantation agriculture, not peasant farming, and rewards were expected from trading profits on the sale of the produce abroad. This development depended on large-scale local production, efficient means of shipping and well-organized marketing in London. In contrast to the capital requirements and complications of such an enterprise, Freetown offered manifold commercial advantages.

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., I, pp. 233, 298, 338; African Institution Report, 1809, pp. 12-27.
opportunities for the individual settler with nothing but initiative and a little credit.

Trade with the surrounding Africans had offered the Sierra Leone colonists an economic alternative to agriculture ever since 1787, when the original settlers found it easier to sell their farming implements than to use them. The colony's unproductive soil, the recurrent frustrations over land acquisition and, after 1808, the ever-increasing local market for all kinds of African produce made commerce more secure, more profitable and less subject to external interference from government policy than was agriculture. The Liberated Africans had above all to be fed, and colonial production could not hope to satisfy the demand for provisions. New arrivals were dependent on public support, and even when they received lands the amounts were too small and the preparations too great for them to create a surplus beyond their own needs, at least for several years. Freetown labourers, apprentices, craftsmen and officials added to the demand for food supplies. For example, CO 270/11, Council Minutes, 8 February 1809. Many Nova Scotians owned boats and had established trading contacts with Africans in the interior, and others had trading posts in African territory, giving them an organizational advantage over more recent arrivals who tried to initiate trading operations. During the second decade of the nineteenth century it was the Nova Scotian traders who con-
veyed African goods, particularly rice and cattle, to Freetown tables. 97

Commonly the enterprising Nova Scotian would procure trading goods on credit from a resident European merchant or agent of a British company, and exchange those goods for African produce in the interior. On his return the settler would deposit the produce with the merchant, and after deducting the amount of his credit the merchant would give the balance to the trader. He was then in a position to repeat the operation. 98 Obviously this was extremely "petty" trading: a few boatloads a year did not create a merchant prince, and the largest piece of the profit went to the European merchant capitalists who extended the initial credit and did the final marketing of the produce in the colony. 99 The Nova Scotians had the necessary contacts and were willing to risk

97 Cf. CO 267/42, MacCarthy to Bathurst, No. 68, 18 April 1816; CO 267/47, MacCarthy to Bathurst, No. 144, 9 May 1818; CO 271/2, Sierra Leone Gazette, 6 January 1821; M. F. C. Easmon, "A Nova Scotian Family", in Easmon, Eminent Sierra Leoneans, p. 57; CO 268/5, Governor and Council to Director, 6 February 1796; Methodist Magazine, XXXV, 1812, p. 796, Warren to Coke, 13 November 1811; The Harbinger, May 1856, p. 77; Registrar General, Freetown, Conveyances, Vol. 3-0, Euba, Annie, and others, from Leonard George, 8 November 1845, an island and trading factory granted to Jesse George by King Samna of the Bullom in 1816; African Institution Report, 1816, Appendix H, "Report on Sierra Leone".

98 CO 267/30, Hopkins to Liverpool, 10 December 1811; The Philanthropist, V, 1815, "Colony of Sierra Leone", p. 244.

99 Cf. CO 267/65, Turner to Bathurst, No. 17, 26 February 1825.
the hazards of interior trade, but without capital of their own they remained merely middlemen between the suppliers of European and African goods. Still it is significant that through such endeavours they could procure a better livelihood, and evidently pursue a more pleasant way of life, than through the cultivation of quit-rent tainted farms.

Only a few Nova Scotians built up their commercial operations to the extent that they could import European trade goods directly. Of 47 importers in 1818, only 7 were Nova Scotian.\(^{100}\) The most successful of them, James Wise, brought £2,461 worth of British goods into the colony from 1916 to 1818.\(^{101}\) Another source of supplies did exist, after 1819, in the slave ships and their contents which were auctioned by the government after having been captured and condemned. There were frequent Nova Scotian purchases at the auctions, though few of them could be considered substantial. The typical Nova Scotian purchase would be valued at from ten to twenty pounds, and would consist of muskets, gunpowder, tobacco, cloth, metalware and spirits. Few sales of more than sixty or seventy pounds were recorded to Nova Scotians, though David Edmonds bought a complete slave ship for seventy pounds in 1821. About two dozen Nova Scotians

\(^{100}\) CO 267/47, MacCarthy to Bathurst, No. 167, 31 August 1818.

\(^{101}\) CO 267/91, Commissioners’ Report, 1827, Appendix A-30, Imports, 1816, 1817 and 1818.
seem to have been regular customers at the slaver sales, and from the small size of their transactions it appears likely that they then carried those goods personally into the interior to engage in direct trade with the Africans. The volume of their trade was therefore similar to that of the settlers trading on credit, though they used their own capital and presumably realized a greater percentage of profit on the cheaper auction-bought trade goods.\footnote{102}

Most of the African produce was consumed in Sierra Leone, but there had been a regular and increasing trade in other African items, particularly gold, ivory and hides, for export. In 1816 a European resident in Freetown, John McCormack, initiated a significant trade in African timber. Sierra Leone merchants leased large tracts of land from African chiefs and employed local labour to cut and transport the timber to Freetown.\footnote{103} A Navy Board contract for Sierra Leone timber stimulated the trade so that by 1821 it was regarded as the colony's staple crop and accounted for ninety percent of exports.\footnote{104} Because of the large invest-

\footnote{102}The inferences here are taken from FO 84/9, /15 and 750, "Proceeds of Sales and Sales Accounts" (of condemned slave vessels) in the early 1820s.

\footnote{103}FO 84/63, Memorial of John McCormack to George Canning, 22 January 1827; FO 84/21, E. Gregory and E. Fitzgerald to Canning, 29 April 1823; PP 1826–7, "Report of the Commissioners", p. 4 (270).

\footnote{104}CO 267/47, MacCarthy to Bathurst, Nov. 1817; 0 February 1818; FO 84/9, Gregory and Fitzgerald to Castlereagh, 5 January 1821; FO 84/63, Memorial of John McCormack to Canning, 22 January 1827.}
ment required for equipment, storage and shipping facilities, and advance wages and rents, the timber industry was beyond the means of most Nova Scotians. In 1819 James Wise shipped 236 tons of timber to England, and in 1824 he was described as one of the principal traders in the product, but timber remained for the most part a European monopoly. Its value to the Nova Scotians lay chiefly in the employment it gave to artisans and overseers, the increased flow of import earnings it brought to the colonial economy, and the enlarged harbour traffic that offered opportunities to the smaller suppliers of food and other basic articles. The latter was of particular benefit to the Nova Scotian retailers in Freetown. Led by the redoubtable James Wise, the settler retailers formed a company of traders to buy wholesale on better terms, and in 1817 they unsuccessfully petitioned the governor to prohibit the large European importers from disposing of their goods at the retail level. Competition in international trade was beyond them, but they had hoped to preserve the local custom for themselves.


106 CO 267/3, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix A-28, Exports for the Year 1819; CO 270/18, Council Minutes, 1 October 1824.

107 FO 84/63, Memorial of John McCormack to Canning, 22 January 1827; FO 84/21, Gregory and Fitzgerald to Canning, 29 April 1823; CO 267/47, MacCarthy to Bathurst, No. 137A, 20 February 1818.

108 CA 1/E5A, No. 98, Garnon to Pratt, 5 March 1817.
The general aspect of the colony presented during Maxwell's governorship was one of reasonable prosperity, particularly for the trans-Atlantic immigrants.\(^{109}\) The 982 Nova Scotians and 807 Maroons lived in distinct districts, with the Nova Scotians concentrated in the eastern part of the town and the Maroons in the west.\(^{110}\) Though most public buildings were in disrepair, the people's homes were usually attractive and substantial. Most had basements, and a double-storeyed frame structure with the ground floor used for storage was popular. Almost all settler homes had front gardens and verandahs, giving the town "a singular appearance."\(^{111}\) Thatched roofs were gradually being replaced by

\(^{109}\) Ibid.; CO 267/30, Maxwell to Liverpool, No. 1, 29 July 1811.

\(^{110}\) PP 1812, X, "Report of the Commissioners", p. 8 (284). In 1811 the population of Freetown was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Men</th>
<th>European</th>
<th>Nova Scotian</th>
<th>Maroon</th>
<th>Native</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note: "Native" figure did not include Kru servants or Liberated African Apprentices.)


\(^{111}\) Methodist Magazine, XXXV, 1812, p. 797, Warren to
shingles or stone, especially after a fire in 1810 destroyed twenty-six houses and demonstrated the dangers of a grass roof.112 The Nova Scotians in particular placed great importance on their homes and treated them as an economic investment as well as a symbol of their wealth and status. In 1813 the average Nova Scotian house was assessed at £56.16, and 10 were valued at over £200, owned by the more successful traders.113

An abundance of food was available in the market place, and most British products were on sale at prices equal to those in Britain.114 Rice sold for threepence half-penny per quart, beef at sixpence a pound, a pair of shoes cost twenty shillings and a coat twenty-five. Since a skilled artisan could earn from three to four shillings a day, a clerk up to £100 a year, and traders or retailers more again, most of the Nova Scotian townsmen were well able to provide for their families in some comfort, particularly

Coke, 13 November 1811. Of 380 family homes, 241 were frame, 136 wattled and 3 of stone. PP 1812, x, "Report of the Commissioners", p. 8 (284).

112 Ibid.; CQ 270/11, Council Minutes, 26 March 1810; CO 270/13, Council Minutes, 19 August 1812; CO 271/1, Sierra Leone Gazette, 9 August 1817.

113 The Philanthropist, V, 1815, "Colony of Sierra Leone", p. 246ff, "Property Owners, Freetown, 11 October 1813". The purchase of a house, Thompson told Castlecrag in 1809, was "the first object" for the young settler. CO 267/24, Thompson to Castlecrag, No. 4, 3 November 1809.

114 CO 267/30, Maxwell to Liverpool, No. 1, 29 July 1811; CMS, CA 1/E5A, No. 98, Garnon to Pratt, 5 March 1817.
when it was virtually universal for settler wives to earn additional income, and most owned their own houses. Those unable to work were supported by the Society for the Relief of the Colonial Poor. Health services were good, including the provision of vaccine inoculation, and basic care was free. There were from six to seven-hundred Krumen in the colony who could be hired for fifteen to twenty shillings a month, and they, with the Liberated African apprentices, performed the daily drudgery in settler lives freeing the settlers themselves for more leisurely pursuits. The Nova Scotians, Paul Cuffe reported in 1811, "are very fond of having a number of servants about them."


116 CO 270/13, Council Minutes, 16 January 1813; CO 270/14, Council Minutes, 13 February 1813.


119 Harris, "An American's Impressions of Sierra Leone", p. 39, quoting Cuffe to Allen, 22 April 1811.
One popular way to spend leisure time was drinking in one of the "enormous number of houses that are allowed to retail spiritous liquors." Even after the governor cancelled several licences, there still remained eighteen public houses owned by settlers where the Nova Scotians and Maroons could indulge in their "fondness of spiritous liquors." An evening spent with locally-produced rum or beer cost only a few pence; for the more prosperous, imported British porter, ale or French wine was available at £1, £1.5 and £3 respectively per dozen bottles. The generous attention paid to alcohol may well have been responsible for the preponderance of quarrels, public disruptions and assault cases at the Quarter Sessions. There were but few more serious cases, and Nova Scotians were not often involved in them. In 1817, though they constituted about half the

120 CO 270/14, Council Minutes, 17 January and February 1816.


122 MMS, Sierra Leone, I, 1, Healey and Hirst to Coke, 24 April 1813.

123 For example, CO 267/24, Sierra Leone Gazette, 8 October 1808; CO 267/25, African Herald, 29 July 1809; CO 270/11, Council Minutes, 12 February 1811; CO 270/12, Council Minutes, 9 March 1811.

124 CO 270/11, Council Minutes, 15, 17 July, 6 September 1810; CO 267/30, Columbine to Liverpool, 24 January 1811; Adm. 1/1674, Commodore George Collier to John Croker, No. 15, 24 January 1820, Enclosure, Court Proceedings, 22 July 1813.
permanent Freetown population, only two Nova Scotians were among the dozen miscreants lodged in the public jail. 125

There were of course aspects of life that made Freetown less than a tropical paradise. Streets were so rutted and pot-holed that it was dangerous to drive down them; mules, dogs, cows and pigs roamed at will, the latter engaging in the unsavoury practice of rooting up arms and legs from the graves in the cemetery. 126 Toilets were uncommon, and for waste disposal people selected streets or public places. During the rainy season the houses were pervaded by dampness, and many were so flooded that they lost walls or foundations. 127 And the old fears of alien attack were never quite laid to rest. The War of 1812, with the United States, disrupted trade and caused a temporary food shortage in 1813; a naval battle between British and American brigs in the vicinity of Freetown made the war a reality and invasion a possibility to cause concern. 128 More ominous was

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125 CO 270/14, Council Minutes, 22 April 1817.
126 CO 270/11, Council Minutes, 21 June 1809; CO 267/39, Hopkins to Liverpool, 10 December 1811; CO 270/14, Council Minutes, 1 November 1814; CA 1/E5, No. 2, Batscher to CO, 24 June 1815.
127 CO 267/30, Maxwell to Liverpool, No. 1, 20 July 1811; CO 267/42, Dr. Stormouth to MacCarthy, 8 April 1810; PP 1821, XXIII, "Papers Relating to the Suppression of the Slave Trade", pp. 50-51 (304-05).
128 CO 267/36, Maxwell to Bathurst, No. 41, 10 March 1813; CO 268/19, Bathurst to Maxwell, No. 11, 29 August 1814; CO 267/40, W. S. Saunders to H. B. Hyde, 28 June 1815.
a threatened French attack, also in 1813. The alarmed Nova Scotians, reminded of 1794, formed five special militia companies and there were more volunteers than guns with which to arm them.\textsuperscript{129} A year later rumours persisted that the Temne were about to overwhelm the colony, in conjunction with a Liberated African uprising. A public meeting in December demanded arms for the settlers and the removal of all weapons from Liberated Africans in the colony. A petition expressing the demand was signed by 257 Nova Scotians, but the governor's confidence in his Liberated African troops precluded its fulfillment, and settlers involved in public demonstrations were threatened with fines and imprisonment.\textsuperscript{130} But for all this the Nova Scotians' physical circumstances were far from unhappy. They were reasonably well-fed, housed, clothed and employed, and if they remained bitter over the perpetuation of their land betrayal at least they had found a kind of economic independence and security in trade and the crafts. For the most part they were not touched adversely by their governors, and in their private lives they could retain a sense of separation and freedom.

The colonial schools continue to foster this sense of separateness. Earlier all the schoolteachers came from

\textsuperscript{129}CO 267/36, Maxwell to Bathurst, No. 30, 2 February 1813.

\textsuperscript{130}CO 267/40, Maxwell to Goulburn, n.d., enclosing petition dated 19 December 1814.
the Nova Scotian community, but even after Nylander of the CMS became Colonial Schoolmaster in 1806, and a Black Englishman named William Henry Savage was brought out as a teacher in 1808, four Nova Scotian teachers still conducted classes. In 1810-11 there were six schools in Freetown, half of them private institutions charging fees, and all but one of the teachers were Nova Scotian. Furthermore the Nova Scotians provided the largest number of pupils, and it was the general practice for them to be instructed separately from the Maroon and indigenous children. As had always been the case, the classroom both reflected and encouraged the Nova Scotian attitudes of righteousness and distinction. Teachers, parents and pupils resisted learning the Church catechism or "any instructions connected with the Establishment."

When the CMS missionary Garnon was appointed superintendent of schools

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131 CO 270/6, Council Minutes, 17 November 1801; CO 270/8, Council Minutes, 30 January 1802; CO 270/9, Council Minutes, 19 January 1803; CO 267/24, Sierra Leone Gazette, 15 August, 15 October 1808; CO 270/11, Council Minutes, 16 August, 31 December 1808; SIA, Governor's Letter Book, 1809-11, Rickards to Schoolmasters of Freetown, 7 January 1808, Rickards to Phillis Hazeley, 1 September 1808.

132 CMS, CA 1/E2, No. 31, Nylander to Pratt, 11 April 1810, No. 32, Nylander to CMS, 25 July 1810, No. 47, Nylander to CMS, 7 April 1811; Harris, "An American's Impressions of Sierra Leone", p. 38, quoting Cufte to Allen, 22 April 1811.

133 CMS CA 1/E3A, No. 36, Garnon's Journal, from 2 October 1816. Though Garnon suggests here that Nova Scotian and Maroon children had to be kept separate "or they are constantly fighting", the practice may have been dictated as much by their residential divisions as by positive policy.

134 Ibid., No. 98, Garnon to Pratt, 5 March 1817.
in 1818 and objected to the rampant non-Conformity being propagated in the classrooms, he was advised by Governor MacCarthy not to tamper with the system lest the Nova Scotians become alarmed. 135

The chapel, because more independent than the government-supported school, was even more significant as an institution of a separate Nova Scotian cultural existence. Though as a focus for political activity the chapels had declined in importance, they still served as the major social grouping in the Nova Scotian community. In the settlers' chapels, a chief justice observed, "the impulses of religious duty" were obeyed with "social harmony", for people generally attended chapel "with others of their own class and social circumstance". 136 Several of the original preachers, for the most part founders of their congregations, had died by 1810, but the traditions that had been established were perpetuated by their successors.

David George died in 1810, and was succeeded as Baptist pastor by Hector Peters, the man whom George had appointed to care for the Preston chapel in Nova Scotia. 137 Cato Perkins of the Huntingdonians had died in 1805, and

135 CMS, CA 1/E7, No. 21, MacCarthy to Pratt, 19 June 1818; CO 267/47, MacCarthy to Bathurst, No. 154, 26 June 1818.
136 CMS, CA 1/ML, Edward Fitzgerald to CMS, 3 May 1821.
137 Clarkson Papers, III, Hector Peters to Clarkson, 26 October 1817.
since he had been predeceased by his principal assistant, William Ash, it was John Ellis who assumed the Huntingdonian mantle. Moses Wilkinson was still alive and active in chapel affairs in 1811, but he was no longer in charge of the settler Methodists. In 1807 the Methodists, with their usual predisposition toward factionalism, had split into three separate groups termed the Great Meeting, the Interceding Meeting and Christ's Chapel. The main Methodist chapel, on Rawdon Street, was in the charge of Joseph Brown, George Carrol and Isom Gordon, all original settlers. There were in addition several "independent chapels", either loosely connected or unconnected with the main denominational chapels. Domingo Jordan and Warwick Francis each had small

138 Fyfe, "Countess of Huntingdon's Connexion", p. 55; WO 1/352, "List of Nova Scotians in Sierra Leone, 1802", shows Mary Ash as "widow of William Ash who drowned in December 1801".


140 Ibid., p. 318, George Warren to Francis Collier, 6 December 1811; Harris, "An American's Impressions of Sierra Leone", pp. 37-8, quoting Cuffe to Allen, 22 April 1811.

Baptist-leaning meetings, and Mrs. Amelia Buxton held services in her home under the rubric "the Speaking Congregation". 142

None of the preachers received a salary from their chapels, supporting themselves by regular week-day occupations, despite the considerable demands made by their chapel duties. It was usual for a chapel to hold services twice daily, at 5AM and 7PM, four or five on Sunday, and additional class meetings, testimonials, disciplinary sessions and examinations of probationers. 143 One Anglican Englishman paid tribute to the hardworking Nova Scotian preachers in a letter to the CMS in London.

Although these men cannot be supposed to be altogether qualified to expound the sacred writings, [Chief Justice Edward Fitzgerald wrote,] they are persons of superior intelligence in their class; and the rectitude of their general principles, as well as the example of their lives, coming in aid of their instruction, their labours have an evident beneficial influence. This humble cooperation cannot therefore be with justice and propriety overlooked or undervalued, in any notice, however summary, of what is done in this Colony for the cause of religion. 144

142 Harris, "An American's Impressions of Sierra Leone", p. 38, quoting Cuffe to Allen, 22 April 1811; CMS, CA 1/M1, Fitzgerald to CMS, 3 May 1821. Cuffe mentioned a Mrs. Mila Baxter as a preacher, but it is assumed here that Cuffe was referring to Mrs. Amelia Huxton who was described in WO 1/352, "List of Nova Scotians, 1802", as being in charge of the Speaking Congregation.

143 MM; Sierra Leone, I, 1, Healey and Hirst to Coke, 24 April 1813; CO 767/47, MacCarthy to Bathurst, No. 152, 1 June 1818; PP 1821, XXIII, "Papers Relating to the Suppression of the Slave Trade", p. 52 (306); CMS, CA 1/M1, Fitzgerald to CMS, 3 May 1821.

144 Ibid.
Many of the Nova Scotian Dissenters, particularly the Methodists, were regular in attendance at Anglican communion services, at least while Nylander, of whom they approved, conducted them, and they generally approached an Establishment clergyman for marriage, burial and even baptism. 145 But regarding "the church of England as bad for them", they adamantly refused to join it or to confess its faith. 146 In the other direction, toward the unconverted, they had a similar attitude of contact without the full embrace. All three of the major denominations sent settler missionaries to the Africans and accepted indigenous members in their chapels, and there was considerable evangelical work among the Liberated Africans, but non-Nova Scotians were not accorded full rights as equal members. Restrictions were placed on their teaching and preaching activities, and they were frequently reminded that, though Christians, they still did not possess the full measure of righteousness that the Nova Scotians themselves had gained through long and continuous communication with the Holy Spirit. 147


146 CMS, CA 1/ESA, Garnon to Bickersteth, 7 February 1817.

147 Methodist Magazine, XXXV, 1812, p. 639, Warren to Coke, 13 November 1811; MMS, Sierra Leone, I, 1, S. Brown, "General Observations Relative to the Sierra Leone Mission", n.d. (filed with 1819), and Petition of the Wesleyan Society,
Though they held themselves distinct from the colony's white Anglican officials, the Nova Scotian Christians were prepared to establish good relations with their co-sectarians in England. In 1793 the Methodists wrote to Dr. Thomas Coke in England asking that a missionary-pastor be sent to guide them. 148 David George accompanied John Clarkson to England in December 1792 where he remained until August 1793, making extensive contacts among English Baptists. He won their financial support for the building of a new chapel, and after the French raid the English brethren organized a campaign to ship clothes and supplies to the destitute Nova Scotians. 149 Cato Perkins met Lady Ann Huntingdon when he carried the settlers' petition to the Directors in 1793, and was "put to Collidge" by her ladyship to occupy his time while waiting for an interview with Company officials. 150 Despite


148 Fox, Wesleyan Missions, p. 209; Walls, "Nova Scotian Settlers and their Religion", pp. 24-5. They may have been hoping for an arbiter to heal the breaches in their ranks.

149 David George, "Life", pp. 483-84; Baptist Annual Register, II, p. 95, "Extracts of letters from Mr. David George, 1793", p. 255, "Sierra Leone, 1795", p. 256, "Extracts of letters from Mr. David George, 1795", and pp. 409-10, "Extract of a letter from Mr. David George, 1796".

150 Clarkson Papers, III, Cato Perkins and Isaac Anderson to Clarkson, 30 October 1793.
these promising beginnings no regular intercourse was established, and the settlers' experience with European non-
Conformists in Freetown tended to discourage cooperation and contact between Black and white Dissenters. Between 1795
and 1798, more than a dozen non-Conformist missionaries arrived in Freetown. Illness, discord, and the attractions
of the slave trade depleted their ranks, however, and two, Jacob Grigg and John Garvin, were banned from the colony by
Zachary Macaulay for their political activities. After arousing sectarian passions and wounding the preachers'
sensitivities with their efforts to impose missionary control over the settler chapels, the white interlopers left Sierra
Leone in the care of the Black pastors. 151

But in 1806, after eight years without European contact, the settler Methodists were ready to try again to avail
themselves of British help. No reply had been received to their request of 1793, and in the meantime factionalism and
division had reduced the main Rawdon Street congregation to half its previous numbers. The chapel's finances and physical

Society (London, 1899), pp. 478-80; Groves, Christianity in Africa, I, pp. 197-99; Fyfe, "Baptist Churches in Sierra
Leone", p. 57; Baptist Annual Register, II, pp. 409-10, "Ex-
tract of a letter from Mr. David George, concerning the Negro
Church, and the two missionaries, Messrs. Grigg and Radway,
dated 19 April 1796", and pp. 531-32, "Sierra Leone", 268/5,
Governor and Council to Directors, 6 February 1796, March 1797; Baptist Missionary Society, Papers relating to
Africa, Sierra Leone, 1795-96.
circumstances were less than healthy, and the ruling elders were becoming old and tired. Joseph Brown, one of the elders, wrote to Thomas Coke in July 1806 asking for a pious person from England to manage the Methodist society in Freetown. It took Coke some time to find a suitable candidate, or perhaps any willing candidate, and it was not until November 1811 that the Methodist missionary George Warren landed in the colony.

At first things went well between the Nova Scotian Methodists and their "superintending pastor". He was welcomed by the settlers as an answer to their prayers, and he wisely declined to interfere with the activities of the three local preachers and six class leaders, while assuming much of the administrative load and trying diplomatically to reunite the various Methodist divisions. Accompanying Warren were three English schoolmasters, Rayner, Healey and Hirst. With its curriculum liberally laced with Bible readings, prayers and enthusiastic hymn-singing, the school they established quickly drew ninety boys away from the CMS-run govern-

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152 Marke, Wesleyan Methodism in Sierra Leone, pp. 11-12, quoting Brown to Coke, 5 July 1806; Fyfe, "West African Methodists", p. 23.

ment school. When Warren died in July 1812, and Rayner left for home because of his ill health, the Mission was left in the care of Healey and Hirst. Like Warren they seem to have been sensitive to the settlers' feelings, and behaved more like assistants than managers to the local preachers. Under Maxwell's new land-grant scheme of 1812-13 a new deed had to be obtained for the Rawdon Street chapel, and a quit-rent paid of ten shillings a year. Either by design or oversight, the grant was made out to the Nova Scotian trustees and elders, who were elected by the people. Thus the congregation remained the proprietors of the chapel, and their legal independence from the Methodist Missionary Society was assured. Their relationship with the British church, through the attitude of Healey and Hirst and through the legal fact of the chapel deed, was one of cooperation rather than subordination.

This comfortable arrangement was to change, however, with the arrival of Warren's official successor as mission-

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154 Ibid.; Methodist Magazine, XXXV, 1812, p. 318, Warren to Collier, 6 December 1811, and p. 638, Warren to Coke, 13 November 1811; CMS, CA 1/E3, No. 4, Nylander to Pratt, 21 April 1812; MMS, Sierra Leone, I, 1, Healey and Hirst to Coke, 24 April 1813.

155 Ibid., Healey and Hirst to Coke, 16 June 1813, enclosing the deed dated 14 April 1813, and TV, 2, "Reply to statements made in the Blue Book, 1848, by Thomas Raston," n.d. (1848); Registrar General, Freetown, Conveyances, Vol. 17 December 1828, for Methodist Chapel at Rawdon Street, canceling title of 12 December 1814; Harke, Wesleyan Methodism in Sierra Leone, p. 14.
ary, William Davies, in 1815. As far as the Nova Scotians were concerned the missionary assigned to them was their ally and an expert adviser; the missionary was expected to present his credentials to the congregation and receive confirmation of his appointment from them, as did any Black preacher receiving a divine call. Warren had done this, Davies did not. The people felt that they had a further claim to be considered as allies in that they provided a part of the missionary's salary. But Davies considered himself the man in charge, gave orders to the local preachers, and besides developed a close relationship with the ruling establishment, becoming Freetown's senior alderman and a justice of the peace. In 1816 the settler leaders accused Davies of lording it over them, of being too proud for a Methodist preacher, and of paying too much attention to Government. They withdrew from him their sanction and financial support, rejected him as superintendent and refused to allow him to enter the chapel. Unable to dispute their legal right to dismiss him, Davies accepted a government posting as missionary-superintendent in the Liberated African village of Leopold.


157 Ibid., Davies to Fleming, 1 January 1817 and Davies to Wood, 1 January 1817; MMS, Sierra Leone and
Davies' successors were less obnoxious, and for several years the Freetown Methodists flourished. European missionaries and Nova Scotians cooperated in trying to bring about a religious revival, restoring the earlier concept of an alliance between them. Chapel numbers increased dramatically, to 400 members in 1818, many of the new converts coming from the Maroon community, and school enrolment grew to 150. The Rawdon Street chapel, a frame structure with a grass roof, became "crowded to suffocation" during the Sunday services, and so plans were laid to construct a larger stone building in its place. The Maroons, at the opposite end of town, also began raising funds for a new chapel to be built in their western neighbourhood. At first there was no suggestion that the Maroon-built chapel could be a separate

Gambia, Sierra Leone, 1859-62, "How the U. M. F. Churches got into Sierra Leone, by Thomas Blanshard", 21 February 1861. The society in England had also become suspicious of Davies' intimacy with the official clique in Freetown (ibid.).


159 MMS, Sierra Leone, I, 1, Baker to MMS, 1 November 1819, Petition of the Wesleyan Society, Sierra Leone, 11 April 1819. The Maroons had been trying to get land for a west end chapel since 1816. CO 270/14, Council Minutes, 30 January 1816, Petition of Charles Shaw, William Lilley and Thomas Parkinson.
institution. The Rawdon Street trustees contributed to the Maroon's building fund, though they were already deeply committed financially to their own, in the belief that the West End chapel would be a daughter church to the Rawdon Street mother. But the Maroons appear to have become frustrated by their secondary role in the chapel. None of the one-hundred Maroon Methodists was a class leader or preacher, and several began wishing "to bring themselves forward as ministers." 160

In other areas of life, outside the chapel, there was little mixing between Nova Scotian and Maroon, and therefore no disposition toward tolerance and cooperation. Indeed, many observers found that resentment and jealousy governed most of the relations between the two groups. There were some inter-marriages, including that of Maroon leader Stephen Gabbidon to Martha Edmonds, another daughter of the prominent David Edmonds, and a few more common-law relationships, but the youths of each community regularly set upon each other, and annually at Christmas time there were threats and rumours of communal massacre. 161 As the new Maroon

160 PP 1826-7, VII, "Report of the Commissioners", p. 13 (279); CMS, CA 1/M1, Fitzgerald to CMS, 3 May 1821; MMS, Sierra Leone, I, 1, Petition of the Wesleyan Society, Sierra Leone, 25 June 1819.

