Economic Segmentation and Politics
Author(s): Richard Apostle, Don Clairmont and Lars Osberg
Published by: University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2779962
Accessed: 18-02-2016 14:04 UTC

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Economic Segmentation and Politics

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Recent research, most of it American, has demonstrated the importance of segmentation theory for explanations of a wide array of social and economic phenomena. This paper attempts to extend this theoretical perspective by examining some of its implications for political orientations and relationships. As many segmentation proponents are aware, conventional liberal and Marxist theories have systematically underestimated the persistence of heterogeneous political structures and processes in advanced capitalist societies. Data gathered in the Maritime Provinces in Canada show that at both the establishment and the worker level there are distinctive political effects attributable to location in particular economic segments. The increasing range of segmentation theory raises important questions for our dominant paradigms.

GENERAL BACKGROUND

A considerable body of literature that explores the utility of an economic segmentation perspective for the analysis of social and economic processes in advanced capitalist systems has developed over the past 15 years. To date, segmentation theory has developed chiefly as a "middle-range" response to a set of interrelated problems (e.g., returns to human capital, job mobility) in the socioeconomic analysis of labor markets and stratification systems. It begins by postulating the existence of two or more basic segments (sectors or markets) in the economy that represent qualitatively different modes of organizing production and work activi-

1 Richard Apostle and Don Clairmont wrote this article, which is based on a survey project jointly conducted by all three authors. We thank Suzanne Berger for discussing this topic with us during the development of the project. We also thank Peter Clark and Victor Thiessen for critical readings of early drafts. An earlier version of this article was presented at the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Annual Meeting in Guelph, Ontario, in June 1984. Requests for reprints should be sent to Richard Apostle, Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada B3H 1T2.

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0002-9602/86/9104-0005$01.50

AJS Volume 91 Number 4 (January 1986): 905–31 905
ties. Indeed, these segments are characteristically depicted as work worlds, “organized around different rules, processes and institutions” (Berger and Piore 1980, p. 2). The segments are, in turn, viewed as the complex outcomes of the interaction of technology, economic constraints, and power relations. There is a significant difference of opinion about the nature of this interaction, especially about the centrality of corporate and/or union power. Piore (1979) emphasizes the role of technology and the desire for market stability, whereas Edwards (1979) stresses the capitalist or managerial interest in dividing and controlling labor, and Rubery (1978) and Freedman (1976) focus on the importance of worker resistance and the creation of “job shelters.” However, regardless of the interpretative emphasis, all agree that the resulting segments differ substantially in the process by which worker-level outcomes, such as wages, status, and mobility, are determined. Specifically, the emphasis on the importance of economic segment location as a causal agent in these processes provided one structural alternative to neoclassical (“human capital”) models of earnings determination (Apostle, Clairmont, and Osberg 1985b; Beck, Horan, and Tolbert 1978; Tolbert, Horan, and Beck 1980) and to functionalist theories of status attainment (Tolbert 1982).

Virtually all segmentation-directed research has dealt either with questions of operationalizing the basic notion of segments or with workers’ economic outcomes and the processes determining them. On the basis of what has been done to date, the value of the segmentation perspective is still uncertain. There is much debate on the range and power of these new ideas as regards both substantive and definitional/operational concerns (Beck, Horan, and Tolbert 1980; Hauser 1980; Hodson and Kaufman 1981, 1982; Horan, Tolbert, and Beck 1981; Jacobs 1983; Zucker and Rosenstein 1981). Indeed, some segmentation theorists have recently argued that the significance of segmentation processes in modern capitalist economies is historically specific and that their importance has begun to diminish in recent years (Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982). Though not unusual in sociology, it is nevertheless premature and unwise to consider as outmoded a theory that has generated interesting empirical results and that continues to pose interesting questions.

In this article we explore the segmentation ideas on relatively new terrain. Little research, save for that of Berger and Piore (1980) and Bonacich (1980), has examined the implications of segmentation for political phenomena. We will first sketch some of the major implications of segmentation theory for an understanding of political life in Western industrial societies. We will then test some of the major propositions concerning the political relationships and activities of both establishments and workers using data gathered in the Maritime Provinces in Canada.
Segmentation

SPECIFIC THEORETICAL CONCERNS

Although it is not surprising that economists, as the chief contributors to segmentation theory, have focused on markets in their research, the central emphasis of the segmentation perspective has been on differences in power and political efficacy. In early dual labor market writings, a parallel was drawn between primary and secondary labor market location and being “in” or “out” with respect to the societal mainstream. Piore (1975), for example, depicted the secondary segment as basically peopled by members of disadvantaged groups and doubted the applicability of economic segmentation to the case of white males. In perhaps the most theoretically elaborate statement of this interpretation, Gordon, Edwards, and Reich (1982) have defined the primary or central segment in terms of an institutional arrangement for capital accumulation fostered by powerful elements in business and labor and reinforced by government. Typically, the American advocates of the segmentation perspective have highlighted the poverty and disadvantage of workers outside this center of the economy. Attention has been directed to the “negative” values and societal alienation induced by work experience there (Harrison 1972) and to policy issues related to the inclusion possibilities of the central sector.

