BRITISH IDENTITY AND THE ANTIREVOLUTIONARY NOVEL: NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH NOVELS ABOUT THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

by

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ABSTRACT

Between Edmund Burke’s 1790 Reflections on the Revolution in France and Charles Dickens’s 1859 A Tale of Two Cities, a cluster of antirevolutionary British works depicting the French Revolution that bridges periodisation divisions and often challenges the conventionally recognised political affiliations of the authors in question appeared. Recent work in recovering neglected Romantic and Victorian-era texts about the French Revolution has typically focused on radical and liberal works or the literary output of the 1790s, while disregarding the long-term antirevolutionary tradition my dissertation examines. I analyse canonical and well-known texts such as Burke’s Reflections, Thomas Carlyle’s The French Revolution (1837) and Dickens’s Tale with understudied and sometimes utterly neglected antirevolutionary novels, including Elizabeth Hamilton’s Memoirs of Modern Philosophers (1800), Frances Burney’s The Wanderer (1814), Anthony Trollope’s La Vendée (1850) and Charlotte M. Yonge’s Dynevor Terrace (1857), in order to reconstruct the political and representational contests surrounding the French Revolution that occurred across seventy years of British literature. My work reveals that by representing the Revolution as inherently and unavoidably violent, the antirevolutionary writers in this study take up their own violent positions against it. These writers are primarily concerned with the French Revolution’s impact on British communities and identities, and construct their own versions of Britishness in the context of, and usually in opposition to, revolutionary violence and the French revolutionary state. These texts all politicise the family and the domestic community as models or microcosms of the broader national community, although they do so in diverse ways: Burney and Trollope turn to the political family romance to test out versions of the state modelled on patriarchy, fraternity or the heterosexual marriage contract. By contrast, Burke, Dickens and Yonge use middle-class domestic ideology to promote a national community rooted in private, social affections. However, as the home comes under threat by revolutionary violence in all of these works, each writer commits some kind of representational violence against revolutionary symbols, ideals and narratives. My analysis of these texts as a group demonstrates that the French Revolution was also a British event, generating decades of antirevolutionary reaction, histrionic paranoia and literary strategies for containing French and British radicalism.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

“A Well-Directed Gun”: Nineteenth-Century British Identities, the Antirevolutionary Novel and the Violence of Representation

In his Autobiography, Anthony Trollope describes the writing and publication of his third novel, La Vendée, concluding, “I read the book the other day, and am not ashamed of it. The conception as to the feeling of the people is, I think, true; the characters are distinct; and the tale is not dull. As far as I can remember, this morsel of criticism is the only one that was ever written on the book” (81). Trollope did have at least one contemporary reader, however; he later relates an attempt to sell The Three Clerks to an unnamed publisher who responds, “I hope it’s not historical, Mr. Trollope? ... Whatever you do, don’t be historical; your historical novel is not worth a damn” (110-111).

Trollope’s anecdotes testify to the popular failure and critical neglect of his novel about the French Revolution, a neglect that continues to this day. Nevertheless, La Vendée is one of a cluster of antirevolutionary British novels published between the 1790s and the mid-nineteenth century that express similar anxieties about revolution in France using many of the same tropes and representational strategies, and it is in light of these texts’ affinities as a group that neglected novels like La Vendée must be read and recovered.

Read alongside Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France, Elizabeth Hamilton’s Memoirs of Modern Philosophers, Frances Burney’s The Wanderer, Charles Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities and Charlotte M. Yonge’s Dynevor Terrace, I contend, a failed novel like Trollope’s La Vendée begins to make sense. As this introduction will outline, these works all use the French Revolution as a starting point for their explorations of British identity and community in the context of the public violence that characterised the revolutionary period. However, they measure this violence in terms of its impact on the families and domestic communities that stand in for the national community in these texts. Representations of violence against the home and family, inflected by gendered and class discourses, are central to the narratives I examine here.

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1 No modern criticism has been published on the novel, and the 1994 Oxford edition is its only scholarly edition.
Furthermore, as a group, these authors engage in a violent representational contest over revolutionary and radical narratives, symbols and plots, the details of which I will return to later in this introduction. Sites of narrative control and authority, as well as contested fields of representation, then, are much more important for my research than any clear and consistent antirevolutionary agenda existing across these texts from the 1790s to 1860.

In fact, I have chosen to designate these texts antirevolutionary rather than giving them a more precise political label because the authors in question would by no means have agreed on the political issues of their own times and because their occurrence across seven decades means that they do not fit neatly into periodisation categories or historically specific political groupings. Yonge, for example, was avowedly a High Church Tory, while Dickens and Trollope were much more reform-minded. Hamilton disliked what she saw as Burke’s bleeding-heart liberal politics, and ridiculed him in her first novel, _Letters of a Hindoo Rajah_. Some of these writers, moreover, were internally conflicted about their own political positions. Burke was a Whig Member of Parliament who broke with his party over the Revolution. Burney’s commitment to her conservative father and her career at court would suggest her investment in old-regime ideas and institutions, but her marriage to the constitutionalist émigré Alexandre d’Arblay and lengthy residence in Napoleonic France complicate her position toward the Revolution’s constitutional and republican phases, as well as its aftermath. Trollope, finally, stood for Parliament as a Liberal, but was less than clear about his political beliefs, professing an “advanced, but still ... conservative Liberal[ism]” (_Autobiography_ 291).

Designating these texts antirevolutionary, then, allows me to read them as a cluster working with shared representational strategies toward similar ends, while a more precise or narrow political term— conservative, Tory, Anti-Jacobin, loyalist, counterrevolutionary, royalist— necessarily excludes some of the writers involved in the antirevolutionary representational trend I see connecting these works by imposing strict political, historical or generic limits. By 1830, conservative emerged as a synonym for Tory (“Conservative,” def. A2.a) as a designation for a specific British political party, a
party to which none of these authors adhered except for Yonge. Anti-Jacobian and loyalist are similarly exclusive: only Hamilton writes in the historically specific genre of the Anti-Jacobian novel, a didactic form current in the 1790s and early nineteenth century written in opposition to specific radical texts and opponents such as William Godwin, Mary Wollstonecraft and Mary Hays. Loyalist, similarly, is a term that only achieves meaning in the particular historical context of Britain’s participation in wars against France and government repression of radicalism at home during the revolutionary period, and would be politically irrelevant and outdated as a description of the historical novels about the French Revolution that appeared in the 1850s. Finally, counterrevolutionary, royalist, and conservative in its most broad definition indicate a desire to counteract or roll back the effects of the Revolution, to return to or preserve a pre-revolutionary, old-regime past. While Burke’s Reflections appeared at an early enough stage in the Revolution to express such a wish, by the end of the Napoleonic Wars, and certainly by the late 1840s and 1850s, which saw France’s return to republican government and, ultimately, the establishment of the Second Empire, France could not simply go back to the past, despite its attempts with the post-Waterloo restoration and July Monarchy. In Britain, likewise, profound political change occurred across the early nineteenth century, and the authors in my study writing after the 1832 Reform Act were uninterested in returning to unreformed British society. Even Yonge, whose royalist sympathies are apparent in her characterisation of her protagonist Louis, throws her support behind the conservative government and its police forces in the Second Republic in her depiction of

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2 James J. Sack’s From Jacobite to Conservative: Reaction and orthodoxy in Britain, c. 1760-1832 provides an in-depth account of conservative thought across this period.


4 Loyalist could be used in a number of historical contexts such as Irish support of Union with Britain and the United Empire Loyalists who left the United States for Canada during the American Revolution. However, with respect to the French Revolution it refers to those who supported William Pitt’s government in its war effort and suppression of radicalism in Britain. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the term broadly as “One who is loyal; one who adheres to his sovereign or to constituted authority, esp. in times of revolt; one who supports the existing form of government.”

5 The OED defines “counter-revolution” as “A revolution opposed to a previous revolution or reversing its results.”

6 “A person who conserves or preserves something; (now usually) an adherent of traditional values, ideas, and institutions; an opponent of (social and political) change, a conservative person” (“Conservative,” def. A2.b).
the June 1848 Insurrection, instead of looking for a restoration of the July Monarchy. In fact, the antirevolutionary novelists I examine are more concerned with moving forward from the violence of the revolutionary period—and the revolutionary era more broadly, if we include the turbulent 1820s, the reformist 1830s and the years leading up to the ‘springtime of the peoples’ in 1848—than in counteracting the Revolution. Hamilton, Burney, Yonge and Dickens especially focus on envisioning a future that erases or contains the Revolution. For Burney and Dickens, this entails critiquing old-regime society as decidedly as it means rejecting the violence of the Revolution, while for Hamilton and Yonge, more conservatively, it means relegating radicalism to the past.

Antirevolutionary, in the context of this broad group of works and writers emerging across a long period of history, indicates the affinities among these texts in the position their authors take up against the Revolution, while also recognising the political diversity of the writers in question, a diversity which has likely contributed to the critical neglect of this cluster of works. The events of the historical period in question have led to these years being termed the revolutionary period (1789-1815) or, more broadly, the revolutionary era (1789-1848). However, my study of antirevolutionary novels reveals that there is an equivalent antirevolutionary impulse, corresponding in many ways to the British government’s repressive reaction during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and the mid-Victorian public response to the ‘springtime of the peoples’ during and following 1848,7 that characterises British fiction in the revolutionary era and beyond. By terming these texts antirevolutionary rather than limiting my study to works that fit within a more politically or historically precise group, I am able to reconstruct a critically unacknowledged conversation that cuts across literary periodisation divisions and typical political affiliations and challenges received opinions about these authors’ politics and priorities. The diversity and politically challenging nature of this cluster of works ultimately reveals how pervasive antirevolutionary impulses were in the nineteenth-century literary imagination.

Some works on the French Revolution from the 1790s and nineteenth century, such as Burke’s Reflections, Dickens’s Tale, Thomas Carlyle’s The French Revolution and, to a

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7 I will discuss British responses to revolution across Europe and Chartist agitation within Britain in 1848 in Chapter 5.
lesser extent, Burney’s *The Wanderer* have received sustained critical attention, and are thus taken to represent the relevant canon. However, these works are only a selective, partial collection of the texts from this period that represent the French Revolution. Exploring these canonical texts against lesser known works like the Anti-Jacobin novels, of which Hamilton’s *Modern Philosophers* is a representative for this study, and Yonge’s and Trollope’s utterly neglected antirevolutionary novels of the 1850s reveals the impact of the antirevolutionary legacy of the 1790s on British fiction across the first half of the nineteenth century to a much fuller extent than currently exists. Some studies have attempted to chart a literary reaction to the French Revolution, among them Marilyn Butler’s *Romantics, Rebels and Reactionaries*, Nicola J. Watson’s *Revolution and the Form of the British Novel*, M. O. Grenby’s *The Anti-Jacobin Novel* and Lisa Wood’s *Modes of Discipline*, which work to recover neglected antirevolutionary writers. These are limited to Romantic writing, however, and thus do not recognise how extensively the strategies and techniques used by Romantic and Victorian antirevolutionary novelists cut across periodisation categories. Critical works that do bridge the Romantic and Victorian periods, such as John P. Farrell’s *Revolution as Tragedy*, focus on canonical writers and texts that do not necessarily address the French Revolution directly. Although discussing the influence of Carlyle’s *French Revolution* on Dickens’s *Tale* is almost a critical commonplace, the relevance of earlier Romantic texts for Dickens’s novel has almost never been recognised: Margaret Doody is exceptional in linking *Tale* to a pre-existing, Romantic-era “Revolutionary mythology” (“English Women Novelists” 182), and Victorianists have rarely looked earlier than 1837 for literary influences on *Tale*. Furthermore, my reading of Dickens’s *Tale* alongside Trollope’s *La Vendée* and Yonge’s

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9 Doody continues, “It seems quite probable to me that Dickens, working up background for that novel, read some of the English novels of the Revolutionary period” (182), and traces from Charlotte Smith’s *The Banished Man* “the first ‘guillotine scene’ ... a predecessor [sic] of a number of later ones, culminating in those of Dickens’s Tale” (183).
Dynevor Terrace acknowledges for the first time that prolific, popular novelists other than Dickens also returned to the political representational contests of the 1790s in the 1850s: in light of the resurgence of antirevolutionary fiction that these novels by Trollope, Yonge and Dickens indicate occurred in the 1850s, I argue that A Tale of Two Cities should no longer be read in isolation, or as a work in dialogue only with Carlyle’s French Revolution and the play Dickens collaborated on with Wilkie Collins, The Frozen Deep. Instead, Dickens’s novel must be read as one contribution to a pervasive and longstanding antirevolutionary legacy in British fiction. This study explores the ways in which these antirevolutionary novels converse with each other across the Romantic and Victorian periods, building on images originating with the Revolution Debate of the 1790s that continued to speak to antirevolutionary writers as late as 1859, the year Dickens’s Tale was published.

Writers of all political allegiances representing the Revolution in the 1790s and nineteenth century appropriated and recycled their opponents’ and allies’ images and claims: the famous “swinish multitude” (79) of Burke’s Reflections, for example, was quickly seized by the popular press, surfacing in the titles of radical periodicals between 1793 and 1795 such as Daniel Isaac Eaton’s Politics for the People: Or A Salmagundy for Swine, also known as Hog’s Wash, and Thomas Spence’s Pig’s Meat; or, Lessons for the Swinish Multitude (Haywood 27-28). As late as 1853, the liberal Charlotte Brontë’s somewhat less liberal heroine Lucy Snowe describes her students at Madame Beck’s school in Villette as a “swinish multitude” (146), using Burke’s phrase to suggest her condescension toward the “marsh-phlegm” (145) that supposedly defines national character in Labassecour. More conservative writers also adopted the language of their opponents to show their conversance in revolutionary thought. Hamilton, for example, quotes wholesale from William Godwin’s Political Justice and Mary Hays’s Memoirs of Emma Courtney, and Yonge’s hero Louis Fitzjocelyn paraphrases a statement Walter Scott attributes to Napoleon in his Life of Napoleon Buonaparte: “It is but one step from the sublime to the ludicrous” (389). Napoleon seems to have taken this thought from Thomas Paine, who claims in The Age of Reason that “[o]ne step above the sublime makes the ridiculous, and one step above the ridiculous makes the sublime again” (15).
Representations of the Revolution, then, were constructed through the kind of “inter-textuality” Julia Kristeva describes as the “transposition of one (or several) sign systems into another” (59-60), a process that “demands a new articulation of the thetic” (60). Kristeva’s claim that “[i]f one grants that every signifying practice is a field of transpositions of various signifying systems (an inter-textuality), one then understands that its ‘place’ of enunciation and its denoted ‘object’ are never single, complete, and identical to themselves, but always plural, shattered, capable to being tabulated” (60) suggests the contested nature of representations of the Revolution in the 1790s and later.

A more historically precise account of the appropriative and citational quality of political and representational conflict in the period I address appears in Jon Klancher’s description of “radical discourse” (42) in The Making of English Reading Audiences, 1790-1832 as “a new mode of interdiscourse, a language of countermand and critique, a dialogue in the most explicit sense .... Radical writers quote, parody, compile, ridicule in a politics of warring contexts” (42-43). Although the kind of carnivalesque political and social subversion Klancher observes in radical “interdiscourse” does not readily apply to antirevolutionary works, which aim to co-opt readers and appropriate their opponents’ language, images and symbols in support of the status quo or in the service of law and order, the “language of countermand and critique” that characterises Klancher’s “politics of warring contexts,” I will show, is essential to the antirevolutionary novel’s project of subverting and containing radicalism. However, there is also a performative thrust to these representational contests, in terms of Judith Butler’s definition of performativity as “the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names” (2). By citing their allies and opponents, intentionally or otherwise, the antirevolutionary writers I investigate appropriate and rewrite politicised discourses and images that lend authority to particular versions of the Revolution, and pass them on to the future. Representations of the French Revolution in these texts, in other words, are pragmatic, didactic and reiterative, rather than mimetic.

Despite the ostensible foreign and often historical focus of their plots, the novels in my study use the French Revolution as a starting point for exploring and constructing versions of British identity and community. Households and families, inflected by discourses of gender and class, as well as broader communities — the region, the nation—
feature as victims of revolutionary violence and as alternatives to the revolutionary state
and its republican values. The political culture of 1790s France highlights the ways in
which class ideologies associated with the Revolution came to overlap with gendered
images. For historian Dorinda Outram, the performance of stoic suicide, for example,
helped construct bourgeois, male, republican identity by shifting images of the body
politic away from the King’s body and onto “bodies of heroic dignity” (4) that referred
back to “the heroic male figures of classical antiquity” (96) in an effort to consolidate
class identity through representations of male civic virtue. However, Linda Colley’s
description of the “sobs and histrionics” that contributed to a political culture of
“emotionalism and violence” in the aristocratic British Parliament of the period (151)
suggests a far different gendering that discursively links upper-class British political
culture with feminised sensibility. Political culture itself thus sets the discursive terms for
the tropes of revolutionary, male violence and sexual appetite that appear in so many
fictional accounts of home invasion and attempted rape in these texts and for the
excessive sentimentality that dominates many of these narratives.

The position of women under the Revolution was influenced by these gendered
discourses of republican masculinity and aristocratic feminisation. In Women and the
Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution, Joan B. Landes argues that women’s
public influence diminished in revolutionary France, as the court and the salon, where
women acted as “purveyors of culture” (22), were superseded by a “masculinist” (7),
bourgeois public sphere and women were progressively confined to the home. As Outram
notes, “To the degree that power in the old regime was ascribed to women, the
Revolution was committed to an anti-feminine rhetoric” (125). Landes recognises that
some laws enacted by the Assembly and Convention, including new divorce laws and
anti-primogeniture laws ensuring partial equality in succession to property, benefitted
French women in the revolutionary period (122-123), but also observes that the 1791
Constitution defined women as passive citizens and categorically banned them from
voting “[f]or the first time in centuries” (122).

Radical women mobilised in support of the Revolution from its earliest days, and their
political engagement continued, culminating in 1793 when the Society of Revolutionary
Republican Women formed and became active in perpetuating the Terror (Landes 139-
Like Dickens’s masculine Madame Defarge, Burney’s cross-dressing Elinor Joddrel and Carlyle’s Menads, these revolutionary women defied gender norms, “affect[ing] a kind of uniform, appearing in public in the red bonnet, with tricolor ribbon, and trousers. They carried arms, usually a pistol and a dagger ... policed the streets and markets and attended the galleries in the fashion of a revolutionary army, as would a general and her troops” (Landes 141). Their popular radicalism, however, placed them at odds with the increasingly powerful Jacobins, who reacted in gendered terms. As Landes writes, “François Chabot paid the club [the Revolutionary Republicans] a backhanded tribute, stating: ‘It is these counter-revolutionary sluts (bougresses) who cause all the riotous outbreaks, above all over bread. They make a revolution over coffee and sugar, and they will make others if we don’t watch out’” (142). Chabot’s comments elide the question of women’s civic virtue, instead underlining the importance of their sexual virtue. In addition, his focus on “bread,” “coffee and sugar” indicates that he views the concerns of the female domestic manager as inadequate political justifications for a revolution against the National Convention’s authority, a claim that further separates the public and private spheres and marginalises women’s voices in politics. Finally, by describing the Revolutionary Republicans as “counter-revolutionary” because they expressed dissent from the authoritarian Convention and despite their popular, radical politics, Chabot denies women a voice in the Revolution. By the end of 1793, an altercation between the Revolutionary Republicans and market women provided the opportunity for the Convention’s prohibition of women’s clubs and, eventually, all political associations (Landes 142-143). Antifeminist language in the Convention increased thereafter (Landes 143-145), but it had already appeared in the political battles between the Girondins and Jacobins in 1792; as Landes notes, Danton and Marat, for example, mocked Jean-Marie Roland by condemning Madame Roland’s political activity (118-119). Across the 1790s, these anecdotes suggest, the French public sphere was reconstructed as a masculinist, political domain.

Although women’s exclusion from public life and relegation to the domestic sphere was initially part of radical republican ideology’s resistance to allegedly feminised, aristocratic and “counter-revolutionary” (Landes 142) power, conservatives also quickly adopted domestic ideology. According to Landes, “Conservatives and revolutionaries
alike recoiled from the unnatural spectacle of political women” (146). Burke describes royal captives proceeding from Versailles to Paris “amidst the horrid yells, and shrilling screams, and frantic dances, and infamous contumelies, and all the unutterable abominations of the furies of hell, in the abused shape of the vilest of women” (72), led by a monstrous female mob that resurfaces in Thomas Carlyle’s representation of the October Days as “The Insurrection of Women”10 and Dickens’s portrayal of Madame Defarge and The Vengeance. The demonisation of public women across the political spectrum, however, was accompanied by the elevation of the domestic woman, even in the least likely of historical places; Burke’s description of the mob’s raid on Versailles, for example, represents the Bourbons themselves as an ideal, middle-class, domestic family. He imagines Marie Antoinette as a “persecuted woman … fly[ing] almost naked [from her bed] … to seek refuge at the feet of a king and husband” and describes the royal couple leaving the “sanctuary” of Versailles with their “infant children” (71). Burke’s quick appropriation of domesticity for the conservative position by equating Versailles with the “sanctuary” of the home neutralises the potentially radical thrust of middle-class, domestic ideology by linking it to traditional power structures and, additionally, normalises the royal family for the middle-class reading public.

By the time Yonge and Dickens wrote their antirevolutionary novels in the 1850s, domestic ideology had become a dominant means of consolidating Victorian class identity, as critics Nancy Armstrong and Elizabeth Langland argue. Armstrong’s Desire and Domestic Fiction claims that the domestic novel reflects the power of the home in nineteenth-century discourse by “translat[ing] all kinds of political information into psychological terms” (187) and “contain[ing] disorder within the household” (183). Domestic fiction thereby constitutes modern subjectivity as specifically female and middle-class, consolidates the authority of the bourgeois domestic manager within the household, and brings political conflict under the jurisdiction of the middle-class home. Langland applies Armstrong’s notion of political disorder to class relations more explicitly, asserting in Nobody’s Angels that the Victorian wife “perform[ed] the ideological work of managing the class question and displaying the signs of middle-class status” (9), a phenomenon “stage[d]” by the nineteenth-century novel. The fate of the

10 “The Insurrection of Women” is the title for Book VII of The French Revolution.
Revolutionary Republicans in 1790s France indicates how modern, masculinist, republican culture progressively excluded women from public, political life, and this marginalisation was reinforced across the nineteenth century, even as French women became increasingly conscious of their gendered political exclusion. The return to republicanism during the 1848 revolution further confirmed women’s disenfranchisement in France:

Feminists were caught up in this swarm of activity [in February 1848], attending mixed-gender political meetings and also organizing autonomously. The declaration of universal male suffrage at the outset of the Revolution, however, magnified rather than resolved women’s political subordination. With the failure of the working-class insurrection and the bourgeoisie’s return to power, the government banned all participation of women and minors in the revolutionary clubs. The clubs were dissolved and restricted suffrage returned. Once again, revolution failed to secure women’s rights. (Landes 174)

As in the case of the Revolutionary Republicans, the results of the revolution of 1848 demonstrate that antifeminism could be as ingrained in radical, French political culture as in Victorian conservatism. However, against this pattern of women’s increased exclusion from political life as the revolutionary era unfolded, according to Armstrong’s theory, women could respond to and counter their marginalisation by asserting the domestic woman’s new power in consolidating class identity through her display of gendered status symbols and authority in the household. Overtly conservative women writers like Hamilton and Yonge, as Armstrong’s theory suggests, use domestic ideology to empower

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11 According to Landes, “Beginning in the 1830s [in France], women organized collectively to demand redress from patriarchal institutions. Despite the public silencing of women during the Revolution ... it was then that feminism acquired its modern shape and consciousness” (169). The best-known British feminist of the 1790s, Mary Wollstonecraft, was also galvanised by revolutionary France’s failure to address women’s rights: she dedicates her Vindication of the Rights of Woman to French finance minister Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord in response to the revolutionary government’s report on public education in order to “induce you to reconsider the subject, and maturely weigh what I have advanced respecting the rights of woman and national education” (101). Wollstonecraft continues,

But, if women are to be excluded, without having a voice, from a participation of the natural rights of mankind, prove first, to ward off the charge of injustice and inconsistency, that they want reason— else this flaw in your NEW CONSTITUTION will ever shew that man must, in some shape, act like a tyrant, and tyranny, in whatever part of society it rears its brazen front, will ever undermine morality. (104)
female characters within the home—promoting women’s education as necessary to their
domestic position as mothers, for example—and to frame the home as a model for the
broader community, for men and women alike.

The Romantic-era writers in my discussion test out domestic ideology tentatively and
propose mismatched pairings of modern, affectively bound families and more traditional,
patriarchal families. Burke, for example, equates Versailles, the symbol of old-regime,
patriarchal power, with the “sanctuary” (71) of home, while Hamilton’s Modern
Philosophers represents homes that are regulated by patriarchal authority rather than that
of a female domestic manager, but which nevertheless point toward a developing new
generation of educated, efficient mothers. Burney’s The Wanderer allows characters to
act out various gendered, politicised identities: her radical feminist Elinor Joddrel
attempts to reinforce her revolutionary enthusiasm through unsuccessful masculine
performances of stoic suicide, before she is ultimately tamed by Burney’s effeminate
hero, Harleigh. However, the domestic ideal is entrenched by the 1850s, a key element of
a Victorian ideology that celebrates the domestic “sanctuary” as inviolable, while it
continues to fortify the home against the threat of invasion by the forces of political
disorder. The threat of rape against Burke’s domesticated Marie Antoinette is displaced
in Yonge’s and Dickens’s novels: Yonge’s Louis Fitzjocelyn receives the bullet wound
that stands in for Isabel Conway’s rape by the mob between the barricades in 1848 Paris,
while the sexual threat against Lucie Manette is reduced to Miss Pross’s exaggerated fear
of the “[h]undreds of people” courting Lucie in her home (95), an image of the mob that,
as it turns out, stands in for “only Two” suitors (97), Charles Darnay and Sydney Carton.
Madame Defarge’s peasant sister, instead, is the victim of rape, an act that only seems
possible in Dickens’s old regime, as Dickens’s most violent revolutionaries are
themselves women, Madame Defarge and The Vengeance. In other words, although
Dickens frames the invasion of Lucie’s home by suitors and revolutionaries as a
violation, domestic ideology is so entrenched in his text that Lucie’s physical integrity
must be maintained by the narrative at all costs. The conventional scene of potential rape
by revolutionary men is displaced into the past, onto utterly safe and unthreatening
courtships, and onto images of the intrusive modern state’s surveillance of the home,
demonstrating the extent to which a class and gender ideology that had been radical in its
eighteenth-century origins had been appropriated by antirevolutionary, conservative discourse by 1859.

However, this embrace of domestic ideology by antirevolutionary fiction is, to use Mary Poovey’s term, an uneven development: while Yonge and Dickens build upon Burke’s and Hamilton’s early gestures toward the middle-class, domestic ideal, Burney and Trollope look back to an earlier model of family politics in their representations of the Revolution, identified in the title of Lynn Avery Hunt’s book, The Family Romance of the French Revolution. According to Hunt, the political family romance preceding and continuing into the revolutionary period expressed “the collective, unconscious images of the familial order that underlie revolutionary politics” (xiii). French revolutionaries imagined “replacing” their “political parents” by constructing a family “in which the parents were effaced and the children, especially the brothers, acted autonomously” (xiv). As Chapter 2 will argue, British supporters of the Revolution, such as Helen Maria Williams, embraced the revolutionary family romance in which fraternal bonds and heterosexual romance challenge and replace the patriarchal family, and, by extension, the aristocratic state that upholds patriarchal power. However, some of the antirevolutionary texts under discussion also turn to the family romance model, rather than to domestic ideology, in their representations of family and state. Burney tests out and questions a range of politicised family structures, rejecting flawed fraternal and heterosexual models of the family and state as well as old-regime patriarchy. Even her attempt to represent a sororal family group to replace the male-centred communities that fail her heroine throughout the novel suggests that communities modeled on sisterhood are, at best, an unattainable ideal. As late as 1850, Trollope casts back to the patriarchal model of the family romance to support his melodramatic representation of the Revolution, featuring the betrayal of father and brother figures at the core of his villain Adolphe Denot’s revolutionary plot. Trollope’s use of symbolic, hierarchical configurations of the family in his patriarchal family romance, instead of more conventional Victorian domestic discourse, suggests that although both the political family romance and domestic ideology are crucial to the ways that this cluster of writers thinks about family, the state and Revolution, there is no clear, linear trajectory among these texts with respect to domestic politics: Burke does not reject domesticity because of its association with the
middle classes in the late eighteenth century, nor does Trollope, by virtue of being a Victorian, represent the home in ways identical to Yonge or Dickens. These works draw from a shared pool of overlapping techniques, strategies, political ideals and tropes, but the political positions they take and the goals they express are not always entirely the same. In other words, in continually returning to the family as a social unit that stands in for the broader national community, these texts constantly re-negotiate family politics rather than offering a cumulative testament to the historical development of domestic ideology over this period.  

The question of domestic authority in these novels, furthermore, intersects with a debate about national sovereignty and insularity. Benedict Anderson defines the nation as “an imagined political community— and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (6). Under the threat of political violence, the authors and characters of the novels in question often define their “imagined political communit[ies]” narrowly, policing their limits and retreating behind a concept of community that is circumscribed by familial, affective and local ties. These works construct national identity in a variety of ways, reflecting their characters’ relation to the revolutionary French state and the English or British nation, as well as their authors’ positions within their own imagined communities. The period my study covers, 1789-1860, saw the emergence of the nation-state across Europe, in the British Isles and revolutionary and nineteenth-century France, as well as in the nationalist unification movements that occurred elsewhere in Europe— especially in Germany and Italy— in the revolutionary era, culminating in the events of 1847-1848. Julia M. Wright’s survey of nationalism in this period in “Nationalist Discourses in the British Isles, 1780-1850” offers the helpful distinction between Enlightenment, civic nationalism and Romantic nationalism, two major competing strands of Romantic-era nationalist discourse. The antirevolutionary writers I investigate all explore versions of Romantic nationalism, a discourse in which, Wright notes, “The people belong to the land and the land belongs to the people, a sense of belonging rooted in affection that is emotionally powerful, intrinsic and embedded in their daily lives.

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12 By arguing this position, I wish to make the point that the division between Romantic and Victorian texts in this study often seems arbitrary and artificial. Nonetheless, there are broad shifts that occur between the earlier novels I discuss and the three latest novels, all of which were published in the 1850s. I will return to the historical shifts that occur between the Romantic and Victorian periods in Chapter 5, and in my summary of that chapter below.
through language. To separate people from the homeland or ask them to reframe their affection for it is to violate their sense of self” (164). Beginning with Burke, these antirevolutionary writers frequently use “the rising power of ‘nature’ to authorize ideological positions on the nation” (Wright 168): Burke, for example, uses images of an emotionalised, English body politic and a national community modelled on a naturalised, affective family to promote his conservative interpretation of the British laws and institutions he wishes to uphold, while Burney, Trollope and Yonge imagine community in terms of geographical place. Romantic nationalism, however, could endorse a range of configurations of the national community. In the emerging nation-state of Germany, for example, Romantic nationalism became a key discourse in unification efforts (Wright 166-167); in a period of consolidation and centralisation in the British Isles (Wright 165), antirevolutionary writers could similarly use Romantic nationalism to envision a unified Britain bound by language, geopolitical borders, and a shared history and mythology, as Hamilton and Yonge do. Conversely, Romantic nationalism could also allow antirevolutionary writers to explore sites of difference, as Trollope does in his representation of the Vendean insurgents who define themselves against the centralised French Republic.

Although all of the antirevolutionary writers in my study use the affective discourse of Romantic nationalism in their constructions of a national community, especially by modelling the nation on the domestic communities they represent, their imagined communities are not always insular. Linda Colley’s *Britons* and Margaret Cohen and Carolyn Dever’s *The Literary Channel* propose different but equally helpful ways of reading British national identity in this period. Colley argues that the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries saw the development of a collective British identity that defined itself against an Other, usually French, while Cohen and Dever emphasise transnational, cross-Channel cultural exchange in the development of the modern novel. My analysis of these antirevolutionary novels reveals that British imaginings of the French Revolution use both strategies for defining community, and frequently even introduce other crucial sites of affinity and difference—colonised Ireland for Trollope and economically

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13 See Wright’s discussion of Romantic nationalism’s turn to myth, especially in its construction of the Celtic periphery (165).
colonised Peru for Yonge—against which to test out their configurations of British identity. Hamilton’s novel could best be read in Colley’s terms: her narrative goes to great lengths to enforce a reconciliation between disparate British groups such as the English and the Scottish, Anglicans and dissenters, and only excludes un-reclaimable revolutionaries like the French Goddess of Reason and unscrupulous villain Vallaton from the reconstructed British community that the end of her Modern Philosophers imagines. Yonge likewise draws upon a collective British identity by mobilising foundation myths such as the Arthurian legend, in a move that would seem to allow her to define the British against the French as national Others. Yet, by eventually confining the revolutionary threat to the past and replacing Paris with Lima as the focal point for testing out British identity mid-way through her novel, Yonge shifts away from imagining the British community from within the cross-Channel world of the revolutionary era and toward constructing British identity in terms of the nation’s involvement in transatlantic economic imperialism. Dickens and Burney, furthermore, portray central characters, such as the Manettes, Darnay and Ellis, who self-identify as both English and French, crossing and re-crossing the Channel throughout the revolutionary period. Ultimately, however, Dickens’s characters withdraw to a domestic life located in London, the centre of the British national community, and in doing so, abdicate their French identities.

Trollope’s La Vendée is the only text in this group that appears not to address issues of British identity. Only one British character appears in his novel, and not until the very end, after the action of the plot concludes: the British, in terms of plot at least, feature only as an absence from the text, as outsiders looking in on French affairs. Nonetheless, Trollope’s construction of community does explore problems relevant to the nineteenth-century British national situation: La Vendée is primarily a novel about national marginalisation, reflecting the Revolution’s campaign to establish a state-sanctioned French identity, articulated through what Steven Blakemore describes as a “linguistic xenophobia” (“Revolution in Language” 5) directed against foreign languages and regional patois (“Revolution in Language” 5-6). Trollope’s Vendée, physically located on the fringes of France and culturally excluded from the new French Republic because of its royalism and Catholicism, is, as a result of such centralisation, an example of what
Ernest Gellner calls a culture “led to the dustheap of history” (46), a casualty of the modern nation-state. The Vendée’s marginalisation corresponds with Trollope’s own geographically and culturally peripheral position in Ireland at the time he wrote the novel in the late 1840s, during the Irish famine and 1848 rebellion. Trollope admits in his Autobiography that, although his personal life was happy in Ireland, he felt marginalised as a literary man: “I thought that a man who could write books ought not to live in Ireland,— ought to live within the reach of the publishers, the clubs, and the dinner parties of the metropolis” (132). Trollope’s writing in the 1840s also exhibits an imaginative interest in Ireland, a satellite to Britain positioned somewhat analogously to the Vendée of the 1790s, as his two preceding novels, the Irish tales *The Macdermots of Ballycloran* and *The Kellys and the O’Kellys* attest. Moreover, Trollope constructs *La Vendée* as a national tale in the Irish tradition, further suggesting the extent to which historical narrative creates national identity and imagined solidarity within communities. Thus, while Trollope does not represent British communities directly in his novel, his exploration of political centralisation and marginalisation in *La Vendée* examines concepts of community that are crucial to Britain’s situation with respect to Ireland and the Celtic periphery more broadly.

My analysis of these understudied antirevolutionary texts also uncovers a pattern of recurring images of terror and violence committed against the homes and communities that feature so prominently in these works, suggesting that for antirevolutionary writers violence perpetrated by the state or the mob invades private lives and families, destabilising and fragmenting the discourses of identity and community that these novels examine. Acts of public violence characterise the Revolution’s historical record as well as the texts in my study, much as historical actors on all sides of the Revolution embraced violence in order to enforce their ideological positions as the Revolution entered its extremist, polarised phases. Maximilien Robespierre’s address to the National Convention on 18 Pluviôse illustrates this tendency to adopt violence to bolster ideology: “If the mainspring of popular government in peacetime is virtue, the mainspring of popular government in revolution is virtue and terror both: virtue, without which terror is disastrous; terror, without which virtue is powerless. Terror is nothing but prompt, severe, inflexible justice; it is therefore an emanation of virtue” (115). For Robespierre and his
allies, revolutionary virtue and terror are simply two sides of the same political coin. Terror in the 1790s was a political strategy, a psychological condition and a physical threat. In addition to the violence of the Reign of Terror and the guillotine, public, political violence occurred in the forms of European-wide war and a civil war in the Vendée that saw hundreds of thousands of civilians “systematically exterminated” by the state in 1794 (Heffernan Preface viii).

Moreover, terror had a visible impact on identity constructions and behaviour on both sides of the Channel. Most notably, revolutionary France embraced a culture of performed stoic suicide, as described in Outram’s *The Body and the French Revolution*:

Between 1793 and 1797, 27 members of the National Convention committed or attempted to commit suicide. Of the 58 *conventionnels* who were guillotined in this period, 7 had attempted, often with great bravura, to kill themselves. At least two ministers, Roland and Clavière, did the same, to be followed by Pétion, the former mayor of Paris, and L’Huillier, its Procureur-général-syndic. Many others, well-known figures such as Danton, Babeuf, Darthé and Lavoisier, acted in such a way as to court imprisonment and almost certain death sentence .... In other words, suicide, whether active or passive, had become a predictable part of Revolutionary political culture .... (90)

Colley remarks a similar violent extremism in aristocratic, British political culture in the period:

Think of the Earl of Chatham collapsing in the House of Lords as he made his last manic and incoherent speech against war with America in 1778, or of Edmund Burke flinging a dagger onto the floor of the House of Commons in December 1792 as a symbol of his departure from the Foxite Whigs, and of Charles James Fox bursting into tears in response. Stiff upper-class lips in this period gave way very easily to sobs, histrionics and highly charged rhetoric; and sometimes gave way entirely. In all, nineteen Members of Parliament are known to have committed suicide between 1790 and 1820; more than twenty lapsed into what seemed like insanity, as did their monarch George III. (151-152)
These historical accounts highlight the importance of violence, whether stoic or histrionic, in revolutionary and counterrevolutionary political culture, demonstrating that the adoption of violent symbolism and behaviour was a political weapon on both sides of the Revolution Debate.

The “special kind of emotionalism and violence” (151) that Colley discovers in British political culture in the revolutionary period also finds its way into the antirevolutionary texts that react, often although not always, against revolutionary violence with hysterical violence of their own. Violence in antirevolutionary texts is not limited to the acts of violence—attempted rape, public execution, home invasion—that occur within their plots. Instead, these works perform their own violence against revolutionary ideology and narratives simply by plotting the Revolution in this way. These texts go further than “impos[ing]” order on the external world, as Michel Foucault suggests discourse does in general, when he writes in “The Order of Discourse” that “[w]e must conceive discourse as a violence which we do to things” (67). Antirevolutionary writers combine their plots of revolutionary violence with strategic discursive, representational and narrative violence that illustrates the point Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse make in their introduction to The Violence of Representation: “To regard certain practices as violent is never to see them just as they are. It is always to take up a position for or against them” (9). For example, Dickens’s narrator cannot remain neutral when describing the September Massacres, and, instead, imagines pointing a “well-directed gun” at the revolutionaries in response to their violence (Tale 252). In recognising that these antirevolutionary novelists “take up a position” on revolutionary and counterrevolutionary violence, readers of these works can begin to explore both the “forms of violence that are represented in writing and the violence committed through representation” (Armstrong and Tennenhouse 2) in these texts.

Such “violence committed through representation,” of course, was one part of the Revolution’s project of ending the political structures and culture of the old regime. Revolutionaries thus violently rewrote the old regime’s symbols, replacing Catholicism, for example, with the Cult of Reason, and, later, the Cult of the Supreme Being, or the Old Calendar with the New, renaming the months according to the natural world with the “singular” words Carlyle ridicules in translation as “Snowous, Rainous, Windous” and so
on (2.312). Political writers living through the 1790s, as Burke did, recognise the violence committed against the symbols of the old order, which were threatened, in Blakemore’s words, “with a new linguistic terror in which old words are torn from their historical context, emptied of their historical meaning, and then ‘filled’ with the ‘new’ revolutionary meaning” (“Revolution in Language” 8). The Revolution Debate of the 1790s, then, was fought on the representational level as well as the literal, as opposed models of interpreting and communicating the past and present competed for dominance and narrative authority.

Although these authors may have adhered to a range of political positions in their lives and the texts as a group may lack a clear-cut, linear, consistent political agenda, as discussed above, we can trace their affinity as a collection of antirevolutionary works in the kinds of representational violence they commit against the Revolution and revolutionary narratives. This representational violence, the literary counterpart to repressive government legislation such as William Pitt’s Gagging Acts, predominantly takes two broad forms: that of generating an excessive emotionalism that works to incite violence against revolutionaries, and that of restricting revolutionary energy, often by forcing characters voicing radical political positions to submit to the authority of the antirevolutionary narratives that the authors produce within their texts. Burke’s Reflections promotes a kind of histrionic sensibility that casts the antirevolutionary position as the only position capable of embracing and expressing natural, organic feeling: he pits his own feeling against English Jacobin rationalism, pushing radical sensibility to the sidelines of the Revolution Debate and legitimising the histrionic excess that he aims, much like the “well-directed gun” Dickens’s narrator imagines pointing at Tale’s revolutionaries (252), against the Revolution and its supporters. Violent, emotional excess is, according to Burke’s strategy, and the strategy that Trollope’s melodramatic and Dickens’s sentimental texts later adopt, a valid means of expressing antirevolutionary feeling when hysterical authors, narrators and characters channel their excessive emotion against the appropriate targets: the mob, the voracious male revolutionary, the unsexed female revolutionary. In other words, histrionic excess is used to counter and overwhelm the violence of mobs and stock villains, absorbing and directing revolutionary energy.
toward new purposes that these writers frame as acceptable, legitimate instances of violence.

Hamilton’s satirical text takes a widely different strategic approach from Burke’s, and, along with other Anti-Jacobin novels from the 1790s, attempts to discipline revolutionary energy by confining it to the restricted range of the didactic plot, which punishes supposedly dangerous pro-revolutionary conduct and rewards characters for following conventional rules of morality. Although Hamilton’s novel takes the opposite approach to Burke’s *Reflections*, critiquing excessive sensibility and, in fact, aligning it with revolutionary politics, her strategy is equally violent: by subjecting her characters to a disciplinary, didactic plot, she contains the revolutionary narratives her English Jacobin characters embrace within a novel that reduces and dismisses those narratives, thereby silencing possible alternative political positions to her own. Some later novels in this cluster of antirevolutionary texts follow Hamilton by attempting to confine Revolution to history, constructing, like Trollope, narratives that work to establish their authors’ and narrators’ historical authority, or dismissing, like Yonge, the threats and hopes of a revolutionary era that appears to be irretrievably past. These two strategies, of overwhelming and redirecting revolutionary plots through narratives of histrionic, emotional excess, and of containing and dismissing revolutionary narratives and values, therefore, take opposite approaches to achieving the same goal of performing representational violence against revolutionary texts and perspectives. It is not primarily these novels’ explicit political messages about Revolution that groups them together, then, but their participation in a shared project of using the “well-directed gun” (Dickens *Tale 252*) of representational violence against revolutionary narratives and plots.

**Chapter Outline**

Chapter 2 examines the representational contests over the Revolution and its resonance with imagined configurations of the British community in the 1790s, focusing on Edmund Burke’s 1790 *Reflections on the Revolution in France* and a number of works by Burke’s radical opponents, including Richard Price, Helen Maria Williams, Mary Wollstonecraft and Thomas Paine. Although Burke’s *Reflections* was accused of being excessively theatrical, even to the point of madness, his histrionics are central to his
political endeavour. The overwrought emotional excess Burke claims as his own natural feeling works to recruit affect in the services of the traditional, hierarchical institutions that are threatened by the Revolution and that, he argues, are crucial to the well-being of the British national community he frames as an affective family and emotionalised body politic. Burke’s version of the political family romance attempts to recuperate the image of the French monarchs by recasting and ascribing value to the royal family as representatives of middle-class, affective domestic ideology. He also uses the family romance in the British context in order to construct himself and his contemporaries as heirs to a constitutional legacy provided to them by their historical forefathers, and to assert his representational authority as a symbolic good father, capable of speaking to and for the patriarchal national family. Furthermore, Burke endows the national body politic with a naturalised emotionalism that corresponds to his conservative sensibility and works to overwhelm the radical principles of his opponents by appealing to what he presents as natural feeling. Yet, in employing histrionic excess, Burke leaves himself open to criticism from opponents who, like Wollstonecraft and Paine, recognise the violence underlying Burke’s theatricality, which employs naturalised emotion to bolster institutions protecting exclusive privilege and power. Furthermore, Burke’s opponents critique his sensibility by pointing out its artificiality, potential hypocrisy and tendency toward irrationality, even madness. The contest between Burke and his opponents introduces but does not resolve the representational conflicts surrounding the Revolution, as the histrionics and emotional excess that characterise the Reflections continue to operate within antirevolutionary texts from Hamilton’s Modern Philosophers to Dickens’s Tale of Two Cities.

Chapter 3 explores Hamilton’s Memoirs of Modern Philosophers as an example of the Anti-Jacobin genre, prevalent in the 1790s and early nineteenth century. As a typical Anti-Jacobin novel, Modern Philosophers attempts to contain radical discourse within an authoritative form that reduces and dismisses voices of political dissent. Hamilton, moreover, constructs an illusion of consensus among embedded author, editor and reader figures, who collude with her political project, confirm the authority of Hamilton’s representations of the contests of the 1790s, and dismiss alternative interpretations of the Revolution and British radicalism. The didactic plot that distributes rewards and
punishments for her characters based on their adherence to the behavioural models she promotes, furthermore, subjects Hamilton’s characters to her narrative authority and contains political discourse within the structure of the domestic novel. However, Hamilton’s novel also has a broader, perhaps contradictory, purpose of imagining a post-revolutionary Britain that can move on from the violence of the 1790s. While Hamilton imagines her post-revolutionary community as a more inclusive Britain, she nonetheless brings it into being by committing a form of representational violence that forcibly converts her fictional radicals to her conservative position through discipline, or, if their forced integration into the new community is impossible, by eliminating them from her plots and thereby excluding them from her imagined community. The consensus that emerges among her characters at the novel’s conclusion, then, is a forced consensus that aims to conceal its own violence.

