To My Parents
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ABSTRACT

This thesis provides an answer to the question, “what is a musical work?” I begin by canvasing four of the leading accounts in the literature, two Platonist theories and two Nominalist theories. Nominalism is, I suggest, well motivated, though neither of the two accounts given is satisfying. Next, I provide a detailed account of the main view in the literature, Julian Dodd’s type theory of musical works. According to Dodd, musical works are types and therefore are abstract entities. In Chapter 3 I criticize Dodd’s view by arguing that positing abstract type-entities provides no explanatory power so they should be rejected. Finally in Chapter 4 I show that a satisfying Nominalist account that does not identify any entity with musical works can be given. Thus, Dodd is correct to say that musical works are types but incorrect to suggest that this thereby commits us to an ontology including types.
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Artists create works of art. The rest of us engage with, appreciate, are moved by, criticize, and assess those works. A painter paints a painting and it is this painting, this thing right here on the wall, that is the object of our aesthetic appraisal. A sculptor sculpts a sculpture and it is this sculpture, this thing right here in the middle of the room, that is beautiful. A composer composes a musical work and it is this musical work that we are moved by. But what is a musical work? It is not hanging on a wall in a gallery or sitting on a pedestal for us to observe. No, a musical work is performed. However, the performance\(^1\) is not the musical work itself; it is merely a performance of a musical work. You and I and people long dead and others yet to be born can all have the enchanting experience of listening to *Clair de Lune* even though each of us might listen to different performances at different times in different places. What is the thing that all of us are able to listen to? What is this one musical work, *Clair de Lune*, that many of us have heard despite having listened to different recordings and performances? What is it that Debussy created and what is it that we think is a work of brilliance? It seems clear what the answer is when we are talking about the painter or the sculptor because they create objects that we can point to. It is this thing here (as I point) that the painter painted. But the composer of musical works? What does he create?

\(^1\) From this point onwards I will refer to instances of works that are intentionally instanced as performances; but unless otherwise stated, what is said about performances should be taken to apply to recordings as well.
The motivating question of this essay is: what is a musical work? Julian Dodd labels this question the "categorial question". The categorial question asks: what ontological category do musical works belong to? In providing an answer to the categorial question we determine what kind of entity a musical work is (Dodd 2007, 1). Dodd has recently provided one of the leading answers to this question. Indeed, he argues that his view is the default position in the ontology of music (Dodd 2007, 5). Anyone proposing an alternative answer must therefore respond to Dodd.

In short, Dodd's answer is that "a musical work is a type whose tokens are datable, locatable patterns of sounds" (Dodd 2007, 2). This answer comes with Platonist commitments. Types are entities that exist at all times but do not exist in space (Dodd 2007, 4). Additionally, types are distinguished by the conditions a token must meet to be a token of a certain type. If a token meets the conditions determined by type K then it is a token of type K. For Dodd, then, types are abstract objects that serve to bind tokens together. Dodd does not explicitly state what he means by “binding” other than to say that tokens are bound together by a type by meeting the conditions to be a token of a certain type. I take him to mean roughly that types are entities that relate distinct objects such that they are of the same thing. Thus musical works qua types are abstract entities that bind together performances.

However, there are significant problems with Dodd’s answer to the categorial question. Foremost, there is no need to posit abstract objects. Doing so yields no explanatory benefit, bloats our ontology, and provides a needlessly complicated ontological picture. It is often thought, and indeed Dodd argues, that abstract objects must exist if our ordinary sentences about musical works are
going to come out true. But contrary to this claim, I argue that all true statements made about musical works can be made true by an ontology that contains only concrete objects. It is my contention that an ontology that contains concrete performances that resemble other concrete performances is sufficient to ground the truth of the statements we make about musical works. If this is correct, then musical works do serve to bind together performances as Dodd argues, but that they do so is a product of our finding utility in carving the world up in places other than at its joints, rather than in their being genuine, abstract members of our ontology. Thus we should reject Dodd’s ontology.

The aim of this thesis is to mount an objection against Dodd’s answer to the categorial question and argue for the position mentioned above. In the remainder of this chapter I will elaborate on the problem of musical works and sketch some of the answers that have been given to the categorial question. These views generally fall into two categories. There are Platonist accounts, which posit that musical works are some kind of abstract object. Alternatively, there are Nominalist accounts, which reject abstracta and identify musical works with some kind of concrete entity or entities. By the end of this chapter it will be clear that I think Platonism should be adopted only as a last resort (despite the fact that Dodd’s Platonist type/token theory is currently one of the dominant theories in the literature) and that Nominalism is preferable but that the leading Nominalist answers to the categorial question are unsatisfactory. Having set the stage, I will proceed by focusing on the current default account, namely, Dodd’s Platonist theory of types and tokens. Chapter 2 will outline the metaphysical commitments and structure of his theory and Chapter 3 will take issue with Dodd’s Platonist account by arguing that his commitment to abstract entities is
both explanatorily inert and poorly motivated. Finally, with the presumption that the objections raised in Chapter 3 are problematic enough to warrant the search for an alternative answer to the categorial question, in Chapter 4 I will provide a Nominalist alternative that is better motivated and more parsimonious than Dodd's Platonist account.

1.1 THE PROBLEM OF MUSICAL WORKS
At the outset of this chapter I suggested that, compared to paradigmatic examples of works of art like paintings and sculptures, musical works are peculiar. Unlike paintings and sculptures, it is unclear what kind of entity a musical work is; but it is also clear that many of the obvious candidates are not suitable to be identified with musical works. For example, it was mentioned that a musical work cannot be identified with performances. You and I might attend different performances of Beethoven's *Fifth*, but neither of them *is* Beethoven's *Fifth* because they are both performances of Beethoven's *Fifth*. There is also no reason to favour one performance over all the others, say the first performance of Beethoven's *Fifth*. Julian Dodd points out that if this were the case, then other performances would be copies of Beethoven's *Fifth*; but other performances are not copies. They are, it seems, "occurrences" of Beethoven's *Fifth* (Dodd 2007, 10). That this is the case is clear from the fact that we speak of a work's first performance and not as if a first performance were the work itself. Any attempt to identify musical works with their scores is also bound to fail. Scores provide instructions for playing a musical work, but they are not the work itself. This is clear for several reasons. First, works of music can exist without scores and
second, scores cannot be the bearers of all the properties characteristic of musical works such as audible properties (Dodd 2007, 21).

What begins to emerge by reflecting on the properties of musical works and the failures of the proposals just enumerated is a set of “givens” that a satisfying ontological account of musical works has to explain. First, as is made evident by the failure to identify musical works with any of a work’s performances, a musical work is a repeatable entity. Every time I listen to a performance of *Clair de Lune* I listen to the work itself. This is one of the main features that distinguishes musical works from other paradigmatic cases of works of art. A painting is singular and a sculpture is singular. Since they are singular entities, it is easy to determine what they are. We can point to a painting and say, "that's it; that's the painting." But musical works are repeatable and so they resist identification in this respect.

Second, musical works are audible. They are audible through their performances. When we listen to a performance of a musical work, we do not just listen to the performance of the work; we also listen to the work itself. Since the musical work is not any one performance, it seems that in listening to a performance of a musical work, we are "hearing two things at once" (Wolterstorff 1980, 41). An account of musical works must explain how it is possible to listen to a musical work by listening to a performance of it.

Thirdly, musical works appear to be creatable, that is to say, when a composer composes a new musical work, she is creating something new in the same way that a painter or sculptor is creating something in producing a painting or sculpture. The idea that musical works are created is presumably an intuition that most or all of us share. For it seems evident that it was Beethoven's
act of composing his fifth symphony between 1804 and 1808 that brought
Beethoven’s *Fifth* into existence and that prior to his composing it, the work did
not exist. The intuition that musical works are created is therefore another fact
that must be accommodated by an ontological account of musical works.

These are the facts that make musical works ontologically puzzling and
therefore the facts that any plausible answer to the categorial question must
explain. In the next two sections I survey several of the leading proposals in the
literature for explaining these facts before critically discussing the metaphysical
commitments of Dodd’s type/token theory in Chapter 2.

1.2 PLATONIST THEORIES
Before looking at some of the views being offered, I should be clear that
generally this debate has been restricted to the Western Classical music tradition.
This tradition provides paradigmatic examples of musical works, so it is
generally this musical tradition that theorists aim to give a metaphysical account
of. All of the theories that I outline below should be understood as applying to
this tradition. Whether they generalize, though, is another matter. It is not
obvious that many, if any of these accounts will give satisfying metaphysical
accounts of other genres of music such as jazz (although Dodd takes his account
to explain Jazz works (Dodd 2007, 2)) or contemporary, experimental music. For
the moment, it should be understood that the scope of the explanation given is
restricted to works of Classical music.

Two kinds of views tend to dominate the literature on the metaphysics of
musical works. One kind of view offered is Nominalism. Nominalist theories
identify musical works with concrete objects. They are proposed in response to
the kinds of views that currently seem to dominate the literature, namely, Platonist theories which identify musical works with abstract entities. The aim of this section is to present two prominent Platonist accounts.

Platonists argue that musical works are abstract objects, typically some kind of abstract sound structure. The reason for this is that the repeatability of musical works is most easily explained by something that is not particular, but rather by something that grounds multiple instantiation. Jerrold Levinson, for instance, holds a view of this kind. For Levinson, musical works are types and as such are complex abstract entities formed by the conjunction of an abstract sound structure and a performance means structure as indicated by X at $t^2$ (Levinson 1980, 20). Let me explain each of these parts in turn. First, a musical work includes an abstract sound structure. Levinson considers a sound structure to be "a structure, sequence, or pattern of sounds, pure and simple" (Levinson 1980, 6). As such, they are entities that exist outside of space. Musical works then, are repeatable because performances embody or exhibit structure isomorphic to this abstract sound structure. But Levinson suggests that pure sound structures are not sufficient to individuate musical works. He argues that the means by which a musical work is performed are also integral to the identity of that work. The idea is that musical works are not identified purely by how they sound, but also by the instrumentation and means by which performances of them are produced (Levinson 1980, 14). Because the means of production are vital to the identity of a work, Levinson argues that musical works are complex abstract entities formed by the conjunction of a sound structure and a performance means structure. But

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2 Levinson notates this complex entity as “$S/PM\text{-structure-as-indicated-by-X-at-}t$” (Levinson 1980, 20). This entity is the combination of a sound structure and a performance means structure indicated by a composer at a time.
this entity is still not sufficient to explain all the facts about musical work, says Levinson. For pure abstract structures are eternally existing entities, while, as we mentioned earlier, musical works are seemingly created entities. Levinson suggests that this creatability intuition can be accounted for by identifying musical works with abstract structures that are indicated by someone at a certain time. Typically a composer will indicate a sound structure and a performance means structure by creating a score because it is in creating a score that she determines which sound structure and which performances means structure she intends to be performed (Levinson 1980, 20). Since the compositional act takes place in time, indication of a sound structure + performance means structure is an action performed by someone at a time, the action of indication causes a new abstract entity to exist that did not exist prior to this act of indication (Levinson 1980, 20). Thus Levinson takes it that he has explained the most puzzling facts about musical works.

For reasons that will be explained in detail in the next chapter, Julian Dodd argues that Levinson’s account is unsustainable. He argues that it is paradoxical to attribute structure to abstract objects (Dodd 2007, 49) and that even Levinson’s indicated types exist eternally. So, according to Dodd, Levinson has failed to adequately account for the creatability intuition (Dodd 2007, 68-9). Thus Dodd offers an alternative Platonist theory of musical works that deviates from Levinson’s in important ways.

Dodd’s answer to the categorial question is that musical works are types whose tokens are concrete ‘sound-sequence-events’ (Dodd 2007, 2). Typically, sound-sequence-events are performances. But Dodd disagrees with Levinson that performance means are integral to a musical work’s identity and instead
holds a view that he calls 'sonicism' (Dodd 2007, 2). According to sonicism, musical works are individuated purely by how they sound. Thus, any sound-sequence event that sounds like work K will be a token of type K and therefore an instance of work K3.

The types themselves are abstract objects. But unlike Levinson, Dodd concludes that types are unstructured entities. All abstract objects must be unstructured owing to the fact that they exist outside of space (Dodd 2007, 49). Structural attributes are spatial attributes and therefore any structured entity must be in space. As a consequence, Dodd cannot avail himself of the isomorphic explanation of token binding. Dodd’s view thus grounds the repeatability of musical works differently from Levinson’s. On Dodd’s view, types set the conditions that a token must meet to be a token of that type. Specifically, the condition that a token must meet is the instantiation of a type’s property-associate. For example, the property-associate a token must instantiate to be a token of type K is the property-associate of type K, namely the property being-a-k. The point is that for Dodd, for each type that exists, there is a unique property associated with the type, the instantiation of which makes an object a token of a certain type. Finally, Dodd also argues that types are modally and temporally inflexible (Dodd 2007, 53). That is, a type has the same intrinsic properties in every possible world in which it exists and types are unchanging through time.