In the American literature, segmentation is seen as an accommodation between large corporations and big unions. Unions are depicted as interest groups, and the labor movement as fragmented and nonrevolutionary in character. Europeans who advance segmentation models have placed segmentation at the very center of the political struggle between capital and labor (Bruno 1979). In Europe, segmentation is not seen as something fostered by or even acquiesced in by strong elements of the working class. Instead, it is viewed as a dynamic where powerful capitalist interests, abetted by the state, try specifically to divide the working class and reduce its revolutionary potential. For the European writers (Bruno 1979; Gagliani 1981; Rubery 1978), segmentation is directed at reducing the power of strong unions in the production process instead of maintaining an accommodation with them. The main difference is that in the American version, segmentation represents the establishment of an institutional arrangement between powerful capitalists and elements of labor, whereas in the European one, it is a consequence of business efforts to avoid such arrangements. Not surprisingly, then, the Europeans have stressed the social organization of workplaces in the diverse segments and the cross-segment linkages between them. In particular, attention has been directed at the conservative political ambience of the secondary sector, where family-operated subcontracting abounds. In contrast to American researchers, Europeans have dealt more with “pre-market” values and
homogeneous thermore, objectives frameworks Marxists, and unions circumvent that segmentation has and institutional the labor acquiesced on maintenance, and more functional for capital, segmentation as an institutional arrangement may be seen as a particular kind of fragmentation that is more or less functional for capitalist society and more or less acquiesced in by capital, depending on technological, economic, and power factors. However, there is considerable ambivalence among Marxists as to the significance of segmentation, the role of labor in its creation and maintenance, and the permanency of the working-class division it has spawned. Gordon, Edwards, and Reich (1982) have argued that segmentation has become less functional for American capitalism and that other basic processes affecting capital’s use of labor (e.g., homogenization, proletarianization) have become more crucial to capital accumulation in the current phase of capitalist development. Some European Marxists, on the other hand (Gagliani 1981), suggest that segmentation is becoming more functional for their societies as corporate interests try to circumvent institutional arrangements negotiated earlier with strong unions and government.

While critical of the Marxists’ heavy emphasis on capitalist strategies and their ambivalence concerning labor’s role, proponents of eclectic frameworks of power and political efficacy (Berger and Piore 1980; Sabel 1979) argue that neither Marxists nor liberals sufficiently appreciate the heterogeneity of mature industrial societies. Berger and Piore succinctly convey the model of society presumed by this perspective: “Society is composed of groups of very unequal power, with disparate assets and objectives and with capabilities which, however considerable, can rarely be decisive when deployed alone” (Berger and Piore 1980, p. 143). Furthermore, they observe, “The nature of capitalism is not to create a homogeneous social and economic world, but rather to dominate and to
draw profit from the diversity and inequality that remains in permanence” (Berger and Piore 1980, p. 136).

Like the Marxists, the proponents of eclecticism argue that segmentation is functional for mature capitalism in the sense that the secondary segment (e.g., small capital) provides goods and services unavailable elsewhere and economic flexibility for a core sector that is dominated by large-scale capital and powerful unions. Also, by virtue of the lower pay scales and poorer working conditions typical of the secondary segment, the level of union militance and the amount of labor organization are reduced. The eclectic theorists recognize that these functions may be achieved through different structural arrangements in different capitalist societies (e.g., a traditional small-capital sector, diverse branch plants, and the like) and also that the degree of segmentation can vary according to prevalent social and economic divisions as well as market factors.

Although sociological theory kindred to this eclectic perspective can be found in pluralist, center-periphery models of influence and decision making (Dahlström 1969; Shils 1968), the neo-Weberian writings of Janowitz (1976), Kreckel (1980), and Parkin (1974, 1979) are more pertinent. They direct attention to such themes as unequal market power, intraclass interests, and corporatism. Janowitz, referring to the marketplace as a system of economic relationships based on the relative bargaining strengths of different groupings or individuals, sees the politics of an advanced society as “a reflection of its own system of inequality which is characterized by intensive occupational and economic interest-group competition” (1976, p. 75). Kreckel interprets segmentation in advanced capitalist societies as contingent on “secondary asymmetries” within capital and labor. He suggests that the degree and persistence of segmentation depend not only on the asymmetries within capital (e.g., market power, affordability) but even more heavily on those within labor that limit social power opposing such an institutional arrangement. Parkin (1974) resurrects Weberian concepts in discussing the processes of exclusion and solidarity that operate between and within classes to yield economic segmentation. He notes that “it is the contrast between productively central and productively marginal groups that underlies those analyses of the current situation in terms of a radical cleavage within the working class—between those able to effect social closure and the new ‘pauper class’ unable to exert industrial leverage” (1974, p. 12).

Despite the fact that segmentation has origins in a variety of perspectives and that it has been conceptualized as a middle-range sociological theory, there is little depth to the segmentation literature concerning its political correlates or implications at the level of firms/workplaces or workers. This shortcoming is due only partly to the fact that segmentation proponents have focused on wage determination and other economic
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dependent variables in their research. Especially among Marxist writers, a more important reason is the continued emphasis on the monopoly capital–petite bourgeoisie distinction, which does not capture the structural complexities identified in segmentation (see Cuneo 1984). Certainly some Marxist writers have pointed to segment-specific, capital-state relationships. O’Connor (1973) has discussed fiscal policy in these terms, and Poulantzas has suggested that monopoly and small capital have different relationships to the state and relatively distinct political ideologies (Poulantzas 1973, pp. 174–78). However, the emphasis has been on monopoly capital (i.e., the hegemonic bourgeoisie) and the primary asymmetry between capital and labor.

SEGMENTED POLITICAL ACTIVITY: THE EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS

The main studies of socioeconomic segmentation have carried out their investigations with different units of analysis, ranging from industries through firms to workers or occupations. Because of the constraints of existing secondary data, the most common operationalization of economic segments has been at the industry level, with analysts typically proceeding to an examination of the effects of segment location on a number of worker variables. However, given the relative strengths and weaknesses of the differing approaches, a good case can be made for beginning with the establishment or workplace in defining economic segments. The establishment represents a group of people in the same spatial location who operate under common managerial authority. It is the best unit for observing alternate managerial styles and internal labor markets (Apostle, Clairmont, and Osberg 1985a). Both areas of concern are crucial to a segmentation perspective, and both suggest that similar jobs or occupations, when situated in separate economic segments, can have very different consequences for workers. In other words, the establishment captures a social reality generated by common managerial orientations to marketing and employment problems—a reality that frequently results in wage increases, training programs, promotion opportunities, and benefit packages that employees share across the board.