161 CO 270/14, Council Minutes, 9 September 1816, Petition of Nancy Jarrett; CO 267/25, Thompson to Castle-reagh, No. 9, 15 August 1809, CO 267/27, Columbine to Liverpool, 13 April 1810; CO 267/28, Columbine to Liverpool, 24 July 1810; CO 267/43, Hogan to Bathurst, 25 May 1816; K. L. Little, "The Significance of the West African Creole", for
chapel neared completion, therefore, its sponsors' feelings of resentment, frustration and ambition led them to declare that it would not become part of the Nova Scotian-dominated Methodist society, but would be an independent church "open to whoever they may choose to preach in it." They also taunted the Nova Scotians for having sold out their Rawdon Street chapel to the whites. 162

The Maroon division, and their parting taunt, touched a sore point with the Nova Scotians. The incumbent missionary, John Huddleston, seems to have shared the disposition of his predecessor William Davies, and a dispute was raging over the ownership and management of the Methodist society. When Huddleston tried to enforce orthodox rules as he had known them in England, he was told by the Nova Scotians that they had their own rules. The white man had ignored them in the past, their spokesmen claimed, and they had no intention of handing over their independence now. Some even suggested that the "White man come for thief their money." A class leader appointed by Huddleston was rejected by the settler trustees on the grounds that only they could make such ap-


162MMS, Sierra Leone, I, I, Petition of the Verleyan Society, Sierra Leone, 25 June 1819, File 2, 102-22, Huddleston to MMS, 19 April 1821.
pointments. The Nova Scotian class leaders refused to carry out the orders of the missionaries, recognizing the sole leadership of their own trustees and elders. At a meeting in April 1821 to discuss the new chapel, the Blacks declared that if the whites wanted control of a chapel they should build one for themselves. The people had already collected £460 in cash and materials on their own, and though they had asked for another £500 from the English society, that assistance had not yet been tendered. They decided to boycott all meetings called by the missionaries until the basic question was answered: "To whom does the Chapel belong, to the trustees or to the confrance?".

In May 1821 James Wise, on behalf of the trustees, called a secret meeting of the Black congregation to decide on a course of action. Huddleston and his assistant, George Lane, interrupted the proceedings and ordered the people home, saying the chapel belonged to the mission and they had no right to be there. When they refused, Huddleston declared the Society dissolved, and said he would re-admit only those willing to conform to his discipline. The settlers' response was to dismiss the missionaries from the society and to order

163 Ibid., Huddleston to MMS, 11 June 1821, George Lane to MMS, 11 June 1821.

164 Ibid., also File 1, Petition of the Wesleyan Society, Sierra Leone, 25 June 1819, File 2, Huddleston to MMS, 11 June 1821 (the mis-spelling in the quotation is Huddleston's), Box III, 1841-47, File 4, 1846, Henry Badger to MMS, 12 March 1846; CMS, CA I/MI, Fitzgerald to CMS, 8 June 1821.
them out of the chapel. Conciliation attempts by the chief justice, an Anglican who feared that the dispute would adversely affect the work of the Nova Scotian preachers among the Liberated Africans, failed to bring the sides together. Eventually the issue fell to Governor MacCarthy for resolution, for the settler claim to control over the chapel rested on a legal interpretation of the deed to the Rawdon Street property. The missionaries' claim was that money for the new chapel had been raised in the colony for an official Methodist society, and it would be a violation of the donors' trust to use the chapel for any other purpose. MacCarthy opted for the legal interpretation, and in January 1822 gave the occupation of the chapel to the Nova Scotian trustees. Thenceforth, according to his decree, no one was to preach in the chapel without the consent of the trustees elected by the congregation.

Since Huddleston had personally dissolved the Mission-connected society, the Nova Scotians of the Rawdon Street chapel reconstituted themselves as an independent Methodist church, and they invited other Methodist chapels in the colony.

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165 MMS, Sierra Leone, I, 2, Huddleston to MMS, 11 June 1821, Baker to MMS, 21 January 1822.
166 Ibid., CMS, CA 1/M1, Fitzgerald to CMS, 9 June 1821.
167 MMS, Sierra Leone, I, 2, Memorial to Governor MacCarthy from John Baker, John Huddleston and George Lane, January 1822, Trustees' Petition to Governor MacCarthy, January 1822, and Provisional Decree, Governor MacCarthy, January 1822.
to join them in a new association untied to any white group.

At first known simply as the "Settlers' Meeting" or "Big Meeting", the Nova Scotian society soon adopted the title "West African Methodist" to distinguish themselves from the white-run Wesleyan Methodist Society. But the Rawdon Street congregation was not long alone in its new society. It was the Nova Scotians who had initially converted most of the Liberated African Methodists, established chapels and classes in their villages, and provided them with preachers and class leaders for their meetings. Led by James Wise, the Nova Scotian Methodist leaders won the allegiance of most Liberated Africans to the new West African Methodists, and within a few years they encompassed a dozen chapels in Freetown and the surrounding villages. The Maroons, meanwhile, remained in fellowship with the missionaries, and as the latter were now a society without a chapel, the Maroons agreed to lease them their still incompeleted new building for a period of fourteen years. With as yet no preachers of their own


169 CMS, CA 1/1, Fitzgerald to CMS, 8 June 1821, CA 1/0 126; Journal of W. A. B. Johnson, 8 August 1822; CO 270/21, Council Minutes, 18 February 1837, Petition of Edward Maer; MMS, Sierra Leone, III, 4, Badger to MMS, 1 March 1840; Nairke, Wesleyan Methodism in Sierra Leone, p. 76.

170 Ibíd., MMS, Sierra Leone, I, 2, Huddleston to MMS, 29 April and 2 May 1821; Huddleston's Journal, 18 May 1821,
race the Maroons depended on the missionaries to guide them and manage their affairs. After the deaths of Huddleston and Lane they wrote to London expressing their desperate need for a speedy replacement, claiming that "we are at present left alone as sheep without shepherds". This time it was the Nova Scotians turn to taunt. 171

After the humiliation and rejection experienced during the rebellion and later at Thompson's hands, the settlers had regained their confidence in a separate existence and community identity. They no longer required the sustenance offered by a flirtation with white officialdom, yet they were free, and willing, to associate with the whites on terms of equality. Trade and the crafts offered economic benefits that rendered less painful the government's land regulations. The process of defending their religious independence from the challenge of white interference, though not completed until 1822, had by the middle of the preceding decade confirmed the Methodists, the largest settler denomination, in their awareness of their own special nature as a free Black church.

By the time Maxwell left the colony, in 1815, the Nova

Scotians were well established as a prosperous, educated and dynamic community, and they were poised to take advantage of the economic expansion and social opportunity that took place under Maxwell's successor.
CHAPTER XIII

The Golden Age

Position and Prosperity, 1815-27

To the Nova Scotians the decade of Charles MacCarthy's governorship, from 1815 to 1824, and its immediate aftermath, was the "best that we have enjoyed since we had been on Africa's Shore". "The Nova Scotians shone once more like the moon, ... they were in their golden age." Their superiority seemed to be recognized at last, their values seemed to dominate colonial society, and their economic prosperity reached its highest point in their history. In their own eyes they were able to consider themselves as Sierra Leone's Black aristocracy; their culture and heritage could be regarded as having been extended to other groups in the colony's population, and as having become the standard by which other Black

1 MacCarthy was appointed lieutenant-governor in July 1814, but left the colony in December of that year to arrange the transfer of Goree and Senegal to the French. He returned as acting-governor in July 1815, after Maxwell's resignation, and in September 1816 became governor in his own right. CO 270/14, Council Minutes, 11 July 1814, 3 September 1816; CO 267/38, MacCarthy to Bathurst, No. 1, 19 August 1814; CO 267/40, Maxwell to Bathurst, 30 June 1815 (letter of resignation). The "MacCarthy era" is taken here as beginning in July 1814, with the resignation of Maxwell.

2 CO 267/92, Commissioners' Report, 1877, Appendix "Statement by Eli Ackim".

3 Sibthorpe, History, p. 28.
societies would be measured.4

But most European visitors and many resident officials had contrary views. They described the Nova Scotian life-style in derogatory terms, and, of more significance, they declined to regard it as an independent culture at all. The Nova Scotians, and generally the Maroons with them, were termed "lazy" and "degenerate", particularly as a result of the settlers' almost universal neglect of agriculture. The European in Freetown, who would never personally engage in agriculture, evidently thought of farming as the only form of "honest labour" appropriate to the Black settlers, and their disinclination to till the soil marked them as being deficiently industrious. Their fault was increased by the fact that the land they owned remained idle and useless, refusing to work the land, they also refused to sell it so that others might profit by it.5 The Nova Scotians were further

4MMS, Sierra Leone, III, 4, Badger to MMS, 12 March 1846.

accused of being "haughty" and "exclusive", of possessing a presumptuous belief in their own superiority which displayed itself in an extreme sensitivity with regard to their rights and position, and in petty squabbles and bitterness even among themselves. Visitors, and local missionaries, decried the lack of marital constancy in the settler community, a form of immorality that was matched by frequent indulgence in alcohol. The foundation of the Nova Scotians' profligate existence, according to these reporters, was that they deliberately fashioned themselves after the lowest types in the European community. Even their inclination for trade, their emphasis on real property, and the styles of their clothing and recreational activities, were held to be a conscious aping of European habits.


8 Rankin, White Man's Grave, I, p. 59; Robert Blake, Sierra Leone. A Description of the Manners and Customs of
Apparently believing that the settlers' behaviour constituted a parody on the manners and attitudes of an English gentleman, European observers were inclined to ridicule the settlers for their attempt at imitation rather than to recognize their differences. As one modern scholar has remarked, "It is psychologically difficult for a model to regard an imitator as his equal; he is hypercritical of, rather than flattered by, awkward efforts at imitation".  

But if their life-style did indeed resemble a burlesqued reflection of white society, in fact the Nova Scotians were living according to a pattern that owed its characteristics not only to European or even African models but to the unique historical experience they had shared since their days as slaves in the American colonies. Whites in the colony disdained physical labour, were exclusive and haughty toward the "lower orders", quarrelled among themselves, dressed in climatically inappropriate finery, and took to alcohol and illicit sex with enthusiasm. That the Nova Scotians seemed

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9 Coleman, Nigeria, p. 147.

10 CO 267/51, MacCarthy to Bathurst, No. 13, 5 February 1820; CO 267/81, Campbell to Bathurst, No. 90, 19 January 1827; Peter Leonard, Records of a Voyage to the Western Coast of Africa in the Years 1830, 1831 and 1832 (Edinburgh, 1833), pp. 96-7; Fyfe, History, p. 190.
to do the same was the result of independent influences in their own background; those factors created many similarities, but many differences as well, between the two communities.

One area of apparent imitation was the social activity shared by the whites and educated Blacks. MacCarthy's Freetown was in a constant social whirl. Various societies and clubs proliferated, white-dominated but with Nova Scotian participation. The governor sponsored an Agricultural Society in 1817, but if it was intended to become a more effective version of the Friendly Society it failed, as had its Nova Scotian predecessor, to do anything more than hold monthly discussion meetings. The Bible Society was more active, raising £300 to distribute free Bibles among the Liberated Africans. On its executive committee Nova Scotians James Wige and David Edmonds sat with the governor, the chief justice and Freetown's chief European merchant, Kenneth Macaulay. A Masonic Lodge competed for attendance with an Amateur Theatre and a Glee Club that met weekly for congenial wining and dining. There were, obviously, numerous opportunities for social mixing between the white expatriates and

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11 CO 271/1, Sierra Leone Gazette, 23, 30 August 1811; CO 271/2, Sierra Leone Gazette, 31 August 1811.

12 CO 271/1, Sierra Leone Gazette, 3 January 1811, 27 March 1819; CO 271/2, Sierra Leone Gazette, 1 February 1822; CO 267/53, MacCarthy to Goulburn, 28 May 1821.

13 CO 271/1, Sierra Leone Gazette, 11 July 1821; CO 271/2, Sierra Leone Gazette, 6 January 1821, 31 November 1822.
the "respectable coloured gentlemen" of the colony, a category that included those Nova Scotians and Maroons who could afford to keep the pace.

The less affluent could at least attend the Turf Club, where European-owned ponies raced for the Commodore's Cup, donated by Sir George Collier. The Fair of Freetown, first held in March-April 1818 and annually thereafter, offered canoe, sailing and rowing races as well as the spectacle of Kru wrestling matches, with the four or five days of festivities culminating in a grand public dinner resounding to the chords of "Rule Britannia". The King's Birthday on 4 June gave another excuse for a "sumptuous entertainment", followed almost immediately by the anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo; both events saw the "European and principal Coloured Inhabitants" proclaiming their toasts together, while the lower orders gathered to watch "a grand display of Sky Rockets". Public dinners and picnics did not seem to require a formal occasion. In October 1819 the Sierra Leone Gazette reported that there had "only" been "two dinners" the

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14 CO 271/1, Sierra Leone Gazette, 26 December 1818; CO 271/2, Sierra Leone Gazette, 5, 12 January, 7 December 1822. In 1820 there were eighty horses reported in Freetown. CO 271/1, Sierra Leone Gazette, 29 April 1820.

15 Ibid., 4 April, 26 December 1818, 4 April, 5 June 1819, 12 February 1820; CO 271/2, Sierra Leone Gazette, 4 February 1821, 5 January 1822; CO 279/15, Council Minutes, 16 November 1818, 13 January 1821.

16 CO 271/1, Sierra Leone Gazette, 6, 12 June 1818; 12 June 1819.
previous week; three years later the editor had the satisfaction of announcing a week of dinners every night and a picnic on Saturday. The *Gazette*, founded in August 1817 "to encourage Virtue and Industry among the Colonists", carried articles on how to build stone houses and "On the Advantages of Thinking", but until its demise in 1827 it served chiefly to keep the literate population informed of the parties and gala affairs hosted by their popular governor.

Such activities were, of course, distinctly European, even though a corps of settlers was regularly invited to attend. The pervading atmosphere of extravagance and festivity caught up the wealthier settlers; a marriage between the Ackim and Hazeley families, two of the most prominent in the Nova Scotian community, was the occasion for a two-day open house at the Ackim home where "the best wines—champagne, claret and Madeira—were given in profusion". The guests, both Nova Scotian and European, enjoyed entertainments which "have not in point of elegance and comfort been surpassed" in that giddy round of amusement that was Freetown in 1822. More recognizably Nova Scotian were the "Dignity

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17 Ibid., 2 October 1819; CO 271/2, Sierra Leone Gazette, 25 October 1822.

18 CO 271/1, Sierra Leone Gazette, April 1817, Prospectus, 9, 16, 23 August, 31 October, 7 November 1821, and Russian.

19 CO 271/2, Sierra Leone Gazette, 17 August 1822.
Balls", descended from the "Frolics" of Company days, where young settler maidens were danced and entertained by the European gentlemen. One may imagine that the chief beneficiaries of these mixed parties were the generous gentlemen themselves; nevertheless the institution of all-night dancing, drinking and song had in fact been introduced into the colony by the Nova Scotians. 20 The European social contribution was to the decidedly masculine dinners with cigars and brandy, where settler women participated only as waitresses.

In addition to their mixed gatherings with the European bachelors, the Nova Scotians continued to hold dances—rights limited to their own community. Termed variously the Koonking, Koonken or Konken, the entire night would be spent singing songs in chorus and dancing in a circle. Many of the songs were brought from America, and others originated in Freetown, often satirizing their supposed white models. The celebrations would usually be accompanied by drinking and humour, but sometimes they were devoted to religious themes, with hymns and testimonies and the visitation of the Holy Spirit. 21 Such events were evidently not derived from the

20 Sibthorpe, History, p. 45; MacQueen, Colonial Controversy, p. 117; Leonard, Records of a Voyage, pp. 100-01; Church, Sierra Leone, p. 14; Clarke, Manners and Customs, p. 22. Note that the Dignity Balls, to which European ladies were not invited, were ignored by the Sierra Leone Gazette.

21 Sibthorpe, History, pp. 22, 45-6; The Artisan, 5 February 1885; Clarke, Manners and Customs, pp. 57-58; Walker, Church of England Mission, p. xiv; Church, Sierra Leone, p. 11.
Freetown Europeans, for the tom-tom music, choral responses and circular dancing were more African than European. But neither was the practice adopted from their African neighbours. "Negro frolicks", those nocturnal sessions of dance and song which were banned by insomniac whites in Shelburne, had characterized the settlers' social life through slavery, loyalist Nova Scotia and the period of Company rule. Drinking was an equally honoured tradition among the Nova Scotians. If the intoxication of which white officials complained owed itself to European example, widespread use of alcohol was nothing new. It had never been considered immoral, and ever David George had kept an alehouse in the 1790s as did Davis Edmonds in 1818.

Nor was extra-marital sex a sudden innovation. Nova Scotian family life remained much as it had in Nova Scotia and during the 1790s, with the difference that adulterous relationships had since the early nineteenth century been extended to include Europeans. They were neither prostituting themselves in order to gain favour nor copying the lux stan-

22 See Chapters IV and IX, above.

23 CO 267/43, Hogan to Bathurst, 25 May 1816; CO 770/1, Council Minutes, 3 October 1818; CO 270/18, Council Minutes, 6 April 1818.

24 Hair, "Sierra Leone and the Bulam", p. 54; John Horne to Hawes, 28 January 1794; Zachary Macaulay, Letter to Macaulay to ----, 6 October 1796, Journal, 6th April 1797; Directors' Report, 1794, pp. 58-9; CO 770/1, Council Minutes, 3 October 1818.
dards of the overseas white community. Disregard for the marital tie had prevailed among them for many years, and could be considered one of their characteristics. It had long since been accommodated by their own moral system, and even the most prominent and religious Nova Scotians had common-law marriages or mistresses. Illegitimacy did not therefore have to be hidden or carry social disqualifications. The census openly listed illegitimate children, and men would provide for their mistresses and offspring in their wills or assign property to them. It should be noted that such unions were generally lasting ones, and the number of

25 See Chapters IV and IX above, also CO 267/25, Thompson to Castlereagh, No. 6, 17 February 1809; CO 267/25, Columbine to Liverpool, 24 July 1810; CO 267/43, Hogan to Bathurst, 25 May 1816; Woodforde, Papers and Diaries, p. 196; CMS, CA 1/0 219, John Weeks to CMS, 23 February 1834; CA 1/0 232, William Young's Journal, 24 October 1837; MMS, Sierra Leone, I, 1, Baker to MMS, 9 November 1819; I, 3, Courties to MMS, 5 July 1827; MMS, Biography, West Africa, Box 8, Journal of William Saunders, 17 July 1837; SLA, Council Minutes, 1836-40, 25 January 1838.

26 For example, CO 267/92, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix C-21, Henry Williams to Commissioners, 15 May 1826.


unmarried relationships did not reflect indiscriminate promiscuity. This was equally the case when Europeans were included within the circle of Nova Scotian relations. The unions were monogamous to the extent that they lasted for the duration of the European's appointment in the colony, and they were openly acknowledged. Governor Findlay raised a monument to his mistress, inscribed

To the Memory of Mary Easmon, who departed this life aged 15 years and 11 months, And of her infant son, who died in the same Hour, on the same day, aged 12 hours. 29

Methodist missionary Samuel Brown reported a visit to Hannah Hayes, who had been MacCarthy's mistress and bore him at least one son. On the governor's death Miss Hayes went to Walter Lewis who "took her according to the usages of this country" and produced several more children. Finally she went to live with a European merchant, Nathan Isaacs, and had two more sons. 30 Despite her vigorous career as a "housekeeper", Hannah Hayes remained a respected member of society.

The settlers' participation in social affairs, charitable organizations and more intimate liaisons was accompanied, under MacCarthy, by their re-instatement as a favoured administrative class from among the Black residents.

29 The Artisan, 25 August 1888.
30 MMS, West Africa, 1858-59, Samuel Brown, t.
tic of the government MacCarthy took immediate steps to relieve the tensions and heal the alienation of the previous few years. He allowed quit-rents to lapse, invited the Militia Act protesters to return under amnesty and be restored of their property, and extended privileges, such as the right to bury the dead, to the Nova Scotian preachers.\footnote{31} He also opened more intermediate-level jobs to educated Blacks and enabled them to obtain municipal office. In practice this meant new opportunities for the Nova Scotians and the two Black groups in Sierra Leone possessing the necessary educational qualifications to become writers and clerks in the colonial establishment and the Liberated African Department.\footnote{32}

While they continued to serve as Commissioners on the Court of Requests and of various public services, and to provide two-thirds of the juries,\footnote{33} the Nova Scotians and

\footnote{31}For example, CO 270/14, Council Minutes, 23 May 1816; CO 267/91, Rev. John Raban to James Rowan, 3 June 1826.

\footnote{32}CO 267/22, Kenneth Macaulay to R. W. Hay, 16 July 1826; CO 267/91, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix A; Government Establishment, 1826; CO 270/6, Sierra Leone Gazette, 1 March 1822; CO 272/4, Blue Book, 1824, Government Establishment; CO 272/4, Blue Book, 1827, Government Establishment; SLA, Liberated African Department, Miscellaneous Return Book, Establishment, 1826-34.

\footnote{33}CO 270/15, Council Minutes, 29 September 1816; CO 270/16, Council Minutes, 15 December 1821; CO 271/2, Sierra Leone Gazette, 16 July 1825; CO 267/8, MacCarthy to Robert Willmot, MP, 18 August 1823; CO 267/22, Commissioners Report, 1827, Appendix C-17, Hamilton to Rowan, 1 June 1826, Appendix C-18, Evidence of Kenneth Macaulay.
Maroons were also admitted to the most dignified positions in the city's administration. James Wise became sheriff in 1820, followed two years later by the Maroon Stephen Gabbidon. In 1824, both men were appointed as aldermen and justices of the peace, and the next year Wise became Freetown's first Nova Scotian mayor. 34 MacCarthy even seemed to acknowledge that the two Black groups were a political force. He refused to allow the colonial clergyman and surgeon to charge for their services on the grounds that such a practice would arouse the animosity of the Freetown population, and when he left the colony temporarily in 1823 he refrained from appointing William Sutherland as acting-governor because of the objections of the city's Black spokesmen. 35 Their courage restored, the "principal settlers" began once again to talk of the possibility of a House of Assembly in which they could participate as partners in the governance of the colony. 36

The restoration of the Nova Scotians to a position of prominence did not derive solely from MacCarthy's efforts to create a peaceful and compatible atmosphere in Freetown, nor from the charms of the young settler ladies. A more

34 CO 270/15, Council Minutes, 5 September 1820; CO 270/16, Council Minutes, 17 September 1822; CO 270/12, Council Minutes, 6, 29 September 1824, 27 July 1822.

35 CO 267/47, MacCarthy to Bathurst, No. 1; 31 June 1818; CO 267/51, MacCarthy to Bathurst, No. 218, 7 May 1820; CO 267/60, Hamilton to Bathurst, No. 77, 22 April 1820.

36 CO 267/51, MacCarthy to Bathurst, No. 74, 7 May 1820.
fundamental force behind their resurgence was a considerable increase in the economic activity and prosperity of the colony, in which the settlers participated and from which they gained the wealth and respectability that qualified them to mingle with European society. In 1819 Freetown became the home of the Vice-Admiralty Court and the International Mixed Commission to adjudicate captured slave ships, and the army headquarters and navy victualling depot for the West African coast. One immediate result was a greatly increased intercourse with Britain: every week several vessels arrived in the harbour, bringing European goods to supply the local market and also creating a market themselves for local produce. More permanent residents, the soldiers, administrators and merchants stationed in Freetown for several years, brought their wages into the colony and spent them there, adding to the demand for goods and the money to buy them. The Liberated African farms, despite an increase in the area of cultivation to 1,290 acres by 1822, could not supply the new demand for provisions. Opportunities for trade were therefore multiplied, and the harbour activities created new pressures upon the local supply of labour, storage space and

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37 Cf. CO 271/1, Sierra Leone Gazette, 11 March 1822; CO 271/2, Sierra Leone Gazette, 25 January, 15 February 1823, 30 July 1825; N. A. Cox-George, "The Economic Significance of Grants-in-Aid of Sierra Leone in the Nineteenth Century", SLG (ns), No. 8, June 1957, p. 240.

38 CO 271/2, Sierra Leone Gazette, 31 August 1822, 25 December 1824.
accommodation. 39

"The never-ending demand for houses" caused by the influx of European personnel placed a premium on the two economic assets held by the Nova Scotians: their property, and their construction skills. 40 The naval and army officers, the court officials, the Englishmen employed in the government service or in commercial enterprises, all had to live in Freetown, and most of the available housing was owned by the Nova Scotians. 41 Even in Company times it had been the practice to rent settler buildings as required rather than to build new ones, 42 and some of the more astute settlers, including James Wise, Eli Ackim, Abraham Hazeley and David Edmonds, began gradually to buy up Freetown property and to build substantial dwellings. 43 Profits made in trade were

39 Ibid., 7, 8 September 1821; Adm. 109/100, Sierra Leone, 1822-1830, John Lewes to Walter Clifton, No. 16, 28 December 1824, and No. 33, 25 July 1825.

40 Pp 1821, XXIII, "Papers Relating to the Suppression of the Slave Trade", p. 51 (305); Adm. 109/100, Lewes to Clifton, No. 12, 18 December, and No. 16, 28 December

41 CO 267/51, MacCarthy to Bathurst, No. 232, 5 February 1820; CO 267/73, Campbell to Bathurst, No. 21, 8 September 1826.

42 CO 268/5, Governor and Council to Directors, 6 February 1796; CO 270/3, Council Minutes, 27 March, 30 June, 24 July, 7 September 1795, 18 January 1796. In June 1795 the Company was spending a total of £51.16/6 per week for the rental of Nova Scotian homes and buildings. Even a single room rented for 6 shillings a week.

43 For example, Registrar General, Freetown, Conveyances, Vol. 7-0, Joseph Elliott to Eli Ackim, 1850.
converted into real property, and as early as 1813 there were traders owning eight or ten Freetown lots valued at several hundred pounds. After 1819 the value of these lots increased astronomically. The average Nova Scotian town lot, worth just under £60 in 1813, was assessed at over £150 in 1825 even without a house. In one series of transactions a house on Perceval Street increased in price by 150 percent in only 3 years.

Rents kept pace with the increase in property values; and since the government owned no housing accommodation at all the officials had to compete to procure a room or a house from the settlers. Even the governor lived in a rented Nova Scotian home. The cost of its annual lease went from £250 to

4 July 1796, Thomas Evans to Eli Ackim, 8 acres, 1799, Phillis Battis to Abraham Hazeley, 1 acre, 24 September 1803, Ezekiel Campbell to Abraham Hazeley, 4 acres, 20 September 1795, Ann Francis to Abraham Hazeley, 2 acres, 4 July 1803, George Leonard to James Wise, No. 146 Howe St., 22 October 1811, Mary Saunders to Abraham Hazeley, 2 acres, 3 April 1805, Abraham Smith to Eli Ackim, 6 acres, 1796, Thomas Bryan to James Wise, No. 21 East St., 19 November 1816, Thomas Hirst to James Wise, No. 22 East St., 5 September 1816, Stephen Ficklin to Abraham Hazeley, 3 acres, 7 August 1823 and 14 March 1826, Henry Floyd to James Wise, No. 242 Rawdon St., 16 August 1824.

44 The Philanthropist, V, 1815, "Colony of Sierra Leone", pp. 251-61, "Property Owners, Freetown, 14 October 1813". Some of the more extensive landowners at that time were David Edmonds, Anthony Davis, John Kizell, Eli Ackim, James Wise, William Easmon, Lazarus Jones and Abraham Hazeley. Edmonds' ten Freetown properties were worth a total of £60.

45 CO 71/2, Sierra Leone Gazette, 8 January 1825.

46 Registrar General, Freetown, Conveyances, Vol. 1-6, John Barnett to John Richmond, No. 656 Perceval St., 16 April 1827, John Richmond to John Barnett, No. 656 Perceval St., 11 February 1827.
£350 in 1816 and in 1826 was £500. The owners of fine houses would take a fortune in rents, but the most humble settlers also participated in the prosperous situation. One official paid £6 per month for an unfinished loft in 1817 and had to spend £40 of his own money to make it habitable. Ordinary clerks had to pay £100 a year for "an inferior house — not even a second class one" in 1824, and a year later the average cost was up to £120. Nova Scotians who wished to remain in their homes could rent their cellars, neither floored nor secure from dampness, for £3.10 per month to the navy for storage purposes. Houses unfit for habitation could be rented at £6.10 per month for naval stores, exclusive of cellars. The typical Nova Scotian homeowner could live, if he chose to, exclusively upon the rental income of his cellar and a room or two in his house; those with additional occupations or with more substantial properties could enjoy a stan-

47 CO 267/42, MacCarthy to Bathurst, No. 81, 6 July 1816; CO 267/65, Turner to Bathurst, No. 17, 26 February 1825; CO 267/73, Campbell to Bathurst, No. 21, 8 September 1826.

48 For example, ibid., which shows James Wise being paid £300 rent in 1826.

49 AO 16/47, J. Boocock to George Harrison, No. 28, 26 March 1817.

50 FO 34/28, Gregory and Hamilton to Joseph Planter, 30 December 1824; Adm. 114/46, John Lewes to Walter Clifton, No. 47, 24 October 1825.

51 Adm. 109/100, Lewes to Clifton, No. 16, 26 December 1824; Adm. 114/46, Lewes to Clifton, No. 47, 24 October 1825.
The prospect of deriving support from property rental became increasingly relevant as competition drove the Nova Scotians from trade. Under the combined influence of local needs and the promotion of Governor MacCarthy and his successors, trade with neighbouring Africans and with Britain grew into a major industry. In the process it outstripped the means and the techniques of most of the Nova Scotians hitherto engaged in petty trade. There were still fourteen Nova Scotian traders in 1826 and twelve in 1831, but they were outnumbered by the Maroons. Reputedly more

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52 CO 267/73, Campbell to Bathurst, No. 21, 8 September 1826; Melville, Residence at Sierra Leone, p. 240; Fyfe, History, p. 175.

53 CO 267/47, MacCarthy to Bathurst, No. 137A, 20 February 1818, Enclosure, Exports and Imports, 1817; CO 267/49, MacCarthy to Bathurst, No. 189, 24 February 1819, Enclosure, Exports and Imports, 1818; CO 272/1, Blue Book, 1824, Exports and Imports; CO 272/2, Blue Book, 1825, Exports and Imports; CO 272/4, Blue Book, 1827, Exports and Imports. Average imports from Britain for the years 1821 to 1824 totaled £79,219 per annum, and exports averaged £61,454 per annum. The importance placed by MacCarthy, Turner and Macaulay on trade and the encouragement they gave to colonial traders, see CO 267/47, MacCarthy to Bathurst, No. 128, 2 January 1818; No. 144, 9 May 1818, No. 150, 20 May 1818, No. 167, 31 August 1818, No. 173, 9 October 1818; CO 271/2, Sierra Leone Gazette, 20 February 1821; CO 270/16, Council Minutes, 22 December 1823; CO 267/65, Turner to Bathurst, No. 26, 25 June 1825; CO 267/66, No. 73, 18 October 1825, No. 91, 20 December 1825; CO 267/70, Turner to Hay, 11 March 1826; CO 267/72, Kenneth Macaulay to Bathurst, No. 24, 21 April 1826, No. 56, 2 July 1826.