Unlike Reflections and Modern Philosophers, Frances Burney’s The Wanderer, the subject of Chapter 4, does not explicitly commit antirevolutionary representational violence. However, in her twin critiques of unreformed Britain and republican France, Burney points an accusatory finger at both old-regime, patriarchal authority and revolutionary power, indicting the abusive exercise of power that victimises the disenfranchised, especially women, under both configurations of the state. The sexual, economic and social victimisation of Burney’s heroine Ellis appears in images of her geographical marginalisation and exclusion from the insular British community that fortifies itself against her. Although in her wanderings Ellis learns to reconstruct her identity independently of the public, social signifiers that she lacks as an outcast, Burney is ultimately unable to establish a more compassionate, inclusive community for Ellis at the end of the novel. Burney explores possible options for Ellis by returning to the political family romance, but both patriarchal and revolutionary configurations of the family victimise Ellis by subjecting her to masculine aggression, and while Burney attempts to envision a sympathetic sororal community for her heroine, she portrays that possibility as, at best, an unattainable ideal. By focusing Ellis’s subjection to violence through the domestic, Burney ultimately voices her refusal to resolve the conflicts of the 1790s.
Between 1815 and 1850 there is an expressive gap in the production of antirevolutionary novels that corresponds to a period of radical political change in Britain and to the period of transition between Romantic and Victorian literary cultures. This gap is the focus of Chapter 5. British citizens, concerned with their own reformist political projects and the emergence of a national protest movement after Waterloo, responded overwhelmingly favourably to the July Revolution of 1830 and many, at least initially, also welcomed the 1848 French revolution. Thomas Carlyle’s 1837 *The French Revolution: A History*, read in the context of British radicalism and reform in this age of transition, presents an alternative to the antirevolutionary representational legacy I trace in this study. Instead of working to reduce, contain or overwhelm radical and revolutionary texts, symbols and narratives, Carlyle embraces the Revolution’s incoherence, employing a radical, experimental style and formal technique that parallels the Revolution’s democratic enterprise. However, despite his initial support for the French revolution of 1848, Carlyle eventually steps back from his radical position, suggesting a representative shift in British public opinion about French revolution and Chartist agitation in Britain that occurred as 1848 progressed and that replays the kind of retreat from radicalism characteristic of British public opinion in the 1790s. The Chartist and revolutionary crises of 1848 produced two contradictory trends in British thinking about the Revolution that contributed to and characterised the antirevolutionary novel’s re-emergence in the 1850s. In the short term, as fears and anxieties about Revolution revived in 1848, a new generation of British writers confronted the antirevolutionary legacy of the 1790s—its paranoia and histrionics—for the first time. In the long term, the end of the revolutionary era, signalled in Britain by the symbolic failure of the Chartist rally at Kennington Common, seemed to confirm Victorian faith in British moderation and the status quo, facilitating the efforts of antirevolutionary novelists to contain and dismiss revolution from a position of historical distance and political stability.

Anthony Trollope’s *La Vendée*, the subject of Chapter 6, was written in the context of this re-emergence of antirevolutionary sentiment in 1848, and inherits both the Burkean histrionics and the Anti-Jacobin strategies of containing and dismissing the Revolution passed on from the 1790s to the post-1848 world. Combining melodramatic excess with
the conventions of the interrelated national tale and historical novel, Trollope attempts to write the old-regime, deferential culture his royalist Vendean rebels defend with the clear-cut moral stakes of the melodramatic mode, while converting revolution into royalism by framing the Vendean rebels as nationalist insurgents. Trollope’s exploration of the relationship between revolution and incipient nationhood demonstrates his engagement with the stakes of the 1848 ‘springtime of the peoples,’ and, in particular, the position of Ireland in the mid-nineteenth century: Ireland was, like Trollope’s Vendée, a marginalised community victimised by an antagonistic, centralised power. Trollope’s effort to construct an ideal, pre-revolutionary community to oppose the suspicion and centralisation of the modern French state, however, fractures under the historical anxieties that underlie the novel’s attempt to distance the Revolution in the context of the rebirth of revolution across Europe in the 1840s: Trollope’s inability to find closure for his novel suggests the ongoing, immediate relevance of revolution in the Victorian period.

Chapter 7 discusses the most famous Victorian-era fictionalisation of the French Revolution, Charles Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities. Like Burney, Dickens critiques the old regime and revolutionary state, both of which exercise power in dehumanising ways: under the old regime, individuals are reduced to representative social types and marked by the spectacle of absolutist rule, especially the old-regime power to punish, while under the Revolution each individual becomes both the instrument and the object of the state’s disciplinary gaze. However, the unreformed but modern Britain Dickens represents is also subjected to such dehumanising techniques of state control. Charles Darnay’s British treason trial and Dickens’s portrayals of state spies in Britain and in France point to the impact of two particularly British legacies from the revolutionary period, the 1794 Treason Trials and the numerous spy scandals that occurred in the 1790s and first half of the nineteenth century. A Tale of Two Cities thus engages in hitherto unrecognised ways with the political contests of the revolutionary decade. Dickens’s novel also commits the kind of representational violence apparent in other antirevolutionary texts. By promoting Lucie Manette’s domestic community as an alternative to the dehumanising old regime and revolutionary state Dickens provides a model for the national community that is based in the middle-class values of intimacy and compassion that Lucie represents.
However, as the home and domestic circle come under threat by the mob and revolutionary government, Dickens gradually endorses the insular patriotism and militant defence of the domestic sphere that Miss Pross and Sydney Carton represent at the novel’s conclusion. Carton’s sentimental self-sacrifice is particularly violent, encoding the silencing of rival narratives of the revolutionary experience as his plot to replace Darnay at the guillotine assumes representational authority at the end of the novel. The excess emotion generated by the sentimental spectacle of Carton’s death, moreover, is readily converted into antirevolutionary rage and aggression on the part of both Carton and Dickens’s narrator, whose outbursts expose the violence that underlies Tale’s sentimentality.

Although Charlotte M. Yonge’s 1857 novel Dynevor Terrace was published before A Tale of Two Cities, I address it in my final chapter because it fictionalises the 1848 French revolution, rather than the Revolution of the 1790s. Yonge’s domestic novel inherits the strategies of Anti-Jacobin didactic fiction like Hamilton’s. However, her representation of 1848 disciplines and contains both the aggressive energy typically associated with the voracious male revolutionaries of the antirevolutionary tradition and the insular paranoia the antirevolutionary texts in this study themselves promote. By containing both the revolutionary threat and the antirevolutionary representational legacy in the past, Yonge suggests that the mid-Victorian culture she portrays is ready to move away from the violent inheritances of the revolutionary era. To confirm this, Yonge shifts from her cross-Channel exploration of the domestic and national community mid-way through her novel and turns instead to a transatlantic site of difference from the home and homeland she represents: Peru. By turning away from representations of France and revolution in the middle of the novel, Yonge dismisses the legacies of the revolutionary era. Yet, in her exploration of British identity against the backdrop of informal, economic imperialism in South America, Yonge continues to engage with a number of problems that are crucial to the antirevolutionary texts I examine here: the role of the family and affective domestic community in creating a sense of national belonging, the feelings of exile and homelessness that can develop when an individual is removed from that community, and the responsibilities the family and, by extension, the national community have toward its members, especially those who have not always been included.
CHAPTER 2
“IT IS NATURAL TO BE SO AFFECTED”: THE AFFECTIVE NATIONAL FAMILY
AND THE EMOTIONAL BODY POLITIC IN EDMUND BURKE’S REFLECTIONS
AND HIS OPPONENTS

As the French Revolution developed in 1789 and into the 1790s, literary and political
English men and women reacted in a pamphlet war that amounted to a conflict over
representational authority. Edmund Burke’s reactionary Reflections on the Revolution in
France formed the centrepiece of a debate in which radical and conservative parties
staked out the ground for defining the truthful representation of revolutionary events and
ideology, and provoked responses from his political opponents that accused Burke of
histrionic artificiality, hypocrisy and even insanity. The debate between Burke and his
liberal and radical opponents, however, resonates beyond the 1790s, defining the stakes
for representing the Revolution well into the nineteenth century. Burke, Thomas Paine,
Mary Wollstonecraft and other participants in the Revolution Debate ask the key
questions that form the basis for fictional portrayals of the Revolution in works by
Elizabeth Hamilton and Frances Burney during the Napoleonic period and Anthony
Trollope, Charles Dickens and Charlotte M. Yonge in the 1850s. Burke and his
successors confront the problem of how urgent, traumatic experiences of public violence
like the Revolution can be processed and represented from a distance, either geographical
or temporal, and use events in France as a starting point from which to explore the state
of the British community. These writers ask, for example, how can fact and fiction be
distinguished when even first-hand accounts are tainted by rumour and investment in one
political system or another? What kinds of communities are desirable in France and
Britain, what are the boundaries of these communities, and what models should they take
for themselves? What role do affect and sentiment play in cementing the bonds of the
community, and how does sympathy urge the reading public to assume certain political
positions?

Immediately at the moment of its publication on 1 November 1790, Reflections on the
Revolution in France provoked the flurry of responses that have now come to be known
collectively as the English Revolution Debate, a controversy centering on the ways in
which the English could best understand, represent and react to the French Revolution. Increased scholarly interest in the 1790s in recent years has now produced a large body of work on Burke’s role in the Revolution Debate and beyond: anthologies like Marilyn Butler’s *Burke, Paine, Godwin, and the Revolution Controversy* and numerous articles, books and collections document the relationship between Burke and his opponents during the 1790s, his influence on radicals, moderates and conservatives as early hope for the Revolution faded in England,¹⁴ and the long-term legacy of *Reflections* as the major text of reaction against the Revolution. In addition, much criticism has addressed Burke’s influence as a conservative thinker in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.¹⁵

Burke’s political legacy, however, was conflicted, primarily as a result of his inconsistency in assuming a reactionary position with respect to the French Revolution after having supported liberal causes in Ireland, America and India. As Steven Blakemore notes, “It was not just anyone who opposed the Revolution: it was a celebrated and admired member of the House of Commons with a record of support for progressive causes—a man who could not easily be dismissed as ‘reactionary’” (*Intertextual War* 16). Burke’s progressive, Whig politics, especially his support for the American Revolution, criticism of the Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland, and leadership in the impeachment trial of Warren Hastings over abuses in the governance of India, combined


¹⁵ James Sack’s “Edmund Burke and the Conservative Party in the Nineteenth Century” examines what he sees as Burke’s lack of influence on nineteenth-century British conservatives, while Yves Chiron’s “The Influence of Burke’s Writings in Post-Revolutionary France” charts Burke’s relationship to counterrevolutionaries, liberals and historians in nineteenth-century France. Several other essays in Ian Crowe’s collection *The Enduring Edmund Burke: Bicentennial Essays* address Burke’s political legacy in the twentieth century.
with his antirevolutionary position on France, troubled his legacy to British politics throughout the nineteenth century. James Sack notes that the liberal William Gladstone judged Burke to be right on America and Ireland, but wrong on France, adding that “[t]he Conservatives would no doubt, if asked, have reversed the Gladstonian formula, placing Burke as wrong on all save French affairs” (84). The pre-1830 Pittite Tories, Sack argues, faced “an especially serious difficulty in grafting Burke’s generous sympathy for Irish Catholics and native Indians upon the trunk of early-nineteenth-century Toryism” (77), while after 1830 “there was relatively little effort to connect Burke ... with a Tory or conservative interpretation of history, or to see Burke as a particular progenitor of the nineteenth-century Conservative Party” (78), a neglect Sack believes arose from Burke’s position on Ireland (79-80). Nonetheless, Burke broke publicly and decisively with the radical Whig contingent, including Charles James Fox, when *Reflections* appeared. Gregory Claeys surveys Fox’s response to *Reflections*, stating that “Fox loudly proclaimed his view to be ‘wide as the poles asunder’ from Burke’s. Privately he called the book ‘Cursed Stuff’. In Parliament ... he said that, ‘as soon as his [Burke’s] book on the subject was published, he condemned that book both in public and private, and every one of the doctrines it contained’” (“The *Reflections* refracted” 43). Burke’s overall career, therefore, cannot be neatly labelled Tory or Whig, according to eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century English political categories.

Burke’s *Reflections*, however, leaves behind a representational legacy crucial to understanding the fictional narratives of the French Revolution that emerged in Britain in the seven decades following its publication. His work and alternative readings of the Revolution posed by opponents such as Thomas Paine, Mary Wollstonecraft and Helen Maria Williams defined the sites of contestation that occur again and again in subsequent writing about the Revolution. Between Burke and Paine, for example, a debate emerges over the best way to represent political disorder: for Burke, factual accuracy is subservient to the kind of moral and emotional truth he claims to produce through histrionic appeals to emotional excess. Burke uses the emotional capital generated by his histrionics to refute revolutionary versions of the family romance that emerge in revolutionary France and radical British writing of the period, and turn to fraternity and heterosexual romance as revolutionary alternatives to the model of the patriarchal family.
that is strongly affiliated to the hierarchical institutions of the old regime. While Burke defends the patriarchal hierarchy of the old regime against these reconfigured family romances, he also works to recuperate the French royal family and patriarchal British institutions by applying the modern, middle-class discourse of domestic affect outward into the French and British national communities. Finally, he mobilises an image of an emotional British body politic that assumes its national character from what he represents as its natural sensibility, challenging, in the process, the capacity of practitioners of radical sensibility, like Wollstonecraft, to conduct their programmes of benevolence and political justice. In doing all this, Burke uses the Reflections to construct his own authority as the best person to speak to and for the British public by representing himself as the patriarch of a national family bound by affect and, as a man of naturalised sensibility, the spokesperson for English feeling.

“My Friend, I Tell You it is Truth”: Histrionics and the Problem of Representing the French Revolution

Burke’s Reflections and other contributions to the Revolution Debate like Williams’s Letters Written in France, Paine’s Rights of Man and Wollstonecraft’s two Vindications were published in an atmosphere of urgent political crisis, in which the stakes and results of the Revolution were as yet unknown and objective, factual accounts of events were not forthcoming. Misinformation and biased accounts in the newspapers, pamphlets and longer narratives of the Revolution demonstrate the impossibility, and even sometimes the political undesirability for people invested in traditional institutions, of accessing accurate facts about what was occurring across the Channel as well as the urgency and immediacy of the debate about French affairs and their impact on British politics as it unfolded. Although Burke challenges what he sees as the manipulative theatricality of political opponents like Richard Price, who used speech and literature to motivate radical action, he resists critiques that single him out as hysterical and hypocritical, and claims for himself, in the absence of factual accuracy, the ability to access moral and political truths about the Revolution’s impact through his mobilisation of histrionic emotional excess.
The Revolution Debate in its most basic form was a contest for the control of meaning, including the meaning of the events of the Revolution, the meaning of history and national narratives, and the meaning of the language and symbols that structure experience. Steven Blakemore argues extensively that Burke perceived the Revolution and the radical writing it inspired in Britain as threatening his world “with a new linguistic terror in which old words are torn from their historical context, emptied of their historical meaning, and then ‘filled’ with the ‘new’ revolutionary meaning” that thereby “violently fragmented the coherent linguistic community of Europe” (“Revolution in Language” 8, 9). The stakes of such a debate over representational authority were high; as F. P. Lock argues, “For Burke’s contemporaries ... the accuracy of his representations was crucial. They were being asked to make judgements, which by 1793 amounted to war or peace, on the basis of the veracity of his description and the accuracy of his analysis” (20).

Getting the facts straight as the Revolution occurred, however, was not an easy feat. As late as 22 July 1789, a week after the Bastille had fallen, for example, a Times article denied the possibility that the fortress could have been demolished (“The Bastile” 3). Burke’s famous histrionic representation of the raid on Versailles, moreover, is hardly less dramatic than the Times’s spectacular descriptions of the October Days. According to Burke’s rendition,

History will record, that on the morning of the 6th of October 1789, the king and queen of France, after a day of confusion, alarm, dismay, and slaughter, lay down, under the pledged security of public faith, to indulge nature in a few hours of respite, and troubled melancholy repose. From this sleep the queen was first startled by the voice of the centinel at her door, who cried out to her, to save herself by flight— that this was the last proof of fidelity he could give— that they were upon him, and he was dead. Instantly he was cut down. A band of cruel ruffians and assassins, reeking with his blood, rushed into the chamber of the queen, and pierced with an hundred strokes of bayonets and poniards the bed, from whence this persecuted woman had but just time to fly almost naked, and through
ways unknown to the murderers had escaped to seek refuge at the feet of a
king and husband, not secure of his own life for a moment. (71)

Burke is not alone in figuring the October Days as a home invasion and potential rape
scene; his famous description clearly owes its extravagant language to the earliest
accounts of the attack on Versailles that circulated in England. The Times, for example,
represents a mob penetrating the private, domestic space of the palace to attack a
vulnerable Queen in an article with the telling extended title of “France. Confinement of
the King, Queen, and Royal Family, and the Attempt to Murder the Queen”: “At this
moment, the fate of Europe depends on the actions—of A BARBAROUS AND
UNRESTRAINED MOB!—a mob, which has shown itself so licentious, that the country
which claims it, blushes at its cruelties. The MURDER of the QUEEN has been
attempted in the dead of night, while she was in her slumber ...” (2). A subsequent article,
of 13 October, provides the source for Burke’s narrative of Marie Antoinette’s naked
flight to her husband’s chamber: “in the dead of the night a party of the troops and mob
forced their way into the Palace to the Antichamber of the QUEEN’s apartment: the noise
was so sudden, that her Majesty ran trembling to the KING’s apartment with only her
shift on” (“France. Further Detail of the Late Revolution” 2). Unsubstantiated
descriptions of events in the press like these16 provided Burke with the material he
needed to construct a narrative of revolutionary violence.

The authenticity of representations of the Revolution emerging as it occurred
depended, for most writers and readers, not on factual accuracy, which was difficult to
achieve given the available resources and the immediacy of events, but on its relation to
one’s political perspective. As Lock suggests, “The reader is invited either to agree with
Burke’s assessment of the October Days as a scene of almost unparalleled horror, or to

16 Although the Times articles are the most inflammatory, other newspapers also circulated narratives of
violence perpetrated against Marie Antoinette. According to the London Chronicle of 10-13 October, for
example, “At two o’clock on Tuesday morning a considerable number of the persons [the troops and
civilians led to Versailles by Lafayette] who were habited in women’s dresses, but, at it since appears, were
many of them guards, having gained the outward entrances of the castle, forced their way into the palace,
and up the staircase leading to the Queen’s apartment, with an intent (as it is generally supposed), to seize
and murder her” (“Postscript. France” 358). However, the General Evening Post almost immediately
challenged such “exaggerated accounts of the late commotion” and commended the low number of
casualties during the crisis, attributing this outcome to a revolutionary crowd that was either “extremely
moderate” or “judiciously restrained by the national militia” (“Yesterday Arrived the Mails from France”
1).
regard them (with Price) as a proper subject for a ‘triumph’” (29). The immediate threat or potential of the Revolution rendered events either horrific or triumphant, depending on each individual’s political allegiances. Peter Howell’s article, “Burke, Paine, and the Newspapers: An ‘Archaeology’ of Political Knowledge 1789-93,” examines in detail the ways newspapers plotted the Revolution in its early years, arguing that “the equivocal nature of political factuality and truth stems from the whole system of the representation of political events at this time, and that this act of creative imagining is one of the ways in which political activity could legitimately be construed during the 1790s” (358). Howell’s survey of political reporting determines that newspaper writing followed familiar, “widespread generic characteristics,” constituting “the possible ways of construing ‘politics’ or the ‘political arena’” (360). Political events, and the way the population experienced the Revolution, that is, were constructed in the public imagination through their representation in the press.

Howell traces the generic conventions of conservative and radical writing on the Revolution, determining that conservative accounts of French affairs followed the pattern of the court-circular, imagined, and even positioned on the page, alongside the London court news. Like the court-circular proper, such news from France articulated the “outward display of power” (365) determined by social rank: in the early days, “a series of set-pieces are presented to the public, in which the King and the three estates are choreographed in their various oppositions” (366). As the Revolution progressed, newspapers like the London Gazette presented tableaux in which the choreography of power inversions suggests a “‘frustrated’ court-circular” (367). Representations of the invasion of the private spaces of Versailles by the mob during the October Days, the event which became the centrepiece of Burke’s antirevolutionary narrative, are structured by the inversion of the court-circular’s expression of hierarchy. Such “choreograph[y]”—the use of tableaux to articulate power relations in depictions of the Revolution—indicates an affiliation to theatrical modes representation, such as the masque. This points both to the importance of spectacle in enforcing old-regime displays of power, a subject to which I will return in detail in Chapter 7, and to the importance of theatricality in shaping conservative responses to the Revolution, leading to histrionic reactions like Burke’s.
Howell finds that radical discourse, on the other hand, reported on debates and trials “in a minutely faithful representation, rather than as the discontinuous coups de théâtre typical of the spectacular forms of political representation” (372), imposing “a certain kind of juridico-political structure ... on the apparent formlessness of the crowd” (373). Just as the court-circular form of imposing hierarchical structure through reporting was challenged by the Revolution’s inversions of traditional power relations, the radical discourse of rational politics was “consistently confounded by the course of events” as the Revolution became increasingly violent and volatile (374). Burke’s strategy, in his intervention in the representation of French politics, privileges the kind of discourse Howell finds in the choreographed tableaux or “coups de théâtre” (372); his Reflections attempts to vindicate its own use of histrionic excess by appealing to the supposed emotional honesty of its hierarchical representations, claiming a narrative truth that exists beyond and is elevated over factual accuracy.

Despite the ambiguities and complexities of Burke’s career, the sense of crisis surrounding the publication and content of the Reflections exacerbated the histrionic urgency of his pamphlet and facilitated the efforts of his earliest critics in the Revolution Debate to frame his views on France as paranoid and hysterical. Burke composed the pamphlet as a letter addressed to “a very young gentleman at Paris” (3), but also as a response to dissenter Richard Price’s radical sermon celebrating the Revolution, “A Discourse on the Love of our Country,” delivered to the Revolution Society in London on 4 November 1789. Although Burke’s Reflections was not published until a year later, for Burke its composition was marked by urgency and uncertainty; as Claeys comments, “Well aware of the implications and growing sense of public anticipation, he had laboured over the text, revising and redrafting until his exasperated printer, Dodsley, urged a conclusion. He was not, finally, completely pleased with the result” (“The Reflections refracted” 40). The Reflections appeared at the end of 1790 at the “comparatively expensive price of five shillings” (Claeys “The Reflections refracted” 40), and was initially a success, selling well in England and France: L. G. Mitchell notes that it was “an immediate best-seller. Within six months it had sold nineteen thousand copies. By September 1791 it had gone through eleven editions” (vii). In France, the Reflections was translated quickly by Pierre-Gaëtan Dupont and published on 29 November; twenty-
five hundred copies were sold immediately, while ten thousand more were sold in Paris over the next three months and six thousand pirated editions were printed (Chiron 85). For many, including Frances Burney and Horace Walpole, the Reflections produced sympathetic enthusiasm (Claeys “The Reflections refracted” 42), but it also provoked immediate, hostile responses from Burke’s critics. The most famous of these replies, Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Men and Thomas Paine’s Rights of Man appeared quickly: Wollstonecraft’s Rights of Men was published just one month after the Reflections, with a second edition following in the middle of December, and Paine’s Rights of Man was published four months after Burke’s pamphlet, in March of 1791. The haste with which Wollstonecraft’s response appeared is famously encapsulated by the anecdote of her publisher Joseph Johnson’s eagerness to print her work: “as individual manuscript sheets were completed, he had them set, printed, and corrected” (Macdonald and Scherf 9).

The urgency with which the Revolution Debate unfolded and the extreme hostility of the parties toward their opponents demonstrates the sense of immediate crisis in English political thought at that historical moment. Accusations of dishonesty were coupled with ridicule directed at what appeared to be excessive theatricality on all sides. Paine, for example, derides Burke’s pamphlet as an “unprovoked attack” on the French National Assembly (39), referring to the Reflections as a “dramatic performance” (59) that distorts the facts of the events in France in order to produce “stage effect” (60). This was despite the fact that much of the Reflections focuses on interpreting history and the British constitution, especially by contesting Price’s understanding of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and on analysing the new French state, including the composition of the National Assembly and the financial system based on paper money supported by confiscated church property. Burke’s own criticism of Price’s sermon takes the same hostile tone and features the same accusations that Paine would later use against the Reflections; Burke indicts what he perceives as Price’s excessive, manipulative theatricality, claiming that the Revolution Society’s congratulatory message to the French National Assembly was inspired by the emotional excess provoked by Price’s preaching:

On the forenoon of the 4th of November last, Doctor Richard Price, a non-conforming minister of eminence, preached at the dissenting meeting-
house of the Old Jewry, to his club or society, a very extraordinary miscellaneous sermon, in which there are some good moral and religious sentiments, and not ill expressed, mixed up in a sort of porridge of various political opinions and reflections: but the revolution in France is the grand ingredient in the cauldron. I consider the address transmitted by the Revolution Society to the National Assembly, through Earl Stanhope, as originating in the principles of the sermon, and as a corollary from them. It was moved by the preacher of that discourse. It was passed by those who came reeking from the effect of the sermon, without any censure or qualification, expressed or implied. (10-11)

For Burke, the Revolution Society’s radical political action is clearly rooted in the effects of persuasion, particularly in the histrionics of Price’s public speech.

Yet, while Burke condemns Price and the Revolution Society members “who came reeking from the effect of the sermon” (11), he is famous for deploying his own histrionic methods both in Reflections and in the House of Commons. Tim Gray and Paul Hindson argue that “the drama of the Revolution itself demanded a dramatic response” (203), and Anne Mallory suggests that the intensity of Burke’s histrionics in the Reflections is produced by the fact that Burke “appears in a new character” (234), publicly framing himself for the first time in terms of reaction instead of progress, and “giving a performance it is impossible not to watch” (235). Histrionics, however, were not new territory for Burke in the 1790s. His parliamentary speeches were the foundation of his career, and his personal sense of their importance is evident in the exceptional fact for the period that he prepared many of them for the press himself (Reid Edmund Burke and the Practice of Political Writing 106). Gray and Hindson claim that Burke “so perfected the techniques of histrionics that the House was packed whenever he chose to speak” (205), and during the impeachment of Warren Hastings in particular Burke was at his dramatic best: “his speeches had a spectacular effect on the public which had gathered to hear them. His description of the horrors of tax extortion in Bengal drew gasps from the galleries, and, if one is to believe the reports, rendered Mrs Sheridan senseless” (Reid Edmund Burke 128).
However, Burke’s speech breaking with Fox’s party during the Revolution in order to support the government’s repressive measures in the 1792 Alien Bill, as recounted in William Cobbett’s *Parliamentary History*, best exemplifies his willingness to mobilise spectacle for political effect:

[Here Mr. Burke drew out a dagger which he had kept concealed, and with much vehemence of action threw it on the floor.]\(^{17}\) This, said he, pointing to the dagger, is what you are to gain by an alliance with France: wherever their principles are introduced, their practice must follow. You must guard against their principles; you must proscribe their persons. He then held the dagger up to public view, which he said never could have been intended for fair and open war, but solely for murderous purposes. It is my object, said he, to keep the French infection from this country; their principles from our minds, and their daggers from our hearts. (189)

This theatrical use of the dagger as a prop symbolising France’s “murderous purposes” and the “French infection” that Burke supposes will penetrate English “minds” and “hearts” is clearly intended to provoke his audience to an excessive emotional response against France and in support of the government’s bill.

The question of how Burke could criticise Price’s politicised theatricality while deploying the techniques of histrionics so constantly himself was largely beside the point for participants in the Revolution Debate,\(^ {18}\) whose critiques of histrionics focus almost entirely on the importance of conveying the supposed truth about the Revolution, rather than on theatricality itself. It is the content of Price’s and Burke’s histrionic performances, in other words, not their form and style, that offends their opponents.

\(^{17}\) Cobbett’s brackets.

\(^{18}\) Several recent critics do debate the place of theatre in Burke’s writing, however. Frans De Bruyn claims that the metaphor of the Revolution as “grand, tragic theatre must be one of the most sustained leitmotifs running through the outpouring of letters, pamphlets, speeches, and treatises that the events in France provoked from Burke’s prolific pen” (*The Literary Genres of Edmund Burke* 164), while Christopher Reid argues in “Burke’s Tragic Muse: Sarah Siddons and the ‘Feminization’ of the *Reflections*” that *Reflections* is shaped by the generic conventions of Restoration and eighteenth-century tragedy (2). According to Elizabeth D. Samet’s “Spectacular History and the Politics of Theater: Sympathetic Arts in the Shadow of the Bastille,” the *Reflections* is constructed as a “didactic melodrama” (1309) in which “Burke articulates an ethic of spectatorship that accords moral utility to the pity aroused by tragedy” (1310). Anne Mallory’s “Burke, Boredom, and the Theater of Counterrevolution” claims that Burke’s histrionics counter the urge for “bored and restless revolutionaries [to] seek out popular spectacles” (225) like Price’s sermon, but ultimately replicate the kind of extreme theatrical effects he endeavours to contain (227).
Paine’s complaint about Burke’s theatricality is based in his contention that Burke’s facts are wrong. Before introducing his own account of the October Days of 1789 as a rebuttal to Burke’s description of the raid on Versailles and Marie Antoinette’s bedchamber, Paine claims, “I cannot consider Mr Burke’s book in scarcely any other light than a dramatic performance; and he must, I think, have considered it in the same light himself, by the poetical liberties he has taken of omitting some facts, distorting others, and making the whole machinery bend to produce a stage effect” (59). Through this criticism, Paine undermines Burke by reducing his Reflections to a fiction, the “poetical liberties” of a “dramatic performance,” instead of a political truth. This strategy of subordinating Burke’s fiction to Paine’s supposed fact appears most forcefully when Paine develops the distinction between drama and history:

As to the tragic paintings by which Mr Burke has outraged his own imagination, and seeks to work upon that of the readers, they are very well calculated for theatrical representation, where facts are manufactured for the sake of show, and accommodated to produce, through the weakness of sympathy, a weeping effect. But Mr Burke should recollect that he is writing History, and not Plays; and that his readers will expect truth, and not the spouting rant of high-toned exclamation. (49-50)

Paine suggests that, though Burke’s “imagination” may be “outraged” by his histrionics, his representations are finally hypocritically “calculated” and “manufactured,” manipulating his readers’ emotional “weakness[es]” instead of convincing them with “truth.” Paine also substitutes himself for Burke’s most demanding and critical readers, speaking for their expectations and aligning himself with a rational reading public that looks for “truth” in political writing and resists the manipulation that “weeping” readers might fall victim to.

Burke’s accusations against Price and the Revolution are strikingly similar to Paine’s anti-theatrical reading of the Reflections. The “porridge of various political opinions and reflections” that characterises Price’s address to the Revolution Society sends its audience “reeking” (11) from the effects of dishonest, manipulative political discourse, as Burke goes on to explain:
For my part, I looked on that sermon as the public declaration of a man much connected with literary caballers, and intriguing philosophers; with political theologians, and theological politicians, both at home and abroad. I know they set him up as a sort of oracle; because, with the best intentions in the world, he naturally philippizes, and chaunts his prophetic song in exact unison with their designs. (11)

Price’s interpretation of the French and Glorious Revolutions, in this view, is predetermined and tainted by the political “designs” of those radicals behind the Revolution in France and urging the same in England. The Revolution Society, Burke argues, is attracted to the French Revolution because of its love of “magnificent stage effect” and “grand spectacle” (65). The Revolution itself, he claims, is a “monstrous tragi-comic scene” (10), the procession of the royal family from Versailles is “the most horrid, atrocious, and afflicting spectacle, that perhaps ever was exhibited to the pity and indignation of mankind” (67), and the National Assembly is a “profane burlesque” of representative assemblies (69). Accusations of theatricality, therefore, coalesce around revolutionary speech and action just as absolutely as they characterise the reception of the *Reflections*.

Burke, however, does not critique tragedy or the theatre themselves, but, like the confused “porridge” of Price’s sermon (11), their “monstrous” (10), unnatural incarnation in France. He writes, “Every thing seems out of nature in this strange chaos of levity and ferocity, and all sorts of crimes jumbled together with all sorts of follies. In viewing this monstrous tragi-comic scene, the most opposite passions necessarily succeed, and sometimes mix with each other in the mind; alternate contempt and indignation; alternate laughter and tears; alternate scorn and horror” (10). While for Paine, “History,” “truth” (50) and “facts” (59) are privileged over drama, in Burke’s writing supposedly natural feeling is contrasted to monstrosity.¹⁹ Truth, in Burke’s view, is apparent to natural

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¹⁹This is not to say that Burke never questions his opponents’ facts: he describes Price’s list of the fundamental rights of the English “fictitious” (16), referring to the specific claim that the King holds his crown at the choice of the people as “a gross error of fact” (15), and argues that radicals like Price are “sophisters” who combat the “old fanatics” supporting divine right (26) by “alleging a false fact, or promulgating mischievous maxims” (27). However, as I will show below, Burke locates the source of his political and historical facts in what he describes as natural sentiment rather than focusing on interpreting constitutional questions.
sensibility, and can be represented through theatre. Truthful theatre, Burke believes, can teach morality; he writes about the October Days,

Some tears might be drawn from me, if such a spectacle were exhibited on the stage. I should be truly ashamed of finding in myself that superficial, theatric sense of pained distress, whilst I could exult over it in real life. With such a perverted mind, I could never venture to shew my face at a tragedy. People would think the tears that Garrick formerly, or that Siddons not long since, have extorted from me were the tears of hypocrisy; I should know them to be the tears of folly.

Indeed the theatre is a better school of moral sentiments than churches, where the feelings of humanity are thus outraged. (80-81)

Histrionic performance, according to this argument, can be a valuable tool of emotional education, if it expresses honest sentiment.

Burke, moreover, insists on the honesty of his theatrics. For example, he frames his account of the raid on Versailles as historical truth, beginning that section of the Reflections with the statement “History will record ...” (71), endowing the narrative of domestic outrage perpetrated against the royal family, and especially Marie Antoinette, the section of the Reflections most characteristic of Burke’s histrionic, emotional excess, with a claim for its representational legitimacy despite its dramatic fictionalisation of the bare facts. Predicting the nature of the debate between Burke and Paine, Burke’s friend Philip Francis challenged his representation of Marie Antoinette in the manuscript of the Reflections, writing in a private letter,

In my opinion all that you say of the Queen is pure foppery. If she be a perfect female character you ought to take your ground upon her virtues. If she be the reverse it is ridiculous in any but a Lover, to place her personal charms in opposition to her crimes. Either way I know the argument must proceed upon a supposition; for neither have you said anything to establish her moral merits, nor have her accusers formally tried and convicted her of guilt. On this subject, however, you cannot but know that the opinion of the world is not lately but has been many years decided. But in effect when you assert her claim to protection and respect on no other topics but
those of gallantry and beauty and personal accomplishments, you virtually abandon the proof and assertion of her innocence, which you know is the point substantially in question. (Cobban and Smith 86-87)

Francis refers to the “opinion of the world ... many years decided” on Marie Antoinette as evidence that Burke’s audience will not accept his sympathetic portrait of the Queen, but Burke’s response argues that his defence of Marie Antoinette expresses a personal emotional truth existing apart from rumour and public opinion:

I tell you again that the recollection of the manner in which I saw the Queen of France in the year 1774 and the contrast between that brilliancy, Splendour, and beauty, with the prostrate Homage of a Nation to her, compared with the abominable Scene of 1789 which I was describing did draw Tears from me and wetted my Paper. These Tears came again into my Eyes almost as often as I lookd at the description. They may again. You do not believ e this fact, or that these are my real feelings, but that the whole is affected, or as you express it, “downright Foppery”. My friend, I tell you it is truth— and that it is true, and will be true, when you and I are no more, and will exist as long as men— with their Natural feelings exist. (Cobban and Smith 91)

Burke vehemently asserts that his emotionalism articulates the truth of his “Natural feelings,” that his “Tears” are “real,” “truth,” and even “fact.” Moreover, he contrasts the emotionally honest tears his own representation of events produces in him with the monstrosity of revolutionary theatre, the “abominable Scene of 1789.” Burke, like Paine, looks for truth in representation, but accepts the use of histrionics if they seem to confirm a supposed emotional, natural truth; the “porridge” (11) of Price’s discourse and the Revolution’s perverse “monstrous tragi-comic scene” (10), Burke believes by contrast, do not.

Burke stakes his claim to representational truthfulness at a time when factual authenticity was difficult or impossible and even all eye-witness accounts appeared to be tainted by misinformation or political bias on the supposed natural sentiment and emotional honesty with which he enhances his fictionalisation of events in France. If the Revolution itself is a theatre of monstrosity, the Reflections suggests, then Burke’s
reaction against it can constitute an opposing theatre of moral, emotional and political
instruction. Having attempted to establish the legitimacy of his histrionics as a means of
representing the truth about the Revolution, Burke mobilises his appeal to the emotions in
his imagining of the British community.

“Our Dearest Domestic Ties”: The Revolutionary Family Romance and Burke’s
Affective State

One crucial arena toward which Burke directs the emotional excesses generated by his
histrionics is his representation of the family, and by extension, the nation, which takes
the family as its model. Burke’s royal family and his use of the family as a metaphor for
state institutions responds to changes in the conceptualisation of the family in the pre-
revolutionary period, including the rise of the companionate marriage and the emergence
of affect as the central organising principle for the nuclear family. More importantly,
however, Burke’s representation of the family reacts against the revolutionary family
romance that was embraced by French and English radicals leading up to and during the
Revolution. The revolutionary family romance symbolised the overthrow of patriarchy
and the French monarch, Louis XVI, and their replacement with families configured
around fraternity and marriage. Burke’s representations of the family in Reflections, as a
response to the radical family romance, is designed to recuperate the image of the French
royal family, and with them, the hierarchical, patriarchal institutions they stand for, by
endowing the monarchs with the emotional commitment associated with the emerging
companionate, affectionate family. Burke thus extends the emotional loyalty he
establishes for the family into the public sphere, making affect the basis for national
belonging and the functioning of the state.

Imagined communities centring on the family formed a central part of the debate
about the role of the state during the Revolution: the traditional, patriarchal family
seemed analogous with old-regime social stratification, while new concepts of the state
and marriage as social contracts emerged in tandem. Lawrence Stone’s The Family, Sex
and Marriage in England 1500-1800 traces changes in the configuration of the family
across the early modern period and into the eighteenth century, focusing on the shift from
what he calls the Open Lineage Family to the Restricted Patriarchal Nuclear Family, and,
finally, to the Closed Domesticated Nuclear Family by the mid-eighteenth century. The development of the Closed Domesticated Nuclear Family, he argues, “was the decisive shift, for this new type of family was the product of the rise of Affective Individualism. It was a family organized around the principle of personal autonomy, and bound together by strong affective ties” (7). What Stone calls the “four key features of the modern family—intensified affective bonding of the nuclear core at the expense of neighbours and kin; a strong sense of individual autonomy and the right to personal freedom in the pursuit of happiness; a weakening of the association of sexual pleasure with sin and guilt; and a growing desire for physical privacy” (8) had all emerged by the outbreak of Revolution. The crucial components to creating the modern nuclear family include ideas about and the practice of companionate marriage and the emergence of more affectionate relationships between parents and children. This new kind of family, however, also developed alongside radical political theory. According to Stone, “The practical need to remodel the political theory of state power in the late seventeenth century ... brought with it a severe modification of theories about patriarchal power within the family and the rights of the individual” (240); if, according to social contract theory, the state was established on a contractual basis, “[m]arriage was now similarly a contract” (240).

Metaphors describing the state as a family with the monarch, a father figure, as its head, were not new in the eighteenth century, but before and during the Revolution different formulations for the state were imagined in terms of new domestic configurations. Lynn Avery Hunt’s *The Family Romance of the French Revolution* reads attitudes toward the state and family in French literature, art and public life in the period in terms of the various incarnations of the revolutionary family romance, which she defines as “the collective, unconscious images of the familial order that underlie revolutionary politics” (xiii). Hunt argues that “family romances ... helped organise the political experience of the Revolution; revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries alike had to confront the issues of paternal authority, female participation, and fraternal solidarity” (xv). Before the Revolution, Hunt notes, a softened concept of patriarchal power, or “the ideal of the good father” (17) emerged, and was a crucial feature of the

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French royal family’s public image: “Louis XVI and Marie-Antoinette appeared in popular paintings, drawings, and engravings as examples of virtue and beneficence— the good parents— rather than in old-style dynastic glory” (20). Despite efforts to rewrite patriarchal authority in more positive terms, French literature prepared the symbolic ground for the Revolution by gradually minimising the importance of father figures across the eighteenth century (Hunt 27-28), revealing what Hunt describes as an “inherently antipatriarchal” undercurrent (28). The Revolution itself enacted the complete erasure of the father figure in the trial and execution of the King, then known as Louis Capet, and developed a concept of the family and state based on fraternity (Hunt 53-67), including new laws addressing the patriarchal authority of lettres de cachet, primogeniture and divorce (Hunt 40-43). In Hunt’s words, “The contractual association of free individuals was now supposed to replace the patriarchal family despotically controlled by the father as the fundamental unit of the new polity” (42). Fraternity was articulated in the Revolution’s “collective leadership” (Hunt 73) and in the state’s new authority over family affairs: as Hunt explains, “Society and the state were now asserting the superiority of their claims over the family” (66).

Versions of the revolutionary family romance also appeared across the Channel, as English radicals incorporated it into their writing about the Revolution. A government, Wollstonecraft claims, can fail in its responsibilities toward its poor citizens, and, in such cases, “cannot be called a good parent, nor inspire natural (habitual is the proper word) affection, in the breasts of children who are thus disregarded” (Rights of Men 47). Paine uses the generational conflict at the core of the family romance to vindicate his claim that forms of government should not be inherited as tradition, but determined by each new generation:

There never did, there never will, and there never can exist a parliament, or any description of men, or any generation of men, in any country, possessed of the right or the power of binding and controlling posterity to the ‘end of time,’ or of commanding forever how the world shall be governed, or who shall govern it .... Every age and generation must be as free to act for itself, in all cases, as the ages and generations
which preceded it. The vanity and presumption of governing beyond the grave, is the most ridiculous and insolent of all tyrannies. (41-42)

New generations of children, here, take the place of the fraternal band of brothers who formed the revolutionary leadership in France.

Helen Maria Williams’s eye-witness account of the Revolution, *Letters Written in France, in the Summer 1790*, published, like *Reflections*, in November of that year, and thus competing directly with Burke’s version of events, rejoices extensively in the anti-patriarchal content of the family romance, celebrating the National Assembly’s measures against primogeniture and deriding the power of the father figure in the old regime. Her description of the National Assembly at work is followed by an emotional tribute to the Revolution’s fraternal spirit:

I was interrupted by a visitor, who related a little incident, which has interested me so much, that I can write of nothing else at present, and you shall therefore have it warm from my heart. While the National Assembly were deliberating upon the division of property among brothers, a young man of high birth and fortune, who is a member of the Assembly, entered with precipitation, and, mounting the tribune, with great emotion informed the Assembly, that he had just received accounts that his father was dying; that he himself was his eldest son, and had come to conjure the Assembly to pass, without delay, that equitable decree, giving the younger sons an equal share of fortune with the eldest, in order, he said, that his father might have the satisfaction, before he breathed his last, of knowing that all his children were secure of provision. If you are not affected by this circumstance, you have read it with very different feelings from those with which I have written it: but if, on the contrary, you have fallen in love with this young Frenchman, do not imagine your passion is singular, for I am violently in love with him myself. (89)

In addition to applauding the National Assembly’s enactment of the fraternal family romance in its abolition of primogeniture, Williams represents two of the other important shifts in the French concepts of the state and the family in the period: the disappearance of the good father, who is incapable of acting out the reforms he might wish on his own,
even within his own family, and the growing authority and intervention of the state in family affairs. Williams’s violent emotion, especially her “passion” for “this young Frenchman,” also points to her own configuration of the family romance, in which romantic love features as the most important social and familial component. In “Helen Maria Williams and Edmund Burke: Radical Critique and Complicity,” Matthew Bray notes that “the primary human relationship for Williams, the one that forms the paradigm for her political discussions, is heterosexual love” (8). In the embedded narrative of the du F—— family in her Letters (114-140), Williams locates the evils of the old regime in the power of patriarchy, and finds promise for the future in companionate marriage. In the du F—— family romance, Mons du F—— is persecuted by his father, the Baron, for secretly marrying the sympathetic Monique C——. Mons du F—— is imprisoned through a lettre de cachet obtained by the Baron before escaping to England and reuniting with his wife. According to Williams, the du F——’s history “is a good excuse for loving the revolution” (140). Although she models her politics on a family romance of heterosexual love and emotional friendship, continuing, “What, indeed, but friendship, could have led my attention from the annals of imagination to the records of politics; from the poetry to the prose of human life?” (140), Williams’s account of the du F—— story is also an appeal for further state regulation of private life and intervention for the enforcement of compassionate conduct within and without the home: “May the fate of the captive, in the land of France, no more hang suspended on the frail thread of the pity, or the caprice of individuals! May justice erect, on eternal foundations, her protecting sanctuary for the oppressed; and may humanity and mercy be the graceful decorations of her temple!” (132). Despite the importance Williams places on personal affect, then, she ultimately argues that individual compassion must be transformed into and enacted as state-sanctioned justice: the revolutionary state must intervene in family relationships and make domestic affect into law.