An additional advantage of focusing on the workplace is that it permits us to be more sensitive to the persistence of segmentation in the North American economy. Since Berger is correct that the old middle classes, or small, independent businesses, are a less important component of the social order, we must, if the segmentation perspective is applicable, be able to specify the functional alternatives that have evolved to meet the needs for a traditional economic sector. The early dual labor market literature tended to identify racial minorities, particularly blacks, as the
groups that filled this role, and more recent work has also suggested the possibility that women generally constitute a “marginal” work force. However, others have argued that racial minorities are not sufficiently numerous to meet the overall demand in the system for secondary labor and that the position of women in the occupational order is only partially explicable in segmentation terms. Thus, the system takes advantage of the presence of racial minorities and women in the economy, but there are some more general processes at work that involve a broader spectrum of the work force. Given the increasing integration of the economy at the level of the firm, or the growth of multi-establishment economic units, it is the workplace that best captures the continuing diversities of our economies. Of course, for some considerations, possibly including political correlates, the firm may be a more appropriate level of analysis. This suggests the need to consider not only the segment location of the workplace but also its degree of embeddedness in larger organizational structures.

Proponents of the segmentation perspective typically have emphasized the greater political power, or “clout with government,” of the industries and firms in the central or primary sector. Averitt (1968) and Galbraith (1967) have discussed the close bureaucratic ties between core firms and the government, whereas dual labor market researchers have differentiated between core and periphery firms in terms of the relevance of specific government policies and agencies. For example, periphery firms especially relate to policies and agencies that deal with manpower recruitment and training, whereas core firms are particularly concerned with governmental sales and fiscal activity. Following Averitt’s work (1968, p. 177), most segmentation theorists posit bureaucratic compatibility and reciprocal policy aid. Employment and output concerns of government policy are facilitated by core firms but may be hindered in industries where there is periphery dominance.

Given a socioeconomic framework in which the establishment is the focus of attention, what expectations might one have about the relations between government and the economy? In terms of specific hypotheses, the close association between central economic location and corporate structures means that establishments in the primary sector or sectors (“central work-world establishments”) will have close, positive ties to government and that they will communicate frequently through interest groups and meetings with government officials as well as through political parties. In contrast, establishments in the secondary sector or sectors (“marginal work-world establishments”) that have less control over their environment will be less likely to utilize trade associations or informal

2 Bridges (1980) is particularly persuasive on this latter point.
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bureaucratic channels to communicate with government and will have less influence in the formulation of relevant government policies. Thus, one would anticipate that establishments at the core of the economy will be more likely to have various sorts of connections to government, either directly or through trade associations, that they will have greater influence with government, and that they will be more likely to benefit from the general range of business-oriented programs. We would expect establishments on the periphery to be more concerned with government policies on minimum wages, unemployment insurance, and welfare and to try to shape these policies through reliance on formal political channels, particularly local ones.

These structural conditions probably also have effects at the level of the individual worker. However, few specific hypotheses concerning political values, attitudes, and behaviors among workers in different segments have emerged from the segmentation literature. Parkin (1974, 1979) has suggested that standards of distributive justice (e.g., support for more egalitarian policies) would vary by segment. Gordon, Edwards, and Reich (1982) hypothesize lower participation in established political institutions (e.g., lower voter participation) among those outside the primary or central segment. Typically, it is presumed that perceptions of vulnerability (e.g., being without articulate spokesmen to advance one's interests) and feelings of alienation as well as political identification and participation may vary by segment. Little evidence has been marshaled to substantiate these hypotheses or presumptions.

A key issue concerning political variation is whether differences are to be attributed to segment-specific work experience or to factors preexisting and "independent" of it. Many dual labor market proponents, especially those in the Marxist tradition (Gordon 1972), have emphasized that work experience shapes attitudes and behavior. The argument here is as follows: the work environments of the periphery or marginal segments are characterized by more capricious and direct authority relations, the absence of opportunities for advancement, job instability, and low wages. This complex of factors neither provides the structural supports usually associated with conventional political involvement nor encourages the development of positive attitudes toward existing political institutions. Thus, basic work conditions associated with involvement in the marginal sectors lead us to anticipate that individuals located in such sectors will be less interested in politics, less efficacious, more cynical about their political representatives, and less politically active. We also anticipate that segment locations will have some effects at the ideological level, with workers in the relatively disadvantaged marginal segments being likely to perceive governmental favoritism toward "big interests" or the powerful and to support increased economic equality at a personal level.
Segmentation

Sabel (1979), Berger and Piore (1980), and others who emphasize the heterogeneity of modern societies suggest cleavages in political orientations and ties that facilitate the institutional arrangement of segmentation rather than being its by-product. They indicate that many workers outside the primary segment have a different orientation to work (e.g., "peasants") and that it is this orientation rather than work experience that accounts for their political motivation and style. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that at least some significant part of the nonprimary segment shares the "mainstream" outlook; indeed, Berger, though a strong advocate of the heterogeneity position, notes that "there is considerable evidence that when better paying, more stable jobs are available, workers in the traditional sector take them" (Berger and Piore 1980, p. 106). The arguments of Sabel and Berger suggest the desirability of controlling for commitment to industrial work (i.e., the "peasant" effect generalized to include age and sex factors).

THE DATA SET

The data on which this paper is based are drawn from a large panel study of workers and workplaces throughout the Maritime Provinces in Canada (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island). We followed a two-step procedure of sampling establishments and sampling the workers who were employed at them. We drew a stratified random sample of 697 establishments from the three Maritime Provinces and obtained 476 complete mail-back and personal interviews (a 68.2% completed rate) with owners and/or managers of these establishments during 1979. At the same time, we telephoned a sample of 2,069 workers drawn from lists

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3 As we explain in the methodology report (Apostle, Clairmont, and Osberg 1980), our basic notion of an "establishment" is that "of a group of people at a single workplace under common management authority." In economic terms, one can see this as the "point of production"; in sociological terms, it is the work setting for individuals. In practice, this notion had to be amended somewhat, in a few instances, to allow for meaningful analysis of employers with a "diffuse" workplace (e.g., a firm providing security guards) and of a couple of larger firms whose work force was highly integrated but housed on different floors of the same building or in different buildings.