All of these claims will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter but the point here is to show how various Platonists account for the facts that

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3 This does have the counter-intuitive conclusion that a musical work can be tokened completely accidentally, say, by a bird who happens to whistle something that sounds like Beethoven’s Fifth (Dodd 2007, 34). However counter-intuitive this may be though, it is not central to my criticism of Dodd’s theory. For a defense of this position, see chapter 8 and 9 in (Dodd 2007). For criticisms of this view see (Levinson 1980) and (Davies 2009).
need to be explained by any plausible account of musical works. So whereas Levinson accounts for the repeatability of musical works by explaining performances have structure isomorphic to a complex, abstract, structured entity, this response is not available to Dodd who denies that abstract entities have structure. Instead as was mentioned, Dodd explains the repeatability of musical works by suggesting types lay down conditions for being tokened and objects must instantiate certain properties to meet these conditions and thus count as tokens of a type. And whereas Levinson does not directly respond to this problem of accounting for the audibility intuition, Dodd does so by drawing an analogy with deferred ostension (Dodd 2007, 12). He says, "as in the case of demonstrative reference via deferred ostension, the presence of a token secures the obtaining of a relation between a person and a type" (Dodd 2007, 12). So in the same way that we may point to a token of the letter A and thereby indicate the type The Letter A, we may listen to a performance of Beethoven’s Fifth and thereby listen to the type Beethoven’s Fifth. Finally, whereas Levinson posits indicated sound structures to ensure that musical works are creatable, Dodd argues that there is no consistent way to posit creatable abstracta and we are therefore forced to give up the creatability intuition. Instead we should opt to understand composition, not as an endeavour that brings something into existence, but as a process of 'creative discovery' (Dodd 2007, 112-21). Strictly speaking, since musical works are types and types exist eternally, they cannot be created by composers. But composers can go through a process of creatively discovering an abstract sound structure and picking it out for tokening. On Dodd’s view, it is this process of careful selection that characterizes the compositional process.
1.3 NOMINALIST THEORIES
Levinson’s and Dodd’s accounts are examples of the general trend towards embracing a Platonist answer to the categorial question. Moreover, Dodd characterizes his view as the default theory in the metaphysics of music. Even if the details of Dodd’s view are controversial, there is widespread agreement that musical works must be some kind of abstract object. However, there are those who attempt to buck the trend by giving a theory of musical works that identifies them with *concrete* objects. Two prominent views are Ben Caplan and Carl Matheson’s (2006) perdurantist theory and Chris Tillman’s (2011) endurantist theory.

Caplan and Matheson defend a view they call musical perdurantism (Caplan & Matheson 2006). Like most Nominalists they advance such an account in order to avoid the difficulties that confront any theory involving abstract objects. Specifically, they wish to steer clear of the problems of perceptibility that a Platonist account must answer. Abstract objects are, by definition, objects that exist outside of space. This presents a problem if, as is often assumed, abstract objects cannot enter into causal relations and therefore cannot interact with our perceptual apparati. Some explanation of how we could ever come to listen to musical works is thus demanded from the Platonist. Dodd at least attempts to articulate how this problem can be solved by arguing that the perceptibility of types can operate analogously to deferred ostension. His answer may or may not be a convincing solution⁴. However, it would clearly be desirable to side-step this problem entirely by identifying musical works with a concrete object.

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⁴ For a critique of Dodd’s answer to the perceptibility problem, see Franklin Bruno’s review of “Works of Music” (Bruno 2007).
To that end, Caplan and Matheson advance an account in which performances are temporal parts of a single perduring entity (Caplan & Matheson 2006, 60-1). An entity perdures if it has parts spread out in time the same way an object has parts spread out in space. If, for instance this tennis ball perdures, then it has temporal parts, that is, a unique temporal part at each moment that it exists. The tennis ball then is identified with the entire space-time worm constituted by its temporal parts. Musical perdurantism makes the same claim about musical works. Each of a work’s performances is merely a temporal part of a whole that is made up of all of the performances of a given work. Beethoven’s *Fifth* is the object that is the space-time worm whose temporal parts are all the performances of Beethoven’s *Fifth*.

This solution makes musical works entirely concrete objects. Thus we can appeal to an accepted causal explanation of how we perceive or hear a musical work since the work on the perdurantist picture is in spacetime. Perdurantism also accommodates the repeatability intuition, albeit in a roundabout way, by explaining how various performances are in fact parts of the same entity. And a perdurantist can clearly accommodate the creatability intuition because perduring objects are not eternally existing entities. The coming into being of a musical work will coincide with its first temporal stage, that is, its initial performance⁵. However the perdurantist faces an alternative perceptibility problem. Perdurantism about musical works has the odd consequence that no one could ever listen to a work of music in its entirety because doing so would

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⁵ It was pointed out to me by Duncan MacIntosh that though perdurantism would account for the creatability of musical works, it would have the odd consequence that musical works would not come into existence all at once but rather would still be coming into being as more and more performances are performed. This may or may not be a troubling consequence. In either case it would take me too far afield to offer a detailed discussion here. Thus I simply note this possible objection and move on.
require listening to all performances of the work, clearly an impossible task. (Caplan & Matheson 2006, 61). There is also an objection from modal constancy. For instance, Beethoven’s *Fifth* could have had more or fewer performances than it actually has but perduring objects are fusions of their parts. According to the standard mereological conception of fusions, fusions are identical to their parts and therefore a fusion cannot gain or lose parts without being identical to a different fusion of parts. So, a musical work that is a fusion of parts other than the parts that actually compose Beethoven’s *Fifth* would be a different entity and therefore not Beethoven’s *Fifth*. Caplan and Matheson provide replies to both of these objections (Caplan & Matheson 2006), but one may still be motivated to search for a different Nominalist theory before accepting the complicated Nominalist story given by perdurantists.

Chris Tillman offers an alternative possibility for identifying musical works with concrete objects. Instead of perduring, he suggests that musical works might *endure* (Tillman 2011, 18). For instance, Tillman suggests, an object may occupy two distinct regions of space-time without occupying the fusion of those regions (Tillman 2011, 17). In that case, it is consistent to hold that performances are parts of a whole, that is, musical works occupy all the space-time locations of their performances, without occupying the *fusion* of those locations. On this view musical works are not extended in time but rather are ‘wholly present’ in each of the space-time regions they occupy (Tillman 2011, 18). A musical work is therefore not identical to any one of its performances.

Tillman’s endurantism theory can provide an answer to the repeatability of musical works, because musical works are wholly present in each of their performances. In identifying musical works with concrete objects, musical
endurantism also provides an answer to the question of audibility. And finally, unlike abstract objects, concrete entities are understood to be creatable; so there is equally no problem accommodating the demand for creatability. Moreover, endurantism does not face the same perceptibility problem that perduantism faces, namely that it is unclear how anyone could ever come to listen to a work in its entirety.

These then are two ways one may attempt to avoid the problems inherent in Platonism by advancing Nominalist theories of musical works. A complete examination of these views is outside the scope of this thesis. So suffice it to say that I am generally skeptical of the existence of abstract objects. As will be explained momentarily, they generally seem ad hoc and unparsimonious. But, I find it equally fantastical to suppose that there is an object composed of the fusion of musical performances; and I must confess that I am skeptical of the coherence of endurantism generally. It is unclear to me how anything can both exist in time and lack temporal parts. In any case, for this essay, my general incredulity towards both Caplan and Matheson’s perduantism and Tillman’s endurantism will stand as reason enough to motivate the search for a different account.

1.4 MOTIVATING NOMINALISM
I have given now four possible responses to the categorial question; two Platonist accounts and two Nominalist accounts. Though Platonists may disagree about how to spell out a metaphysical account of musical works, they are united by the conviction that the best way to account for the repeatability of musical works is by positing some kind of abstract object. Abstract objects fundamentally are objects that admit of multiple instances so it seems they are tailor-made to be
identified with musical works. Nominalists on the other hand, are united in their rejection of abstract objects. In order to convincingly reject abstract objects, they offer various proposals for identifying musical works with widely different entities. I suggested in the last section that while I am generally sympathetic to the Nominalist aims, it seems to me the accounts given by Nominalists are unconvincing and clearly desperate attempts to fend off Platonism. With the remainder of this chapter then, I propose to explain why I think, though the Nominalists answers above to the categorial question are unconvincing, Nominalism is still well motivated.

By Nominalism here I simply mean a rejection of abstract objects. In rejecting abstract objects one endorses the claim that everything that exists exists in space. And I suggest that this is a reasonable claim to endorse. I am not interested here in arguing that abstract objects are impossible entities, only that we should avoid positing them as long as possible. Many philosophers seem rather cavalier about positing the existence of entities, while I (and, of course, many other philosophers) claim that this should not be done lightly. Indeed it seems that this should be a last resort.

The reason I think we should avoid positing abstract objects is that we simply ought to have less confidence in our beliefs about the existence of abstract objects as opposed to other objects, namely, concrete objects, things that exist in space. Moreover, all parties in this debate accept the existence of concrete objects. The debate between Nominalists and Platonists thus comes down to a disagreement about whether concrete objects are all that exist. And our default stance should be firmly on the Nominalist side. That is, we should seek as much as possible to provide theories that include only objects we already accept,
independently of the theory we are building. Rodriguez-Pereyra states this in terms of a disposition against *ad hoc* entities (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, 210). It is a theoretical virtue to avoid positing entities in order to fill a “specific theoretical role” (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, 211). Now it may be the case that we are forced to posit an entity because no other explanation of a certain phenomenon is available. But the point is that insofar as we are already committed to concrete objects because concrete objects are not posited only in order to fill a theoretical role (as Dodd’s types are), then we should be motivated to answer the categorial question by employing only concrete objects. There is, of course, much more that can be said on this topic but this should be enough to motivate the idea that Nominalist accounts are more desirable than Platonist accounts.
In Chapter 1 I presented the central problem of this essay: how to answer the categorial question, “what is a musical work?” This problem is, it turned out, primarily one of explaining repeatability, although there are other features of musical works that require explaining as well, such as audibility and creatability. I presented several different answers that have been proposed to the categorial question as a way of setting the background of this debate. And while I finished by admitting that I have strong Nominalist leanings, this attitude seems to be a minority one in the literature. Indeed some form or other of Platonism is generally accepted and Dodd’s type/token theory is one of the recent, leading views put forth by the Platonist camp. Dodd himself argues that his account is the default view, effectively establishing his as the view to beat (Dodd 2007, 3). Well, my aim in this project is to do just that. But in order to mount an objection to Dodd’s view, more will have to be said about his theory and specifically its underlying metaphysics. It is the focus of this chapter to give a detailed discussion of the relevant portions of Dodd’s theory. Moreover, it is to argue that despite his insistence to the contrary, his theory is committed to an extreme form of Platonism that must accept self-subsisting abstract objects.

2.1 TYPES AND TOKENS
Dodd thinks the correct answer to the categorial question is that musical works are types whose tokens are concrete sound-sequence-events (Dodd 2007, 10). But this is not quite right. Dodd actually argues that musical works are norm-types
(Dodd 2007, 32). Norm-types, as opposed to pure types, admit of improperly formed tokens. They allow for improperly formed tokens because they determine normative properties of tokening. So the identity of a pure-type is determined intensionally by the conditions a token must meet to be a token of that type. Thus to be a token of a pure-type, a token must meet all of the relevant conditions set by the type. But a property is normative to a type just in case only a properly formed token of the type must instantiate the relevant property (Dodd 2007, 32). Thus a token that fails to instantiate a property normative to a norm-type and that instantiates only some of the properties normative to a given norm-type may still count as a token of that norm-type, albeit it an improperly formed one. The reason Dodd makes this emendation to his pure-types is that musical works admit of bad performances. A botched high school performance of Beethoven’s Fifth is still a performance of Beethoven’s Fifth. The high school musician’s unwitting liberal playing of wrong notes and unintentionally creative intonation does not disqualify the performance from being a performance of Beethoven’s Fifth. Their failure to meet all the conditions set by the Beethoven’s Fifth norm-type means that their performance is an improperly formed token of the norm-type that is Beethoven’s Fifth. So strictly speaking musical works are norm-types. But for the sake of simplicity I shall continue to refer to them as types.