Burke’s contribution to 1790s representations of the family in Reflections is designed to recuperate, through affect, the image of the French royal family, and with them the

21 This is not, of course, true for all English radicals. While Wollstonecraft, for example, is continually drawn to heterosexual love in her writing, her characters, such as Maria in The Wrongs of Woman, often become disillusioned with their lovers. Maria’s “romantic expectations” (77) are shattered when her husband, Venables, imprisons her in a madhouse and her new lover, Darnford, abandons her. In this formulation, husbands are as complicit as fathers in the patriarchal repression of women.
figure of the good father and authority of history and tradition, to enforce gender
differentiation by imagining a sovereign domestic sphere, and to align love of the family
with love of one’s social rank through a vindication of patriarchal inheritance and
property privileges. Burke mobilises the emotional tools of conservative sensibility to
imagine the monarchy as both a private family with its own affective ties and as a key
part of the French national family, deserving reverence and love. In Radical Sensibility:
Literature and ideas in the 1790s, Chris Jones argues that coexisting conservative and
radical tendencies in the culture and discourse of sensibility over the eighteenth century
became polarised in the 1790s, a split that Jones locates “in the confrontation between
Burke and [William] Godwin over the French Revolution” (23), and, above all, in the
publication of Burke’s Reflections (85). Radicals such as Godwin and Wollstonecraft,
according to Jones, deploy sensibility “emphasizing action and intervention” in their
work (9), focusing on “universal benevolence” by opposing it to “the partial affections”
(108), or “those family loyalties which narrowed the range of benevolence and
perpetuated inequality” (64). For Godwin in particular, justice and principle, rather than
“the partial affections” (Jones 108) that an individual feels for a friend or family member,
should motivate his or her actions. The famous example in his Enquiry Concerning
Political Justice of the justice of saving Fénelon, “the illustrious archbishop of
Cambray,” from a fire rather than his less socially valuable chambermaid (1:82)
illustrates Godwin’s efforts to divorce benevolence from domestic affect and unite it to
his principle of justice as social utility:

Supposing I had been myself the chambermaid, I ought to have chosen
to die, rather than that Fenelon should have died. The life of Fenelon was
really preferable to that of the chambermaid. But understanding is the
faculty that perceives the truth of this and similar propositions; and justice
is the principle that regulates my conduct accordingly. It would have been
just in the chambermaid to have preferred the archbishop to herself. To
have done otherwise would have been a breach of justice.

Supposing the chambermaid had been my wife, my mother or my
benefactor. This would not alter the truth of the proposition. The life of
Fenelon would still be more valuable than that of the chambermaid; and
justice, pure, unadulterated justice, would still have preferred that which was most valuable. Justice would have taught me to save the life of Fenelon at the expense of the other. What magic is there in the pronoun “my,” to overturn the decisions of everlasting truth? My wife or my mother may be a fool or a prostitute, malicious, lying or dishonest. If they be, of what consequence is it that they are mine? (1:82-83)

For Burke, conversely, “the partial affections” (Jones 108)—the private bonds shared by family members and friends—are what hold society together. He uses the language of the affective family to emotionally confirm traditional hierarchy, including the patriarchal family. In Jones’s words, in works of conservative sensibility, “The affectualization of the child-parent bond, like that of the wife-husband bond, all too often rendered submission an exalted act of emotional loyalty” (7). Burke, moreover, uses his version of an affective patriarchal family as an analogue to political institutions, extending the subject’s emotional loyalty to the nation and the monarchy. As Evan Radcliffe writes in “Burke, Radical Cosmopolitanism, and the Debates on Patriotism in the 1790s,” “for him family affections are not only the source of national affections, a developmental step, but also a paradigm or image by which we understand national affections” (325). Like Williams, who imagines a French state which institutionalises compassion, Burke exploits affection in order to support a particular kind of government, the traditional monarchy.

Burke demonstrates that he understands the anti-patriarchal violence at the centre of the revolutionary family romance, and counters it by recuperating an affective image of the national family. For example, Burke portrays the state in need of reform as a wounded father, demanding and deserving reverence. Every man, Burke argues, should approach to the faults of the state as to the wounds of the father, with pious awe and trembling sollicitude. By this wise prejudice we are taught to look with horror on those children of their country who are prompt rashly to hack that aged parent in pieces, and put him into the kettle of magicians, in hopes that by their poisonous weeds, and wild incantations, they may regenerate the paternal constitution, and renovate their father’s life. (96)
Here, Burke draws on the family romance’s images of parricide, or the “aged parent” hack[ed] ... in pieces,” to produce emotional loyalty to the establishment. The image of the “paternal constitution” in particular speaks the languages of both family affect and institutional legality.

Burke’s most important mobilisation of family loyalty in defence of hierarchical institutions, however, appears in his description of the raid on Versailles, discussed briefly above. In his portrayal of the October Days, Burke represents a domesticated royal family under threat of revolutionary violence.22

    History will record, that on the morning of the 6th of October 1789, the king and queen of France, after a day of confusion, alarm, dismay, and slaughter, lay down, under the pledged security of public faith, to indulge nature in a few hours of respite, and troubled melancholy repose. From this sleep the queen was first startled by the voice of the centinel at her door, who cried out to her, to save herself by flight— that this was the last proof of fidelity he could give— that they were upon him, and he was dead. Instantly he was cut down. A band of cruel ruffians and assassins, reeking with his blood, rushed into the chamber of the queen, and pierced with an hundred strokes of bayonets and poniards the bed, from whence this persecuted woman had but just time to fly almost naked, and through ways unknown to the murderers had escaped to seek refuge at the feet of a king and husband, not secure of his own life for a moment.

    This king, to say no more of him, and his queen, and their infant children (who once would have been the pride and hope of a great and

22 Critics often comment on Burke’s representation of a domesticated monarchy. Elizabeth D. Samet argues that the invasion of Versailles “constitutes a domestic calamity” and that Burke represents the monarchs “in their personal capacities as husband and wife, father and mother” (1309). John C. Whale is not convinced by Burke’s presentation of the monarchs, claiming that he “exploit[s] the rather unpromising raw material of Louis XVI as king, father, and man; and Marie Antoinette (much more problematically and certainly not equally) as Queen, mother, virgin, and rape-victim” (“Literature and Symbolic Representations” 347). For other critics, such as Seamus Deane and Ronald Paulson, the royal family exists in contrast to the revolutionaries who attempt its destruction: Deane argues that Burke establishes a “sovereign antithesis ... between the family, represented by the French Royal Family of Louis XVI, Marie Antoinette, and their son, the Dauphin, and the cabal, represented by the philosophes and their terrorist descendants, the Revolutionary mob” (The French Revolution 7), while Paulson claims, “we see Burke opposing a vigorous (‘active’), unprincipled, rootless, masculine sexuality, unleashed and irressible, against a gentle aristocratic family, patriarchal and based on bonds of love” (246).
generous people) were then forced to abandon the sanctuary of the most splendid palace in the world, which they left swimming in blood, polluted by massacre, and strewed with scattered limbs and mutilated carcases. (71)

In this passage, Burke represents the mob acting out the revolutionary family romance of the attack on the father figure, while countering that narrative with his own attempt to merge Louis XVI's kingly and domestic roles under the affective discourse of the national family. He allies his sensibility with the family at Versailles, and, by extension, the national family under threat. Louis XVI is “a king and husband” to Marie Antoinette, while she is both a Queen and a “persecuted woman.” These roles, Burke implies, are inseparable, and any emotion produced in his audience in the contemplation of a private “domestic calamity” (Samet 1309) is therefore extended to an attack on the monarchy as an institution. The description of Louis XVI as “a king and husband,” furthermore, softens the image of the father figure, aligning him with the affect associated with companionate marriage.

Burke consolidates the link between the royal family and the national family by mentioning the “infant children (who once would have been the pride and hope of a great and generous people)” (71), a representational move that positions the French as the neglectful parents of the royal children, undermining the version of the family romance that writes the revolutionaries as adult children rebelling against a tyrannical father. In fact, he suggests, the revolutionaries are themselves the bad parents; Burke likens the National Assembly’s experiments with designing a constitution to a parent’s abuse of a child, framing the old-regime establishment as the child in the Assembly’s care: “in these gentlemen [of the National Assembly] there is nothing of the tender parental solicitude which fears to cut up the infant for the sake of an experiment” (167). By portraying the revolutionaries as unfit parents, Burke invests his representation of a national family with a certain amount of fluidity; he recuperates the image of the good father in Louis XVI, denying the revolutionaries the justification that they are rebelling against tyranny, but he also implies that revolutionary France cannot stand in for the royal father because its interventions in family life result in the numbing of affect, as represented in the national neglect of the royal infants and destruction of French institutions. In other words, Burke focuses his efforts on producing emotional commitment to the family, the monarchy and
the nation by positing various configurations of the family that highlight the contrast between the emotionalised family at Versailles and the revolutionaries who threaten the family itself and what Burke calls the “public affections” (78), or the role of affect in national politics. Burke believes that “[w]e begin our public affections in our families” (198); his famous lament that that “the age of chivalry is gone” (76) is consistent with his effort to recuperate affection for state institutions, as he expresses the concern that without chivalry “[n]othing is left which engages the affections on the part of the commonwealth” (77). The “pleasing illusions” of chivalry, Burke argues, “incorporated into politics the sentiments which beautify and soften private society” (77). The fact that Burke dates the revolution in “sentiments, manners, and moral opinions” from the October Days (80) testifies the extent to which attachment to the royal family features at the core of his vision of an affective national family, tied to the traditional state and its institutions.

In order to further cement the role of affect in confirming social hierarchy, and, in particular, loyalty to the monarchy, Burke attempts to revise the public image of the French Queen, Marie Antoinette, by portraying her as a victimised woman, vulnerable even in her own private chambers, and “seek[ing] refuge at the feet of a king and husband” (71). By imagining the raid on Versailles as a rape, in which “[a] band of cruel ruffians and assassins, reeking with ... blood, rushed into the chamber of the queen, and pierced with an hundred strokes of bayonets and poniards the bed, from whence this persecuted woman had but just time to fly almost naked” (71), Burke constructs a representational link between threats against the monarchy and the sexual integrity of the domestic woman, the physical sovereignty of the private home, and the emotional solidarity of the affective family. Burke further consolidates his association of the home and the monarchy with the “public affections” (78) when he laments that “[a]ll the decent drapery of life is to be rudely torn off” (77), linking the revolution in “sentiments, manners, and moral opinions” (80) not only with the potential invasion of the home and destruction of the affective family, but specifically with the threat of rape against the Queen. This is a substantial transformation of the public image of Marie Antoinette, which, as his friend Philip Francis noted in his letter to Burke, “ha[d] been many years decided” (Cobban and Smith 87), and not in the Queen’s favour. Historians like Hunt and
Sarah Maza argue that Marie Antoinette’s public reputation for immorality expresses the anxiety revolutionaries and reactionaries alike felt about women’s public role at the time of the Revolution. Maza traces revolutionary antifeminism to the perceived “feminization, eroticization, or privatization of the public sphere under Louis XV,” which was accompanied by “the growing public role of the women who ruled over him, and not surprisingly, for Pompadour and Du Barry had begun their careers as public women” (68). The tradition of hostility to Louis XV’s influential mistresses was transferred to Marie Antoinette before and during the Revolution (Maza 69), as women in positions of arbitrary power, like the Queen, were perceived as “embod[ying] the worst of monarchical power” (Maza 82). Hunt outlines the ways in which the revolutionary family romance represented Marie Antoinette as a bad mother figure, drawing on the extensive history of pornographic literature depicting her supposedly compromised moral and sexual integrity (101-114), and finally indicting her as “the scourge and the bloodsucker of the French” (92) and charging her with incest at her trial (101-102). Even the conservative English Times, “under the wing of the Pitt administration” throughout the revolutionary period (Ascherson xii), voiced public antagonism to the French Queen, even blaming her for the Revolution. An article of 20 July 1789 identifies Marie Antoinette and the Count d’Artois as “the principal persons of the public detestation,” claiming that 500,000 livres were advertised as a reward for the Queen’s head (“Rebellion and Civil War in France” 2), and three days later the Times compares Marie Antoinette unfavourably to the popular English Queen, Charlotte: “Had the Queen of France made the conduct of the Queen of England her model— the Revolution of France would have slept perhaps for another century. She is said ... to have uttered these words— ‘Happy Charlotte! thou art beloved and respected in a land of liberty— what shall I be?’” (“The late convulsions in Paris” 2). This public hostility to Marie Antoinette, according to Hunt, articulates a “fundamental anxiety about queenship as the most extreme form of the invasion of the public sphere by women” (113-114).

Conservatives who supported Marie Antoinette, however, also expressed anxiety about female participation in the public sphere, focusing their fears about the dissolution of gender differentiation on the women who joined in revolutionary activity, such as the march to Versailles. The Times on 13 October, for example, identifies the procession
from Versailles as composed of “rabble, women, and part of the soldiery” (“France. Further Detail of the Late Revolution” 2), but on 12 October had described the supposed women participants as cross-dressing men: “a considerable number of the persons who were habited in women’s dresses, but as it since appears, were many of them guards ... forced their way into the Palace, and up the staircase leading to the Queen’s apartment, with an intent to seize and murder her ...” (“France. Confinement of the King, Queen, and Royal Family” 2). Women acting as members of a mob and men disguised as women in order to gain access to the Queen’s private rooms appear to appeal equally to conservative fears about dissolving gender norms. Burke’s domesticated, victimised Marie Antoinette in this context appears in contrast to both her public image as a moral and sexual criminal, and his representation of the political, revolutionary women leading the procession from Versailles, whom he, along with the Times, perceives as the real offenders against gender norms: “the royal captives who followed in the train were slowly moved along, amidst the horrid yells, and shrilling screams, and frantic dances, and infamous contumelies, and all the unutterable abominations of the furies of hell, in the abused shape of the vilest of women” (72). In Burke’s formulation, Marie Antoinette is an idealised domestic woman, while the revolutionary women who participate in the procession from Versailles occupy the demonised public role associated with the Queen in the revolutionary imagination. According to Hunt, “Women acting in the public sphere—whether the market women as portrayed by Burke or Marie-Antoinette as depicted by her republican critics—were linked to beasts; they lost their femininity and with it their very humanity” (116).

Burke’s attempt to recuperate Marie Antoinette’s image at the expense of revolutionary women, in fact, seems to have worked: depictions of female revolutionary violence in Charles Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities and Thomas Carlyle’s French Revolution follow Burke’s precedent. More importantly, Burke’s rendition of the

23 Charles Dickens’s contrast between an idealised domestic woman, Lucie Manette, and demonised revolutionary women like Madame Defarge, The Vengeance and the dancers of the Carmagnole mirrors Burke’s gendering of participants in the Revolution here. See Chapter 7 for more on gender and domesticity in A Tale of Two Cities. Although I would not locate Thomas Carlyle’s French Revolution within the same cluster of antirevolutionary texts as Burke’s and Dickens’s works, he nonetheless owes Burke for his depiction of the October Days: he re-names the event “The Insurrection of Women,” the title he gives to Book VII of his history. Although Carlyle is excited by the mob’s “Sincerity and Reality” (261),
October Days even exerts an unexpected influence over the radical feminist Mary Wollstonecraft’s gendering of the event. While Wollstonecraft responds to Burke by following her French republican counterparts and condemning Marie Antoinette’s character in Rights of Men,\(^{24}\) she later presents an “almost Burkean” (Landes 149) narrative of the October Days in her 1794 Historical and Moral View of the Origin and Progress of the French Revolution.\(^{25}\) Wollstonecraft’s account of the procession to Versailles is, like Burke’s, a narrative of “pillage,” “plunder” (449), and, most importantly, the “brutal violation of the apartment of the queen” (450). According to Wollstonecraft, after the royal family had retired for the night, “the whole gang of ruffians, rushed towards the palace, and finding its avenues unguarded, entered like a torrent; and some among them, most probably, conceived, that this was the moment to perpetuate the crime [the murder of the royal family] for which they had been drawn from their lurking-holes in Paris” (446). She continues,

> The most desperate found their way to the queen’s chamber, and left for dead the man who courageously disputed their entrance. But she had been alarmed by the tumult, though the miscreants were not long in making their way good, and, throwing a wrapping-gown around her, ran, by a private passage, to the king’s apartment, where she found the dauphin; but the king was gone in quest of her: he, however, quickly returning, they waited together in a horrid state of suspense. (447)

This account of a semi-naked Marie Antoinette fleeing to the presence of a protective husband and vulnerable son in order to escape the “gang of ruffians” (446) that invades her bedroom in the middle of the night replicates the narrative of the raid on Versailles he nonetheless describes the “inarticulate frenzy” of his revolutionary “Menads” (266) in terms similar to Burke’s.\(^{24}\) She asks, “who will presume to compare her [the British Queen Charlotte’s] character to that of the queen of France?” (59).\(^{25}\) Wollstonecraft remains highly critical of Marie Antoinette and the royal court at Versailles that she represents elsewhere in Historical and Moral View: as a young Dauphine, Wollstonecraft argues, Marie Antoinette could not “escape [the] contagion of the “voluptuous atmosphere” at court (33), and as Queen the “sovereign disgust excited by her ruinous vices” resulted in the people’s “contempt” and “hatred” (35). See also her description of Marie Antoinette’s character and her response to the Revolution (131-135). Despite Wollstonecraft’s continued dislike of Marie Antoinette, her October Days narrative is coloured by Burke’s account.
that Burke popularised, despite the author’s revolutionary sympathies. The degree to which Burke has succeeded in recuperating Marie Antoinette’s image in his depiction of her as an idealised woman at the heart of a domesticated royal family, at least in this brief scene describing her potential rape, appears in Wollstonecraft’s suspension of her dislike as she expresses sympathy for the Queen as a private woman who has been the victim of violence: “The sanctuary of repose, the asylum of care and fatigue, the chaste temple of a woman, I consider the queen only as one, the apartment where she consigns her sense to the bosom of sleep, folded in it’s arms forgetful of the world, was violated with murderous fury” (457). In representing Marie Antoinette as a woman whose private space— and by implication, whose body— has been “violated,” Wollstonecraft follows Burke’s re-framing of the Queen as a domestic, rather than a solely political, figure.

Just as she follows Burke’s precedent in her depiction of a private, domestic Marie Antoinette, Wollstonecraft also imitates Burke by demonising the crowd of revolutionary women who lead the procession to Versailles. Although she attributes the raid on Versailles to the machinations of the Duke of Orleans, who, she believes, roused a mob of “hired assassins” (430) to invade the palace and attack the royal family, rather than to the revolutionary women themselves, her belief in this political plot allows her to demonstrate the “tumultuous concourse of women” and men “disguised in women’s clothes” or “in their own garb armed like ruffians” (437) as Burke does. Surprisingly for Wollstonecraft, she also attributes the monstrosity of this mob to the confusion of gender norms it fosters:

The concourse, at first, consisted mostly of market women, and the lowest refuse of the streets, women who had thrown off the virtues of one sex without having power to assume more than the vices of the other. A number of men also followed them, armed with pikes, bludgeons, and hatchets; but they were strictly speaking a mob, affixing all the odium to

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26 The sense of danger in Wollstonecraft’s version is perhaps even more intense than in Burke’s, as the royal family is rescued by Lafayette just in time: “They had actually forced the king’s apartment at the moment he arrived; and the royal family were listening to the increasing tumult as the harbinger of death” (448).

27 Wollstonecraft describes the conspiracy to attack the royal family that she attributes to Orleans in great detail (429-432, 450-456).
the appellation it can possibly import ... In fact, such a rabble has seldom been gathered together. (426)

The revolutionary women’s association with male “vices” as they cast off their female “virtues” in the cause of the Revolution and join with armed, violent men results, as it does for Burke, in the rousing of an “odi[ous]” mob.28 Burke’s successful relocation of Marie Antoinette to the domestic sphere and the accompanying demonisation of the revolutionary women marching on Versailles, evident in his opponent Wollstonecraft’s surprising embrace of his depiction of the October Days as her model, therefore, allows him to align the Queen with the affective family, recuperating her value as wife and mother, and strengthening the monarchy’s emotional appeal, while siphoning his gender anxiety away from Marie Antoinette and onto revolutionary women.

Burke’s portrayal of family politics also allows him to establish a defence of rank, property and aristocratic entitlement. Loyalty to rank parallels the family by also producing emotional commitment to the national establishment. Burke defines chivalry as “loyalty to rank and sex” (76), an experience that mobilises reverence for hierarchy and domestic affect, and his apostrophe to Marie Antoinette is, above all, like the overflowing, “truth[ful],” “Natural feelings” he describes for his friend Philip Francis (Cobban and Smith 91) in his defence of this passage, an emotional expression of awe for her rank:

It is now sixteen or seventeen years since I saw the queen of France, then the dauphiness, at Versailles; and surely never lighted on this orb, which she hardly seemed to touch, a more delightful vision. I saw her just above the horizon, decorating and cheering the elevated sphere she just began to move in,— glittering like the morning-star, full of life, and splendour, and joy. Oh! what a revolution! and what an heart must I have, to contemplate without emotion that elevation and that fall! Little did I dream when she added titles of veneration to those of enthusiastic, distant, respectful love, that she should ever be obliged to carry the sharp antidote

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28 This description also reveals a surprising underlying class bias against the revolutionary women as “market women, and the lowest refuse of the streets” (Historical and Moral View 426). For more on Wollstonecraft’s portrayal of the October Days in the context of revolutionary feminism in France and England, see Joan B. Landes’s chapter “Women and Revolution” (93-151) in her book Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution.
against disgrace concealed in that bosom; little did I dream that I should have lived to see such disasters fallen upon her in a nation of gallant men, in a nation of men of honour and of cavaliers. I thought ten thousand swords must have leaped from their scabbards to avenge even a look that threatened her with insult.— But the age of chivalry is gone.— (75-76)

Rather than dealing directly with Marie Antoinette’s character or personal qualities, Burke focuses on her high birth and rank, endowing her with cosmic significance by distinguishing her “elevated sphere” from “this orb,” which she barely touches in her high rank. Burke’s emotion, like the “Tears” he tells Francis “wetted [his] Paper” as he composed this part of the Reflections (Cobban and Smith 91), arises from “that elevation and that fall,” and his call for chivalrous defence of Marie Antoinette centres on her position as Queen and her “titles of veneration.” The violence committed against the royal family at Versailles is also conceived, then, as a betrayal of the attachment due to rank that Burke’s “Tears” (Cobban and Smith 91) attempt to emotionalise and naturalise.

When imagining the role of revolutionary rationalism in public life, Burke laments that under the “new conquering empire of light and reason … a king is but a man; a queen is but a woman; a woman is but an animal; and an animal not of the highest order …. Regicide, parricide, and sacrilege, are but fictions of superstition …. The murder of a king, or a queen, or a bishop, or a father, are only common homicide” (77). In this passage, Burke explicitly establishes the parallel between his reverence for rank and powerful old-regime institutions and his affective commitment to family, and refers both to the threat of violence perpetrated against the royal family. Burke furthermore sees each individual’s place in the social hierarchy, like the family, as a basis for social affection.

Through an image that could be equally applied to the role of the family in political life, but which Burke applies to social rank, he argues that “[t]o be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon[^29] we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ as it were) of public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed towards a

[^29]: The Oxford English Dictionary cites Burke’s use of “platoon” here as one example for its definition, “A (usually small) company, squad, set, or group of people acting together” (“Platoon,” def. 2a). Although this particular use does not have a specifically military meaning, the most common definitions for “platoon” do. It is odd, therefore, that Burke uses a word with military connotations to describe an individual’s loyalty to people of his or her own place in the social hierarchy while overall he writes against the militant antagonism between the ranks that motivates the violence of the Revolution.
love to our country and to mankind” (46-47). Like affection for the family, affection for rank produces emotional commitment that extends beyond the “little platoon we belong to” and generates attachment to the nation and its institutions.

Above all, Burke uses the language of family inheritance as a sacred tradition to create loyalty to the British establishment, and in doing so vindicates aristocratic and church property interests and privileges. He portrays English institutions as inherited property, even conceiving constitutional freedoms in this manner:

You will observe, that from Magna Charta to the Declaration of Right, it has been the uniform policy of our constitution to claim and assert our liberties, as an entailed inheritance derived to us from our forefathers, and to be transmitted to our posterity; as an estate specially belonging to the people of this kingdom without any reference whatever to any other more general or prior right. By this means our constitution preserves an unity in so great a diversity of its parts. We have an inheritable crown; an inheritable peerage; and an house of commons and a people inheriting privileges, franchises, and liberties, from a long line of ancestors .... In this choice of inheritance we have given to our frame of polity the image of a relation in blood; binding up the constitution of our country with our dearest domestic ties; adopting our fundamental laws into the bosom of our family affections; keeping inseparable, and cherishing with the warmth of all their combined and mutually reflected charities, our state, our hearths, our sepulchres, and our altars. (33-34)

The national community, in this conception, includes the current generation as well as its “forefathers” and “posterity”; by imagining past, present and future generations as part of the national family, Burke endows the constitution with stability over time and works to naturalise British institutions, from the family represented by “our hearths” to the “state” and the church represented by “our altars,” by figuring them as a biological inheritance from “a relation in blood.” He even revises social contract theory to reflect this model, stating that “[s]ociety is indeed a contract .... As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be
born” (96). The nation and its institutions, in this view, act as mirror-images of the family.

Burke’s images of the establishment as inherited property, however, also prepare the way for his defence of property, and thus the propertied classes, as the crucial component in the functioning of the state, and provide an opportunity for his rationalist opponents to attack his political principles. Wollstonecraft’s distinction between what Burke sees as “natural ... affection” within the patriarchal state and her own reading of the old regime as an “habitual” construction (Rights of Men 47) suggests her unwillingness to accept Burke’s naturalisation of historical precedent. For Wollstonecraft, Burke’s appeal to Magna Charta and the history of the English constitution for his definition of English political rights means that he confuses rights with power and property. She asks, “Are we to seek for the rights of men in the ages when a few marks were the only penalty imposed for the life of a man, and death for death when the property of the rich was touched? ... Were the rights of men understood when the law authorized or tolerated murder?— or is power and right the same in your creed?” (Rights of Men 42), and continues to offer an extensive critique of Burke’s defence of property (Rights of Men 44-47).

Burke, however, clearly indicates that both the figurative inherited property of the English constitution and physical property are central to his politics. He argues, for example, that one of the problems with the new French system is that “[t]he property of France does not govern it. Of course property is destroyed, and rational liberty has no existence. All you have got for the present is a paper circulation, and a stock-jobbing constitution” (52). Burke’s lengthy defence of the clergy and critique of the ethics and economics of the National Assembly’s confiscation of church property and establishment of the assignat, France’s new paper money (105-164), demonstrate the extent to which property forms the basis of his political theory. Moreover, he suggests that encroachment on personal property and inherited privileges mirrors the raid on Versailles, framing state anti-aristocratic measures and confiscation as a kind of home invasion, or threat to the individual and the family. Burke asks,

What have they [the French nobility] ... done that they were to be driven into exile, that their persons should be hunted about, mangled, and tortured, their families dispersed, their houses laid to ashes, that their order
should be abolished, and the memory of it, if possible, extinguished, by
ordaining them to change the very names by which they were usually
known? (135)

Attacks on the aristocracy, Burke argues, are tantamount to physical assaults, the
destruction of the home and family, and the dissolution of identity as class distinctions
and even names are “extinguished.”

The landed classes’ investment in the state is not in physical property alone, however;
Burke’s equation of the destruction of property and the end of “rational liberty” in France
(52) and his emphasis on inherited “privileges, franchises, and liberties” in the English
constitution (33) illustrate this point. Burke describes liberty as a “treasure” (54), aligning
it with physical property, and writes of “knowledge” as a “patrimony” “left to us by our
forefathers” (100). Moreover, Burke vindicates the privileges of propertied groups like
the aristocracy and the church by defining them as the heirs to English culture. He argues
that learning and civilisation depend on “the spirit of a gentleman, and the spirit of
religion” (79), and that with the end of privilege learning will be “cast into the mire, and
trodden down under the hoofs of a swinish multitude” (79). Even sentiment, which for
Burke encourages the growth of public affections, is an inheritance descending through
the generations via the tradition of chivalry (76). In addition to arguing that reverence for
high rank and attachment to one’s own rank produce social affection, then, Burke places
public sentiments in the care of privileged and propertied groups. Without the public
affections, privilege, rank and property are under threat, and without privilege, rank and
property, traditions like chivalry cannot be passed on to future generations. The cultural
traditions that Burke associates with aristocratic rank, therefore, perform what Pierre
Bourdieu describes as the “social function of legitimating social differences” (7); Burke’s
“cultural nobility” (Bourdieu 2) is literally equivalent to Britain’s old-regime social
nobility. Burke thus aligns the inherited public property of cultural and political tradition,
including established institutions and hierarchical social privileges, with personal, private
property by using the language of family inheritance to defend tradition; this enables him
to support the property interests, physical and cultural, of the establishment, including the
aristocracy, clergy and monarchy, and to generate affective commitment to these groups
as integral members of the national family.
Throughout the *Reflections*, Burke also uses the framework of the family to construct himself as a paternal figure and as the heir to his English forefathers, allowing him to speak with authority to and on behalf of the population. Burke emphasises that *Reflections* takes the form of a letter to “a very young gentleman at Paris” (3), and the stress on his addressee’s youth appears to justify Burke’s paternal position in relation to his intended audience. In a private letter to his son Richard, Burke refers to his young correspondent, Charles-Jean-François Depont, as “Young Picky Poky” and “Dumpling” (Cobban and Smith 33), assuming a tone that is both affectionate and diminishing, and fits with Burke’s assumption of fatherly authority in the *Reflections*. In his discussion of English institutions, however, Burke constructs himself as both the good father instructing the misguided national family, and the deferential heir to a revered tradition.

First, Burke locates authority in experience, or what John Whale describes as “the local, specific, and actual” (Introduction 7), rather than in the abstract reasoning he associates with the revolutionaries and English Jacobins. The conflict between Burke and his radical opponents could be described as a confrontation between precedent and principle, and this distinction is most clear in the debate over what can constitute political rights. In Burke’s view, radical politics favour a set of abstract rights at the expense of experience and historical precedent: the “speculatists” who take charge during the Revolution “despise experience as the wisdom of unlettered men; and as for the rest, they have wrought underground a mine that will blow up at one grand explosion all examples of antiquity, all precedents, charters, and acts of parliament. They have the ‘rights of men’” (58).

For Burke’s opponents, however, political rights are not derived from history, but are the natural birthright of rational humanity, and Burke’s reliance on historical precedent is thus a weakness. Paine, for example, refutes the authority of historical precedent in political affairs, arguing, “I am contending for the rights of the living, and against their being willed away, and controlled and contracted for ... and Mr Burke is contending for the authority of the dead over the rights and freedom of the living” (*Rights of Man* 42), while Wollstonecraft, as her denunciation of Burke’s appeal to Medieval English precedent discussed above suggests (*Rights of Men* 42), frames Burke’s project of tracing political rights through history as absurd. Instead, Wollstonecraft argues, “It is necessary
emphatically to repeat, that there are rights which men inherit at their birth, as rational creatures, who were raised above the brute creation by their improvable faculties; and that, in receiving these, not from their forefathers but, from God, prescription can never undermine natural rights” (43). Although Wollstonecraft appeals to reason instead of history for the sources of the rights she promotes, interestingly, like Burke, she also frames these rights as “natural”; the difference is that Wollstonecraft’s “natural” rights are “inherit[ed] at ... birth” from “God,” rather than figured as a naturalised, affective inheritance from patriarchal “forefathers,” as Burke’s “prescript[ed]” historical rights are. Even Price, whose “Discourse” focuses on commemorating the Glorious Revolution, reads history as a manifestation of abstract political rights, rather than, as Burke would argue, the process by which those rights are constructed. He argues, “Were it not true that liberty of conscience is a sacred right; that power abused justifies resistance; and that civil authority is a delegation from the people ... the Revolution would have been not an ASSERTION, but an INVASION of rights; not a REVOLUTION, but a REBELLION” (29). He thus departs from the constitutional precedents set by the Glorious Revolution to promote the abstract rights that history has not yet protected by exhorting the “oppressors of the world” to “[r]estore to mankind their rights; and consent to the correction of abuses, before they and you are destroyed together” (32). By figuring the Glorious Revolution as a “[r]estoration,” or an historical manifestation of rational humanity’s innate, natural rights, Price differs substantially from Burke, for whom historical forefathers pass on their own institutions and a body of constitutional precedent as a proprietary legacy for their affective heirs.

Having appealed to history as a political inheritance naturalised through his images of familial affect, Burke works to undermine Price’s authority as an interpreter of British history, and especially of the Glorious Revolution, and to establish himself, by contrast, as the voice of experience. Burke embarks on a lengthy contradiction of Price’s claims for the three fundamental political rights of the English, highlighting his own familiarity with parliamentary proceedings and English law. He contests the legitimacy of the following supposed political rights:

1. “To choose our own governors.”
2. “To cashier them for misconduct.”
3. “To frame a government for ourselves.” (Reflections 16)³⁰

Burke’s discussion of the constitution focuses on parliamentary documents, from Magna Charta to the Declaration of Right under William and Mary (13-35), and endeavours to prove that Price’s three rights are “fictitious” (16) and have no basis in English political history. Burke’s argument contrasts the rational abstractions and “passions” (12) of the Revolution Society with his methodology of uncovering the principles of the Glorious Revolution as they are articulated in English law. He claims, “If you are desirous of knowing the spirit of our constitution, and the policy which predominated in that great period [1688] which has secured it to this hour, pray look for both in our histories, in our records, in our acts of parliament, and journals of parliaments, and not in the sermons of the Old Jewry, and the after-dinner toasts of the Revolution Society” (31).

Burke’s extensive appeal to the documents of English law frames his writing as adept at historicising and practically applying politics, while the Revolution Society’s abstract concept of political rights, he claims, is theoretical only and extralegal, even illegal. In particular, Burke takes issue with Price’s claim that the English King is “the only one who owes his crown to the choice of his people” (Reflections 13). This interpretation of political rights in the abstract, Burke argues, is strictly outside of English law:

whatever kings might have been here or elsewhere, a thousand years ago, or in whatever manner the ruling dynasties of England or France may have begun, the king of Great Britain is at this day king by a fixed rule of succession, according to the laws of his country; and whilst the legal conditions of the compact of sovereignty are performed by him (as they are performed) he holds his crown in contempt of the choice of the Revolution Society, who have not a single vote for a king amongst them, either individually or collectively .... (15)

By describing the King’s rule as a legal “compact” here, Burke mobilises the social contract theory so important to radical political thought, only to promptly exclude the

³⁰ In fact, Burke focuses only on the third right on Price’s list. The “principles” of the Glorious Revolution, as Price presents them are,
First; The right to liberty of conscience in religious matters.
Secondly; The right to resist power when abused. And,
Thirdly; The right to choose our own governors; to cashier them for misconduct; and to frame a government for ourselves. (29)
members of Revolution Society from that contract, as its potential destroyers. Through the language of politics, law and parliamentary history, Burke attempts to undermine Price’s right to speak with legitimacy on political matters, while framing himself as an expert.

Burke also works to establish his paternalistic authority by constructing himself as a man of experience. He withholds his congratulations for the National Assembly, he claims, until their revolutionary principles are put into practice, stating, “The effect of liberty to individuals is, that they may do what they please: We ought to see what it will please them to do, before we risque congratulations, which may be soon turned into complaints” (8-9). One of the problems with the French National Assembly, he argues, is that “of any practical experience in the state, not one man was to be found. The best were only men of theory” (40). Burke’s political theory, clearly, is extremely practical; he only conceives of rights in terms of “the civil social man,” arguing that they are “a thing to be settled by convention” (59). Burke also imagines himself, in Tom Furniss’s words, “as a man of extensive experience— as a practical politician, and as someone familiar with English feeling through long years of attentive observation and experience” (“Cementing the nation” 123). Burke denies that he writes with authority, but locates authority in the experience and observation that he does claim for himself. When making assertions about the English population, he argues, “I speak from observation not from authority; but I speak from the experience I have had in a pretty extensive and mixed communication with the inhabitants of this kingdom, of all descriptions and ranks, and after a course of attentive observation, began early in life, and continued for near forty years” (85).

Burke depicts himself, moreover, as a parliamentary patriarch; he is the heir to past Whigs, like Lord Somers, to whose understanding of the Glorious Revolution he defers (20), and as such to what he believes is Britain’s true liberal legacy, unlike radicals such as Price. Burke portrays Parliament as the voice of the English people, citing the opinion of the “nation” (18), “the English nation” (20), and the “British nation” (25) at the time of the Glorious Revolution, stating that “the body of the people of England ... utterly disclaim” Price’s list of English political rights (16), and locating the source for his own observations about English political opinion in parliamentary documents like the Declaration of Right. If Lord Somers and other Whig forefathers spoke for the nation in
the past, Burke implies, then the true parliamentary expert, and heir to the constitutional tradition, Burke himself, possesses the skill and background to act as a national good father at the time of another crisis. Burke, the patriarch, accepts the “entailed inheritance” left by his forefathers (33), and endeavours to pass it on to the 1790s as his political legacy.

Burke applies the excessive emotion generated through his histrionics to his configurations of the French royal family, and by extension to an image of a British national family aligned with patriarchal structure and established institutions. However, his discussion of British political rights as an inheritance passed down as a kind of legal property from historical father figures leaves him vulnerable to rationalist critiques of his appeal to a British history and body of constitutional precedent that, for his radical opponents, neither protects the disenfranchised from abuses nor speaks to the political needs of the present generation. Nonetheless, Burke’s imagining of a legal and constitutional family romance that occurs across generations and over time is crucial to his project of constructing himself as a national father figure, able to speak to and for his audience. The national family, however, is only one of the metaphors Burke mobilises to support his political vision of the British state; his second key metaphor, that of the emotionalised body politic, capitalises even more extensively on his ability to muster and direct histrionic excess.

“Real Hearts of Flesh and Blood”: The Body Politic and the Problem of Sensibility for Burke, Paine and Wollstonecraft

In order to consolidate the imagined national, affective family, bound by a shared, inherited cultural and constitutional tradition including privileged institutions like the monarchy, clergy and aristocracy, Burke endeavours to naturalise his representation of the state by appealing to conservative sensibility as natural feeling and to another familiar metaphor for the nation, the body politic, which constructs the nation as an organic unit. He thus stakes his claim for the representational truth of his histrionic, emotional excess in the shared feelings of the body politic, which he imagines as belonging to English national character. This strategy, however, leaves Burke vulnerable to accusations of hypocrisy and madness, as his opponents read his extreme emotionalism as either
opportunistic or hysterical. Nonetheless, attempts by Paine and Wollstonecraft to
discredit Burke on the basis of his sensibility and histrionics pose a challenge for radical
writers, like Wollstonecraft, who remain drawn to the power of emotion in their own
writing, thereby problematising radical appeals to sympathy as a force for social change,
and confirming Burke’s construction of sensibility as the political property of his brand
of conservatism.

Burke’s construction of the emotional body politic and English national character
extends from his conception of the affective family as the basis for emotional
commitment to the national community. He re-imagines the social contract and discourse
of political rights, to the exclusion of radical definitions, as a contract, including
historically acquired rights, existing over time and between generations, metaphorically
appearing in his work as inherited property passed between family members and as a
body of constitutional documentation, changing and growing organically. Burke’s double
metaphor appears when he explains how the English political system replicates both “the
image of a relation in blood” and “a permanent body composed of transitory parts” (34).
For Burke, the body politic articulates itself through a country’s constitution, and, like the
social contract, exists over time, physically binding the state to its past and future
members:

Our political system is placed in a just correspondence and symmetry with
the order of the world, and with the mode of existence decreed to a
permanent body composed of transitory parts; wherein, by the disposition
of a stupendous wisdom, moulding together the great mysterious
incorporation of the human race, the whole, at one time, is never old, or
middle-aged, or young, but in a condition of unchangeable constancy,
moves on through the varied tenour of perpetual decay, fall, renovation,
and progression. (33-34)

Burke’s image of the “perpetual decay, fall, renovation, and progression” expresses his
particular theory of gradual liberalism, in which the state must function according to the
“two principles of conservation and correction” (22). The concept of the body of the
constitution growing organically over time, and thus legally binding the body politic
across the generations, naturalises Burke’s gradualism by linking it to the image of the
physical body, and capitalises on what Blakemore describes as the eighteenth-century understanding of the constitution as “an organic tissue of the past, present, and future—an organic tissue of collaborative parts that were conserved within a circumscribed order of growth, change, and reformation” (Burke and the Fall of Language 7).

This organicism, Burke argues, is what the new French system lacks; instead, the body politic is mutilated and fractured through the application of radical political theory. Burke argues that the old regime possessed some elements of an historical constitution on which the National Assembly had the option of building, stating, “Your constitution, it is true, whilst you were out of possession, suffered waste and dilapidation; but you possessed in some parts the walls, and in all the foundations of a noble and venerable castle. You might have repaired those walls; you might have built on those foundations” (35). In Burke’s view, the National Assembly does not rebuild the French constitution, but merely destroys, revealing its violent potential; he asks, “is it in destroying and pulling down that skill is displayed? Your mob can do this as well at least as your assemblies” (168). Not only have the French destroyed the potential foundation of an organically constituted state, Burke claims, but under the National Assembly the “spirit of rational liberty” in France does not inhabit a “permanent body” or “effectual organ” (4). The new electoral system, instead, constitutes a “false foundation” (174) that fractures the state internally by splitting France confusingly according to geometrical territorial divisions, population and on the basis of contribution of wealth (173-183), “dissever[ing]” the body politic in a “barbarous manner” (183). Burke asks his audience, “do you seriously think that the territory of France, upon the republican system of eighty-three independent municipalities (to say nothing of the parts that compose them) can ever be governed as one body, or can ever be set in motion by the impulse of one mind?” (52), questioning whether the application of an abstract system could effectively constitute an organic body politic. Instead, what the revolutionaries design, in Burke’s view, is an artificially constructed, fragmented, “dissever[ed]” (183) national body.

For Burke, the organic connection between the members of the body politic and English institutions articulates England’s national health, while the French state doctors itself unsuccessfully. Burke portrays Revolution as experimental medicine administered to a diseased state. The Glorious Revolution, he argues, reinstated regularity in English
institutions, rather than overhauling the establishment, especially with regards to monarchical succession: “An irregular, convulsive movement may be necessary to throw off an irregular, convulsive disease. But the course of succession is the healthy habit of the British constitution” (25). The French Revolution, in this configuration, applies drastic medical measures to a state that does not need it, acting in “despair of curing common distempers by regular methods” (171). Medicine itself becomes a dangerous addiction according to this view. Burke writes, “I never liked this continual talk of resistance and revolution, or the practice of making the extreme medicine of the constitution its daily bread. It renders the habit of society dangerously valetudinary: it is taking periodical doses of mercury sublimate, and swallowing down repeated provocatives of cantharides to our love of liberty” (63). For Burke, the experiment of Revolution causes a “distemper of remedy” (63), producing the disease it intends to eradicate; France is “dismembered” (53), affected by “palsy” (49), or troubled by a supposed “panacea” that is actually a “plague” (89). Burke integrates his two presiding metaphors for the state as a family and a body by conceiving the new French democracy as a sick child. He writes, “your new commonwealth is born, and bred, and fed, in those corruptions which mark degenerated and worn out republics. Your child comes into the world with the symptoms of death; the facies Hippocratica forms the character of its physiognomy, and the prognostic of its fate” (185). Doctoring the body politic, according to Burke, requires the delicate administration of minor reforms designed to keep the establishment in “healthy habit[s]” (25): too much medicine where none or little is necessary produces the distemper it seeks to cure, breeding a diseased state.

Burke suggests that England is immune to the disease of revolution, mobilising an image of the English nation that constructs national character as both inherently natural and as a kind of physical experience. He opposes the English system of political inheritance, described as “the happy effect of following nature” (33), with the revolutionary French state: “All your sophisters cannot produce any thing better adapted to preserve a rational and manly freedom than the course that we have pursued, who have chosen our nature rather than our speculations, our breasts rather than our inventions, for the great conservatories and magazines of our rights and privileges” (35). In England, the state is governed by national character, or English “nature,” and the sentiment found in
English “breasts,” while the National Assembly designs the “new experimental government” (165) in France based on “speculations” and “inventions” with no basis in national history. Most importantly, Burke aligns English national character with natural feeling:

In England we have not yet been completely embowelled of our natural entrails; we still feel within us, and we cherish and cultivate, those inbred sentiments which are the faithful guardians, the active monitors of our duty, the true supporters of all liberal and manly morals. We have not been drawn and trussed, in order that we may be filled, like stuffed birds in a museum, with chaff and rags, and paltry, blurred shreds of paper about the rights of man. We preserve the whole of our feelings still native and entire, unsophisticated by pedantry and infidelity. We have real hearts of flesh and blood beating in our bosoms. We fear God; we look up with awe to kings; with affection to parliaments; with duty to magistrates; with reverence to priests; and with respect to nobility. Why? Because when such ideas are brought before our minds, it is natural to be so affected .... (86-87)

In this passage, Burke mobilises a supposedly natural affection for the establishment, including the church, the monarchy and the aristocracy. Natural feeling, here, moreover, is profoundly physical, “inbred” in the English national character and located in the population’s “natural entrails” and the “real hearts of flesh and blood beating in our bosoms,” indicating the extent to which Burke imagines loyalty to the body politic as an immediate, bodily experience. Enthusiasm for the Revolution, conversely, is artificial and deadening, envisioned as “drawn and trussed ... stuffed birds in a museum, with chaff and rags, and paltry, blurred shreds of paper about the rights of man.” The Revolution is, like the stuffed birds, an artificial monstrosity, as Burke continually asserts. He describes the Revolution as “out of nature” (10), an “unnatural” (38) rebellion resulting in anarchy (38-40), and “at war with nature” (49); furthermore, the principle of equality that forms the foundation of radical politics is a “monstrous fiction” (37), and the National Assembly designs a “monster of a constitution” (196) to replace old-regime institutions. Not only is the new French system diseased where the English constitution is healthy, but the
“natural entrails” (86) that unite the English through a bodily experience of national affection contrast with revolutionary France’s supposed monstrous rejection of nature.