4 Our stratifying dimensions were broad industrial categories and number of employees.

5 The general mandate for the research program has been to study the socioeconomic structure of these provinces. As indicated in the methodology report, we do not believe that this focus limits the generalizability of our findings.

6 Of the 476 interviews, 269 were done as personal interviews. We began the establishment survey with predominantly mail-back procedures and switched to personal interviews when it became clear that our completion rate was not going to be adequate. See Apostle, Clairmont, and Osberg (1980, pp. 14–15) for a discussion of this shift.
of employees provided by a representative subsample of 118 establishments for information regarding their employment history, work conditions, and family and household activities. We completed 1,513 interviews, for a 73.1% completion rate. Overall, the approximately 70% completion rate for both establishment and workers was considered quite satisfactory. No obvious bias was associated with the actual selection of workers. In the case of establishments, a slight selection bias was created by our greater success with getting universities to cooperate than with other establishments of comparable size among the service industries.

The establishment-level variables that we chose to include in our initial study were selected primarily to represent major conceptual areas that had been emphasized in the existing literature (Averitt 1968; Beck, Horan, and Tolbert 1978; Hodson 1978; Oster 1979) and that we felt were specifically applicable to the establishment as a unit of analysis. The basic dimensions that we attempted to measure were size, technology and job structuring, unionization, market control, industry demand characteristics, and labor force outcomes. The particular variables utilized, as well as our success in using them to characterize establishment structures, are discussed in detail in the next section.

In 1981, we reinterviewed the establishments and workers that completed the 1979 surveys (mail backs from the establishments and telephone interviews with the workers). The completion rate was 76.5% for establishments and 78.9% for workers. In neither instance were there any indications of bias in the completed interviews. All our political data, save for worker questions on political efficacy and political activity, were gathered in the 1981 follow-up surveys. Owing to resource limitations, we asked only one-half of the worker respondents to answer political questions in the follow-up survey. The political measures at the establishment level (App. A) tap the following dimensions: business association, government and local political linkages, establishment influence, dependence on government manpower and “marginal work-world” policies, and financial connections to government. At the worker level, the political measures (App. B) refer to standard concepts, such as party identification and activity, political interest, and political efficacy. In addition, we have followed Ornstein, Stevenson, and Williams (1980) in

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7 Because of time and cost considerations, we could only contact workers at a subsample of the establishments. Persuading businesses to release lists of employees was the single greatest difficulty that we faced in our fieldwork.

8 This rate is calculated for the half-sample that answered the political subsection in the 1981 survey. The other half answered a subsection on the use of leisure time.

9 We checked the industry and size distributions for the establishments and the education, age, and sex distributions for the workers.
developing indices about attitudes concerning the power of big organizations and the need for economic equality.

DATA ANALYSIS

In some previous work (Apostle, Clairmont, and Osberg 1985b), we used a combination of factor and cluster techniques suggested by Kaufman, Hodson, and Fligstein (1981) to analyze our establishment data. We have demonstrated that the six conceptual areas in our data can be reduced to five basic dimensions. The factors, as suggested in table 1, respectively involve size, technology, and job structuring variables; market control variables; union and worker protection variables; women and low-wage variables; and demand stability and economic prospects variables. We subsequently used establishment factor scores to cluster establishments into economic segments.

In general terms, the information given in table 1 indicates that we have a third cluster that consists of central establishments and first and second clusters that contain marginal establishments that are differentiated chiefly by labor force strategy considerations. The two clusters containing marginal establishments are quite similar to one another and significantly unlike the third cluster with respect to size of work force, replacement value of capital, job structuring, and unionization; on each of these variables the marginal clusters have low mean values. Additionally, the marginal clusters are alike in their high mean dependence on local sales. The two marginal clusters segment with respect to the proportion of female employees and the proportion earning under four dollars

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10 It should be noted that the variables on our last factor (variables 16–18) were initially intended to measure stable, predictable demand among more central establishments but have in fact captured a perception of a stable but unpredictable (and perhaps uncontrollable) environment for more marginal establishments. This unexpected pattern is probably attributable to the implicitly limited time span specified in variable 16. The five factors respectively account for 53.4%, 17.9%, 12.4%, 8.9%, and 7.4% of common variance.

11 This discussion of the economic segments is borrowed from Apostle, Clairmont, and Osberg (1985b, pp. 34–37). Following Kaufman, Hodson, and Fligstein (1981), we used Ward's method to cluster the establishments. We found only two solutions, for four and three clusters, statistically acceptable at the .05 level. We have utilized the three-cluster grouping in our analysis because the additional cluster in the four-segment solution contains only three establishments (and correspondingly few workers).