Now, Dodd argues that considering musical works to be types should be the default position in the ontology of musical works. Why? Because if musical works are types, then we can account for the peculiar combination of facts that characterize musical works. First, it neatly explains the most significant fact to be explained, namely, the repeatability of musical works. By their very nature, types
are repeatable entities, and their repeatability is familiar to us (Dodd 2007, 11). The repeatability of musical works is the same as the repeatability that we already recognize between, for instance, word types and their tokens. A type’s repeatability rests in its role in binding tokens together. It seems then that we have an ontological category already at hand to employ when answering the categorial question. Second, Dodd thinks he can explain the audibility of musical works. Their audibility is explained by drawing an analogy with Quine’s notion of deferred ostension (Quine 1969, 39-41). In brief, we may demonstratively refer to, for example, the letter 'A' by pointing to a particular token A. In pointing at this A, we allow this concrete instance of the letter ‘A’ to stand for the letter type. Our act of ostension is deferred to the type so that we may refer to the type via the token. In the same way, a performance can serve to relate us to the musical work of which it is a performance (Dodd 2007, 12). So Dodd explains, "hearing a performance of a work just is to hear the work in performance" (Dodd 2007, 12).

Finally, the metaphysics of type/token theory requires us to give up the creatability intuition because types are eternally existing entities. Dodd argues that composition should not be viewed as a literal creation process in the sense of bringing a new entity into the world. Composers do not add to the ontology of the world since they are picking out entities that have been there all along. Still this should not take away from our appreciation and awe of truly good composers. We should instead view composition as an act of "creative discovery" on par with Einstein's breakthroughs in theoretical physics. Producing the general theory of relativity was no doubt a creative endeavor and one of powerful genius but, it did not bring something into being. Einstein was discovering something about the way the world is, but this fact in no way
diminishes his brilliance. And so too, says Dodd, great composers discover their works. Beethoven’s *Fifth* is a type that existed before Beethoven; and Beethoven’s compositional act was to indicate a certain type for tokening. But this should not be taken as any less sensational than if he were to have brought an entity into existence. So while Dodd cannot provide an explanation of the creation involved in composition, he can explain it away. And he thinks this should not trouble us; for, he writes, “nothing in the phenomenology of composition determines that we should view it as creation rather than discovery” (Dodd 2007, 5).

Besides these central facts to be explained, Dodd argues that several other characteristic of musical works are explained by considering musical works to be types instead of other paradigmatically repeatable entities like properties and sets; and this lends further credence to the claim that musical works are types. For one thing, types, *qua* norm-types, explain how performances can be bad and still be instances of a certain work. Musical works also exhibit the phenomenon of shared predication that is indicative of types. That is, anything that can truly be predicated of a token in virtue of it being of a certain type can also be predicated of the type itself (Dodd 2007, 17). The example Dodd gives is that ‘is rectangular’ and ‘is coloured’ are truly predicable of both the type The Union Jack and tokens of The Union Jack (Dodd 2007, 17). But properties, for example, do not exhibit this shared predication. Green things are green, but the property *being green* is not itself green. Musical works share predication with their instances. Hence there is more reason to think that musical works are types as opposed to properties.

Finally, musical works have their performances inessentially. There could have been more or fewer performances of Beethoven’s *Fifth*. Sets cannot account
for this fact because sets are modally constant as a product of being identified extensionally (Dodd 2007, 18). If a musical work is identified with a set of performances, then the work necessarily has only those performances because a set of different performances would be a different set and therefore a different musical work. But types are defined intensionally, so they are not identified with a fixed plurality of members. It is a contingent matter how many and which tokens of a type exist because it is a contingent matter which entities will actually meet the conditions for being of a given type.

According to Dodd, the peculiar set of facts about musical works that call for explanation are straightforwardly explained by considering musical works to be types of sound-sequence-events. But Dodd’s expressed aim is not just to say what kind of thing a musical work is, but to bring the metaphysics of art back into contact with serious analytic metaphysics (Dodd 2007, 4). Thus, he provides an extended metaphysical account of types generally. In the next section, I explain Dodd’s type/token theory.

2.2 METAPHYSICAL COMMITMENTS
According to Dodd, types are genuine entities in the world. Types are entities that bind tokens together and as such are unstructured entities, “modally and temporally inflexible” and eternally existent (Dodd 2007, 37). Each of these claims will be explained in turn.

First, according to Dodd, types are entities in their own right; they are genuinely members of our ontology (Dodd 2007, 38-42). This conclusion is reached mostly by reflecting on our everyday language use and musical practice.
A Quinean criterion of ontological commitment⁶ - that we are committed to the entities our sentences quantify over (Quine 1948, 32) - applied to ordinary language shows us that we are indeed, in our everyday discourse, realists about types. We regularly refer to types with sentences like "The Telephone is a brilliant invention" and we quantify over types when we say things like "all of Beethoven’s symphonies are works of genius." To all appearances, then, types are real entities - "denizens of our ontology" (Dodd 2007, 42). Types exist.

If types really are entities in their own right, what kind of entities are they? According to Dodd, they are, as they are standardly conceived, abstract objects. It is not clear that any concrete object could fill the role properly. The type Beethoven’s Fifth does not exist at any place. It makes no sense to say that Beethoven's Fifth exists over there in that concert hall. To be sure, a performance of Beethoven’s Fifth may be over in that concert hall, but not Beethoven’s Fifth, the work itself. Types then, being abstract objects, do not exist in space. An immediate consequence of this view is that types are entirely unstructured entities (Dodd 2007, 48). Simply put, there is no non-paradoxical way to maintain that abstract entities have structure. Structural attributes are spatial attributes (Dodd 2007, 50-1). That is, for an object to have structure is for it to have parts which are arranged in a certain way. But something that is not in space cannot be arranged in any way. Indeed, it cannot have pieces to be arranged. This also means that such things cannot be coloured or be big or small or a certain shape etc. In short, any structural attributes that an entity can have are not attributes

⁶ In order to disambiguate, it should be noted that Quine himself held that we are ontologically committed to whatever our sentences, in our best scientific theories, quantify over. Dodd is not applying Quine’s criterion but rather his criterion is Quinean in that he accepts that quantification over x indicates ontological commitment to x. Dodd is thus free to apply this Quinean criterion to ordinary language (as he chooses to do) but Quine himself would not accept this application. For Quine’s own discussion on this matter, see (Quine 1948).
that an object outside of space can have. Types must be viewed as completely lacking in structure.

Dodd’s explicit denial of types as structured entities runs counter to many other type/token theorists. Musical works are commonly construed as abstract sound structures. Dodd (Dodd 2007, 69) and I read Jerrold Levinson as holding such a view, although I think Levinson is unclear about what exactly he thinks his ontological commitments are (Levinson 1980). I said earlier that Levinson takes musical works to be a fairly complex brand of abstract entities: Sounds Structure + Performance Means Structure as-indicated-by-X-at-t (Levinson 1980, 20). In doing so he seems to be adopting a kind of isomorphic conception of types whereby a token is a token of a type just in case it exhibits structure isomorphic to that type. The relevant point here is that a natural understanding (and one that I think is often implicit) of abstract sound structures is as some kind of abstract entity that has structure isomorphic to that of its tokens. In a sense an abstract sound structure is easily viewed as a kind of paradigmatic instance of some work, say, Beethoven’s *Fifth*. Types understood this way bind together tokens just in case the tokens exhibit structure isomorphic to the type in question. But Dodd is clear that once types are admitted to be abstract objects, such a view is untenable because abstract entities must be entirely unstructured.

Of course Dodd then owes us an explanation of how types bind tokens together. Types are posited largely because of the need to explain repeatability; and if Dodd cannot avail himself of the isomorphic explanation of repeatability, he must provide an alternative account. What he says is that types are identified by the conditions a token must meet in order to be a token of that type. The condition that a token must meet to be of a certain type is the instantiation of the
type’s property-associate, being-a-k (Dodd 2007, 49). I take it that property-associates can be conjunctive properties. For instance, an object instantiates the property being-a-cat just in case it instantiates the properties having fur and having four legs and having whiskers and having whatever else it takes to be a cat. The type The Cat thus binds together all its tokens “according to whether they have its property-associate” (Dodd 2007, 49). Importantly, types can perform as token binders in this way while completely lacking any structure. The fact that cats are structured entities does not entail that the type The Cat has any structure (Dodd 2007, 50). Or, to give a musical example, being a performance of Beethoven’s Fifth certainly requires being a highly complex entity but Beethoven’s Fifth itself need not be structured because the performance is not a performance of Beethoven’s Fifth in virtue of exhibiting isomorphic structure to Beethoven’s Fifth. Rather a performance of Beethoven’s Fifth meets the conditions of being Beethoven’s Fifth determined by the type Beethoven’s Fifth.

Denying that types have any structure immediately produces another puzzle, however. One of the features of types and tokens is that they share predication. Whatever can be predicated of a token of type x in virtue of it being a token of type x can also be predicated of type x itself (Dodd 2007, 17). Tokens of the Union Jack are red and rectangular so "The Union Jack is rectangular" and "The Union Jack is red" are both true sentences. However, this clearly has to be reconciled with what has just been said about types being unstructured since the lack of structure seems to prohibit these predicates from applying to types. Recall that because types are abstract, they cannot have any attributes that depend on being spatially located such as being-rectangular or being-red. It is possible that strictly speaking these sentences are false. The Union Jack is not actually
rectangular, because, really, it is not in space. But Dodd thinks that these sentences clearly express truths. So his preferred solution is that types and tokens share predication but not properties (Dodd 2007, 46). The predicate "is red" expresses what we standardly understand it to express, namely having the property being-red, when it is applied to a token. But when it is applied to a type, it expresses a different property, namely, the property of being-such-that-any-properly-formed-token-of-type-x-is-red. This is called analogical predication and it allows Dodd to explain away apparent paradoxical cases of property attribution to abstract objects.

Next on our list of metaphysical facts is that types are modally inflexible and temporally inflexible (Dodd 2007, 53). For an entity to be modally inflexible (fixed) is, "for there to exist no possible worlds in which the entity in question differs with respect to the intrinsic properties it actually has" (Dodd 2007, 53). And for an entity to be temporally inflexible (unchanging) is for an entity to be "incapable of change in its intrinsic properties over time" (Dodd 2007, 53). That types are fixed and unchanging follows from the way they are individuated. Remember that types are individuated by the conditions that tokens must meet to be tokens of the types in question. Now, for a type $K$ to differ in its intrinsic properties would be for it to lay down different conditions of being tokened. But since a type is individuated by the conditions it lays down, any type $F$ that lays down conditions different from type $K$ is a different entity from $K$. Thus a type cannot have other intrinsic properties than it actually has. Types are modally inflexible and temporally inflexible.

Finally, types are eternal existents. This is one of Dodd's most contentious claims as it requires him to bite the bullet on one of the widely recognized
features to be explained about musical works, namely, their creatibility. Dodd argues that types are eternal entities because they cannot come into existence or go out of existence. Thus it is true of each type \( K \) that 1) \( K \) exists (tenselessly) and 2) \( K \) exists at all times (Dodd 2007, 58). It was mentioned earlier that types have property-associates and that instantiation of a property-associate is the condition a token must meet to be of a certain type. So there is a one-to-one mapping of properties onto types: for any property being a \( K \) there is a type-associate \( K \) (Dodd 2007, 60). This entails that if the property associate of a type exists at a time, then the type exists at that same time. And, according to Dodd, properties exist at all times. It follows, then, that types must exist at all times.

The premise that if a type's property-associate exists at a time, then the type exists is fairly straightforward (Dodd 2007, 60). All it takes for a type to exist is for there to be conditions of being a token of that type. And since the conditions a token must meet are the instantiation of a type's property-associate, the existence of a property-associate guarantees the existence of the conditions a token must meet to be of the type in question.

Dodd advances the second premise because he accepts that, "a property \( F \) exists at \( t \) if and only if there is some time \( t^* \) such that \( t^* \) is either before, after or identical with \( t \), and at which it is (metaphysically) possible for \( F \) to be instantiated" (Dodd 2007, 61). And the reason why this entails that properties do not go into or out of being is this: "if it is ever the case that there is some time (past, present, or future) at which it is possible for something to be \( F \), it is always the case; and [if it] is ever false, it is always false" (Dodd 2007, 61). So Dodd takes properties to exist eternally.
This is the reason why Dodd rejects Levinson’s indicated types. Recall that Levinson proposed that musical works were complex entities made up of a sound structure and a performance means structure, indicated by someone at a certain time. The reason that he suggested musical works be identified with indicated types was to account for the intuition that musical works are creatable. Pure, abstract entities cannot be created, but perhaps indicated abstract entities can be created because their indication takes place at a time. It would seem that for an indicated abstract entity to exist requires that it be indicated by someone, and thus it cannot exist prior to this act of indication. But Dodd’s point is that types exist just in case the conditions for being a token of that type exist. And, if the conditions for being an indicated type exist, then they exist eternally. For example, one of the conditions that a token must meet to be a token of a type K indicated on September 30th 1988 is that it exist after September 30th 1988. This condition though, which surely exists, exists prior to September 30th 1988. That is, what it is for something to be a thing that exists after September 30th 1988 is for it to instantiate an eternally existing property. Of course nothing can instantiate the property until after September 30th 1988. Levinson’s mistake then is to think that because tokens of an indicated type can only exist after the act of indication, then the indicated type itself does not exist eternally (Dodd 2007, 71). Like it or not, if types are abstract objects, then they exist eternally and the intuition that musical works are created must be rejected.