Just as Burke positions himself as a patriarchal figure in his interpretation of the national family, he aligns himself with what he represents as the natural English sensibility that is part of the experience of the body politic. Conservative sensibility is, Chris Jones argues, “Apparently an appeal to unconditioned natural feelings, ... [but] also a social construction which translated prevailing power-based relationships into loyalties upheld by ‘natural’ feelings” (7). Burke uses the concept of the organic body politic to confirm the authority of the conservative sensibility that locates affect in institutions like the patriarchal family, the monarchy, the clergy and the aristocracy by representing emotion as a bodily experience shared by the entire population. The “Tears” that Burke tells Philip Francis he shed while recalling his account of Marie Antoinette’s fall (Cobban and Smith 91) both encode the emotional response Burke expects from his reader, and construct him as the ideal man of feeling. Burke even frames the Reflections as a whole as the expression of his sensibility through the supposedly natural epistolary style: “Indulging myself in the freedom of epistolary intercourse, I beg leave to throw out my thoughts, and express my feelings, just as they arise in my mind, with very little attention to formal method” (10). As the voice of natural sensibility, Burke is, in Tom Furniss’s words, “an embodiment of the English national character” (“Cementing the nation” 123), defending “those inbred sentiments” that the English feel in their “natural entrails” and “hearts of flesh and blood” (Reflections 86). Burke contrasts his natural feeling to the radical exuberance over the Revolution displayed by his opponents, asking, “Why do I feel so differently from the Reverend Dr Price, and those of his lay flock, who will choose to adopt the sentiments of his discourse?— For this plain reason— because it is natural I should” (80). Moreover, Burke aligns his natural feeling with a kind of special knowledge about human nature, and, especially, as discussed above, English national character. Human nature, for Burke, cannot be accessed through Enlightenment reason, but requires sympathy with human emotion:

This sort of people [the revolutionaries] are so taken up with their theories about the rights of man, that they have totally forgot his nature. Without opening one new avenue to the understanding, they have succeeded in
stopping up those that lead to the heart. They have perverted in themselves, and in those that attend to them, all the well-placed sympathies of the human breast. (64-65)

Burke’s emphasis on his own emotionalism, then, contributes to his construction of himself as a man of experience, demonstrating a sympathy with “the heart” that allows him to speak authoritatively about human nature and on behalf of the English. Burke’s absolute identification with the English heart allows him to speak for the “nation” (18), “[t]he English nation” (20), and the “British nation” (25), or to make assertions like “The English people are satisfied ...” and “The people of England know ...” (102). He is, therefore, not only the father of the national family, but also the national body’s heart and voice.

Burke’s construction of his own conservative sensibility, however, while it serves his effort to consolidate his authoritative voice, also leaves him vulnerable to his liberal and radical critics. Burke’s histrionic language of emotion appears, to his radical readers, to be an hysterical expression of madness. Burke himself introduces accusations of madness into the Revolution Debate, opposing English natural sympathies to the supposed madness of French events, most importantly the experimental elements of the new French system; he calls the confiscation of church property and the introduction of the assignat “madness and folly” (191), and proclaims that “[a]theists are not our preachers; madmen are not our lawgivers” (86), for example. Moreover, Burke questions the very principle of liberty when applied to revolutionary France, introducing an allusion to Don Quixote that popular and radical responses to the Reflections turn against him:

Is it because liberty in the abstract may be classed amongst the blessings of mankind, that I am seriously to felicitate a madman, who has escaped from the protecting restraint and wholesome darkness of his cell, on his restoration to the enjoyment of light and liberty. Am I to congratulate an highwayman and murderer, who has break prison, upon the recovery of his natural rights? This would be to act over again the scene of the criminals condemned to the gallies, and their heroic deliverer, the metaphysic Knight of the Sorrowful Countenance. (8)
In this passage, the Revolution is both mad and criminal, and these characteristics spring not from extreme emotionalism, but from abstract reasoning, which allows the congratulation of theoretical liberty without any interest in the specific circumstances by which that liberty is obtained.

For his critics, however, Burke’s reliance on a naturalised, conservative sensibility over reason provides the context for accusations of madness against him. Thomas Kullman notes that “one of the main arguments of Burke’s conservatism consists in a vindication of the irrational elements of human nature while conceding their irrationality” (146), but that “[i]n associating revolutionary change with reason and conservatism with prejudice Burke adopts the terms used by the revolutionaries and their supporters” (147). Burke defends prejudice as an articulation of historically ordained habits and responsibilities, as well as natural emotions:

You see, Sir, that in this enlightened age I am bold enough to confess, that we are generally men of untaught feelings; that instead of casting away all our old prejudices, we cherish them to a very considerable degree, and, to take more shame to ourselves, we cherish them because they are prejudices; and the longer they have lasted, and the more generally they have prevailed, the more we cherish them. We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would be better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations, and of ages …. Prejudice renders a man’s virtue his habit; and not a series of unconnected acts. Through just prejudice, his duty becomes a part of his nature. (87)

Here, Burke aligns prejudice both with the “untaught feelings” of nature and with the inherited, collective wisdom of history, revealing the process by which feelings become naturalised over time in his political theory. In this way, Burke’s recuperation of prejudice parallels his strategy throughout the *Reflections* of naturalising and consolidating established historical constructions through affect.

However, the extent to which *Reflections* retains binary relationships opposing reason and feeling facilitated attacks on Burke as, in Blakemore’s words, “a
counterrevolutionary Don Quixote, the crazed defender of frivolous queens and obsolete chivalry” (“Revolution in Representation” 6). Nicholas K. Robinson’s collection of political cartoons, *Edmund Burke: A Life in Caricature*, provides numerous examples of the ways cartoonists such as James Gillray, Isaac Cruikshank and William Dent represented Burke’s supposed madness. In a caricature illustrating Burke’s apostrophe to Marie Antoinette, titled *Frontispiece to Reflections on the French Revolution*, for example, “An enraptured Burke kneels before his vision of Marie Antoinette, his brain inflamed by the torch of a cherub” (140). Burke also appeared piggybacking the French monarchs in *French Flight, Or, the Grand Monarque and the Rights of Kings Supported in a Sublime and Beautiful Manner* (159), as a resident of Bedlam in *A Peep into Bethlehem* (169-170), fighting a weeping Charles James Fox (147-156), and hysterically flinging his dagger to the floor of the House of Commons in numerous caricatures (162-166) as the Revolution Debate unfolded. The most frequently occurring image of Burke in the 1790s, however, was in a parody of Don Quixote. *The Knight of the Woful Countenance Going to Extirpate the National Assembly* portrays Burke “on the back of an ass … emerg[ing] as Don Quixote from the premises of his publisher” (140), and representations of Burke as a misguided knight defending a world of chivalry that no longer exists recur in caricatures such as *Don Dismallo, After an Absence of Sixteen Years, Embracing his Beautiful Vision!, Don Dismallo Running the Literary Gantlet* and *The Aristocratic Crusade* (143-147).

Burke’s immediate respondents, Wollstonecraft and Paine, likewise challenge Burke’s extreme conservative sensibility as misplaced, selfish, and, ultimately, mad. Sensibility, as the *Reflections* demonstrates, can be used to promote conservative as well as radical politics, and Wollstonecraft, as Alex Schulman argues, “objects not to Burke’s raising the specter of the emotions, but rather to whom these emotions are applied .... Misery’s subject, in Wollstonecraft’s view, should be politically useful toward progressive ends” (43). By challenging the objects of Burke’s sensibility, Wollstonecraft questions the truthfulness of his representations, as Philip Francis had done with respect to his emotional portrayal of Marie Antoinette. Burke’s sympathy, Wollstonecraft argues, is superficial and ignores real social and political problems, such as the abusive practice of pressing men into naval service:
a gentleman of lively imagination must borrow some drapery from fancy before he can love or pity a man.— Misery, to reach your heart, I perceive, must have its cap and bells; your tears are reserved, very naturally considering your character, for the declamation of the theatre, or for the downfall of queens, whose rank alters the nature of folly, and throws a graceful veil over vices that degrade humanity; whilst the distress of many industrious mothers, whose helpmates have been torn from them, and the hungry cry of helpless babes, were vulgar sorrows that could not move your commiseration, though they might extort an alms. (Rights of Men 45)

Wollstonecraft aligns Burke’s compassion with the “cap and bells” of artificial feeling, not the real “distress” of the vulnerable. Not only is Burke’s sensibility false, Wollstonecraft implies, but it exposes his class prejudice, which allows him to sympathise with “rank” over the “vulgar sorrows” of the disenfranchised.

Paine also argues that Burke’s sensibility is misplaced, creating sympathy for the show of power, while ignoring the old regime’s abuses, represented by the Bastille:

Not one glance of compassion, not one commiserating reflection, that I can find throughout his book, has he bestowed on those who lingered out the most wretched of lives, a life without hope, in the most miserable of prisons. It is painful to behold a man employing his talents to corrupt himself. Nature has been kinder to Mr Burke than he is to her. He is not affected by the reality of distress touching his heart, but by the showy resemblance of it striking his imagination. He pities the plumage, but forgets the dying bird. (51)

Like Wollstonecraft, Paine claims that Burke can only conceive of the “showy resemblance” or “plumage” of misery, neglecting the object of radical sensibility, the distressed prisoner. Moreover, Paine suggests that it is Burke’s “imagination,” and not his “heart,” that is mobilised in favour of his conservative causes, rejecting Burke’s claims for the natural, physical basis of his sentiment.

For Wollstonecraft, Burke’s sensibility is not only selective and socially unproductive, but hypocritical, artificial and politically dangerous. She describes romantic sentiment as
“false, or rather artificial, feelings,” and questions not only Burke’s “sincerity” (Rights of Men 61), but the honesty of sensibility as a cultural phenomenon, asking,

Where is the dignity, the infallibility, of sensibility, in the fair ladies, whom, if the voice of rumour is to be credited, the captive negroes curse in all the agony of bodily pain, for the unheard of tortures they invent? It is probable that some of them, after the sight of a flagellation, compose their ruffled spirits and exercise their tender feelings by the perusal of the last imported novel.— How true these tears are to nature, I leave you to determine. (Rights of Men 79)

Here, Wollstonecraft represents sensibility as potentially hypocritical, and endeavours to expose its true nature, claiming to “shew you [Burke] to yourself, stripped of the gorgeous drapery in which you have enwrapped your tyrannic principles” (Rights of Men 70). Wollstonecraft also points to the kind of shift in Burke’s broader politics that his emotional reaction against the French Revolution entailed in the 1790s, as his overwrought sensibility overpowered the liberal political principles that had characterised his earlier career. Her allusion to the “captive negroes” (Rights of Men 79) whose wrongs are ignored by the proponents of sensibility in particular predicts the outrage Burke later expresses against revolutionary slave populations in the Caribbean in his Two Letters Addressed to a Member of the Present Parliament, on the Proposals for Peace with the Regicide Directory of France. According to Marcus Wood, although in the 1780s Burke “had thrown the weight of his reputation behind the reform and eventually abolition of slavery and the slave trade,” by the mid 1790s his fear of revolution in France coloured his reaction to the slave revolutions that occurred in San Domingo: Burke’s Regicide Peace cemented “the fashionable Loyalist link between French Jacobinism and revolutionary developments in the French Caribbean” (n. pag.). After the revolution in San Domingo, in Wood’s words, “Slave/savage and Jacobin/savage, white/Jacobin and black/Jacobin are conjoined, and through their ideological union ironically attain a charged equality in iniquity” (n. pag.). Burke’s strategy of joining class prejudice and racism appears when he asks his reader,

How must we feel, if the pride and flower of the English nobility and Gentry, who might escape the pestilential clime, and the devouring sword,
should, if taken prisoners, be delivered over as rebel subjects, to be
condemned as rebels, as traitors, as the vilest of all criminals, by tribunals
formed of Maroon negroe slaves, covered over with the blood of their
masters, who were made free and organised into judges, for their robberies
and murders? (Regicide Peace 123)31

The emotional histrionics that characterise Burke’s overpowering antirevolutionary
sentiment, therefore, contributed to a revolution in his politics and principles; as
Wollstonecraft predicts, sensibility breeds hypocrisy and the destruction of the rational
principle that recognises and condemns political wrongs such as slavery.32

Yet, Wollstonecraft does not reject the power of emotional appeal altogether, but
instead focuses on the opposition Chris Jones identifies between radical sensibility’s
“universal benevolence” and conservative sensibility’s appeal to “the partial affections”
(108). Wollstonecraft makes a case for the importance of broad, principled social
affection by claiming that “in my eye all feelings are false and spurious, that do not rest
on justice as their foundation, and are not concentrated by universal love” (Rights of Men
66), recalling Williams’s exclamation, in Letters Written in France, “May the fate of the
captive, in the land of France, no more hang suspended on the frail thread of the pity, or
the caprice of individuals! May justice erect, on eternal foundations, her protecting
sanctuary for the oppressed; and may humanity and mercy be the graceful decorations of
her temple!” (132). Wollstonecraft furthermore defines Burke’s “partial feelings” (Rights
of Men 57) as inherently selfish, citing the example of his public position against George
III’s rights as King during the crisis of his insanity: “But sympathy, and you tell us that
you have a heart of flesh, was made to give way to party spirit and the feelings of a man,
not to allude to your romantic gallantry, to the views of the statesman” (Rights of Men
58). Wollstonecraft’s reference to the crisis of George III’s insanity indicates that Burke’s
sensibility is strategically opportunistic, appearing only when it suits his political

31 Burke continues to equate “rebels, traitors, Regicides, and furious negro slaves, whose crimes have broke
their chains” (124).
32 Wood’s article, “William Cobbett, John Thelwall, Radicalism, Racism and Slavery,” however, also
points out that radical politics were not always affiliated to positions against slavery: he compares John
Thelwall’s “originality” as a radical thinker who was also committed to abolitionism to William Cobbett’s
Burkean racism (n. pag.). Of course, many early abolitionist leaders, such as William Wilberforce and
Hannah More, were Tories.
ambitions, an accusation that undermines his personal credibility and his conservative emotional project.

Wollstonecraft and Paine, however, destabilise their own attempts to disentangle radical and conservative sensibility on the basis of conservatism’s artificiality and hypocrisy by also representing Burke’s sensibility as bordering on complete madness, and thereby implying that sensibility itself is inherently irrational. Paine links Burke’s misplaced feelings with his irrationality, asking, “Is this the language of a rational man? Is it the language of a heart feeling as it ought to feel for the rights and happiness of the human race?” (49). Although these questions suggest that radical sensibility, or “a heart feeling as it ought to feel,” could be rational, it frames Burke’s sentiments as perverse and potentially insane. In addition, Paine reads Burke specifically in terms of Enlightenment reason, claiming that Burke’s critique of French affairs constitutes “darkness attempting to illuminate light” (45) and concluding that “Reason and Ignorance, the opposites of each other, influence the great bulk of mankind ... Reason obeys itself; and Ignorance submits to whatever is dictated to it,” in a formulation that associates “Reason” with republicanism and “Ignorance” with hereditary succession (140). He also mobilises the image of Don Quixote exploited by the press in his representation of Burke’s irrational mind, writing, “In the rhapsody of his imagination, he has discovered a world of windmills, and his sorrows are, that there are no Quixotes to attack them” (50). Finally, Paine takes issue with Reflections’s supposedly organic form, arguing that the pamphlet instead reveals Burke’s mental disorder: “Mr Burke’s Book is all Miscellany. His intention was to make an attack on the French Revolution; but instead of proceeding with an orderly arrangement, he has stormed it with a mob of ideas tumbling over and destroying one another” (116). In defining the Reflections as “Miscellany” or “a mob of ideas,” Paine turns Burke’s critique of Price’s “Discourse” as a “porridge” stirring the members of the Revolution Society “reeking” with his speech to compose their congratulatory message to the National Assembly against him (Reflections 11), and, furthermore, constructs the Reflections as the confused though rousing work, mobilising its audience to irrational political commitments.

Wollstonecraft’s attack on Burke’s lack of reason in Rights of Men is more explicitly directed at his sensibility, which she associates with his imagination. The form of
Reflections in her view follows the “devious tracks” of Burke’s “fancy” (33), and she attributes this to Burke’s emotional excess:

it is natural to conclude, that all your pretty flights arise from your pampered sensibility; and that, vain of this fancied pre-eminence of organs, you foster every emotion till the fumes, mounting to your brain, dispel the sober suggestion of reason. It is not in this view surprising, that when you should argue you become impassioned, and that reflection inflames your imagination, instead of enlightening your understanding.

(37)

Sensibility, Wollstonecraft suggests, works on the “imagination” rather than the “understanding” and, furthermore, disturbs the brain by “inflam[ing]” instead of “enlightening.” She also aligns Burke’s sensibility with his political opportunism and his inability to control his thoughts, arguing that he takes his position against the Revolution in order to create a public sensation and revive his career. She writes, “There appears to be such a mixture of real sensibility and fondly cherished romance in your composition, that the present crisis carries you out of yourself; and since you could not be one of the grand movers, the next best thing that dazzled your imagination was to be a conspicuous opposer” (78). In this passage, Burke is “carrier[d] ... out of [himself]” by his excited emotions and “dazzled” imagination, the two aspects of sensibility that, in Wollstonecraft’s view, render it dangerous to reason. In fact, for Wollstonecraft, sensibility, “the manie of the day” (36), borders on insanity; she mocks Burke’s histrionic rejection of abstract reasoning, beginning one sentence with “If I were not afraid to derange your nervous system by the bare mention of a metaphysical enquiry...” (47), and uses Burke’s language of extreme emotion to ridicule him, stating, for example, “I still preserve my bowels; my heart is human” (66). Finally, in her critique of Burke’s hypocritical treatment of George III’s mental illness, she subverts his conservative sensibility by questioning its sincerity and his capacity for feeling real compassion, while also exploiting the hysteria inherent in Burke’s own language by paraphrasing his reaction to the Revolution: if Burke possessed real sympathy for the sufferings of

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33 See Burke’s claim that “[i]n England we have not yet been completely embowelled of our natural entrails .... We have real hearts of flesh and blood beating in our bosoms” (86).
monarchs, Wollstonecraft argues, he “would have seen in that monstrous tragi-comic scene the most opposite passions necessarily succeed, and sometimes mix with each other in the mind; alternate contempt and indignation; alternate laughter and tears; alternate scorn and horror.— This is a true picture of that chaotic state of mind, called madness” (60). Wollstonecraft’s description of the King’s madness highlights Burke’s lack of compassion for George III while characterising her opponent’s reaction to the revolutionary events in France as mad, paraphrasing from Burke’s representation of himself as an observer of the Revolution in her portrayal of the insane King.

The polarisation of reason and sensibility that emerges in Reflections and the responses of Burke’s opponents, however, undermines the project of radical sensibility by troubling writers, like Wollstonecraft, who wish to appear both rational and compassionate. Burke’s critics’ attacks on his histrionics identify conservatism with a kind of extreme sensibility indistinguishable from madness, but, at the same time, confirm Burke’s claim that the language of affect belongs to the conservative position. This is problematic for Wollstonecraft in particular, who expresses ambivalence toward sensibility throughout her work. As Schulman argues, this is partly because she recognises that the politics of sensibility “can be employed as much in the service of the French Revolution as in the Burkean counter-revolutionary project” (43-44). In Rights of Men, Wollstonecraft stresses her allegiance to Enlightenment reason; she defines madness, for example, as “only the absence of reason.— The ruling angel leaving its seat, wild anarchy ensues” (60), privileging reason’s intellectual status while demonising mental disorder as the absence of the “ruling angel.” Wollstonecraft’s attempts to discredit Burke by associating his views with insanity can at times, however, work against her own political aims. In endeavouring to prove her own rationality, for example, she feminises Burke, and thereby undermines her own feminist arguments by retaining the hierarchy between reason and sensibility usually associated with gender distinctions. In Blakemore’s words, “she implicitly valorized the language she resented by inverting the sexual clichés in terms of the ‘stronger’ masculine woman and the ‘weaker’ feminine man” (Intertextual War 28). In Rights of Men, for example, Wollstonecraft argues that

34 Compare Burke’s “In viewing this monstrous tragi-comic scene, the most opposite passions necessarily succeed, and sometimes mix with each other in the mind; alternate contempt and indignation; alternate laughter and tears; alternate scorn and horror” (10).
Burke’s “lively imagination” makes him a wit, who, “like a celebrated beauty” aims “to raise admiration on every occasion, and excite emotion” (36). She returns to the issue of Burke’s wit at the end of her pamphlet, constructing it as the binary opposite of judgment, and gendering those qualities according to the aesthetic categories Burke establishes in his *Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful*. “Judgment is sublime, wit beautiful; and, according to your own theory, they cannot exist together without impairing each other’s power. The predominancy of the latter, in your endless Reflections, should lead hasty readers to suspect that it may, in a great degree, exclude the former” (91). Wollstonecraft explicitly links Burke’s lack of judgment or reason with his supposed femininity here, a connection she refers to throughout the *Rights of Men*, writing, for example, of his “pretty flights” of fancy (37). The difficulties Wollstonecraft faces in her efforts to condemn Burke’s irrationality and vindicate her own reason by disavowing supposedly feminine characteristics of superficial wit and sensibility while maintaining her feminist principles demonstrate the complexity of the confrontation between reason and sensibility that Burke and his radical opponents attempted to negotiate in the 1790s.

Yet, despite her critique of Burke’s emotionalism, Wollstonecraft remains drawn to the social power of sensibility. Her *Letters Written During a Short Residence in Sweden, Norway and Denmark* suggest that subordinating sensibility to reason is more difficult in practice than in theory, and that sensibility can, in fact, awaken the individual to the wrongs of others:

> What are these imperious sympathies? How frequently has melancholy and even misanthropy taken possession of me, when the world has disgusted me, and friends have proved unkind. I have then considered myself as a particle broken off from the grand mass of mankind; — I was alone, till some involuntary sympathetic emotion, like that traction of adhesion, made me feel that I was still a part of a mighty whole, from which I could not sever myself .... (15)

35 In *Sublime and Beautiful*, Burke associates sublimity with masculine characteristics like power and potential danger or terror, but describes beauty as a “social quality” which “inspire[s] us with sentiments of tenderness and affection” (39).
This passage draws on sympathy’s power to integrate the individual into the “mighty whole” of the social body, recalling Burke’s claims that the body politic is united by its shared emotions, but also represents sympathy as an overwhelming physical force not subject to reason and potentially excessive: it is both “imperious” and “involuntary.” While recognising the potential good of sympathy, then, Wollstonecraft continues here to stress its dangerous capacity to overpower reason. Near the conclusion of Rights of Men, Wollstonecraft’s description of human misery constitutes a passionate, rather than rational, denunciation of Burke’s politics, but also attempts to regulate her excessive emotion by channelling it toward political action:

Man preys on man; and you mourn for the idle tapestry that decorated a gothic pile, and the dronish bell that summoned the fat priest to prayer. You mourn for the empty pageant of a name, when slavery flaps her wing, and the sick heart retires to die in lonely wilds, far from the abodes of men, ....

Such misery demands more than tears— I pause to recollect myself; and smother the contempt I feel rising for your rhetorical flourishes and infantine sensibility. (95-96)

Although Burke’s “tears” are still the object of Wollstonecraft’s attack, her own emotion overflows onto the page, as she must “pause to recollect [her]self.” Her claim that “misery demands more than tears,” more importantly, suggests that emotion alone cannot correct social evils, but that it must be accompanied by action; sensibility, in other words, can usefully serve progressive political projects, but without those ends is, like Burke’s emotion, empty and “infantine.”

Burke’s intentional histrionic emotionalism in the Reflections is part of his attempt to claim sensibility as specifically conservative territory and to use the emotional capital he generates to propose images of the British community as a national family and sentimental body politic that reinforce traditional hierarchies and institutions. In framing institutional and constitutional precedent as a legacy inherited from affective political forefathers, he represents himself as the good father of the patriarchal family romance.

36 For a more detailed discussion of the problematic relationship between reason and sensibility in Wollstonecraft’s work see my article “‘The Walls of Her Prison’: Madness, Gender and Discursive Agency in Eliza Fenwick’s Secresy and Mary Wollstonecraft’s The Wrongs of Woman.”
and as the heart of an emotionalised English nation. However, in attempting to naturalise the historically constructed institutions of old-regime Britain, Burke leaves himself open to radical critics like Wollstonecraft and Paine, for whom his violent emotionalism simply aims at protecting the property, privilege and power of the old regime’s stakeholders. Burke’s histrionic sensibility, therefore, is an overstated weapon that reveals his vulnerabilities to the radical opponents who wish to discredit his principles, as he refuses to argue his positions rationally and thereby exposes the potential madness at the heart of the discourse of sensibility he embraces. Yet the very opposition between reason and sensibility that Wollstonecraft and Paine use against Burke suggests the complexity of the debates of the 1790s. Wollstonecraft especially wished to use sensibility to serve her progressive politics, but found herself conflicted by the relationship between emotion and reason in her work. A rationalist critique of Burke’s sensibility that defines emotion as madness could problematically mean giving up the field of sensibility to the conservative position. However, as the 1790s progressed, sensibility remained a crucial contested field in the Revolution Debate, as Anti-Jacobin writers like Elizabeth Hamilton, whose Memoirs of Modern Philosophers is the subject of my next chapter, returned to the kind of criticisms Paine and Wollstonecraft directed against Burke as a means of undermining the project of radical sensibility and revolutionary politics more broadly. Hamilton, in other words, relocates the antirevolutionary message away from Burkean emotionalism and excess, and aligns it with a programme of disciplining the national community. The representational problems raised by Burke and his opponents in the early 1790s thus clearly continue to resonate at the end of the decade and into the nineteenth century, as writers like Hamilton attempt to negotiate the role of affect in imagining the family and the community, the risks of allowing the emotional excess of sensibility to overpower principle, and the challenges the Revolution poses to a British community reconstructing itself in the wake of a decade of political violence and public disorder across the Channel.
CHAPTER 3

“THE RIGHT PATH”: DISCIPLINE, THE ILLUSION OF CONSENSUS AND THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY BRITISH COMMUNITY IN ELIZABETH HAMILTON’S

MEMOIRS OF MODERN PHILOSOPHERS

In 1800, after a decade of escalating violence in France, including war, the Terror, and the rise of Napoleon, and increased conservative nationalism and government paranoia in Britain, Elizabeth Hamilton published Memoirs of Modern Philosophers, an Anti-Jacobin satire of English radicalism. Like Edmund Burke, Hamilton engages in a fierce representational contest against specific radical opponents, especially the English Jacobins William Godwin and Mary Hays, a contest in which she violently appropriates and rewrites the content of well-known revolutionary texts and symbols, like the figure of the Goddess of Reason, and even, through caricature, Godwin and Hays themselves. She furthermore returns to the same contested fields, Godwinian rationalism and radical sensibility, that feature in Burke’s debate with Richard Price, Thomas Paine and Mary Wollstonecraft. However, while the Revolution Debate reveals how complicated the relationship between reason and sensibility was for radicals and conservatives alike, Hamilton attempts to assert control over these contested fields by reductively simplifying their political and intellectual nuances, and thereby containing the proliferation of political positions produced by the Revolution within her own authoritative narrative and didactic plot.

Hamilton’s efforts to appropriate and contain revolutionary symbols and discourses point to the violence that underlies her Anti-Jacobin text. Hamilton attempts to produce authority for her novel and its antirevolutionary position by constructing an illusion of consensus among the embedded readers, editor and author figures who provide an interpretive model and imagined critical reception within her frame story, and works to co-opt her real-world readers to that position by, for example, including them in jokes at the expense of her political opponents, Godwin and Hays. Hamilton furthermore attempts to indoctrinate her characters within her text, by forcibly converting her political radicals, or, if they resist discipline, by exorcising them from her plot. The consensus that Hamilton produces among her characters and embedded author, editor and readers,
therefore, depends on their submission to her representative authority and is therefore constructed through representational violence. The illusion of consensus that Hamilton promotes, in other words, attempts to conceal the operation of violence that lies beneath it.

Hamilton’s efforts to force an antirevolutionary agreement in her readers through her text’s illusion of consensus as to the pitfalls of radical thought, however, are also a part of her broader programme of depicting a reconstructed British national community, one that puts the radical 1790s behind it by disciplining and reintegrating revolutionaries into wider society. While Hamilton imagines her post-1790s community as a conservative, antirevolutionary community, represented by the patriarchal household, she also envisions an inclusive British nation, one that promotes acceptance among diverse cultural groups, encourages women’s education, and supports the emerging ideal of the affective family to replace the patriarchal community that is still the centre of power within her novel. This points to the paradox that underlies Hamilton’s political project: while her imagined inclusive community suggests that her antirevolutionary conservatism is complicated by some moderate political views, the creation of that community requires the integration of its members through their conversion to Hamilton’s politics, or to the forced consensus that Hamilton envisions.

“An Excellent Antidote to the Poison”: Hamilton’s Anti-Jacobin Form

Hamilton’s contemporary readers instantly recognised Memoirs of Modern Philosophers as an Anti-Jacobin intervention in the politically contested literary field of the 1790s. Hamilton uses a third-person, supposedly objective narrator, and an embedded set of readers to establish her narrative authority and to produce an illusion of consensus among her characters and her fictional author and readers that works to promote social integration over a more radical ethic of individualism. The novel’s frame story embeds a reception that establishes its literary merit and the value of its political positions, and attempts to recruit Hamilton’s real-world readers to those positions. Her parodies of Jacobin figures further represent Hamilton’s views as those of a broader community by contrasting her characters’ ludicrous short-sightedness and rote thinking with the supposed competent, accurate and responsible reading that she appropriates for herself.
and the model reader she portrays in her character Harriet Orwell. Divorcing radical thought from its political context while familiarising her readers with its rhetoric, Hamilton intends her readers to recognise and reject English Jacobinism as both ridiculous and dangerous. By encouraging critical reading Hamilton may unintentionally train her readers to resist her efforts to co-opt them to her political position and point them to the radical texts she condemns; nevertheless, within the narrative at least responsible reading means submitting to the conservative, Anti-Jacobin position that Hamilton promotes and represents as authoritative.

Although Hamilton’s writing never completely disappeared from literary criticism, meriting brief mentions in several twentieth-century studies on Romantic and women’s writing, her work began to receive sustained attention only in the 1990s with increased interest in the political writing of the 1790s. More recently, with the explosion of academic work on British imperialism, numerous critics have studied Hamilton’s first political novel, *Translation of the Letters of a Hindoo Rajah*. Over the decades, however, much of the critical debate surrounding Hamilton’s work has focused on her politics, asking whether she can truly be considered an Anti-Jacobin novelist. Claudia L. Johnson argues that “Elizabeth Hamilton’s novels are unmistakably conservative in their defense of established forms, but they are also remarkable in their refusal to be inflexibly doctrinaire and in their readiness to recognize and give way to at least some progressive social criticism,” including the critique of aristocratic prejudices and admiration for religious dissent, for example (*Jane Austen* 9). Although many critics follow Johnson in reading Hamilton as an Anti-Jacobin who nonetheless encourages some moderate reform,


38 Studies from the 1990s by Eleanor Ty, Gary Kelly and Janice Thaddeus focus extensively on Hamilton’s work. Hamilton also received two entries in the *Dictionary of Literary Biography* for the first time in the 1990s, in the *British Romantic Novelists, 1789-1832* and *British Reform Writers, 1789-1832* volumes. More recent work on conservative novels of the 1790s includes April London’s “Novel and History in Anti-Jacobin Satire” (2000), and two studies that address Hamilton directly, M. O. Grenby’s *The Anti-Jacobin Novel: British Conservatism and the French Revolution* (2001) and Lisa Wood’s *Modes of Discipline: Women, Conservatism, and the Novel after the French Revolution* (2003).

her novels have still polarised other critics. Studies of *Hindoo Rajah*, for example, are split by Hamilton’s treatment of women and the degree of her imperialist sympathies. Several critics, like Anne K. Mellor, are tempted to see Hamilton as a Wollstonecraftian feminist who critiques the limits of women’s education and offers intelligent female characters as alternative models of femininity, while others, such as Felicity A. Nussbaum, label the eponymous Rajah, Zāārmilla, a “misogynist” (171) and suggest that the novel “berates women of both nations [Britain and India]” (172). Mellor additionally sees Hamilton as a social reformer, arguing that “Hamilton clearly suggests that oriental despotism begins at home, in Britain” (156), while Nigel Leask describes *Hindoo Rajah* as “pro-Hindu and Islamophobic,” a novel that offers a “spirited defence of the Hastings phase of British rule” and conforms to “colonial ideology” by supporting the Rohilla War (187). Mona Narain addresses Hamilton’s treatment of women and of India side by side, concluding that “ultimately, her vision of a benevolent English Empire is a paternalistic vision that compromises her critique of patriarchy” (598).

Recently, critics have also been interested in reading *Memoirs of Modern Philosophers* as more liberal than Hamilton’s obvious Anti-Jacobin plot would suggest. Janice Thaddeus argues that Hamilton’s voice constitutes “a liberal, if not a radical, presence” in the novel and claims that it “was a book too intelligent for its audience” (“Elizabeth Hamilton’s *Modern Philosophers*” 398, 395). Eleanor Ty locates the novel’s liberalism in the unintentional results of its parodic form, arguing that “in quoting at length from the texts of the authors being parodied, Hamilton also inadvertently reproduces these arguments in her own work. The reproduction may indeed incite laughter but it may also paradoxically create new interest or attract a new audience for the master text” (113). To complete her subversion of an Anti-Jacobin interpretation of *Modern Philosophers*, Ty reads Bridgetina Botherim, the mock-heroic female philosopher who is the butt of Hamilton’s satire, as “noble,” “attractive,” and “full of

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40 Mellor suggests that *Hindoo Rajah*’s critique of British gender identities is based on Wollstonecraft’s polemic, “in which she lists the evil consequences of a female educational system devoted entirely to attaining ‘accomplishments’ and learning how to entice a man into marriage” (156), and that Hamilton offers her feminist philosopher Miss Ardent as “a viable alternative” to submissive, domestic femininity (161). Clare Midgley, similarly, argues that *Hindoo Rajah* “suggest[s] that there may be a role in the world for women in both the More and the Wollstonecraft mould, or perhaps for a woman who combines the qualities of both their ideal types” (35).

41 Hamilton, in fact, dedicated *Hindoo Rajah* to Warren Hastings.
energy and ambition” (118). Whether the novel’s supposed liberalism is intentional, as Thaddeus would argue, or accidental, as Ty suggests, these critics agree that Hamilton cannot be read as simply and unproblematically conservative.

While it is possible to read *Modern Philosophers* against the grain of Hamilton’s obvious Anti-Jacobin politics or to focus on her political inconsistencies, as Thaddeus and Ty do, the antirevolutionary conservatism that motivates her intervention in the debates of the 1790s is undeniable. As M. O. Grenby proposes, Hamilton can also be read as an entirely ideologically committed Anti-Jacobin novelist (205) who, following typical Anti-Jacobin representational strategies, depicts travestied, reduced versions of English Jacobin arguments (93-95). Grenby argues that Hamilton presents an “entirely notional ‘understanding’ of the ideological debate of the 1790s” (69-70), and that her novel “never becomes a satire of ideas but remains a satire of individual characters who merely represent, and in very loose terms, those ideas, and then only in pastiche” (70).

Nevertheless, he concedes that “Hamilton assumes a knowledge of what modern philosophy is, assumes that the same conception of it is shared by herself and her readers” (70), suggesting that Hamilton’s novel speaks in a conservative language familiar and recognisable to her audience. This is a radically different reading from those proposed by Thaddeus and Ty, who claim that Hamilton’s novel exploits the gaps generated by parody to provide her readership with new access to revolutionary thought. In fact, neither of these extreme positions on Hamilton is entirely adequate. As I will argue, Hamilton does travesty and rewrite the radical texts she parodies as part of her strategy of appropriating, re-interpreting and containing radical discourse and revolutionary symbols within the authoritative narrative she constructs. However, she also embraces some moderate political views by encouraging women’s education and by promoting reconciliation and acceptance among the diverse cultural groups that make up the 1790s British community. Therefore, although Hamilton’s representational strategy works to contain and simplify the diverse and contested political positions of 1790s Britain, the fractures and complexity within her own ideology mark a departure from her conservative representational policy.

This range of critical interpretations of Hamilton’s politics suggests that, as Susan B. Taylor argues, “[t]rying to capture Hamilton as either liberal or conservative is in some
ways a faulty exercise” (560). Nonetheless, contemporary reviews of *Modern Philosophers* demonstrate that her immediate audience did not doubt that her opinions fell on the conservative side of the Revolution Debate. The *Anti-Jacobin Review and Magazine*, which Lisa Wood describes as one of a set of conservative journals “active in policing the boundaries of politically acceptable writing, as well as in authorizing texts that they read as politically ‘unobjectionable’” (50), calls *Modern Philosophers* an “excellent work” (39) demonstrating “that all the female writers of the day are not corrupted by the voluptuous dogmas of Mary Godwin, or her more profligate imitators” (374). The reviewer concludes that Hamilton “deserves the thanks of her country, and the honour of being classed with the most unexceptionable female writer of the times,” the conservative Hannah More (376). A review in the *British Critic* endorses the novel’s Anti-Jacobin position as well, identifying the “design” of *Modern Philosophers* to be that of ridiculing the extravagancies of several pretenders to wisdom in the present times, particularly of Mr. Godwin. The wild and almost incredible absurdities of that author’s Political Justice ... afford so fair and open a subject for ridicule, that no man possessing any share of humour could fail to raise a laugh, if so disposed, at the expence of the fanatical speculator. (439)

These highly politicised responses to the novel clearly identify Hamilton as an ally of British conservatism and locate her in opposition to English Jacobins like Godwin and Wollstonecraft.

The split among critics on the subject of Hamilton’s politics and the urge to read her as a radical or at least a liberal masquerading as an Anti-Jacobin, despite the evidence of the contemporary reviews, arises from what Wood identifies as the problem of conservatism’s failure to appeal to modern critics:

Revolutionary and feminist writers continue to be more compelling than conservatives for many critics of this period, especially in the attempt to analyze the contributions made by women to gender and social history. Antirevolutionary writers, in comparison, seem to fulfill the purely negative function of obstructing progress, and to epitomize an antifeminist acceptance of repressive patriarchal ideologies. (21)
Wood cautions that “[b]y foregrounding only those qualities we find most compatible with our current political position, we deny women the status of full historical subjects” (24), and suggests that instead of ignoring the voices of the past that no longer resonate with contemporary politics, or approaching them solely by examining the ways they “subvert, counter, or manipulate patriarchal norms” (22), her project of reconsidering conservative women’s writing “entails an acknowledgment that women did not, and do not, always act, think, or write, in ways that support my own political position” (23). For Wood, this is a necessary critical approach, as “[a] significant number of novels published in Britain during the post-French Revolutionary period were both didactic and conservative, united by the explicit purpose of protecting the British people from revolutionary contagion; of these, the majority were written by women” (11).

If the appeal of didactic novels peaked between 1793 and 1815, as Wood argues (12), then the more specific genre of the Anti-Jacobin novel, into which category Hamilton’s Modern Philosophers certainly falls, reached its apex in an even shorter historical window, according to Grenby’s The Anti-Jacobin Novel: British Conservatism and the French Revolution: “Between 1791 and 1805 as many as fifty overtly conservative novels were published in Britain. Others contained distinctly conservative elements. These were the anti-Jacobin novels” (1). Grenby counts thirty “highly conservative novels” appearing between 1798 and 1805 (10) and notes that during this period, in contrast, “only about twenty radical novels [were] produced, with only a very few of them appearing any later than 1796” (2). Yet, writing in 2001, Grenby argues that these novels, unlike Jacobin texts, “have so far escaped any sustained analysis” (xi). 42 His claim for their significance focuses on their importance as artefacts of a broadly conservative public opinion in Britain during the revolutionary period: “Their popularity, and their tendency to reproduce the familiarly conventional, endow these novels with a representativeness which entitles them to be thought of as a vital key to the understanding of British society in an age of crisis and as perhaps the most historically meaningful literary response to the French Revolution and its aftermath” (1-2). By the mid 1790s, Grenby argues, debate over radical principles had “withered away” and been replaced with the “near unanimous

42 Wood’s Modes of Discipline appeared very soon after Grenby’s study, in 2003.
and highly militant anti-Jacobism” (5) that characterised British public opinion in a
time of war, Terror in France and government repression in Britain.\footnote{Historian Linda Colley examines the kind of conservative British identity constructed during the revolutionary period, on which Grenby’s argument is based, in \textit{Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837}. Colley argues that “war with France brought Britons ... into confrontation with an obviously hostile Other and encouraged them to define themselves collectively against it” and that mass mobilisation in this period became a means for British subjects to “[claim] the right to participate in British political life” (5).}

As an Anti-Jacobin novel, \textit{Memoirs of Modern Philosophers} deploys several
techniques recognisable as features of that genre, and of didactic conservatism more
generally. For example, the Anti-Jacobin novel attempts to establish its narrative
authority as distinct from the subjective, often first-person or epistolary, narratives of
radical sensibility epitomised by Helen Maria Williams’s \textit{Letters Written in France}, Mary
Hays’s \textit{Memoirs of Emma Courtney} and Mary Wollstonecraft’s \textit{The Wrongs of Woman:
or, Maria}. According to Nicola J. Watson, conservative writers denounce radical
subjectivity and individualism in their formal rejection of the epistolary mode, through
“the subordination of the letter to centralized narrative authority modelled within variants
of omniscient third-person narration, an aesthetic structure designed to enforce public
circulation and a vocabulary of consensus, as opposed to the private circulation of the
solipsistic language of feeling conventionally represented by the epistolary” (70). The
epistolary form and narratives of sensibility were not exclusively radical terrain, as my
discussion of Burke and his opponents in Chapter 2 explores, and Watson’s
generalisations about the politics of literary form thus miss the degree to which genres
and plots were contested fields for writers engaged in the Revolution Debate, as well as
the fractures and problems within each camp. As I suggest in my introduction,
revolutionary and antirevolutionary contributions to the representational contest over the
Revolution were citational, borrowed extensively from political allies and opponents
alike, and fought for representational control of the tropes and narratives shared by both
sides. Sensibility was highly problematic for the radical writers who nonetheless
employed it,\footnote{See my discussion of Wollstonecraft’s fraught relationship to sensibility in Chapter 2. I will return to Hays’s \textit{Emma Courtney} in more detail below.} and conservative writers were not united aesthetically or politically on
every issue: Hamilton, for example, caricatures Burke in \textit{Hindoos Rajah},\footnote{Hamilton’s \textit{Rajah}, Zāārmilla, meets with a caricature of Burke in a coffee house, and is subjected to a lengthy histrionic speech against British conduct in India that paraphrases from \textit{Reflections}:}
person, satirical narrator opposes the kind of histrionic sensibility *Reflections* demonstrates as much, if not as explicitly, as it ridicules Hays and Godwin.

Nonetheless, Watson’s description of Anti-Jacobin representational strategies applies to Hamilton’s text, in which the third-person narrator works to authorise a forced consensus among characters, the fictional author and editor, and her embedded readers, in an effort to promote a form of social integration that relies on submission to social authority, rather than validate the kind of individualism often espoused by radical writers. Anti-Jacobin form thus mirrors its conservative content: as Wood writes, antirevolutionary novels “focus less on personal psychological and emotional development than on an individual’s propriety of action within a social setting” (76). In other words, just as Hamilton forces her characters to submit to social authority within her conservative, didactic plots, the Anti-Jacobin form of her novel works to force submission among her readers to the authority of her narrative. Although Hamilton may frame the outcome of her novel as a consensus achieved among characters, author, narrator and readers, then, this is a forced consensus that tries to conceal the underlying violence through which it is constructed.

Furthermore, the Anti-Jacobin novel, according to April London, “integrat[es] the formal and thematic conventions of satire with those of the novel” (72) as a means of addressing what London sees as a Jacobin blurring of romance and history apparent in the “utopianism” of “political romance” (73). Although London’s understanding of Jacobin texts also misses the extent to which radical writers like Wollstonecraft and Hays problematised their own work or presented their characters’ efforts to change their

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...we are not a nation of monsters. Some virtue still remains among us, confined to me, and my honourable friends, it is true; but we, Sir, are Englishmen. Englishmen, capable of blushing at the nefarious practices of delegated authority. Englishmen, who have not been completely embowelled of our natural entrails; our hearts, and galls, and spleens, and livers, have not been forcibly torn from our bodies, and their places supplied by shawls and lacks, and nabob-ships, and dewannes! We have real hearts of flesh and blood, within our bosoms. (244-245)

Zāārmilla follows Wollstonecraft, Paine and the popular caricatures of the time in concluding, “I had no doubt of the unhappy man’s insanity” (245). Hamilton’s dislike of Burke arises as much from his position on India and prosecutorial role in the impeachment of Warren Hastings as from the excesses of the *Reflections*; her brother Charles worked under Hastings in India, and Hamilton dedicates *Hindoo Rajah* to Hastings, “AS THE HONOURED PATRON, AND FRIEND, OF A BELOVED, AND MUCH LAMENTED BROTHER” (54).
societies as failures, as well as the frequency with which satire features in radical texts, 46 her description of satire points to its aptness for conveying conservative political messages. Satire, London suggests, became the perfect tool for conservative texts because of “its classical pedigree, its inductive logic, its assumptions about the knowability of the reader, and its corrective impulse” (72). In other words, satire, like the third-person, authoritative narrator more generally, endeavours to produce and enforce a consensus between the parties involved in interpreting a work. Although neither satire nor sensibility belonged solely to one political group, then, third-person, satirical narrators were frequently used by Anti-Jacobin novelists like Hamilton to promote a kind of community standard among her characters and readers.