54 CO 267/91, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix A-1, "Nova Scotians Settled in Sierra Leone", March 1826, including occupations, and Appendix A-2, "Maroons Settled in Sierra Leone", March 1826, including occupations; CO 267/111, Findlay to Hay, 3 November 1831, enclosing the Freetown Census, in-
united in their commercial enterprises, and therefore able to meet competition more successfully, the Maroons began to displace the Nova Scotians from petty trade during the 1820s. 55

More significant than the Maroons' capture of the petty trade was the competition from large European operations that reduced the amount of petty trade available and forced the Nova Scotians to expand beyond the limits of their credit. Contracts to supply the navy, army or Liberated African Department with provisions went to those traders with the capital and the capacity to fulfil the requirements; the government could not rely on a steady supply of food from small traders when their operations depended on a regular and guaranteed flow of provisions from the surrounding territories. Accustomed to taking a boatload of European trade goods on credit from a Freetown merchant and then exchanging it in the interior for African produce, 56 the small traders began to hire or sub-contract for agents of their own so that several

including occupations. See also CO 267/97, MacCartney to Bentinck, No. 167, 31 August 1818, enclosing Petition of the Sierra Leone Traders; CO 270/16, Council Minutes, 22 December 1827.


56 See Chapter XII, footnote 98.
boatloads could be exchanged at the same time. But the mar-
gin of profit had never been great, and what had proved just
comfortably profitable as an individual enterprise became a
very marginal operation when expansion caused the profit to
be split among more people. A Nova Scotian trader would
first have to purchase more boats, take more goods on credit,
pay more presents to African chiefs, and then share the
profit with his agents. All this was financed by loans and,
advances of trade goods supplied by European merchants. Many
African agents simply absconded with the goods, boats would
be lost to interior raiders, prices would rise or fall at the
wrong moment. Traders would mortgage their Freetown homes
to procure the necessary credit; and when something went wrong
in one or two ventures there were no further resources to
call upon, and the debt would cost them their businesses and
their homes. Richard George, Cato Preston, Eli Ackim, William
Easmon and John Kizell were among the traders forced to satisfy
their debts by giving up Freetown properties worth hundreds
of pounds. 57 A few examples sufficed to convince the others

57 George, British West Africa, p. 201; Melville, Residence at Sierra Leone, p. 241; FF 1826-7, VII, "Report of
the Commissioner", p. 12 (277); CO 267/65, Turner to Bathurst,
No. 26, 25 June 1825; CO 267/66, Turner to Bathurst, No. 10,
20 September 1825; No. 91, 20 December 1825; CO 267/72,
Kenneth Macaulay to Bathurst, No. 56, 7 July 1826; CO 267/73,
Campbell to Bathurst, No. 26, 13 September 1826, No. 28, 1
September 1826. Some examples of Freetown property lost for
debt to European merchants: Registrar General, Freetown,
Conveyances, Vol. 1, Eli Ackim to William Smith, No. 224
Charlotte St, 30 June 1825, William Easmon to Macaulay and
Babington, No's. 210 and 229 Gloucester St., 20 December 1826
that it was unwise to risk a certain income from property for the hazards of general trade. Though commerce with the interior continued to attract many Nova Scotians for decades to come, there was a tendency during this period for them to retire from trade and to become, in effect, a "rentier" class, idle but gentlemanly, living from the proceeds of their Freetown and neighbouring lands.

The second Nova Scotian asset to be affected by the heightened activity of Freetown was the experience many of them had in the building trades. Carpenters, masons and sawyers had constant business building new houses and improving their own so that they could attract higher rents. Addition MacCartney instituted an extensive construction programme in Freetown and throughout the colony. Between 1814 and 1824 a total of £129,564 was expended on public works, among them roads and bridges to the Liberated African villages, public buildings in the villages, and in Freetown a hospital,

(for a debt of £1212.8), James Parkinson to Kenneth Macaulay, No. 402 Gloucester St., 1826; Vol. 2-0, Richard George to Kenneth Macaulay, No. 147 Howe St., Eli Ackim to Kenneth Macaulay, No. 45 Wilberforce St., No. 218 Gloucester St., No. 249 Water St., and No. 402 Little East St., 23 November 1—; Vol. 3, Cato Preston to John Billaud, No. 941 Bathurst St. and two houses on Upper Wellington St.

58PP 1821, XXIII, "Papers Relating to the Suppression of the Slave Trade", p. 51 (305); CO 267/73, Campbell to Bathurst, No. 21, 8 September 1826.

59CO 267/91, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix 17, "Public Works Expenditures".
a church, a public wharf and a fish market. 60 A navy storehouse was begun in 1822 with a budget of £50,000, and Governor Turner, MacCarthy's successor, erected an army barracks at similar cost. 61 The demand for ordinary labour to complete these projects was greater than the supply of Kru and Liberated African workmen, but the demand for skilled artisans was even more pressing in relation to the experienced men available. 62

As was the case with landed property, construction skills increased dramatically in value and allowed their possessors a very favourable standard of living. Prices of basic provisions were of course forced upwards by the spending of soldiers, sailors and administrators in a situation of limited supply, but rising prices were outpaced by the rise in an artisan's pay, and most of the settlers had small gardens and kept poultry so that food costs did not affect them as much as the European residents. Around 1820 beef could still be purchased for sixpence a pound, largely

60 These were the projects in progress in 1818. CMS, CA 1/E7, No. 83, Cates to CMS, enclosing Sierra Leone Gazette, 19 December 1818.

61 Adm. 109/100, Lewes to Clifton, No. 16, 28 December 1824; WO 55/1559 (4), Captain B. Boteler, "Report on the Ports and Buildings of Sierra Leone", 6 November 1826; CO 267/65, Turner to Bathurst, No. 17, 26 February 1825; CO 267/31, Campbell to Bathurst, No. 21, 29 September 1826.

62 Q 5/1/1, Sierra Leone Gazette, 1 April 1817; CA 274, 42, MacCarthy to Bathurst, No. 74, 31 May 1816; WO 55/1559 (4), Boteler, "Report", 6 November 1826; CMS, CA 1/E5A, No. 36, Garnon's Journal, 23 November 1816.
African-supplied; it was local produce such as eggs, milk, butter and fish that underwent the largest percentage increase, and these were the very items provided by the Nova Scotians themselves. 63 Carpenters, masons and sawyers were receiving salaries of five to seven shillings a day regularly, and immediately before the rainy season or when speed was otherwise required these salaries could rise to nine shillings per day. If the artisan had Liberated African apprentices, as most Nova Scotians did, he could receive an additional three shillings per day for each apprentice employed. Living costs for a settler family were estimated at from two to two shillings and sixpence per day; Liberated African apprentices could be supported for only twopence per day. As a result, the Nova Scotian craftsman was required to spend less than half his personal income for the basic support of his family, and he had the possibility of additional income from his wife and his apprentices. The excess income could therefore be

63 CO 271/2, Sierra Leone Gazette, 1, 8 September 1821, 16 July 1825; CO 267/65, Turner to Bathurst, No. 17, 26 February 1825, No. 20, 8 March 1825; Sibthorpe, History, p. 28. Some examples of prices, 1820-25:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>beef</td>
<td>6d per lb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fish</td>
<td>2s 6d each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>milk</td>
<td>2s 6d per quart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eggs</td>
<td>2s 6d to 4s per dozen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ducks</td>
<td>4s each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>turkeys</td>
<td>up to £1.16 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suckling pigs</td>
<td>1s 2s each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>butter</td>
<td>5s per lb</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All items except beef had increased in price by about 120 percent from 1816. (See HMS, Sierra Leone, I, 1, James West et al. to James Wood, 14 April 1816.)
spent on fine clothes, alcoholic beverages and special foods, or invested in property and household improvements.\(^64\)

About half the Nova Scotian males included in an 1826 census were employed as skilled artisans in the construction trades. Twenty-four had retail shops or plied a public trade such as shoemaker, butcher and baker. Ten were fishermen, five were pilots, twelve worked for the colonial government, and only three Nova Scotian men were listed as unskilled labourers:\(^65\) All of these occupations were in a position to benefit from the economic situation. Anyone supplying the public, the shopkeepers, fishermen or tradesmen, gained from the expanded market and rising prices. Pilots and government clerks were in demand from the increase in shipping and administration. In fact few Nova Scotians were left unaffected by the boom years of the MacCarthy era. The women, only three of whom were not occupied outside the home in 1826, were sempstresses, housekeepers and washerwomen to European residents.\(^66\) In terms

\(^{64}\) CO 16/47, Boocock to Harrison, No. 28, 26 March 1817; CO 267/49, MacCarthy to Bathurst, No. 207, 28 June 1819; CO 271/1, Sierra Leone Gazette, 2 September 1820; CO 271/2, Sierra Leone Gazette, 1 February 1823; CO 267/65, Turner to Bathurst, No. 17, 26 February 1825; Sibthorpe, History, p. 28; PP 1821, XXIII, "Papers Relating to the Suppression of the Slave Trade", p. 51 (905).

\(^{65}\) CO 267/91, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix A-1, "Nova Scotians settled in Sierra Leone", March 1826. In 1826 there were 103 Nova Scotian families with a male head, containing 142 employed males.

\(^{66}\) Ibid.
of income the settlers were separated even more than previously from the Liberated African and Kru labourers, who never earned more than ten pence per day, and consequently the difference in their ways of life was accentuated. The kind of work performed by other Blacks in the colony, with the exception of the Maroons, was equally identifiable as belonging to a lower status: they dug the ground, hauled the loads and raised the beams under the supervision of the Nova Scotian craftsmen. Even the Nova Scotian church cleaner had an apprentice to do the actual cleaning work. Like their rentier counterparts, the skilled settlers were vaulted into a position of affluence and relative ease, supported to a considerable extent by the labour of others.

It was therefore not the example of the Europeans that led the Nova Scotians to extravagant spending and a life unsullied with back-breaking labour, but the economic circumstances of the MacCarthy decade. Favourable though their

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67 Of 105 employed Maroons in 1826, 56 were artisans, 15 traders, 12 farmers, 11 labourers, and 12 were engaged in public or government service. Ibid., Appendix A-2, "Maroons Settled in Sierra Leone," March 1826. On Liberated African and Kru employment and wages see ibid., Appendix B-1. Evidence of Mr. Myrton, Clerk of Works; CO 267/91, Campbell Bathurst, No. 79, 19 January 1827; CO 267/84, Lambton P.R., 19 August 1827; SLA, Council Minutes, 1826-40, 20 January 1838.

68 General comments on Nova Scotian affluence and occupations can be found in Sidthorpe, History, pp. 11-15; Holman, Travels, pp. 61, 115; Forbes, African Blackbird, 9, 22-5; Leonard, Records of a Voyage, p. 17; Forsyth, Notes, Historical Account, p. 31; The Harbinger, November 1826, p. 163, "Memoir of the Rev. Scipio Wright"; CO 267/77, Campbell to Bathurst, No. 21, 8 September 1828.
situation was, the Nova Scotians had not deliberately chosen it. Their property had been theirs since 1792, and their skills had become traditional even before that. The moral acceptance of apprentice labour was nothing new for former slaves, and they had become accustomed to supervising African labour in the 1790s. Individual peasant agriculture was no more a reasonable economic foundation in 1820 than it was twenty years previously, for the colonial soil had not improved in the meantime nor had farms grown any larger, and besides there were numerous Liberated Africans being settled upon farms and cultivating crops. Nova Scotian land grew over with weeds and grass and hung in swampy puddles during the rainy season, frightening Europeans who believed the vapours were deleterious to Freetown's health and convincing visitors that the settlers were spitefully retaining land that they were too lazy to work. 69

Their refusal to sell the land came neither from spite nor from laziness. Land had become to the Nova Scotians a symbol of their independence; they continued in 1826 to believe that the whites would steal the land if given an opportunity, and that if this occurred the Nova Scotians would re-

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69 PP 1826-7, VII, "Report of the Commissioners", pp. 6, 9-11, 72 (272, 275-77, 338); Alexander, Narrative of a Voyage, I, p. 89; CO 271/2, Sierra Leone Gazette, 9 August 1823; CO 267/73, Campbell to Bathurst, No. 21, 8 September 1826; CO 267/92, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix C-17, Evidence of G. Rendall, Appendix C-25, Evidence of R. Clouston, Appendix C-26, Evidence of Henry Savage and Stephen Gabbidon.
come dependent and subservient once again. It was a common practice in Nova Scotian wills to include the provision that lands bequeathed should never be sold outside the family. One celebrated case seemed to confirm the settler fear that their government had designs upon the land. In November 1816, while Eli Ackim was away on a trading trip, an act of council was passed to purchase 17 acres from him for a site on which to build a town for the Kru labourers. On his return Ackim objected to the council's action, and though he was unsuccessful his protest revealed the racial interpretation he placed upon the loss of his land. "What happened to one Black Man today will happen to another tomorrow", Ackim argued. "We are in our own country and British Subjects... I think I have got as much right to hold my lands as Black or Whites. God knows," he concluded, "what will become of our colour."

The Nova Scotians' sensitivity to their land rights illustrated a general suspicion toward their colonial govern-

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70 Ibid., Appendix B-5, John Kizell to Commissioners, March 1826, Appendix B-7, Lazarus Jones, Memorandum, 2 June 1826.

71 Registrar General, Freetown, Wills, Vol. 1, e.g. wills of Elizabeth Trinity, Shadrach Gustus, Lydia Williams, Joseph Jewett, Betsy Harris, William Godfrey, Perry Lockes, Mary King, Nancy Richards, Joseph Leonard, John Haywood, and Conveyances, Vol. 1-9, Suzannah Ball to "Stephen George, 14 October 1817, and to Joseph Jarval", 6 March 1848, citing the will of Stephen Ball (whose wishes were not respected).

72 CO 270/14, Council Minutes, 6-8 November 1816, 27 February 1817, 6 March 1817, enclosing letter of Eli Ackim to the Council, and 30 January 1818.
ment, and revealed a sense of injustice deriving in particular from their resentment over land policies since 1792. No matter how affluent they became through trade, property or the crafts, they considered that the betrayal of Clarkson's promises left them with a moral and legal claim upon the government. The people had always reacted strongly against any alleged restrictions on their rights as freemen, but the testimony they gave of their sufferings to a Commission of Enquiry in 1826 dwelt upon the fact that they had never received enough land to become secure and self-sufficient farmers. From this attitude was drawn the Europeans' impression that the settlers were bitter and resentful. Their great concern for individual rights and a belief in their oppression by others was neither new nor inspired by white agitators, however, as some officials reported. The refusal to accept any encroachments on their liberty had long been a part of their character, and it displayed itself equally in petitions to the government and in the proliferation of petty lawsuits among themselves.

73 For example, CO 267/92, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix B-5, John Kizell to Commissioners, March 1-26, Appendix B-6, "Statement by Eli Ackim", Appendix B-7, Laman Jones, Memorandum, 8 June 1826. See also Walker, Church of England Mission, p. xxvii, and Bridge, Journal of an African Cruiser, p. 172. On his arrival in Freetown Captain Bridgeway was informed by his Nova Scotian pilot of the land betrayal and the injustices visited upon the settler community.

74 For example CO267/39, Maxwell to Bathurst, 5 October 1814.

75 See above, Chapter IX. In his evidence before the
Their specific suspicions and resentments grew out of the Nova Scotians' experience, but their ideological foundations lay in a highly individualistic religion and an exaggerated interpretation of British freedom. One important legacy of their religious origins in Loyalist Nova Scotia was the notion that each man was responsible personally to God for his faith and his actions. 76 Paralleling this idea throughout their history was a conviction that as Christians and as British subjects they were at least the equals of any people on earth. British freedom, to the Nova Scotians, implied the right to be free from interference in their personal lives, including taxation, military duty, or any other requirements not determined by themselves. "No one shall dare to curtail us of our privileges, as British subjects, with impunity", they warned in 1820 when the colonial surgeon tried to introduce a charge for his medical services. 77 It was as a British subject that Eli Ackim protested the involuntary sale of his land, and as British subjects

Commissioners Kenneth Macaulay explained the "considerable spirit of petty litigation" among the settlers: "A portion of this spirit was I think brought from America, a part may be attributed to the vast importance each individual attaches to their little self". CO 267/92, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix C-18, Evidence of K. Macaulay.

76 See Chapter IV, footnote 109.

77 CO 267/51, MacCarthy to Bathurst, No. 248, 27 May 1820, enclosing petition from James Wise, Eli Ackim, William Esmon, David Edmonds, Mingo Jordan and others, 19 February 1820. Note also the Nova Scotians' consistent reaction on principle to quit-rents, school fees, militia acts and other actions termed "tyrannical".
jects that they refused to accept Maxwell's Militia Act. 78

William Davies, the Methodist missionary excluded by his
Nov Scotian congregation, found that his attempt to direct
their chapel activities did not accord with their ideas of
"perfect freedom" as individual Christians or as loyal sub-
jects of the king. 79 The Company Directors in 1794, Zachary
Macaulay in 1796 and Thomas Ludlam in 1800 had been the
recipients of similar charges when they failed to acknowledge
the settlers' independence on terms set by the settlers. 80

It required no European example to inspire the Nova Scotians
to toast the king or to sing "Rule Britannia" at MacCarthy's
public dinners, for the king was seen as the guarantor of
their rights. 81

It was from a confident belief in their own equality
that the Nov Scotians approached white society during
MacCarthy's governorship. Far from toady ing after white re-
ognition or being flattered by white attention, some settlers
disdainfully ignored MacCarthy's invitations. 82 One European

78 CO 270/14, Council Minutes, 6 March 1817, enclosing
letter of Eli Ackim to Council; CO 267/92, Commissioners' Re-
port, 1827, Appendix B-6, "Statement by Eli Ackim".

79 MMS, Sierra Leone, I, 1, Davies to Fleming, 1
January 1817.

80 See above, Chapters VIII and X.

81 Cf. Baptist Annual Register, II, pp. 1-6, "Extrait of
letters from Mr. David George, dated from 13 September to
10 October 1793".

82 CO 267/51, MacCarthy to Bathurst, No. 24, 27
May 1820.
lady was disconcerted on meeting her first Nova Scotian housekeeper. The settler lady "seemed not to consider herself at all inferior, for she walked across the room and took possession of the sofa with the greatest composure in the world, and insisted on shaking hands with me." 83 More material aspects of "European" culture could similarly be accepted without any sense of humility or imitation, for the British colonial heritage was as much a part of their experience and continuing environment as anyone else's in Freetown. Their beaver hats, umbrellas and pocket handkerchiefs were brought with them from Nova Scotia and were less a "badge of civilization", adopted to win European approval, than a valid expression of their own tradition. 84 Their taste for beef and ale had likewise accompanied them across the Atlantic, reinforced, as one settler descendant has noted, by the fact that during their early years in the colony they were sustained by provisions sent from England. 85 As they stayed longer in Africa, and became more dependent upon local food supplies, their daily diet had to be modified—rice became a staple, and they invented "foofoo", a manioc-derivative that was to become Sierra Leone's national dish 86—but when they

83 Church, Sierra Leone, p. 8.
84 Ibid.; Sibthorpe, History, p. 46.
85 Porter, Creolodom, p. 104.
partook of beef, biscuits and cheese they were still within the tradition established by their experience in Nova Scotia and early Sierra Leone.  

As the Nova Scotians looked across to the whites with a sense of equality, they looked down upon the other Black residents of the colony. "The spirit of exclusiveness ran rampant among them", a Liberated African noted. A partial accommodation had been effected with the Maroons by 1825, apparently a result of the Maroons' economic and social respectability, but the settlers' relations with the indigenous people, Liberated Africans and Kru continued to be determined by racial animosity.

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On 23 December 1791 John Clarkson received the following:

"The humble petition of the Black people, humbly beg that if it is convenient for your Honour, as it is the last Christmas Day we ever shall see in America, that it may please your Honour to Grant us, our day's allowance of Fresh Beef for a Christmas Dinner. Thomas Peters and David Edmonds, in behalf of the Black people at Halifax bound for Sierra Leone."

(PANS, Clarkson's Mission, pp. 285-86.) On food and dress in early Sierra Leone see Chapter IX, above.


It was reported in 1826 that "an enmity which had for several years subsisted between the Maroons and Nova Scotians, is now so far abolished, as to be scarcely ever mentioned". CO 267/92, Commissioners' Report, 1822, Appendix C-15, Raban to Rowan, 28 April 1826. Later visitors, however, reported a residue of ill-feeling, and a lack of acceptance between the two groups, for several generations, e.g. Melville, Residence at Sierra Leone, p. 245; George, British West Africa, p. 199; Henry Fceddall, The Missionary History of Sierra Leone (London, 1874), p. 12.
by religious elitism and the circumstances that placed the new arrivals in a subservient position. Until the 1830s most Liberated Africans were located in the villages outside Freetown; the only exceptions were those apprenticed to the government or the settlers themselves. In 1831 eighty-four percent of Nova Scotian homes had Liberated African apprentices, and the only Kru or local Africans living in Eastern Freetown, the settler district, were engaged as servants there.\footnote{CO 267/111, Findlay to Hay, 3 November 1831, enclosing the Freetown Census.}

This meant that a Nova Scotian only met these other Black people in a situation that automatically gave the Nova Scotian a sense of superiority and control.

In a colony with few beasts of burden, it was the new Black arrivals who performed the work, and received the treatment, generally accorded to dumb animals.\footnote{Alexander, Narrative of a Voyage, I, pp. 88-9; CO 267/81, Campbell to Bathurst, No. 79, 19 January 1827; CO 267/83, Lumley to Hay, 19 August 1827; CO 267/92, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix B-16, Evidence of Mr. Myrton, Clerk of Works.} Apprentices were regularly beaten by their masters, sometimes to death;\footnote{CO 267/109, Findlay to Goderich, No. 87, 12 July 1831; Hannah Kilham, Present State of the Colony of Sierra Leone (2nd ed., London, 1832), p. 13.} carpenter Prince Stober, as one example, would punish his apprentices by tying them to his work-bench and setting upon them with his rip saw.\footnote{Sierra Leone Weekly News, 27 February 1826, Obituary of William F. Campbell.} Given such a relationship it is not surpr
prising that the Nova Scotians should withhold their friendship and society from the Liberated Africans. Any common feeling between the two groups was minimal. The Liberated Africans arrived in the colony naked, illiterate and pagan, and were demonstrably not of the same culture as the Freetown residents. And there were further reasons for a Nova Scotian attitude of diffidence toward the newcomers. It was widely felt that the Nova Scotians suffered from the allegedly favourable treatment the government gave the Liberated Africans. John Kizell complained that the government "took the Captive and the Krumen and set before our children and us ourselves this is hurtful.\textsuperscript{94} In a double-barbed thrust Eli Ackim expressed the belief that the lands he lost, had they "belonged to the poorest white man they would not be given to uncivilized Krooomen", and later, referring to the Liberated African influx, he asked rhetorically "if any County in England was over run by 10 or 20 more uncivilized people than themselves what might the inconvenience of that County be supposed to labour under.\textsuperscript{96}

Nothing differentiated the Nova Scotian more from both the European and the newly-landed Black than religion.

\textsuperscript{94}For example, CO 267/94, Denham to Hay, 14 May 1813.

\textsuperscript{95}CO 267/92, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix E-5, John Kizell to Commissioners, March 1827.

\textsuperscript{96}\textit{Ibid.}, Appendix B-6, "Statement by Eli Ackim"; CO 270/14, Council Minutes, 6 March 1817, enclosing letter of Eli Ackim to Council.
the settlers' diligent attendance at chapel and their enthusiasm in worship were their most distinctive characteristics. In religion, furthermore, they had evidence of the influence of their way of life over others in the colony, for they established the Christian atmosphere of Freetown and saw their standards and techniques copied by other denominations, even by the Established Church. In the mid-1820s there were a dozen Dissenting chapels in Freetown, all but one of them presided over by a Nova Scotian preacher, with crowded Sunday meetings full of tears and embraces, visions and testimonies to the effect of the Holy Spirit in settler lives. In contrast Freetown's Anglican church attracted fewer than ten white worshippers at its weekly services; the only other attenders, the military and the Liberated Africans apprenticed to the government, were "marched to church under discipline." It was, clearly, not the


Anglicans, nor the lone European Methodist, who established
the religious character of the town, so noticeable to visi-
tors, exemplified by a decorous observance of the Sabbath. 100

When Liberated Africans arrived in Sierra Leone they
were usually either apprenticed or settled in the villages.
Those apprenticed to settlers were introduced to Christianity
by their masters and began attending the Nova Scotian chapels:
despite the disadvantages they suffered in terms of their
rights as members, far more Liberated Africans belonged to
the settler Methodist society than to the European Methodist
or Anglican churches in Freetown. 101 The Nova Scotian pre-
achers and class leaders were also active in the Liberated
African villages, where they won large numbers of converts
and established chapels affiliated to the settler chapels in
Freetown. 102 Of equal or perhaps even greater significance,
the Anglican CMS superintendents in the villages undertook a
programme of "civilization" that tended to fashion the Liber-

100 Rankin, White Man's Grave I, p. 61; Church, Sierra
Leone, p. 23; The Artisan, 25 February 1885, quoting A. B. C.
Sibthorpe; CO 267/43, Hogan to Bathurst, 25 May 1816.

101 Methodist Magazine, XXXV, 1812, pp. 639, 795, Warfe:
to Coke, 13 November 1811; CO 267/92, Commissioners' Report,
1827, Appendix C-27, Piggott to Rowan, 8 April 1826, encl:
report on "Preachers and Congregations in Freetown"; PP 1484-
Vol. XLVII, "Slave Trade, Sierra Leone", p. 17 (405), evidence
of Prince Stober.

102 CMS, CA 1/M1, Fitzgerald to CMS, 9 June 1871, CA 1
126, Journal of Rev. W. A. B. Johnson, 8 August 1822; MMS,
Sierra Leone, III, 1, Schedule of Chapels, 1842, III, 4, Napper
to MMS, 12 March 1846, IV, 2, "Reply to Statements made in the
Blue Book, 1848, by Thomas Raston", n.d. (1848); CO 270/21, Coun-
cil Minutes, 18 February 1837, Petition of Edward Maer; Mark,
ated Africans after a Nova Scotian model. The missionaries adapted the class-system to assist in Christian education, they urged their charges to accept shirts and trousers as decent dress, and they imparted to them the skills, such as carpentry, that were needed in town and coincidentally were possessed by the Nova Scotians. 103 Therefore whether he was apprenticed in Freetown or placed in an outlying village, the Liberated African came under the influence, and was pushed toward the adoption, of the Nova Scotian style of religion and life.

Though the concept of an "elite" was not in common use in the English-speaking world until the twentieth century, 104 the Nova Scotians shared many characteristics associated with elite status and awareness. They regarded themselves, according to the times, as a Black aristocracy, 105 but the terminology is unsatisfactory given that their lands, wealth and power were inconsequential outside the very limited realms of their Freetown properties and the control they had over construction skills. Still, though they were by the 1820s a


105 MMS, Sierra Leone, III, 4, Badger to MMS, 12 March 1846.
small proportion of Sierra Leone’s Black population, the Nova Scotians exerted an influence and enjoyed a prestige far beyond what their numbers might suggest. An elite, as accepted by modern social analysts, is "an organized minority, obeying a single impulse" who possess "some attribute, real or apparent, which is highly esteemed and very influential in the society in which they live." In this sense the Nova Scotians were an elite in Sierra Leone: they were united, conscious of their identity, and lived according to a pattern that served as a model to other Blacks in the colony.

In 1808 the Nova Scotians ceased to form a numerical majority in Sierra Leone. By 1825 almost 18,000 Liberated Africans had been settled in the colony, and to them were directed the government’s attention and funds. Several smaller additions to the population also arrived during the MacCarthy period. In 1816 Paul Cuffe returned with thirty-four Black American settlers, all of whom were given lots in Freetown. Early in 1819 eighty-five slaves from Barbadoes, banished for

106 Bottomore, Elites and Society, p. 9.

107 CO 267/90, "Abstract of General Returns—Liberated Africans actually settled in the Colony, 1808-25". The number of freed slaves landed in Freetown was much greater (CO 267/91, Commissioners’ Report, 1827, Appendix A-17, "Number of Slaves received in the Colony, 1808-25"), but many died, deserted to their home or other African territories, or were settled at other British posts along the coast.

participating in an insurrection, were apprenticed to the government and employed in the public works in Freetown, and later that year almost a thousand free Black troops from the West Indies were disbanded in Sierra Leone, where they received land and pensions. The combined strength of these new trans-Atlantic immigrants alone was greater than that of either the Nova Scotians or Maroons.

At the same time Nova Scotian numbers had been declining. Deaths outnumbered births by 409 to 167 between 1822 and 1825, and large numbers of younger men had left the colony in times of dispute with the government or simply in search of better opportunities than were available in Freetown. In 1826 thirty-six Nova Scotian men were living outside the colony but still had families in Freetown. Their absence, and the permanent departure of the other young men, would account for the low birth-rate in the settler community. The Nova Scotians never regained the number, 1,131, that landed in Africa in 1792. In 1802 they were listed as totalling 904 and in 1811 had increased slightly to 982.

considerable decline occurred to 1818, when the census showed 691 Nova Scotians in Freetown, and, after a brief rise to 730 in 1820, the decline was consistent thereafter to 722 in 1822 and only 578 in 1826. Throughout the first quarter of the nineteenth century Nova Scotian females outnumbered males by a ratio of about three to two. During the same period the Maroons increased from 515 in 1802 to 636 in 1826. Though many Maroons also left the colony, particularly in 1812, and women outnumbered men by a ratio of about four to three, the continued existence of polygamy in certain segments of their community evidently compensated for this loss. 112

By 1825 the Nova Scotians were decidedly a minority, accounting for only ten percent of the Freetown population and less than three percent of the colony as a whole. Yet they were the most organized group in the colony, essentially through their chapels, and they did have a dominating impulse in common: a belief in the select nature of Nova Scotian society and a determination to preserve it. Their Christianity

112 Ibid., pp. 70, 89, 92; PF 1812, X, "Report of the Commissioners", p. 8 (284); PP 1826-7, VII, "Report of the Commissioners", pp. 12-13, 21 (278-79, 287); CO 267/49, MacCarthy to Bathurst, No. 189, 24 February 1819, enclosing 1818 census; CO 272/1, Blue Book, 1819-24, Returns of Trade and Population, census for 1818, 1820, 1822; CO 267/51, MacCarthy to Bathurst, No. 260, 22 July 1820, enclosing General Census, 8 July 1820 (also bound with this letter is the census of 1 January 1822); CO 267/91, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix A-1, "Nova Scotians Settled in Sierra Leone as returned in 1802 and as existing in March 1826", Appendix A-, "Maroons".
was undoubtedly an esteemed attribute, for thousands of Liberated Africans flocked to emulate it. In language, food, dress, occupations and house-styles it was the Nova Scotian pattern that attracted Liberated African imitation. The Nova Scotians were the church leaders, the skilled artisans directing unskilled labour, the Black representatives on city council and at the governor's table. In short, as a recent scholar has pointed out, "all the criteria which make up a class position, especially the economic, status and political dimensions of class, were concentrated in the hands of a few, the Settlers".