To summarize, the picture that Dodd arrives at, then, is this: types are genuine members of our ontology. They are abstract, modally and temporally inflexible and eternally existent. They are individuated by the conditions that tokens must meet to be of a certain type. And the condition that any token must
2.3 EXTREME PLATONISM
Upon suggesting that types are genuine abstract entities that exist independently of their tokens, it would seem Dodd is forced to accept an unsavoury conclusion: types exist in some kind of Platonic realm that is distinct from the natural world. The concern is that if types are entities in their own right, that is, ontologically independent of their tokens, and if they are abstract, then they must be "ghostly inhabitant[s] of some mythical Platonic realm" (Dodd 2007, 66). With respect to properties being placed in a Platonic realm, Dodd says, "it becomes hard to conceive of how a particular could come to have a property. On this view, properties and their instances, so it seems, occupy different realms, and, as a result instantiation is rendered utterly mysterious" (Dodd 2007, 61). Analogously, the worry with placing types in a Platonic realm is that it becomes hard to conceive how a token can be of a certain type. To me, the worry seems to be, at least with types, that by placing types in Platonic heaven, we risk just turning them into particulars of a different stripe. That is, it seems we have just posited other entities along the lines of tables and chairs; the only difference is that tables and chairs are concrete, whereas types are abstract. But the point is that if types exist independently, i.e., even in the absences of their tokens, then types become "free-floating," self-subsisting entities and it becomes mysterious how this token is of the type The Table.

But Dodd thinks that his account avoids the charge of extreme Platonism. Following Michael Dummett (1986, 261), Dodd says that entities are problematic
for the reasons above if they are "self-subsisting" and entities are self-subsisting if they "can be referred to or thought about without our needing to refer to, or think about, concrete entities" (Dodd 2007, 61). If one can only refer to or think about a type by referring to or thinking about a concrete token of that type, then types are not problematically self-subsistent and thus do not float freely in some other realm of being. Dodd is sure, then, to say that types are "conceptually tied to [their] tokens" (Dodd 2007, 66). Types are fundamentally of particulars. Types cannot be referred to or thought of independently of their tokens. According to Dodd, this conceptual tie is all that is required to avoid positing a Platonic heaven. He provides the following example (Dodd 2007, 67):

Consider...The Square Cut. This is a cricketting batting stroke and, as such, is a type of thing done with a cricket bat. Of course, that this is so does not entail that The Square Cut depends for its existence upon cricket bats. It would be extremely odd to insist that if every cricket bat in the world were destroyed, The Square Cut would cease to exist. Nonetheless, this batting stroke is conceptually dependent on cricket bats: we can only think of it as something done by a person with a bat. This combination of relations- namely conceptual dependence on and existential independence of - is precisely what is distinctive of the relation between a type and its tokens. The close conceptual dependence of a type upon its tokens ensures that types are not self-subsistent. The charge that we have placed types in Platonic heaven cannot be made to stick.

It seems, then, that the initial worry can be avoided because types do not self-subsist in the problematic way mentioned at the outset.

But this is wrong. The charge that Dodd has placed types in Platonic heaven can be made to stick. If Dodd is really committed to the claim that entities are problematically self-subsistent if they can be referred to or thought about independently of concrete instances, then by his own argument the types he has posited are self-subsistent. In tying types conceptually to their tokens, he has given reason to think that types can only by thought of by thinking of concrete
tokens. It may be the case that to think of a type, we have to think of a token of that type as it is unclear what it would be like to think of an abstract entity, completely lacking in any structural attributes. The trouble is, he has done nothing to undermine our ability to refer to types independently of their tokens. I need not, every time I want to refer to the type The Polar Bear, refer to any particular polar bear. If I say, “The Polar Bear is a type,” I have referred directly to the type The Polar Bear and avoided any reference to polar bears. Indeed it seems Dodd cannot undermine our reference to types by themselves without undermining his own argument for the existence of types, because his argument to the conclusion that we are ontologically committed to types relies on precisely our regular reference to types, independently of their concrete tokens. For example, we see Dodd arguing that, "to say that The Daffodil is the national flower of Wales is not to say that all, most, or even properly formed daffodils are the national flowers of Wales. The claim being made seems irreducibly to concern a type of flower" (Dodd 2007, 39). Here Dodd’s point seems to be precisely that our reference to The Daffodil does not depend on any concrete entity, but rather that when stating that "The Daffodil is the national flower of Wales," we are referring directly to that type. This is why he thinks the Nominalist’s project of paraphrasing away reference is bound to fail, because some sentences refer “irreducibly” to types. Showing then that types are conceptually tied to tokens does not affect our ability to refer directly to types.

It may be suggested however, that tokens are indeed necessary for reference. In order to refer to the type The Daffodil, I may need to point out a particular daffodil. Perhaps I am speaking to someone who does not know what a daffodil is and I must point out a daffodil and say, “I mean to refer to the type
of flower of which that is a token.” In doing so, I refer to a type - The Daffodil - by referring to one of its tokens.

Well it may indeed by the case that this is sometimes required, especially when learning about daffodils. Perhaps all types must initially be referred to through their tokens as, in order to learn concepts, we must be shown concrete instances. But my point in the preceding paragraphs is that it is possible to refer to types without referring to any of their tokens. If you and I are both familiar with daffodils and I say to you, “The Daffodil is The National Flower of Wales” then I thereby refer directly the type, The Daffodil. The fact that sometimes or perhaps often, types must be referred to by referring to one of their tokens does not undermine the claim that there are times when reference is made to types directly. But, that we can refer directly to types on some occasions means that even by the definition of self-subsistent entities favoured by Dodd, whereby an entity is problematically self-subsistent just in case it is possible to refer to or think about a type independently of referring to our thinking about one of its tokens, types are problematically self-subsistent. They are because, even if we cannot think of the type The Daffodil without thinking of a daffodil, we can nonetheless refer to The Daffodil (sometimes) without any reference to particular daffodils. Since we can refer to types without reference to their tokens, types are self-subsistent entities. Thus, Dodd has not successfully rebutted to objection that he has placed types in a Platonic realm.

However, Dodd should not be committed to the criterion of self-subsistence that he gives because it is not clear why conceptual dependence should have any bearing on ontological matters. Whether something is conceptually tied to something else is clearly an epistemic matter, and it does not
have ontological implications. It may be the case that we cannot conceive of
types without conceiving of their tokens, but our ability to conceive of types in a
particular way, or rather our *inability* to conceive of types in a particular way,
does not tell us about the ontological status of types.

But if conceptual dependence does not matter, what does matter for self-
subsistence? What matters is not epistemic independence but ontological
independence; and clearly Dodd’s types are ontologically independent of their
tokens. Types are entities in their own right and crucially they do not depend for
their existence on the existence of their tokens. It is true that their existence
depends on the *possibility* of being tokened, but, so long as it is possible for a type
to exist without any concrete tokens actually existing, types must be self-
subsistent. And, this is possible. There can be, and certainly are on Dodd’s view,
types that are untokened. Remember the cricket bats. Dodd’s point is that even
when all the cricket bats are destroyed, The Square Cut still exists. But then if
types are entities in their own right and they are abstract, it seems we are forced
to conclude that they exist in some Platonic realm. In other words, to state that
The Square Cut is fundamentally *of* cricket bats is only to say something about
how we think of The Square Cut (as Dodd readily admits). It may be that no
cricket bats exist but The Square Cut does exist; and all of this is independent of
the fact that I can only think of The Square Cut by thinking of someone
performing a certain motion with a cricket bat. For that does not, as Dodd thinks,
undermine the ontological commitments. And Dodd’s ontological commitments
are clear. Types exist outside of space and they exist even if no tokens of them
exist. Thus he is committed to free-floating entities. We should reject free-floating
entities that occupy some mysterious Platonic heaven. So there is reason to reject
Dodd’s theory of types.
CHAPTER 3: REJECTING ABSTRACT TYPES

Now that the metaphysics underlying Dodd’s type/token theory has been described, it is time for me to suggest that his ontological commitments are fundamentally misguided. In short, I wish to establish that there is no good reason to suppose that types are entities. That is, there is no good reason to suppose that types are genuine members of our ontology. The thrust of the objection against reifying types as "genuine denizens of our ontology" is that doing so yields no explanatory benefit. Specifically, the kind of abstract object that Dodd endorses is freeloading on the rest of his theory. What I mean by this is that, in Dodd’s case, the type/token theory that considers types to be distinct, existing, abstract objects is in no better position to explain how several tokens can be of the same type than the type/token theory that does not reify types. Abstract objects as Dodd describes them do not contribute any explanatory power to his theory of types, and thus positing them is of no utility. I conclude this chapter by saying that positing the abstract entities that Dodd does is poorly motivated and we therefore should reject the metaphysical underpinnings of his type/token theory. In Chapter 4 I will attempt to fill the void left by rejecting Dodd’s metaphysics by giving the type/token account of musical works a more parsimonious ontology than the one offered by Dodd.
3.1 REIFIED TYPES ARE UNECESSARY

In order to understand why I do not think Dodd’s particular explanation of abstract objects adds any explanatory power to his theory of types, it is important to remind ourselves of what his aim is in working out a metaphysical theory of types. Dodd is aiming to explain the repeatability of types because he thinks it is specifically their repeatability that makes them excellent candidates for identifying with musical works; for it is the repeatability of musical works that is their most perplexing feature (Dodd 2007, 10). To take an example from language, the tokens A, A and A are distinct particulars but they are all of the same type, namely, the type, The Letter A. A theory of types and tokens must explain how these distinct inscriptions are all tokens of the same type. A satisfactory explanation of types will explain the mechanism responsible for repeatability. Indeed, for Dodd, types are "way[s] of binding together tokens" (Dodd 2007, 49). Their purpose in the theory is to explain repeatability by binding tokens together.

Dodd explains this repeatability by positing that types act as token 'binders' (Dodd 2007, 49). Types do this binding by determining what conditions must be met by an object in order to 'count' as tokens of certain types (Dodd 2007, 49). The condition that must be met for any token to be of a certain type is the instantiation of the property-associate of that type, being-an-x. I read Dodd as saying that the property being-an-x can be broken down into further properties. Something instantiates the property being-an-x just in case it instantiates the properties, say, being F, being G, and being H. So, a type determines that an object must instantiate being F, being G and being H, and when a thing instantiates being
F, being G and being H, it instantiates the property being-an-x. That is, being-an-x is the conjunctive property being F, G and H. For example, the property of being a polar bear is the conjunctive property of being furry, having black skin, having four legs and whatever else makes up the essential set of properties that the type The Polar Bear\(^7\) determines. If several things instantiate the same property-associates, then they are tokens of the same type. "So," says Dodd, "here is my answer to the question of how K [a type] binds together its tokens: it does so according to whether they have its property-associate" (Dodd 2007, 49). And repeatability is thus explained.

Now, my claim is this: types qua entities do not actually contribute to the explanation of how types bind together tokens. Since Dodd makes property-associate instantiation the determiner of sameness of type, he has eliminated the role of types in binding together tokens. It turns out, on Dodd’s view, that two tokens are tokens of the same type just in case they instantiate the same property-associate. I think this is a good commitment to make. However, it entails that what is binding tokens together, i.e., what is making several tokens be tokens of the same type, are properties. Sameness of property-associates and difference of property-associates is what determines whether tokens are of the same type or of different type. But if this is the case, types, which are posited in order to explain repeatability, are not actually being implicated in the thing which they are posited to explain. Having certain properties, it turns out, is what bind tokens together and not types.