Hamilton’s novels of the 1790s contribute substantially to the experiment in the form of the Anti-Jacobin novel, as her early effort, Letters of a Hindoo Rajah (1796), and Memoirs of Modern Philosophers (1800) employ some similar, but also some widely different, formal techniques. Both works are what Gary Kelly, in Women, Writing, and Revolution, calls “footnote novel[s]” (157), works that cross “masculine” (144) or “authoritative, learned, and satirical discourse” (155) with the feminised form of the novel “associated with Revolutionary sympathy in such writers as Helen Maria Williams and Mary Hays” (155). Many critics note the complexity of Hamilton’s genre-crossing in conjunction with her experimentation with her narrators’ gender identities. Kelly claims that “[a]lthough Memoirs partly feminizes the ‘masculine’ discourses and topics it reworks [by examining philosophical material in the form of the novel], it also gives its narrator a masculine identity and constructs its ‘author’ as a paternalistic political commentator” (Women, Writing, and Revolution 144). Numerous other studies address the form of Hindoo Rajah, whose textual apparatus—including a “Preliminary Dissertation” on India, footnotes, and a glossary of terms—“asserts [Hamilton] as an orientalist, someone with knowledge of the Hindu culture and language” (Taylor 564), and frames her as the editor of a scholarly text. Hamilton “combin[es] elements of the

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46 London’s association of English Jacobin writing with “utopianism” (73) is too strong. Although early responses to the Revolution such as Williams’s Letters Written in France could be exuberant and optimistic about political change, by the middle of the 1790s writers like Hays and Wollstonecraft demonstrate a conflicted attitude toward radical sensibility as potentially confining, and offering little hope for the future of the Revolution. Wollstonecraft, among other rationalist English Jacobin writers, also employs satire: see my discussion in Chapter 2 of her parody of Burke in her Vindications.
typically masculine genres of Oriental satire and Orientalism with the feminine genre of the novel to create her own brand of Orientalist study” (Grogan “Crossing Genre, Gender and Race” 30). Hindoo Rajah is also written in the traditionally feminine epistolary mode, but features only male characters as correspondents.47

Hamilton’s gender identity is thus crucial to her experimentation and self-construction as an authoritative Anti-Jacobin novelist: she allowed the name Eliza Hamilton to appear on the title page of Hindoo Rajah, but by 1800 decided to publish Modern Philosophers anonymously and include a frame story that imagines the novel’s author as a male. In her Advertisement to the Third Edition in 1801, Hamilton reveals her identity and indicates that her initial anonymous publication was intended to minimise prejudice, especially gender prejudice, against her work: “Conscious how much the judgement of friends is liable to be influenced by partiality; and sensible, that where partiality cannot operate, prejudice against the known opinions, or even the sex, of a writer may unwittingly bias the reader’s mind; the Author of the following Memoirs resolved to introduce the first edition under a signature evidently fictitious” (30). Grenby argues that “the Jacobin novel was an invaluable invitation into the literary mêlée” for women writers like Hannah More, Jane West and Hamilton, “who felt they had an urgent political message to impart to the public but few opportunities to do so without violating their own, and others’, sense of gender propriety” (25). Nevertheless, Hamilton evidently felt trepidation about entering the “literary mêlée” as a female political novelist, and quite convincingly constructs herself as an authoritative male author within the novel: the Anti-Jacobin reviewer initially assumes she is a man,48 but ultimately sanctions her writing as gender appropriate when her identity is revealed, arguing that she should be “classed with the most unexceptionable female writer of the times,” Hannah More (376).

As in Hindoo Rajah, Hamilton frames Modern Philosophers in a manner that constructs her textual authority, and attempts to establish an embedded consensus about

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47 See Gioia Angeletti’s “Generic Hybridism and Narrative Ventriloquism in Elizabeth Hamilton’s Translation of the Letters of a Hindoo Rajah (1796)” (31).

48 The reviewer writes, “we give the author our best thanks for his very happy exposition of its [the new philosophy’s] absurd and wicked doctrines” (45). The British Critic reviewer also speculates about Hamilton’s identity, writing, “We have heard it surmised, probably from its being printed at Bath, that the present novel proceeds from the pen of the venerable Mr. Graves, author of the Spiritual Quixote, Euphrosyne, &c. Some passages seem to us a little to contradict that opinion, but we would not be too positive. Much of the work is certainly worthy of that able author” (440).
the novel’s literary merit and the value of its didactic, political purpose that confirms that authority. Unlike *Hindoos Rajah*s subjective, epistolary mode, contained within a scholarly form, *Modern Philosophers* is authorised by a fictional third-person, male narrator and an author figure, and mediated through a fictional editor, Geoffrey Jarvis, a publisher, and numerous embedded literary critics. According to Thaddeus, Hamilton’s use of multiple voices in her frame story produces gaps through which alternative political positions could potentially emerge: “As ventriloquist, she speaks through double voices; the characters are not her own dummies, but another’s. In the introduction, this extra author is critic Geoffrey Jarvis; in the text the dead male lodger occasionally comments; other voices erupt into the text through the parodic renderings of Godwin’s and Mary Hays’s words” (“Elizabeth Hamilton’s *Modern Philosophers*” 405). While Thaddeus’s interpretation of the novel’s multiple voices demonstrates that not all of Hamilton’s readers would willingly collude with her political project, the voices she embeds in her narrative nonetheless work together to construct Hamilton’s narrative authority.

The frame story is formatted as a letter from Jarvis, the editor of a found manuscript, to the publisher “Mr. Robinson” in “Pater-Noster-Row” (33), identifiable as Hamilton’s actual publisher, as well as the publisher of numerous Jacobin works. Jarvis finds a “fragment” of the novel’s manuscript, missing fifty pages (35) and beginning in the middle of chapter 5 (37), which had been offered by the dying author as payment to his landlady, but which she instead used as kindling (34-35). Hamilton initially attributes a wide, comic assortment of possible monetary and artistic values to the work. These range from its most basic use as kindling, to the possibility that it provides “compensation” for the author’s debt to the landlady, including his funeral expenses (34), to its questionable literary merit, as a friend of the landlady deprecates the manuscript as “a fair take-in ... all stuff and good for nothing” (35). She thus initially seems to undermine the value of her fictional author’s work.

However, it is only when Jarvis, a lover of books, adopts and vets the manuscript that a true consensus about it emerges within the frame story. Jarvis outlines the criteria for a good book when he laments his own lack of ability as a writer: “‘Oh, that I could write a

49 See Claire Grogan’s footnote in the Broadview edition (33).
book!’ cried I. ‘But, alas! of what subject am I master? All my old notions are, I find, by the Reviews, quite exploded. Of the new fangled ones that are now in fashion, I can make nothing; and notwithstanding all I have heard to the contrary, I do suppose it is necessary to understand something of the subject one writes about’” (33). Jarvis’s subsequent adoption of Modern Philosophers indicates that it fits this description as a work authored by one who “understand[s] something of the subject.” Jarvis’s next decision, to submit the manuscript to “several criticks of both sexes,” embeds a mixed reception for the novel in its frame, as he receives answering opinions “so various, so contradictory, so opposite to each other, that I was quite bewildered” (35). This mixed reception seems to preclude a critical consensus about the manuscript’s worth, except that Jarvis finally prioritises the favourable opinion he solicits “from a gentleman of great worth and knowledge” (35). This suggests that though public opinion may be divided, as is that of the “several criticks” (35), working toward critical agreement is, to Hamilton, an important part of forming accurate, reliable and educated judgments; the novel’s final form, as a text edited and introduced by Jarvis, published by Robinson and endorsed by the “gentleman of great worth and knowledge” (35), demonstrates that a favourable consensus as to the novel’s value has finally emerged, at least among these three embedded readers.

In order to generate further consensus about the novel’s value, Jarvis reproduces the gentleman’s review of the manuscript in full for the publisher and the implied reader, thereby authorising this opinion as the definitive interpretation of Modern Philosophers. The gentleman describes the novel as “not only praise-worthy in the design, which is evidently that of supporting the cause of religion and virtue, but unexceptionable in the means of executing this design; or at least less exceptionable than some other recent publications, which, like it, have avowedly been written in opposition to the opinions generally known by the name of the New Philosophy” (35). Hamilton identifies the “design” of the manuscript, allowing her to stake out her political position and categorise her work as an Anti-Jacobin novel at the onset. Yet, her claim that the manuscript is “less exceptionable than some other recent [Anti-Jacobin] publications” constructs Modern Philosophers as something more, or something better, than merely another Anti-Jacobin propaganda piece. The gentleman seems to locate the novel’s superiority to conservative propaganda in its liberality toward the objects of its satire:
To impute evil intention to the author of every speculative opinion that has an evil tendency, is equally illiberal and unjust; but to expose that tendency to the unsuspicious, and to point it out to the unwary, is an office of charity, not only innocent, but meritorious. From the use that is made by Vallaton [Hamilton’s villain] of some of the opinions promulgated in Mr. Godwin’s Political Justice, it appears to me to have been the intention of your author not to pass an indiscriminate censure on that ingenious, and in many parts admirable, performance, but to expose the dangerous tendency of those parts of his theory which might, by a bad man, be converted into an engine of mischief, and be made the means of ensnaring innocence and virtue. (35-36)

In this passage, Hamilton articulates her intention with respect to her satire of the Godwin circle, and pre-emptively addresses possible angry reactions to her novel by referring to Political Justice as “ingenious, and in many parts admirable,” yet potentially “dangerous” and “mischievous” in practice, although her reductive and sometimes cruel caricatures of Godwin and Hays cannot be dismissed by virtue of such a partial apology. More importantly, however, she indicates that her intention, including her openness to parts of Godwin’s work, is self-evident by embedding a reader who so perfectly interprets her objectives. This collusion between the fictional author and critic provides a template for promoting an Anti-Jacobin consensus among Hamilton’s real-world readers.

Hamilton also introduces her pragmatic purpose early in Modern Philosophers, demonstrating her belief in the Anti-Jacobin satirical novel as the best means of combating the influence of radical thought on the reading public, and its educational thrust as a justification of its use of ridicule to undermine its opponents. London argues that “Anti-Jacobin novels ... by appropriating the readership of political romances, attempt to convert naïve idealists into sceptical realists. These novels adopt satire to criticize romance, combining an attack on the public domain of radical politics with censure of the various narrative forms through which radical principles are expressed” (73). Furthermore, Grenby remarks on the paradox by which Anti-Jacobinism, which represents “novel-reading ... as the sure road to Jacobinism” (26), managed to rehabilitate the novel in the late 1790s (27), writing that “[a] fear of a reading public, and a fear of
radicalism’s ability to capture those readers, would suddenly combine to enable and encourage the anti-Jacobin novel to flourish” (17). Hamilton justifies her use of satire against the Godwin circle as a tool for educating the reading public in her epigraph, translated from Horace as “Ridicule shall frequently prevail, / And cut the knot, when graver reasons fail” (31), and confirms this position in the review by the “gentleman of great worth and knowledge” (35) in the frame story. Although the gentleman states that Modern Philosophers mocks “opinions, not persons” (36), he also vindicates the novel’s ridicule of individual figures, like the mock-heroine Bridgetina, as “an excellent antidote to the poison; calculated to make an impression upon those to whom serious disquisitions would have been addressed in vain” (37). The review in the Anti-Jacobin sanctions this pragmatic union between didacticism and satire, even using the same metaphor as Hamilton’s fictional reviewer: “the same means by which the poison is offered, are, perhaps, the best by which their antidote may be rendered efficacious. It will in this shape [the novel] find its way into the circulating libraries of the country, whence is daily issued such a pestiferous portion of what are termed enlightened and liberal sentiments” (375).

It is not surprising, then, that Hamilton uses her novel to parody Jacobin texts and caricature the Godwin circle, the modern philosophers of her title, in her effort to convert her real-world readers to the Anti-Jacobin position she shares with her embedded readers and to assert her own interpretive control over familiar, revolutionary discourse and symbols. As Wood notes, the conservative, didactic novel frequently “use[s] parody to mock central revolutionary texts” and “rewrite[s] the revolutionary novelistic plot according to a dysphoric model, which posits tragic or absurd outcomes to the implementation of revolutionary social theory” (76). Hamilton’s characters were immediately recognisable to her contemporaries as caricatures of Godwin and Hays especially, and the novel establishes a clear distinction between her realistic, admirable characters and her satirical philosophers. Hamilton distinguishes between her two sets of characters on an artistic level in her Advertisement to the Third Edition, in which she denies that her satirical characters reflect on any particular individuals and attributes them

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50 The Anti-Jacobin reviewer, for example, praises the Orwell and Sydney families, stating that “[t]hese excellent people strictly performing the duties of religion and morality are admirably contrasted, with the unprincipled disciples of Godwin and his wife” (42–43), and identifies Bridgetina as “M—y H—s,” noting that “[i]ndeed the whole character of Bridgetina so strongly resembles that of this impassioned Godwinian, that it is impossible to be mistaken” (371).
to “FANCY,” while claiming, however, that her admirable characters are “drawn by Truth” and originate among “the circle of her own acquainances” (30). Despite its denial of the obvious references to Godwin and Hays in Myope and Bridgetina, however, the Advertisement draws attention to the major focus of Hamilton’s satire: the supposed abstraction, impracticality and short-sightedness of English Jacobin thought. She argues that her satirical characters were developed “by tracing the probable operation of certain principles upon certain characters” (30), preparing the ground for an elucidation of the “tragic or absurd outcomes” Wood expects from didactic conservatism (76) and offering a common-sense alternative to radical philosophy.\(^5\) Hamilton experimented with representing the new philosophy as absurd in *Letters of a Hindoo Rajah* when depicting the attempt by a circle of radical philosophers, tellingly given such apt names as Sir Caprice Ardent, Axiom, Puzzledorf, Sceptic, and Vapour, to illustrate Godwin’s doctrine of necessity by converting a group of sparrows into honey-bees:

> On the evening of the third day, which was the conclusion of their destined term of probation, the entrance to the hive was opened, but not a bird came forth; every method was taken to entice them abroad— but in vain. At length, by the assistance of the servants, their habitation was so far raised, as to enable the philosophers to take a peep within. Sight of horrors! and smell, still worse than the sight! The lifeless corses of the three hundred half-fledged nestlings lay at the bottom of their hive, in a promiscuous heap.— “They have effectually swarmed at last!” said Mr. Axiom.— Neither the Baronet, nor the young philosopher, staid to make any remark— but every one putting his fingers to his nose— impelled by the necessity of *existing circumstances*, hurried from the dismal scene.

(269)

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\(^5\) Several critics trace the influence of the common-sense school of philosophy on Hamilton’s writing. Penny Warburton, for example, sees her work “as part of a larger project to recoup ‘philosophy’ from its association with dangerous, revolutionary ideals” (271), and Fiona Price argues that Hamilton uses common sense to implicate “the overly imaginative nature of their [radical writers’] work and [connect] their ‘metaphysics’ with the emptiness of fashion. In contrast, Hamilton adopted herself the common sense position that it was possible to make meaningful assumptions about the external world” (179). Janice Thaddeus’s pithy statement that “Godwin theorizes and Hamilton generalizes” (“Uncertainties of Satire” 416) sums up the critical position on Hamilton’s attitude toward philosophy.
In *Modern Philosophers*, the new philosophers are equally physically absurd and impractical, demonstrating Hamilton’s strategy of asserting representational control over not only her opponents’ ideas, but also over their persons. According to Grenby, Anti-Jacobin novels mark their characters as philosophers with their descriptive names and absurd appearances, and through “personal invective” (96). The names Glib and Myope comment obviously on those characters who possess them, like Sir Caprice Ardent and company in *Hindoo Rajah*, but Bridgetina Botherim is the primary target of Hamilton’s ridicule. She is described as “rather taller sitting than standing” (46), making a “grotesque figure” (48), and possessing a shrill voice (71) and “unfortunate squint” (72). More importantly, Bridgetina continually exposes herself to further absurdity by allowing her gown to trail in the mud (219), by appearing in extremely silly dress at a party in London (282-287), and by soliloquising to the extent that she does not realise she has been overtaken and trapped within a drove of pigs on a country road (157-158). She also submits to a “fraternal embrace” (48) with the Goddess of Reason’s pet monkey, Mr Pug, who subsequently bites Myope’s finger (48-49), and loses her wig in the gutter, into which “muddy torrent” she “made shift to waddle through” on her way to meet the philosophers (47).\(^{52}\) In addition to their obvious physical ridiculousness, the new philosophers, like those in *Hindoo Rajah*, fail to understand the practical application of their theories. Hamilton illustrates their impracticality, for example, by showing them discussing the possibility of using mental energies to overcome the physical demands of pain and the need for sleep while one of their circle suffers from a dislocated shoulder following a carriage accident, ignoring his evident distress and preventing him from resting (154-156).\(^ {53}\)

Hamilton thus reduces Godwin and Hays to crude caricatures, absurd figures whose flaws, such as their short-sightedness and lack of perspective, stand in for what Hamilton sees as the limits of their political philosophies. What Gary Handwerk and A. A. Markley

\(^{52}\) Bridgetina’s physical absurdity and her immediate recognisability as a parody of Hays among Hamilton’s contemporaries suggest that Hamilton intended a cruel physical portrait of her opponent. Claire Grogan finds the source for Bridgetina in both “Mary Hays’s person and in her work *Memoirs of Emma Courtney,*” indicating that Bridgetina is derived from Hays’s actual physical appearance (Introduction 18-19).

\(^{53}\) Myope asserts that “I make no doubt, from the known powers of my friend Vallaton, that if every bone in his body had been broken, he would have effected a reunion of the parts by his own exertion. As for pain, it is a mere vulgar prejudice.” Vallaton replies while “writhing in great agony, from an attempt to move” (154).
describe as “the blunt manner in which Godwin derived consequences from the pure rationalism of his principles,” as exemplified by his “notorious” description of the justice of saving François Fénelon from a fire over his chambermaid, or his other “equally scandalous criticisms of conventional morality and accepted calculations of social justice,” such as his position against marriage (20), 54 defined his philosophy for some of his contemporaries as abstract and impractical. He was condemned by his conservative opponents as, in the words of the British Critic reviewer for Modern Philosophers, a “fanatical speculator” (439). Hamilton transforms this quality of Godwin’s philosophy into the physical blindness that symbolises Myope’s preoccupation with the impractical abstractions that she casts as out of touch with and irrelevant to real-world problems. Myope’s name and Bridgetina’s squint are obvious references to the philosophers’ inability to make practical, common-sense observations, but Hamilton also allows her narrator and characters to frequently remark on Bridgetina’s blindness to the facts of the external world. Bridgetina, Myope’s uncritical disciple, exemplifies a “total want of observation” (255) and is “obstinately blind” (378). She is, moreover, unable to respond appropriately in social situations because of this blindness. When Julia, Hamilton’s tragic heroine, indicates that she would like Bridgetina to leave her alone to speak to her mother, “Every hint was lost on Bridgetina, whose mind was so completely occupied in discussion and investigation of abstract theory, as to be totally lost to the perception of all that was obvious to common observation. Just as those whose opticks, by being constantly employed on distant objects, lose the power of seeing whatever comes close to the eye” (194-195). Hamilton explicitly links Bridgetina’s insufficient “opticks” to her “discussion and investigation of abstract theory” here, implicating theory as an inadequate tool when it comes to reading the details of the external, social world. Hamilton’s Bridgetina is far more indoctrinated by Godwinian philosophy than her more critical living model, Hays, as I will discuss in greater detail below. Yet, the crudeness of these caricatures is a crucial part of Hamilton’s strategy in portraying her opponents; by reducing Godwin, Hays and the English Jacobin politics they represent to travesties, she

54 See Political Justice, Book II, Chapter II, “Of Justice” for Godwin’s discussion of Fénelon and the fire (1:80-91), which Hamilton parodies at length (50). I also discuss this section of Political Justice briefly in Chapter 2. Even Godwin came to revise the “rationalism” and “utopian dimensions” of his political thought in the years after he wrote Political Justice, under the influence of Mary Wollstonecraft and as a result of his experience writing novels (Handwerk and Markley 27).
can minimise and manage the complexity and diversity of radical thought in order to
demonise and dismiss it with greater ease.

Hamilton further works to undermine the credibility of her opponents by presenting
her philosophers as indecisive and unreliable, vacillating from one theory or scheme to
the next because their lack of common-sense observation has left them unable to
distinguish between valid philosophical positions and trendy political jargon. As Fiona
Price argues, in *Hindoo Rajah* and *Modern Philosophers* “the weakness of their
reasoning leaves them vulnerable to following intellectual fashion” (182). Like his
precursor in *Hindoo Rajah*, Sir Caprice Ardent, Myope is easily and infinitely convertible
from each new opinion to the next trend. When Vallaton first encounters Myope, he
appears “in the character of an itinerant preacher,” “a religionist,” but when the pair meet
again at the “Apotheosis of the Goddess of Reason” in Paris, Myope has “become a
convert to the new philosophy” (59); by the novel’s end, he has married a rich widow
who converts him to Swedenborgianism (387). The narrator attributes Myope’s
impetuosity to his “inflammable imagination,” arguing that his brand of enthusiasm “is
blinded by the glare of its own bewildering light, expends itself upon any object that
chance puts in its reach, and is usually unsteady as it is abortive” (145). Moreover, the
narrator distinguishes between Myope’s unfocused enthusiasm and the concentrating
enthusiasm of “great minds” (144), “born of reason and directed by judgment, ... noble,
discriminating, and effective” (145), linking the intellectual effects of the abstract theory
of philosophers like Myope or Godwin with the emotional instability of the discourse of
sensibility displayed by Bridgetina and Mary Hays, to which I will return. Neither
philosophical abstraction nor novelistic sensibility, Hamilton suggests, is rational.
Although, as I will discuss below, Hamilton demonstrates her extensive familiarity with
Godwin’s work in particular, in these caricatures of her radical opponents she presents
reductive portraits of Godwin and Hays, but also simplified abstractions of the new
philosophy and radical sensibility that work to contain their political potential by
dismissing their legitimacy as complex and nuanced tools for developing political and

55 Hamilton follows this description up with a catalogue of Myope’s various incarnations as a “religionist,”
including his short-lived but zealous and dogmatic commitment to Quakerism, Anabaptism, and Calvinism
(145). In fact, Godwin’s rational philosophy is not a departure from the Calvinism of his upbringing, but a
secularisation of Calvinist doctrine (Handwerk and Markley 24).
social consciousness. Hamilton’s violent intervention in the complex representational contests of the 1790s, in other words, attempts in part to simplify those contests in order to invalidate the radical positions she opposes.

Hamilton furthermore demonises the new philosophers by representing them, as Wollstonecraft and Paine had portrayed Burke, as superficial and self-centred. She uses a proposal the philosophers devise to emigrate to Africa to join a community of Hottentots, in a parody of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s idea of the noble savage, to illustrate their ignorance and impulsiveness. Glib originates the emigration scheme when reading François Le Vaillant’s African travel narratives, and projects Godwinian philosophy onto the Hottentots he reads about:

See here, Citizen Myope, all our wishes fulfilled! All our theory realized!
Here is a whole nation of philosophers, all as wise as ourselves! All
enjoying the proper dignity of man! Things just as they ought! No man
working for another! All alike! All equal! No laws! No government! No
coercion! Every one exerting his energies as he pleases! Take a wife
today: leave her again to-morrow! It is the very essence of virtue, and the
quintessence of enjoyment! (141)

The other philosophers embrace the scheme eagerly, applying the language of radical politics to African culture. Bridgetina, for example, exclaims, using the discourse of Godwin and Thomas Paine, “Here is the Age of Reason exemplified; here is proof sufficient of the perfectability of man!” (142). Their speculations about the Hottentots, based on an extremely selective and inventive reading of Le Vaillant, further expose their Eurocentric folly:

“Vere do dese wise people live?” enquired the Goddess of Reason.
“Have dey no fete, no grand spectacle, no ball, no concerta?”
“Yes, yes, they have balls, Madam,” returned Glib, “and concerts too.
But you are not to imagine, that in the reasonable state of society to which they are advanced, that any man will condescend to perform the
compositions of another. All compose for themselves; all play their own tune; no two in the same key!”

“Vat be dere ball dress?” said the Goddess. “De fashions of so enlightened a people be ver elegant, to be sure. Do dey rouge, like de French lady; or be dey pale-faced, like de lady of England?” (143)

This comic transaction between Glib and the Goddess of Reason focuses on the two supposed aspects of the new philosophers Hamilton wishes to ridicule: their ignorance about the world, including their own enthusiastic endeavours, which are coloured by their abstract theory rather than practical experience, and their interest in the fashionable, to the extent that they equate their political schemes with the world of “fete[s],” “grand spectacle[s],” “ball[s],” “concert[s],” “ball dress[es]” and “rouge.” Because Glib and the Goddess of Reason are not caricatures of specific individuals, Hamilton has more freedom with these characters to offer a general condemnation of her version of revolutionary thought. Hamilton transforms the historical Goddesses of Reason, the female figures embodying revolutionary values who were featured at public events celebrating the Revolution like the Festival of Reason, into one utterly fallible and irrational woman who is ignorant, racist, superficial, and, above all, like the Revolution she symbolises, French. In depicting her Goddess of Reason, then, Hamilton appropriates and rewrites a well-known revolutionary symbol, emptying it of its radical value and endowing it with the negative qualities that make it an easy target for her Anti-Jacobin critique. As in the case of her caricatures of Godwin and Hays, Hamilton’s portrayal of the Goddess of Reason is an example of her engagement in a violent representational contest, as she wrests interpretive control away from her opponents, even with respect to their own leaders and symbols, and asserts her own representational authority over the historical radical figures and revolutionary symbols she depicts.

56 Compare Godwin’s radically individualistic imagined future, in which the “evil[s]” (2:844) of cooperation disappear:

shall we have concerts of music? The miserable state of mechanism of the majority of the performers is so conspicuous, as to be even at this day a topic of mortification and ridicule. Will it not be practicable hereafter for one man to perform the whole? Shall we have theatrical exhibitions? This seems to include an absurd and vicious cooperation. It may be doubted whether men will hereafter come forward in any mode gravely to repeat words and ideas not their own? It may be doubted whether any musical performer will habitually execute the compositions of others? (2:846-847)
Hamilton’s understanding of the English Jacobins, however, is not only focused on a critique of the external, superficial, even stereotypical appearance of her new philosophers. Although my presentation thus far of the superficial targets of Hamilton’s satire has tended to confirm Grenby’s assertion that Anti-Jacobin novels often present travestied, reduced versions of English Jacobin arguments (93-95), Grenby’s position is not wholly accurate in Hamilton’s case, as her novel exhibits a thorough knowledge of radical texts, like Godwin’s and Hays’s, and, moreover, assumes her reader also possesses a basic understanding of English Jacobin thought. In fact, as a “footnote novel” (Kelly Women, Writing, and Revolution 157), Modern Philosophers draws extensively on Godwin’s Political Justice and Hays’s Memoirs of Emma Courtney, among other radical texts, in order to contrast Hamilton’s competence as a reader of the new philosophy with the shallow understandings her satirical characters exhibit. Hamilton draws attention to her familiarity with radical discourse and its prevalence in her texts by frequently citing her quotations and paraphrases, and even apologising for allegedly accidental plagiarisms. In one such footnote, Hamilton humorously points to the extent to which her philosophers draw their speeches from Godwin’s texts, using the voice of her fictional editor, Jarvis:

The frequent plagiarisms of our author have been particularly objected to by some of my learned friends; who informed me, that by perusing the works of Mr. Godwin, and some of his disciples, I should be enabled to detect the stolen passages, which it would be but honest to restore to the right owner. Alas! they knew not what a heavy task they imposed on me. If I have failed in its execution, I humbly hope Mr. Godwin and his friends shall accept of this apology; and while they recognize, in the speeches of Mr. Vallaton, the expressions they have themselves made use of, that they will have the goodness to forgive me, for not having always correctly pointed out the page from whence they have been taken. — Editor. (50)

In this passage, Hamilton explicitly names the target of her satire, Godwin, while reminding the reader of the many places where she does cite her opponents’ texts and indicating that Godwin’s words are frequently to be found in the mouth of her villain, Vallaton. This occurs, for example, when Vallaton uses the Godwinian arguments “best
calculated to work on the ardent imagination of his fair and unsuspecting pupil” as he attempts to seduce Julia by suggesting that his own authority as a philosopher should have more weight with her than her duty to her parents. Hamilton thus points to the danger Godwinian thought could pose to naive young radicals like Julia when used by a manipulative villain like Vallaton. Furthermore, by referring to Jarvis’s “learned friends,” who succeed in identifying passages from Godwin, Hamilton also suggests an understanding between the author who parodies Godwin and the reader who, through a familiarity with the original text, gets the joke. Finally, by allowing Jarvis, another stand-in reader, to admit he is unequal to the “heavy task” of locating the author’s quotations and paraphrases in Godwin’s work, Hamilton draws a distinction between her own readable text and Godwin’s supposedly dry or boring original.

Moreover, Hamilton showcases her ability to read the practical consequences of Godwinian thought, whereas her new philosophers can only unthinkingly apply his writing to absurd or inappropriate contexts. London argues that “the grafting of the dialogue, characters, and plot from the radical text on to the conservative text is intended to render the original ludicrous by a process of decontextualization that involves fracturing the coherence on which the affective unity of the source work depends” (74), and continues to suggest that this process makes radicals “appear rote thinkers, and Jacobin politics seem the product not of enlightened empiricism, but of derivative abstraction” (74). Bridgetina is an exemplary rote thinker, basing all of her opinions on the authority of the new philosophers and quoting them extensively without understanding their meaning. Speaking of the new philosophers’ position on gratitude, for example, Bridgetina argues,

there is nothing so immoral as gratitude. It is, as Mr. Myope says, a vice, or rather a mistake, peculiar to minds who have imbibed certain

57 Vallaton says, “as to your regard for them [her parents], philosophy should teach you to consider only—how can these old people benefit society? What can they do for the general good? And then placing beside them some of those whose extensive faculties, whose great powers enable them to perform the glorious task of enlightening the world; say, whether justice, pure unadulterated justice, will not point out where the preference ought to fall?” (51). Cf. Political Justice, “The life of Fenelon would still be more valuable than that of the chambermaid; and justice, pure, unadulterated justice, would still have preferred that which was most valuable” (1:83). Myope also paraphrases heavily from Political Justice in this scene, asking, for example, “What magic is there in the word my, to overturn the decision of everlasting truth?” (50) in an almost exact echo of Godwin’s question, “What magic is there in the pronoun ‘my,’ to overturn the decisions of everlasting truth?” (1:83).

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prejudices, but which none who have energy to rise above them, are ever known to practice; it is, in short, the greatest obstacle to perfectability. Whoever knew Mr. Myope grateful for any favour that he ever received? (45)

Bridgetina can only frame her philosophical utterances around Myope’s authority. Such instances fulfil the double purpose of showing, as Thaddeus argues, that “although Bridgetina can mimic Godwin’s words, she does not really understand his ideas;” Hamilton, by contrast, “has read her Godwin widely and carefully” (“Uncertainties of Satire” 408).

Hamilton proposes that the new philosophers privilege rote learning, as opposed to independent thought, and are proud of their ability to quote with ease and upon all occasions, in another attempt to simplify her opponents’ nuanced and diverse political positions. While Hays does paraphrase Godwin extensively in Emma Courtney, she does so in the context of the novel’s epistolary form, and through the voice of one character, Mr Francis, a fictionalised version of Godwin. In fact, as Marilyn L. Brooks argues, Hays re-frames her private correspondence with Godwin as the fictional correspondence between Emma and Francis “to find a public ‘voice’ for her private objections to Godwin’s uncompromisingly rational discourse,” suggesting that Emma Courtney “might be viewed as one of the first anti-Jacobin novels; a challenge to, rather than an echo of ‘the Godwinian school,’ as Emma Courtney ... interrogates such Godwinian terms as ‘utility,’ ‘sincerity,’ and ‘disinterest’” (15). Godwin, moreover, was extremely critical of Emma Courtney when he read it in manuscript, and urged several alterations which Hays refused to make (Brooks 16-17). This produced a strain on their relationship that, along with private offences that occurred on both sides at Wollstonecraft’s death, resulted in the end of their friendship.58 The intellectual, literary and personal relationship between Godwin and Hays, therefore, was far more difficult than Bridgetina’s unthinking worship of Myope would suggest, and while exploiting such fractures within the radical camp may perhaps have served Hamilton’s antirevolutionary purpose, her novel instead works

58 According to Brooks, Godwin kept Hays away from Wollstonecraft’s deathbed, and Hays refused to attend her friend’s funeral (15-16).
to conceal the diversity of English Jacobin politics and philosophy as part of her strategy to target radicalism by simplifying and thus containing it within her own representations.

Unlike Hamilton, who mimics Godwin and Hays as a critical reader, and the real-world Hays, who was willing to critique her political ally, Bridgetina parrots Myope’s words unthinkingly, and takes pride in doing so. She says to Julia, for example, “You may take down the book, if you please, but I know I have quoted it word for word; you know I am seldom wrong in a quotation” (68). Her memory is a quality for which Bridgetina is much praised by her ignorant mother, Mrs Botherim, who raves to Julia, “She will talk you out of any book she has been reading, for the length of a whole hour, and never once put in a word of her own. It is a fine thing to have such a genius!” (203-204). In addition to relying on the authority of the new philosophers, Bridgetina is unable to think beyond the confines of her reading or speak for herself, as the narrator shows on several occasions. While travelling to London by coach, Bridgetina initially impresses two lawyers, her fellow passengers, with her discourse, but they quickly perceive her intellectual limits:

The two lawyers were not a little astonished to hear such a stream of eloquence flow from so unexpected a source. They for some time thought it inexhaustible, but on putting some pertinent queries to the fair orator, they discovered that her eloquence, like the little coach and horses to be seen in the shew-box at the fair, ran always the same round. In vain did they endeavour to make it trace a wider circle; it could neither stop, nor turn, nor go strait forwards, nor move in any other direction than that in which it had at first attracted their curiosity. (237)

Bridgetina similarly finds, while conversing in London, that she “was soon run aground. She had gone to the very end of her lesson” (257). Although Grenby suggests that Anti-Jacobin novels convince their readers by presenting a one-sided debate (93), Hamilton, while she is guilty herself of reducing complex and nuanced radical arguments in order to demonise and dismiss them, attempts to superficially suggest that the reverse is true by portraying philosophers like Bridgetina who rely on authoritative opinion in conversation while closing their ears and their minds to alternative positions. She thereby attempts to
align radical politics and philosophy with traditional rote learning and one-sided, closed-minded discussions.

Although Bridgetina’s intellectual limits do not accurately depict Hays’s critical position on Godwinian philosophy, Hamilton does use her caricature of Hays to discredit one characteristic for which Hays was known: the novelistic sensibility that she displayed in life and in her semi-autobiographical *Emma Courtney*, a fictionalisation of Hays’s romantic pursuit of William Frend, the original for Emma’s infatuation, Augustus Harley. According to Brooks,

By 1796 Hays was in love with both the man and, as important, with the idea of the man. *Memoirs* is the result of that love .... During 1795 Hays made no secret of her affection for him, and in 1796 she must have conducted as “hazardous” an “experiment” as that risked by Emma, by earnestly demanding a response to her love. His ultimate rejection was a “blow” which had been suspended over her head “for days, weeks, months, years” and which had “at length descended,” leaving her doubtingly to conclude “& still I live.” (9–10)

By consciously imitating the plot of *Emma Courtney*, therefore, Bridgetina would also be evidently acting out Hays’s biography, and Hamilton’s contemporaries immediately recognised Hays as the original for Bridgetina; the *Anti-Jacobin* reviewer identifies Bridgetina as “M—y H—s” and Henry Sydney, the man she pursues, as “Mr. F—d” (374). As late as 1932 J. M. S. Tomkins calls Bridgetina a “fair satire, indeed, at times hardly an exaggeration of the original” (318–319). The *Anti-Jacobin* reviewer, moreover, calls Bridgetina’s speech on the causes that have formed her character “an excellent imitation of that vicious and detestable stuff which has issued from the pen of M—y H—s. Indeed the whole character of Bridgetina so strongly resembles that of this impassioned Godwinian, that it is impossible to be mistaken” (371). In fact, the *Anti-Jacobin* goes further than simply praising Hamilton’s parody and takes the opportunity to reprimand Hays: the reviewer directs “[t]he gentle and tender original of Bridgetina” to attend to more traditionally feminine work such as needlework instead of her “present worthless, nay, unprincipled, pursuits,” exhorting, “[t]o your sampler, to your sampler” (376).
Hamilton, however, deliberately misreads *Emma Courtney*, ignoring Hays’s explicit construction of Emma as a warning of the dangers of sensibility, in order to portray radical thought as risky and short-sighted. In her Preface, Hays entreats her readers to “bear in mind, that the errors of my heroine were the offspring of sensibility; and that the result of her hazardous experiment is calculated to operate as a warning, rather than as an example” (36), and Emma herself tells her history in order to warn her adopted child Augustus from allowing himself to become, as she has been, a “victim of ... ardent passions” (43). Hays thus exhibits the same radical feminist suspicion of sensibility as her friend Wollstonecraft.\(^5\) Emma’s emotional excess derives from the conditions of the education that construct her as a subject of sensibility. Her reading of Rousseau, particularly, is “dangerous, enchanting,” and produces “a long chain of consequences” in her life (60). Emma’s problem, according to Hays, lies in the social wrongs that shape her experience and must be reformed for the future; Emma remains optimistic that “men begin to think and reason; reformation dawns, though the advance is tardy” (221). Yet, despite Hays’s critique of women’s education as emotional subjects through their cultivation of sensibility, she remains drawn to the plot of sensibility as a means of articulating her warning. Emma suggests that the tale of her life offers Augustus “a more striking and affecting lesson than abstract philosophy can ever afford” (43). In fact, Emma asserts that her sensibility is the very source of her reason, writing to Francis, “But do you not perceive, that my reason was the auxiliary of my passion, or rather my passion the generative principle of my reason? Had not these contradictions, these oppositions, roused the energy of my mind, I might have domesticated, tamely, in the lap of indolence and apathy” (172). The “contradictions” at the heart of Emma’s dilemma are the same as those at the centre of English Jacobin thought: Emma’s passions awaken her reason, but her vindication of sensibility necessarily exposes the limits of “abstract philosophy” to produce the “affecting lesson[s]” she wishes her writing to develop (43), while also pointing to the dangers of the plot of sensibility for the emotional, female subject. *Emma Courtney* is paradoxically both a critique of sensibility that encourages the cultivation of reason over passion, and a narrative of sensibility that suggests the inadequacy of Godwinian rationalism to effect the social change Emma and Hays advocate.

\(^5\) See Chapter 2 for more on Wollstonecraft and sensibility.
As a parody of a radical, sentimental heroine, Bridgetina neutralises the political edge of Hays’s appeal to radical sensibility as a means of articulating the need for social reform, by taking the discourse of *Emma Courtney* out of its original context and re-applying it in the most absurd of circumstances. In Ty’s words, “The parodic version of Hays’s *Emma Courtney*, unlike its original, is non-threatening to the patriarchal order, precisely because she is so comic” (119). In addition to her ridiculous physical appearance, Bridgetina’s absurdity derives from her bizarre behaviour under the influence of the sentimental novels she consumes. Bridgetina imagines herself as a heroine of sensibility, and constructs Henry Sydney, who is in love with Harriet Orwell, as her lover: “‘Does he then love me?’ cried she, soliloquising in the manner of all heroines. ‘Have my mental attractions power to charm his soul? Oh! the soft, the tender, the extatic thought!’” (119). Like Emma Courtney, Bridgetina rationalises the idea of Henry’s attachment to her using the new philosophy, despite his evident cold behaviour toward her, and under the influence of a “new novel” (216), presumably *Emma Courtney*, Bridgetina determines to pursue Henry’s affections by following him to London, where he practices as a physician. Bridgetina not only follows the plot and form of *Emma Courtney*, imagining her romance with Henry as an epistolary novel publishing their correspondence (309-310), but she continually paraphrases and quotes directly from Hays, using the novel to “refresh her memory with a few of the most striking

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60 Nicola J. Watson’s reading of Bridgetina as a parody of Emma Courtney aligns Bridgetina’s ridiculous body with Hamilton’s subversion of the conventions of the novel of sensibility, and, in particular, the epistolary mode:

The deformed and squinting body of Hamilton’s absurd heroine, Bridgetina Botherim, ironizes, to ludicrous effect, the conventional equation of the sentimental letter with the body of the sentimental heroine. Bridgetina conceives of herself as an emphatically epistolary heroine … identifying herself (predictably) with both Wollstonecraft and Rousseau’s Julie in her faithful parroting of sentimental discourse; however, … this version of Emma Courtney … once relocated within the body of the heroine by courtesy of third-person narration, is satirically invalidated by its lack of ‘correspondence’ with the body that extrudes it. (85)

61 “Day after day she expected to behold Henry Sydney, and day after day closed in disappointment. She considered his conduct in all points of view; she discussed every possible motive that could induce him to forbear gratifying himself in her society; she divided and subdivided every argument in his favour; she reasoned, she investigated, and always concluded with proving, in the most satisfactory manner, that she was right, and that, therefore, Henry must inevitably be wrong” (202).

62 Bridgetina exclaims to herself, “in extacy” (309), “Our correspondence shall be printed. It shall be published. It shall be called *The Sweet Sensations of Sensibility, or the Force of Argument*” (309-310).
passages” in order to convince Henry with discourse “so ardent, so expressive, so full of
energy and emphasis, that it would have grieved a saint to have had them lost” (216).

Hamilton’s parody of Hays suggests a formulaic quality to radical discourse, a quality
she in fact helps to create when she imitates radical writers, and which, ironically, also
occurs in the Anti-Jacobin, didactic formulas Modern Philosophers employs. Bridgetina,
for example, prepares novelistic speeches for use in real life, arguing by rote in affairs of
love as she does in philosophical discussions:

A speech which had long been conned, twice written over in a fair hand,
and thirteen times repeated in private, was now to prove its efficacy. It
was taken from her pocket; the heads again run over; and for the help of
memory, in case of interruption, a sort of index taken of the contents,
which she thus read aloud, while the maid cleared the table after dinner.
*Moral sensibility, thinking sensibility, importunate sensibility; mental
sensation, pernicious state of protracted and uncertain feeling; congenial
sympathy, congenial sentiment, congenial ardour; delicious emotions,
melancholy emotions, frenzied emotions; tender feeling, energetic feeling,
sublimised feeling; the germ, the bud, and the full-grown fruits of the
general utility, &c. &c.* “Yes,” cried she, in extacy, when she had finished
the contents, “this will do! Here is argument irresistible; here is a series of
calculations, enough to pour conviction on the most incredulous mind.
Henry overcome shall cry— Bridgetina, thou has conquered!” (308)

Performing radical identity, Hamilton suggests, is as simple as citing a few typical and
well-known subject headings. To ensure that her reader gets the joke, Hamilton inserts a
footnote “for the benefit of Novel-writers,” indicating,

We here generously present the fair manufacturers in this line with a set of
phrases, which, if carefully mixed up with a handful of story, a pretty
quantity of moonshine, an old house of any kind, so that it be in sufficient
decay, and well tenanted with bats and owls, and two or three ghosts, will
make a couple of very neat volumes. Or should the sentimental be
preferred to the descriptive, it is only leaving out the ghosts, bats, owls,
and moonlight, and the above phrases will season any tender tale to taste.

(308)

Hamilton’s comic effort to “season” her own “tender tale” suggests the ease with which political writers could adopt sentimental techniques to make their works palatable to readers, and attempts to educate those readers to recognise radical sensibility when it appears. Ty suggests that “[m]uch of the success of Hamilton’s parody lies in her ability to imitate the lofty language of the radical writers” (120), and Bridgetina frequently employs the kind of rhetorical flourishes found in Emma Courtney, familiarising Hamilton’s readers with Hays’s style while divorcing it from her work’s radical content. Bridgetina exclaims, for example, “And is not happiness and pleasure the only true end of our being?” and, “Sensations! emotions! delicacies! sensibilities! O how shall ye overwhelm us in one great torrent of felicity!” (217). In imitation of Hays’s emphasis on causation and existing circumstances in forming Emma’s character, moreover, Bridgetina outlines for her friend Julia the “seven generating causes of the energies which stamp [her] individuality” (174). Hamilton thus absurdly rewrites Hays’s autobiographical, confessional model and her critique of the social wrongs that construct Emma’s identity by locating the source of her subjectivity in such moments as her birth without a midwife, the nurse dropping her on the floor, and her absorption of “love of literature, and importunate sensibility” (175) through the milk of her novel-reading wet-nurse (174-175).

Hamilton’s attempt to construct a consensus among author, editor, publisher and embedded readers in her frame story and footnotes establishes a community among those fictional figures, and pits them against the reduced versions of her radical opponents that she portrays. By containing and forcibly rewriting radical discourse and revolutionary symbols, Hamilton commits a kind of representational violence that aims to co-opt her real-world readers by dismissing and demonising alternative political positions. Her decontextualisation of English Jacobin thought renders radical literary tactics recognisable while eliminating their intellectual and aesthetic attractiveness. Moreover,

63 Cf. Emma Courtney, “Individual happiness constitutes the general good:— happiness is the only true end of existence” (148).
64 For example, Emma traces “a long train of consequences” in her life from her impressions of reading Rousseau (60).
the opposition she constructs between responsible and competent social readers, like herself, and the supposedly myopic new philosophers, while it does not reflect the real diversity and self-reflexivity of English Jacobin politics, aims to endow her own interpretation of the revolutionary decade with the authority that she needs to frame her didactic plot and eradicate political dissent, at least within the confines of her narrative.

“A Dangerous Excursion”: Didactic Conservatism and the Threat of the New Philosophy

Hamilton’s intention, however, is not merely to provide her readers with a sense of the new philosophy’s practical absurdity, or radical sensibility’s high-strung conventionality, but to convince her audience that English Jacobin political thought is potentially dangerous. Her work thus has a serious, didactic purpose in addition to the comic strategy of undermining the new philosophy through parody. Hamilton’s plot suggests that conditions in revolutionary France and the new philosophy’s tenets could be exploited by criminals and adventurers, such as her villain Vallaton, implying that adherence to English Jacobin beliefs is fundamentally selfish, unpatriotic and opportunistic. In addition to providing a model of villainy in Vallaton, Hamilton’s novel didactically contrasts her three exemplary heroines, the comic Bridgetina, tragic Julia and successfully domestic Harriet to supply her readers with models of how education and behaviour can produce predictable social outcomes. Above all, Hamilton’s three heroines are representative types who demonstrate, through their reading practices, good and bad methods of navigating both political texts and the practical dilemmas of the real world. Like the authoritative, satirical, third-person form Hamilton employs, her didactic plots attempt to contain radical politics by restricting her characters to a set of predictable, conservative outcomes meant to bolster her Anti-Jacobian position through their association with specific, politicised behavioural patterns.