12 Subsequent to doing the factor and cluster analysis on the establishment data, we discovered that our wage information for one moderate-sized business in transportation was incorrect in that it indicated very low wages, when in fact wages were quite high. Given the otherwise Central-oriented characteristics of this establishment, we manually reassigned this case to the Central sector in the analysis reported below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Marginal Segment</th>
<th>Maritimes Segment</th>
<th>Central Segment</th>
<th>Marginal Segment</th>
<th>Maritimes Segment</th>
<th>Central Segment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Access computer*</td>
<td>.32 (109)</td>
<td>.35 (231)</td>
<td>.60 (114)</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Log replacement value (ln)</td>
<td>11.55 (87)</td>
<td>11.64 (194)</td>
<td>14.33 (98)</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>2.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Job structuringb</td>
<td>.84 (111)</td>
<td>84 (232)</td>
<td>1.37 (115)</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Fringe benefits (%)c</td>
<td>1.77 (107)</td>
<td>1.89 (217)</td>
<td>2.97 (115)</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sized</td>
<td>59.43 (110)</td>
<td>41.53 (214)</td>
<td>277.93 (113)</td>
<td>(135.95</td>
<td>(78.96</td>
<td>(503.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. K/L conversion</td>
<td>3.85 (106)</td>
<td>3.91 (219)</td>
<td>3.27 (113)</td>
<td>(1.21</td>
<td>(1.17</td>
<td>(96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Employees 5 + years (%)f</td>
<td>2.74 (108)</td>
<td>2.95 (231)</td>
<td>3.63 (114)</td>
<td>(1.28</td>
<td>(1.40</td>
<td>(1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Need previous experience*</td>
<td>.73 (110)</td>
<td>.82 (227)</td>
<td>.91 (115)</td>
<td>(.45</td>
<td>(.39</td>
<td>(.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Market control:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Sales local (%)</td>
<td>72.15 (108)</td>
<td>79.61 (221)</td>
<td>56.76 (113)</td>
<td>(39.99</td>
<td>(31.13</td>
<td>(41.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Maritimes market (%)g</td>
<td>2.04 (104)</td>
<td>1.64 (214)</td>
<td>2.29 (101)</td>
<td>(1.46</td>
<td>(1.02</td>
<td>(1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Canadian market (%)h</td>
<td>1.56 (103)</td>
<td>1.09 (211)</td>
<td>1.46 (102)</td>
<td>(1.11</td>
<td>(32</td>
<td>(82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Union/protection:
12. Unionized (%)f                          | 1.39 (108)       | 1.09 (230)        | 4.69 (115)     | (1.10            | (.38             | (.62            |
13. Freedom lay offh                         | 2.45 (111)       | 2.68 (228)        | 1.54 (113)     | (.88             | (.63             | (.76            |

4. Women/low wages:
14. Proportion women                         | .57 (110)        | .19 (213)         | .12 (113)      | (52              | (.24             | (17             |
15. Under $4.00 (%)                          | 73.11 (108)      | 12.46 (190)       | 4.61 (103)     | (29.52           | (18.64           | (9.88           |

5. Stable future prospects:
16. Demand stabilityg                        | 3.14 (104)       | 3.83 (222)        | 3.86 (111)     | (2.03            | (2.12            | (2.17           |
17. Economic prospectsi                       | 3.37 (104)       | 3.49 (219)        | 3.76 (110)     | (1.85            | (1.91            | (1.98           |

18. Hard to predict variation in sales/outputk | 32 (111)         | 37 (232)          | .44 (115)      | (.47             | (.48             | (.50            |
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per hour. The establishments in the first cluster have, on the average, a large, low-paid female work force; those in the second cluster typically have employees who are neither low wage nor female. In these specific regards, the second cluster is somewhat similar to the central cluster, though the latter consistently yields higher values for wages, fringe benefits, and the portion employed for more than five years. In sum, then, the three-cluster solution presented in table 1 may be seen as representing two bifurcations, one focusing on gender and wage levels and the other on the remaining variables (chiefly size, capital intensity, and unionization).

In descriptive terms, the three clusters may be labeled, respectively, Marginal, Maritimes Marginal, and Central. The Marginal cluster's establishments are the typically low-wage operations in trade, personal and business services, and nondurable manufacturing found throughout Western advanced economies. This cluster represents the small, very competitive peripheral sector of the economy. In the Maritimes Marginal cluster the establishments are typically relatively small wholesale, transportation, and construction operations. This is an important part of the Maritimes economy, since, lacking significant durable manufacturing, the "hinterland" Maritime Provinces basically distribute and service goods made elsewhere. Operations in the Maritimes Marginal cluster are often, though not always, tied to large, powerful corporations. Finally, there is a Central cluster, which is made up largely of establishments in either the capital-intensive resource industries or the highly skilled service sector. Our sample excluded the public sector, which in the Maritimes would also provide central workplaces.

This establishment-level approach to segmentation proves quite illuminating concerning the connections between the government and the economy. As is indicated in table 2, section A, the economic clusters are associated with our major political measures. The work underlying the table shows that compared with Marginal establishments, Central establishments have more ties with trade associations and government, perceive themselves to be more influential with government, and are more likely to receive assistance in recruiting and training workers as well as financial support. Surprisingly, it is not the Marginal but the Maritimes Marginal establishments, which are more likely to hire males and to pay average wages, that have the least involvement with government and business organizations. In the work leading to section A of table 2, the Maritimes Marginal establishments had the lowest scores on all variables.

13 An inspection of the relevant cross-tabulations shows that the Maritimes Marginal establishments score slightly, but consistently, lower than the Marginal ones on the first four of these political dimensions and considerably lower on the measure concerning financial support.
### TABLE 2
**ECONOMIC SEGMENTS AND ESTABLISHMENT POLITICS**

#### A. ETA VALUES FOR THE ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN THE ESTABLISHMENT POLITICAL INDICES AND THE ECONOMIC SEGMENT CATEGORIZATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Segment Categorization</th>
<th>Establishment Political Indices*</th>
<th>Dependence on Government Manpower Policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Association Linkages</td>
<td>Government Linkages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritimes Marginal/</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>.23**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginal/Central</td>
<td>(351)</td>
<td>(351)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of cases</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### B. REGRESSION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT POLITICAL INDICES ON THE BASIC ESTABLISHMENT FACTORS (STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENTS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size and technology</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>.28*</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market control</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union/protection</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.16**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women/low wages</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable future prospects</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of cases</td>
<td>(352)</td>
<td>(356)</td>
<td>(344)</td>
<td>(355)</td>
<td>(357)</td>
<td>(357)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

* See App. A for a description of the item wordings and the construction of these indices.

b These measures are the composite factor scores produced through a combination of principal factoring with iteration and a varimax final rotation.

* Significant at the .05 level.