From the Liberated African point of view, the Nova Scotians represented an achievable social and cultural goal. They could not aspire to become governor or chief justice, to speak with an Establishment accent or to race ponies at the Fair, but they could hope and try to graduate to skilled journeymen, to become class-leaders and even preachers, and to live a comfortable life as exemplified by their Nova Scotian neighbours. It is clear that the Liberated Africans were influenced by the Nova Scotians to this extent, as the Maroons had been before them, and it is also clear that the Nova Scotian way of life was itself no mere reflection of


114 Porter, Creoledom, p. 137.
white society in Freetown. Their character, attitudes and habits were the reasonable result of what the settlers had done and what had happened to them during the preceding generation. Their belligerence, exclusiveness and sensitivity, their social functions, political activities and occupations, their houses, clothes and food, were different in 1825 from what they had been in 1795 only to the extent that increased affluence and a continuing adaptation to the African environment had made them so. What the MacCarthy era did do was to accentuate the differences between the Nova Scotians and the more recent Black arrivals in terms of their economic status, and thereby to make of the settler group a Black ideal in the material as well as in the cultural sphere. It may be noted that between 1800 and 1814, before the period of prosperity, the Maroons had moved toward an acceptance of Nova Scotian manners. Whether those manners were inherently attractive or not, they were an intermediate alternative between the European and the native African. The Golden Age of MacCarthy made them more attractive, and provided the vehicle whereby the Nova Scotian culture did become the acceptable norm for free Black Christians in Sierra Leone.
CHAPTER XIV

The Disinheritance

The Price of Survival, 1827-50

The death of Sir Charles MacCarthy in 1824 signalled the end of the Nova Scotians' "Golden Age". Between 1827 and 1853 the settlers were threatened in almost all the foundations of their special status. First to be attacked was land. In 1827 Governor Sir Neil Campbell became distressed by the continued irregularity in the registration and occupation of colonial lands, and so in April of that year he appointed a commission to ascertain "the true and Rightful owners to lands within this Colony". On Campbell's death in August his successor, acting-Governor Hugh Lumley, continued the enquiry, hearing land claims, searching titles and registering grants. All old grants from the Crown were nullified, and the new grants issued by Lumley stipulated the payment of a quit-rent beginning 1 January 1828. Though grants confirmed by the Sierra Leone Company as being free of quit-rents were not subjected to the new charges, the

1CO 267/81, Campbell to Bathurst, No. 111, 13 March 1827; CO 270/18, Council Minutes, 9 April 1827; SLA, Acts of Governor and Council, 1800-31, 9 April 1827.

2CO 270/18, Council Minutes, 14 August, 10 September 1827; CO 270/19, Council Minutes, 15 October 1827; CO 267/83, Lumley to Hay, 27, 29 August, 1 October 1827.
resurrection of the hated tax and the vulnerability of their informal titles revived old fears and insecurity among the Nova Scotians, and they expressed their opposition to it.  

A more substantial challenge to the settlers' land ownership was presented by Lumley's "Act to Enforce the Clearing of Lands" of June 1828. It was a common belief among Freetown's European community that their ill-health was caused by the miasma arising from the uncleared lands surrounding the town, and the new Act was designed to force the settlers either to clear or to be dispossessed of their idle lands. The owner of any lot with uncut bush exceeding six months' growth was required to pay a fine of ten shillings per acre, and if the fine were not paid within fourteen days of notice the land would be sold at public auction.  

Lumley's death prevented the implementation of the Act, but acting-Governor Alexander Fraser brought in his own measure "to obtain the same end". Fraser discovered that it was impossible to force the settlers to clear their lands or summarily to disregard their claims.

Many of them do not know where their lots are, [Fraser reported to Whitehall,] and possess no documents to prove they are proprietors, yet maintain their right to land somewhere in the parish. There is sufficient

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3Ibid., 27 August 1827; CO 237/123, Temple to Stanley, No. 41, 9 April 1834; CO 270/19, Council Minutes, 4 February 1828; CO 270/20, Council Minutes, 24 November 1832.

evidence of much land within the limits of this parish being granted to Nova Scotians and Maroons and this has great weight with the authorities here, even when the Title of the individual is defective. Fraser proposed to expropriate settler land and either exchange it for other land at a safer distance from Freetown or compensate the claimants at a price to be set by arbitration. A committee of Nova Scotians and Maroons was elected by a general meeting to assess the land's value, and they reported with a demand for five pounds an acre, a sum the local government could not afford to pay.

Again this specific threat was removed, by a British government decision that Fraser's assumption of the governorship was illegal and that therefore all his acts were null and void. Still, as Fraser acknowledged, the Campbell, Lumley and Fraser attempts to remove them from their lands caused "much serious discontent and insubordination" among the settlers. Though the land was useless economically in its idle state, it represented the Nova Scotians' birthright in Sierra Leone as the founders and first citizens of the colony. It was their ultimate security and the symbol of

5 Ibid.
7 CO 267/103, Findlay to Hay, No. 1, 27 April 1830.
8 CO 267/102, Fraser to Murray, No. 36, 24 February 1830.
their status and of their independence. The failure of all measures against their land rights reportedly convinced them that some higher authority was preserving their ancestral heritage, but they were disillusioned by an "Act Subjecting Real Estate in the Colony of Sierra Leone to the Payment of Debts", brought in, on London's instructions, by Governor Ricketts. Hitherto only property actually put forward as collateral for loans could be seized for non-payment of that loan, but by the new Act all a man's property was seizable for any legal debt. The result, as indeed was intended, was the gradual whittling away of the Nova Scotians' allotments held since the 1790s.

The attack on their suburban holdings was a serious blow to the settlers' spirits, but it did not immediately affect their economic situation. Their prosperity during the MacCarthy era had been based on property within Freetown itself and upon public works expenditures that created a heavy demand for their construction skills. These two economic foundations were undermined by a British government proposal in 1827 to move the Court of Mixed Commission to Fernando Po, where it would be closer to the area where slave ships were

9 Cf. Fyfe, History, p. 175.


11 For examples see below, footnotes 106, 108-110.
actually captured, and to locate the Liberated Africans there. Such a move would relieve the pressure on Freetown accommodation, cancel any need for further public works, and reduce the shipping, commerce and colonial establishment that had been thriving since 1819. The mere threat that the colony was to be abandoned by the chief source of its wealth caused a precipitous decline in property values and rents. Houses that sold for £4,000 in 1826 went begging for buyers at £400 a year or two later; residences and stores that had demanded rentals of £500 could be leased for £50. On the average, it was reported, income from property sales and rentals was reduced by 75 percent. Public works were delayed, for there seemed no point in completing something that might never be used. The naval storehouse, in such desperate need in the mid-1820s, was left unfinished and vacant in 1831. Hundreds were put out of work, and the settler prosperity was rapidly and visibly dissolving.

Confidence was restored to some extent by the government's rejection of the Fernando Po proposal, but the effect

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13 CO 267/94, Denham to Huskisson, No. 4, 13 May, and No. 6, 14 May 1828; CO 267/121, Treasury Office to Hay, 26 November 1833, enclosing Maclean to Stewart, 19 July 1833; CO 267/123, Temple to Stanley, No. 4?, 10 April 1834; Sittorpe, History, p. 51.

14 For example, Adm. 114/46, H. W. Macaulay to Z. Macaulay, 20 April 1831.
was qualified by a decision to enforce strict economy in Sierra Leone expenditures. Rent allowances were limited, civil appointments were reviewed in order to delete from the establishment those officials who were not absolutely necessary, and overall colonial expenditures were reduced by over £288,000 by 1832. Even the governor's salary was lowered by twenty percent. The revival, though it brought rentals up slightly, did not cause a return to the carefree government spending and consequent settler prosperity of the MacCarthy years. One economy measure, the abolition of the Department of the Civil Engineer and the performance of all construction works by private contractors, did tend to create more work for Freetown artisans, but by this time the Nova Scotian and Maroon monopoly of the trades was meeting a serious challenge from the Liberated Africans.

Before 1830 the majority of Liberated Africans not placed in separate villages was employed as common labour in

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16 CO 267/94, Denham to Huskisson, No. 6, 14 May 1827.

17 Ibid., Denham to Huskisson, No. 4, 13 May 1827.
Freetown: they cleared roads, unloaded ships and hauled the bricks and beams for the construction trades.\textsuperscript{18} Then, slowly but persistently, the villagers began moving into Freetown, and the apprentices began acquiring the skills of their masters and supervisors so that they could saw a board or cut a shingle with as great accuracy as the Nova Scotians and Maroons. The Engineer's Department, before its demise, hired instructors to train the apprentices as artificers, and the CMS superintendents graduated sawyers, masons and carpenters from their suburban institutions. As early as 1829 there were almost five-hundred Liberated Africans who could be designated "mechanics", and the following decade witnessed a steady increase in their numbers.\textsuperscript{19} The decreased demand and increased supply in construction skills not unnaturally forced a drop in wages commensurate with the decline in property incomes. Employers were loath to hire Nova Scotian artisans when free Liberated Africans were willing to perform the same work at a fraction of the cost.

\textsuperscript{18} CO 267/81, Campbell to Bathurst, No. 79, 19 January, and No. 106, 7 March 1827; CO 267/83, Lumley to Hay, 1\textsuperscript{st} August 1827; Alexander, Narrative of a Voyage, I, pp. 88-q.

\textsuperscript{19} CO 267/92, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix C-14, Martin Haffner, Colonial Engineer, to Rowan, 2 May 1826; CO 267/98, Ricketts to Murray, 30 June 1829; CO 267/109, Findlay to Goderich, No. 16, 7 May 1831; CO 267/140, H. D. Campbell to Glencol, No. 209, 18 April 1837; CO 267/160, Doherty to Russell, No. 48, 3 October 1840; Clarke, Manners and Customs, p. 38; Porter, Creolism, p. 17; Peterson, Province of Freedom, p. 272; George, British West Africa, p. 201; Little, "West African Creole", p. 312; Groves, Christianity in Africa, I, p. 278-79.
The reduction in construction activities halved a carpenter's pay before 1830; under pressure from the Liberated Africans a carpenter could demand only sixpence per day by the end of that decade, less than ten percent of the prevailing rate at the time of MacCarthy's death. Most Nova Scotians refused to accept such wages, and besides they tended to consider it demeaning to compete for work with men they were accustomed to consider their inferiors. Furthermore, much of the heaviest work had in fact been performed by the apprentices. The Liberated African artisan was willing, as the Nova Scotian was not, to do the dirty and demanding jobs himself, thus making himself more valuable and correspondingly less expensive than the settler who tried to keep up a supporting establishment of labourers. As a result the Nova Scotians as a group were forced, or voluntarily withdrew, from the construction field, leaving the second mainstay of their former prosperity in the hands of their erstwhile subordinates.

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21 CO 267/160, Doherty to Russell, No. 18, 1 October 1840; Clarke, Manners and Customs, p. 39; George, British West Africa, p. 201; Melville, Residence at Sierra Leone, p. 124; Little, "West African Creole", p. 317; Frye, History, p. 175.
The displacement of the Nova Scotians from trade had already begun in the 1820s, as they were surpassed by Maroons and the larger European firms. The 1830s saw the entry of the Liberated Africans into the interior trade, to the eventual destruction of most of their competitors. The system of exchanging Liberated African agricultural produce encouraged their participation in trade: when they brought their vegetable crops into Freetown they were given merchandise for them, not cash. In order to obtain cash they had to take the rum or cotton goods given them in Freetown into the interior, where they exchanged it for rice with the local African producers. They then returned to the colony and sold the rice into the Freetown market. Sierra Leone depended on the rice trade, for rice was a staple part of the colonial diet yet none was actually raised within the colony. By combining their operations into cooperative societies to carry the trade goods into the country and return with the rice, the Liberated Africans had soon captured the rice trade from smaller operators who tried to compete with only a few boatloads of merchandise. In


this way the members of the cooperative societies built up capital, and since their own agricultural enterprises were not large or profitable enough to attract their savings, they tended to invest their surplus in more trade goods and larger boats, and to enter trade as full-time merchants. The Nova Scotian traders, and the Maroons with them, either withdrew or were driven from the interior trade. Trying to keep up their homes and to retain an expensive life-style, they could not accumulate capital for expansion as could the Liberated Africans who built simple homes for as little as two pounds and who sustained themselves on a few pence a day. The process of settler bankruptcy went on as they tried to expand on credit; by the late 1830s it could be reported that "Trade is swallow'd up by the deported Africans".

A similar combination of cooperative tactics, frugality and the circumstances of the system also enabled the Liberated Africans to dominate slaver auctions and, with goods so procured, the petty retail trade of Freetown. In the

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24 Porter, Creoledom, pp. 7, 42, 44; PP 1847-8, XXI, "Slave Trade", "Third Report", p. 181; George Thompson, Thompson in Africa (Dayton, Ohio, 1857), p. 16; Christopher Fyfe, "The Life and Times of John Ezzidio", in Easmon, Eminent Sierra Leoneans, pp. 23-4; CO 267/147, Doherty to Glenelg, No. 35, 10 June 1838; CO 267/216, Macdonald to Grey, No. 12, 1 October 1850.

25 CO 267/151, Petition of the Maroons to Queen Victoria, 4 October 1838; GO 267/91, Commissioners' Report, 1847; Appendix A-11, "Report on the Liberated Africans"; CO 267/... Lewis to Hay, 7 November 1829; CMS, CA 1/0 219, John Weeks to D. Coates, 5 May 1836; Little, "West African Creole", p. 317; Fyfe, History, pp. 175-76, 211. The term "deported Africans" referred to the Liberated Africans.
earlier period of the West Africa Squadron's career most of the ships brought to Freetown were laden with slaves. By 1840 it was usual for the slave ship to be captured before it had any slaves on board, and it would be brought in full of trade goods. The goods and ships were then auctioned off by the government. It became the common practice for Liberated Africans to combine their purchasing power in order to obtain entire shiploads at the auctions. Settler and even European merchants could not mobilize the same amount of capital, and therefore could not bid against the Liberated African combinations. As a result the latter were able to obtain European merchandise—cloth, hardware, spirits, tobacco—at about one-fifth the regular landed cost of such goods in Freetown. The auction goods would then be distributed among the cooperative members, who hawked them in the streets of Freetown and the villages. Having procured their wares far below the merchant rate, and having no expensive shops or employees to maintain, the hawkers were able to take over much of the retail trade and to drive their competitors, with their warehouses full of English merchandise purchased on credit, into bankruptcy.

26 FO: 84/50, Sales Accounts (at the slaver auctions), 1825 and 1826; FO 84/193, Sales Accounts, 1836, and Lewis and Campbell to Palmerston, 31 December 1836; FO 84/213, Sales Accounts, 1837; FO 84/231, Macaulay and Lewis to Palmerston, 15 January 1838; FO 84/310, Sales Accounts, 1840, and Jeremie and Lewis to Backhouse, 31 December 1840; PP 1842, XI, "West Coast of Africa", Part I, pp. 175-77, 290, 300-01 (207-09, 322, 332-33); PP 1842, XII, "West Coast of Africa", Part II, pp. 252-53 (256-57).
Removed from the sources of their previous prosperity the older Black communities, both Nova Scotian and Maroon, turned to the government for employment. There they met a different kind of competition: the preference of the administration for European officials. Many settlers had resigned their government posts, obtained under MacCarthy’s open hiring policy, to enter the more lucrative commercial field, and when they failed in trade they found that their old jobs had been filled by young Englishmen. In 1829 there were only fifteen Nova Scotians on the civil list, at an average salary of £65 per year; at the same time the average annual salary of the twenty-one European officials was over £700. The highest paid Nova Scotian was David Wilson who, as clerk in the Court of Mixed Commission, received £200. There were twenty-six other Black government employees, including nine Maroons, at even lower rates of pay.  

Thirteen Nova Scotians and Maroons, with two other Blacks, petitioned Secretary of State Sir George Murray in October 1829, charging racial discrimination in the colony’s hiring practice and claiming that even well-educated Blacks were being refused jobs.  

27 CO 267/99, Lewis to Hay, 7 November 1829, enclosing “Return of Coloured Settlers holding Government appointments” and “European Office-holders”.  

28 Ibid., enclosing “The Memorial of certain Freeholders, being persons of Colour, to Sir George Murray”, 22 October 1829. See also CO 267/97, Maroon Petition to the Hon. George Walpole, October 1827; CMS CA 1/0 219, Weeks to CMS, 23 February 1834; FO 84/88, Smith to Sandinei, 5 November 1829.
favourable response for, as their petition pointed out, local people would be less expensive even at an improved salary scale than Europeans who had to be recruited in and transported from England. Furthermore there were at that time several higher posts left vacant from the death of eight Europeans during a Yellow Fever epidemic, a scourge the Nova Scotians were inclined to interpret as "an interposition of divine providence in their favour". And the expense and mortality of a European administration had already evoked the proposal, accepted in principle by Whitehall, that qualified Blacks should replace Europeans in office whenever possible. Yet the British government rejected the 1829 petition, finding the Black complaints unfounded and criticizing them for throwing blame upon their superiors in the colony.

The petitioners believed, with some justification, that the failure of their proposal reflected the very racial discrimination against which they had been complaining.

Walter Lewis, the Colonial Secretary in Freetown, who had for-

29 Ibid.; CO 267/98, Ricketts to Hay, 7 June 1829; CO 267/99, Lewis to Hay, 7 November 1829, and enclosure, "Memorial of certain Freeholders", 22 October 1829; Boyle, Medico-Historical Account, pp. 201-11.

30 CO 267/90, "Replies to Queries proposed to Major Rowan on 16 November ", 30 November 1828; CO 267/102, Fraser to Hay, 22 April 1830; PP 1830, X, "Sierra Leone and Fernando Po", p. 3 (407), Resolution 1.

31 CO 267/103, Findlay to Murray, No. 3, 8 May 1830.
warded their document to London, sent Murray a letter explaining away their charges. He noted that the petitioners had become "respectable" only through the "extravagantly high wages" of the MacCarthy era, and that several of them had given up government positions paying up to £400 in order to engage in trade. Now they came shirking back to regain their jobs, but refused to accept the new, lower, salaries being offered. Lewis enclosed a detailed description of each memorialist, indicating that this one had been mayor of Freetown, that one had given up a good job for independent trade, and another had been dismissed for incompetence. To illustrate their general deficiency in education, Lewis enclosed a letter from Herbert Williams, dated March 1808, in which the Maroon petitioner had applied, with some grammatical difficulty, for employment as a carpenter. Lewis was able to conclude, to the apparent satisfaction of the Secretary of State, that jobs and honours were readily available to Freetown Blacks, and that only their personal limitations kept them from complete equality. 32

The implications of Lewis' remarks were decidedly unfair, for there were numerous Europeans occupying senior posts whose letters reveal an even greater educational defi-

32 CO 267/99, Lewis to Hay, 7 November 1829, and enclosures, "Trades and Occupations of the Memorialists", Lewis to Gabbidon, Wise et al., 4 November 1829, Gabbidon, Wise et al. to Lewis, 6 November 1829, Gabbidon to Ricketts, 2 September 1829, and Herbert Williams to Ludlam, 14 March 1808.
ciency than the carpenter Williams'. Most of the English officials were young, often school-leavers, without experience or competence for the high positions they held. 33 Nor was the charge of discrimination a mere excuse for inability on the Blacks' part. Alexander Findlay, who became Governor in 1830, wrote revealingly that

There are but very few men of colour in this colony fit to hold responsible situations, although they all aspire to the highest office, but without a European to direct them they can do nothing. 34 Describing all Black men as "naturally lazy and indolent", Findlay even dismissed a suggested list of qualified Blacks sent him by the Under-Secretary of State. 35 And the post-MacCarthy racism extended beyond government employment. The old social mixing between white and Black was now "considered an offense against propriety". 36 Findlay, who admitted that his white colleagues "looked upon the principal inhabitants and respectable persons of colour as beneath their notice", 37 himself chastised Commissary Judge H. W. Macaulay for playing

33 Ibid., enclosure, "Memorial of Certain Freeholders", 22 October 1829, and Gabbidon, Wise et al. to Lewis, 6 November 1829; Fyfe, History, pp. 174-75.
34 CO 267/115, Findlay to Hay, 6 October 1832.
35 CO 267/149, Findlay to Hay, 5 March, 25 April 1833.
36 CO 267/99, Lewis to Hay, 7 November 1829, and enclosure, Gabbidon, Wise et al. to Lewis, 6 November 1829.
37 CO 267/108, Findlay to Goderich, No. 9, 23 March 1834.
cricket with Blacks.\textsuperscript{38} The Nova Scotians could not, under such circumstances, expect their government to relieve their financial distress.\textsuperscript{39} And to the injury of social and employment disadvantage was added the insult of a petty, presumptuous and uninspiring class of whites set over them. Their example was no more enlightening than had been the original council's in 1792. As soon as MacCarthy's death in January 1824 was known, squabbling took place among the senior Europeans over the succession, and party strife, factionalism and public displays of arrogance and temper continued for a dozen years. Drunken Europeans rolled and fought in Freetown streets, all the while demanding due respect from lesser whites as well as from the Black population. When insult or disrespect was assumed, fisticuffs, horse-whippings and duels were the frequent result. One acting-governor used his position to cancel the contracts of his commercial rivals, another was accused of misusing government funds. The very sanity of Governor Ricketts was widely suspected, and his infirmity led to

\textsuperscript{38}Co 267/119, Findlay to Goderich, No. 85, 6 May 1833, enclosing Findlay to H. W. Macaulay, 6 May 1833.

\textsuperscript{39}Between 1830 and 1841 only five Nova Scotians received government posts, at an average salary of £75 per annum. See SLA, Colonial Secretary's Letter Book, Vol. II, 1831-33, Thomas Cole to Samuel Leigh, 29 April 1833, to John Wise, 27 July 1833; Vol. III, 1833-35; Cole to James Wise, 8 April 1834, to Jacob B. Haseley, 6 June 1834; Vol. V, 1836-38, Cole to James Haseley, 22 July 1837; Council Minutes, 1836-40, 29 September 1836; Liberated African Department, Miscellaneous Return Book, Establishment, 1826-34.
the usurpation of the government by Walter Lewis. Lewis was himself challenged by the military, first by Captain Augustine Evans and then a month later by Captain Alexander Fraser. Finally the home government had to nullify all local acts passed since Ricketts became ill. Findlay, the man sent out to establish order, was recalled for illegally imprisoning a European who had an altercation with the governor's son. The settlers' reaction was one of disgust and frustration. "At no period of the history of this Colony", they wrote, "has it ever suffered more from the paucity of mental ability, in the several members of the Government, than at present... At no former period were the members of that Government more unpopular than at present".

Encouraged by the incompetence and factionalism of

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40 CO 267/60, Hamilton to Bathurst, No. 1, 17 April, No. 3, 20 April 1824; CO 267/73, Campbell to Bathurst, 28, 15 September and Campbell to Bathurst, confidential, 17 September 1826; CO 267/99, Ricketts to Murray, 20 November 1829, Lewis to Hay, 8, 22 December 1829; CO 267/101, Ramsay to Hay, 29 October 1829; CO 270/19, Council Minutes, 18 December 1829; CO 267/102, Fraser to Murray, No. 1, 14 January 1830; CO 267/103, Findlay to Hay, No. 1, 27 April, No. 3, 8 May 1830; CO 267/118, Findlay to Hay, 9 March 1833, CO 267/119, Findlay to Stanley, 29 June 1833; CO 267/120, Melville to Stanley, No. 1 and No. 2, 15 July, and No. 4, 19 July 1833; CO 267/126, Findlay to Hay, 29 December 1834; CO 267/131, "Z" to Secretary of State, 2 January 1835; CO 267/132, H.J. D. Campbell to Glenelg, No. 122, 25 July 1836; PP 1831-2, Vol. XLVII, "Slave Trade--Sierra Leone", p. 2 (490); Leonard, Records of a Voyage, pp. 96-7.

41 CO 267/99, Lewis to Hay, 7 November 1820, enclosing Gabbidon, Wise et al. to Lewis, 6 November 1820. See also ibid., "Memorial of certain Freeholders", 22 October 1829, and CMS CA 1/0 219, Weeks to CMS, 1st April, 1829.
the governing party, the Nova Scotians attempted to exert a political influence, mobilizing Black public opinion against what they considered to be arbitrary acts or racial discrimination. In 1827 Sir Neil Campbell used the military to remove some squatters from Crown land, as part of his plan to rationalize the land-holding system in the colony. Though they do not personally seem to have been affected, since the individuals involved were Liberated Africans, several Nova Scotians helped to organize a protest against this "misuse of government power". James Wise, a magistrate at the time, protested to the governor and was threatened with dismissal. Wise, Prince Stober and Anthony Elliott, all of them preachers in Nova Scotian chapels, and three Maroons, then organized a public meeting "for the purpose of taking into consideration the state of the colony". A few days later Campbell instituted a formal enquiry to examine and regularize land titles, and according to Lumley this restored the settlers' confidence and brought a halt to their "considerable public agitation". Whether this may be considered a political victory or not, it is significant that the Nova Scotians could arouse and articulate public dissatisfaction despite their numerical position, and also that they appear to have

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42 CO 267/82, Campbell to Bathurst, confidential, April 1827, and enclosure, Elliott, Stober et al. to William Cole, Sheriff, 16 March 1827.

43 CO 267/83, Lumley to Goderich, private, 29 August 1827.
felt it their role to protest on behalf of the other Blacks in the colony against an act of their white government. They intervened again in 1829 when the indisposed Governor Ricketts was about to appoint an acting-governor. Their request that someone be appointed who had not been involved in "party strife" led Ricketts to delegate his authority to a military officer, Captain Evans. Had Ricketts not followed their wishes, the Military Commissary suggested, an insurrection could have followed. 44

Under MacCarthy the militia had fallen into disuse, and though the people were liable to be called upon in case of emergency it had never been put into operation and there were no training sessions or periods of service. 45 Governor Ricketts, an army major, passed a new Militia Act in 1829 to embody a militia chosen by ballot from all males aged sixteen to forty-five. 46 Balloting took place under acting-Governor Fraser, but the men were not called or organized. When Findlay tried to invoke the Act and complete the militia organization in 1830 he met resistance from the Freetown people. "They declare certain parts of the Militia Act are objectionable", Findlay explained, but their chief complaint was that

44 CO 270/19, Council Minutes, 18 December 1829; CO 267/101, T. W. Ramsay to Hay, 29 October 1829.

45 CO 270/19, Blue Book, 1826. "Defence".

Walter Lewis, the Colonial Secretary who was regarded as a racist, was apparently to be in command. "His haughtiness in public life", they feared, "will be carried into the militia". Concerned that the colony was vulnerable to both African attack and internal insurrection without a proper militia, Findlay gave in to the popular demand and asked the offending Lewis to resign, whereupon the people registered for the militia. Nova Scotians, Benjamin Leigh, Eli Ackim, and George Cummings, with several Maroons and the private white merchant John McCormack, had been the spokesmen for the general public feeling. They were equally successful in forcing the dismissal of King's Advocate John Samo, a white man with dubious legal qualifications, who had been appointed over the head of W. H. Savage, "our ablest lawyer", who was Black. Samo was accused not only of professional incompetence but of an unsympathetic attitude toward Black people, and in view of the "majority demand" Findlay asked him to resign.

On each of these occasions it was Nova Scotians and

47 CO 267/103, Findlay to Murray, 24 June 1830; CO 267/108, Findlay to Hay, 17 January and 30 March 1831, and to Goderich, No. 9, 23 March 1831; CO 267/109, Findlay to Hay, 9 April, 31 May 1831, and to Goderich, No. 10, 4 May 1831; CO 267/115, Findlay to Goderich, No. 6, 4 December 1832.

48 CO 267/101, Ramsay to Hay, 20 October 1830; CO 267/102, Fraser to Hay, 18 February 1830; CO 267/108, Findlay to Hay, 17 January 1831, and enclosure, Petition from McCormack, Savage, Leigh, Gabbidon, Ackim, Moore, Cummings and others, to the Grand Jury, and Findlay to Goderich, No. 9, 23 March 1831.
Maroons, as the "principal coloured citizens", who acted for the Black population as a whole in confronting the administration. "They have a great idea that their freedom gives them equality", as Governor Findlay noted; as free-men and British subjects they did not feel obliged to submit to the whims of their governors, nor to relax into apathy when discrimination threatened. When the proposal was bruited that Sierra Leone should cease to be governed directly by the Crown, and instead fall under a government of merchants as was the case in the Gold Coast, they therefore expressed their immediate hostility to the plan. "The feelings of the Maroons, and free Settlers (an Influential Class) would", Fraser reported, "be ... repugnant to the adoption of a measure which would deprive them of the support of HM's Government," and when Findlay took further soundings on the subject he found that the Freetown colonists "would not submit to a merchant government".

No longer aspiring to political independence, perhaps because they were not in a position to exert control, the Nova Scotians recognized that their continued survival depended upon the guarantee and exercise cf their British rights. In order to ensure those rights they felt that they should be

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49 CO 267/103, Findlay to Murray, 24 June 1830.
50 CO 267/102, Fraser to Hay, 24 April 1830.
51 CO 267/103, Findlay to Hay, 10 May, 24 June 1830.
granted, and in fact as tax-payers deserved, a greater participatory role in making the decisions that affected them. Wise, Leigh and others, including the Maroon Gabbidon, wrote to Sir George Murray complaining that the government system had not evolved since 1808, through which circumstance the whole of the coloured portion of His Majesty's subjects remain precluded from having it in their power either to offer their support or express their dissent to those enactments which emanating from His Honour the Governor and Their Honours the European Council bind the colonists at large.\textsuperscript{52}

As long as they were ruled by Europeans who placed other interests ahead of the local population's, they said, they were not being treated properly as British freemen.