\(^7\) Strictly speaking, The Polar Bear is a norm-type, so some of these properties are normative to the type The Polar Bear. This allows for the possibility of improperly formed polar bears, such as a polar bear with only three legs.
It will be instructive here to remind ourselves of the way Levinson presumably sees the token-binding role of types. For Levinson, musical works are indicated types which are complex entities made up of the conjunction of an abstract sound structure and a performing-means structure, indicated by a composer at time $t$ (Levinson 1980, 19). The part that is of particular interest is that Levinson identifies musical works (partially) with abstract sound structures. Levinson is not particularly forthcoming with an explanation of what abstract sound structures are. He gives us some idea of how he is envisioning abstract sound structures when he says that an abstract sound structure is "a structure, sequence, or pattern of sounds, pure and simple" (Levinson 1980, 6). And later he says of pure abstract sounds structures (those that are not indicated) that they are "in effect mathematical objects - they are sequences of sets of sonic elements" (Levinson 1980, 7). These comments and the fact that Levinson does not object to structured abstracta suggest to me that he is either explicitly or implicitly relying on some kind of picture theory of ontology. By holding both that musical work types are abstract entities and that they are structured, he seems to be endorsing the view that performances (tokens) are of a certain musical work (type) in virtue of instantiating some structure that is isomorphic to a certain structured abstract entity. So, why is this performance a performance of Beethoven's *Fifth*? Because it exhibits a certain structure that is isomorphic to the abstract, structured type that is Beethoven's *Fifth*.

The point of bringing this up is to show that on an isomorphic view of types, types are necessarily involved in binding tokens together. On this kind of view, types bind together tokens according to whether the tokens bear the same relation to the type. That is, two tokens are of the same type just in case both
tokens are related isomorphically to the same type. So notice the difference in the two Platonist views. On the isomorphic view, the type entity is fundamentally involved in making several things count as the type because it is the sameness of relation to the type that unites tokens. On Dodd’s account, it is not the relation to the type that matters. It is the instantiation of the same property by two entities that makes them count as being of the same type. But if it is the relation between two tokens that determines whether they are of the same type, then positing a type-entity does not provide any additional explanation of repeatability beyond what is already explained by sameness of property-associates.

I am not suggesting that the isomorphic view is a better view of types. Dodd has pointed out that this view requires abstract objects to be structured and that there is simply no way to make this claim unparadoxical (Dodd 1980, 50). But in denying (rightly) that abstract objects are structured, he also removes their power to bind tokens together. For their binding ability is typically dependent on the isomorphic view. Realizing the isomorphic view is not available to him, he offers an alternative view of how tokens are bound together whereby tokens are bound together by property-associate instantiation. However, even this, I am claiming, does not save the token-binding function of types, because he has shifted the burden of token binding from types to properties. In doing so he has eliminated the need to posit type-entities to bind tokens together. We should only posit entities that occupy relevant theoretical roles in our theory. Since types do not, on Dodd’s account, bind tokens together, they are an unnecessary ontological commitment.
3.2 OBJECTIONS
So far I have explained my contention that the type-entities Dodd posits are not involved in binding together. This is problematic since the purpose of a type/token theory is to explain repeatability, and types specifically are the things that are ostensibly posited to explain repeatability via their role as token-binders. But if types are not implicated in explaining repeatability after all, then they seem an unnecessary addition to a theory. Still, one might think that Dodd’s reasons for reifying types come from other considerations besides their role in binding tokens together. I think the strongest reply Dodd might make is that ontological commitment to types does not come just from their theoretical function as token binders, but rather that our ontological commitments to types constitute the starting point of metaphysical enquiry into types. In this section I will present this possible reply and show that it is fundamentally mistaken.

3.2.1 QUANTIFICATION AND REFERENCE
At this point I may be charged with being uncharitable to Dodd’s account. Dodd reifies types in his theory, not because they must be reified in order to explain how tokens can be bound together, but because we are ontologically committed to types even before an enquiry into their nature is begun. Indeed this is how Dodd proceeds in his discussion of the metaphysics of types. He begins by noting that we constantly refer to types with sentences like, "the letter 'A' begins the alphabet" and we regularly quantify over types with sentences like, "there are many symphonies that Beethoven composed." So it seems that types exist. Dodd explains, "all in all, the truth of sentences such as [those that make reference to types and those that quantify over types], together with our demonstrative
reference to types, indicates that types are genuine denizens of the universe” (Dodd 2007, 38). Moreover, we should accept ontological commitment as indicated unless a theory of types becomes unsupportable. If this is the case, then types qua entities are not posited to explain some fact about how tokens are repetitions of something, but rather reified types constitute the starting point of enquiry. We begin with a commitment to an ontology including types and then the aim is to explain their nature.

It seems that this is Dodd’s strategy, and I think it is problematic. If, for the sake of argument, we take reference and quantification in these sentences at face value, all we are committed to is something. We are told only that there is some kind of entity out there that we must accept into our ontology. But what kind of thing we must accept into our ontology is determined by the other properties these things seem to exhibit, facts such as repeatability, shared predication and the fact that they do not have their members essentially. These are the facts that determine the kind of entity we are committed to. So in this case, reference and quantification tell us there is something there, and other data tell us what kind of thing is there, namely, types. We should expect then that a theory of types will implicate the type-entity in binding together tokens because the binding together of tokens is not just a free-floating fact to be explained; it is a fact about type-entities that they bind tokens together. We are committed (if Dodd is right) not just to there being type-entities, but to there being type-entities that perform certain functions. It is problematic then to find that types on Dodd's view do not perform this function of binding, but rather that properties perform this function. So, I contend that if the linguistic data commit us to types, then we are committed to types qua token-binders and not simply types qua genuine entities.
It is a deal breaker that Dodd’s types do not seem to perform the role for which they are posited.

If what I have said so far is right, then the most I can conclude is that Dodd has provided an insufficient explanation of types. That is, I have only given reason to suppose that Dodd has given a bad metaphysical explanation of types. I have done nothing to undermine Dodd’s commitment to types; I have only shown that his theory is inadequate because it does not have types do any token-binding. We might think that we should accept that types really are genuine, abstract entities and that we simply need to keep searching for a proper understanding of them. But as I said at the outset, I think we should reject altogether that types really are members of our ontology, and certainly we should reject that they are abstract objects. So what needs to be challenged is Dodd’s claim that we should accept the ontological commitment of our ordinary language at face value.

3.2.2 REJECTING COMMITMENT
Why does Dodd think we should accept our ordinary language ontological commitments at face value? Well, first of all we refer to and quantify over types in our sentences of ordinary language. The truth of those sentences seems to depend on the existence of types (Dodd 2007, 38). But, I submit that this alone is not enough to motivate the view that we should endorse a commitment to types. After all, Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment states that a theory is committed to whatever it quantifies over (Quine 1948, 33). But whether we should believe in the commitments of a theory depends on the truth of that
theory and the truth of the theory is a different matter entirely. If our theory must quantify over types, then we know that the theory is committed to types. But we do not know if types really exist unless we know if the theory is true. After all, the theory in question could turn out to be false. If our theory is false, then the fact that it is committed to some entities does not give us reason to believe in those entities.

So Dodd needs some additional reasons to accept the ontological commitments of our ordinary sentences other than the fact that ordinary language quantifies over types and he does indeed advance such reasons. For one, it does not appear that all of our sentences committed to types can be paraphrased to show that this commitment is just apparent and not actual. Various proposals have been made, but to each of these proposals, it seems that there are sentences that stubbornly refuse to be paraphrased (Dodd 2007, 38-9). To give just one example, "to say that The Daffodil is the national flower of Wales is not to say that all, most, or even properly formed daffodils are the national flower of Wales. The claim being made seems irreducibly to concern a type of flower" (Dodd 2007, 39). Since this sentence seems to resist paraphrase, but is nonetheless true, the moral to be drawn is that we have strong reason to believe that even our best theories will quantify over types and in that case we would clearly be committed to them.

But Dodd goes a step further and notes that even if all sentences which refer to and quantify over types were successfully paraphrased, this would not settle the question of which sentences, the original sentences or the paraphrased
sentences, display the true ontological commitment (Dodd 2007, 24-5, 39). Suppose then, for argument's sake, that we had two sets of sentences: all the sentences that refer to and quantify over types, and the set which contains paraphrases for all of the sentences in the first set. We can conclude that we are not forced to accept types but we are not forced not to accept them either (Dodd 2007, 39). Drawing from David Lewis, Dodd thinks that in this situation, "we should take such sentences [our original set of ordinary language claims], with their ontological commitments, at face value unless doing so leads to trouble and doing otherwise is known not to" (Dodd 2007, 25). Why should we accept the original set in this situation and not the paraphrased set? We should accept the original set because this set contains all our common utterances and accepting the ontological commitment of our common utterances is less of a break with common sense than accepting the ontological commitments of the paraphrased, non-ordinary utterances. All things being equal, it is better to maintain as many of our common sense intuitions as possible. In advancing the same argument about musical works Dodd says, "we should only abandon this reading [i.e. reading our ordinary language claims as having ontological commitment] if it is shown to be unsustainable" (Dodd 2007, 25). Presumably this holds true of types as well. Clearly Dodd thinks that accepting types into our ontology does not lead to trouble and not accepting them does. And my aim currently is to show the opposite.

What kind of trouble might we run into if we accept types into our ontology? Dodd entertains two answers the Nominalist might give. First, he says, one might argue that we simply do not or cannot know enough about types

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8 See also (Alston 1958).
because they are intensional entities and so are fundamentally "mysterious" (Dodd 2007, 40). Dodd's response is that this charge is simply untrue; we do know quite a bit about types. They are entities in their own right, whose identities are determined by the conditions that something must meet to be a token of them, namely, instantiation of a property-associate. Types therefore do not have their tokens essentially, and they are intensional objects, this meaning that two distinct types can nonetheless have exactly the same tokens. According to Dodd, we know enough about types to dispel the air of mystery surrounding them.

The second objection leveled at the Platonist conception of types by the Nominalist is that it is impossible to give non-circular identity conditions for types (Dodd 2007, 41). The identity of a type is determined by which property-associate a thing must instantiate to be a token of that type, but the identity of a property-associate is determined by the type that it is associated with. But this objection is also quickly rejected. Dodd denies that we need to give non-circular identity conditions for a class of entities before we accept it into our ontology. For one, "our notion of property is clear enough to be usable, and, as a result, so is our notion of a type" (Dodd 2007, 41). Moreover, it seems that even material objects cannot be given non-circular identity conditions, but surely the Nominalist does not want to deny material objects a place in our ontology (Loux 1998, 56).

And so, having dispatched with these Nominalist attempts to show that types are problematic entities to posit and given the fact that it seems at least some of our reference and quantification to types will not yield to paraphrase, Dodd thinks it is safe to accept that types are genuine entities. We have not come
across a good reason to suppose that types are "unsustainable," and therefore we should accept that they exist and move on to do the metaphysical work of finding out how they operate.

But I say not so fast. If those Nominalist objections were convincing, then we would definitely have reason to avoid positing types if at all possible. I do not want to defend either of those objections here. Instead, I want to argue that the fact that an unproblematic entity has been proposed is not enough reason to adopt it. The fact that Dodd does not run into contradictions or other major problems in working out a theory of types does not mean there is sufficient reason to accept the ontological commitments of our ordinary utterances. To appeal to the fact that we can unproblematically uphold our common sense intuitions is to set the bar too low. Instead, we have other theoretical virtues; and the relevant virtue here is parsimony. We should be positing no unnecessary entities. We should only be willing to posit additional entities as a last resort, when it has been shown that we cannot give an adequate explanation of the phenomenon in question without positing additional entities. So in this case, unless we cannot give an adequate explanation of types without reifying types, then we should not accept them into our ontology. Thus Dodd is incorrect to suggest that we do not have a reason to search for paraphrases of all our sentences that seem to refer to or quantify over types. We do have a reason. We have a reason because it should be our default position to eliminate unnecessary elements from our ontology. If a Nominalist can find problems with the entities being posited, then we have a reason to find paraphrases. But equally we have a reason to find paraphrases even if the entities are part of a "well-formed ontological category" (Dodd 2007, 42), by which I take him to mean, a well-
understood ontological category. For example, one might admit that sets are a well-formed ontological category even if one denies the existence of sets.