** Significant at the .01 level.
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In terms of what we have labeled “dependence on marginal work-world policies” (i.e., minimum wage, unemployment insurance, welfare), the Maritimes Marginal establishments are far less dependent than Marginal ones on such policies and even less dependent than the Central ones.14 Finally, there is no relationship between segment location and the utilization of local political channels; establishments in all segments are equally likely to tap this political resource.15

Further insight into the relationships between political processes and economic segments is provided when one regresses the political measures on the basic economic factors that define our segments. In table 2, section B, one can observe a general tendency for the size and technology dimension to be the only major predictor of affiliations between establishments and trade associations, government, or local politicians, as well as of perceptions of political influence. The larger, more technologically advanced establishments have the greater range of political ties. However, on the question of dependence on specific government policies, one finds different patterns. As suggested by the work underlying section A, table 2, the women and low-wages dimension is significantly related to dependence on marginal work-world policies. In addition, establishments with unions or other constraints on labor allocation tend to have more financial connections with government and to be more reliant on government manpower services. There are parallel, but weaker, effects for market control on these two political scales. It is possible to speculate that there are various niches or power bases within the economy on which symbiotic relationships between government and business may be built. Central-sector establishments have the obvious power resources associated with size, technology, and unionization. The marginal segments present an interesting specification, as the Maritimes Marginal establishments seem to have stable economic niches, whereas the Marginal establishments’ survival depends on some government support.

At the worker level, there is also a multiplicity of political outcomes, which demonstrates the strength of the segmentation approach. As shown in table 3, our socioeconomic segment classification compares

14 Of 99 Central establishments, 44.5% were high on this scale, as compared with 40.3% of the 179 Maritimes Marginal establishments and 62.5% of the 80 Marginal ones.

15 Given the importance of multi-establishment organizations, or firms, in our economy, it is possible that political patterns at the workplace level will be modified or blurred if establishments are tied to, or embedded in, the operation of larger organizational structures. If one controls in table 2, sec. A, for whether the establishment is owner managed or not (the only operationalization that we have available), one finds that the relationships are stronger in all instances among the owner-managed establishments, save for local political linkages.
TABLE 3

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR REGRESSION OF POLITICAL INDICES ON ECONOMIC SEGMENTS, CLASS, AND SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLITICAL INDICES</th>
<th>Zero-Order Effects</th>
<th>Unique Effects</th>
<th>Additional for Education, Income (ln), and Age</th>
<th>Unique Effects for Regression Including All Variables</th>
<th>N OF CASES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Segment</td>
<td>Class (Pineo/</td>
<td>Economic Segment</td>
<td>Class</td>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>Porter/McRoberts)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party identification</td>
<td>.09**</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.08**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party activity</td>
<td>.04**</td>
<td>.05**</td>
<td>.05**</td>
<td>.06**</td>
<td>.03*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.11**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.11**</td>
<td>.11**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political efficacy</td>
<td>.01**</td>
<td>.02**</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.02**</td>
<td>.03**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political activity</td>
<td>.01**</td>
<td>.07**</td>
<td>.01**</td>
<td>.06**</td>
<td>.04**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Big interests&quot;</td>
<td>.03**</td>
<td>.03*</td>
<td>.03**</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>.04**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.04**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* It should be noted that these, and subsequent calculations regarding significance levels, assume, within the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, the existence of a simple random sample and hence are moderate overstimates of actual significance levels. The design effect for stratification is 2.56, and if one conservatively assumes a 35% increase in variance to clustering, we get an overall design effect of 3.56. This means our initial sample of 1,513 is the equivalent of a simple random sample of 814. Also, the data are weighted to present a representative cross section of private-sector workers in the Maritimes. See Apostle, Clairmont, and Osberg (1980, pp. 23–26) for details.

b See App. B for the index wordings.

c Following Ogmundson (1975), we have ordered the parties that the respondents tend to support from left to right, with New Democrats, Social Credit, New Democrats/Liberals, Liberals, Liberals/Progressive Conservatives, and Progressive Conservatives scored from one to six, respectively.

* Significant at the .05 level.

** Significant at the .01 level.
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quite favorably with a conventional social class index\(^\text{16}\) in accounting for variation on a wide range of political measures.\(^\text{17}\) The first two columns, presenting the zero-order effects, suggest that economic segment location is, when considered by itself, a good predictor of party-level phenomena, such as party identification and activity, as well as of general ideological measures concerning “big interests” and equality. Social class, on the other hand, tends to have its greatest effects on questions that relate specifically to government (political interest, efficacy, and activity) rather than to party identification or ideology. These patterns persist when one examines these measures relative to one another, as in columns 3 and 4. When one repeats this comparison (in cols. 6 and 7), controlling for the three sociodemographic variables (education, income, and age), the segment effects remain constant, where most of those for social class decline.\(^\text{18}\) These findings clearly indicate that our segments have individual-level consequences, particularly at the level of party and ideology, which are not reduced when one controls for social class or other salient background variables.

In more substantive terms, there are some interesting associations between segment location and political processes. Central-sector employees are well distributed across the political spectrum in terms of party identification. Within this grouping, one finds roughly equal numbers of Liberals and Progressive Conservatives. Also, the great majority of left political identification—New Demographic party (NDP) support—is found in this segment. Of the NDP support, 79% comes from workers located in the Central segment establishments (only 19% of the total sample tends to support the NDP). This pattern underscores both the

\(^\text{16}\) The occupational classification used here is the socioeconomic ranking scheme that Pineo, Porter, and McRoberts (1977) constructed with the Canadian Classification and Dictionary of Occupations and 1971 Census of Canada data. In this analysis, we have recoded their original 16 occupational categories into five: professional/technical/managerial, supervisor/foreman, skilled clerical-sales-service/skilled crafts and trades, semiskilled-clerical-sales-service/semiskilled crafts and trades, and unskilled clerical-sales-service/unskilled laborers/farm laborers. It should be noted that, given our study design, we have tended to exclude some top managers (and owners) from our worker survey. We were sufficiently dubious about obtaining information about the establishment from such people, as well as lists of employees in some cases, that we decided to leave them out of the worker survey. This means that we are unable to test the effect of Marxist operationalizations of class (which depend a good deal on the inclusion of such strata in their operationalizations) adequately with these data.