Hamilton employs several recognisable tactics belonging to conservative, didactic novels. Modern Philosophers, like other didactic texts, encourages “self-discipline” (Wood 63) by representing the new philosophers, from Hamilton’s antirevolutionary position, as hypocritical and opportunistic (Grenby 96-99), and outlining the perceived negative consequences of their beliefs (Grenby 99-103). In Grenby’s words, “As well as
the plot itself proving the disastrous results of their empty systems ... Hamilton periodically interspersed running tallies of the ruin so far wreaked by new philosophy” (100). One lesson the novel offers is that the new philosophy is fundamentally selfish: even characters like Bridgetina and Glib, who are eventually rehabilitated by the broader community, use the new philosophy for selfish ends. Bridgetina, for example, shirks her domestic duty by arguing that she cannot stay at home to entertain her mother’s guests when she, by the doctrine of necessity, must do what is “most preferable” (46), and Glib calls himself “too much of a philosopher to be tied to hours” (120), preferring instead to leave his shop closed. More importantly, he exploits Godwin’s radical view of marriage to deny his family’s claims on him, crying, “Live with no one one does not like. Love no one but for what is in them. That’s it! that’s the way to perfectibility! What is it but loving one’s own child, or one’s own mother, or one’s own wife, better than other people’s, that obstructs the progress of morals? Leave them all. Let them all shift for themselves. Make them exert their energies” (228). Here, Glib gradually shifts from stating Godwin’s abstract theories about marriage, such as “Live with no one one does not like. Love no one but for what is in them,” to selfishly applying these words to his own situation, in the directions, “Leave them all. Let them all shift for themselves.” This is advice he subsequently follows when he abandons his children, justifying his actions by “mak[ing] use of the words of some author, who probably little imagined that his theory would ever meet with such a practical advocate” (294). Although Godwin is much more tentative than Glib in applying these abstract principles to real situations, 66

65 Again, Hamilton is selective and reductive in her critique of Godwin, emphasising the strands of his theories deriving from his radical individualism in such passages as “every thing that is usually understood by the term cooperation, is in some degree an evil .... If I be expected to eat or to work in conjunction with my neighbour, it must either be at a time most convenient to me, or to him, or to neither of us” (2:844) that give rise of his rejection of marriage as a form of cohabitation:

Cohabitation is not only an evil as it checks the independent progress of mind; it is also inconsistent with the imperfections and propensities of man. It is absurd to expect that the inclinations and wishes of two human beings should coincide through any long period of time. To oblige them to act and to live together, is to subject them to some inevitable portion of thwarting, bickering and unhappiness .... The supposition that I must have a companion for life, is the result of a complication of vices. It is the dictate of cowardice, and not of fortitude. It flows from the desire of being loved and esteemed for something that is not desert. (2:848-849)

Hamilton ignores other aspects of Godwin’s critique of marriage, especially his claim that marriage is “an affair of property, and the worst of all properties” (2:850).

66 Cf. Political Justice,

114
Hamilton uses Glib to demonstrate that in the hands of the selfish the new philosophy is readily exploited and abused.

Hamilton indicates her belief in the dangers of the new philosophy most explicitly through the tragic story of her heroine Julia’s victimisation by the opportunistic adventurer and criminal Vallaton, who exploits the new philosophy to take advantage of the vulnerable. London identifies two types of radicals in the Anti-Jacobin novel, the “well-born heroes and heroines led by their credulity to accept the radical programme of perfectibility and innate goodness” which “generates not an ideal community but a damaged family” (75), and “the low born who invoke Jacobin principles for entirely self-interested and often criminal ends” (75-76). These two types of radicals take their place in Hamilton’s novel as Julia and Vallaton, respectively. Vallaton occupies the position of the vaurien in Modern Philosophers, a term Grenby takes from the name of Isaac D’Israeli’s anti-hero in Vaurien: or, Sketches of the Times (104). Thaddeus describes Vallaton as “a designing hypocrite” (“Uncertainties of Satire” 411), and Margaret Doody notes that he “employ[s] the new philosophy for the sake of old rakishness” (“English Women Novelists” 188). Vallaton uses Godwinian philosophy to seduce Julia, drawing on the arguments “he thought were best calculated to work on the ardent imagination of his fair and unsuspecting pupil” (51), and even exploits the other new philosophers by stealing the money they entrust to him as the treasurer for the Hottentot scheme (322-323). Vallaton’s history is, as Kelly notes, “the picaresque narrative of the lower-class anti-hero” (Women, Writing, and Revolution 147), and illustrates the facility with which adventurers and criminals could supposedly manipulate radical politics and the revolutionary conditions in France for their own purposes. Vallaton is raised among criminals to commit fraud from a young age, and takes advantage of the patroness who

There seems to be more truth in the argument, derived chiefly from the unequal distribution of property, in favour of my providing in ordinary cases for my wife and children, my brothers and relations, before I provide for strangers. As long as providing for individuals belongs to individuals, it seems as if there must be a certain distribution of the class needing superintendence and supply among the class affording it, that each man may have his claim and resource. But this argument, if admitted at all, is to be admitted with great caution. It belongs only to ordinary cases ... (1:86)

This argument arises from Godwin’s discussion of Fénelon and the fire, when he asks, “What magic is there in the pronoun ‘my,’ to overturn the decisions of everlasting truth? My wife or my mother may be a fool or a prostitute, malicious, lying or dishonest. If they be, of what consequence is it that they are mine?” (1:83).

67 Grenby translates vaurien from the French as “a good-for-nothing” (104).
adopts him from the streets in his early adulthood (52-54). He trains to become a hairdresser, but his criminal education has fitted him with the rhetorical skills to become an orator in a “three-penny spouting club” (56), and, eventually, “the oracle of his district” (57). His career in radical public speaking leads Vallaton into political writing and atheism, and he begins to style himself “Vallaton, the patriot” (58). His radicalism, however, is purely opportunistic: “The only shape in which patriotism ever appeared to the mind of Vallaton, was in that of a ladder, by the assistance of which, he might be enabled to climb a few steps higher on the hill of fame” (58).

While Vallaton is in revolutionary France, the conditions of the Revolution and his embrace of the new philosophy facilitate his criminality. Vallaton devises a plot to denounce a friend’s brother in order to embezzle the money his friend entrusted to him. The resulting guillotine scene is an example of what Grenby categorises as the Anti-Jacobin motif of “portrayals of revolutionary ‘justice’ at work” (39). For Doody, the execution of Vallaton’s victim “connects the cruelty of private egotism and the cruelty of public violence” (“English Women Novelists” 189). Hamilton contrasts a sentimental picture of the guillotine’s victims with Vallaton’s heartless rationalisation of his actions in order to emphasise his violence:

A youth of about seventeen or eighteen years of age, whose air of manly fortitude expressed maturity of virtue, appeared to exert his utmost efforts to support an aged mother, whose enfeebled mind was lost in the horrors that surrounded her. A young woman, who was placed in the most conspicuous part of the machine, still more forcibly attracted the notice of the spectators. A gleam of satisfaction illumined each fine feature of her beautiful countenance; and as she turned her lovely eyes to heaven, they appeared animated with the sweet enthusiasm of hope and joy. (61-62)

Vallaton fails to see such victims in his concept of the guillotine, instead viewing the instrument in utilitarian terms and conflating the new philosophers’ idea of general utility with the personal advantage he could accrue from manipulating revolutionary violence to serve his purpose:

“What a charming contrivance is this guillotine!” said he to himself, as he went along. “How effectually does it stop the mouths of troublesome
people. Would that this good-for-nothing old man had made such a desirable exit! And why should he not? Of what utility is his life to society? Why should he deprive me of these seven hundred guineas?” (62)

Having justified denouncing his friend’s brother through a misuse of radical philosophy, Vallaton proceeds to excuse his own role in the man’s execution by using Godwin’s doctrine of necessity, identifying himself, along with the guillotine, as a tool only, “the passive instrument” (64) of the man’s death, “a machine in the hand of fate” (65).

Although Vallaton provides a negative example of how villainy could misuse the new philosophy, Hamilton also uses her three heroines, Bridgetina, Julia and Harriet, to provide contrasting behavioural models for her readers. Although Hamilton is critical of what she sees as a formulaic quality to the novel of radical sensibility, *Modern Philosophers* also follows formulaic plotlines, particularly those Wood associates with the didactic novel: the sisters plot, the educational plot and the domestic or marriage plot (66-70).68 Most important for Hamilton is the sisters plot, which shows the various consequences of alternative models of conduct in order to highlight the options available to her heroines and the seemingly inevitable results of their politicised decisions and actions. As discussed above, Wood argues that didactic narratives “discipline their negative exemplary heroines, punishing them with dysphoric plotlines” (63), and the sisters plot in *Modern Philosophers* is a recognisable disciplinary strategy, described by Marilyn Butler as “the typical Jane Austen plot— but painted in the lurid colours of the years of violent reaction” (*Jane Austen and the War of Ideas* 111). For Wood, domestic plots like the sisters plot are a crucial feature of Anti-Jacobin fiction by women; although she claims male Anti-Jacobin writers focus on the “satiric novel of ideas,” she argues that Anti-Jacobin women emphasise “domestic realism” in their narratives (54). Hamilton, as the discussion above shows, does satirise the new philosophy, but, in Wood’s words, “[e]ven Elizabeth Hamilton ... focuses her political and social critique through a domestic plot, rather than utilizing it as an adjunct to the political plot” (56). Just as Hamilton works to reduce and contain radical discourses and symbols through her simplifying parodies, she contains her novel’s political content more broadly within her fictional

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68 Hamilton uses all three, but focuses the final two around the sisters plot, framing her didactic lessons through the contrast she provides in the educational trajectories, choices, and ultimate fates of the three heroines.
homes and domestic plots. Hamilton’s method for domesticating her satirical novel appears in the importance she places on her heroines’ domestic educations and on the role of the family and the home in training them to be rational and responsible adults.

As her limited intellectual capacity suggests, Bridgetina’s education has been severely circumscribed by her biases in favour of certain kinds of learning over others. Early in the novel, Bridgetina declares that she only reads “novels and metaphysics” (38) and refuses to engage in domestic employments, such as making a pudding, with her mother (37). Mrs Botherim summarises her daughter’s interests in conversation with a relation, Mr Mapple:

“Biddy is a great scholar! You will find, if you converse with her a little, that she is far too learned to trouble herself about doing anything useful. Do, Bridgetina, my dear, talk to your cousin a little about the cowsation, and perfebility, and all them there things as Mr. Glib and you are so often upon. You have no ideer what a scholar she is,” continued the fond mother ... “she has read every book in the circulating library, and Mr. Glib declares she knows them better than he does himself.” (38)

Hamilton uses Mrs Botherim’s speech to set up an opposition between “cowsation” and “perfebility,” the abstract notions of the new philosophers, and the possibility of “doing anything useful,” contrasting metaphysics to practical knowledge early in the novel. Bridgetina’s response to her mother reveals her intellectual biases more explicitly, as she sets her own reading limits by denying that she has, in fact, read the entire contents of the circulating library: “history and travels, sermons and matters of fact? I hope I have a better taste! You know very well I never read any thing but novels and metaphysics” (38). Moreover, Bridgetina will only read novels of radical sensibility, declaring, “I do not care for wit and humour ... they may serve to amuse the vulgar, but you know they are quite exploded by the new philosophy” (172), and continuing, “What is Cervantes, or Moliere, or Fielding ... in the eye of a philosopher?” (173). Instead, she exclaims,

Give me the wild extatic wanderings of imagination, the solemn sorrows of suffocating sensibility! Oh how I doat on the gloomy ravings of despair, or delicious description of the soul-melting sensations of fierce and ardent love! ... O Heloise! divine, incomparable Heloise! how, in perusing thy
enrapturing page, have all my latent energies been excited? O Henry Sydney, Henry Sydney, the St. Preuse of my affections, how at the mention of thy name has a tide of sweet sensations gushed upon my heart!

(173)

The consequence of Bridgetina’s self-chosen, unguided reading is that she lives by the conventions of novels of sensibility, such as Rousseau’s Julie or Hays’s Emma Courtney, and is unprepared to face practical dilemmas in her life when they arise. Hamilton’s admirable characters recognise the limits Bridgetina’s narrow reading imposes upon her mind: Henry refuses to debate with “one possessed of a shallow understanding” (71) and Harriet condemns her rote learning, stating that “[p]lagiarism is an unlawful weapon in debate” (165), although Hamilton allows herself to plagiarise extensively to suit her satirical purposes. Harriet’s aunt, Martha Goodwin, furthermore, critiques Bridgetina’s strong opinions as “illiberal,” “harsh,” “arrogant and dogmatical” (113). The most dire practical result of Bridgetina’s self-education, however, appears when she pursues Henry to London, without money or any ability to care for herself away from her mother’s home. Henry’s patroness, Mrs Fielding, explains to Mrs Botherim that Bridgetina’s unfitness for living in the world comes from her extensive reading on subjects she is not prepared to properly understand:

It could not be expected from Miss Botherim, that with her limited opportunities of information she should be able to detect the pernicious tendency of the opinions she so unhappily embraced .... To an imagination enflamed by an incessant perusal of the improbable fictions of romance, a flight into the regions of metaphysics must rather be a dangerous excursion. I am afraid Miss Botherim has gone too far astray in the fields of imagination to be easily brought back to the plain path of common sense. (326-327)

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69 Katherine Binhammer argues that “whereas Julia understands her self through the novel, Bridgetina’s plot writes the opposite relation in that she understands novels through her self. Her diseased reading emerges from an overactive sense of self” (15). I only partly agree; Bridgetina fails to distinguish between her own biography and those of the heroines she reads about, but she does project novelistic plots onto her own circumstances, rather than reading novels through the interpretive lens of her own experience. The real difference between her reading and Julia’s is that Julia’s experience in fact does replicate that of the tragic heroine, while Bridgetina’s mock-heroic status renders her projections absurd.
Bridgetina’s “enflamed” imagination and lack of “common sense” leave her vulnerable in London where she is unable to navigate the streets on her own (302-303), is bullied and mistaken for a notorious criminal (287-289), is robbed by a pickpocket (303) and is victimised by a pawnbroker and her acquaintance Glib, who combine to cheat her (320-323). More comically, her strange appearance and incomprehensible speeches cause her to be mistaken for an insane, preaching Methodist at an inn (238-240).

Like Bridgetina’s, Julia’s reading is unguided and self-determined, and although she has more natural understanding and a slightly more solid educational background than Bridgetina, her reading exposes her to a far more tragic outcome, as her attractive appearance leaves her vulnerable to Vallaton’s sexual threat where Bridgetina’s ridiculous figure protects her. As Katherine Binhammer rightly argues, “Julia’s descent into sexual ruin is mapped through her transparent interpretation of the novels she has read from childhood” (13), and “[t]he scene of her reading literally stands in for the absent scene of the moment of ruin” (14). Julia’s seduction by Vallaton, in other words, is primarily literary. Although Julia was educated to “common-sense” at a young age (82), her appetite for novels becomes insatiable as she matures. Julia initially reads a wide variety of books including “philosophy, history, and travels” aloud to her father (85), but takes the most pleasure in

devouring the pages of a novel or romance in her own apartment. Her feelings were alive to all the joys and all the sorrows of the heroes and heroines, whose adventures she had the delight of perusing. The agitation they excited was so animated, so intoxicating, that she felt a void in her breast when not under the influence of strong emotions.... [I]n the kindling passions of her youthful bosom they found a never-failing incentive to their perusal.

Imagination, wild and ungovernable imagination reigned paramount in her breast. The investigation of truth had no longer any charm. Sentiment usurped the place of judgment, and the mind, instead of deducing inferences from facts, was now solely occupied in the invention of extravagant and chimerical situations. (85-86)
Julia is both physically addicted to and emotionally infatuated with novels, “devouring” them in order to produce sensations of “agitation” and “intoxicat[ion],” and allowing them to create “kindling passions” within her. Julia’s seduction by the novel, moreover, leaves her vulnerable to the kind of delusions Bridgetina embraces, quelling her “judgment” and establishing an imagined reality based on novelistic conventions.

Although Julia perceives Bridgetina’s folly in her pursuit of Henry, expressing her doubts as to Henry’s affection for her friend (217-218), she fails to recognise the same delusions operating in her own romance with Vallaton, as the narrator indicates:

Julia (bewildered, as she often was, by the illusions of her own imagination) was struck with astonishment at the effects of a similar illusion on the mind of her friend. With regard to Bridgetina, she very quickly perceived the fatal consequences of yielding to the suggestions of a distempered fancy. She saw, that under the idea of cultivating mind, she had only been encouraging the mischievous chimeras of a teeming imagination; but never once did it occur to Julia, that she was herself the victim of the very same species of folly. (179)

Seduced by the novel of sensibility, Julia compels herself to act out the plot of seduction; her passion for Vallaton derives immediately from her vulnerability to novelistic conventions. She imagines his picaresque history as that of “the foundling hero of every novel” (52) and attempts to author a plot based on his distorted account of his childhood whereby he would discover himself the child of General Villers, her father’s friend (68-70). In constructing her version of Vallaton’s discovery of his family, Julia called to remembrance all the similar events in her most favourite novels; in these instructive books, the discovery of the hero’s parents had always appeared to her a catastrophe particularly interesting, and the idea that she should now have it in her power, not only to witness, but to be a principal actor in so tender a scene, filled her heart with extacy. (75)

Like her comic counterpart, Julia frames her actions around the conventional plots of the novels with which she is so familiar, and, more importantly, she also inserts herself into a novel of sensibility; learning that a Major Minden has made a marriage proposal to her father, Julia writes herself into the plot of Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa: “Already did
she behold Major Minden, with the determined and selfish obstinacy of the hateful Solmes, persisting in seizing her reluctant hand; while her father, with all the cruelty of all the Harlowes, attempted to force her to the hateful union” (231). Imagining herself as Clarissa, Julia marks for herself a similar fate as the victim of a libertine, eloping with Vallaton and eventually finding herself imprisoned in a brothel, from which she escapes to be rescued by the benevolent Mrs Fielding just before her premature death.

If Bridgetina and Julia provide Hamilton’s readers with negative comic and tragic examples, then Harriet functions as a positive educational model, and through Harriet the conservatism underlying Hamilton’s didactic message is most evident. Harriet succeeds at feminine, domestic employments, such as nursing Julia and providing for her comfort after her carriage accident (140, 151), where Bridgetina proves unable to contribute (179-180). Moreover, Harriet has been trained through her deference to parental, and especially paternal, authority, which Hamilton represents as complementary to her sense of religious duty. In a discussion with Julia, Harriet states, “Surely no sensation is so sweet as that a child enjoys from the fond affection of a worthy parent. How dreadful must it be to forfeit it!” (163), and continues to claim that her father, Dr Orwell, models his authority on his Christian views: “my father looks to the example of his great Master; and by the mildness of entreaty, not the thunderings of indignation, calls sinners to repentance” (164). Harriet’s willingness to defer to religious and domestic authority figures facilitates her capacity to make practical moral decisions when she faces dilemmas in her life. Her aunt Martha, for example, in a letter written on her deathbed, urges Harriet to submit her passion for Henry Sydney to reason, as the pair will be unable to marry without financial means (187-192). This kind of training through submission enables Harriet to draw on her practical, rather than abstract, reason during her aunt’s illness, when she contains her sorrow for Martha’s sake (184), and when she prevents Henry from declaring his love, a “hero[i]c” act, according to the narrator, given their financial circumstances (214).

Harriet’s reading, unlike Julia’s and Bridgetina’s, then, is guided by the sense of domestic duty and submission to authority that so strongly influence her daily life, and Harriet’s own plotline therefore reads like a conservative conduct book that locates her ability to operate as an educational model in the deference she displays within her
paternalistic domestic community. As Binhammer suggests, “It is not only the content of her reading, but also the scene, the context—with familial supervision, after a well-regulated day of domesticity, with a little Christian benevolence thrown in for good measure—that distinguishes Harriet’s reading from that of the other protagonists” (16). Hamilton characterises Harriet’s reading as a complement to her practical responsibilities in her home, as well as an educational experience shared by the entire domestic community: “Already had the active and judicious Harriet performed every domestic task, and having compleatly regulated the family economy for the day, was quietly seated at her work with her aunt and sister, listening to Hume’s History of England, as it was read to them by a little orphan girl she had herself instructed” (73). Harriet’s efficient, “active and judicious” domestic employment, the narrator suggests, prepares her for her daily home-education, while this kind of communal reading, unlike Julia’s private, sexualised consumption of novels, extends knowledge into the broader community, combining Harriet’s own self-improvement with her benevolent instruction of the orphan girl. Hamilton, in fact, takes the opportunity provided by this description of Harriet’s lifestyle to address her readers directly on the importance of efficiency in the home:

Here some notable housewife, who may, peradventure, chance to sit long enough at a time to catch the last paragraph as it is read by some of her family, will probably exclaim, “a few hours’ attention regulate a family, indeed! a pretty story, truly! what nonsense these men authors speak! ...” Softly, good lady, and for once take the trouble to calculate. Be so good as fairly to set down, at the end of every day, the time employed in repeating directions imperfectly given, or in revoking those that were given improperly; the time wasted in again looking at that which you have looked at before; the time thrown away peeping into corners, without object or end in view; the time misspent in perplexing your domestics with contradictory orders; and the time abused in scolding them .... (73)

Here, Hamilton reinforces the plotline that establishes Harriet as a positive exemplary heroine with an articulation of a direct, didactic message for her audience that establishes domestic efficiency as the foundation for her model heroine’s education. Harriet thus

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70 Efficient housekeeping is a major preoccupation of Hamilton’s later novel, *The Cottagers of Glenburnie*. 

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succeeds in obtaining the authority and efficiency critics like Nancy Armstrong and Elizabeth Langland associate with the new kinds of power middle-class women display in nineteenth-century fiction as Angels in the House. However, she can only access this power, within the fictional world of the novel and as a conservative, didactic example for Hamilton’s readers, by deferring and submitting to the patriarchal authority that still maintains control within her home.

By providing her readers with three educational models, Hamilton promotes Harriet as an exemplary self-disciplined, domestic woman and reader because she submissively accommodates her reading to the practical demands of her daily life. As Binhammer notes, “it is by defining them [the three heroines] by contrast that Hamilton finally posits a female reader who can judge and distinguish between the various forms of reading and types of novels represented in Modern Philosophers” (12). This model female reader is Harriet, the heroine who avoids the dangers of self-delusion and folly in which Julia and Bridgetina become mired and who can recognise a villain when she meets him, but is also the indoctrinated real-world female reader Hamilton imagines converting with her didactic lessons, whose training via Modern Philosophers prepares her to make the practical judgments Julia and Bridgetina fail at, with Harriet as her example.

“Go Home to Your Mother, My Biddy”: Domestic Discipline and the Re-Educated National Community

Hamilton’s emphasis on her three heroines’ education and conduct is more than a simple didactic lesson, however. Hamilton uses the sisters plot to provide a broader political statement about women’s education, a crucial feature of her programme of post-revolutionary national reconstruction. If Hamilton uses the didactic, Anti-Jacobin form to impose an illusion of consensus on her readers that frames her novel as authoritative, she also produces consensus among her characters through the realist, domestic plot that imagines inclusive, participatory communities as a keystone to her project of reconstructing the nation after the violence of the 1790s. This, however, ultimately exposes the contradictions at the centre of her novel: while she promotes a more inclusive

71 See Coventry Patmore’s poem The Angel in the House for the origin of this term for the domestic woman.
post-revolutionary Britain, Hamilton also represents the forced integration through conversion or the exorcism through didactic punishment of those radical members of the community who do not fit with her imagined reconfigured nation.

For Hamilton, as for Edmund Burke, the family figures as a representative community that stands in for the nation, and, like Burke, Hamilton argues that revolutionary thought threatens the affective bonds that hold the family together. Henry Sydney’s sister Maria, for example, challenges the new philosophy on this basis, asking, “But what shall we say to this sort of philosophy, which builds the fabric of morals on a dereliction of all the principles of natural affection, which cuts the ties of gratitude, and pretends to extend our benevolence by annihilating the sweet bonds of domestic attachment?” (271). To combat the new philosophy, Hamilton focuses on the importance of domestic life in moral education, as in Harriet’s case. Harriet’s domestic education prepares her for the role Gary Kelly argues conservative women writers like Hamilton and Hannah More developed in the late 1790s, that of a “renewed model of ‘domestic woman’ as professionalized custodian of the ‘national’ conscience, culture, and destiny” (Women, Writing, and Revolution 21). Harriet and her friend Maria Sydney function as early examples of the empowered domestic woman Nancy Armstrong examines in Desire and Domestic Fiction, as I suggest above, and as precursors to Victorian domestic angels, like A Tale of Two Cities’s Lucie Manette, and Dynevor Terrace’s Mary Ponsonby, characters who appear in later English novels about the French Revolution. Conservatives in the 1790s, Wood argues, capitalised on the rise of middle-class ideology throughout the eighteenth century, a “shift in focus toward the domestic [which] foregrounded the role of middle-class women in British society and focused attention on virtue as a gendered category” (35). Virtuous domestic women, like Harriet and Maria, are thus framed as national role models.

Because the domestic woman becomes a model for the entire national community in 1790s conservative discourse, women’s education is crucial to Hamilton’s project of national reconstruction and the production of consensus within the community. Harriet’s domestic education gains importance in contrast with both the unregulated reading of new philosophers Bridgetina and Julia and the education available to women in boarding schools. Hamilton’s representation of women’s education thus elevates middle-class,
domestic values over those belonging to the privileged and rich upper ranks. Hamilton introduces her critique of boarding schools very early in the novel, through the frivolous and undereducated Miss Aldgate and Mrs Gubbles, schoolmates who meet each other at Mrs Botherim’s home and spend their time talking scandal and ridiculing Bridgetina (40-42). Harriet and Maria, by contrast, refuse to recognise Bridgetina’s absurd physical appearance, which Hamilton traces to their different educational background: “To the misfortunate of never having been at a boarding-school, may perhaps be attributed this seeming want of discernment to those deformities of person, and incongruities of dress, to which so many ladies, and so many beaux, confine their whole stock of observation” (41). Maria’s home education, Hamilton further argues, endows her with a brand of good breeding that trumps the ceremony of fashion, a “sterling sort that might pass current in any country in the civilized world” that holds the advantage over “the paper money of a country bank” with “only a circumscribed and local value” (99). Hamilton, moreover, contrasts the overlapping worlds of the boarding school and fashion with the intellectual ambitions of the new philosophers, as when Bridgetina meets with her relation Sir Anthony Aldgate, who is repelled by her radical talk:

GOD help the foolish girl, how she talks. Prythee, my dear, where didst thou pick up all this jargon? This is all along of them there foolish books your mother suffers you to read. If I ever caught my daughter so much as opening a book, it should be the dearest day she ever saw. But she is better taught, I promise ye; I don’t believe she has looked in one since she came from school; don’t know how she should, for not a book has ever been within these doors, but the Book of Common-Prayer, and old Robin’s almanac. (306)

If Bridgetina’s unregulated reading fails to prepare her for practical life, Sir Anthony’s prohibition of reading for Miss Aldgate, combined with her frivolous boarding school instruction, equally fails to train her into the domesticated role model for the community Hamilton expects women to become, and indicts the educational methods of British elites.

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72 Of course this is a double-standard, as Hamilton expects different conduct from her heroines than from her satirical narrator, who willingly and continually mocks Bridgetina.
like Sir Anthony, a knight and leading London financial expert, suggesting that standards of education, and of women’s education in particular, must be reformed.

In framing women as potential moral and cultural authorities, but also revealing the shortcomings of women’s education, Hamilton radically remakes gender roles in her novel. Paradoxically, model women like Maria and Harriet can only access education and authority as representatives of the domestic ideal by embracing their confinement to the home and their submission to patriarchal authority within that home. This political contradiction arises, perhaps, from the volatility of domestic discourse itself in this period: as Langland argues, “domestic ideology is an unstable amalgam of at least two other major ideologies: a patriarchal ideology regulating interactions between men and women and a bourgeois ideology justifying the class system and supporting the social status quo” (18). While the bourgeois ideology underlying domestic discourse is far more radical in 1800, in the context of the middle-class French Revolution, than it would be in Victorian culture, the patriarchal content of Hamilton’s novel suggests that while she promotes a national community modelled on a new, middle-class ideal, the authority that the domestic woman obtains by achieving that ideal is still subjected to the conservative power of a patriarchal gender discourse. However, for Hamilton there is a further complication, as she combines her empowerment of women within the limits of her patriarchal domestic discourse with a genuine effort to promote educational reform for women. Harriet, Hamilton’s ideal woman, thus represents either, in Kelly’s words, “how the rational and well-educated woman called for by Wollstonecraft could be accommodated to the counterrevolutionary ideal of domestic woman” (“Elizabeth Hamilton” 121), or how even the model of the domestic woman “could have feminist and revolutionary potential, as Hamilton and other counter-Revolutionary writers showed” (Women, Writing, and Revolution 21), depending on which strand of Hamilton’s complicated gender politics is emphasised.

Hamilton’s Wollstonecraftian re-imagining of women’s education composes the radical content of her novel’s gender politics. As Claudia L. Johnson argues, Bridgetina “bears the brunt of Hamilton’s antifeminist satire,” but “[o]nce having discredited Bridgetina, Hamilton is secure enough to praise Mary Wollstonecraft’s criticisms of Rousseau and to present her as a ‘very sensible authoress’ who does not deserve the
abuse with which ‘superficial readers’ treat her” (Jane Austen 20). In fact, Henry defends Wollstonecraft in conversation with Bridgetina, revealing the shallowness of Bridgetina’s revolutionary thought as she interrupts him just as he launches into an argument in support of Wollstonecraft’s feminism to pose several abstract rhetorical questions that are only tangentially relevant to the discussion:

“The inconsistency and folly of his [Rousseau’s] system,” said Henry, “was, perhaps, never better exposed than in the very ingenious publication which takes the Rights of Women for its title. Pity that the very sensible authoress has sometimes permitted her zeal to hurry her into expressions which have raised a prejudice against the whole. To superficial readers it appears to be her intention to unsex women entirely. But—.” (101)

Although Henry critiques revolutionary “zeal,” he marks his departure from stereotypically conservative readings of Wollstonecraft with “But—,” arguing against “superficial readers” of all political allegiances, and aligning himself with Wollstonecraft’s condemnation of Rousseau’s system of female education. The narrator also makes Wollstonecraftian claims about female character throughout the novel, arguing, for example, that Julia would benefit from the supposed “masculine” qualities of “[f]ortitude and courage,” which are not only compatible with “modesty and gentleness” but are, in fact, necessary to the development of the firm principles that would encourage virtuous conduct in women (89).

Nonetheless, Hamilton situates the importance of women’s education within a discussion of the necessity of performing one’s duties, which contains her potential radicalism within the conservative framework that dominates the novel. Harriet’s father, Dr Orwell, establishes a kind of Christian feminist discourse that supports women’s education on the basis that it prepares them for their domestic and religious commitments, arguing, “One philosopher, and one only, has appeared, who, superior to all prejudices, invariably treated the female sex as beings who were to be taught the performance of a duty, not by arbitrary regulations confined to particular parts of conduct, but by the knowledge of principles which enlighten the understanding and improve the heart;” he responds to Bridgetina’s questions about this “philosopher” by stating, “his name was JESUS CHRIST” (103). For Orwell, women can only learn their
duties by being educated in “enlighten[ing]” and “improv[ing]” principles, not through speculative new philosophy or an “arbitrary,” superficial education.

Women like Harriet and Maria provide examples of the kind of principled but duty-driven education Dr Orwell espouses, but they also become the future mothers of the nation, as both women marry appropriately at the end of the novel, Harriet to Henry Sydney, and Maria to a Mr Churchill who had been disappointed in his early love for Julia. Hamilton initially situates these young women in the traditional structure of the patriarchal family, with admirable father figures, while mothers are notably either absent from the novel or incompetent, like Mrs Botherim and Mrs Delmond. The positive patriarchal figures, Orwell and Sydney, are described as “liberal” thinkers (43), particularly in contrast with Sir Anthony Aldgate’s narrow-minded adherence to class privilege (40-45). They furthermore instil in all around them a sense of social and domestic duty that marks their authority: Orwell, for example, lectures Bridgetina on her duty to her mother when Mrs Botherim’s remonstrance fails (344-345). Maria in particular expresses pleasure in having such a father figure, writing to Henry, “In my opinion, the greatest gift we can have from Heaven, is a just sense of the happiness we enjoy in having such a parent” (294). Harriet and Maria do turn to female role models, but find them in independent, unmarried women like Martha Goodwin and Mrs Fielding instead of the novel’s mothers; Hamilton’s suggestion is that the educated women of the previous generation remained unmarried, but that, in the trajectories of Harriet and Maria, a space is opened for the kind of morally and intellectually developed and responsible mother figure Wollstonecraft argues for in the future.

The Delmonds and Mrs Botherim, in contrast to Orwell and Sydney, are failed parents. As Kelly argues, Julia’s parents are “Lacking the ideological, cultural, and social support of religion, proper patriarchal authority, and maternal domestic affections” (Women, Writing, and Revolution 151). Captain Delmond’s education through novels and metaphysics (77-79), like Julia’s and Bridgetina’s, encourages him to see the religious as

73 Mrs Fielding is particularly independent: she is rich enough to fund a charity to care for and train vulnerable women (299-302), and determines to remain single despite her former lover Mr Sydney’s renewed proposals to her at the end of the novel (387-388). Kelly describes her as “an intellectual, reform-minded, philanthropic, humane, and happily unmarried figure (Mrs. was a courtesy title for an older woman) based on the ‘bluestocking’ feminists of an earlier generation, who had tried to raise the condition and status of women by taking up intellectual and artistic pursuits and engaging in charitable work” (“Elizabeth Hamilton” 121).
“fools, and hypocrites” (79), and the rote religion taught to Julia by her mother and the scepticism encouraged by her father (87-88) influence her unregulated reading. Delmond permits Julia free rein in her reading habits because he believes her superior to other women in understanding (85), and Mrs Delmond is entirely uninvolved in Julia’s education, believing it to be “altogether out of her sphere” (87). The absence of any training in principles in Julia’s education exposes her to Vallaton’s efforts to destroy her domestic allegiances by manipulating the new philosophy’s privileging of universal benevolence over bonds of affection and gratitude (49-51, 90-93), a strategy that prepares the way for her elopement (233-236).

If Mrs Delmond lacks any sense of maternal duty and leaves Julia’s education to others, Mrs Botherim is equally unprepared to educate Bridgetina, despite her successful ability to run a household, showing that a sense of domestic duty alone does not make a fit parent, but must be, as in the cases of Harriet and Maria, accompanied by a developed understanding. Mrs Botherim is portrayed as an expert in “the science of cookery” to the extent that Myope is under the “necessity” (39) of eating her tarts (39-40), and fulfils all the required domestic employments. Preparing for a dinner party, she states, “There had I this morning to make the tarts, and the custards, aye, and the pudding too, which you ate at dinner, and praised so much. And now I have only to put on the best covers on the drawing-room chairs, and to unpaper the fire-screens, and to fix the candles on the sconces, and to prepare my daughter’s things; so that I shall soon be ready...” (38).

Despite her domestic accomplishments, or perhaps even because she is so preoccupied by housework, she is unfit to educate her daughter, or, as she puts it, unable to “speak in print” (227). In fact, Bridgetina’s deceased father has encouraged in both women a sense of Mrs Botherim’s intellectual inferiority; during his lifetime, Bridgetina explains, Botherim rewarded his daughter for her “premature eloquence” while demanding Mrs Botherim keep to the kitchen, and constructed Bridgetina’s unfavourable image of her mother through his “contemptuous expressions” (175). Mrs Botherim accepts that she cannot keep up to Bridgetina intellectually, and idealises her learning, especially her memory (202-204). Moreover, she is motivated by a sense of her late husband’s antifeminist prejudices to give Bridgetina free rein over her own reading: “Seeing my late dear Mr. Botherim consider me as nobody, because I was not book-read, I thought I
would take care to prevent my daughter’s meeting with such disrespect from her husband; and so I encouraged her in doing nothing but reading from morning till night” (225-226). Not only has Mrs Botherim’s relegation to the kitchen prevented her from gaining the intellectual competence necessary to educate a child, but her husband’s antifeminism has wholly removed her authority over Bridgetina and educated her daughter in disrespect for her mother.

For Hamilton, then, a mother must be able to balance the duties required for running the household and the self-improvement necessary to form her into a fit instructor for her children. As Aída Díaz Bild argues, Hamilton’s writing asserts that domestic and maternal responsibilities “cannot be properly exercised unless women are intellectually trained and have the freedom to acquire moral discipline” (85). In her later non-fiction work, Letters on the Elementary Principles of Education, Hamilton locates the supposed “error[s]” of judgement committed by women in their “defective education” (78), consolidating her view that better-educated mothers can help train better-educated daughters. According to Jane Rendall, in Letters on Education Hamilton “noted how effectively national character ... was shaped by the responsibility of mothers for early education, which determined a child’s patterns of desire and aversion” (80). In Modern Philosophers, Maria speaks for the importance of the educated mother in raising the new generation, writing to Henry of Mrs Botherim’s ludicrous incapacity to train Bridgetina:

surely the man does great injustice to his children, who gives them a mother so weak, or so ignorant, as to render her despicable in their eyes; not that to a well-regulated mind the weakness of a parent will ever be made the object of contempt; but how should the children of a fool come

Hamilton continues,

Often does the ill-judging vanity and pride of parents lay the foundation .... The over educated and the uneducated are equally incapacitated from making a proper use of their faculties. The conceptions of the former having been stretched to embrace abstract propositions, at a period when they ought to have been strengthened on objects of perception, become dull and languid as to those objects; and the judgement having, like the conceptions been exercised on speculative enquiry, before it had been proved upon simple propositions, has neither soundness nor vigour. (78-79)

This later educational argument clearly resonates with the ways in which Hamilton portrays Bridgetina’s near-sightedness and Captain Delmond’s pride in Julia’s intellectual capabilities.

Rendall’s argument focuses on the pattern of national influence through the fulfilment of domestic duty that Kelly notes in conservative 1790s discourse in Hamilton’s historical biography, Memoirs of Agrippina, claiming that Hamilton “review[s], through her historical writing, the ways in which British women could participate in the shaping of the national character” (84).
by the information necessary to point out the line of duty, or to fix the principles of filial piety in the heart?

Oh, my brother, if ever you marry, may your wife be one whose memory your children’s children shall delight to honour; may she demand from her family, not merely the barren obedience of duty, but the grateful tribute of heart-felt veneration and esteem! (293)

Maria’s letter argues that the choices made by mothers and fathers are implicated in the future instruction of their children, but also, in her closing invocation to Henry’s imagined wife, posits an optimistic view of future generations, no longer educated by “a fool” but by women like herself and Harriet Orwell, who eventually becomes Henry’s wife.

It is not enough, however, for families like the Orwells and Sydneys to educate their own households; because of the strength of the new philosophy’s threat to women like Julia and Bridgetina, and because of the inadequacy of their instruction, the Orwells and Sydneys ultimately must extend their educational influence into the broader community in order to rehabilitate and reintegrate members who lack the judgment and guidance Hamilton desires for them. Like Hamilton, who, according to the Anti-Jacobin reviewer, “deserves the thanks of the country” (376), the Orwells and Sydneys intervene in the community in order to reconstruct a more inclusive nation that reconciles its dissenting parts through consensus. The reconstructed nation, Kelly argues, is symbolised by the marriage between Harriet and Henry, through which “social values and class relations are inscribed in the history of the individual family” (Women, Writing, and Revolution 151-152). Their marriage and the broader friendship between the two families, Kelly claims,

Lisa Wood argues for the importance of a woman’s sexual conduct in the Anti-Jacobin novel, stating that “a woman’s marital choices become implicated in the national political struggle. The only true sexual threat in these novels is a lack of judgment on the woman’s part .... [T]he moral message of the novel is reinforced by the heroine’s success in marriage— which proves her moral fitness— and the existing system of gender relations can be shown to be appropriate, only dangerous to those who are badly educated” (70). Hamilton’s novel is more complex than this, however, as Maria’s letter shows; not only are women implicated by their sexual choices, but men are also responsible for choosing a wife based on her fitness to be a partner in the education of their children. Wood’s claim that “the existing system of gender relations can be shown to be appropriate, only dangerous to those who are badly educated” (70) is also not quite accurate: in “the existing system of gender relations,” where the only educated women, Mrs Fielding and Martha Goodwin, remain unmarried, and the only mothers, Mrs Delmond and Mrs Botherim, are incompetent, the danger is that all children will be “badly educated.” Only by ensuring that married women and mothers are as well-instructed as Maria and Harriet, Hamilton suggests, can appropriate training for the next generation be guaranteed.
“represent the mutual toleration, respect, and cooperation of different religious, political, and cultural communities within the professional middle class, communities that were once opposed in civil war, and during the 1790s threatened to be so again” *Women, Writing, and Revolution* 150).

The most obvious signal of national reconciliation in the intimacy between the two families appears in their mutual respect for their different religions: Dr Orwell is an Anglican clergyman, while Mr Sydney is a dissenting minister who, at an early age, rejected a church living because of his conscience, a move that prevented his intended marriage to Mrs Fielding when her relatives reprimanded him for “daring to think for [him]self” (245). Other Anglican clergyman, such as Dr Orwell’s predecessor, the late Mr Botherim, infect the community with prejudice against religious dissenters: Mrs Botherim exclaims to Dr Orwell, for example,

you don’t know what them there presbyterians are capable of. The late dear Mr. Botherim used to say as how they were all cunning and deceitful as Satan himself; and not one of them would he so much as speak to; no, nor give a farthing to one of their beggars, though in ever so much need of it, because it was encouraging a schism in the church; but the honour of the church was indeed ever next to his heart. Poor dear gentleman! hard would it have been upon him, had he but known that he was to fall from his horse at a dissenter’s door, and breathe his last in a dissenter’s house [Mr Sydney’s]! (226)

By contrast, Orwell and Sydney are not only intimate friends, but promote the closer alliance of marriage between their children that symbolises reconciliation between different stakeholders in the national community.

Hamilton’s representation of a unified Britain replicates the kind of inclusive Christianity enacted by the Orwells and Sydneys, especially in terms of the importance she places on Scotland as an example for England. Henry recounts his tour of Scotland by foot in order to critique anglocentric stereotypes about the Scots based on close, personal observation, recalling the kind of politicised wanderings of radical 1790s writers such as
John Thelwall. As in the instance of religion, anti-Scottish prejudice appears in the novel through the voice of Mrs Botherim, who mimics her late husband:

I vow I am quite astonished how you could think of trusting yourself among them there Scotch savages, I would not have wondered if they had murdered you. Why I heard my dear late Mr. Botherim declare, that them Scotch Presbyterians were the most horridest, wickedest people in the world. And then the wretches are so very poor! not one of them with rags to cover their nakedness; faugh! I wonder how you could enter into their stinking houses? (109)

Henry’s peripatetic adventures, however, tell a different tale about the Scottish peasantry; in his experience, they are better educated, more religious, and live under better conditions than their English counterparts, despite their poverty (110-117). Henry’s perception of the Scottish system of educating and caring for the poor also serves as an indictment of the class system and industrial capitalism in England. The most extreme poverty he has witnessed in Britain, he claims, occurs amidst the luxury of the capital and the manufacturing towns (109-110, 117-118). The poor, Henry argues, stand little chance of moral and educational development when under the influence of capitalist dissipation, as, he states, “sentiment is lost in the society of the vicious, and of every species of vice untutored minds quickly catch the contagion” (110).

In fact, in their charitable treatment of the poor, the Orwells and Sydneys themselves appear to be radicals to the privileged and politically powerful characters in Modern Philosophers. When Julia visits Castle-Villers, the home of her father’s friend, a British General, the company consumes a luxurious meal while complaining about the supposed lack of gratitude the poor show for the crumbs they are allowed:

Mrs. Villers desired the servants to hand the brown barley-bread along with the white, observing that she always made a point of using a little of it every day at her own table, by way of setting a good example. “And yet, would you believe it,” addressing herself to Lady Page, “the poor people are so saucy as not to like it.”

See Thelwall’s 1793 work, The Peripatetic, as well as my discussion of pedestrian wandering in Chapter 4.
“I am sure, then, they deserve to starve,” returned her Ladyship, sending her plate for some more jelly-sauce to the nice slice of venison; “I never ate anything better in my life; but the poor are really now become so insolent they are quite insufferable.”

“Yes, indeed,” rejoined Mrs. Villers, while she helped herself to another plate of turtle-soup, “I think those who murmur at such bread as that, do not deserve any compassion.” (129)

When one member of the company does respond with “compassion” for the poor, citing Orwell’s opinion that “the poor wretches had really nothing but bread to eat” (129), Mrs Villers replies, “I dare say that Dr. Orwell is a democrat .... It is these people who encourage the poor in all their insolence; to hear them speak, one would think there was nothing but misery in the world” (130).

Despite Mrs Villers’s opinion, however, Dr Orwell and his circle are decidedly not democrats; although Hamilton includes the amelioration of living conditions for the poor as an element of her national reconstruction project, she refuses to confront the question of political rights for the disenfranchised, and critiques the new philosophers’ questions about social injustice as abstract and ultimately dehumanising. Bridgetina, for example, exclaims, “Miserable wretches! ... how doth the injustice under which you groan, generate the spirit of virtuous indignation in the breasts of the enlightened” (105), while ignoring the real voices of the poor, who are “irritated” (106) by her meddling (105-106), and failing to participate in the charitable work that functions as a practical alleviation to the poor’s suffering, pursued by the Orwell and Sydney circle. Martha Goodwin reprimands Bridgetina and dismisses radical concerns about political, social and economic justice by distinguishing between the “natural evils that are incident to poverty, and the fantastic and imaginary ones which have no existence but in the dreams of visionaries” (107). Dr Orwell is slightly more liberal, however, focusing on the importance of individual action when reform of the political and economic systems is deemed unlikely or impossible; he states that “some great national calamity” might chastise the haughty pride of luxury, and open the eyes of the ignorant and misguided crowd, who estimate national prosperity by the superfluous riches heaped upon thousands at the expence of the accumulated
wretchedness of millions of their fellow-creatures. All we have to do as individuals, is to exert our utmost efforts to ameliorate the condition of all within our reach. (108)

While he recognises the need for reform, Dr Orwell imposes limits on the possibility of practical action for the alleviation of the evils of the class system, suggesting the moderate, defeatist notion that while individuals can contribute to improving the lives of those in their immediate sphere of influence, they can produce no real systemic change.