So, I think there is reason to motivate the search for paraphrases in all cases. Our default position should be to aim for a theory that does without type-entities. If we could find adequate paraphrases for all of our ordinary language sentences that refer to or quantify over types, then we would be justified in accepting the paraphrased sentences as displaying the true ontological commitment. Although it is not my main project, it is worth noting that I am more optimistic about finding paraphrases for all sentences than Dodd is. The fact that paraphrases are "piecemeal" (Dodd 2007, 39) is not, I think, very troubling. It seems that much of the piecemeal quality of the paraphrases can be traced to the pragmatic nature of language. That is, sentences that refer to types may require different paraphrases not because of any syntactic difference but because of the semantic factors that are contextually determined. Secondly, some of the sentences Dodd thinks make "irreducible" reference to types are not convincing examples. For example, "The Daffodil is the national flower of Wales" appears to refer irreducibly to a type (Dodd 2007, 39). The reason is that this sentence does not express that "all, most, or even properly formed Daffodils are the national flower of Wales" (Dodd 2007, 39). But this ignores the fact that The National Flower of Wales is also a type; so in a fully paraphrased sentence, this also needs to be paraphrased. This makes the project more likely to succeed because it is more plausible to claim that the sentence above expresses something like, "daffodils or the image of daffodils stands for or represents Wales in certain contexts." This expresses the fact that individual daffodils can play the role of The National Flower of Wales when we realize that ‘The National Flower’ is to be
paraphrased away. This is obviously a very rough first approximation, but it should make the point that the inability to paraphrase ‘The Daffodil’ in the above sentence might result from leaving ‘The National Flower of Wales’ unparaphrased, the inability to find a paraphrase stemming from the fact that the sentence in question is an identity claim between two types. Clearly then, paraphrasing away reference to one type will cause problems because it results in trying to identify tokens with a type. But the identity needs to be made between two things operating at the same level of analysis. Paraphrase away reference to The National Flower of Wales and your project seems more likely to succeed because it will identify tokens with tokens.

However, as I said, I do not wish to pursue the project of paraphrasing any further here. Instead, the project I do want to embark on is a truthmaking project. The reason is that the search for paraphrases seems to be a squabble more about language than metaphysics. I want to avoid the debate over paraphrasing entirely.

3.2.3 TRUTHMAKING
We can avoid this debate by looking to truthmaking. The truthmaker theorist whose views I am most drawn to is Ross Cameron. The following discussion draws liberally on Cameron’s work, especially his paper “Quantification, Naturalness and Ontology” (Cameron 2010). The discussion will proceed in two parts. The first will be a general introduction and discussion of the relevant portions of truthmaking theory with an explanation of how the reference and quantification over types in our ordinary language need not be ontologically committal.
Recall that according to Dodd, part of the reason why we should accept types is that our ordinary sentences refer to and quantify over types. The argument is that a sentence like "Beethoven composed many symphonies" seems to require that symphonies exist for it to be true. And surely this sentence is true. We thus have reason to believe that types exist. Now if there are some true sentences that resist paraphrasing and therefore seem to "irreducibly" refer to or quantify over types, then we have even greater reason to accept types as genuine entities. The choice offered to us by Dodd seems to be this: if you accept that these sentences are true, then you have to accept that types exist because types must exist to make them true, or you can deny that types exist (as per Nominalism) but realize that if you do you must likewise deny the truth of these sentences. Presumably the second option is bad because Beethoven did compose many symphonies. But given that, as argued above, Nominalism is always well motivated, it would be highly desirable to do without commitment to types.

Enter truthmaking. The truthmaker theorist argues that the choice offered by Dodd is a false dichotomy. Surely "Beethoven composed many symphonies" is a true sentence, just as "The Daffodil is the National Flower of Wales" is a true sentence. But the truth of these sentences, even if they cannot be paraphrased, does not require types to exist. Insisting that for these sentences to be true, types must exist is to invite the pejorative charge that "this is to read ontology off of language" (Cameron 2010, 8). It is to decide, "a serious ontological question...by considering what claims of English we consider inviolable" (Cameron 2010, 10).

Take for example, the classic problem of the statue and the clay (Cameron 2010, 9). I am a sculptor and I take this lump of clay and fashion it into a statue. The question now is, "what is the statue?" It would appear that the statue is not
just the lump of clay because the clay existed before I made it into a statue but
the statue did not. The statue also has different dispositional properties. If I
squash the statue, I destroy it but I do not thereby destroy the clay. Cameron
argues that to think there is a deep ontological puzzle here is to:

[confuse] features of our representation of the world with features of the
world that is thereby represented. What is a datum - a Moorean truth - in
this case is that it is true now to say that both Statue and Clay exist,
whereas it was the case that Clay but not Statue existed. But to conclude
from this that there has been some change in being...is to read off features
of the world from features of our representations of the world in an
objectionable way. (Cameron 2010, 10)

The relevant consideration is not what our true sentences refer to or quantify
over but what the world must be like to make our true sentences true. And in
this case, the world need not contain both a statue and some clay for both "there
is a statue" and "there is some clay" to be true simultaneously. There only need be
a collection of simples that are arranged as a blob for a while and then the same
simples arranged as a statue for a while (Cameron 2008, 298-9). By simples I
mean objects without proper parts. In this case, they are likely to be the smallest
objects posited by science. These simples are sufficient to ground the truth of
these sentences, and thus we only need commit ourselves to these simples to
maintain the truth of sentences that are clearly true.

Why should this be the case? After all, saying that "Beethoven composed
many symphonies" seems to be straightforwardly to assert the existence of
symphonies. Cameron’s response is this:

My claim is simply that in English, 'exists' works such that not everything
that exists has being (is an element of ontology). The view to be offered is
that 'X exists' can express a truth not because there is some element of our
ontology X (not because X really exists) but because there’s some element
of our ontology Y (because Y really exists), and we just happen to use our
language in such a way that 'X exists' expresses a truth when Y really
exists. (Cameron 2010, 11)
The point is that our language functions in such a way that, when we say, "there is a statue" and "there is some clay", both can be true even if statues and clay are not part of our ontology, but simples are part of our ontology and these are arranged in the appropriate ways. We can give up our commitment to statues and clay if we want to, but, crucially, we are not therefore forced to give up the literal truth of the sentences about statues and clay.

Of course to say that we can give up the commitment to the entities that our sentences refer to or quantify over does not mean that we have to give up the commitment. It is not, at this point to say that types do not exist. What it does mean is that Dodd’s argument that we seem to be committed to types does not hold up. That we regularly refer to and quantify over types and even that some of these sentences may not be paraphrased does not automatically commit us to anything. Reference, quantification and the project of paraphrase are all beside the point. What does matter is which sentences are true and how the world must be to make these sentences true.

Where do we stand then, at the end of this chapter? First, I have argued that Dodd’s types fail to explain the central phenomenon they are posited to explain: repeatability. Instead of types binding tokens together, Dodd has made it the case that properties bind tokens together. Second, our enquiry into the metaphysics of types should not begin with the presumption that types are genuine entities. It should no doubt begin with the presumption that our sentences about types are true, but ontological commitment does not follow from the truth of these sentences. Given then that I have also suggested Nominalism should be our goal, we should be highly skeptical of Dodd’s type-entities and we
should thus be unconvinced that they provide an answer to the categorial question. The question, “what is a musical work?” remains unanswered. The project of the final chapter is to offer an answer to this question.
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION

In the previous chapter I argued that Dodd has not sufficiently motivated belief in type-entities and thus has failed to motivate his preferred answer to the categorial question. In this chapter I advance an alternative answer to the categorial question. In short, the argument of the final chapter is this: I have already argued that, contrary to Dodd’s convictions, we have an ongoing motivation to accept Nominalist accounts in metaphysics unless a Nominalist account is unavailable. Fortunately, I think that a Nominalist account of musical works is available. To begin with, by giving a truthmaking argument similar to the one given in the previous chapter, I will show that musical works need not be members of our ontology for our sentences about musical works to be true. But if works of music do not exist, then what is in our ontology? The answer is that performances are in our ontology. Many of these performances are sufficiently similar sounding to ground the truth of our sentences about musical works. The reason for this is that, just as “exist” in English does not carve the world at its joints, so too “musical works” does not carve nature at its joints. If I am right about this, then we can extend the account to all type terms, vindicating Dodd’s conviction that musical works are types while denying them a spot in our ontology.

4.1 TRUTHMAKING AND MUSICAL WORKS
What kind of thing is a musical work? That is the question that has motivated this entire essay, and it may seem that we are further from answering the
question than when we started. At least when we started, we had some candidate entities; but now it seems we have none. If so, let us truly start from the beginning and ask, what makes us think there are musical works in the first place? The response, and we have already seen this from Dodd, is that we make true statements about musical works all the time. We talk of composers composing musical works, we talk about the various aesthetic qualities of musical works, and we talk about experiencing and listening to performances of musical works. It is clear that we say a lot of things about musical works. In short, as Dodd makes clear, we make reference to and quantify over musical works regularly (Dodd 2007, 9). And, to borrow a phrase from Quine, it is clear that our ordinary discourse is "up to its neck" in ontological commitments to musical works. The point is, at first glance, musical works exist; the truth of our sentences depends on their existence.

Well as we saw in the previous chapter, first glances can be misleading. In that chapter, we saw that the Quinean commitment leads us astray. Sentences might be made true by entities other than the ones that the sentences are about. Surely our sentences about musical works are true, but to conclude from this that there are musical works in our ontology is to move too quickly. It would be to commit the same mistake that I mentioned earlier in relation to the case of the statue and the clay. The fact that this lump of clay has been shaped a certain way, making the sentences "here is a lump of clay," and "here is a statue" both true, does not entail that there is now an additional entity, namely, a statue, in our ontology. It only entails something about our representation of the world. Both sentences can be (and certainly are) made true by a collection of simples arranged in the appropriate ways. The solution I am proposing in the case of
musical works is essentially this solution. When we say, "Beethoven's Fifth is extraordinary," we say something true, but the truth of this sentence does not depend on our ontology having as one of its members Beethoven's Fifth.

But if musical works do not exist, what does exist, and how is it that our true sentences about musical works are true in the absence of musical works? Before answering this let me make it completely clear what my position is by borrowing Cameron's distinction between what exists and what really exists (Cameron 2010, 11). The quantifier “really exists” carves nature at its joints by being the most natural meaning of our existence claims (Cameron 2010, 15). That is, if we make a claim about what really exists, we are making a claim about the actual quantificational or extensional structure of the world. But our analog quantifier in English, "exists" does not carve nature at its joints. It has, "one of the unnatural meanings" (Cameron 2010, 15), where the unnatural meanings are simply the various possible meanings of "exists" that do not carve nature at its joints. The unnatural meaning of “exists” in English is so much more useful, as it turns out, than the natural meaning attached to "really exists," which is why it has this meaning in English; its usefulness far outweighs its unnaturalness. When I say, then, that musical works are not genuine members of our ontology, what I am saying is that musical works do not really exist. If we carve nature at its joints, we will not get any musical works. But the common sense claim that "musical works exist" is unaffected by this realization as are all the other true statements we make about musical works.

This brings us back to the question just asked, though now we can state it more precisely. If musical works do not really exist, what does really exist? And
how is the stuff that really exists sufficient for grounding the truth of our everyday statements about musical works?

4.2 WHAT REALLY EXISTS
Much of the effort that goes into metaphysical enquiry is focused on the categorial question about musical works. What kind of thing is a musical work? It is often noted in passing, as a way to set up this really interesting question, that performances are concrete entities, the implication being that there is not much of a metaphysical mystery here. For my purposes, simply taking on this claim before getting into the thick of the debate might be fine. Admitting that performances are concrete entities would be in line with my Nominalist aims. But given what has just been said about the way "exist" operates in English, we should be curious to know if performances really exist. I do not mean to cast doubt on the truth of English sentences that assert the existence of performances. It would surely be wrong if my friend were telling me about a performance of Beethoven's Fifth that he had just attended for me to reply that the performance did not in fact exist. But it is not obviously wrong to deny that performances really exist. After all, performances are clearly not monolithic entities, but rather are made up of many smaller bits. They are the product of at least one, but often more than one person playing sequences of notes. It is the whole of these sequences that make up performances, in the same way that a collection of simples arranged table-wise make up a table. But if we carve nature at its joints, we will find no tables or performances, only simples or other concrete entities. Nonetheless it is true that I listened to a performance of Beethoven's Fifth last week and that I am sitting at a desk as I write this.
My immediate aim, then, in order to give the widest view possible, is to describe a metaphysical account of musical works. But it is not just an aim at full disclosure that motivates me here. The central aim in this project is to provide an answer to the categorial question. What I say here is crucial to answering this question. I am providing the pieces so to speak, out of which I will build the final conclusion. I cannot offer much here by way of argument for these commitments, though I do think they are plausible. In any case, I will simply have to take them for granted here. Finally, here they are: 1) all that really exists are concrete simples and 2) an object x has a property F just in case x resembles all the other objects F-like objects to at least the same degree that the objects resemble each other (Armstrong 1989, 47). I will explain each of these in turn.