\(^\text{17}\) Following Ornstein, Stevenson, and Williams (1980, pp. 264–65), we have used this format to facilitate comparisons that involve key nominal variables.

\(^\text{18}\) Education has the greatest control effects on the three governmental measures, whereas income is the strongest for party activity.
Segmentation

extent to which the Central segment is unionized and the integration of the social democratic party into the institutional arrangement represented by segmentation. Party identification among marginal workers not only provides a contrast but also suggests a useful theoretical specification. Maritimes Marginal workers disproportionately support the more “ideological” Progressive Conservatives, whereas the Marginal workers opt slightly more for the brokerage Liberal party.19

As hypothesized, Central-segment workers tend to score higher than Marginal ones for the governmental measures (political interest, efficacy, and activity). Again, there is an interesting specification among Marginal-sector employees. Persons working in the Maritimes Marginal establishments have intermediate-level scores on the governmental measures, but they are the most likely to favor increased economic equality and to oppose what they perceive to be general favoritism toward “big interests.” This portrait is consistent with the small-capital character of the Maritimes Marginal establishments referred to earlier. It seems quite plausible that the workers there would be most likely to oppose, perhaps with the concepts of classic small-business ideology, both large-scale organization and the increased economic inequalities that accompany it. Finally, the Marginal-segment workers do not emerge here in any particularly distinctive way. However, their comparatively low scores on the governmental measures and their seeming indifference to “big interests,” favoritism, and inequality may well reflect the alienation hypothesized by segmentation researchers.

The connections between worker and establishment data demonstrate the relevance of the segmentation perspective for political analysis. They also suggest a specification among marginal segments that incorporates both European and American models of segmentation. Maritimes Marginal establishments and employees represent the secondary sector highlighted by the Europeans, with its low level of governmental ties (apart from local politics) and conservative political ambience. The Marginal establishments and workers, in contrast, reflect the secondary sector highlighted in American research, with its establishments dependent on governmental social policies and its workers characterized by political alienation and ideological indifference.

19 There is a tendency for workers in the Marginal establishments to prefer the Liberals (47.5% vs. 43.0% Progressive Conservative), whereas those in Maritimes Marginal establishments disproportionately support the Progressive Conservatives (60.0% vs. 33.5% Liberals). The remainder, less than 10% in both cases, is New Democratic. However, given the extensive missing data for this question (34.3%), one must be cautious about drawing inferences here.
DISCUSSION
In this article, we have tried to elaborate the implications of segmentation theory to incorporate political dimensions in a more explicit fashion. Using the key variables discussed in the segmentation literature, a factor/cluster analysis yielded three segments. It may well be that if the input variables were different, if a different society were chosen, or if the operational level were the industry or firm rather than the workplace, a different portrait of segmentation would have been produced. Nevertheless, the segments that were produced appear to be sociologically meaningful, and it was possible to demonstrate the existence of heterogeneous forms of political orientations and activity, which segmentation theory postulates.

At the establishment level, one finds significant differences among economic segments in the ways in which they relate to trade associations, government, and major policy areas, which are compatible with theoretical expectations. Furthermore, analysis of the underlying components of segmentation specifies the nature of these connections. Controlling for the embeddedness of the workplace in larger corporate structure could only be done in a limited fashion with our data. However, the relationships were more distinct when partialed for owner-managed status. At the worker level, one finds reasonably strong workplace location effects for party and ideology, which cannot be explained away by reference to other important structural variables. Although our data did not permit, it would have been interesting to control for what some eclectic-oriented segmentation proponents refer to as “peasant effects” (i.e., differential commitment to paid, regular work) by selecting out prime-age males. Presumably, political correlates and consequences of workplace location for such workers would have varied even more sharply.

Our investigation of the political aspects of segmentation processes suggests the need for basic revision in our thinking about political life in advanced capitalist societies and for further research. At a theoretical level, our findings challenge both orthodox liberal and Marxist interpretations of Canadian politics. The prevalent liberal approach has been to emphasize regional differences in explaining party allegiances, voting behavior, and federal-provincial relations (Simeon and Elkins 1974). Marxists have responded, quite successfully, to such theories by pointing out that liberals have neglected the importance of class in understanding ideological divisions among Canadians and by showing that regional political differences reduce in many instances to ones between French Quebecers and other Canadians (Ornstein, Stevenson, and Williams 1980). In contrast, our study both raises the possibility that structural conditions other than class are important in constructing more adequate theories and indicates that we may be able to use a segmentation view-
point to clarify the reasons for the enduring character of regional features in political life.²⁰

Much further work remains to be done. With respect to the segmentation literature, the nature of our survey has not enabled us to look at the independent role of government and politics in the economy or to assess the ways in which relations between government and business change over time. Berger and Bonacich have indicated some of the directions such research should take, and there are other helpful suggestions in the existing segmentation literature.²¹ Growing dissatisfaction with conventional theoretical paradigms can only encourage such projects.

APPENDIX A

Item Wordings for the Establishment Political Indices²²

1. The association linkage index consists of the summed scores on the following items:
   31. “Does your establishment belong to any business-related organization such as the Chamber of Commerce or the Board of Trade or any industry associations such as the Meat Packers Association? (no/yes)”
   37. “How do you usually find out about government programs which can significantly benefit or harm this establishment’s business? Is it through:
      e. Associations and groups in your industry? (yes/no) (reversed)”

2. The government linkage index consists of the summed scores on the following items:
   36. “In order to promote or protect their interests some businesses consider it important to communicate with government leaders

²⁰ Given the fact that our surveys were conducted in one region (or even subregion), this latter idea is indeed just a hypothesis. However, aside from the French/English Canada distinction, “region” is a “black box” variable in Canadian social science that has remained quite impervious to adequate interpretation. Our notion of socioeconomic segmentation is as plausible a candidate as any of the ethnic, religious, or cultural alternatives.

²¹ In particular, Richard Edwards (1979, pp. 200–16) has sketched out some connections between American class structure and politics.