Nonetheless, Hamilton does indicate that individuals may be active in constructing the institutions that work toward addressing major social problems, as the example of Mrs Fielding’s shelter for vulnerable women illustrates. According to the narrator, poverty is intensified by the capitalist system, which exploits the poor without making any returns; without Mrs Fielding’s institution, the narrator argues, each rescued woman would “soon have added one other wretched female to the thousands who yearly perish by disease and want, in the streets of the most wealthy, the most charitable, and the most munificent city in the world” (301). Like Dr Orwell, however, Mrs Fielding perceives her women’s shelter as an extension of her sphere of individual influence, not daring to make her institution a political statement. The first time she rescues a woman from prostitution, before opening her shelter, she argues to herself,

Surely ... there is something wrong in this. There ought to be a reputable receptacle established for affording temporary shelter to those who are willing to eat the bread of honest industry. The government ought— but, alas! I cannot dictate to the government. I have not the power to influence the makers of our laws. But cannot I do something towards the relief of a few of these unhappy individuals? (301)

This passage suggests not only Hamilton’s belief in the limits of individual action under existing circumstances, but in Mrs Fielding’s claims, “I cannot dictate to the government” and “I have not the power to influence the makers of our laws,” indicates her awareness of her own disenfranchisement as a woman, while also dismissing the problem of her absent political rights by shifting immediately to the question of how she can exert the individual influence her wealth and education provide. Finally, then, Hamilton remains

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78 It is worth noting that the Sydneys would also be politically disenfranchised, as dissenters.
conservative in her suggestion that, while systemic change may be desirable, it is beyond the reach of individuals wishing to act for the community’s good.

The most strongly conservative element of Hamilton’s project for national reconstruction, however, is the re-education of the new philosophers, who are disciplined and reincorporated into the community by the Orwell and Sydney circle by the end of the novel. The re-education of the community’s most disruptive members is crucial for the construction of the fictional consensus with which *Modern Philosophers* concludes. After being abandoned and forced into a brothel by Vallaton, Julia takes poison, which ends her pregnancy and causes the illness that eventually leads to her death. Nevertheless, the conclusion of her story illustrates the success of Mrs Fielding’s project for rescuing vulnerable women, as she finds herself in the “Asylum of the Destitute” (367) surrounded by her friends, the Orwells and Sydneys, who enact her reform. Encouraged by Harriet’s compassionate concern for her situation (360-364, 367-377), Julia declares that she now recognises “It is to vanity ... (though not the vanity of beauty) that I owe my ruin!” (369), continuing that “it is now my wish to live, that by my future life I may make some amends for my past misconduct” (370). Even though Julia’s punishment, death, prevents her final reincorporation into the community of consensus Hamilton constructs around the Orwell and Sydney circle, she acknowledges a desire to support that community before her demise. Hamilton, however, looks to the reformation of the other new philosophers, Bridgetina, Glib and Myope, for her examples of how the discipline of individuals contributes to the rebuilding of the larger community.

Bridgetina’s reformation begins with the negative example of Julia’s fate, which works didactically on Bridgetina, as it should on Hamilton’s reader. As Kelly notes, “[t]he pathetic Quixote cures the comic one” (*Women, Writing, and Revolution* 145). Julia herself lectures Bridgetina, concluding, “Go home to your mother, my Biddy; and in the sober duties of life forget the idle vagaries which our distempered brains dignified with the name of philosophy” (383). Such a speech highlights Julia’s ultimate renunciation of the new philosophy and recognition of the importance of domestic duty as protection against the supposed threat of radicalism. Sydney’s comments on Julia’s shockingly changed appearance, however, makes Bridgetina’s lesson more explicit:
It has been wrought ... by the same delusive principles that have seduced you from the path of filial duty. Had nature bestowed upon you a form as beautiful, or a face as fair, you too would have been the prey of lust, and the victim of infamy. Be thankful that you have escaped a fate so dreadful. Repent of ever having dared it; and by your future behaviour to your fond mother, strive to make amends for your past conduct. (364)

Sydney’s evocation of Bridgetina’s “future behaviour” indicates the confidence with which Hamilton assures the reader of Bridgetina’s reformation. Although Sydney admits that her complete re-education must be more thorough than the effects of Julia’s example alone, relying on “time, her ripened judgment, reading, and observation” (379), the narrator assures us at the end of the novel that when once returned to her mother’s home, Bridgetina “begins to find that the consciousness of contributing to the happiness of a parent is a pleasurable sensation” (387), demonstrating how crucially domestic life features in Hamilton’s imagining of the post-revolutionary, reformed community.

In fact, a return to the values of domesticity appears in Hamilton’s disciplining of all of the new philosophers who are eventually reincorporated into the community. The parallel between the return to domestic duty and engagement with the good of the nation is signalled by the abandonment of the Hottentot scheme; like Mrs Jellyby’s philanthropy in Charles Dickens’s Bleak House, the new philosophers’ African ambitions represent their neglect of their practical and immediate duties to the home and homeland in favour of a distant and abstract commitment that, in Hamilton’s novel at least, is little more than a utopian fantasy. Myope and Glib are robbed by Vallaton, the treasurer for the Hottentot scheme, who elopes with the money and Myope’s lover the Goddess of Reason, leaving Glib in prison (356) and Myope distraught at his betrayal (358-359). Yet, the scheme’s failure prepares the way for the efforts of Sydney and his friends to reform the new philosophers. When Glib is released from Newgate, Sydney’s influence reunites his family and thoroughly re-educates both Glib and his adulterous wife with a sense of their responsibilities to the family and the community: “New ideas of duty, and new perceptions of happiness, began to open on their minds; attention to business occupied the hours that had formerly been devoted to the study of new theories in philosophy; and instead of descanting on general utility, they now seriously applied themselves to the
education of their own children” (360). Myope’s reformation is much more comic, and somewhat less complete; his changeable character “kindle[s]” his “enthusiasm” for Christianity as Sydney endeavours to convert him (365), but the finality of Myope’s disciplining is undermined by his subsequent quick adoption of Swedenborgianism to please a “rich widow” whom he subsequently marries (387). If Myope’s unreliable character leaves him vulnerable to endless future conversions, at least, Hamilton suggests, his domestic situation is settled.

Vallaton, however, poses a problem for Hamilton, as he is not merely the dupe of the new philosophy, but its opportunist manipulator; as such, he must be punished like his victim, Julia, instead of disciplined at the end of the novel. The narrator toys with the reader’s expectation that Vallaton might be re-educated and reintegrated into the community, but finally rejects that possibility as unlikely and unsuitable, too conventional, like the expectation that Modern Philosophers will end with Bridgetina’s marriage, but not useful to the overall didactic scheme of the novel. Confronting the reader with the expectation of Vallaton’s reform combined with that of Bridgetina’s marriage, Hamilton illustrates the absurdity of such outcomes: “Mr. Vallaton might, it is true, have been reformed for her, as you propose; he might, likewise, for aught we know, have been recognized as the offspring of some noble Lord ...” (385-386). This conclusion about Vallaton’s possible conventional fate functions as a final warning for the reader against interpreting the world according to literary conventions, as Julia has fatally done.

Vallaton’s true fate, instead, institutes the kind of poetic justice for his crimes that discipline alone could not enact, as he returns to Paris with the Goddess of Reason only to be betrayed to the guillotine by “the wretched partner of his guilt” (387):

On his way to the scaffold he gave vent to his rage by curses and imprecations, which he continued to pour forth till the last minute drew on. He then paused, and by the expression of his countenance seemed to cast a retrospective glance on the events of his past life. A convulsive groan of horror and despair then burst from his agitated bosom; he started from the grasp of the executioner, but after a short and ineffectual struggle, was forced to submit to the fatal blow. (387)
Although Vallaton’s “retrospective glance” and “convulsive groan of horror” suggest his final recognition of his crimes, his execution stands in contrast to Hamilton’s earlier guillotine scene, discussed above, in which the victims are marked by innocence and tranquillity, and thereby functions as a closing comment on the Revolution: by replacing the true victims of the early chapters with villains who deserve punishment, Hamilton suggests that the Revolution’s perpetrators quickly become its sufferers, and concludes the novel by fulfilling the Anti-Jacobin hope that the Revolution’s intense violence soon causes it to consume itself.

Discipline and punishment, however, are also accompanied, at the end of the novel, by a just distribution of rewards for Hamilton’s positive exemplary characters. Although Hamilton refuses to marry Bridgetina to a reformed Vallaton or Myope (385), she does grant Harriet what Binhammer calls “a fairy-tale ending” (18), concluding her narrative with the “double wedding” that placates her audience and rewards Harriet and Maria by joining them to Henry and Churchill (Hamilton 384). Their rewards, however, are not merely found in their happy marriages, but in their continued ability to mobilise the intellectual, moral, and affective resources with which Hamilton endows them throughout the novel, as the conservative definition of happiness Hamilton places in her final sentences illustrates. She describes the new couples as

[h]appy even in “this corrupt wilderness of human society,”79 where any degree of happiness is, in the dark and gloomy dogmas of modern philosophy, represented as impossible. Impossible, however, it never will be found by those who seek for it in the right path of regulated desires, social affections, active benevolence, humility, sincerity, and a lively dependence on the Divine favour and protection. (389)

Happiness is possible, Hamilton suggests, if her newly constructed community abandons the “dark and gloomy dogmas of modern philosophy” in favour of returning to her own catalogue of the qualities constituting the “right path.” The exercise of “regulated desires, social affections, active benevolence, humility, sincerity, and a lively dependence on the Divine favour and protection,” Modern Philosophers concludes, is its own reward.

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79 This quotation, as Grogan notes in the Broadview edition, comes from Emma Courtney, showing Hamilton’s wish to take a parting jab at her radical opponent.
Using an authoritative fictional frame story and didactic plot, Hamilton works to create an illusion of consensus within her novel by embedding an Anti-Jacobin readership and critical response that concurs with her conservative politics and allows her to contain voices of political dissent by simplifying and thereby dismissing them with the apparent agreement of the embedded readers Hamilton portrays as colluders in her political project. By using this strategy, Hamilton works to conceal the violence of her own representations: she asserts interpretive and representational control over the discourses and symbols of her political and literary opponents and denies the legitimacy of alternative political positions by subjecting her novel to judgment by those fictional figures whose consensus authorises it. The content of Hamilton’s didactic plot, moreover, mirrors her novel’s authoritative form by rewarding those characters who model the behavioural patterns she promotes and ultimately integrating those characters who represent political dissent into her imagined post-revolutionary community by subjecting them to the discipline of that community. Although Hamilton envisions post-revolutionary Britain as a more inclusive nation that reconciles diverse cultural groups—Anglicans and religious dissenters, the English and the Scottish—and promotes educational reform for women and increased attention to social problems such as poverty, paradoxically her apparently inclusive community can only come into being through the success of the disciplinary project that forces her radical political dissenters to share the conservative consensus embedded in her frame story. This consensus among characters, then, is not a true consensus, since Hamilton’s radical characters must be forcibly converted or exorcised from the plot in order for the new, integrated community to be born.
CHAPTER 4

“AN ALIEN TO MY COUNTRY”: INSULAR PREJUDICE, TRANSNATIONAL BELONGING AND CONFIGURATIONS OF DOMESTIC POWER IN FRANCES BURNEY’S THE WANDERER

If Elizabeth Hamilton’s Modern Philosophers closes by envisioning an inclusive post-revolutionary Britain that disciplines its members in order to incorporate them into a community based on an imagined conservative consensus, Frances Burney’s novel The Wanderer, published in 1814 at the peak of anti-French, anti-Napoleon British insularity and nationalist paranoia, reveals a Britain in which the Revolution changes nothing. In fact, Burney’s revolutionary state exacerbates and collaborates with the conditions of social, economic and gender inequality that victimise her heroine Ellis as she wanders through old-regime Britain. Ellis appears as a disguised, unknown wanderer, disowned by her aristocratic British family and judged by the community based on external appearances alone. She thus must work to establish her own autonomous subjectivity outside of the social signifiers that mark her, including her body, dress, employment, name and family, while balancing this effort with an attempt to situate herself as a social being with sympathies that extend beyond her private, individual concerns. Her social, economic and geographical wanderings endow her with the kind of mobility, primarily downward, that challenges her sense of self while exposing her to different ways of life, thereby expanding her social sympathies. Unlike other Romantic wanderers such as Hamilton’s Henry Sydney or John Thelwall’s Sylvanus Theophrastus, for whom deliberate pedestrianism is a conscious choice that articulates a coherent political programme, Ellis’s wandering results from her victimisation and contributes to her further disempowerment and marginalisation. Thus, as she is the victim of old-regime patriarchal rule and an intrusive revolutionary state that combine to violate her subjectivity and perpetrate physical, psychological, emotional, social and economic violence against her, Ellis’s ability to act with autonomy is severely circumscribed, as is her sense of belonging to a family or a national community.

Responding to the violence that challenges her sense of self, Ellis attempts to re-make her identity by inhabiting a range of socioeconomic positions and geographical spaces
representing her relationship to the broader British community. By figuring Ellis’s position as a social outcast geographically, Burney engages with a trend in 1790s literature that politically re-maps Britain in the revolutionary context. This appears in works on French emigrants by Edmund Burke, Charlotte Smith and Burney herself that redefine Britain’s coastal regions, as well as in political writings on Salisbury Plain by Hannah More and John Thelwall. Unlike Thelwall and More, for whom Salisbury Plain and the surrounding area provide an opportunity for expressing their politics, Ellis instead confronts the destruction of her subjectivity as she wanders through Salisbury, the New Forest and Wilton; stripped of her public, social identity, Ellis must rebuild her sense of self at Stonehenge before she can begin to resituate herself politically. Finally, Burney attempts to re-imagine Ellis’s national community by offering a range of configurations of the family that stand in for the operation of power within differing social structures and forms of government. By filtering Ellis’s political experience through her domestic relationships, Burney engages in a conflicted re-evaluation of Wollstonecraftian feminism that highlights the gender dimension to Ellis’s victimisation in Britain and France. Although Burney explores these different configurations for the national British community, the state and the family, and offers Ellis’s expansion of social sympathies as a model for responsible citizenship, Ellis’s negative experiences within all of these social constructions destabilise any suggestion that post-revolutionary Britain can successfully recover from the violence of the old regime and the revolutionary period.

Burney’s unwillingness to endorse either the old-regime British power structures or the French revolutionary state she represents points to a politics of frustration, rather than a clear liberal or conservative agenda. Since the 1980s, Burney scholars have been drawn to *The Wanderer*, Burney’s final novel, as a means of claiming Burney as a reformer, or even a proto-feminist, focusing, as Margaret Doody does, on Burney’s indictment of the “static” Britain of the war years (*Frances Burney* 328) and suggesting that the novel voices an empowering feminist message, which is, for Doody, encoded in Ellis’s name: “elle is, i.e. ‘she is’. Woman lives” (Introduction xvi). *The Wanderer*’s political ambiguity partially lends itself to this interpretation; as Kristina Straub argues in her 1987 survey, *Divided Fictions*, Burney’s writing “often seems awkwardly strained in opposite directions” (1), featuring female characters who face the “self-division, alienation, and
madness that are dangers of facing and sustaining ideological contradictions” (22). As Deborah Kennedy claims, despite following the plotline of “a conservative fairy tale,” Burney’s final novel can be read as “radical” in its 1814 context for the critique it offers of British institutions and traditions before coming to its conventional resolution (9, 5).

For Pam Perkins, Burney’s ambivalent attitude in The Wanderer toward polarised political positions is “[o]ne of the major strengths of this dark novel,” as “Burney refuses to endorse fully either the radical or the conservative point of view or to give any easy answers to the intractable problems caused by a society which defines ‘woman’ by her supposed exclusion from the public, economic world which she is perforce dependent upon” (“Private Men” 79). Other Burney critics take more forceful positions on Burney’s political stance: in her 1989 study, The Iron Pen, Julia Epstein “uncover[s]” in Burney’s work “the masked simmering rage of a conflicted but self-conscious social reformer” (4).

In Epstein’s interpretation, Burney’s political ambivalence is the signal of profound, underlying anger that articulates itself most clearly in her novels’ incidents of “aggressive violence” (4). The plot of The Wanderer, a series of traumatic and violent episodes perpetrated against Burney’s heroine Ellis, does resonate with Epstein’s focus on aggression in her work, but Barbara Zonitch’s reading of Burney’s novels in Familiar Violence, I would suggest, reflects Burney’s position as a political writer more accurately; for Zonitch, Burney’s novels as a whole negotiate the transition between patriarchal, old-regime absolutist government and the new political and social structures of modernity, illustrating the “untenable” choice that her heroines face “between the harsh and even violent restraints of aristocratic rule and the alternative forms of violence created by newer versions of social control” (14).

Unlike Burke’s histrionic emotionalism or Hamilton’s forced containment and conversion of radicalism, Burney’s representational strategies are not overtly violent. However, as Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse argue in their introduction to The Violence of Representation, “[t]o regard certain practices as violent is never to see them just as they are. It is always to take up a position for or against them” (9). My analysis of The Wanderer in the context of a cluster of antirevolutionary Romantic and Victorian texts that commit violence through their representations uncovers Burney’s violent rejection of traditional, patriarchal power and revolutionary aggression. By
“regard[ing]”— and, furthermore, representing— old-regime Britain and revolutionary France as violent, in other words, Burney “take[s] up a position” against both. As the violence that pursues Ellis can be traced back to the institutions of old-regime Britain and new mechanisms of power in revolutionary France, Burney frames both states as perpetrators of aggression and abusers of governmental power, and thereby challenges the legitimacy of patriarchal and revolutionary rule. Epstein is not wrong, therefore, in locating “simmering rage” directed at Britain’s establishment in Burney’s work, but it is not entirely that of the “social reformer” (The Iron Pen 4). Instead, Burney expresses an equal amount of hostility against the French revolutionary government that would succeed the old regime, marking The Wanderer with a profound political pessimism that rejects both the inadequate old institutions and the new republican option that appears to be incapable of achieving any real, substantial change for those, especially women, subject to its power. In fact, this very frustrated inability to imagine a better community highlights the depth of Burney’s hostility to patriarchal and revolutionary power alike.

“Without Name, Without Fortune, Without Friends!”: Ellis’s Fragmented Subjectivity and the Growth of Social Sympathy

Ellis, an unknown wanderer unrecognised by her aristocratic family and pursued by agents of the revolutionary state, appears in the novel on the coast of France, begging to cross the Channel into a Britain that is unwilling to receive her. Ellis is ostracised and persecuted by the British community she encounters just as she is victimised by the agents of the French Revolution from whom she flees, and she finds her sense of individual autonomy stripped away by her lack of public identity. However, the same encounters with violence that damage Ellis’s subjectivity also force her into social and economic positions that allow her to expand her social sympathies and develop her awareness of Britain’s injustices, offering her and Burney’s readers a potential means of re-establishing a sense of community in a Britain that is fractured by violence.

The Wanderer’s opening sentence prepares the reader for the crucial conflicts of the novel, between old-regime England and revolutionary France, and between the known and unknown social entities which are brought into contact through the plot:
During the dire reign of the terrific Robespierre, and in the dead of night, braving the cold, the darkness and the damps of December, some English passengers, in a small vessel, were preparing to glide silently from the coast of France, when a voice of keen distress resounded from the shore, imploring, in the French language, pity and admission. (11)

This opening presents a confrontation between the “dire” and “terrific” Reign of Terror in France and the escaping travellers, as well as between the identifiable English passengers and the “imploring” but genderless, classless and bodiless voice, recognisable only in terms of its supposed nationality, as it speaks “in the French language.” The voice belongs to the disguised English aristocrat, the Honourable Juliet Granville, known to the other characters throughout the novel, and by the reader until the beginning of the third volume, only by her gender-neutral assumed name, Ellis. Like her predecessor Evelina Anville, the heroine of Burney’s debut novel, who, “disregarded, silent, and melancholy, ... sat like a cypher, whom to nobody belonging, by nobody was noticed” (Evelina 479), Ellis’s lack of a knowable public identity makes her the victim of social snobbery, as her fellow passengers on the Channel crossing attempt to identify and label her according to her external appearance. When the disembodied voice’s gender is identified, Ellis becomes an “Incognita” (12), and when she boards the boat her physical appearance automatically marks her as Other, or “out-landish” (14), as does her English, spoken with “a foreign accent” (17). The passengers speculate about her ethnicity and class, ironically naming her “dulcinea” and guessing that she is either a “tawny Hottentot ... [or] fair Circassian” (12), a “nun” (13) or “house-maid” (17), based on the external signs of her “vulgar” dress (17), bandaged head (20), “black” arms and “dusky” face (19). These speculations about Ellis’s class and national status encode the English passengers’ chauvinistic moral judgment of her; even the kind sea officer imagines she crosses from France to England because she “prefer[s] good people to bad” (17), and praises her “right ... way of thinking,” which he identifies as the “English” way (23). Even his charity toward Ellis is the result of his sense of national superiority, as he appeals to the other passengers as “true Briton[s]” (12) and takes charge of an “unprotected female” because it is his duty to do so as an Englishman (22).
In addition to being threatened by “the dire reign of the terrific Robespierre” (11) from which she flees and by the chauvinistic judgment she is subject to on the crossing, Ellis is the victim of the old-regime snobbery and aristocratic pride of her elite English family, which denies and conceals her identity; in fact, representatives of the French republic and British establishment combine to persecute her. Ellis is actually the legitimate daughter of an English aristocrat, Lord Granville, who fails to acknowledge her birth publicly. Granville’s failure to admit to his secret first marriage before his death, combined with the destruction of the documentation attesting to Ellis’s legal claim to the Granville name and fortune during the Revolution, facilitates the efforts of the late Lord Melbury, her grandfather, and Lord Denmeath, her half-siblings’ guardian, to deny her claim on her family (640-647). Moreover, the efforts of Denmeath and the late Melbury to buy Ellis’s silence by sending her a promissory note for £6,000, provided she marry and settle in France (645), leave her vulnerable to the persecution of a mercenary revolutionary commissary, who forces Ellis into marriage by threatening her guardian, a Catholic Bishop, with the guillotine (738-753). Thus, in escaping across the Channel, Ellis both flies a brutal, revolutionary husband in the commissary and rejects the authority of a tyrannical, aristocratic father figure in Denmeath, who, as Ellis states, intends to “mak[e] me an alien to my country” (752).

Ellis recalls the difficulties she faced at the moment of her emigration late in the novel:

the dreadful idea of flying one who might lay claim to the honoured title of husband for pursuing me; the consciousness of being held by an engagement which I would not fulfil, yet could not deny; the uncertainty whether my revered Bishop had effected his escape; and the necessity of abandoning my generous benefactress [the Bishop’s sister] when surrounded by danger; joined to the affliction of returning to my native country,— the country of my birth, my heart, and my pride!— without name, without fortune, without friends! no parents to receive me, no protector to counsel me; unacknowledged by my family,— unknown even to the children of my father!— Oh! bitter, bitter were my feelings! (749)
Ellis’s negative and tentative language points to the identity markers she lacks; her repeated “without” and “no” combine with her use of “unacknowledged” and “unknown” to highlight her feelings of familial and social want, while words such as “might” and “uncertainty,” and her conflicted sense of the ties embedded in her forced marriage reveal how her condition as a destitute émigré results from her social liminality. Finally, words like “pursuing,” “abandoning,” “danger” and “affliction” emphasise the kind of violence the Revolution has brought her into contact with, while her repetition of “bitter, bitter” in describing her own feelings indicates her internalisation of the violence created by her old-regime persecutors and exacerbated by the revolutionary state.

Ellis, then, is a woman with a fragmented sense of self: she is a nameless, classless, nationless and apparently multiethnic émigré, but also the privileged Honourable Juliet Granville, highly educated, able to play beautifully on the harp, graceful, elegant and accomplished. Because she is split between these two identities, she must construct her own subjectivity in the space between Ellis the émigré and Juliet the aristocrat, and renegotiate her place in the social world. The crucial barrier to Ellis’s ability to demonstrate her autonomous individuality to the society she meets during the Channel crossing and in England is her namelessness: her inability to tell her name destabilises all other external marks of identity, like her elegance and display of accomplishments, and signals her status as an unknown social entity. Ellis refuses all of her fellow travellers’ early attempts to discover her name, crying, “I cannot tell my name!” (33). Moreover, by not “tell[ing]” her name, Ellis begins to feel her own private knowledge of her identity deteriorate, remonstrating, when met with further enquiries, “Alas! I hardly know it myself!” (58). The name “Ellis” is chosen by accident, demonstrating the arbitrariness with which the greater community decides on her identity: Miss Bydel, a Brighthelmstone busybody, mistakes the initials “L. S.,” which Ellis assumes to receive letters from her French friends in order to protect her identity and elude pursuit, for “Elless” (80). She soon becomes known as “Ellis” (81), and eventually adopts this name herself, having “long felt the absurdity of seeming nameless” and hoping that with any name, even an assumed one, she will be “treated with less indignity” (91). According to

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80 Doody’s introduction to the 1991 Oxford edition features a detailed analysis of Ellis’s name, distinguishing between Miss Bydel’s “Elless” and “Ellis,” first adopted by Elinor, Ellis’s feminist friend.
Joanne Cutting-Gray, Ellis’s naming by the community as the result of a mistake “exemplifies how others arbitrarily misname Juliet rather than consent to her appearing as she is” (95). As Cutting-Gray suggests, “Without a surname that identifies and legitimizes Juliet within the familial context of culture, and without even a given name to individuate her, Juliet cannot be placed in the context of class, family, social rule” (90). Ellis’s assumed name thus partially grants her the public and social identity that she lacks as an unnamed Incognita. However, because it is so arbitrarily chosen, the name “Ellis” also functions as a stand-in for whatever is unidentifiable about Burney’s heroine: Ellis herself is infinitely disguisable, able to confound social expectations, and, in the absence of meaningful social signifiers, can be judged only on how she appears. In this light, an arbitrary, meaningless name, neither given name nor family name, is the perfect representation of Ellis’s mysterious social existence. In Darryl Jones’s words, “‘Ellis’ is simply a variant of ‘Alias’” (10).

Ellis’s nameless condition, however, is not only a result of her flight from revolutionary France and her effort to protect her French guardians. Late in the novel she exclaims, “when [may I] appear,— when alas!— even know what I am!” (673), suggesting that her alterable public identity derives from a more fundamental social problem: her family’s refusal to acknowledge her as Juliet Granville. In fact, Ellis’s name has been disguised and modified throughout her lifetime, contributing to her sense of fragmented identity. Her foster-sister Gabriella, for example, addresses her in French as “Ma Julie,” a name which Burney translates in a footnote as Juliet (387), revealing how Ellis’s multilingual education affects her identity even before the Revolution; as Doody remarks, “Even the ‘real’ name is double” (Introduction xxiii). Furthermore, the secrecy surrounding Ellis’s birth disguises her identity at her French boarding school where she is known as “Mademoiselle Juliette, which had generally been supposed to be the name of her family” (644). This proliferation of names for Ellis only increases during the Revolution, when she becomes first “Citoyenne Julie” (740) and then Ellis, before she

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According to Doody, Miss Bydel’s name resonates as “elle-less— less than a woman,” while Elinor’s name suggests “elle is, i.e. ‘she is’. Woman lives” (xvi).  
Cutting-Gray is mistaken in part about the process by which Ellis is named, attributing Miss Bydel’s role to the dilettante Miss Arbe, an error which allows her to pun on the character’s name in her choice of the word “arbitrarily” (95).  
Ellis also addresses Gabriella in French as “Gabrielle,” while the narrator uses her anglicised name (387).
finally drops that name to elude discovery by the agents of the French commissary who pursue her (694). Ellis’s ambiguous marital status, following her forced marriage with the nameless commissary, further complicates her legal and social identities, as well as her ability to consider herself an autonomous individual, as she states that “little as I feel to belong to the person in question, I cannot consider myself to be my own!” (779). Such sentiments reveal how greatly Ellis’s ability to establish her own subjectivity depends on the public and legal recognition of her family name and the nullification of her marriage, unlikely future events which leave her in a nameless limbo for most of the novel.

Ellis’s body, furthermore, is malleable, disguised and covered with false and misleading signifiers. Her initial disguise gradually disappears after the crossing: her complexion alters over time, as the dye with which she has covered her face fades, “from a tint nearly black, to the brightest, whitest, and most dazzling fairness” (43), and her patches and bandages fall off, revealing no wounds or scars (42-46). Ellis’s ability to transform, however, marks her more permanently than any other external signs could, as, by thwarting the other characters’ urges to identify her by her body, she becomes an object of suspicion. The authoritative Mrs Ireton demands to know how Ellis “could cover over all that black” (44), revealing antirevolutionary discourse’s entanglement of Burkean racial anxiety with fear of French radicalism in the wake of simultaneous Revolution in France and slave uprisings in the Caribbean in the 1790s. Her comment also suggests that she assumes the revelation of Ellis’s actual body beneath the disguise to be simply a continuation of Ellis’s deceptive transformations. Mrs Ireton constantly berates Ellis’s physical changes, locating in them a kind of violence directed both at her own body and at the entire community:

You have been bruised and beaten; and dirty and clean; and ragged and whole; and wounded and healed; and a European and a Creole, in less than a week. I suppose, next, you will dwindle into a dwarf; and then, perhaps, find some surprising contrivance to shoot up into a giantess. There is nothing that can be too much to expect from so great an adept in metamorphosis. (46)

83 See Chapter 2 for more on Burke’s reaction against the San Domingo slave revolt.
Mrs Ireton’s choice of words like “bruised and beaten” and “wounded and healed” defines Ellis’s disguise not as the necessary strategy of a vulnerable victim fleeing an autocratic government, but, because she has marked her own body with bruises and wounds, as a kind of self-inflicted violence. She thus relocates blame for Ellis’s situation away from her oppressors and onto Ellis herself. Her description of Ellis as “an adept in metamorphosis,” furthermore, enforces her position that Ellis has no permanent, recognisable public identity, and is, instead, continually posing before the community as what she is not.

Possessing an undisclosable, perhaps unknowable, name and changeable body, Ellis attempts to retrieve and publicly assert her independent subjectivity as a counter to the community’s understanding of her as a transformable but ultimately meaningless placeholder, lacking true social content. Ellis is not, as Epstein argues she is, “virtually a free-floating signifier of Woman, a symbol system of female virtues and accomplishments in search of a way to exist in the world” (“Marginality in Frances Burney’s Novels” 207); although the community views her as such a social cipher, Ellis’s efforts to locate and demonstrate her subjectivity fight against the kind of social violence that reduces her to a “symbol system” instead of an autonomous individual. Doody suggests that Ellis’s best means of constructing herself as an autonomous subject is through her speech: she “speaks up for herself; she is at first a voice and nothing else” (Introduction xv). However, her ability to speak in her own defence is severely limited by the revolutionary dangers she runs from: she is unable even to disclose her experience during the Terror, including her forced marriage and the threats against her guardian the Bishop, to her childhood friend and fellow émigré Gabriella, for fear that open communication will place her loved ones in greater danger (392-393). In her undefined social and familial situation she can also not afford to allow herself to feel freely, as she reveals when she replies to her lover Harleigh’s question of whether her heart is pre-engaged, “I have no heart!— I must have none!” (341). The limbo in which Ellis’s public, legal identity hovers requires her to repress her emotional life and stifle her subjectivity.

When challenged, however, Ellis is able to assert her autonomy in a manner that requires her audience to accept her as an independent subject despite the absence of
recognisable, external markers of her social identity. When Mrs Ireton, with whom Ellis briefly resides as a humble companion, humiliates her before guests, Ellis exits the room with dignity, which results in the following dialogue with her haughty and sarcastic employer:

Astonished and offended, “Permit me, Madam,” cried Mrs. Ireton;
“permit me, Miss Ellis,— if it is not taking too great a liberty with a person of your vast consequence,— permit me to enquire who told you to go?”

Juliet turned back her head, and quietly answered, “A person, Madam, who has not the honour to be known to you,— myself!” And then steadily left the room. (525-526)

Ellis thus rejects the social terms through which Mrs Ireton structures the argument, in her idea of recognising “a person of ... vast consequence.” More importantly, however, she demonstrates through her voicing of “myself” that individuals exist outside of and apart from the knowable, public signs that locate them within the social hierarchy.

Ellis’s loss of social identity, however, is not only an opportunity for her to discover and voice her subjectivity independent of the public markers that define her status, but is also the opening for her to expand her social sympathies beyond the privileged sphere hitherto available to the Honourable Juliet Granville. Ellis is infinitely transformable physically, but she also possesses an unlimited amount of social mobility, although that mobility is entirely downward from the position of her birth. She is, as several critics note, an Everywoman\textsuperscript{84} exposed to a complete range of economic positions. Ellis’s “socially downhill” movement, Doody argues, exhibits Burney’s “sympathy for the working women in their normal conditions of work” (Introduction xxx, xxxi). This sympathy extends to Ellis via her experience of a number of economic positions, and, through Ellis’s reflections on her difficulties, to the reader, encouraging a more compassionate community. Ellis’s economic status shifts continually throughout the novel as she occupies the positions of a poor dependent, a harp instructor and performer,

\textsuperscript{84} Doody associates this claim with Ellis’s ethnic and class status, noting that she “arrives as a nameless Everywoman; both black and white, both Eastern and Western, both high and low, both English and French” (Introduction xv), while other critics take a more specifically feminist approach to Ellis’s position. Katharine M. Rogers writes, for example, that Ellis’s “female difficulties are melodramatic projections of everywoman’s situation” (Feminism in Eighteenth-Century England 168).
a seamstress for a milliner and a mantua-maker, a humble companion, an assistant at her friend Gabriella’s haberdasher’s shop, and, finally, a homeless wanderer, fleeing the agents of the commissary and travelling alone through the New Forest, residing among farmers and poor labourers.

Ellis is not radicalised by her experience of this range of social and economic positions, but she is able to take each new experience as a lesson in social sympathy and charity. As an unwanted and neglected dependent in Mrs Maple’s home, Ellis reasons, “Unknown, unnamed, without any sort of recommendation, she applied for succour, and it was granted her” (72-73). This thought shows her willingness to explain away her social victimisation by contextualising it, instead of challenging the customs and prejudices that exclude her. In reflecting that appearances remain against her, she asks, “and to appearances are we not all either victims or dupes?” (275), implicitly accepting the system of judgment based on external signs to which she is victim. She likewise attempts to find consolation for her position in a letter from her French friends advocating “female exertion” (220). However, she soon finds that hard work is not enough to ensure economic stability. When her harp pupils delay their payments, Ellis learns to reflect on the position of “all the harassed industrious” and wishes that such reflections might extend to “all the unfeeling indolent” who owe payments to working people (300). Such a desire for expanded sympathies requires Ellis to attempt to see all sides of a social question: for example, although Gabriella is victimised in trade because of her inexperience (622-624), Ellis’s time at the milliner’s shop reveals that, just as shopkeepers are exploited by the Brighthelmstone elite, so they, in turn, victimise and deceive their less experienced, lower-class patrons (426-428). Similarly, observing life in the New Forest teaches Ellis to challenge the romantic “fallacy” of the “happy ... peasant’s lot” and recognise the “hardships” of rural poverty (700); yet, despite this sympathetic understanding of rural life, Ellis’s nightmarish experiences with sexual harassment and with criminal poachers in the New Forest teach her that “no class, and no station, appropriatively merit trust” (705).

Having reflected on social and economic injustice, Ellis finally aligns herself with a conservative, paternalist position, locating the problems caused by economic inequality in the conduct of the wealthy and privileged, rather than seeing them as ingrained in British
institutions. She exclaims, “Where superiour wealth falls into liberal hands,— where its possessor is an Aurora Granville, it proves a good still more to the surrounders than to the owners .... But Oh! where it is misused for the purposes of bowing down the indigent, of oppressing the helpless, of triumphing over the dependent,— then, how baneful then is inequality of fortune!” (494). Ellis’s education in sympathy, therefore, does not train her in democratic principles, but, rather, with her half-sister Aurora as a model, prepares her for the privileges and responsibilities she will one day possess as the Honourable Juliet Granville. Ellis’s thoughts express this political programme succinctly when she contrasts Mrs Ireton with Aurora:

Oh! if those who receive, from the unequal conditions of life, the fruits of the toils of others, could,— only for a few days,— experience, personally, how cruelly those toils are embittered by arrogance, or how sweetly they may be softened by kindness,— the race of the Mrs. Iretons would become rare,— and Lady Aurora Granville, might, perhaps, be paralleled! (511) Ellis’s experience of a multitude of “embittered” “toils” trains her in the appropriately charitable exertion of power, a lesson Burney communicates to the readers who feel for her economic and social distress. Social change, in this view, occurs as individuals come into contact with suffering or with positive role models like Lady Aurora, rather than through challenges to systematic or institutionalised wrongs.

However, in representing Ellis’s social and sexual victimisation, the product of her economic vulnerability, Burney destabilises Ellis’s essentially conservative politics. In her wanderings, Ellis is continually exposed to precarious social situations in which her aristocratic pride, delicacy and propriety cannot always be maintained, and which show the reader that, despite Ellis’s ultimate support for the unreformed class system, reliance on the goodness of those in power cannot prevent the exploitative exercise of that power. Doody states that Ellis is not a character “who would be happy to go back to some original state of conservative living. Once she has seen the world in which real lives are lived, no retreat is possible” (Introduction xvi). While I argue, instead, that Ellis does clearly and explicitly voice an economically and socially conservative message, it is true that in Burney’s representation of old-regime England as it is, paternalistic charity does not seem to be enough to address the inequalities and abuses the novel raises. Ellis’s
sexual victimisation arises from her lack of social and economic power and reveals her vulnerability within Britain’s unreformed, old-regime power structure; the narrator repeats that she is “unprotected, unsustained, unknown” (315), “unfriended, unsupported, nameless” (347), which exposes her to male predators including the republican commissary, old-fashioned elite libertines and vulgar rural ruffians. As numerous critics note, Ellis’s lack of social identity allows Burney to draw attention to the economic difficulties women face as a group, and Ellis recognises that she, a nameless and unknown woman, is perceived as a stereotype by the community, asking, “What is woman,— with the most upright designs, the most rigid circumspection,— what is woman unprotected? She is pronounced upon only from outward semblance:— and, indeed, what other criterion has the world? Can it read the heart?” (344). Ellis’s public appearance, or “outward semblance” again comes into conflict with her subjectivity, her “heart,” in this speech, which indicates how dramatically her social marginalisation corresponds to the gender dynamic that makes her, an unknown social entity, an appropriate victim for libertines and louts.

Ellis understands early in the novel that her economic difficulties are gender-specific, as her options are limited by the rules of propriety that she believes are in place to protect her from sexual scrutiny. She cries,

How few ... how circumscribed, are the attainments of women! and how much fewer and more circumscribed still, are those which may, in their consequences, be useful as well as ornamental, to the higher, or educated class! those through which, in the reverses of fortune, a FEMALE may reap benefit without abasement! those which, while preserving her from pecuniary distress, will not aggravate the hardships or sorrows of her changed condition, either by immediate humiliation, or by what, eventually, her connexions may consider as disgrace! (289)

Epstein argues that “Juliet’s stripped-down female status (stateless, placeless, and penniless as well as nameless, married yet not married, of high birth yet not recognized) raises explicitly Burney’s political analysis of the position of women” (The Iron Pen 177), pointing out that the one obvious and changeless external marker of Ellis’s identity is her gender, while Debra Silverman returns to the idea of Ellis as an Everywoman, claiming that “[a] stranger with no name reveals the stereotypes of femininity and of women’s roles. Though the Incognita does not have a name per se, she can be labelled by her gender” (69).
Although Ellis is fully conscious that her economic decisions may expose her to “humiliation” or “disgrace” (289), she is not yet aware that, as Doody claims, “Women do not command a currency—they are a currency” (Introduction xvi), a reality she is exposed to when she embarks on a public career, first as a harp instructor and performer, and, later, as a seamstress in a publicly accessible shop. When Ellis appears alone, unprotected and ignored by her Brighthelmstone acquaintances at a public concert, for example, she is blatantly pursued by the libertine Sir Lyell Sycamore (241-255), who continues persecuting her at church (267-271) and assailing her in her new employment at Miss Matson’s shop, where the seamstresses are placed in the open as a draw for customers, exposed to the public gaze and sexual advances of male patrons (428-430). Failing to seduce Ellis, Sir Lyell eventually abducts her, demonstrating the violence at the core of the economic system that displays Ellis as a sexual object available to male consumption; she is released from his power only by a chance meeting with some acquaintances (449-471). Sir Lyell’s pursuit of Ellis at the places of her employment points out the ironic correspondence between Ellis’s sexual victimisation and her attempts to provide for herself rather than relying on men, as Kristina Straub notes: “The milliner’s shop, ostensibly the site of Juliet’s attempts at economic independence, is revealed as the locus of her economic entrapment as a sexual commodity” (209). Both as an economically independent musician and as a dependent seamstress, Ellis is exploited by a system that refuses to see her as a producer of services or goods, but will only treat her as a commodity.

However, she is even further sexually exposed when she breaks out of the economic system altogether and wanders, homeless, through the New Forest, to escape the agents of the commissary. More alone and unprotected than ever, Ellis is chased by two youths threatening “a danger more dreadful than any to which either misfortune or accident had hitherto exposed her,—the danger of personal and brutal assault” (688). Facing an attempted rape which fails to even disguise itself as seduction, Ellis feels herself to be “a devoted victim to outrage” (688); by seeing herself as a “devoted” object of sexual assault, Ellis recognises how completely her victimisation is predetermined by her status as an unprotected female. In Straub’s words, Ellis’s vulnerability is an articulation of “the socially institutionalized fact of women’s sexual and economic victimization” (185).
Burney leads her reader to ask, along with Ellis, “Is there no end ... to the evils of defenceless female youth?” (470).

Ellis’s victimisation, however, is not exhausted by the repeated threat of sexual assault, as some of her most hostile persecutors are women who have gained social or economic power over her. The tyrannical Mrs Ireton, for example, exerts her power over Ellis on every occasion; Ellis reflects that “that lady was amongst the many, though terrible characters, who think superior rank or fortune authorises perverseness, and legitimates arrogance; who hold the display of ill humour to be the display and mark of power” (489). Ellis’s recognition that Mrs Ireton views abuses of her power as somehow “legitim[ised]” or “authorise[d]” by her social status demonstrates how the kind of arbitrary misrule Ellis is victim to at the hands of the commissary in the French revolutionary state is not confined to the Republic alone, but is ingrained in British hierarchies. The “despoti[c]” (305) Miss Arbe, Ellis’s patron during her attempt to maintain herself as a music instructor, likewise misuses her social power on a micro scale, humiliating Ellis, for example, by appropriating the funds Lady Aurora donates for her benefit for a gaudy costume intended to set Ellis apart from the dilettante, lady performers in the subscription concert Miss Arbe plans, ostensibly on Ellis’s behalf (313-314). Miss Arbe’s exercise of power extends over the ladies’ committee she establishes to plan the concert:

whoever ventured to start the smallest objection to an idea of Miss Arbe’s, was overpowered with conceited insinuations of the incompetency of her judgment for deciding upon such matters; or, if any one, yet bolder, presumed to hint at some new arrangement, Miss Arbe looked either sick or angry, and declared that she could not possibly continue to offer her poor advice, if it were eternally to be contested. This annihilated rather than subdued interference; for the whole party was of opinion, that nothing less than utter ruin to the project could ensue from her defection. (305)

Burney creates in Miss Arbe’s ladies’ committee a version, on a minor scale, of Maximilien Robespierre’s Committee of Public Safety, as Doody notes, “show[ing] how

86 Ellis’s loss of caste, should she wear the pink gown, is apparent in Miss Arramede’s comment, “It’s horribly provoking one can’t wear that colour one’s self ... for it’s monstrously pretty” (314). Ellis refuses to wear Miss Arbe’s gown, appearing instead in “plain white satin” (358).
the same impulses may be found in various human constructions” (Introduction xix). Like the guillotine, symbolic of Robespierre’s government, Miss Arbe’s rule is characterised by efficiency; the narrator states, “Concentrated, or arbitrary government may be least just, but it is most effective” (305). Miss Arbe’s misrule in the ladies’ committee is efficient, but it stifles opposition, and thus extends and consolidates her power: having “annihilated” any resistance to her methods, she leaves her subordinates believing in their own incompetence to govern the project without her authoritarian leadership. Burney’s representation of misrule both in the revolutionary style of Miss Arbe’s ladies’ committee and in the power concentrated through Mrs Ireton’s adherence to old-regime rank shows how Ellis’s social education, which extends her sympathy to those who will eventually be the objects of Juliet Granville’s charitable exercise of the power of the privileged, reveals its own inadequacies.

Although Ellis aligns herself with conservative paternalism, excusing her mistreatment by powerful representatives of old-regime Britain, her encounters with the emotional and psychological violence that damages her subjectivity and the sexual and economic violence that systematically victimises her, indicate that a reliance on the charitable exercise of power and privilege is not enough to protect the vulnerable and address institutionalised injustice. The old regime’s misuse of power thus appears to be a counterpart rather than an alternative to the political violence of the Terror from which Ellis flees. Instead of finding a refuge from political violence in Britain, Ellis meets in her homeland further social exile.

“Cast Upon Herself”: Geography, Gender and Ellis’s Marginalisation

If Ellis’s economic mobility allows her to expand her social sympathies while also exposing her to the social and sexual threats that reinforce her exclusion from power, her complementary geographical mobility works to critique British nationalism and demonstrate Ellis’s efforts to negotiate her commitment to numerous, disparate communities. Ellis is affectively bound, but does not fully belong, to the elite France of her upbringing, the aristocratic England from which she is prohibited, the community of French émigrés, and the English homeless, whom she joins as she wanders through the New Forest. Her geographical movement through a Britain that has been politically re-
mapped by the literary debates of the 1790s highlights the conflict between her allegiances to multiple social groups and her interior self, as her constant motion severs the connections by which she is bound to these communities and leaves her stripped of any sense of national belonging.

Burney, like her heroine, had a complicated sense of her own national identity and mixed allegiances to her homeland, England, and the country where she resided for many years, France. As a child, Burney had been drawn to the French side of her ancestry through her close relationship with her French Catholic maternal grandmother, Mme DuBois (Kubica Howard 32). Meeting with a community of émigré French constitutionalists who lived in exile at Norbury Hall from 1792, including her future husband Alexandre d’Arblay and Mme de Staël, helped extend Burney’s sympathy toward those French liberals who had supported the Revolution early on, but were later banished from their homeland (Doody Frances Burney 199-200). Burney’s attraction and marriage to d’Arblay could be seen, as Doody argues, as an example of Burney “turning to that other side of her heritage, to her mother’s history, to the language of her grandmother” (Frances Burney 200). Nevertheless, Burney’s political exile from England during the Napoleonic Wars served to heighten her emotional commitment to her country upon her return to British soil in 1812. In her Journals and Letters she recounts, “I no sooner touched, than ... I took up, on one knee, with irrepressible transport, the nearest bright pebble, to press to my lips, in grateful joy at touching again the land of my Nativity, after an absence nearly hopeless of more than 10 Years” (6:727). Ellis is likewise affected when she lands at Dover following the lifetime of exile imposed by her family: she “darted forward with such eagerness, that she was the first to touch the land, where, with a fervour that seemed resistless, she rapturously ejaculated, ‘Heaven, Heaven be praised!’” (22). Ellis’s double allegiance to the land of her birth and that where she has happily resided for several years of her life exposes her to her new English acquaintances’ assumption that she is a national enemy. As Doody writes, however, Juliet is technically English by strict line of birth, but she speaks English with a French accent, and her life is divided—those who accuse her of Frenchness are not wrong. The scene in French [in which Ellis accidentally meets her émigré friend Gabriella] offers a welcome
exchange of the affections, of sympathy, in contrast to the abrasive and
callous utterance of so many English characters .... *(Frances Burney 330-
331)*

As Doody suggests, Ellis’s ability to sympathise with the plight of her émigré friend is what separates her from the xenophobic community at Brighthelmstone, whose understanding of French affairs is marked by ignorance and misconceptions.