The issue of government participation came to an open confrontation in 1832 when Governor Findlay fired Maroon John Harding from his post in the Liberated African Department. Findlay's racial views were well known, and so twenty "coloured inhabitants of Freetown" accused the governor of discrimination, claiming that Harding was being deprived of his rights "contrary to the wishes of His Majesty's Government". A delegation tried to wait on Findlay, a privilege they also considered a British right, and when they were turned away they held a meeting to draw up a petition. This meeting Findlay declared illegal, an interpretation disputed by the Blacks who regarded the right of assembly as part of their.

\textsuperscript{52}CO 267/99, Lewis to Hay, 7 November 1832, "Memorial of certain Freneholders", 22 October 1832.
British heritage. Harding's dismissal was swallowed up in the greater issue of the settlers' position as citizens. Accused by the governor of disloyalty, the Black spokesmen denied that opposition was incompatible with loyalty. Findlay, they wrote in their petition, was behaving as if Sierra Leone were a West Indian island. But they were no slaves and refused to be treated as such. "Your Excellency must be aware of the fact that no body of free Settlers themselves British subjects enjoy so little the opportunity of having their wants, wishes and sentiments consulted as the coloured portion of those under your Excellency's government", the petitioners continued, and they ended with a warning that they might be driven to send a delegation to England "to solicit that change of the system as adopted towards us which we are convinced the circumstances of this Colony now demand, and which the most benevolent, most just and enlightened Government of England we are persuaded will when honestly explained with readiness grant."  

It cannot of course be claimed that the Nova Scotians alone organized or led the series of protests that erupted from the Black population between 1827 and 1832; in each instance they were participants, but so were an equivalent number of Maroons and sometimes some later Black arrivals from

53CO 270/20, Council Minutes, 8 October 1832, containing petition of the "Coloured Inhabitants of Freetown", 5 October 1832, and Findlay's reply, 8 October 1832; CO 567/118, Findlay to Hay, 9 February 1833.
Britain or the West Indies. What is evident, however, is the Nova Scotian inspiration in both the form and the language taken by the Black opposition. All of the sentiments expressed in the 1832 petition to Findlay had been part of the Nova Scotian political ideology since 1792. That the Maroons had adopted it, as for instance was revealed in their Militia objections in 1812, was evidence of the general Maroon assimilation of Nova Scotian manners and attitudes after 1800. By 1830 it was difficult for a European to distinguish a Maroon from a Nova Scotian. They each retained a sense of distinction, and on the Nova Scotians' part a sense of superiority, but their outward habits, language, dress and occupations were identifiably the same. And, as has already been described, the culture shared by the Maroons and Nova Scotians in the nineteenth century traced its roots not to the Jamaican cockpits, nor to the European community of Freetown, but to the settlers' experience in Nova Scotia and early Sierra Leone. Their sensitivity over land rights and their racial resentment, including the allusion to their treatment as slaves in the petition to Findlay, were peculiarly Nova Scotian. The settlers had never forsaken their faith in the justice and good intent of the British government, or in the tactic of a direct presentation

54 See Chapter XII, footnotes 55 and 56.
55 For example PP 1830, X, "Sierra Leone and Ferra Po", p. 38 (442).
56 See Chapter XIII, above.
of their grievances to the Crown. British rights had attracted them first as Loyalists, and had provided the foundation for their claims of equality ever since.

The reforms the settler leaders anticipated with such confidence in 1832 were not, however, forthcoming. Findlay chose to regard the petition as the work of his white opponents, particularly John McCormack, brother of the man Findlay had falsely imprisoned, and Alexander Fraser, the officer deposed by Findlay when he became governor in 1830.57 The plea for Black council members was taken up by Michael Melville, acting-governor after Findlay's recall, who recommended the appointment of four Blacks to the council, but when Octavius Temple arrived as permanent governor a few months later the Black appointments were not confirmed.58 The political channel was no more open than the channels of private wealth or government employment. Rebuffed from above and buffeted from below, the Nova Scotians and Maroons began to drift away from their traditional activities, both economic and political. Still regarded as an intermediate

57 CO 267/118, Findlay to Hay, 9 February 1833.

58 CO 267/120, Melville to Stanley, No. 4, 19 July 1833; CO 267/123, Temple to Stanley, No. 11, 1 January 1834. This was not the first time a Black had been appointed to council. On 11 December 1829, in the midst of his "mental aberration", Ricketts had named Stephen Gabbidon as a councillor. In view of Ricketts' illness, however, the British government annulled all his acts since 1 September 1829, and so Gabbidon's appointment was not legal. CO 270/19, Council Minutes, 11 December 1829, 26 April 1830; CO 267/99, Lewis to Hay, 22 December 1829; CO 267/103, Findlay to Hay, No. 1, 27 April 1830, and 17 May 1830.
group between European and Liberated African, they continued to be in demand as jurors and commissioners, but the attraction of such functions was lost when it became evident that they were not a step toward greater participation in government. Several Nova Scotians were fined for refusing to accept a commission appointment, and one was jailed for failure to pay the fine. There had been a pattern of withdrawal into their own society when their survival was threatened by outside interference, and that pattern was followed again in the 1830s.

However discouraged the Nova Scotians might become with their prospects in the colony, they still considered Sierra Leone as their homeland. This was not the case with the Maroons, who retained a memory of their life of freedom in Jamaica and referred to that island, not Sierra Leone, as their homeland. In 1827 a group of Maroons wrote to their old champion George Walpole, complaining that since MacCarthy's death "we have suffered in a Most Horrid Condition" and asking for Walpole's assistance "to remove us from Sierra Leone to our Native Country". Their main problem, they said, was

59 CO 267/123, Temple to Stanley, No. 53, 10 June 1834.
the sudden lack of employment, caused by European prejudice. "In fact we all lie Begging." 62 Eleven years later, in a petition to Queen Victoria directly, 224 Maroons blamed their "insurmountable hardships" on "the great numbers of Liberated Africans annually thrown upon this colony". Their jobs, their farms, their trade, all had been overrun by the uncivilized newcomers, and they begged the Queen's permission to return to Jamaica and there to receive lands to farm. 63

The government response was that while no obstacles would be placed in their path, there would be no assistance for their return voyage, and no free lands for them in Jamaica. 64

This did not dismay Mrs. Mary Brown, an old Maroon widow, who bought a schooner of her own in 1839 and prepared to depart. Her daughter's new husband, a Spanish slave captain, commanded the schooner, and they sailed to Jamaica with a dozen other Maroons in January 1840. 65

For most of the Maroons private transport was beyond their means, and they may have been forced to remain in

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62 CO 267/97, Memorial of the Maroons to the Hon. George Walpole, October 1827.

63 CO 267/151, John Thorpe et al. to Glenelg, enclosing Maroon Petition to Queen Victoria, 4 October 1839. Of the 224 signatories, half were illiterate, indicating that the petitioners were probably older Maroons who had been born in Jamaica.

64 CO 267/151, Glenelg to Doherty, 31 January 1839; CO 270/21, Council Minutes, 11 April 1839.

65 CO 267/169, H. W. Macaulay to Vernon Smith, 15 February 1841.
Africa had Emancipation not caused a West Indian need for more labour. The Jamaican Assembly passed a resolution to encourage and assist any Maroons desiring to settle in the island, and recruiting agents from both Jamaica and Trinidad came to Freetown to enlist emigrants. So anxious were they to leave, that when the transport ships arrived in the harbour in May 1841 sixty-four Maroons hired canoes to meet them so that they could quit Africa's shore more quickly. Their inability to earn a decent living in Sierra Leone was their stated reason for leaving, but there was an additional cause for their haste. In October 1839 Maroon John Jarratt was murdered at his timber factory by his Liberated African apprentice, an Ibo named Martin. Since the offence occurred outside colonial jurisdiction, and therefore beyond the reach of British law, a group of Maroons set out to punish the murderer themselves. With the assistance of three Nova Scotian traders in the vicinity and some Temne employees, the Maroons captured Martin, tarred, tortured and mutilated him, and then burned him at the stake. The Ibo in the colony called for vengeance, and began moving on Freetown from their

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67 Ibid., p. 467 (171).

68 Ibid., p. 468 (472).
villages to retaliate against the Maroon community. Dozens of Maroons fled to native territory, and it took a party of marines from a naval ship, plus the colonial troops, to disperse the angry Ibo. Afterwards the Maroons felt themselves in continual danger of their lives, and the conflict with the numerically-superior Ibo may have offered an inducement to accept the invitation of the Jamaican assembly. It would appear that about two-hundred Maroons left Sierra Leone, in a physical counterpart to the Nova Scotians' symbolic withdrawal from competition with the whites and Liberated Africans.

By the date of their fiftieth anniversary in Sierra Leone, the Nova Scotian community had been displaced economically and politically, and even their social position was in

69 CO 267/154, Doherty to Russell, No. 74, 29 November 1839; Clarke, Manners and Customs, p. 62.

70 CO 267/154, Doherty to Russell, No. 76, 2 December 1839, enclosing Petition from Sixty Maroons to Lord John Russell.

71 There were 650 Maroons in Freetown in 1837 and 454 in 1844, plus an additional 16 living elsewhere in the colony (PP 1847-8, Vol. XLIV, "Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry into the Subject of Emigration from Sierra Leone to the West Indies," pp. 38-9 (60-61), Census of Freetown, 31 December 1844. See also Kuczynski, West Africa, pp. 89-94). The difference need not have been caused by emigration, but since Maroon numbers had remained fairly constant from 1826 to 1837 the sudden drop from 1837 to 1844 is suggestive of that likelihood. In the total emigration from Sierra Leone the Maroons formed only a small part, being greatly outnumbered by Liberated Africans, but unfortunately the emigrants were not categorized by their community of origin. See the Emigration Returns in CO 267/176, and J. U. J. Asiegbu, Liberated Africans and British Policies 1840-1920 (unpublished PhD thesis, Cambridge, 1966), especially p. 36ff.
danger. As a result of the Maroon emigration Nova Scotians again outnumbered their old rivals, but with a population of 597 they made scarcely a mark on the Freetown total of 14,330 in 1844. Though the decline in the settler population that had characterized the period 1802-1826 had been halted, the influx from the villages since the latter date had tripled the Liberated African contingent in Freetown. Most of the remaining Nova Scotians and their descendants were poor, at least in comparison with the preceding generation. Food prices, for the dietary items considered essential by the Nova Scotians, had not gone down with the deflation in wages. It required a carpenter's full day's pay to buy a loaf of bread in the early 1840s, and another day's pay for a pound of beef. Rice was cheap at two pence a pound, but that was of more advantage to the Liberated Africans than to the Nova Scotians who clung desperately to a way of life they could no longer afford. The occupations listed by the Nova Scotian males did not change significantly during the 1830s and 1840s, but it is clear from other evidence that the

72 PP 1847-8, XLIV, "Colonies Emigration"; "Emigration from Sierra Leone to the West Indies", pp. 38-9 (60-61), Census of Freetown, 31 December 1844. The census listed 251 Nova Scotian men and 348 women in Freetown, and one woman elsewhere in the colony. See also Kuczynski, West Africa, pp. 74-5.

73 See Chapter XIII, footnotes 111-112.

tradesmen had priced themselves out of most employment and
that in fact the Nova Scotian community was largely being
supported by a meagre income from rents, the earnings of
the women who were laundresses, market-women and housekeep-
ers, and their small gardens and the cows they grazed on the
common ground at Tower Hill, with which they were able to
supplement their tables and sell the excess in the Freetown
market. 75

Impoverished, the Nova Scotians refused to acknow-
ledge humiliation. When a fire in 1833 destroyed eighty-
four homes, none of them Nova Scotian, the meeting held to
raise relief funds for the victims reported that Nova Sco-
tians had contributed £6.9.11, the Maroons £1.2.9, and
Europeans less than one pound. 76 Their savings disappeared

75 Property transactions usually noted the occupations
of buyer and seller. Between 1830 and 1840 land was sold by
three Nova Scotians shown as carpenters and one each as pilot,
sawyer, dealer, shopman, merchant, trader, timber factor, head
constable, sexton and mason. Between 1841 and 1850 Nova Sco-
tian sellers were five carpenters, three traders, two pilots,
a printer, a shipwright, a painter, a clerk and a wheelwright
(Registrar General, Freetown, Conveyances, Vols. 1-5). On
women's occupations and earnings see CO 267/111, Findlay to
Hay, 3 November 1831, enclosing 1831 census, and Rankin, White
Man's Grave, I, pp. 93-4. In 1836 the Ordnance Department
claimed Tower Hill, but the Nova Scotians successfully peti-
tioned Governor H. D. Campbell to have it kept as common
land. In granting their petition Campbell noted that the cows
they grazed there supplied Freetown with most of its milk. CO
270/20, Council Minutes, 5, 8 August 1836; CO 270/21, Council
Minutes, 12 April 1838; CO 267/133, H. D. Campbell to Glenelg,
No. 136, 30 August 1836.

76 CO 267/119, Findlay to Hay, 20 April 1833.
on the purchase of beef, bread and ale, trousers and top-
coats; their pride was sustained by dreams of their past
glories, and the conviction that the injustice and pre-
judice with which they had been served were the true cause
of their misfortune. Loyalist Nova Scotia came to represent
a happier period, when their fathers had been free and se-
cure, and the early years of Company rule gained a euphoric
memory that was equally inaccurate. 77 Only their chapels,
and the influence they exerted thereby over their Liberated
African converts, remained a reality to them. The Nova
Scotian preachers pressed the government to require "decent"
dress for local and Liberated Africans, agitated against
polygamy, and sought strict rules for Sabbath observance,
claiming for their authority the "Christian principles" upon
which the colony had been founded, principles they could
identify as their own. 78 Their confidence that they remained
a chosen people was unshaken; they kept their community an
exclusive as they could, deeply resenting efforts of other
groups to enter their society through intermarriage, and

77 Melville, Residence at Sierra Leone, pp. 232-33,
239-42; Rankin, White Man's Grave, I, pp. 98-9; Little,
"West African Creole", p. 312; Walker, Church of England
Mission, p. xxvii; Bridge, Journal of an African Cruiser,
pp. 171-72; The Artisan, 25 February 1885; Fyfe, History,
pp. 175-76, 232.

78 For example, CO 267/160, Doherty to Russell, No. 51,
7 October 1840, and enclosure, Anthony Elliott and Joseph
Jewitt to Doherty, n.d.; CO 267/166, Doherty to J. W. Hope,
27 October 1841, and enclosure, petition of Anthony Fili-
John Leigh, Scipio Wright, Jacob Snowball, David Wilson et
al., n.d.
they refused to associate with non-Nova Scotians on any basis
suggesting equality. 79

But any material basis for superiority, or even dis-
tinction, was rapidly disappearing. The Liberated African
villages, though physically separated from Freetown, in many
ways subjected the villagers to the same pressures and influ-
ences felt by their apprentice compatriots. An arrangement
between Governor MacCarthy and the Church Missionary Society
gave that Society control over village administration and
education. "It was our duty", MacCarthy advised the mission-
aries, "to make them all Christians", and this included
trousers and blouses and skills that would be useful in a
colony run by Europeans. 80 In 1827 the CMS ceased to have
civil responsibility, but the missionaries continued to run
over twenty schools for Liberated Africans in the villages.
At about the same time a few Liberated Africans were admitted
to the Freetown school as well, where they sat with Nova
Scotian and Maroon children, and during the 1830s they began
to outnumber the older residents. "The Wesleyan Methodists
ran an additional thirteen schools, and the settler Hunting-

79 Mrs. Melville reported in the 1840s that a Liber-
ated African who married a Nova Scotian was "well-nigh beaten
to death" by a Nova Scotian mob (Residence at Sierra Leone,
pp. 241-42).

80 Groves; Christianity in Africa, i, pp. 278-79,
quoting Journal of the Rev. W. A. B. Johnson; CO 267/47;
MacCarthy to Bathurst, No. 154, 26 June 1818; CO 267/63,
Pratt to Bathurst, 12 April, 15 May 1824; Owen, Narrative
of Voyages, II, pp. 146-47; Porter, "Religious Affiliation
in Freetown", pp. 8-9.
donian and Methodist chapels had schools attached. By 1840 most Liberated African children were receiving an equivalent education to their Nova Scotian counterparts, just as their parents were gaining equivalent experience and skills in the practical trades. As a result there were few differences in qualifications or occupations between the Nova Scotians and those Liberated Africans who had been born or trained in the colony.

In 1841 London instructed the local authorities to give preference in government employment to Liberated Africans whenever they were qualified, a policy that coincided

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82 For example, see Registrar General, Freetown, Conveyances, Vol. 5, Section 4, John Ellis to Anthony Elliott et al., Trustees of the Zion Chapel, No. 48 Wilberforce St., 17 January 1835. There were Nova Scotian and Liberated African trustees listed as shipwrights, masons and carpenters. The only occupation not shared with a Liberated African was Elliott's, a pilot.

83 CO 267/160, Russell to Jeremie, 23 March 1841.
with the entrance of the Liberated Africans into most of the positions of honour and duty available to Black citizens. The first Liberated African juror, John French, was appointed in 1821, and as more of them gained the minimum £10 property qualification during the 1830s and '40s they came to dominate both Petit and Grand Juries in Freetown.84 Their rise to social and civic equality was confirmed by the selection of John Ezzidio, a Liberated African merchant, as alderman in 1844 and then as mayor of Freetown in 1845.85 There were no perquisites left to the Nova Scotians, no positions or honours or monopolies of power, outside their chapels. These they continued to run on an elitist basis, acknowledging only those of their own community as spiritually qualified to lead the worship and instruct the unrighteous.

Despite denominational labels, the similarities between the settler chapels were greater than their differences. Structurally they were identical, with elected trustees, and preachers and class leaders who were responsible to their congregations through the trustees. At the settler denominations united for a regular Wednesday morning prayer meeting, and on special occasions, such as Good Friday, they joined

84 CO 267/92, Commissioners' Report, 1827, Appendix C-17, Hamilton to Rowan, 1 June 1826, Appendix C-18, Evidence of Kenneth Macaulay, Appendix C-19, Evidence of G. Kendall; CO 70/140, Mill to Labouchere, No. 20, 1 February 1838; James, History, pp. 24–7.

85 CO 70/22, Council Minute., 23 September 1844, 26 September 1845.
for an all-night service of hymn and worship. The Methodists and Huntingdonians held joint processions and shared in visions and the visitation of the Holy Spirit. Their Sunday services, sometimes lasting as long as four hours, were all characterized by physical involvement, the clapping, jumping and embracing that a missionary termed "carnel gesticulations" but which the participants considered "an expression of the joy of the heart and of brotherly love". 86

The chapels were also similar in the sense of mission they felt toward the unconverted: they all sent preachers and class leaders into the Liberated African villages to save sinners and to found new societies. Most villages had at least one Nova Scotian-founded chapel by about 1840, and the settler class leaders had a more profound effect upon the Liberated Africans' religion than did the permanently resident European missionaries. 87

The Methodists had always welcomed Liberated African worshippers at the Rawdon Street chapel, and by the 1880s almost a third of that congregation was made up of newcomers. The two Baptist chapels and the Huntingdonians also had considerable Liberated African memberships, even Hector Peters'
tiny grass shack that only had a total membership of thirty. After the separation from the Wesleyan missionaries in 1821-27 the settler Methodists greatly increased their activities among the Liberated Africans, until by the 1840s they had half a dozen affiliated chapels in Freetown itself and another eighteen chapels located in the villages. The Huntingdonians were almost as active. In 1834 they received government permission to preach in two villages, where they already had chapels and preachers established; they added two more in 1836 and another six during the 1840s. A Baptist preacher set up a suburban meeting house without government permission, where he offered serious competition to the CMS superintendent, and after he was disposessed his converts continued to ignore


the missionary and instead walked to Freetown to attend the Sunday services held by their former pastor.91

The Methodists were in the meantime suffering internal dissensions of a kind that had become characteristic of them. In 1826 the trustees of the main Rawdon Street chapel voted to remove James Wise as a preacher because of "his refusing to submit to those rules, and regulations, which as a religious body we were resolved if possible should be attended to". A court case, brought by Wise, decided in 1828 that the chapel building belonged to the trustees and their appointed preachers, Prince Stober and Joseph Jewitt, whereupon Wise led twenty-two followers, his own class group, over to the Wesleyan missionaries.92 In an ironic twist from the 1821 situation, Wise shortly succeeded as pastor of the Wesleyan society when the two European missionaries died during the 1829 Yellow Fever epidemic.93 Now aligned with the Wesleyan mission, Wise and his followers urged the English

91CMS, CA 1/E5A, No. 48, Wenzel to Bickersteth, February 1817, No. 49, Wenzel to Pratt, 5 February 1817.

92MMS, Sierra Leone, I, 3, Piggott and Dawson to MMS, 21 September 1826, Courties to MMS, 5 July 1827, May and Courties to MMS, 12 October 1827, Courties and May to MMS, 21 July 1828, Court of Chancery, 7 August 1828, Between James Wise and others, Plaintiffs, and Prince Stober and others, Defendants, and Prince Stober, Joseph Jewell, J. J. Jones, Jacob Snowball, Eli Ackin, Lazarus Jones, Henry Floyd and R. Robertson, Rawdon Street Chapel Trustees, to MMS, 10 August 1828.

93Ibid., I, 4, Charles Shaw and others, Trustees of the Maroon Chapel, to MMS, 22 July 1829, James Wise and others of the Methodist Society, to MMS, 23 July 1829.
society to insist on its right of access to the Rawdon Street chapel and its affiliates. An attempt by the new missionary to enter the chapel forcibly in 1833 had to be repelled by the police assisted by a body of angry settlers loyal to their independent society. 94 Though unsuccessful in regaining the Rawdon Street pulpit, Wise and his followers did gain considerable influence within the Wesleyan society: Wise himself, John Robinson, Abraham Hazeley, Aberdeen Turner, Isom Gordon, Peter Blair and George Cummings all became preachers in the mission circuit. 95 When the Maroons broke with the missionaries in 1833, over the terms of renewal for the lease on their chapel held by the Europeans since 1821, the Rawdon Street renegades stayed with the missionaries and continued to dominate the official Methodist chapels just as their old colleagues dominated the independent West African Methodists. 96

94 Ibid., William Munro and William Peck to MMS, 13 April 1829, John Keitley to MMS, 12 May 1830, James Wise, Abraham Hazeley, John Robinson, Peter Blair, Aberdeen Turner and one other to William Ritchie, 17 May 1832, James Wise to MMS, 17 May 1833; SLA, Colonial Secretary's Letter Book, III, Cole to J. D. Lake, Police Magistrate, 19 December 1833.

95 MMS, Sierra Leone, Box II, 1834-40, File 1, 1834-36, Maer to Mrs. Beecham, 8 April 1835.

96 Ibid., Edward Maer and Benjamin Crosby to MMS, 16 November 1835, Stephen Gabbidon and the Maroon Chapel Trustees to Maer and Crosby, 29 October 1835, File 7, 1835-36, James Wise, Aberdeen Turner and others to MMS, 3 November 1835, Gabbidon to MMS, 25 November 1835, File 12, 1835-36, Maroon Chapel Papers, enclosing Maer and Crosby to Maroon Trustees, 16 October and 21 October 1835, III, 4, Badger to MMS, 12 March 1836. Seven of the nine official Methodist preachers in 1835 were Nova Scotians.
The Baptists, numbering only two-hundred, were also divided in two because of personality conflicts among their preachers;97 of the three settler denominations only the Huntingdonians maintained unity and a regular succession of leadership. When John Ellis died in 1839 at the age of ninety, he was succeeded as pastor and superintendent to the one-thousand Huntingdonians by Anthony Elliott, another original Nova Scotian. A harbour pilot during the week, as were Stober and Jewitt of the Methodists, Elliott preached in the main Zion chapel on Wilberforce Street and visited each village chapel four times a year. Unlike the other sects, chapel deeds in Freetown and the villages were made out jointly to Elliott as superintendent and to the local trustees, a legal fact that may have contributed to Huntingdonian stability.98

The active involvement of the settler chapels in Liberated African salvation did not imply the acceptance of the new converts as equal participants in chapel affairs. Though Liberated Africans could become class leaders and


preach in the village chapels, they were refused ordination and were therefore prevented from administering the sacraments. They were also prevented from preaching to settler congregations. In the Rawdon Street chapel there was a pulpit and a lower reading desk, and Liberated Africans were kept at the reading desk. But as they gained wealth and status in other aspects of life, the Liberated Africans began to resent the presumptions of the settler "aristocracy". They tried to mount the high pulpit, and were hauled down ceremoniously and told to stay where they belonged. Nova Scotian members made it clear that while they welcomed Liberated African communicants, as they had welcomed local Africans, Maroons and European missionaries before them, they were not prepared to risk the purity of their religion by compromising their own exclusive control over the administrative, worship and social functions of the chapels. There may also have been an awareness that the Liberated African membership, who outnumbered the Nova Scotians by ten to one in the West African Methodist Society and five to one in the Huntingdonian Connection, would quickly reduce the settlers to insignificance if they were granted equality as individual members.

Inevitably the Liberated Africans reacted against their inferior position, and since they were unable to change the chapel hierarchy from within they decided, as the Maroons had done in their turn, to break away from the old structure and establish independent churches free of Nova Scotian pretensions and restrictions. The departure of the Liberated African Methodists was led by Anthony O'Connor, who arrived in a slave ship in 1811, received an education and became a senior clerk in the government service. O'Connor joined the Rawdon Street chapel in 1833 and eventually became a class leader and licensed preacher. In the face of settler opposition, he purchased a house in the Nova Scotian quarter of Freetown in 1838 and in 1839 married a Nova Scotian girl, Hannah Barnett. Obviously not a man to accept second-class status, O'Connor sought ordination from Joseph Jewitt and, when he was refused, he led the Liberated Africans out of Rawdon Street in 1844. He was joined not only by the Liberated Africans in the Rawdon Street congregation itself but by Liberated African Methodists in all the Methodist chapels, numbering over two-thousand. In effect it was an expulsion of the settler chapel from the Methodist society, for the Liberated Africans kept the name West African Methodist and elected Anthony O'Connor as superintendent. Joseph Jewitt and the Nova Scotians were left with only one chapel, Rawdon Street, which reverted once again to an isolated and
independent settler church.\textsuperscript{100}

The Baptists underwent a similar experience. Strephon Ball, the settler preacher, evidently had ideas similar to Joseph Jeavitt's, to the annoyance of his Liberated African members. One of them, William Jenkins, who had made a fortune in trade, bought a separate chapel in 1838 for the Liberated Africans and formed the African Baptist Church, completely distinct from the Nova Scotian chapels.\textsuperscript{101} The Huntingdonians followed the same pattern, but only to a partial division in 1847. Two Liberated African members, James Purdie and James Gallon, rejected Anthony Elliott's leadership in the Zion Chapel and led some two-hundred other Liberated Africans away to found the Free Grace church with Purdie as superintendent. The village chapels, however, remained


\textsuperscript{101} MMS, Sierra Leone, III, 4, Badger to MMS, 1\textsuperscript{st} March 1846; T. J. Bowen, Adventures and Missionary Labour in several countries in the Interior of Africa from 18\textsuperscript{11} to 1856 (New York, 1857), pp. 210-16; Fyfe, History, p. 38; Fyfe, "Baptist Churches in Sierra Leone", p. 38.
loyal to Elliott and stayed in communion with the mother chapel. By the end of the 1840s each settler chapel had lost its old position as leader of its denomination in Sierra Leone. Independence and exclusiveness had cost them their one remaining area of authority. Even the Huntingdonians' Zion chapel, where the Freetown settlers worshipped, was bereft of its Liberated African converts; the village chapels, though still under Elliott's superintendence, had contact only with the visiting preachers, not with the Nova Scotian congregation as a whole. The individual settler, whether Methodist, Baptist or Huntingdonian, was no longer kept aware of his superiority by the presence of subordinate beings at his chapel functions.

The final disinherittance suffered by the Nova Scotians, after a quarter-century of resistance since the first challenge in 1827, was the loss of their land. In the 1820s and early 1830s about two dozen Freetown homes were sold or exchanged for debt, but these were in every case given over to Europeans, usually merchants who had extended credit to settler and Maroon traders. The old Sierra Leone Company allotments remained generally inviolate: John Kizell and Daniel Prophet were forced to part with country lands to meet their debts, but the others kept them intact or exchanged them only

102 For, Sierra Leone, IV, 2, "Reply to Statement made in the Blue Book, 1848, by Thomas Raston", p. 29; Fyfe, "Countess of Huntingdon's Connexion", p. 373, and January 1854, p. 25.
within the Nova Scotian community. Even the flood of Liberated Africans to Freetown in the 1830s did not cause the Nova Scotians to sell their land. They resisted as a group the sale of Freetown houses to Black newcomers, and only a few sold portions of their country lots to Liberated Africans during that decade. By tradition, as was reflected in numerous Nova Scotian wills, the country farmlands were considered a unique settler heritage from the founding fathers, and were not to be alienated to strangers. Their control over the choicest parts of Freetown and the

103 (To avoid a confusion of non-pertinent detail, only the names of the Nova Scotian and Maroon sellers will be given in this and the subsequent lists of property transactions. The conveyances normally contain the names and occupations of both buyer and seller, the value and description of the property exchanged, and the date of the sale.) For example, Registrar General, Freetown, Conveyances, Vols. 1, 1-0; 2, 2-0; 3, 3-0; 4 and 5, Section 4, 1818-1832, Eli Ackim, John Ellis, James Robinson, Aberdeen Turner, William Easton, William Libert, James Parkinson, Richard Barnett, John Kizell, Pompey Rutledge, Sandy Edmonds, Sarah Holliday, Daniel Prophet, Richard George, William Gray, Cato Proston, Jeremiah York. Several lost more than one piece of property, e.g. Eli Ackim, 6, Daniel Prophet, 5, and John Kizell, 3, between 1818 and 1832. All were town lots except for two sales of 4 and 5 acres respectively by John Kizell and 5 country lots by Daniel Prophet, the largest measuring 1/2 acre.

104 For example, ibid., Vols. 1, 3-0, 4 and 5, 1833-39, Elias Deeper, Emma Keeling, Anthony Dixon, James Jackson, Andrew Moore, Eli Ackim, Henry Rawlins, James Edmonds, Abraham Hazley, Jacob Keeling. Some of the sellers parted with more than one piece of land. All sales were from the original Sierra Leone Company allotment.

105 For example, Registrar General, Freetown, Wills, Vol. 1, wills of Shadrack Gustus, Lydia Williams, Joseph Jewett, Betsy Harris, Fanny Jesty, Mary King, John Haywood, William Godfrey, Nancy Richards, Joseph Leonard, Elizabeth Trinity.
land immediately surrounding the town gave the Nova Scotians considerable influence over life in the capital. However insignificant they became in the colonial population as a whole, as long as they occupied the physical core of Sierra Leone it was their image and their life that was at the focus of the entire colony's attention.