The first commitment I want to take on is that if we carve the world at its joints, we will be carving the world into concrete simples. Only these concrete simples really exist. What exactly these fundamental simples are is a scientific question. It is up to science, particularly physics, to tell us where the natural joints in the world are. It is also up to science to tell us how these things clump together into the objects we bump into every day, tables and chairs and breadboxes. But it is up to the metaphysician to determine that collections of these simples, however they collect, make true our sentences about tables and chairs and breadboxes. And in regards to musical performances, it is up to the metaphysician to determine how collections of simples make true our sentences about musical works and to say that musical works exist but that they do not really exist⁹.

⁹ If the reader finds this commitment to simples to suggest an unpalatable reductionism, then she is free to replace it with her preferred metaphysical explanation of musical performances.
The second commitment is resemblance Nominalism. It is far too big of a project to argue for resemblance Nominalism here. I will simply have to state that I endorse it and describe the relevant features of the view. The central notion behind resemblance Nominalism is the idea that properties are resemblances between particulars. So, two particulars share a property just in case they resemble all the other things within a certain resemblance class. For example, my pen is red because it resembles this tomato and this fire hydrant and this stop sign to the same or greater degree than these things resemble each other (Armstrong 1989, 47). Resemblance itself is simply a relation between entities and it is basic i.e. that the resemblance relation holds between certain entities is a brute fact. It is important to state that this is not circular because the resemblances between particulars are not explained by particulars instantiating the properties. Rather the notion of a property is a consequence of the resemblances holding between particulars. As Rodriguez-Pereyra states it, “what makes red entities red is that they resemble each other, what makes yellow entities yellow is that they resemble each other, and so on (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, 4).

The advantage of resemblance Nominalism is that it analyzes the notion of a property in terms only of concrete particulars and the resemblances between them. Importantly this means there is no need to posit property-entities in addition to the concrete particulars we have already accepted. No need for properties in the Platonist sense. No need for properties in the Aristotelian sense. Clearly if the aim is to give a fully Nominalist account, eliminating the need for

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Provided that her explanation has it that musical performances are concrete particulars, the final conclusion, that a musical works are types though types are not entities, will go through.  

10 See also (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002)
these kinds of abstract entities is necessary. But more than that, we get to take on
talk of properties even as we eschew any objectionable ontological commitment
to properties. This is a virtue because the language of properties is highly useful.
Reassured that we can (at least for this thesis) accept talk of properties without
breaking with the Nominalist project, let me pause to provide some examples.\textsuperscript{11}

So what is a performance given these commitments? Musical
performances exist, that is for sure. But they do not really exist. There are simples
that interact causally to produce audible sounds. It is up to science to tell us the
mechanisms by which this takes place, but I will take it that such an explanation
can be given. Suppose then that some simples are arranged to produce a sound,
say middle C. This property, call it, \textit{middle-C-ness}, is had by objects in virtue of
resembling all the other middle C objects. Take, then, enough of these objects,
with various sound properties and you produce a performance. Or rather, at
bottom, the microphysical facts make it true that this performance has the sound
properties that it has. So, satisfied that performances exist because of the
microphysical simples arranged performances-wise, we can adopt talk of
performances as concrete entities with the realization that they are strictly
speaking, not genuine entities, but rather, admit of the same type of ontological
explanation that concrete entities like tables and chairs and statues and lumps of
clay do. This should not be highly contentious because no one wishes to deny

\textsuperscript{11} It may be dissatisfying to the reader, especially the reader who does not share my deep
suspicion of abstract objects, that I am taking on resemblance Nominalism so quickly here. She
might suspect that I am waving my hands a bit too vigorously. To this reader I will admit the
following concession. My final aim is to argue that \textit{musical works} are not genuine members of our
ontology. My argument for this relies on talk of properties, but it would equally go through with
ontological commitment to properties, Platonist or otherwise. That is, even if we accept a
Platonist theory of properties, my conclusion is that musical works do not really exist. After all,
accepting some kinds of abstract entities does not entail that we should accept any abstract
entities that we choose. Thus the Platonist can accept my argument against musical works while
maintaining a commitment to Platonist properties, the only difference in the end being that her
world contains properties \textit{qua} abstract entities and my world does not.
that performances are concrete entities. And any disagreement about how to explain the reduction of a performance to its parts will be minor compared to our central question, over which there has been considerable disagreement, namely, what kind of thing is a musical work? And in any case as long as performances are taken as concrete, the details of the explanation will not affect the conclusion about works of music.

There is one more building block that I would like to introduce before proceeding to give an account of musical works. I would like to introduce the notion of a musical-work-property. A musical-work-property is the property a performance has in virtue of resembling the paradigmatic or exemplary (not necessarily the first) performances of work x. Last night I listened to Beethoven's Fifth. The recording that I listened to instantiated the property being-a-performance-of-Beethoven’s-Fifth because it resembled the paradigmatic performances of Beethoven's Fifth to a sufficient degree. Saying that it resembles the paradigmatic performances of Beethoven's Fifth to a sufficient degree is important because it makes clear the fact that there can be enormous variation in the way performances of Beethoven's Fifth sound and still count as performances of Beethoven's Fifth. And saying that a performance must resemble paradigmatic performances to a sufficient degree is important because it allows for the fact that performances might contain mistakes. Nonetheless a performance with many mistakes, as long as it resembles the paradigmatic performances sufficiently, instantiates the property being-a-performance-of-x.

It is important to recognize just what the claim being made is here, because this is the crucial step in the argument. There are many performances, and many of them sound very closely similar and are performed from the same
score, etc. Because of the resemblances between performances, there is utility in carving nature at joints other than its natural joints. There is utility in recognizing these performances as all being instances of the same thing. I am not suggesting that we make a conscious decision to recognize these resembling things as all being instances of the same. It may just be that we are the kinds of creatures that divide the world up this way. But that does not mean that we do not divide the world up this way because it is useful. It is also worth pointing out that when it comes to musical works, recognizing performances as instances of a certain musical work may indeed be a conscious decision.

In regards to this last point, it is worth recognizing that our musical practices could be very different. It is by no means necessary that we consider composers to compose musical works. Our practices could be such that the work of music created by a composer is the initial performance of a work. Any subsequent performances that sound the same might instead be considered copies of the original. This practice would then match our current practice in painting for instance. Only the original painting is considered the actual work of art and any subsequent copies are just that, copies. But it would also be open to us to revise our practices in this domain to reflect those in music. We could consider any painting and copy of the painting to merely be an instance of a certain painting. The original piece created by the artist would have no more of a claim to be the painting than any of the copies, because all of them would be manifestations of the painting. In fact, our musical practices have changed, so this is not just some philosopher’s thought experiment. Lydia Goehr argues that the idea that it is the business of composers to create items, musical works, only arrived in the 1800s (Goehr 1992, 206). But there is utility in viewing the world as
containing musical works, so it is a practice that continues. What is the utility of speaking of musical works this way but not of paintings and sculpture this way? It is simply that paintings and sculptures are objects and as such persist through time. People can continue to see the thing created by the artist for many years, often centuries. But music does not allow for this. A musical performance is played and then it is gone forever, never to be heard again. The only way people can enjoy the beauty of say, Beethoven's Fifth, is to listen to a different performance that is quantitatively similar enough to the ideal of Beethoven's instructions. So it is in this fleeting quality of music that we find utility in carving the world up differently than we do in say, sculpture. Finally, it is interesting to note that recording abilities now allow us to preserve original copies of musical works, and in these instances we straddle the fence of the two artistic practices. We talk of songs in popular music, but if we hear a song performed by someone other than the artist who wrote and performed the first recording of it, we recognize it as a cover or copy of the original. We regularly point out that covers are not the originals, as if to suggest that there is something special about the original recording that is analogous to an original painting or sculpture.

Let us then take stock of where we have come. There are true sentences of English that assert the existence of certain entities. And although these sentences may be true, they do not necessarily cut nature at its joints. A distinction of Cameron's has thus been introduced. If we wish to carve nature at its joints, we must use the qualification really exists. Sentences quantified over by “really exists” come out true only if the entities quantified over are genuine members of our ontology. I claim that it is only the concrete simples discovered by science that really exist. Moreover, properties are resemblances between particulars.
From these pieces, sentences about musical performances are made true. That is, performances are concreta in the same way tables are concreta. Tables and performances exist but they do not really exist. Finally, performances instantiate musical-work-properties, being-a-performance-of-x. They instantiate these properties in virtue of resembling the paradigmatic cases of a given work. What is left then, is to show that all of the relevant phenomena that need to be explained about musical works can be explained.

4.3 REPEATABILITY
So what about the facts that Dodd says must be explained? Foremost is the fact that musical works are repeatable. It is their repeatability that really makes it difficult to say just what kind of thing a musical work is and leads to an enquiry into musical works in the first place. Paintings and sculptures are clearly concrete objects; we can point to them and pick them up and say definitively, it is this thing here that is the work of art. Musical works are repeatable and so they resist this explanation. Any metaphysical account of musical works needs to explain this fact above all else. So what shall we say about it here?

Of course, by now it has been made clear that to say musical works are repeatable entities is not a given but rather a commitment that is generated by a Quinean criterion of ontological commitment, applied to ordinary language. Thus it does not characterize the starting point of enquiry, but a fact to be explained only after other commitments have been taken on board. The true starting point of enquiry is with our true sentences of English and the repeatability suggested by them. Therefore, the actual fact that needs to be explained is not, "how can an entity be repeatable?" but, "how do we account for
the truth of our sentences that are ostensibly about repeatable entities?" Of course, one way these sentences could be true is if truly repeatable entities exist. But that is not the only way, nor is it the best way.

Why then, does it seem that musical works are repeatable entities? Clearly, as Dodd says, "a symphony can be played or performed over and over again, and, crucially, such performances are not mere copies of it, but occurrences of it: items that make the works manifest" (Dodd 2007, 10). This requires that, "the performance I heard last night was Beethoven's Fifth," and "the performance you heard last week was Beethoven's Fifth" can both be true. Indeed it requires that we can say truthfully of all performances of Beethoven's Fifth that they are performances of Beethoven's Fifth. And it requires the truth of other sentences that explicitly involve repetition. For example, my music teacher might tell me to "practice the first violin part to Beethoven's Fifth at least ten times this week" or I may say that "I have been listening to Beethoven's Fifth on repeat since this morning." But the truth of these sentences need not require the existence of some repeatable entity. Instead, they only require that concrete performances (or recordings) that sound qualitatively similar enough to the paradigmatic cases exist. That is, they only require that concrete performances that instantiate the property being-of-Beethoven's-Fifth exist. If we look at our list of what exists, we will find musical performances and recordings (remember that strictly speaking these will reduce to simples) but not musical works. Nonetheless, our sentences about musical works will be true. They will be true because just as "exists" does not carve the world at its joints, neither does “musical works”. Cameron's point is that "exists" in ordinary English is not used to carve nature at its joints because it is significantly more useful to use “exists” to carve nature in some other way.
(Cameron 2010, 16). Thinking that the quantificational structure of English must be the most natural, that is, actually carve nature at its joints is what leads us to confuse "features of the world [with] features of our representations of the world" (Cameron 2010, 10). Taking the truth of our sentences about musical works to tell us something about an entity in the world is to commit just this sin. Our sentences about musical works represent the world in a certain way, namely, as being chunked up into musical works that can be repeated time and time again. But they represent the world this way, not because that is the way the world really is but because it is useful to describe the world this way.

Another way to articulate the idea that 'exists' in English carves at places other than the joints of the world can be borrowed from a point made by Dodd. For Dodd, musical works, because they are types, act to bind together performances. It is because types bind together their tokens, that this performance here is a performance of Beethoven's Fifth and this performance over here is also a performance of Beethoven's Fifth. Well I am suggesting that this is essentially correct but that there is no deep ontological binding going on. Rather, performances are bound together by the resemblances between them. Musical works do serve to bind performances together because the truth of sentences about them depends on the instantiation of work-properties and work-properties depend on resemblances. To say that musical works bind together performances is just to say that musical works cut nature in places other than at its joints.

The repeatability of musical works thus can be explained without positing musical work-entities. Sentences that refer to or quantify over musical works are made true by the existence of concrete performances. We say something true
when you and I both say that we attended different performances of Beethoven's *Fifth*. But crucially, those statements are both made true by really existing entities that are similar enough to each other that we consider them the same.

4.4 AUDIBILITY

Other than repeatability, what does a metaphysical account of musical works need to explain? After repeatability, Dodd argues that the audibility of musical works is in need of explanation. For when one listens to a performance, one is not just listening to the performance, one is also listening to a musical work (Dodd 2007, 11). This seems on the face of it, puzzling. How can we be listening to one thing, Beethoven's *Fifth*, by listening to something else, a performance?