²² After inspection of the relevant cross-tabulations, the small proportions of missing data and refusals were given intermediate scores of two on questions 31, 32c, 33a, 36, and 37 and grouped with the middle response on questions 34 and 35. The “hardly at all” and “moderately” responses to question 32b were given a score of one, and the “strongly” and “very strongly” responses were given a score of three to create an item equal in length to the other items in the index.
or government agencies. Have representatives of your establishment engaged in any of the following activities in the past two years?

a. Communicated with provincial political leaders. (yes/no) (reversed)
b. Communicated with federal political leaders. (yes/no) (reversed)
c. Communicated with local politicians or party organizations. (yes/no) (reversed)"

3. The establishment influence index consists of the summed scores on the following items:

32.b. “Do you feel that this organization effectively represents itself in dealings with government? (no/yes)”
32.c. “How well does this organization represent your establishment's interests in dealing with government? (hardly at all/moderately/strongly/very strongly)”

33.a. “Does this establishment have people to represent its interest who have influence with government policymakers? (no/yes)”

4. The local politics linkage index consists of the summed scores on the following items:

37. “How do you usually find out about government programs which can significantly benefit or harm this establishment’s business? Is it through:

a. Elected officials? (yes/no) (reversed)
b. Local party organizations? (yes/no) (reversed)”

5. The dependence on marginal work-world policies index consists of the summed scores on the following items:

34. “How important have each of the following government policies been to your establishment over the past five years?

a. Minimum wage policy. (very important/important/not very important) (reversed)
c. Unemployment insurance policy. (very important/important/not very important) (reversed)
d. Welfare policy. (very important/important/not very important) (reversed)
e. Regulations concerning overtime and holidays. (very important/important/not very important) (reversed)”

6. The financial connections index consists of the summed scores on the following items:

35. “Increasingly government and business are connected. As far as this establishment is concerned, how important is the relationship or tie to government in each of the following cases?

a. Financial assistance for capitalization and development.
7. The dependence on government manpower policies index consists of the summed scores on the following items:

34.b. “Manpower placement services. (very important/important/not very important) (reversed)”

35.d. “Recruitment and training of work force. (very important/important/not very important) (reversed)”

All the establishment political indices are constructed from responses to the 1981 General Segmentation Follow-Up Survey. The seven indices have Cronbach’s alpha values of .49, .85, .51, .59, .68, .70, and .68, respectively.

APPENDIX B

Item Wordings for the Worker Political Indices

1. The political efficacy index consists of the summed scores on the following items from the 1979 General Segmentation Survey:

   50. “Now we would like to change the topic, and discuss your opinions about current affairs in this country. As I read each one, I would like you to tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree.

   a. Generally, those elected to parliament soon lose touch with the people. (reversed)

   b. I don’t think that the government cares much about what people think. (reversed)

   d. People don’t have any say about what the government does. (reversed)”

2. The political activity index consists of the summed scores on the following items from the 1979 General Segmentation Survey:

   51. “I’m going to read you a list of the things people sometimes do between elections to keep in touch with the government. Can you tell me, for each of these things, whether you have ever done such a thing (no/yes) when there was not an election campaign going on?”

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23 After inspection of the relevant cross-tabulations, the small proportions of missing data and refusals were given intermediate scores of three on questions 50, 51, 1, and 3 and grouped with the middle responses on questions 8, 9, and 15. The “not at all,” “fairly closely,” and “very closely” responses for question 2 were given scores of one, three, and five, respectively, to create an item equal in length to the other items in the index. The missing data for question 2 were grouped with the “fairly closely” response.
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a. Signed a petition directed to some government agency?
b. Helped draft or circulate such a petition?
c. Attended a city council, school board, or similar meeting to support or oppose some policy?
d. Worked with an organization of neighbors or other members of your community to persuade government (such as Department of Highways, the school board) to do something you feel ought to be done?”

3. The political interest index consists of the summed scores on the following items from the 1981 General Segmentation Follow-Up Survey politics addendum:
   1. “We have found that people sometimes don't pay too much attention to elections. How about yourself? Would you say that you were generally interested in elections, fairly interested, slightly interested, or not at all interested in it [sic]? (reversed)"
   2. “We would also like to know whether you pay much attention to politics generally. I mean from day to day, when there isn't a big election campaign going on. Would you say that you follow politics very closely, fairly closely, or not much at all? (reversed)"
   3. “Some people do quite a lot in politics, while others find they haven't the time or perhaps the interest to participate in political activities. I'll read you briefly some of the things that people do, and I would like you to please tell me how often you have done each of these things in recent federal or provincial elections: often, sometimes, seldom, or never.
   a. Discuss politics with other people. (reversed)”

4. The party activity index consists of the summed scores on the following items from the 1981 General Segmentation Follow-Up Survey political addendum:
   3.d. “Attend a political meeting or rally. (reversed)”
   3.e. “Spend time working for a political party or a candidate. (reversed)”

5. The “big interests” index consists of the summed scores on the following items from the 1981 General Segmentation Follow-Up Survey political addendum:
   8. “If society is going to develop smoothly, do you think that the government should pay special attention to the 'big interests' or the powerful? (yes/yes, qualified/no) (reversed)"
   9. “Do you think the government does in fact pay more attention than it should to ‘the big interests’ or the powerful? (yes/yes, qualified/no)”

6. The equality index consists of the summed scores on the following
items from the 1981 General Segmentation Follow-Up Survey political addendum:

15. “Now here is a series of statements. Could you please indicate whether you agree or disagree strongly or mildly with each statement.

a. There is too much of a difference between rich and poor in this country. (strongly agree/agree/neither agree nor disagree, depends/disagree/strongly disagree) (reversed)

b. People with high incomes should pay a greater share of the total taxes than they do now. (strongly agree/agree/neither agree nor disagree, depends/disagree/strongly disagree) (reversed)

The six indices have Cronbach’s alpha values of .67, .67, .74, .66, .63, and .54, respectively.

REFERENCES


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