The first slight leak in the dam was caused by the 1829 "Act Subjecting Real Estate in the Colony of Sierra Leone to the Payments of Debts". A debtor's property could be sold at auction to meet his liabilities, and as the debtor had no control over the bidding he could not place any restrictions on the buyer. When Prince Stober died in debt in 1836, for example, one of his Wilberforce Street houses was bought at auction by Governor H. D. Campbell, the other by a Liberated African chapman.\textsuperscript{106} The leak was widened by the sale, between 1838 and 1843, of much of the Maroon land at King Tom's Point, granted by the Company after the Temne wars. Evidently on the point of departure for Jamaica, the Maroons were not concerned that the purchasers were Liberated African.\textsuperscript{107} Further in the later 1840s and particularly into the 1850s the dam burst, and the Liberated African flood finally submerged the

\textsuperscript{106} Registrar General, Freetown, Conveyances, Vol. 41, Major H. D. Campbell from Margaret Stober, at auction, No. 4 Wilberforce St., 20 October 1836, and Vol. 5, Nathaniel Thompson from Margaret Stober, at auction, No. 76 Wilberforce St. The deeds note that the properties were auctioned under authority of the Debt Act of 25 May 1829.

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., Vol. 5, Section 4, a total of 23 acres, at prices ranging from £3 to £5 per acre.
settlers in their old habitat. Many Nova Scotians lost their Freetown homes for inability to pay their taxes. "The houses and town allotments of these indolent settlers", one Colonial Secretary wrote from Freetown, "are year after year brought under legal sequestration, and the Liberated Africans invariably become the purchasers."

The heirs of Samuel Clarke were forced to sell his home simply to pay his funeral expenses of £6.16. Savings had disappeared, rents were minimal, employment was difficult to find: in vain effort to acquire the income that would enable them to maintain their accustomed living habits the few remaining Nova Scotian immigrants and their descendants subdivided their Sierra Leone Company allotments for Liberated African residences, and gave up their family homes for less expensive accommodation.

Eli Ackim's heirs parcelled out over forty acres in seventy-five by fifty foot lots. Scipio Wright sold ten small lots between 1849 and 1853, and after his death his executors divided up the rest of his father's original grant for another twelve Liberated African purchasers. The Balls, the Burdens, the Chambers and Dioxes, the Georges, Keelings.

108 CO 267/162, Thomas Cole to Lord John Russell, 11 August 1840.

109 Registrar General, Freetown, Conveyances, Vol. 1-0, Anthony Elliott from Mary Ann Griffiths and Mary Williams, the estate of Samuel Clarke, for £6.16 funeral expenses and £9.4 cash, 13 April 1857.
and Leighs, the Moores, Peters, Prestons, Snowballs, Staffords, Turners, Willoughbys and Zizers, all families that had figured in Sierra Leone's early history, sold first their country lands in bits and pieces and then their Freetown houses. The income was pitiable. Joseph Williams sold a fifty by seventy foot lot, part of his mother's three acre allotment, for only £1.12. At the opposite end of the scale, James Gooding sold a forty-six by fifty-eight foot lot for £35. The average sale price was £9.11, and even if the family had ten or a dozen to sell the proceeds were hardly enough to keep them in luxury. Town houses averaged slightly less than £45, if transfers for debt are not included in the calculations, an amount that failed to match the annual rents most of those same houses could demand in the early 1820s.  

It is obvious that the Nova Scotians received scarcely

more than the biblical mess of potage in exchange for their birthright. Their disinheritance did not buy them a return to the golden MacCarthy years, it merely confirmed their poverty. According to the 1853-55 tax assessment, the majority of settler Freetown properties was valued at between £10 and £20. Another 10 fell in the £20 to £30 category, and a similar number over £30. Only the heirs of James Wise, listed jointly as "Wise and Co.", were valued at over £100 from among the settler community. Others may have been evaluated at less than £10 and therefore left off the list. At a shilling tax per pound assessed, it was unlikely that many could have afforded to retain expensive houses in any case.\(^{111}\) Of course not all the land was lost. Wills in the late 1850s and 1860s continued to bequeath Freetown houses and old Sierra Leone Company acreages to Nova Scotian heirs,\(^{112}\) but the Nova Scotian displacement was general and effective from about 1850. Freetown was in the possession of the Liberated Africans, just as were the offices, the trades, the schools, the positions of honour, and even most of the chapels.

\(^{111}\)SLA, General Entry Book, 1853-5, "Nominal List of Persons assessed in the Colony of Sierra Leone"; CO 267/241, Kennedy to Grey, No. 141, 24 August 1854, enclosing "Land and House Taxes Paid".

CHAPTER XV

Creoledom

The Nova Scotian Heritage in a New Nationality, 1850-70

As the Liberated Africans moved into Nova Scotian homes, jobs and perquisites, they tended to adopt the culture and attitudes of the Nova Scotian community. Despite their economic decline, the settlers possessed those attributes that carried the highest prestige in colonial African society: Christianity, education, industrial skills and a "civilized" living style. The Liberated African who aspired to respectability and social status had to acquire those same attributes, and his model was his Nova Scotian neighbour.¹ There was the natural "pull" of the Nova Scotian example, for the settlers were in prior occupation of most of the positions sought by the rising group of Liberated Africans, and there was also the "push" of the European missionaries and administrators who sought "to form a sort of resident coloured aristocracy", according to an 1837 report, "embued with European tastes and habits, and with a proper sense of the decorum and decencies of civilized life".² The settlers,

¹Porter, Creoledom, pp. 6, 12, and "Religious Affiliation in Freetown", p. 5.

²PP 1837, Vol. VII, "Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements)", p. 37 (12)
as the existing "Aristocracy of the place", 3 were therefore held out as a desirable mould into which the Liberated Africans should be fitted; if the settlers were derided for their alleged laziness, immorality and pretentions, they were at least a demonstrable part of Euro-Christian civilization.

The Nova Scotians exerted "unrelenting cultural pressure on the late arrivals". 4 Apprentices in particular were subjected to a constant enforcement of Nova Scotian values and habits. Living intimately in settler homes, accepting even the names of their settler masters, they soon learned to behave as if they were themselves settlers. 5 More pervasive, if less concentrated, was the influence extended through religion and education. Many of the teachers and preachers were Nova Scotians, but the European missionaries held almost identical goals: the chapel and the school were expected to produce, and did produce, literate, Christian, British Africans, a deliberate process that had already become the Nova Scotian pattern through experience and tradition. 6 The logi-

3 MMS, Sierra Leone, III, 4, Badger to MMS, 12 March 15.

4 Hair, review article, "A History of Sierra Leone by Christopher Fyfe", p. 286.

5 Porter, Creoledom, p. 37; CO 267/111, Findlay to Hay, 3 November 1831, enclosing Freetown census, 1831. The census indicates that 84 percent of settler homes had resident apprentices or servants, many of whom had adopted the surnames of their Nova Scotian masters.

6 For example, Porter, Creoledom, p. 79; Peterson,
ical consequence was that the Liberated African, removed from the source of his own traditional culture, rapidly accepted many aspects of the Nova Scotian alternative and soon became indistinguishable from its originators. 7

One of the more immediately evident adoptions of Nova Scotian culture was the Liberated African acceptance of "respectable" dress. Urged by government and mission to don trousers and shirts, the educated Liberated African took a step further and dressed himself in the woollens, beaver hats and waistcoats long considered gentlemanly by the settlers. 8 The central importance of a house, both as a symbol of status and as an investment, was another superficial display of a significant settler value. The Liberated Africans sought to purchase Nova Scotian homes, and even when they built their own they copied Nova Scotian architectural styles. Freetown in the 1840s reminded one visitor of Washington, a not unreasonable comparison since it was the settler ideal of accommodation, brought from Colonial

Province of Freedom, p. 62; Porter, "Religious Affiliation in Freetown", pp. 5-7; CO 267/109, Findlay to Goderich, No. 16, 7 May 1831.


8Poster, Creoles, pp. 99-103; True, "Color and Creoles", p. 61.
America, that lent Freetown its residential image. And as their ideas became similar, so did the language used to express them. Each Liberated African language group naturally added items of vocabulary to the Sierra Leone dialect, just as had various European slave traders and even the German CMS pioneers, but it was the English spoken by the Nova Scotian settlers that gave Sierra Leone English its basic grammar and construction.

Inside the home the Liberated African sat down to a meal of "foofoo", a Yoruba term for a dish created by Nova Scotians and Maroons. For recreation he joined in the dance-nights introduced by the early Black settlers. The ale-houses, many of them still settler-owned, attracted crowds of Liberated African customers. The independence


12 The Artisan, 25 February 1885; Sibthorpe, History, p. 22; CO 267/189, Ferguson to Stanley, No. 9, 26 November 1845.

13 CO 267/129, H. D. "Campbell to Glenelg, No. 41, 10 November 1835; CO 267/133, H. D. Campbell to Glenelg, No. 144, 3 September 1836; CMS, CA 1/0 59, Bultmann's Journal, 15 August 1847; MMS, Sierra Leone, IV, 4, Prize Essay, 1850, "The Best Means of Improving the Social and Industrial condition of Sierra Leone", by Moses Renner.
of women, a long-standing settler characteristic, was copied by many Liberated Africans: unlike most of their African neighbours, Liberated African women were free to set up house on their own and to share their favours with whom they chose, and then to support their offspring through independent enterprise. On the Sabbath they would join their Nova Scotian sisters in church or chapel, similarly garbed in kerchiefs and beaver hats.

Sabbath observance, dress and dialect were general Liberated African adoptions that immediately struck the visitor, but they were based on a more subtle acceptance of some of the fundamental values that had animated the Nova Scotian community for generations. "A blind fanatical Religious Craze" infected the Liberated Africans, even when they were nominally Anglican. Soldiers were stealing out to 4 A.M. prayer meetings conducted by settlers, later parading to the church under their European officers. The Anglican adoption of Nova Scotian techniques, including early morning prayer meetings and classes presided over by Black converts, stayed the Liberated African exodus from the Established Church, but it also meant that Nova Scotian religion had pron-

16 CO 267/130, Treasury to Hay, 1 April 1835, enclosures: Fraser to Somerset, 19 January 1835.
trated the Anglicanism of Sierra Leone. 17 "Independency", that settler insistence on a direct relationship with God, was an "evil" the CMS missionaries discovered in their Liberated African congregations. 18 It was displayed secularly as well. "Settled" Liberated Africans, as opposed to new arrivals, declined "the controlled and hampered life of a soldier". 19 Confidence in the worth of each individual, before God and before the British Crown, made Sierra Leone "the only colony where the negro seems to feel he is a free man, and knows his rights". 20

The Liberated Africans gained a zeal for education matching that of the early Black Loyalists, and perpetuated by their descendents in Sierra Leone. 21 The new Black majority rejected agriculture and physical labour as they were educated for more prestigious callings, turning instead to trade and government service, in a pattern established by their Nova Scotian mentors. 22 As early as 1827 settled

18 CMS, CA 1/04, Charles Haensel to Henry Rishton, 4 March 1830.
19 CO 267/189, Fergusson to Stanley, No. 94, 26 November 1845.
20 PP 1842, XII, "West Coast of Africa", Part II, p. 252 (256).
22 Ibid.; Horton, West African Countries and Peoples,
Liberated Africans were able to acquire new Liberated Africans as apprentices, and fifteen years later the practice was so common that the apprenticeship fee was doubled as a deterrent to undesirables who exploited the labour of their servants. With apprentices, the "Creoles", as colony-born children of Liberated African parents were coming to be called, were relieved of the necessity of performing physical labour for themselves, either in the home or in their trades. As a result, one acting-governor wrote, "Many of the creole-born children arrive at adult age, not only unaccustomed to labour, but disinclined to it".

In a repetition of an earlier cycle, tradesmen, traders, shop-keepers and washerwomen left the physical and arduous aspects of their operations to unpaid apprentices, and with it went the familiar attitude of superiority over the labourers. An Englishwoman noted that Creoles, "forgetting their own descent, look down with the utmost contempt upon all the negroes emancipated here, and assume equal airs with the settlers and Maroons"; a CMS Missionary related

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23 CO 267/81, Campbell to Bathurst, No. 96B, 18 February 1827; PP 1842, XI, "West Coast of Africa", Part I, p. 161 (193). It was evidently believed by the authorities that anyone respectable enough to afford a one pound fee would better treat an apprentice than one who could pay only ten shillings.

24 CO 267/189, Fergusson to Stanley, No. 04, 26 November 1845.

with horror that educated Creoles even grew up to despise their own illiterate parents. Whether the settled Liberated Africans and Creoles learned these attitudes from their Nova Scotian models, or whether the availability of cheap labour simply ran its logical course and created a class of people who considered physical work beneath them, the effect was the same: an exclusiveness developed that was justified in terms of culture and civilization. The "civilized" Liberated African shared with the Nova Scotian the idea that fresh arrivals were savages whose place was to serve, and who were not to be treated as equals.

Though they had lost their monopoly of their own culture, just as they had lost every other source of distinction, the settlers were not at first prepared to accept the educated Creole as an equal any more than they could accept the heathen import. To the Nova Scotian at mid-century, "community" still implied common descent from the founding

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27 CO 267/189, Fergusson to Stanley, No. 72, 18 September 1845, and No. 94, 26 November 1845; PP 1842, XI, "West Coast of Africa", Part I, p. 556 (58). It has been suggested, e.g. by Jean Herskovits Kopytoff, A Preface to Modern Nigeria (Madison, Wisconsin, 1965), p. 30, that the rejection of physical labour by the Creoles derived from African tradition which taught that such work was properly left to women and slaves. Two points argue against this interpretation, however. First, the newly landed Liberated Africans, who were closest to their traditional social system, were clearly not averse to the most demanding physical tasks, and secondly, any Liberated African, regardless of origin, could join the superior class within Liberated African society by adopting as his own the locally-accepted criteria of civilization.
fathers; no one else could join the community merely by conforming to Nova Scotian standards. In a final effort to give substance to their claim of status and privilege, they campaigned in England and in Sierra Leone for the fulfilment of the promises made generations before by John Clarkson. When John Elliott, son of the Huntingdonian pastor, visited England in 1851 he carried with him documentary evidence to support the settler claim for larger land grants and special considerations for "the aid rendered by these black loyalists in the war". He won the assistance of his English co-religionists, and a series of articles appeared in the Huntingdonian magazine, The Harbinger, relating the story of the settlers' betrayal in Africa. Two years later Scipio Wright, during a tour of Huntingdonian chapels in Britain, spoke regularly on "the conditions and claims" of the Nova Scotian community and won a sympathetic hearing in such an unlikely place as Tunbridge Wells. In Freetown "the surviving aboriginal Nova Scotian Settlers and their descendants" petitioned the local government for "our long neglected rights". Expressing themselves "fully satisfied with the exercise of that perfect freedom of action unexceptionally

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28 Porter, Creoledom, p. 43.


30 Ibid., January 1854, p. 22.
enjoyed under the British constitution", the eighty-two signatories still hoped that "a remedy may yet be applied to our case", and in particular they sought "the lands promised to our ancestors". 31 No government support was forthcoming, however, and the appeal to the rights of their ancestors brought little more than some sympathetic publicity. Without abandoning their claims, and certainly without forsaking the privileges they believed those claims implied, the Nova Scotians dropped the active agitation for Clarkson's promised land. 32

While they continued to regard the Liberated Africans "as an inferior and degraded caste", 33 political events in Freetown began to draw the Nova Scotians into a new community of interest with the Creoles as cultural similarities had hitherto failed to do. In September 1850 Governor Norman Macdonald introduced a House and Land Tax requiring Sierra Leoneans to pay one shilling in tax per pound of the annual rental value on their town houses, and sixpence per acre of

31 CO 267/263, Hill to Lyttel, No. 30, 19 February 1859, enclosing the Memorial of the Nova Scotians and their descendants, 1 January 1859. Among the 82 signatories were representatives of the Peters, Snowball, George, Elliott, Prophet, Hazeley, Stober, Leigh, Eason, Gordon, Dixon and Wright families.

32 A Nova Scotian lady stated, in a conversation in her Freetown home in June 1970, that many Nova Scotians had joined Wallace Johnson's Youth League in 1937 because Johnson promised to agitate for the fulfilment of the land claim, by then almost 150 years past the event.

33 CO 267/160, Doherty to Russell, No. 48, 3 October 1840. See also Forbes, African Blockade, pp. 22-3.
country land. This was the kind of ordinance the Nova Scotians had always resented and resisted, and 1850 was no exception. But this time there was a realization that the tiny Nova Scotian community could neither speak for the Black population nor sway the colonial government, and so efforts were made to enlist Liberated Africans into a Nova Scotian-headed campaign against the tax. Preachers Joseph Jewett, Anthony Elliott, Scipio Wright and Jacob Snowball, and eight other Nova Scotians, organized a petition to the governor declaring that the people were too poor to pay the tax and that if instituted it would force many to sell their homes and therefore cause a decline in property values. They gathered a total of almost 1,500 names, most of them Liberated African, for their petition. Further petitions to the same effect were added from eight of the Liberated African villages. When the government rejected their plea, over two-thousand Sierra Leoneans defaulted in their tax payment.

34 CO 267/215, Macdonald to Grey, No. 118, 29 September 1850; CO 267/220, Macdonald to Grey, No. 83, 15 April 1851. The act was passed on 14 April 1851.

35 CO 267/215, Macdonald to Grey, No. 118, 29 September 1850, enclosing Petition of Proprietors of Lands and Houses, 30 August 1850.

36 Ibid., enclosing petitions from inhabitants of Wilberforce, Lumley Town, Regent, Bathurst, Charlotte, Gloucester, Leicester and York.

Though it failed to prevent the tax, the agitation revealed the common interest of settler and newcomer in colonial land security, and it also raised the ideological issue of political representation for those required to pay the tax, just as the Nova Scotians had demanded in a petition to Sir George Murray thirty years previously. The Liberated Africans were afterwards never again the pliant citizenry they had once been believed to be. The 1850 tax resistance marked the end of the Nova Scotians as a separate political force, but it also represented the Liberated Africans' debut into popular opposition to their government.

Political agitations later in the 1850s did not depend on Nova Scotian initiative or leadership, for their goals and methods had been adopted by the Black majority. The street traders and hawkers managed to defeat an act intended to require them to purchase licenses, in 1853, using tactics pioneered by Nova Scotians. That same year Governor Arthur Kennedy abolished the Grand Jury in Sierra Leone and introduced restrictions on the system of "guardianship" whereby indigenous parents placed their children with colonial families, as they had done since 1792, for an "English education". Kennedy argued that guardianship constituted

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39 Sierra Leone Weekly News, 28 May 1904.
"clandestine slave dealing," as had Thompson in 1808, and that Liberated Africans on the Grand Jury would never convict another Liberated African on charges of owning or importing slaves. Opposition was immediately mounted in Freetown. A public meeting launched a petition with 550 names to the Secretary of State in London, and though Nova Scotian names were less prominent than they had been in 1850—John Ezzidio headed the list of petitioners—the language, including a charge that the Kennedy bills were "a reproach upon the Loyalty of the Community," was reminiscent of earlier settler petitions.  

The Grand Jury had been considered the one colonial body representative of local opinion, and the Secretary of State's support for Kennedy, upholding the abolition, inspired a new round of agitation for a local voice in government decision-making. The opportunity came in 1863, when a new Charter replaced the old Council with Executive and Legislative Councils. Governor Blackhall asked the Mercantile Association to recommend a member for the latter Council, and they elected John Ezzidio.  


41 For example, CO 267/108, Findlay to Hatton, 1 January 1831, enclosing "Report of the Grand Jury".  

42 CO 267/233, Kennedy to Newcastle, 27 September 1...
first time since 1800 a member of the Sierra Leone popula-
tion had an active role in making laws for the colony. Ap-
propriately, that man was a Liberated African; equally ap-
propriate was the fact that as a Methodist, trader, owner of
a former settler home and exponent of British African civi-
lization, Ezzidio incorporated the cultural characteristics
of his eighteenth century predecessors, the settler hun-
dredors and tythingmen.

Politically, at least, there seemed to be a recogni-
tion during the 1850s that settler and Liberated African
concerns were not divergent. Other activities in that same
decade were similarly revealing of the extent to which the
old and new Black communities were acknowledging common
problems and an identity of interest. Fundamental to this
feeling was the apparent disadvantage local Blacks suffered
in relation to other groups in the colony. Whitehall's de-
cision to appoint Blacks to government positions, after the
1829-29 Yellow Fever epidemic displayed the vulnerability
of white officials, brought a number of West Indians to
Sierra Leone rather than the promotion of settlers or Liber-
atied Africans. The white hesitation to accord social equal-

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CO 267/260, Hill to Lobouhere, No. 29, 17 February 1858;
Hair, "Africanism", p. 530; Fyfe, "The Life and Times of
John Ezzidio", p. 26; John D. Hargreaves, "Sir Samuel Lewis
and the Legislative Council", in Esmon, Eminent Sierra

43. CO 267/102, Fraser to Hay, 22 April 1830; PP 1830,
X, "Sierra Leone and Fernando Po", p. 3 (407), Resolution 1.
ity to Blacks did not extend to the West Indians, many of whom were mulatto, so that Freetowners watched aliens of their own colour gaining the positions and advantages they sought for themselves. Early in the 1830s West Indians replaced settlers as mayor, sheriff and magistrate, and on the boards of local societies. 44 John Carr, a Trinidadian who came to the colony as Queen's Advocate in 1840, became acting-governor on the death of Sir John Jeremie in April 1841. Carr, the first Black chief administrator in Sierra Leone's history, was challenged for that post by William Fergusson, the senior medical officer and himself a West Indian. The Colonial Office decided that the top honour belonged to Fergusson; he was confirmed as acting-governor and Carr became chief justice. 45 At the time when many Maroons were seeking a better life in the West Indies, the two senior government positions in Freetown were held by West Indians.

By the 1850s many of the highest level jobs in the civil establishment were filled by West Indians, the remainder by whites. G. W. Nicol, a Nova Scotian mulatto, was as First Writer the senior-most Sierra Leonean in the

44 SLA, Council Minutes, 1832-36, 2 September 1833; Colonial Secretary's Letter Book, III, H. C. Leigh to J. Wise, 19 October 1833, Rev. D. F. Morgan to Members of the Poor Society, 7 March 1834.

45 CO 267/164, Carr to Russell, No. 1, 23 April 1–11, No. 2, 27 April 1841, and Russell to Carr, No. 62, 12 July 1841.
government service; over two-hundred other Sierra Leoneans served as junior clerks, messengers and labourers. The resentment of the local Blacks was expressed against the West Indians rather than against the Colonial government.

A petition from "the middle and working classes in Sierra Leone" complained in 1858 that they did not receive proper British justice from West Indian officials, and an anonymous Sierra Leonian explained that "what vexes us most is to see West Indians who may be very ignorant admitted on arriving in the Colony into the first society, and treated as equals, whilst we, who have a right to it, are debarred from it." After receiving a second petition the Secretary of State, Edward Bulwer-Lytton, ordered that no more West Indians should be recruited for high office in Freetown. The Sierra Leonians' desired object of achieving those posts for themselves was not, however, to be fulfilled. It was Governor Hill's opinion that Africans had no respect for other coloured men put in authority over them, and so Bulwer-Lytton

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47 CMS, CA 1/0, 129, E. Jones to Henry Venq, 19 February 1859.

48 CO 267/260, Hill to Labouchere, No. 50, 22 March 1858, enclosing Petition.

49 The African Times, 23 February 1866, letter to the editor.
concluded that the West Indians should be replaced not by other Blacks, but by whites. 50

As far as the local Blacks were concerned, whites were already as much a problem as were the West Indians. In 1848 a group of settlers and Liberated Africans organized a petition of 829 names to Secretary of State Grey, complaining that Governor Norman Macdonald had "uniformly proved himself overbearing, Hostile, Malignant, and Vindicative towards us the Colored Population of this Colony". Macdonald allegedly refused to hire Blacks or to let Blacks get too close to white people, for example in the colonial hospital, and when a delegation complained to him they were told by the governor "I have no good to do for Blackmen". 51 In a second petition they added that Macdonald would only honour letters of recommendation from CMS missionaries, ignoring those from Methodist, Baptist and Huntingdonian preachers, and since a clergy recommendation was necessary to acquire an apprentice this meant that many "respectable people" were denied Liberated African servants. 52 Macdonald received a mild reprimand for "the unbecoming terms" he used to describe Black people. 53

50 CO 267/260, Hill to Stanley, No. 109, 1st June 1858; Lytton to Hill, 14 August 1858; CO 267/261, Hill to Lytton, 4 October 1858.

51 CO 267/203, Petition to Earl Gray from the Freeholders and Inhabitants of Sierra Leone, 1st September 1848.

52 CO 267/207, Pine to Grey, No. 38, 3 May 1849, closing Petition of the Freeholders and Inhabitants of Sierra Leone, 2 April 1849.

but he continued to affirm his belief that Africans were "mentally inferior" and suited only to jobs in "the humble sphere of life." 54

Macdonald, however, was not unique in believing black men incapable of holding responsible positions. A plan, instituted in 1853, to train Africans for the African medical service was abandoned in 1861 after only two Liberated Africans, James Africanus Horton and William Davies, were qualified as doctors. It was feared that African doctors would disturb the sensitivity of white patients. 55 Improvements in tropical medicine, particularly the introduction of quinine, made it easier to recruit Europeans for the African service, and this coincided with a burst of European publications claiming scientific justification for racial prejudice. The 1850s saw the racist theories of Knox, Cobine, Nott and Glidden, and they were followed by the personal observations of Napier Hewett, Richard Burton and Winwood Reade who ridiculed the efforts of educated Africans to become the equals of white men. 56 Just as the Liberated Africans were arriving at a degree of European civilization hitherto acknowledged as beneficial, that very civilization

54 CO 267/221, Macdonald to Grey, No. 101, 28 May 1851.
was declared unfit for them. James Hunt, founder of the Anthropological Society, wrote that "the Negro is inferior intellectually to Europeans" and "European civilization is not suited to the Negro's requirements or character", 57 and Lord Stanley echoed Burton's opinion that European education had produced, in the "westernized" African, "a race the most worthless of any in the world". 58 The educated African suddenly became living proof of the African's inherent inferiority, rather than an indication of African potential. 59

Members of the Black community in Freetown were of course aware of the ridicule directed against them, and they could plainly see the employment disadvantages they faced. 60 Africanus Horton, the Liberated African medical doctor, wrote a "Vindication of the African Race" in 1868 in which he typified the Liberated African response to the new racism. The mass of Africans, Horton agreed, were culturally inferior. As an educated Liberated African he confirmed his group's belief in the superiority of British civilization. But he denied the intellectual inferiority of Blacks, citing the rapid advance of his own people as proof that Africans could

57 Ibid., p. 34.
60 CO 267/264, Fitzjames to Newcastle, No. 156, 11 September 1859; CO 267/274, Hill to Newcastle, 7 July 1869.
adopt the best of western culture, becoming Christians, loyal British subjects and commercial successes. The sum effect of the racial controversy of the 1860s, coming as it did upon the heels of the land tax, Grand Jury and West Indian campaigns, was to confirm the old culture consciousness of the Freetown Blacks and at the same time to instil a new sense of colour consciousness. Their defense of their Afro-European culture committed them all the more strongly to it. The differences between themselves and the indigenous and new Liberated African arrivals were obvious, and they were more than ever convinced that theirs was the superior way. On the other hand, they began to see themselves as a united Black group under attack from white men. The Nova Scotians had always had this dual consciousness, of culture towards other Blacks and of colour towards the whites, but for the Liberated African it was a new phenomenon. Thirty years previously they had felt no animosity toward or from whites, but by 1863 it was possible to unite all settlers and Liberated Africans simply by setting up "a cry of colour". The events since 1850 had dramatized the fact that together they shared a unique position between Africa and Europe.

Meanwhile, and not altogether unconnected with the increasing importance being placed on European participation in colonial affairs, other social phenomena in Freetown were causing the displacement of the Nova Scotians from any remaining influence and prestige outside their own community. As they declined in economic and political importance, the Nova Scotians lost the "socio-economic criteria" of status to a rising class of Liberated Africans and to a dominant class of white administrators. 63 Many Liberated African families had outstripped their social positions with wealth and commercial success, and as members of their community became mayors, preachers, and in 1863 even a Legislative Councillor, social recognition at last caught up to economic reality. 64 When a Liberated African made money as a hawker or trader, he put his money into a fine home and an advanced education for his sons; he took apprentices or "native wards" to do the physical labour, he adopted western civilization as interpreted by the settlers, and the family was eventually incorporated into the superior class of educated Africans.

Wealth and education, two of the factors that had given the settlers their dominance earlier in the century, enabled Liberated Africans to bypass the prestige of settler

64 See Porter, Creoledom, p. 7.
65 Ibid., p. 6; Lewis, Sierra Leone, p. 35.
descent. With the third factor, Christianity, these symbols of civilization gave direct access to social position. And all three were possessed, at least in relative terms, by every white man in the colony. But Christianity per se was losing its distinctiveness as the chapels and missionaries enjoyed widespread success in making converts. The organized missionary churches, because they were associated with the white man and therefore with greater wealth and education, took on greater prestige than the independent Black chapels. This, as particularly true of the Anglican church, the church of official patronage, attended by the governor and the wealthiest European merchants. The Wesleyan mission-affiliated churches came next in respectability, followed by the larger independent chapels, the Methodist and Huntingdonian, and finally by the small Baptist group which had been identified with poverty since the early decades of the nineteenth century.  