But I submit that this is a phenomenon that is even less puzzling than repeatability. Listening to a performance of Beethoven’s *Fifth*, just is to listen to Beethoven’s *Fifth*. That is, listening to Beethoven's *Fifth* just requires that one listen to something that sounds like Beethoven’s *Fifth*. What is it for something to sound like Beethoven’s *Fifth*? Initially it will be to sound the way Beethoven intended a performance of Beethoven’s *Fifth* to sound. He wrote instructions to follow and if those instructions are carried out correctly, it will produce something that sounds like Beethoven’s *Fifth*. Perhaps Beethoven will even have said, “yes, this is how it should sound.” At this point we have a paradigmatic instance which other performances can resemble. And, eventually, after many performances have been performed, there will be a class of things that resemble each other to a sufficient degree. Any performance that then resembles the paradigmatic instances in this class will sound like Beethoven’s *Fifth*. 
We can of course translate this into our truthmaking argument as well. Our sentences about listening to musical works will come out true in the appropriate cases. If you say you heard Beethoven’s *Fifth* you will say something literally true (assuming you are not lying) because listening to Beethoven’s *Fifth* is just to listen to something that sounds\(^\text{12}\) like the paradigmatic performances. And crucially no concern ever arises about how we can possible perceive performances as they are concrete entities.

### 4.5 Creatability

It is also apparently a fact to be explained that musical works are created. One of the most notable statements of the creatability intuition comes from Levinson (Levinson 1980, 8):

> The main reason for holding to it [that composers create their works] is that it is one of the most firmly entrenched of our beliefs concerning art. There is probably no idea more central to thought about art than that it is an activity in which participants create things - these things being artworks. The whole tradition of art assumes art is creative in the strict sense, that it is a godlike activity in which the artist brings into being what did not exist beforehand - much as a demiurge forms a world out of inchoate matter. The notion that artists truly *add* to the world, in company with cake-bakers, house-builders, law-makers, and theory-constructers, is surely a deep-rooted idea that merits preservation if at all possible. The suggestion that some artists, composers in particular, instead merely *discover* or *select* for attention entities they have no hand in creating is so contrary to this basic intuition regarding artists and their works that we have a strong *prima facie* reason to reject it if we can. If it is possible to align musical works with indisputably creatable artworks such as paintings and sculptures, then it seems we should do so.

\(^\text{12}\) It may seem as if I am suggesting that all that matters for being a performance of a certain work is that the performance *sound* like other performances of that work. But this is only for ease of exposition. In fact I mean to remain agnostic about which resemblances actually matter for work individuation. For example, it may be the case that a performance, to be a performance of Beethoven’s *Fifth* must not only resemble the paradigmatic cases acoustically, but also must resemble the instrumentation of the paradigmatic cases. This would accommodate the intuitions of someone like Levinson who insists that the means of performance are integral to the individuation of musical works. I however do not think this is an ontological matter (I do not think there is a fact of the matter independent of our practices) and it is a virtue of my account that it can accommodate whichever individuation criteria one prefers.
The notion that artworks require bringing something into existence is what leads Levinson to posit indicated-types rather than pure types. Pure types are eternal existents. But, according to Levinson, indication of a type takes place at a time and thus the act of indicating a certain type brings a new entity into existence (Levinson 1980, 20)

The suggestion that Levinson refers to, that composers merely discover or select for attention certain entities is the kind of suggestion that Dodd makes. Dodd's metaphysics cannot accommodate the strict creatability that Levinson urges should be accounted for because for Dodd, musical works are types and types are eternal existents. But he suggests that this should not trouble us because what we are truly concerned about preserving is not the creatability intuition but the intuition that composers are involved in a highly creative (not in the strict sense of creation) endeavour, and in some cases are truly brilliant people. We must seek not to undermine the notion that what composers do requires a great deal of skill. Thus, he suggests composition is a process of creative discovery, whereby composers go through a process of imagining various performances until arriving at one that is satisfactory for their purposes (Dodd 2007, 112-3). This process does not result in bringing something into being. Instead, it ends in discovery of an eternally existing type.

So here are two options that have been proposed for explaining our beliefs about creatability. What can the account now being offered say about creatability? First, I should admit that I find this requirement completely unmoving. It is simply false that art requires literally bringing something into existence. The tradition of found art sees artists displaying everyday objects that
they have found. What is strictly created here? Or what about an improvised
dance? What is brought into being when someone performs some unique
movements for an audience? Moreover, it is not obvious that if creation requires
that something new is introduced into our ontology, that anything at all can be
created. On the account that I have given so far, tables and chairs could not be
created because the act of building a table does not introduce any new stuff into
the world. It simply results in the table-wise arrangement of stuff that already
exists in our ontology.

This second point is important because clearly it is true that we create
tables and chairs, but we should not suppose that we are doing anything more
than re-arranging the stuff that already exists. I think that the thing to say here is
the same as I have been urging this whole chapter. It is true that "I just created
this table," and it is true that "there is something here that was not here a few
hours ago, namely the table I just built." But these sentences are made true by the
arrangement of the concrete simples that really exist. Likewise, when we say that,
"Beethoven created the musical work, Beethoven's Fifth" and "there was
something new in the world once Beethoven composed his fifth symphony," we
speak truths. But we speak truths because before Beethoven composed
Beethoven's Fifth no one was playing anything that sounded like Beethoven's
Fifth. He contributed something new to the world in that sense. But did he really
introduce anything new into the ontology of the world? No, of course not. There
were the same simples really existing in the world before and after Beethoven
composed his fifth symphony. What changed is that after he composed his fifth
symphony, symphony orchestras started playing things that sounded like
Beethoven's Fifth. The things that really exist started being arranged such as to
produce performances that resemble the paradigmatic performances of the music that Beethoven gave us the instructions to produce in writing the score.

In the end I agree with Dodd that we must give up the notion that artists of any stripe add to the ontology of the world. But I disagree with Dodd that this also requires giving up the truth of our sentences about musical work creation and composition. Nothing can or ought to be expected to achieve the high bar set by Levinson and Dodd; that is simply not what composition or creation requires, at least not in English.

4.6 IDENTITY CONDITIONS

So far, throughout this entire essay, I have remained silent on the second half of Dodd’s project. In *Works of Music* Dodd takes his project to be answering the categorial question and secondly to be giving the correct identity conditions for musical works. It has not been necessary to delve into this issue in detail because my central aim has been a critique of Dodd’s answer to the categorial question. However, it is worth mentioning how my account deals with the identity conditions of musical works because it is a contentious issue in the metaphysics of music.

Those who offer answers about the identity conditions of musical works fall into two camps roughly: revisionists and conservatists. Dodd, for instance is a revisionist. He begins his investigation of musical works by giving priority to ontology. In establishing the ontology of musical works at the beginning of his project, he is constrained about what kind of identity conditions he can give for musical works. He argues that musical works are individuated purely in terms of how they sound because they are types of sound structures (Dodd 2007, 201).
The consequence of such a view is that if two composers compose identically sounding works, in different eras say, then they would have composed the same musical work. He is more or less forced into this conclusion by the metaphysical account that he develops beforehand (Davies 2009, 161).

Others, like David Davies, Levinson, Gregory Currie and Guy Rohrbaugh, begin the examination of musical works, not with the metaphysics but with the epistemology of musical works (Davies 2009, 161). And Kendall Walton argues that, “which work a performance is a performance of depends at least partly on some non-acoustic properties of it” (Walton 1988, 239). These philosophers constrain their metaphysical pursuits by what Davies calls the Pragmatic Constraint. Approaching the metaphysic of musical works from this direction makes our metaphysical accounts beholden to our musical practices. According to this methodology, we ought to build a metaphysical account that is consistent with all those "features of our practice that we deem acceptable on reflection" (Davies 2009, 161). Those theorists that take the epistemology of music as prior to metaphysics tend not to think that musical works are individuated purely by how they sound. They think Dodd’s approach is revisionary because current musical practice is not such that musical works can be individuated purely by how they sound. Levinson again, gives an excellent characterization of this view. He says (Levinson 1980, 10):

Composers who produce identical scores in the same notational system with the same conventions of interpretation will determine the sound structure. But the musical works they thereby compose will generally not be the same. The reason for this is that certain attributes of musical works are dependent on more than the sound structures contained. In particular, the aesthetic and artistic attributes of a piece of music are partly a function of, and must be gauged with reference to, the total musico-historical context in which the composer is situated while composing his piece. Since the musico-historical contexts of composing individuals are
invariably different, then even if their works are identical in sound structure, they will differ widely in aesthetic and artistic attributes.

Levinson is here taking practice to be primary. According to our musical practices, the attributes a work of music possesses are not just a product of how it sounds, but also of the place the work occupies in musico-historical context. The music that inspires and precedes a composition and the music that is inspired by and comes after a composition serve to affect our interpretation of a musical work and thus affects the properties of a musical work. Since Levinson takes this methodological approach, he is led to argue that even if two composers were to compose identically sounding works, because they have different properties in virtue of the context in which they are situated, by Leibniz’s law, the works must be distinct entities (Levinson 1980, 10).

The upshot of my view is that this debate is really a pseudo-problem, at least, a pseudo-metaphysical problem. It only arises if we mistakenly believe that musical works are entities in our ontology. If we start by saying they are sound types, then we are led to revising our practice by saying that musical works are distinguished purely by how they sound. If we start with practice and build our metaphysics from there, we are forced to posit odd entities like indicated sound structures to account for aspects of practice like those mentioned above. But as soon as we realize that musical works are not genuine entities, this debate becomes irrelevant for the metaphysics of music. Whether we individuate music purely by sound or in terms of sound properties and musico-historical properties or some other properties, this is a debate to be had by aestheticians, musicians, critics and just everyday people that enjoy music. But it is not a debate that is going to be settled by, or it turns out, really worth engaging in by the
metaphysician. The point is that the account I have given can accommodate whichever answer is given to this question of identity because musical works turn out to be simply ways of carving up the world. And we can, if we want to, choose to carve it in different ways. If anything, my account shows that this debate is not one about the world. Of course it does not mean that the debate over the identity conditions of musical works is not a debate worth having because there might be other reasons, like historical accuracy, convenience or utility that give us reason to identify musical works in one way rather than the other. In any case, it is a virtue of my account that it sidesteps this debate entirely.

A related conclusion is that this account should apply to all genres of music. At the very beginning of this thesis I mentioned that the accounts being considered were taken to apply to works of Western Classical Music and whether they extend to other musical traditions is an open question. Indeed it is sometimes thought that different metaphysical accounts will have to be given for different traditions. The idea that different musical traditions will entail different ontological conclusions seems to me a perplexing position to adopt and at least an undesirable one. But this account provides a single metaphysical picture, available to any musical tradition. At base, it locates the sameness of performances in relevant similarities between performances. This makes room for perhaps the most disparate sounding performances to be nonetheless performances of the same work, if for instance, we decide that in a certain musical tradition it is properties other than acoustic properties that are the most relevant for determining sameness of work. Importantly, the notion that at base all that really exists are concrete performances that ground the truth of our
sentences about musical works is one that is available to the metaphysics of all musical genres.

4.7 TYPES AND TOKENS
Likely it will not have been lost on the reader that the explanation of musical works that I have offered does not differ radically from Dodd’s explanation of types. I have borrowed Dodd’s phrase that to be a performance of Beethoven’s Fifth, a performance must instantiate the property of being-Beethoven’s-Fifth. So Dodd is right to say that being a performance of a musical work is just to instantiate the property being-an-x. This is correct. But something instantiates being-an-x just in case it resembles the paradigmatic cases of x, not if it meets the conditions laid down by some abstract entity. This abstract entity is superfluous. The conditions for being an x are determined by the conditions required to resemble the paradigmatic instances of x. But what counts as a paradigmatic instance of x is determined by composers or possibly, by the people who appreciate music. There is no need to consider that some abstract entity exists to do this job for us.

What this means is that Dodd is correct in saying that musical works are types and performances are tokens. He just committed himself to an unnecessary Platonism. His theory can be cashed out without the abstract objects he posits, and doing so yields a more parsimonious theory because it posits fewer entities. But not only does it posit fewer entities, it relies on entities in which we can have a great deal of confidence. Concrete objects are not contentious, so the account I have given relies on fewer contentious entities.
In sum, I think it is correct to say that I have given a type/token theory of musical works. It is easy to see how the account I have given can be extended to types and tokens generally and thus how it is appropriate to say that musical works are types and performances are tokens. But this is not an ontological distinction; it is a conceptual one. Though types may not be genuine members of our ontology, the conceptual distinction between types and tokens is highly useful.
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