The Anglican Church, hitherto, had not been particularly attractive to the local Black population. The settlers had never lost their suspicions, born in Nova Scotia and nurtured during the 1790s, that Anglicanism threatened their independent existence. And although many Liberated Africans had been forced to attend Anglican services in the CMS-rut,

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66 Potter, "Religious Affiliation in Freetown", pp. 7-12, and Creoledom, p. 79; CMS CA 1/MI, Fitzgerald to CMS, 2 May 1821.
villages, before the 1830s there was little voluntary membership as would have been revealed in attendance at the Freetown Church. In 1827, for example, four Liberated Africans attended a settler-affiliated chapel in Freetown for everyone who attended the Church of England. Nor was the Wesleyan mission very dynamic at that time, its congregation being limited almost exclusively to the Maroons who had remained loyal to the European missionaries after the Nova Scotian departure in 1821-22. Then in the 1840s a new momentum took force until by the early 1860s the European denominations had captured the allegiance of almost every Sierra Leone Christian. This change was apparently part of those ironically-combined phenomena described above: an increased colour-consciousness on the part of educated Africans, a cultural sensitivity that taught exclusiveness toward Blacks who remained illiterate and non-Christian, and an acceptance that wealth, education and Christianity were the marks of civilization. The Anglican and Wesleyan organizations, no doubt unwittingly, were able to cater to the new situation and therefore to benefit from it. Both instituted changes giving Black Christians a greater role in local parish affairs and, in the Anglican case, consecrating a Liberated

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African Bishop for the Niger Mission in 1864. Both devoted considerable resources to education, training thousands of children and hundreds of African teachers. And yet, while in these ways making their churches more "Black" and therefore more acceptable, they retained the aura of prestige, of wealth and education, guaranteed by the European connection. 68

The settler chapels, the independent West African Methodists after 1844, could offer no such combination. Their settler-derived prestige had been dissipated by economic displacement. They could not reach the same number of students or potential converts with their limited financial resources. They gained no confirmation of respectability from the presence of white men. As a result, the period following the Liberated African divisions of the 1840s witnessed a move away from the independent chapels and into the European mission churches; first to the Wesleyans and then, as the families grew in social position, to the Anglican. 69

By 1848 the Wesleyan Methodists had twice the membership of all independent Black churches combined, and by 1851 the

68 The European-connected denominations in Africa expressed a faith in a "Native Pastorate" during the 1850s and 60s, a policy that was expected to show greater success in African conversion than European personnel had enjoyed, and at the same time to avoid the high expenses and mortality rates that had been incurred in the first half of the century.

69 Porter, "Religious Affiliation in Freetown", pp. 10, 12.
Anglicans with 13,863 members were virtually equal to the Wesleyans' 13,946. In the latter year "African Methodists", both settler and Liberated African, numbered 5,134, the Huntingdonians 2,849 and the Baptists 462. Then in 1860, for the first time, the Church of England became Sierra Leone's largest denomination.

For the sake of their own survival, to avoid their complete desertion by all non-settler members, the Nova Scotian chapels were obliged to find a new source of strength and prestige. On Christmas Day 1848 Anthony Elliott and the Zion chapel trustees wrote to the Executive Committee of the Huntingdonian Connection in England, asking for aid and a European minister to help them with their work in Africa. A little over a year later, when no reply had been received, the request was repeated.

Meanwhile Richard Elliott, Anthony's son, went to London on a personal visit and while he was there met members of the Executive Committee "almost by accident". The remainder of his trip was sponsored by the Committee, and he was kept busy speaking to Huntingdonian meetings and describing the work of the connection in Africa.

77 MMS, Sierra Leone, IV, 2, "Reply to statements made in the Blue Book, 1848 by Thomas Raston", n.d. (1848); G: 267/228 Macdonald to Sir John Pakington; No. 11, 26 June 1852, enclosing Census Returns, by occupation, race and creed, 1851; The Harbinger, January 1863, p. 4; Sierra Leone, 1860.

71 The Countess of Huntingdon's New Magazine, July 1850, p. 156.

72 Ibid., October 1850, p. 335.
The result was a decision by the British Church to support Zion chapel's native mission with money and books; and to offer free passage and accommodation to any more of the Sierra Leone faithful who might like to come to London.

John Elliott, Anthony's elder son, went in 1852, and in 1852 Scipio Wright was given a year's theological training at the Huntingdonian college and ordained into the ministry by the English Connection, the first since John Marrant. 73

In addition to their spiritual assistance, the English Huntingdonians threw their support of their monthly magazine behind the settler campaign for the fulfillment of Clarkson's 1791 promises. 74

The British financial aid was used to extend Zion chapel's work among the African people in the Sierra Leone region. Four full-time settler preachers, their salaries paid from England, established missions and schools in outlying territories, travelling in a boat, christened Selina after the Countess herself, also donated by the English society. 75

mission thrived, and Huntingdonian numbers


75 The Countess of Huntingdon's New Magazine, December 1850, p. 194, November 1851, p. 259; The Harbinger.
underwent a dramatic increase. In 1853, after several years of trying to find a suitable, and willing, candidate, the Englishmen sent the Rev. George Fowler on a one-year "delegation" to Freetown to help the settler leaders organize the administration of their mission, assist in the training of indigenous teachers and, if possible, to effect a reconciliation with the Liberated African Free Grace dissidents who had left the main Connection in 1847. Fowler, as an European, gained access to the governor, bishop and chief justice, and though he failed to entice the Free Grace Chapel back into the fold he did establish the Training Institution where young adults could prepare to become teachers and preachers. By the time Fowler left the chapel and schools were well organized, and soon there were fifty-eight trained people to serve them. The operation was growing too large and complicated for a part-time superintendent who had to earn a living during the week. When Anthony Elliott and Scipio Wright, the two leading preachers, both died in 1854, there seemed to be no logical successor. The English society sent the Rev. John Trotter to offer his assistance, and in October 1857 the Sierra Leone Huntingdonians met at Zion.


chapel and resolved to recognize the European Trotter as their pastor and superintendent of the Connection in Africa.\textsuperscript{77} For the first time in its history the Nova Scotian Huntingdonian church fell under the direction of a white man. Yet the people did not consider this to be a betrayal or a rejection of their heritage of independence. On the contrary, chapel membership had increased, they had more money, more schools, and, significantly, more respect in Sierra Leone than before 1850. When Trotter returned to England in 1862 the Zion congregation met and "resolved and carried unanimously, That it is the decided conviction of this conference that unless a European minister is appointed over the churches in this colony, the connexion will soon come to nothing".\textsuperscript{78} A more personal, and revealing, appeal came from A. H. Brown, the settler Huntingdonian secretary, who wrote to Trotter "on behalf of the District Meeting":

Oh, our dear Pastor, do come once more to your poor African children; we are all hungry to see you! You well know how you kept us like the other societies when you were here; and how the Governor, the Bishop, the Secretary, the Queen's Advocate, then came to help us. But now we cannot go forward like the other churches.\textsuperscript{79}"

The settlers obviously believed that only a connection with the European could assure the continued existence of their

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., January 1857, p. 15, December 1857, pp. 198-99, January 1858, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., January 1863, p. 29.

\textsuperscript{79} The Magazine of the Free Church of England, February 1872, p. 27.
church.

The Rawdon Street Methodists shared the same feeling, but not unanimously. In 1852 the chapel at Aberdeen, formerly affiliated to the settler meeting, voted to unite with the Wesleyan missionaries, thus initiating a debate within the settler congregation over whether they should do the same. Some of the remaining original members argued for continued independence, but the younger people pointed to their declining numbers and increasing poverty as evidence that something drastic had to be done before their society withered away. Joseph Jewett's death in 1853 brought Jacob Snowball, a younger and more moderate man, to the Rawdon Street pulpit.

A final factor may have been the decision of the Liberated African West African Methodists to give up their independent status. In 1858 the Liberated Africans approached the United Methodist Free Church, a British society divided from the Wesleyans in 1835, and the following year they received the European missionary Joseph New as their superintendent. The way seemed clear for the Nova Scotians. In June 1861 Jacob Snowball and the Rawdon Street trustees gave over their chapel to Wesleyan Superintendent Charles Knight in exchange for his services as pastor. Two months later the front wall of the chapel collapsed, an event attributed by the older members to the angry spirits of their ancestors, but it probably confirmed the others' conviction that the society, like the chapel, had been on the verge of destruction. For safety's
The entire chapel was torn down and a new one built, with Wesleyan financial support. This time, the missionaries were more careful, for when the new chapel was completed, its ownership was vested not in the trustees but in the European superintendent. Forty years after they had ejected the missionaries from their society, the Nova Scotian Methodists were once again, and more firmly, brought under European control.  

In 1883 American Baptist missionaries began supporting the settler Baptist chapel, though their pastors remained Nova Scotian descendants until in 1902 they joined the British Church of God. Twenty years after the Liberated African Baptists had done the same. The departure of their English superintendent made it difficult for the Huntingdonians to carry on, and so in 1897 the Zion chapel gave up its separate existence and joined the African Methodist Episcopal Church of America. Only the old Maroon chapel, now known as St. John's, survived in "comparative obscurity" as an independent

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81 Fyfe, "Baptist Churches in Sierra Leone", pp. 59-60; Marke, Wesleyan Methodism in Sierra Leone, p. 10.

82 Sierra Leone Weekly News, 16 July 1887; Fyfe, "Countess of Huntingdon's Connexion", p. 60.
The Nova Scotian chapels had all merged with other denominations, gaining, no doubt, the sustenance they sought for the survival of their religious institutions. If the price of their survival was their independence, at least they were able to carry on as distinct congregations within their respective denominations, to hold their frequent services of worship, to participate in the conversion of the heathen, and to fellowship together for social and religious functions. For most of the settlers, and their descendants the price was apparently worth it, for the alternative was their disappearance as an identifiable entity.

Such developments were in fact the work of African-born Sierra Leoneans of Nova Scotian descent, for few of the original immigrants remained alive past mid-century. In 1851 there were 112; in 1860, 69; and in 1862, at the 70th anniversary celebration, only 22. Five old ladies, aged 81 to 88, were the final survivors attending the anniversary service held amid "much pathos" and tears at Zion Chapel on March 1870. Of the settler remnant A. B. C. Sibhiere, the Creole teacher and historian, wrote in the 1860s:

They are not more noticed by the present, mulish gene-

83 West African Reporter, 25 August 1870.
84 CO 267/228, Macdonald to Pakinton, 1852, enclosing Census Return, 1851, Racos; The World, June 1862, p. 186; West African Herald, p. 84; ski, West Africa, pp. 74-5.
tion than a Shango worshipper the Cathedral of St. George's in Freetown. Those who originally knew them, are dead, or are away. There are none to speak for them. Their numbers are diminishing. They are now looked upon as a passing crowd, or dying old men, heavy with age, going, never to return. In a few years, not one of their race will remain, and their very name will be forgotten.85

But their children, born in the colony, did carry on the Nova Scotian name and memory. A "Nova Scotian and Maroon Descendants' Association" was formed in 1859 wherein, as they informed Queen Victoria, they perpetuated "that same Loyalty and Devotion as animated our Fathers when they fought and bled for your Majesty's Illustrious Grand sire, King George of imperishable memory, in the War of American Independence."86 One hundred years later the Association, and the designation "Nova Scotian", were still in existence.87

The Nova Scotian descendants were not, however, a distinctive cultural community as their parents and grandparents had once been. The passing of their independent chapels removed the last support for any realistic claim to "elite" status.88 They did retain an educational advantage, which enabled them to procure some of the better jobs available to

85 The Artisan, 25 February 1885.

86 CO 267/273, Hill to Newcastle, No. 87, 20 April 1862, enclosing "Address of Condolence to Queen Victoria on the death of Prince Albert, from the Nova Scotian and Maroon Descendants' Association", 17 April 1862.

87 See Epilogue, footnotes 13-18.

88 See Chapter XIII, footnotes 104-106, 113-114.
local Black citizens in government service, commerce, and later in the professions, but they did so as educated Africans rather than as the descendants of the colony's founders. They were no longer listed separately on the census returns, being considered together with the colony-born descendants of Liberated African parents, the Creoles, who were also beginning to outnumber immigrants by 1850.

The old restrictions against intermarriage were forgotten by native-born settler and Liberated African descendants: Africanus Horton and William F. Campbell married Elliotts, Bishop Crowther's son married a Hazeley, the Rev. Joseph May a Nicol, with no attendant agitation or resentment such as Anthony O'Connor had met in the 1830s. By 1870 the old Nova Scotian idea of "community" had declined in importance, being replaced by the idea of "culture" or "civilization" which they shared with their Liberated African-descended in-laws. Together they preserved a way of life now known as

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90 CO 267/228, Macdonald to Pakington, No. 83, 26 June 1852, enclosing Census Return, 1851, Races, showing Liberated Africans (i.e. immigrants), 20,461, and native "Creoles", 21,250.

91 Fyfe, History, p. 378; Sierra Leone Weekly News, 14 March 1891 and 27 February 1927.

92 Porter, Creoledom, pp. 7, 12, 52, 137.
"Creole", and together they proudly bore the Creole name to identify themselves. 93

The Liberated African Creoles, despite the many divisions and tribal retentions among them, had gradually been moving closer to each other as they all moved closer to the settler norm. 94 They came to share a common language, religion, food, dress and education, and were conscious of a common purpose and destiny as the purveyors of British African civilization to their mother continent. 95 Developing an awareness of distinction from other Black peoples from their educational experience in the colony, the Creoles gained a colour consciousness during the events of the 1850s and 1860s that made them realize that they were distinct, as well, from their alien rulers. 96 This dual awareness gave birth, as it had among the Nova Scotians during the 1790s, 97 to a feeling of nationality: whatever their differences, the Creoles, both settler- and Liberated African-descended, were united by interest and sentiment in a new Creole nation.

93 Sierra Leone Weekly News, 24 June 1899.

94 For an excellent account of the separate Liberated African life and the national groupings among them see Peterson, Province of Freedom.

95 For example, see PP 1842, XI, "West Coast of Africa", Part I, p. 463 (495).


97 See Chapter X, above.
"The inhabitants of the Colony", James Africanus Horton wrote in 1869, "have been gradually blending into one race, and a national spirit is being developed", and A. B. C. C. Sibthorpe, writing in the same year, described how the Creoles had been "compelled by fortune and nature to become one people, or nation of mixed generation on this soil".

Creole society as it was displayed in 1870 would have been easily recognizable to a Nova Scotian of half a century earlier. The religious observances, drumming and dancing, love of fine clothes and houses, material ambition, desire for education, exclusiveness, jealousy of freedom, imperial loyalty, missionary enterprise and urge to share in government power that characterized Creoledom had once been the preserve of the settlers, now fused into a larger society. It was an Afro-European society, or perhaps more accurately British African, a third cultural alternative between Britain and Africa. The Creoles now incorporated the criteria of a Black colonial elite, but it was an elite to which the settler descendants belonged. As a separate group the Nova Scotians

98 Horton, West African Countries and Peoples, p. 83.
99 Sibthorpe, History, Preface, p. 3.

100 For example, see Fyfe, History, pp. 378-81; Littlé, "West African Creole", pp. 312-13; Luke, "Notes on the Creoles", pp. 53-66; Peterson, Province of Freedom, Preface, p. 13; Porter, Creoledom, pp. 53-7, 137; Hair, review article, "A History of Sierra Leone by Christopher Fyfe", p. 286; Porter, Foreword to Easmon, Eminent Sierra Leoneans, p. 1.
had ceased to have any meaningful existence, but their
values, symbols and traditions survived to serve the new
Creole identity. Superficially conquered and replaced by
an alien majority stronger than themselves, at a subtler
level the Nova Scotians were themselves the conquerors.
EPILOGUE

The *Sierra Leone Weekly News* editorialized in 1890:

All along the West Coast the influence of this Colony is felt and recognized. The man from Sierra Leone, bent on improving his condition, adventures wherever he has reasons to believe that his labour, intellectual or manual, his intelligence and enterprising spirit, may meet with encouraging remunerations. He has left his footprints in the Sands of Senegal. He dips his hands into the waters of the Congo. He followed in the train... of the conquest of Ashantiland. He colonizes Lagos and makes it a prosperous settlement. He was present at all the explorations of the Niger from the earliest. He has largely contributed to the development of the Niger trade. The Niger Mission—its conquest, ... its conversions, are mainly his work.\(^1\)

About 1840 the Liberated Africans of Freetown began to display an "extensive and growing disposition" to seek greater economic opportunities beyond the colony, in other British posts or in the service of African leaders.\(^2\) Since their careers in government service were being retarded by the current preferences for West Indians and Europeans, they sought and received Whitehall's approval for their penetration into

\(^1\)Quoted in Leo Spitzer, review article, "A Preface to Modern Nigeria. The Sierra Leoneans in Yoruba, 1830-1890, by Jean Herskovits Kopytoff", *SLS* (ns), No. 18, January 1966, p. 71.

every part of the coast. Throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century Sierra Leone Creoles occupied positions of importance outside the colony far out of proportion to their numerical significance. Literate in English, with a profound Christian commitment and experienced in the administration of commerce and chapel, they supplied West Africa with its African clerks and teachers, merchants and professional men, catechists and pastors, in the relative absence of local rivals for those positions. Every British post experienced the growth of a Creole community, as did other European settlements and many African jurisdictions.

Creole George W. Johnson organized the Egba United Board of Management and Samuel Ajayi Crowther became the Anglican Bishop of Niger, and their successes encouraged the participation of many more of their Creole brethren in the commercial and religious conversion of Nigeria.

With the Creoles' physical presence and administrative skills went their cultural and political ideas. As the fountainhead of Creole civilization Freetown became "the hub

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3BM Add. Ms. 40563, Peel Papers, Vol. CCCLXXXIII, General Correspondence, 16-31 March 1845, Memo, Addington to Peel, March 1845.

of the West Coast" and the "Athens of West Africa". 5 Freetown's faith and ideals, Freetown's education and ambitions, were communicated to the growing mission stations and commercial centres until, according to several modern scholars, they became the "dominant influence" upon the developing indigenous elites throughout West Africa. 6 In particular, the Creole émigrés transferred their aspirations for African participation in the control of the churches and of the colonial administrations, and thus have been regarded as "among the pioneers of African nationalism". 7 Initially the harbingers of British imperialism, for the Union Jack often followed in their train, ultimately the Creoles were of significance for implanting the seeds of a cultural, social, and economic revolution in West Africa which is still in full flight today. 8 Ideals that originated with the


Sierra Leone settlers, a settler-descendant has noted, were to influence the history of all West Africa.9

Inevitably, as Christianity and literacy were extended along the coast, local African elites grew up to replace the Creoles, and this development coincided with an increasingly direct European involvement in African administration that accompanied the formalization of British imperial rule in the last quarter of the century. The Creoles were no longer considered partners in development by the Europeans, who assumed the higher posts for themselves, and the lower echelons of administrative power were filled by educated Africans with closer ties to the local population and tradition. By the time the editor of the Sierra Leone Weekly News eulogized the Creole role, in 1890, it was almost time for an elegy, for direct Creole influence was in decline.10 Even in Freetown itself Creole influence was diluted as Africans moved into the colony from the Protectorate and gained the education required to perform many jobs hitherto considered a Creole monopoly. Migration and late marriage brought about an absolute decline in Creole numbers, European and Syrian merchants offered overwhelming competition in trade;

9 Jones, "Freetown--The Contemporary Cultural Scene", p. 200. See also Webster and Boahen, West Africa Since 1800, p. 152.

and African immigrants qualified as clerks, schoolmasters and artisans. Just after the turn of the century only half the Freetown population was Creole, a proportion that shrunk steadily as this century progressed. As a result, the position and advantages enjoyed by Creoles were increasingly shared with others, to the extent that they were advantages no longer.  

Although the Creoles lost their economic and administrative predominance, they continued to exert a cultural influence over the colony and especially over the life of Freetown. Within the Creole minority, the Nova Scotian descendants retained their own group identity and even the specific concerns and aspirations of their ancestors. Until 1952 the Nova Scotian and Maroon Descendants Association held "culture nights" in the yard of the Rawdon Street Church or the Zion Chapel; after a late-night barbecue the members would present displays of Nova Scotian dance and song. "When our people came here they had their own food, their own language, their own religion, their own culture", a Sierra Leonean lady of Nova Scotian descent stated in 1970. "People of all kinds came to the Association's social evenings to hear

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12Hair, *A History of Sierra Leone by Christopher Fyfe*, p. 293.
the songs and watch the dances. We all dressed up in the old Nova Scotian costumes. We women wore long dresses with our breasts pushed up high and a tight girdle and a bustle out the back. Our shoes had buckles and we wore high lacy collars. We wore mittens, not gloves, and carried umbrellas, and had big hats on our heads. Even after the Association's demise in the 1950s the settler community sustained the memory of the founding fathers with an annual celebration of the 1792 landing, culminating in a procession to the landing-place and a religious service beneath the cotton tree.

The consciousness of belonging to a distinctive group has clearly survived the Nova Scotians' absorption into the Creole society, a consciousness that is undoubtedly supported by the fact that their ancestors were the founders of modern Freetown. The legacy of Thomas Peters, Nathaniel Snowball, James Wise and the others, however, has penetrated beyond the retention of a few quaint customs. The effects of the Nova Scotian interlude can be discerned in statements made in 1970, that "Family is everything for us", "The Nova Scotians are different", and "The church is the solid rock


14 Interview with the Rev. Gershon F. H. Anderson, Pastor of Zion Chapel, 9 Perceval Street, Freetown, 11 June 1970. The last such celebration seems to have been held in 1968.

15 Mrs. Elliott-Horton.
for all Nova Scotian people. Nova Scotians in Freetown today have kept alive their forebears’ fundamental concern for freedom and self-determination, their aspiration for the fulfilment of the land promises made by Clarkson almost two hundred years ago, and their belief that their treatment by their colonial rulers constituted a betrayal.

We came here to be free. The Nova Scotian must be free. And this was a free country at first. The land, the peninsula, was bought from the Temne, and so it belonged to us. When they tried to take it back we drove them out again. This was a free country and it belonged to the Nova Scotians. Then the colonial people came. They ruined it for us and they betrayed their own Queen. Queen Victoria gave us a charter for our land and our freedoms. But the colonial people refused to give us all the land we were promised, and even took away what we had. They brought in a quit-rent as a trick to take away people's land. If they wanted some property they made the owner pay a quit-rent. Our people refused; they could not accept such a thing. So the colonial people took away the land. As recently as 1937 many Nova Scotians joined Wallace Johnson's Youth League on the promise that the League would agitate for the full allotment of Nova Scotian land claims and political freedoms. The approach of Independence in 1961 was opposed by some Nova Scotians on the ground that the colony, which should itself be free and self-determining, was being given over to the control of the larger and more populous Protectorate. Furthermore, the alleged charter "from Queen Victoria" has been rendered invalid with the severance.

16 Interview with Mr. J. B. Elliott, 3 Ball Street, Freetown, 29 June 1970.

17 Mrs. Elliott-Horton.
of the British tie. "Now", a Nova Scotian sighed, "I think we shall never get our land."

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The Black Loyalists who stayed in Nova Scotia, though they too remained distinct from the greater society surrounding them, did not bequeath the same heritage of pride and superiority to their descendants. The exodus of 1792 had the economic effect that had been feared by the province's employers and proprietors. Trade was depressed by the removal of so many Black consumers, and the province was deprived of "useful labourers and the supplies of small provisions and vegetables they brought to market." Governor John Wentworth, Major Stephen Skinner, Magistrate Gideon White and a group of "Proprietors of Lands" all recorded their conviction that the province had been seriously damaged by the departure of the major pool of casual labour. One might therefore have expected an improvement in the wages and working conditions of the remaining Black

18 Mrs. Elliott-Horton and Mr. Elliott. The final quotation is from Mrs. Elliott-Horton.


20 PANS Vol. 48, Letters to the Secretary of State, Doc. 87, Wentworth to Evan Nepean, 13 December 1792.

21 Ibid., Doc. 81, Wentworth to John King, 14 September 1792; CO 217/63, Stephen Skinner to Henry Dundas, n.d. (received April 1792); PANS; White Collection, VI, Doc. 56, Gideon White to Nathaniel Whitworth, n.d. (1792); CO 217/54, Petition of "Proprietors of Lands" to Henry Dundas, 16 May 1793.
labourers, for their assets were in short supply. That this did not happen may partly be explained by the fact that the free Blacks' importance to the Nova Scotian economy had always been as a labour reserve: they were available to work when required, but had never become an integral or permanent component in a continuing process of production. Clarkson had recruited his emigrants from among that free labour reserve, and particularly from the skilled group within it. Left behind were the slaves, indentured servants and sharecroppers, by definition excluded from the free labour pool, and the weak, the aged, the indebted and the unskilled. 22 Such people were neither free to choose, their employment nor capable of bargaining an equitable share in Nova Scotia's economy. The increased demand and higher wages for labour did not devolve benefits upon the Black remnant as an immediate consequence of Clarkson's mission.

Nor did the provincial government take steps to improve conditions in the depleted Black settlements. The Birchtown petitioners failed to receive the "Cow and two Sheep" they had asked of the Crown in lieu of transportation to Sierra Leone, 23 and the "Enquiry into the Complaint of

22 PANS Vol. 48, Letters to the Secretary of State, Doc. 81, Wentworth to King, 14 September 1792; PP 1797-8, Vol. 103, "Papers relative to the settlement of the Maroons", No. 529A, Alexander Howe to William Dawes Quarrell, 9 August 1797.

23 CO 217/63, Petition of Black residents "in and about the towns of Shelburne and Birchtown", 1 November 1791, enclosed in Skinner to Dundas, n.d. (received April 1792).
Thomas Peters" resulted in no new land grants, despite the assurances of Henry Dundas and John Clarkson. The tract laid out in Clements Township for the Grindley Town Blacks was never formalized by a grant, and was still unoccupied in 1796. A group did "squat" upon some land in the township, and a series of petitions beginning in 1822 finally brought them title to the land they occupied in November, 1830. In the meantime they had built homes and barns, but had no security in their farms. War veteran Samuel Ball, originally settled at Shelburne but disappointed there, moved to Chester where he purchased a lot and in 1809 was permitted to occupy an adjoining four acres on a License of Occupation, the first land he had received from the Crown. At Little Tracadie, 2,720 acres of the 3,000 acre tract granted to Thomas Brownspigg and 73 other Blacks in 1787 were reallocated in 1799 to 36 "Acadians and Negroes", presumably because the original 40 acre lots had proved non-

24 See Chapter VI, footnotes 138-143.


26 PANS, Land Papers, Memorial of Abraham Clements, 7 November 1822, Memorial of Peter Johnson, 7 December 1825, Order to survey issued 4 August 1830, Draft grant for 1038 acres, Clements Township, to Peter Johnson, Peter Johnson Jr., Caesar Hawkins, Abraham Clements and Peter Kinwood, men of colour, 29 November 1830.

27 Ibid., Memorial of Samuel Ball, 9 September 1801, and marginal note.
viable and been deserted.28 Petitions from landless Blacks in New Brunswick reveal that they, too, failed to receive grants in the decade after the exodus.29

Clearly the controversies and promises attendant upon the 1792 removal did not result in the creation of a Promised Land for the Black Loyalists of Nova Scotia. In fact the exodus was detrimental to the Black community's economic interests. Preston was almost immediately deserted. Once the landowners had left for Sierra Leone, the others were forced to seek employment and residence in Halifax.30 Birchtown and Brindley Town were also reported to be suffering from the loss of many employed or landed families.31 Governor Wentworth acknowledged in 1792 that throughout the province "this emigration proves exceedingly distressful to those that remain, many of whom are unable to provide for them-

28PANS, Box, Guysborough County Land Grants, Folder No. 1, Docs. 29 and 30, 9 April 1799. On the original grant see Chapter II, footnote 70.

29For example, PANB, Land Petitions, York County, No. 530, Petition of Stephen Saunders, 10 September 1795, No. 732, Petition of --- Corneilson, 27 June 1808; Land Petitions, Kings County, No. 744, Petition of Robert Ross, 18 February 1796.

30SPG, Bray Associates' Minute Books, III, Minutes for 7 February 1793, quoting Inglis to Associates, 30 November 1792.

selves, having been heretofore assisted and supported by their black friends and brethren.\textsuperscript{32} Without the aid of their relatively more prosperous neighbours, and with neither land nor economic opportunity to enable self-support, Black families were increasingly forced to adopt the alternative of placing their children, usually around age eleven or twelve, into indentured servitude or apprenticeship.\textsuperscript{33}

Even more significant than the economic repercussions of the exodus was the social dislocation it caused. The Black remnant of Nova Scotia was a decapitated community, having lost most of its teachers, preachers and other leaders to Sierra Leone. Boston King, George Ball and Moses Wilkinson of the Methodists, David George and Hector Peters of the Baptists, Isaac Limerick, Joseph Leonard and Catherine Abernathy of the independent Anglicans, and Cato Perkins and William Ash of the Huntingdonians, the core of the Black clergy, all led the majority of their free parishioners to Africa.\textsuperscript{34} Though religious faith remained, the separate Black churches collapsed after 1792. Equally damaging was the demise of the Black-operated separate school. When Joseph Leonard left Brindley Town the remaining Blacks.

\textsuperscript{32}PANS Vol. 48, Letters to the Secretary of State, Doc. 81, Wentworth to King, 14 September 1792.

\textsuperscript{33}SPG, Bray Associates’ Minute Books, III, Rowland to Associates, 3 May 1802; IV, Stanser to Associates, 13 January 1810 and 7 March 1811.

\textsuperscript{34}See Chapter VI, footnotes 66-70, 73-76, 91-92.
petitioned Bishop Inglis for a new schoolmaster to instruct the twenty-eight children still there. The SPG teacher at Digby, a Mr. Foreman was asked to teach the Black children, and construction was begun on a separate wing of the Digby school for their use. In 1793 the Bray Associates agreed to renew their support for a Brindley Town school, and in October of that year John Hale, a white man, was hired as its teacher. Hale visited Brindley Town, sometimes irregularly, until 1799, when another young white man, Daniel Leonard, took over the instruction of the children. Daniel and his brother Edward held day and evening classes for more than forty children and adults, then they resigned in 1801. Their replacement, Alexander Long, lasted only one term, after which the town was left without a teacher for a year. In the autumn of 1802 James Secaur, "a sober, Elderly man", moved with his family to Brindley Town and assumed charge of the school. Secaur was the first teacher to reside in town since Joseph Leonard, and the first white resident in Brindley Town's history. Secaur held classes in his home while the people built a proper schoolhouse. When Secaur retired in 1805 the school was abandoned once again, until in 1807 Thomas Byng, a Black man, was hired and the school re-opened.

35 SPG, Bray Associates' Minute Books, III, Minutes for 7 February 1793, quoting Inglis to Associates, 30 November 1792, and Blacks of Brindley Town to Inglis, 1 June 1792.
36 Ibid., No. 19, Abstract for 1799, Viets to Asso-
For fifteen years the Brindley Town school had ceased to provide a social focus, as it had under Joseph Leonard. The teachers, when there were any, were white, they did not combine the role of educational, religious and community leaders, and until James Secaur had not even been a physical part of the community.

The departure of Isaac Limerick and Catherine Abernathy left the Halifax and Preston schools without teachers. The Preston schoolhouse remained vacant, since there were no Black people there after 1792; in its stead the Associates gave their support to a new school established in Fredericton in 1797 for the thirty Black children remaining there. Halifax, however, had an increase in its Black population, and in 1793 the Associates complied with Inglis' request to appoint Mrs. Deborah Clarke, a white woman, as schoolmistress to the Blacks. Until her death in 1809 Mrs. Clarke, assisted by her widowed daughter Mary, conducted classes for up to fifty children between the ages of four and twelve. Mrs. Clarke attended especially to the appearance and deportment of her pupils, and her graduates were eagerly sought as apprentices and indentured servants. "Their healthy Looks,

37 Ibid., Weeks to Associates, 1 December 1791.

38 Ibid., Minutes for 3 July 1797 and 7 August 1797.
and neat Appearance", Halifax rector Robert Stanser reported, 
"ought to put the Whites of their Class to the Blush." 39

The widow Mary Fitzgerald succeeded her mother in 1809, con-
tinuing the school until it was dissolved in 1814. In the 
latter year a group of private subscribers, assisted by a 
grant from the provincial Assembly, founded the Royal / 
Acadian School in Halifax designed to teach "all descriptions 
of Children". There was, the Associates felt, no further 
need for a separate Black school, and so they closed the 
oldest school in their care. 40 Although the Bray school had 
given Black children an advantage over poor whites in Halifax, 
the instruction they received after 1793 was specifically in-
tended to prepare them for jobs as servants. 41 No more than 
in Brindley Town did the post-exodus school serve as a force 
to develop an independent and self-supporting Black commu-
nity.

Stephen Blucke retained his position as schoolmaster

39 Ibid., Minutes for 7 February 1793, Stanser to 
Associates, 3 July 1794, 2 July 1795, 5 December 1796, 12 
June 1797, 5 February 1798, 25 April 1800, 23 October 1800, 
27 October 1801, 21 May 1802, Minutes for 5 December 1803, 
Stanser to Associates, 23 October 1807, 24 October 1808, 19 
May 1809.

40 Ibid., Minutes for 6 July 1809; IV. Stanser to 
Associates, 10 January 1811; Bray Associates, Box 7, Canadian 
Papers, Stanser to Associates, 27 April 1814; PANS, Journal 
and Proceedings of the House of Assembly, 1814, pp. 31-2, 24 
February 1814.

41 JSPG, Bray Associates, Box 7, Canadian Paper. 
Stanser to Associates, 24 October 1797; Bray Associates 
Minute Books, III, Stanser to Associates, 23 October 1800; 
IV, Stanser to Associates, 10 January 1811.
at Birchtown, though the number of pupils in his care was "greatly reduced". The reduction, to only fourteen children, caused Blucke to close his school in September 1795. However he sent the Associates a final account claiming to have taught thirty-six children during the preceding year and a half, a discrepancy that gave the Associates "room to doubt the Legality of Mr. Blucke's Claim", and they refused to pay. Blucke swore an oath before Magistrate Gideon White that his claim was valid, and the Associates eventually paid, but the suspicion surrounding the dispute seems to have destroyed his position in the Black community. No record of Blucke's death appears in the Shelburne parish register, indicating that he probably moved away from Birchtown in 1795, the last date of his mention in the Bray correspondence. Thenceforth Birchtown remained without a school of its own, though the Associates did transfer their support to a new school in Shelburne. The Black children in Shelburne's North Division had not attended the Birchtown school, and in 1792 plans were laid to found a school for them. Clarkson's mission disrupted this plan, but it was revived in 1796 after Blucke's departure. In November 1798 the Shelburne Black


43 *SPG*, Bray Associates' Minute Books, III, Minutes for 11 April 1793, 4 February 1796, and 3 March 1796; Bray Associates, Box 7, Canadian Papers, sworn statement by Stephen Blucke, 28 November 1795.
school was finally opened, with Joseph Ingram, a white, as its master. Like the Halifax school, Shelburne's was intent upon training the children as servants, a role most of them filled upon graduation. 44

Finally, the exodus had resulted in the physical shattering of the Black settlements. Brindley Town was reduced by three-quarters, Birchtown by half, and Preston was completely depopulated. 45 This, combined with the disruption of the church and school, meant that there were no longer in existence isolated concentrations of Black people served by institutions under their own effective control. Instead there was a widely scattered Black population, located on white-owned farms as sharecroppers or in white homes and businesses as servants. This trend was accentuated by the economic decline of the outlying settlements and the education received in the remaining schools, which encouraged the younger Blacks to re-locate in the city of Halifax as servants and apprentices. Without economic opportunity and without viable community institutions in the original settlements, Brindley Town, Birchtown and Shelburne's North Division were gradually depleted in favour of Halifax, where

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44 SPG, Designs of the Associates, No. 16, Abstract for 1792, p. 43, No. 19, Abstract for: 1796, pp. 29-30; Bray Associates' Minute Books, III, Minutes for 2 July 1798, November 1798, 5 January 1801, 1 November 1802, 6 July 1807; IV, Thomas Rowland to Associates, 13 November 1813; Bray Associates, Box 7, Canadian Papers, Rowland to Associates, 17 November 1813.

45 See Chapter VI, footnotes 65, 67-68, 79.
the nature of their employment and the pattern of their residence in white homes prevented the revival of a separate cultural development. Only Little Tracadie in its remoteness was left intact by the exodus. In 1792 Thomas Brownspiggs deserted his post as teacher and church leader, but he was replaced, after a short interval, by Dempsey Jordan who conducted classes and led the religious life of the community.

Economically, at least, the free Blacks' position began to show a decided improvement by the second decade of the nineteenth century. As indenture terms were fulfilled, and as apprentices qualified in trades, the young men once again constituted an available labour reserve in a province that was short of manpower. During the War of 1812 wages for Blacks in Halifax ranged from five shillings to seven shillings and sixpence per day, and so great was the demand that any able man could find constant employment. Once more the lament was heard that there were not enough free

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46 SPG, Bray Associates' Minute Books, III, Rowland to Associates, 3 April 1807; IV, Stanser to Associates, 24 October 1808, Rowland to Associates, 13 November 1813; Bray Associates, Box 7, Canadian Papers, Rowland to Associates, 17 November 1813.


Blacks in Halifax to perform all the available work.\footnote{Spb, Bray Associates' Minute Books, IV, Minutes for 5 February 1812.} The Blacks won approval, too, for their loyalty and readiness to defend the Empire. A Black Company attached to the First Battalion of the Halifax Militia attracted 120 volunteers, and they were described as "fine young men, equal in every respect to the White Militia, both in Discipline and Appearance".\footnote{Ibid., Stanser to Associates, 18 November 1811.} When the new governor, Sir John Coape Sherbrooke, reviewed the troops on the Prince Regent's birthday in 1812, he expressed his satisfaction with the Black Company's "neat and soldierlike Appearance. Of their loyalty and steady attachment to the Parent State there can be no doubt."\footnote{Ibid., Stanser to Associates, 8 October 1811.}

Ironically, just as the Blacks' fortunes were turning upward, Nova Scotia was swamped with the very thing provincial employers claimed they wanted: a sudden influx of free Black labour. In September and October 1813, several British ships landed in Halifax, bound from the United States, bearing runaway slaves who had sought the protection of the British forces then fighting their masters.\footnote{PanS Vol. 420, Refugee Negroes, 1813-16, Docs. 1-8, Returns of American Slaves, September-October 1813.} Sherbrooke permitted them to land, administered the oath of allegiance, and autho-
ized them to go into the interior in search of employment where, he felt, they would afford "a large accession of useful Labour to the Agriculture of the Country". Destitute newcomers unable to support themselves were assisted by private charity and by a vote of provisions made by the Assembly. As had happened during the Revolutionary War, American-owned slaves had faith that the British were enemies to slavery, and hundreds fled to the Union Jack in hope of freedom. Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, faced with these Black Refugees who were "in greatest misery, and destitute of Clothing, Food and Shelter", wrote to Lord Bathurst for advice. Assured that His Majesty's government welcomed the Refugees and would provide them with "the necessaries", Cochrane issued a Proclamation on 2 April 1814 inviting any American residents to avail themselves of the opportunity to become British subjects. Those who did so, the Proclamation promised, would be "sent as Free Settlers to the British Possessions in North America or the West Indies, where they will meet with all due Encouragement".

The Cochrane Proclamation, as had Clinton's thirty-

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54 Ibid.

55 PANS Vol. 111, Governor's Letter Book, Cochrane to Sherbrooke, 5 October 1814, enclosing the Proclamation dated 2 April 1814.
five years earlier, brought a flood of runaway slaves to the British: over 3,500 of them responded, about 2,000 of whom were carried to Nova Scotia to join the few hundred who had arrived in 1813. Some organization was required for their reception in Halifax, and so Sherbrooke opened the Poor House to them and placed them on rations equivalent to those received by regular soldiers. When the Poor House quickly proved inadequate a special depot was established on Melville Island, site of an American prisoner-of-war camp. There the Refugees' illnesses were treated and they were supported pending their removal to other parts of the province.

It was Theophilus Chamberlain who recommended Preston as a new home for the Black Refugees. Deserted since 1800, Preston had a history of Black occupation, both Loyalist and Maroon. Land already escheated for tax default was made available, another 550 acres was purchased from whites (one of whom was Chamberlain himself), and in 1815 Refugees began moving onto the Preston lands first cleared by the Black Loyalists in the 1780s. They were granted provisions, clothing and farm implements, and placed on farms measuring eight to ten acres each. Refugees were also settled in other

56 Ibid., Sherbrooke to Cochrane, 5 October 1814.

57 PANS Vol. 112, Governor's Letter Book, 1816-20, Dalhousie to Bathurst, 2 December 1816.

58 PANS Vol. 419, Refugee Negroes, 1790-1734 (sic), Docs. 39 and 40, provisions vouchers for the Blacks at Preston, 2 and 8 November 1815, Doc. 41, Theophilus Chamberlain
parts of the province, principally at Hammond's Plains, northwest of Halifax city, under similar conditions. By 1820 there were 958 Blacks at Preston, 469 at Hammond's Plains, 76 at Refugee Hill near Halifax, and 20 families "on the Windsor and Colchester Roads". Over a hundred located within the Halifax city limits. 59

The men at Preston were organized into work parties to clear the land and to build one house each day, and while construction was progressing the families shared the houses already built. To supplement their government rations they undertook to cut cord wood for neighbouring white farmers. Some degree of self-government was provided in that each street elected a constable, and also a "general Constable", to oversee the peace of the settlement. 60 However the tiny farms, of no more than ten acres of marginal land, were not sufficient to support the Refugees at Preston, Hammond's


60 Ibid; PANS Vol. 419, Refugee Negroes, Doc. 46, Chamberlain to Morris, 4 January 1816, Doc. 88, Memo.
Plains or elsewhere. An epidemic of mice and a heavy frost destroyed potato crops, and though the more fortunate families shared their harvest with the destitute, provincial relief continued to be necessary to keep them from starvation. A post-war depression, and the arrival of white immigrant labour, reversed the favourable employment situation that had existed before 1814. Once the wooded areas had been stripped there was little other means of support for the Refugee settlers; many were forced to steal or beg for a living in Halifax, or to engage in prostitution. Unable to sell their land to finance a move, for their farms were given on Licenses of Occupation, not freehold grants, the Black Refugees were tied to uneconomical holdings with scant prospect for additional income.

Thus from the outset the Refugee settlements were doomed to poverty and economic marginality. Frequently their condition was truly appalling. In January 1827 Bishop John

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62 PANS Vol. 112, Governor’s Letter Book, Dalhousie to Bathurst, 2 December 1816; PANS Vol. 420, Refugee Negroes, 1813-16, Seth Coleman to the Poor Commission, 5 March 1815.

63 PANS Vol. 419, Refugee Negroes, Doc. 29, Plan of Preston, 19 November 1816, Doc. 30, Plan of Hammond’s Plains, n.d. Sample Licenses of Occupation are in ibid., Doc. 36, Preston, 27 March 1818, and Doc. 119, Hammond’s Plains, n.d. The Licenses were allegedly temporary, promising to become clear grants if the holders proved industrious and loyal subjects.
Inglis sent Archdeacon Robert Willis to report on the situation at Hammond's Plains. Willis found that potatoes, of a poor quality, served as the only food for the settlement, most people had few clothes or bedding, and one woman and two children were discovered "in absolute nakedness". An epidemic described as "a modification of Scarlet Fever" was raging, for which there was no medicine. 64 Private philanthropists and the provincial Assembly sent emergency relief of medicine, blankets and food, 65 but without preventative measures the same situation arose again in succeeding years. Poor potato harvests in 1832 and 1836 brought the people to an "absolute State of poverty and wretchedness"; living at the line of absolute subsistence, they were vulnerable to the slightest variations in weather and growing conditions. 66 Preston shared the same fate. Sworn statements from their white neighbours testified that the Black settlers worked hard and had improved their meagre land-holdings, but the poor potato crops of 1832 and 1836, upon which they relied, brought them to the point of starvation. 67

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65 Ibid., Doc. 37, John Stass to Rupert George, 16 January 1827.


67 PANS, Box, Negroes, Negro Refugees, 1815-57, "Return of the Distribution of relief of Poor Coloured People
In 1838 John Chamberlain and four other whites gave their account of the reasons for the Black Refugees' distress. The Black farms, they explained, were too small, and the land "Sterile and unproductive". They deemed it impossible for "any persons to support families on them. . . . No class of Settlers, let their habits be ever so industrious could possibly maintain their families' on lots of the same size and quality, without being reduced to suffering and perhaps to starvation." There was no work for the Blacks in Halifax County, even in summer; when employment was available only whites were hired for it. Hitherto the Refugees had avoided starvation "by marketing charcoal, staves, shingles and such other lumber as their limited quantity of land enabled them to produce", but all lumber was now exhausted. With a fair opportunity, the memorialists believed, the Blacks could achieve "a comfortable independence", but without better land or jobs they would remain, through no fault of their own, chronic objects of provincial charity. 68

Such was in fact the case in Black settlements throughout the province. Even in Guysborough, described in 1830 as being the least poverty-stricken of the Black communities, the Loyalist-descended Blacks were able to subsist only "by the

at Preston, 1833"; PANS Vol. 422, Refugee Negroes, Doc. 43; Thomas Desbrisay and Edward Lowe to Rupert George, 9 March 1837.

68 Ibid., Doc. 49, Memorial of John Chamberlain and four others, neighbours of the Preston Blacks, 8 June 1838.
charity of their white neighbours. The remoteness of the district prevented their marketing any surplus crops in favourable seasons, and there was little employment available there for labourers. The provincial Assembly was forced to vote special relief distributions almost annually just to keep the scattered Black population, Loyalist and Refugee, from death by starvation and exposure.

One result of the almost universal Black poverty, especially as it was concentrated to such an extent within Halifax County, was a burst of anti-Black sentiment among the white officials and population of Nova Scotia. Discriminatory restrictions had of course been introduced since the very arrival of the Black Loyalists in 1783, but such acts had as their apparent object the keeping of the Black man "in his place". As the white resistance to the Sierra Leone emigra-


70 PANS Vol. 422, Refugee Negroes, Doc. 43, Desbrisay and Lowe to George, 9 March 1837.

71 For example, Journal and Proceedings of the House of Assembly, 1847, Relief voted to the Blacks at Hammond's Plains, Beech Hill, Sackville and Preston in Halifax County, £300, to the Blacks in Hants County, £25, in Guysborough, £50, in Tracadie, £25, in Shelburne, £25, in Queens County, £25, in Annapolis, £25, in Digby, £25, 23 March 1847. PANS, Box, Negroes, is largely made up of receipts, bills and accounts for relief funds or materials sent to poor Blacks from the 1820s to the 1850s.

72 See above, Chapters III and IV.
tion would indicate, an exploitable Black community was deemed useful to the province. The arrival of the Refugees, however, coincided with economic depression and a surplus of white immigrant labour; there was no longer any valid role for the Black man in the general provincial economic structure. After 1815, therefore, white feeling went beyond the earlier restrictions to the point where the Black was denied any "place" at all. Even as the Refugees were still arriving the Assembly declared their "concern and alarm" over the influx of "bodies of negroes and mulattoes; of whom many have already become burthensome to the public". In a reversal of the 1791 argument, the Assembly claimed that there were already too many "Africans" in Nova Scotia, and "the introduction of more, must tend to the discouragement of white labourers and Servants". Ever afterwards the Black Nova Scotians faced discrimination in employment, and only Whitehall's

73 See Chapter VI, footnotes 37-40, 46-55.

74 PANS Vol. 305, House of Assembly Papers, 1815-18, Doc. 3, Address of the House to Lieutenant-Governor Sherbrooke, 1 April 1815; Journal and Proceedings of the House of Assembly, 1812-15, p. 107, Address, 1 April 1815, and p. 113, reply of the Lieutenant-Governor, 3 April 1815, promising his cooperation in curbing the future immigration of Blacks.

75 Cf. PANS Vol. 422, Refugee Negroes, Doc. 49, Memorial of John Chamberlain and 4 others; 8 June 1838. On the perpetuation of this situation see Jules Oliver, "Report on the Problem of Unemployment for the Negro" (unpublished report, Halifax, 1968); Dalhousie Institute of Public Affairs, The Condition of the Negroes of Halifax City (Halifax, 1962); K. S. Wood, Profile of Poverty in Nova Scotia (Halifax, 1965); Donald Clairmont et al., A Socio-Economic Study and Recommendations: Sunnyville, Lincolnville and Upper Big
disallowance prevented the implementation of a provincial act passed in 1834 to ban the entrance of former slaves freed by the Emancipation Act. Black poverty, too evident to be denied, was blamed on the fact that the Refugees (and presumably the native-born children of Loyalist immigrants) were "Slaves by habit and education". With the "dread of the lash" removed, "their idea of freedom is idleness and they are therefore quite incapable of Industry".

Another consequence of the economic distress and attendant prejudice was a gradual internal movement of the Black population; vulnerable outlying farms and smaller centres were deserted, particularly in favour of Halifax and Guysborough Counties, as the Blacks sought employment, mutual support and freedom from racial discrimination. In cities such as Halifax, Guysborough and Manchester, and in new all-Black settlements such as Guysborough Road (later Africville), the descendants of Loyalist and Refugee Blacks merged, creating a new Black population that eventually lost its.

Tracadie, Guysborough County, Nova Scotia (Halifax, 1965); Clairmont and Magill, Nova Scotian Blacks; Donald Clairmont and Dennis Magill, Africville Relocation Report (Halifax, 1972).


78 PANS Vol. 422, Refugee Negroes, Doc. 43, Desbrisay and Lowe to George, 9 March 1837, Doc. 47, "Petition of 17 Blacks wishing to move to Guysborough Road, 26 March 1837; Rawlyk, "The Guysborough Negroes", p. 31.
awareness of the particular origin of its ancestors. The Loyalist tradition, therefore, was lost, but in its place the new Black population created a new community awareness: existing under similar conditions to those which had pertained after 1783, the Blacks of Nova Scotia underwent a similar social development.

Geographically the Black communities were once again distinct from white society, being located on the fringes of white towns or in all-Black neighbourhoods. The physical possibility for a revival of community life was therefore present as it had not been since the shattering of 1792. Schools, where they existed, were separate from white schools, and by the mid-1830s the Halifax school was supplying graduates who could act as teachers in the other Black districts.

Numerous conversations with Black Nova Scotians between 1968 and 1971, and with Black students from every part of Nova Scotia attending the Transition Year Programme at Dalhousie University, 1970-71, failed to discover a single person who was able to identify positively the immigrant group from which he descended. Most knew of the Refugee arrival and their interlude at Melville Island, and simply assumed that their ancestors must have been part of that group. Even at Birchtown, once the largest free Black settlement in North America, memory of the Loyalist roots has apparently been lost.

It was suggested by Professor Robin W. Winks, during a conversation in August 1970, that Annapolis County is an exception to this general trend. Professor Winks met several Blacks there who retained a memory of and a pride in their Loyalist origin. The present writer has been unable to corroborate Professor Winks' observation with personal interviews, but it is true that Annapolis County received few Refugee immigrants in the period after 1814 and therefore the merger described here may not have taken place to the extent that it did elsewhere.
The Halifax Black school was re-established in 1824, and though never large enough to accommodate all the children, over fifty received instruction during the day and another thirty "parents and Servants" attended evening classes. When fire destroyed the schoolhouse in 1836 private charity and a provincial grant provided over £200 for a reconstruction fund. Preston and Hammond's Plains received school-building and -operating funds from the province and from the Bray Associates; in Shelburne County Birchtown and Port Latour had Black schools; Dempsey Jordan, who had operated unofficially for many years, received a formal appointment from the SPG as schoolmaster to Little Tracadie in 1818; the Black Methodists of Liverpool won provincial aid for their school in 1841; and at Brindley Town John Pleasant, described as "A Man of Colour with his Left arm off", was teaching with Bray and provincial support in 1825.

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In most areas, therefore, an institutional foundation for a new cultural development was being created during the 1820s and 1830s. The trend was greatly strengthened by the appearance of successors to the mantle of David George. Many of the Black Refugees were "rigid Baptists" on their arrival in Nova Scotia, due to the success that church had enjoyed in converting American slaves. Two white evangelists, John Burton and David Nutter, organized chapels in the Black settlements and made new converts; in 1821 even the Loyalist Anglicans of Little Tracadie fell to the Baptist persuaders. But it was Richard Preston, a Black American who followed after the Refugees, who did most to ensure the almost universal adherence of the Black Nova Scotians, Refugee and Loyalist, to the Baptist faith. After his ordination in London in 1831, Richard Preston returned to Nova Scotia, became pastor of the church at Preston, and embarked on a crusade that led eventually to the establishment of the African Baptist Association in 1854. Almost every Black


83. SPG, Bray Associates, Box 7, Canadian Papers, John Inglis to Associates, 21 March 1818. See Brooks, "Negro Baptist Church", passim.

84. I. E. Bill, Fifty Years with the Baptist Ministers
settlement had its own chapel and local preacher, and within the community a common religious outlook gave strength to a feeling of belonging together. Like the earlier Loyalist churches, the new chapels of the 1820s and 1830s insisted on a direct experience with a personal God, on visions, dreams, and proof that the Holy Spirit had touched the individual believer. Such doctrines set them apart, just as much as did their physical separation, from the white society surrounding them.

Though the Blacks of Nova Scotia were economically dependent upon the white community, for employment, charity and government relief, just as the original Black Loyalists had been, yet they were not involved in the life of the province or in provincial affairs. Local loyalties predominated as the Blacks looked inward to their own communities for their religious, social and educational existence. A


86An interpretive account of Black "marginality" can be found in Clairemont and Magill, Nova Scotian Blacks, especially Part II, pp. 96-142. Though some of their conclusions may be questioned, Professors Clairemont and Magill have given a detailed and convincing description of the economic position of Black Nova Scotians since slavery. See also footnote 75, above, for references to studies on poverty conditions in the Nova Scotian Black community.
deep attachment to the community had developed by the 1830s, to the extent that people were prepared to forego individual advantage for the sake of keeping the community intact. Two incidents from that decade illustrate the strength of the Blacks' commitment to their local identity. The island of Trinidad, suffering a labour shortage after the abolition of the slave trade, made several attempts to recruit free Black immigrants from Nova Scotia. In 1820 a total of ninety-five, all from Hammond's Plains, accepted Trinidad's offer of free lands and promise of high wages, but all efforts to recruit more ended in failure. In a vain attempt to imitate John Clarkson a British army lieutenant, Richard Inglis, toured the Black districts extolling the virtues of Trinidad, pointing out "in the most particular manner the great advantage that would result to them from such a change", and Governor Sir James Kempt added his personal persuasions to "induce them to remove". The offer was rejected without much as an expression of thanks. After 1821 Trinidad tried again and again, passing special laws to encourage Black immigration, sending envoys to Nova Scotia, promising

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87 PANS Vol. 422, Refugee Negroes; Doc. 19, Return of Black American Refugees at Hammond Plains and those willing to go to Trinidad, 1820; PANS Vol. 113, Governor's Letter Book, 1820-26, James Kempt to George Harrison, 20 January 1822. They actually sailed from Halifax in January 1821.

88 PANS Vol. 422, Refugee Negroes, Doc. 29, Rupert George to Richard Inglis, 14 August 1821, Doc. 30, Richard Inglis to Rupert George, 20 August 1821; PANS Vol. 113, Governor's Letter Book, Kempt to Bathurst, 16 October 1823.
free houses on half-acre plots and wages of four to five shillings a day plus provisions, even offering assistance in the establishment of churches and schools. But by 1839, despite the crop failures and economic hardships of the preceding few years, the Blacks of Nova Scotia had roundly and finally dismissed the possibility of a second exodus. "They seem to have some attachment to the soil they have cultivated, poor and barren as it is", one agent reported incredulously, and another noted perceptively that several community leaders refused to go and the others, "poor and miserable though they be, are unwilling to remove without them".

The Blacks were, as a modern Black-produced play was entitled, "Here to Stay". Roots were struck deep after a quarter-century in Nova Scotia, and it would take more than physical hardship to induce them to move. The second incident, also culminating in 1839, bore a similar message. The Blacks' persistent refusal to emigrate, and their apparent inability to prosper on ten acres of marginal soil, prompted attempts to secure new, larger and more fertile farms for them.

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89 PANS, Box, Negroes, Negro Refugees, 1815-57, Gray to James, 11 May 1836; Lowe to James, 7 June 1836; PANS Vol. 422, Refugee Negroes, Doc. 43, Desbrisay and Lowe to George, 9 March 1837, Doc. 51, John A. Mein, Governor of Trinidad, to Governor Sir Colin Campbell of Nova Scotia, 24 April 1839, Doc. 52, An Ordinance for the Encouragement of Immigration, and for the Protection of Persons immigrating to this Colony (Trinidad), 24 November 1838; Doc. 53, William Burley to Sir Colin Campbell, 3 August 1839.

90 PANS, Box, Negroes, Negro Refugees, 1815-57, Lowe to James, 7 June 1836, Gray to James, 11 May 1836.
in other parts of the province. Governor Sir Colin Campbell urged Whitehall to finance a Black relocation on more promising farmland, but Lord Glenelg, reflecting the current view that the Blacks' problems derived from a lack of ambition, replied that "If the want and privations from which they have so long suffered have not furnished sufficient inducement to active and industrious habits, I should fear that the mere occupation of rich land would fail of that effect." Besides, Crown land was no longer being made available free to settlers, and the British government hesitated to set a precedent that could cause problems for the future administration of colonial lands. However the continual need for relief funds convinced the government that a few hundred pounds spent in relocation could save thousands in special assistance, and so in 1839, "considering the peculiar circumstances under which those people were originally sent to Nova Scotia", an exception was made and Nova Scotia was authorized to place the Blacks on "any unoccupied Crown Lands in the Province". For the present, at least, such lands were to be allocated on Licenses of Occupation, not title deeds.  

92 PANS Vol. 77, Despatches, Secretary of State to Lieutenant Governor, 1839, Glenelg to Campbell, No. 700, 8 January 1839.
Had such a policy been advanced in 1815 there can be little doubt that the Blacks would have accepted, established comfortable farms and become part, eventually, of the districts in which they settled. But by the late 1830s it was too late. White prejudice had become entrenched, and the Surveyor-General feared that Black neighbours would not be well received by white farmers. The Blacks must have been aware of this, and had no desire to expose themselves individually to racial attack on holdings scattered around the province. In their all-Black settlements they had at least the support and protection afforded by their numbers. Removal would also have meant the destruction of the Black community, the disappearance of the church, the severing of ties welded in shared poverty and mutual assistance for an entire generation. Unless they could remove in a body, they informed the government, so that their entire communal life could be transplanted to the new location, they preferred to stay where they were. Since this was not possible the plan was dropped; the Black community survived at the expense of the people's economic future.

The conditions, prejudices and insecurities that drove their brethren to Sierra Leone drove the Nova Scotian Blacks

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93 PANS, Journal and Proceedings of the House of Assembly, 1838, Appendix 32, Morris to George, 1 August 1837.

94 PANS' Vol. 115, Governor's Letter Book, Campbell to Glenelg, 25 August 1837.
into their own isolated society during the nineteenth century. The separate churches and schools and residential neighbourhoods, at first forced upon the Blacks by a hostile or indifferent white society, had gained a positive meaning by about 1840. In an atmosphere of physical and institutional segregation, Black communities developed that were economically stagnant and politically sterile, but were viable and valid cultural entities. As yet there was no institutional unity among the various Black settlements spread from Tracadie to Shelburne; physical isolation and the importance of the local community prevented even the African Baptist Association from including all the Black Baptists. But a cultural unity was becoming visible. All the Blacks shared a heritage of American slavery and of disadvantage in Nova Scotia, and had common continuing experience with racial prejudice, neglect and poverty. In their peripheral society they produced their own leadership, developed their own religious style and nourished a belief that in separation they could best realize the salvation of their souls and the integrity of their group identity. For the Black Nova Scotians the Promised Land became a realm of the spirit, a place where they could be themselves and find their own destiny even though engulfed by a society that denied them all other means of self-expression.

The Blacks in Nova Scotia have remained a peripheral society, economically marginal and socially distinct. Few have attained prominent positions, and when they have it has
been as leaders of their own people, not as participants in the general stream of provincial affairs. And yet, though they have not been regarded as a positive force in Nova Scotia's history, they have been able to preserve and develop a set of values and a distinctive way of life despite overwhelming economic, cultural and political pressure to the contrary. Their victory has been in their endurance, the more impressive for the conditions they have faced. Their co-descendants in Sierra Leone, on the other hand, have been central to the creation of a new society. They lent their ideals, values and practices to the Creoles and even, through them, to West Africa generally. Descendants of the Nova Scotian founders have played a leadership role in Sierra Leone right up to the present time. Among the people who can trace their ancestry to the 1792 migration are a prominent historian, a leading economist, the outstanding literary critic and a top-ranking university administrator, as well as several other professional and academic personalities vital to the development of an independent Sierra Leone. According to them, the Black Loyalists who followed Thomas Peters and John Clarkson made the wiser choice in 1792. This sentiment

95 For example, Professor Arthur T. Porter, now at Nairobi, Professors N. A. Cox-George and Eldred Jones, of Fourah Bay College, and Dean E. W. Blyden III, also of Fourah Bay College, who descends from the Nova Scotians through his mother.

96 The Rev. Gershon Anderson once visited Halifax, but made no attempt to contact the Black community there. His
has been echoed by Black Nova Scotians in Halifax. One Black student exclaimed in 1971, "We all should have gone over there when we had the chance." He met no argument from his classmates. 97

reason, as expressed during a conversation in June 1970, was that there was nothing in common between the Nova Scotians of Freetown and those of Halifax. The latter, he felt, had been oppressed to the point where recognizable similarities with the Freetown elite must have been eliminated. Mrs. Elliott-Horton was equally convinced of the advantages deriving from the 1792 exodus. Those Blacks who stayed behind, she said, remained forever "slaves", while the migrants became freemen. A Creole lady, not of settler descent, who was interviewing this writer for a Sierra Leone radio broadcast in July 1970 had only sympathy for the Black remnant in Nova Scotia.

97 The comment came from Louis Dixon, a student in the Transition Year Programme at Dalhousie University, during a Black history class in February 1971.
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