In fact, what Burney’s British characters see as political stability, as opposed to the chaos the Revolution has caused in France, is nothing more than stasis and atrophy, a representation of old-regime England that reflects on the paranoid 1814 community that composed *The Wanderer*’s reading public. By 1814-15, historian Linda Colley claims, “mass arming in Great Britain during the wars against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France had provided irrefutable proof that patriotism—in the sense of an identification with British independence against those foreign forces that threatened it—transcended the divisions between the social classes” (319).87 The pervasive patriotic militarism that took precedence in British society at the time of *The Wanderer*’s publication appears in Burney’s representation of the atrophied, reactionary community Ellis meets in the 1790s. Most of the characters Ellis encounters on her crossing are types of “the stagnation of English life” (Doody Introduction xvi): they are privileged but abuse their power, wealthy but misuse their wealth. Such a stifling political atmosphere, Doody suggests, is just as destructive to human life as the mechanisms of the Terror in France:

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87 See Colley’s full discussion of mass mobilisation during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in chapter 7 of *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837*, “Manpower” (283-319).
threatening her with rape and abduction (457-476), imprisonment (570-571) and a forced return to France (209-210), where the guillotine and a violent husband await her. British prejudice and power thus translate into actual, physical violence and terror for Ellis.

The social and cultural prejudices Ellis meets with during her crossing extend beyond the privileged boat passengers and into the middle classes, represented by Scope, Gooch, Stubbs and Riley, who are characterised by their ignorant preoccupation with the Revolution and demonstrate how much British public opinion on France could be guided by bias and misunderstanding. Burney captures the insular provincialism of the Brighthelmstone community in the symbolic fact of the residents’ failure to properly pronounce Robespierre’s name: Scope identifies him as “Mr. Robertspierre” (79), which Gooch anglicises even further into “Mr. Robert Speer” (93), “Bob Spear” (466), and the very slightly more French “Mounseer Robert Speer” (465). Even Riley, who has just crossed from France, fails to get Robespierre’s name and title correct, describing the French generally as “Mounseers” (257), diminutively referring to Robespierre as “Master Robertspierre” (257), and absurdly calling him “Signor Robespierre” (15), showing his tendency to lump all foreigners together as simply non-English.

These comically ignorant characters also project their own preoccupations onto France. Young Gooch observes French affairs with a kind of militaristic voyeurism, while Stubbs, a steward, is only concerned with the value of French land:

“But pray, Ma’am, did you ever look on, to see that Mr. Robert Speer mow down his hundreds, like to grass in a hay-field? We should not much like it if they were to do so in England. But the French have no spirit. They are but a poor set; except for their generals, or the like of that. And, for them, they’ll fight you like so many lions. They are afraid of nobody.”

“By what I hear, Ma’am,” said Mr. Stubbs, “a gentleman, in that country, may have rents due to the value of thousands, and hardly receive a frog, as one may say, an acre.” (93)

Gooch’s insensitive description of Robespierre’s power to “mow down his hundreds” blames the victims of revolutionary excess, who, he believes, “have no spirit,” and

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88 Similar conversations held among members of the Gooch, Stubbs and Scope circle occur throughout the novel (268-269, 465-467).
deflects the discussion away from Ellis’s first-hand experience of violence in France. Stubbs’s self-interested focus on landed wealth, furthermore, shows that, in interpreting French events, English public ignorance sets the agenda while eye-witness accounts from victims like Ellis are sidelined. Gooch and Stubbs, in other words, ask questions of Ellis, but do not wish to hear her answers, and instead read French affairs according to their own interests.

Characters who do not display self-interested misconceptions of French affairs exhibit an absolute lack of interest and disbelief in the events of the Revolution, as does Mr Gooch senior in the following speech that voices his denial of revolutionary violence:

for a man for to come for to go for to pretend telling me, because it be a great ways off, and I can’t find un out, that there be a place where there comes a man, who says, every morning of his life, to as many of his fellow-creatures as a can set eyes on, whether they be man, woman, or baby; here, mount me two or three dozen of you into that cart, and go and have your heads chopt off! And that they’ll make no more ado, than go, only because they’re bid! Why if one will believe such staring stuff as that be, one may as well believe that the moon be made of cream-cheese, and the like. (465-466)

While Mr Gooch’s comments reveal the complete strangeness of the Terror to an outsider, his refusal to believe in the stories of revolutionary violence demonstrates a kind of insular denial that prohibits his ability to establish sympathy with émigrés like Ellis who have fled the site of their victimisation. British ignorance, appearing either in the denials of Gooch senior or the insensitive misconceptions of Stubbs and the younger Gooch, is complicit in revolutionary violence by marginalising the stories of its victims’ suffering.

It is significant, therefore, that nobody but Ellis, herself an exile, expresses any sympathy in Gabriella’s plight as a lonely and penniless émigré. Burney’s only published polemical work, the 1793 pamphlet *Brief Reflections Relative to the Emigrant French Clergy: Earnestly Submitted to the Humane Consideration of the Ladies of Great Britain*, shows the importance she attributes to Britain’s charitable acceptance of political exiles. The connection between the “desperate wanderers” (3-4) of her pamphlet and the émigrés
in her later novel is clear in the novel’s recollection of this designation for the emigrants in its title. Burney’s pamphlet attempts to mobilise public support for the emigrant clergy by cataloguing their sufferings, exclaiming that they are “Driven from house and home, despoiled of dignities and honours, abandoned to the seas for mercy, to chance for support, many old, some infirm, all impoverished? with mental strength alone allowed them for coping with such an aggregate of evil!” (6-7). Burney also urges the emigrants’ claims on English charity as “duties” of the “community” (14), arguing in particular that the emigrant clergy should be considered as part of a community of human virtue to which the British also belong:

We are too apt to consider ourselves rather as a different race of beings, than as merely the emulous inhabitants of rival states; but ere our detestation leads to the indiscriminate proscription of a whole people, let us look at the Emigrant French Clergy, and ask where is the Englishman, where, indeed, the human being, in whom a sense of right can more disinterestedly have been demonstrated, or more nobly predominate? O let us be brethren with the good, wheresoever they may arise! (12-13)

The community Burney envisions embraces political exiles as “brethren” rather than seeing them as national aliens of a “different race of beings,” and provides émigrés with surrogate homes to replace those from which they were “[d]riven” and the community which “abandoned” them (6). Ellis similarly attempts to arouse compassion for Gabriella’s marginalised position by recounting her sufferings and describing her as an outsider to the homeland which she has been compelled to abandon: “She has lost her country; she wastes in exile; she sinks in obscurity; she has no communication with her friends; she knows not even whether they yet breathe the vital air!” (636-637). Ellis understands Gabriella’s sufferings as a dislocation in space, resulting in the loss of her sense of belonging: she “lost her country” and is irreparably separated from her loved ones by her political exile. Contrary to Burney’s hopes for the emigrant clergy, however, the British community fails to open itself to Gabriella in her distress.

Burney emphasises the two friends’ outsider status in England through such images of their spatial dislocation. Claudia L. Johnson notes that “Burney adopts the narrative vantage point of marginal figures” (Jane Austen 25); however, in addition to being
economically and socially marginalised, Ellis and Gabriella are physically located on the geographical fringes of England. Burney’s spatial representation of Ellis’s exclusion from the national community first appears in what Nora Nachumi describes as the “liminality” of the opening scene: “The passengers are literally between France and England. Blinded by darkness and without a familiar context, neither they nor the reader can possibly know what kind of person owns the voice on the beach .... The usual means of establishing identity—vision, context, and auxiliary information—are entirely absent from this initial encounter” (138). Nachumi’s comments suggest that Ellis’s lack of recognisable social identity is exacerbated by her geographical marginalisation: she exists on the periphery, neither in England nor in France. Despite Ellis’s joyful homage to British soil, she remains an outsider on landing at Dover and continues to find herself spatially marginalised throughout the novel. As Doody notes, The Wanderer “take[s] us to rural England and the littoral margin, rather than centring on London” (“Burney and politics” 101). When she does briefly reside in London, it is in the émigré quarter of Soho, the location of the emigrant Manette family’s home in Charles Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities, where she helps keep Gabriella’s shop. For most of the novel, however, Ellis finds herself in coastal towns, Dover, Brighthelmstone, and finally Teignmouth, where she is reconciled to her family while literally standing on the beach. The peripheral location of the novel’s resolution, in which Ellis establishes her new family and circle of friends, is crucial to her new-found sense of social belonging, as she rejects the images of enclosure associated with xenophobic British nationalism in favour of community and openness, referring repeatedly to her refutation of what she sees as the lonely, socially “insulated” life (819, 822) she has been forced to lead as an unrecognised wanderer. Significantly, the Teignmouth beach is also literally the space in which Ellis’s transnational identity is

89 The history of Burney’s manuscript’s crossing from Dunkirk, recounted in her Journals and Letters (6:714-727), usefully parallels Ellis’s geographical marginalisation at the novel’s opening; as Doody writes, “Her work is itself a voice from the coast of France, imploring (sometimes in the French language) pity and admission” (Frances Burney 331).

90 See the 1991 Oxford edition’s Appendix III for a description of the geographical locations that appear in the novel. Some articles also address the specific landmarks Ellis encounters in her wanderings, including Silvia Mergenthal’s “‘The Architecture of the Devil’: Stonehenge, Englishness, English Fiction” and Elizabeth Heckendorf Cook’s “Crown forests and female georgic: Frances Burney and the reconstruction of Britishness.” Hester Davenport’s essay “Fanny Goes Dipping—Evelina does not: Burney’s Attitude to the Pursuit of Sea-bathing in her Life and Writings” features an interesting discussion of Teignmouth as the location of The Wanderer’s final scene.
ratified by her new, cross-Channel domestic community: her xenophobic maternal uncle, Admiral Powel, is discovered intimately conversing with Ellis’s other affective father figure, a French Bishop, inside a bathing machine, where Harleigh and Melbury join them to make offers and arrangements for Ellis’s marriage (864-865). Not only do Ellis’s two father figures learn to converse “as lovingly as if they were both a couple of Christians, coming off the same shore,” as an old sailor puts it (864), but the beach provides the space in which Ellis’s new family is constructed.

Ellis’s positioning on the geographical periphery throughout the novel facilitates her ability to sympathise with outsiders to the national community. By the time of The Wanderer’s publication, the Channel coast was imaginatively populated with the poetic speakers and revolutionary sympathisers that occur in such Romantic literary works as Charlotte Smith’s “Beachy Head” and The Emigrants and John Thelwall’s chapter in The Peripatetic titled “The Cliffs,” including an “Ode to the Cliffs, At Sandgate.” The characters and speakers in these works, unlike Burney’s insular, xenophobic British characters, look out across the Channel at France while reflecting on contemporary politics. By setting most of the novel, including Ellis’s emotional reunion with her foster sister Gabriella at Brighthelmstone, Burney engages with this political writing of British coastal space that occurred in the preceding decades, particularly responding to Smith’s 1793 poem The Emigrants, which opens on the cliffs east of Brighthelmstone, from where Smith also signed the poem’s dedication to William Cowper. As Burney had in her pamphlet, Smith uses coastal geography and the plight of the emigrants to express her dismay at the “national aversion” existing between the British and the French (231) and to encourage public sympathy for the poem’s “Poor wand’ring wretches” (237). Burney’s Emigrant Clergy, Susan J. Wolfson argues, offers a conservative representation of emigrant priests that looks to efforts by Edmund Burke and Hannah More as models for encouraging public sympathy for the exiled religious patriarchs: Wolfson notes that the title of Burney’s pamphlet, Brief Reflections Relative to the Emigrant French Clergy, alludes to Burke’s famous Reflections on the Revolution in France, and also identifies “patently Burkean theatrics” and “Burkean gothic horror” in Burney’s descriptions of the

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91 This quotation, taken from Smith’s dedication, is cited by page number. However, all subsequent quotations from The Emigrants come from the poem itself, and are cited by line number.
emigrant clergy’s victimisation at the hands of French revolutionaries (521). Smith, however, revises the conservative position associated with portrayals of emigrant clergy according to her own republican politics, intentionally complicating her gestures of compassion for the exiled priests through her anti-patriarchal, anti-militaristic polemic.

Burney’s novel is thus a return to her own earlier writing on French emigrants and the conservative public effort to which it belonged, but, more importantly, to the political and geographical terrain mapped by Smith’s poem. Although Burney does not adhere to Smith’s republicanism, she does follow Smith’s critique of militant nationalism and the patriarchal institutions and social structure that fuel British insularism and facilitate women’s victimisation. Both Smith and Burney use the plight of exiled emigrants as a means of approaching broader social problems. As Adriana Craciun and Kari E. Lokke rightly note, both women “saw in the exile and disenfranchisement of the clergy the political and economic disenfranchisement of larger groups—women and working people—and thus in The Emigrants and The Wanderer, women and clergy wander through the same treacherous British landscape, victims of a patriarchal ethos of economic and political violence” (“British Women Writers” 12). Thus, while Smith uses sympathy for the emigrant priests to complicate the more straightforwardly conservative politics of Burney’s earlier pamphlet, Burney’s scene on the Brighthelmstone cliffs signals her decision to pick up the threads of Smith’s broader social and political project: significantly, Burney’s émigrés are not a group of priests, invested with old-regime institutional power, but two penniless women, exiled from France, rejected by the patriarchal and patriotic British public they encounter, and economically, politically and socially victimised because of their gender and nationality.

Unlike the hostile British public Burney represents, Ellis is prepared to offer her sympathy for the disenfranchised because of her own experience of marginalisation. Not recognising Gabriella, Ellis follows the unknown “foreigner” (385) to a coastal churchyard, sympathising with her as a political exile:

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92 For further discussion of Burke’s and More’s support for émigré priests, see Angela Keane’s “The Anxiety of (Feminine) Influence: Hannah More and Counterrevolution” (115-119).
93 For a discussion of the poem’s anti-patriarchal republicanism, see Wolfson’s “Charlotte Smith’s Emigrants.”
she [Gabriella] extended her arms, seeming to hail the full view of the wide spreading ocean; or rather, Ellis imagined, the idea of her native land, which she knew, from this spot, to be its boundary. The beauty of the early morning from that height, the expansive view, impressive, though calm, of the sea, and the awful solitude of the place, would have sufficed to occupy the mind of Ellis, had it not been completely caught by the person whom she followed; and who now, in the persuasion of being wholly alone, gently murmured, “Oh ma chère patrie!— malheureuse, coupable,— mais toujours chère patrie!— ne te reverrai-je jamais!” (385).

Burney locates the reunion between Ellis and Gabriella against the backdrop of “the full view of the wide spreading ocean” in order to set their ability to recognise that there is a world beyond Britain’s geopolitical borders against the insular ignorance and mistreatment both women receive from the community in which they seek refuge. The subsequent lengthy conversation between the two friends, who finally recognise each other, is conducted entirely in French, with English translations in Burney’s footnotes (385-393), reinforcing the multilingual, multinational upbringing that has bred Ellis to reject the kind of paranoid nationalism that characterises the Brighthelmstone community.

Not only does the community snub and suspect the alien Gabriella as it has excluded Ellis, but it fails to use its geographical advantage and look outward, away from the self-enclosed, snobbish society it fosters. In Doody’s words, Brighthelmstone “is an inturned world .... [O]nly the poor émigrés, Ellis and Gabriella, look at the sea” (Introduction xx). Ellis’s ability to see beyond national borders facilitates her disillusionment in the kind of patriotism she is willing to express when she first touches British soil. As Tamara Wagner recognises, “The concept of a shared, national, memory is evoked and then dismissed as the dramatic fate of the wandering orphan heroine dismantles ideologies of the homeland” (n.pag.). Though Ellis is drawn to her homeland as a place of refuge from revolutionary France, her continued geographical dislocation after landing in England shows both her exclusion from the British elite and her inability to concede to the kind of xenophobic, inward-looking self-fortification against social and geographical outsiders with which the national community consolidates itself. Unlike Smith’s emigrant priests,
whose location on the periphery of Britain suggests that they “have in no way committed themselves geographically or ideologically to even a temporary life there” (Wiley 58), Ellis and Gabriella are marginalised despite their desire to accommodate themselves to British life, or, in Ellis’s case, to prove that she belongs. They remain peripheral because they cannot break through the fortress of paranoid British nationalism and therefore have nowhere to go, socially, economically, and geographically, in Britain.

Ellis’s status as a wanderer heightens her sense of connection to marginal spaces and the socially homeless, but it also continues the stripping away of her public identity that her namelessness and disguises set in motion in a way that marks her distinctness from other Romantic wanderers, for whom wandering can be a politically and socially empowering activity. Doody describes wandering as “the quintessential Romantic activity, as it represents erratic and personal energy expended outside a structure, and without progressing to a set objective .... Alien and alienated, yet potentially bearing a new compassion or a new wisdom, the Wanderer draws a different map” (Introduction vii), pointing to Ellis’s place within a group of politicised Romantic wanderers. However, this reading of Ellis’s activity as “draw[ing] a different map” does not adequately note the nuances of her position as a wanderer who is victimised, not empowered, by her forced, peripheral geographical movement, primarily as a result of her gender. According to Robin Jarvis, “there was an element of deliberate social nonconformism, of oppositionality, in the self-levelling expeditions of most early pedestrians” (27), which helped produce a radical solidarity with the socially excluded and a sense of liberation from social structures. In Jarvis’s words, “their walking was a radical assertion of autonomy .... Walking affirmed a desired freedom from context” (28). Although Ellis’s mobility does, as we have seen, endow her with “a new compassion” (Doody Introduction vii), she does not have the leisure or the explicit political purpose of other Romantic wanderers, from Thelwall’s Sylvanus Theophrastus, to the wandering speakers in the poetry of William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, to Elizabeth Hamilton’s Henry Sydney, which allows them to construct political identities through their observations and sympathies. Ellis’s flight from persecution, moreover, is not “self-levelling” or “deliberate social nonconformism” (Jarvis 27) because it is not a personal choice, but is forced upon her by circumstances. Nor is the “freedom from context”
which Ellis experiences “desired” (Jarvis 28), as her loss of social identity markers only contributes to her victimisation by the greater community.

It is important to recollect, therefore, that, Ellis’s wandering must be read in the context of the social, economic and sexual threats she faces. Her wandering, like that of the gypsies whose appearance in Romantic and Victorian works denotes cultural and ethnic difference, classlessness and the limits imposed by gender expectations, indicates her removal from the British community. In Stephen Hunt’s words, “Geographical space, both rural and urban, has always been contested: factors such as class, gender, and age all intersect to determine who may wander where” (51), a point supported by Jarvis’s findings, which recognise that “[l]abouring-class men, and women of whatever class, inhabited material contexts which impeded their participation in the age of pedestrianism” (155). As Pam Perkins reminds us, a wanderer is “de facto a masculine figure” (“Private Men” 74). Ellis does not choose to wander as part of a political or aesthetic exercise; instead, her gender determines her wanderings, as she flies from aggressive male characters who intend her harm and, as a result, encounters further sexual, economic and social persecution. Moreover, Ellis is to some extent an unclassed figure: her wandering is subject to the limits of her very moderate means and her inability to achieve economic independence. Doody’s statement that “Juliet is a Wanderer, like a beggar, like a Romantic poet, or—in a woman’s case—like a prostitute” (Frances Burney 329), tellingly identifies the ways in which Ellis’s wanderings, while situating her in a literary tradition, also construct her as a figure of abject social and economic status.

94 In Thelwall’s Peripatetic, for example, Sylvanus takes issue with gypsies’ removal from the economic system, telling his friend Ambulator, “I would relieve the miserable indigent who was shivering naked among the severities of winter even though I were conscious that his misery was the effect of his indolent profligacy; but when the season invites to labour, and the means of industry are at hand, let the young and healthy solicit our assistance in vain, till they find they must either work or starve.” However, Thelwall’s critique of “indolence” is primarily directed against the aristocracy, whose idleness is “commanded by the coercive laws of his country, and sanctioned by hereditary institutions” (196). Harriet’s encounter with gypsies in Jane Austen’s Emma points to a similar kind of existence outside of British social and economic structures: her rescue by Frank Churchill gives Harriet—described as “an imaginist” (295)—cause to indulge in the kind of romantic fantasies that Austen’s comic realism and didactic plot aim to discipline. Maggie Tulliver’s decision to run away to join a gypsy community in George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss suggests how a marginalised character like Maggie could be drawn to the gypsies, whose socially peripheral position seems to mirror her own. This connection is consolidated through Maggie’s physical resemblance to the ethnically different gypsies she meets (146). See also David Simpson’s article “Figuring Class, Sex, and Gender: What is the Subject of Wordsworth’s ‘Gipsies’?” for a discussion of the political resonance of gypsies in Wordsworth’s work.
Ellis is thus more closely aligned to the Gothic heroines who fly their enemies in Romantic literature than the male Romantics who “[draw] a different map” (Doody Introduction vii) with their excursions. Her wandering is an expression of her victimisation and subjection to violence as she eludes and confronts the pursuers who intend her harm, not an articulation of her politics. In other words, her trajectory is one of disempowerment. Ellis’s experience is a Gothic experience, furthermore, as it contributes to her loss of identity and autonomy. Her sense of her internal self and the public, external signs like her family name that mark her identity are challenged, and she becomes a cipher, or a figure of uncertainty. Her aimless, fearful geographical movement accelerates the dissolution of her identity that occurs across the novel. Jay D. Salisbury argues that “[w]hen the Wanderer appears in the Gothic novel it embodies the dreadful uncertainty upon which subjects and structures of meaning found their epistemologies” (46), and Ellis’s movement through liminal and marginal spaces strips away the external world, revealing the uncertainty even of her own autonomous subjectivity.

The extent to which the social world disappears as Ellis wanders further and further from her knowable identity emerges in Burney’s image of Ellis as “a being who had been cast upon herself; a female Robinson Crusoe” (873). This “female Robinson Crusoe,” Burney continues, is “as unaided and unprotected, though in the midst of the world, as that imaginary hero in his uninhabited island; and reduced either to sink, through inanition, to non-entity, or to be rescued from famine and death by such resources as she could find, independently, in herself” (873). As Katharine M. Rogers argues, this description of Ellis has explicit gender implications:

by comparing Juliet’s unsupported state to Crusoe’s isolation on his island, Burney invites us to contrast male preparation for life with female incapacitation .... [W]hile everything in his [Crusoe’s] training has developed resourcefulness, enterprise, self-reliance and initiative, everything in Juliet’s has been designed to render her helpless and dependent. (Frances Burney 141)

More important than the educational double-standard that Rogers points out, however, is Burney’s use of the “female Robinson Crusoe” image to indict “the world,” which “cast[s] [Ellis] upon herself,” abandoning her to her wanderings. The social world,
Burney implies, is at best an absence, a space of bleak isolation or “uninhabited island” (873), no more charitable or compassionate than Robinson Crusoe’s island. Ellis, in other words, does not have to find herself literally shipwrecked in order to be utterly alone.

However, this stripping away of the social world also offers Ellis an opportunity to imaginatively reconstruct her own identity without reference to the social and political relationships that hitherto define her, and to remake her sense of social responsibility according to her experiences as a wanderer. Burney continually points out that Ellis’s situation is complicated by her gender: “How mighty, thus circumstanced, are the DIFFICULTIES with which a FEMALE has to struggle! Her honour always in danger of being assailed, her delicacy of being offended, her strength of being exhausted, and her virtue of being calumniated” (873). However, she concludes the novel with words of hope, inspired by Ellis’s ability to overcome these obstacles on her own: “Yet even DIFFICULTIES such as these are not insurmountable, where mental courage, operating through patience, prudence, and principle, supply physical force, combat disappointment, and keep the untamed spirits superior to failure, and ever alive to hope” (873). Burney’s final description of Ellis’s strength of character does not support Rogers’s view of her as an example of “female incapacitation,” “helpless and dependent” (Frances Burney 141). Instead, Burney suggests that Ellis is capable of surviving the process by which her identity is challenged and remade by her experiences as a wanderer. The “female Robinson Crusoe” (873) image suggests two important gendered features of Ellis’s wandering, then. First, it implies what Rogers points out: Ellis is different from a male Robinson Crusoe, as she can be metaphorically shipwrecked while living within normal social, economic and political structures in ways that a male Robinson Crusoe could never be. Secondly, however, the image indicates that Ellis can only learn how capable she is of reconstructing her identity and claiming the autonomy of a Robinson Crusoe figure by allowing the political and social worlds to disappear.

Stripped of the social markers that have determined her identity, Ellis must reconstruct her sense of self before she can apply the lessons of her experience to her efforts to build a more sympathetic and socially responsible community as an alternative to the violent French Republic and oppressive British establishment. As “a being ... cast upon herself” (873), Ellis is reduced to the essentials, seeking only physical sustenance and self-
preservation from the threat of capture by the commissary’s agents. When she leaves Gabriella in Soho to fly to Salisbury, for example, she is overwhelmed by the danger of her situation, “too much self-occupied to remark the buildings, the neatness, the antiquities, or the singularities of the city” (656). Unable to observe and process her surroundings, Ellis cannot visit the Cathedral or other tourist attractions that “might have solaced the anxiety of the moment” because “discretion baffled curiosity, and fear took place of all desire of amusement” (661). Ellis escapes into the New Forest under a similar threat to her person, found in the newspaper advertisement the commissary’s agents place in order to trace her, and her “terrified eagerness ... made her enter the New Forest ... unmoved by its beauties .... Her steps had no guide but fear, which winged their flight” (674). Discovering the dangers of the Forest, including a set of sinister poachers, she feels that “[a]ll was lost to her for pleasure, all was thrown away upon her as enjoyment; she saw nothing but her danger, she could make no observation but how to escape what it menaced” (686). Ellis’s traumatised inability to appreciate her surroundings when faced with the pressure of immediate physical danger illustrates Burney’s maxim that “the basis of [man’s] social comfort is confidence” (711); Ellis cannot even begin to re-build a social world around herself until she confronts her basic physical needs, security and sustenance. Yet, this stripping away of unnecessary social cares allows Ellis to begin to reconstruct her subjectivity, which is threatened by the community that excludes and alienates her throughout the novel. Hidden in the obscurity of the New Forest, Ellis enjoys a brief moment of physical safety when she stops to rest: “Here, for the first time, she ceased to sigh for social intercourse: she had no void, no want; her mind was sufficient to itself; Nature, Reflection, and Heaven seemed her own!” (676). Such a stripping away of social needs so that Ellis has “no void, no want” allows her, for the first time, to fully recognise her individuality in her own thoughts, rather than understanding her identity in terms of its public manifestations, distinguishable through external signs. Ellis’s reflections, arising from her internal self as distinct from her social self, now become the foundation of her subjectivity; having been “cast upon herself” (873), she discovers that “her mind was sufficient to itself” (676).

Like the cliffs at Brighthelmstone, the New Forest, Wilton and Salisbury Plain, where Ellis finds herself wandering destitute, are sites invested with layers of political meaning.
deriving from the literary projects of the 1790s. Salisbury Plain, for example, became a

crucial “focusing image” for William Wordsworth’s “turbulent feelings … about the war

in France and the condition of England” (Gill 5, 3) in the revolutionary decade, an image

that he returned to throughout his career.\textsuperscript{95} Wordsworth’s first version of Salisbury Plain,
an expression of his “alienated radicalism” (Williams “Salisbury Plain” 172), stages a

sympathetic encounter between a solitary traveller and a female wanderer that indict the
disenfranchisement of the poor, and particularly the nationalist warmongering\textsuperscript{96} that
exploits the female wanderer’s family and leaves her destitute. Burney would not have

known Salisbury Plain, the first incarnation of which remained unpublished, but
Wordsworth’s poem “The Female Vagrant,” derived from a fragment of Salisbury Plain,
was included in Lyrical Ballads in 1798; thus, Wordsworth’s critique of the female
wanderer’s victimisation would have been available as a template for Burney, although
Wordsworth’s political mapping of Salisbury Plain would not have directly influenced
her depiction of Ellis’s wandering.

However, Wordsworth was not the only writer drawn to Salisbury Plain and the
surrounding area in the 1790s. Hannah More’s 1795 tract, The Shepherd of Salisbury
Plain, was widely distributed, well-known, and fraught with political content. While for
Wordsworth Salisbury Plain is the site of a struggle against social isolation and political
marginalisation, More uses it to “inoculate the poor against revolutionary discontent”
(Gilmartin “ ‘Study to be Quiet’” 498). Her Plain is populated by a religious, labouring
shepherd and his family, a benevolent clergyman and the charitable Mr Johnson, who
rewards the shepherd’s hard work by helping his family to set up a Sunday school. The
moral of the tract, that “a laborious life is a happy one” (4), illustrates More’s
counterrevolutionary vision for a community undisrupted by radical political thought or
economic discontent. Thelwall’s “Pedestrian Excursion,” conversely, draws on the
“democratic associations” of pedestrianism to highlight the “social labour and political
conflicts that … are part of the land’s meaning” (Scrivener “Jacobin Romanticism” 76,
77). Thelwall maps the neighbourhood of Salisbury with political and social questions

\textsuperscript{95} There are three distinct Salisbury Plain poems by Wordsworth: Salisbury Plain (1793-1794), Adventures
on Salisbury Plain (1795-1799) and Incidents upon Salisbury Plain (1841). See The Salisbury Plain Poems of William Wordsworth
edited by Stephen Gill for all three versions.

\textsuperscript{96} Although Wordsworth is critiquing Britain’s involvement in war with France, the female vagrant’s story
is set during the American War of Independence.
focusing on war’s effects on the manufacturers of Salisbury (8:966), the problems of child labour, “wretched” living conditions and the “misery” of the workhouse in the village of Quidhampton, near Wilton (8:967), the poverty of the agricultural labourers at Amesbury (9:229) and the political corruption represented by the rotten borough of Old Sarum (9:228). Ellis’s reduction to the necessities of survival and preliminary efforts to recoup her sense of self while she wanders through the New Forest and Salisbury prevent her from developing and expressing a concerted political worldview, as Thelwall and More do, while she is thus preoccupied. However, for Burney, Ellis’s destitution and social and geographical dislocation, like that of Wordsworth’s female vagrant, are central to the novel’s critique of institutional power.

Ellis’s loss and subsequent rebuilding of her identity against the backdrop of the overdetermined tourist sites of the New Forest, Wilton and Stonehenge is thus loaded with political meaning. Like Wordsworth, More and Thelwall, Burney uses these geographical locations to point to her own political position, especially her efforts to reconstruct a more open community for Ellis in light of Ellis’s experience of marginalisation. The process by which Ellis learns to recognise her subjectivity through her wanderings, as the social world absents itself from her situation, is most clearly articulated in her visits to Wilton and Stonehenge, after she is rescued from the commissary by her elderly friend Sir Jaspar Herrington. At Wilton, where the pair stops to look at the estate’s collection of art, Ellis assumes yet another disguise, pretending to be Sir Jaspar’s nursery-maid in order to account for her plain clothing. In posing as yet another person she is not, while absolutely in Sir Jaspar’s power, Ellis feels her loss of autonomy to be complete. In becoming so entirely dependent on her new protector and the social posture he pushes her to adopt, even as a private joke, Ellis feels her sense of her own subjectivity dissolve:

Not as Juliet she followed; Juliet whose soul was delightedly “awake to tender strokes of art,” whether in painting, music, or poetry; who never saw excellence without emotion; and whose skill and taste would have

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97 He writes, “Our intention was to have slept at the public house, which is the only tenement in the neighbourhood of this venerable borough; of the borough itself about half a cartload of stones, in two separate heaps, where the castle once stood, and the old spreading oak under which the representatives of these stones are chosen and returned to parliament, are all that remains” (9:228).
heightened her pleasure into rapture, her approbation into enthusiasm, in viewing the delicious assemblage of painting, statuary, antiques, natural curiosities, and artificial rarities, of Wilton;— not as Juliet, she followed; but as one to whom every thing was indifferent; whose discernment was gone, whose eyes were dimmed, whose powers of perception were asleep, and whose spirit of enjoyment was annihilated. (759-760)

The trauma to which Ellis is exposed by losing her public self appears in Burney’s language of absence and negation; Ellis is “not” Juliet Granville, and, in this final blow to her social identity, her mental resources, tastes, education and interior character are “gone,” “asleep,” “annihilated.” Ellis’s lack is made more poignant by the setting, a well-known, museum-like mansion with a famous, quantifiable collection. Silvia Mergenthal argues that “Wilton can be seen as providing an excess of signs ... which temporarily deprives Juliet of her subjecthood” (128). Against the backdrop of this cluttered collection of “painting, statuary, antiques, natural curiosities, and artificial rarities” (759), the proliferation of Ellis’s identity markers throughout the novel finally renders her an overdetermined cipher that comes to stand for nothing.98

At Stonehenge, however, Ellis learns to recoup her private self by recognising that value does not always exist in the public naming of something. Unlike Wilton, Stonehenge is a space “apparently devoid of signs” (Mergenthal 128), or at least a place in which the signs are unreadable, “The ruins and fragments of a lost vision [which] parallel the fragmentation that Juliet herself has undergone” (Epstein The Iron Pen 180). It is thus a fitting place for Ellis’s attempt to reconnect with her subjectivity before the novel’s conclusion at Teignmouth. Doody notes that Stonehenge is a centre of Romantic preoccupation, arguing that “[t]he tendency of many Romantic narratives of the Regency period is to draw the reader through a narrative which at some point breaks its own

98 Ellis’s inability to process the excess of signs at Wilton can be contrasted with the sophisticated political and historical reflections the collection provokes in Thelwall. Although in his “Pedestrian Excursion” Thelwall also remarks on the “chaos of indistinct impressions” the collection produces (9:17), unlike Ellis he is capable of drawing political conclusions from these “impressions.” For example, a likeness of Brutus causes him to reflect, “Perhaps we wrong the holy name of liberty, when we rank among its champions the conspirators who assassinated Caesar. It is not by crimes that the virtue of a country is to be restored. It is not by executing even a tyrant unheard and unarraigned, that liberty and justice are to be promoted” (9:18). Ellis’s political disempowerment is clear in contrast with Thelwall’s thoughtful and articulate narrative of his encounter with Wilton.
framework and questions its own structure by an encounter with ruin” (Frances Burney 364); however, in The Wanderer, the questions Stonehenge raises are directed not at the aesthetic framework of Burney’s novel, but at the British community that continually refuses to recognise Ellis in the absence of any external ratification of her identity. Ellis recognises herself in Stonehenge, establishing sympathy with the space without naming it:

she was struck by the appearance of a wide ditch between a circular double bank; and perceived that she was approaching the scattered remains of some ancient building, vast, irregular, strange, and in ruin.

Excited by sympathy in what seemed lonely and undone ... she arrived at a stupendous assemblage of enormous stones ....

In a state of mind so utterly deplorable as that of Juliet, this grand, uncouth monument of ancient days had a certain sad, indefinable attraction, more congenial to her distress, than all the polish, taste, and delicacy of modern skill .... Thought, uninterrupted and uncontrouled, was master of the mind. (765-766)

Ellis takes Stonehenge for what it is, “the scattered remains of some ancient building,” or “a stupendous assemblage of enormous stones,” rather than imposing an identity on it by speaking its public name. In recognising its characteristics and its emotional effects on herself, “a certain sad, indefinable attraction” and “sympathy in what seemed lonely and undone,” Ellis learns that the structure has a meaning outside of its public name, an emotional, subjective meaning which she then uses to restore her own sense of interiority, as she allows her “[t]hought” to become “master of the mind.” Although Sir Jaspar intervenes to act as a “nomenclator,”99 reinstating the authority of public knowledge by telling Ellis “you ramble now within the holy precincts of that rude wonder of other days, and disgrace of modern geometry, Stonehenge” (766), Stonehenge symbolises, as Doody suggests, “the momentary death of law, culture, names” (Introduction xxxvi). In identifying with a nameless but thought-provoking wonder, Ellis finally rediscovers her own capacity to think and feel, the subjectivity that has been threatened by the abdication of public identity inseparable from her flight.

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99 This is Burney’s term for Sir Jaspar, but Mergenthal also uses it to describe his role in this scene (128).
Ellis’s geographical movement facilitates her extension of sympathy to the socially and economically homeless, including the disenfranchised within Britain and those emigrants, like Gabriella, who have been displaced by the Revolution. This suggests that old-regime British institutions and the French revolutionary state share the violent, exclusionary tactics that marginalise whole groups of people, especially, Ellis’s experience indicates, women. As a wanderer, Ellis learns to move outside of the paranoid, prejudiced, insular British community and to develop a kind of cross-class, transnational compassion. Her marginalisation, however, exacerbates the stripping of public identity that first appears in Ellis’s nameless, disguised condition and therefore prevents her from developing and expressing a coherent political worldview, as Burney’s Romantic contemporaries Smith, Thelwall and More do as they politically map Britain’s geographical spaces. Nonetheless, by placing Ellis within the settings mapped by the contests of the 1790s, Burney situates her novel within this political dialogue centring on British geography. In fact, Ellis’s very inability to articulate a politics of wandering is Burney’s message; as in Wordsworth’s Salisbury Plain, the wanderer’s abjection speaks to the consequences of her social, political and economic disenfranchisement. Ellis finally begins to reconstruct her fractured subjectivity independently of the socially ratified identities that have limited her throughout the novel. Having rediscovered herself as a thoughtful, autonomous individual at Stonehenge, Ellis is prepared for the task of reconstructing her family and, by extension, her community, at Teignmouth.

“Documents, Certificates”: The Political Family Romance and Ellis’s Reconfigured Community

The restoration of Ellis’s social status and legitimacy can ultimately only come from a public reconciliation with her family, and it is thus as a political family romance that Burney’s plot offers its conclusion. The family romance, however, is also the means by which Burney further dramatises and complicates her already ambivalent political position. Although the tyranny of the Terror and the French commissary set the plot in motion, Burney is more concerned throughout the novel with the prejudice, insularity and abusive authority Ellis encounters after crossing the Channel into Britain. Her political family romance, therefore, represents a typically revolutionary indictment of patriarchy.
by portraying inadequate and authoritarian father figures. However, it also fails to offer the kind of optimistic faith in either heterosexual romance or fraternity that could symbolise confidence in a reformed order: the evils of old-regime, patriarchal power are simply replaced by the evils of other, newer kinds of extensive, unlimited authority in her domestic configurations, much as the Terror repeats and intensifies the old regime’s abuses.

When threatened by the sexual advances of men on the road to the New Forest, Ellis asks herself, “is it only under the domestic roof,— that roof to me denied!— that woman can know safety, respect, and honour?” (666). Ellis’s geographical and social wanderings can only cease when she is reinstated under the Granvilles’ “domestic roof,” recognised and publicly protected by her aristocratic family: the family, as the basic social unit in old-regime Britain, can confirm and legitimise Ellis’s right to belong to the national community. As the novel’s concluding words suggest, it is only “with the acknowledgement of her name, and her family” that “the DIFFICULTIES of the WANDERER” can end (873). Her public naming and new status within the family restore Ellis to her social self, as the Honourable Juliet Granville. Burney summarises Ellis’s domestic position late in the novel, revealing how her social and economic situation depends on her exclusion from the Granvilles and her ambiguous marital status after her forced marriage:

Entitled to an ample fortune, yet pennyless; indebted for her sole preservation from insult and from famine, to pecuniary obligations from accidental acquaintances, and those acquaintances, men! pursued, with documents of legal right, by one whom she shuddered to behold, and to whom she was so irreligiously tied, that she could not, even if she wished it, regard herself as his lawful wife; though so entangled, that her fetters seemed to be linked with duty and honour; unacknowledged,— perhaps disowned by her family; and, though born to a noble and yet untouched fortune, consigned to disguise, to debt, to indigence, and to flight! (816)

Burney contrasts Ellis’s “[e]ntitle[ments]” and “fortune” to her “disowned” status, and shows how the Granvilles’ abandonment of her causes her to come under the power of the men who support her, including Harleigh and Sir Jaspar, as well as those who abuse
their power, like the commissary. Burney further contrasts the commissary’s use of “documents of legal right,” “entangling” and “fettering” Ellis to an unwanted marriage, with her lack of documentation to legitimise herself after the Revolution destroys the codicil to her father’s will and her biological family abdicates the legal and domestic ties that should bind her to them. “[U]nacknowledged” by the family that has neglected her from her birth, the only home Ellis can hope for in her future, it seems, is the prison offered to her as the “lawful wife” of her enemy. The very affective, domestic ties Ellis seeks to build with her family transform during the Revolution into the “fetters” with which she is “so irreligiously tied” against her will to the commissary.

Ellis’s inability to legitimise herself as a member of her father’s family arises from the combined incompetence and authoritarianism of the various father figures that emerge to guide and control her throughout the novel. Doody summarises the position Ellis finds herself in with respect to the novel’s patriarchs:

In the background there is one weak absconding father, Lord Granville, who ... never acknowledges his daughter, and one villainous father, the rejecting and blackmailing Lord Denmeath. The valued Father is the pious but passive bishop, always invisible in the course of the narrative; he represents something that has to be saved and protected, not something that can protect and save. (Frances Burney 323)

Father figures like Lord Granville and the Bishop represent what Kristina Straub describes as the “male impotence” that creates a “power vacuum” in the novel (210). Granville fails to recognise his daughter before his death, and the Bishop cannot prove her identity to her family’s sceptical patriarchs, and, more importantly, is the direct cause of Ellis’s forced marriage and flight, which she undertakes to save him from the guillotine. Harleigh excuses Granville for causing Ellis’s exile and leaving her vulnerable, arguing that “when my Lord Granville trusted his daughter to a foreign country, his own premature death was not less foreseen, than the political event in which her property and safety, in common with those of the natives, were involved” (869). However, other characters recognise that Ellis is the victim of her father’s irresolute character. The Bishop states, for example, that
An irresistible, or rather, an unresisted disposition to procrastinate whatever was painful ... was the origin and cause of [Ellis’s foreign upbringing] .... Lord Granville always persuaded himself that the morrow would offer opportunity, or inspire courage, for a confession of his marriage that the day never presented, nor excited; and to avow his daughter while that was concealed, would have been a disgrace indelible to his deserving departed lady. This from year to year, kept Miss Granville abroad. With the most exalted sentiments, the nicest honour, and the quickest feelings, my noble, however irresolute friend, had an unfortunate indecision of character, that made him waste in weighing what should be done, the time and occasion of action. (869)

Granville’s inability to courageously avow his marriage and Ellis’s birth to his own father, Lord Melbury, compromises his capacity to function as Ellis’s father. Furthermore, his failure to acknowledge his marriage to Juliet Powel also exacerbates Ellis’s motherless condition; Juliet Powel is absent because of her early death, but her membership to the Granville family has also been denied, leaving her place in Ellis’s family a blank that can never be filled. The erasure of Ellis’s mother is thus a direct result of her father’s absence and his failure to recognise the mother’s place in the patriarchal family.

The Bishop and Admiral Powel, Ellis’s guardian and maternal uncle, cannot fill Granville’s absent place because they possess similar weaknesses and inadequacies. Despite the Bishop’s efforts to assert Ellis’s rights to her grandfather and Lord Denmeath, it is Ellis who must ultimately protect the Bishop and save him from the guillotine by submitting to the forced marriage that sets the plot of Ellis’s exile, dispossession and indigence in motion. In Doody’s words, “Burney shows why we cannot believe that the system of male patronage and protection actually works justly and fairly for women. In fact, in order to save ... [the Bishop] from the guillotine, ‘Ellis’ in France has had in effect

100 This highlights Granville’s resemblance to Evelina’s father Sir John Belmont, who refuses to acknowledge his daughter because he denies that he ever married her mother, Caroline Evelyn. Analyses of Burney’s use of family romance, such as Susan C. Greenfield’s chapter in *Mothering Daughters: Novels and the Politics of Family Romance: Frances Burney to Jane Austen* and Irene Fizer’s “The Name of the Daughter: Identity and Incest in *Evelina*,” tend to emphasise the role separation from her mother plays in Evelina’s experience as well as Belmont’s simultaneous victimisation of mother and daughter.
to prostitute herself” (Introduction xxi). The Revolution that disempowers patriarchal figures like the Bishop renders him helpless to aid or advise Ellis in her flight. While Admiral Powel does succeed in providing the documentation that unequivocally asserts Ellis’s identity as Juliet Granville, his copy of the codicil to Lord Granville’s will (839-840), he demonstrates intense and sustained anti-French and antifeminist sentiment, speaking of the French as his “native enemies” (854) and misunderstanding Ellis’s situation when he condemns both her marriage to the commissary and her flight from his power:

How came you here without your husband? For all I have no great goust\(^{101}\) to your marrying in that sort, God forbid I should uphold a wife in running away from her lawful spouse, even though he be a Frenchman! We should always do right, for the sake of shaming wrong. A man, being the higher vessel, may marry all over the globe, and take his wife to his home; but a woman, as she is only given him for his help-mate, must tack about after him, and come to the same anchorage. (842)

Although the Admiral’s chauvinism relents in a minor way near the novel’s conclusion, when he befriends the Bishop, his combination of patriotism and paternalism is troubling, given the evidence of Ellis’s mistreatment by the British community and Burney’s indictment of the ineffectual “system of male patronage and protection” (Doody Introduction xxi) that fails Ellis throughout the novel.\(^{102}\) His willingness to hand her over to the commissary further challenges his competence as Ellis’s supposed protector in a patriarchal social structure.

Ellis’s lack of guidance and support from Lord Granville, the Bishop and Admiral Powel pales next to her victimisation at the hands of Lord Denmeath, the guardian and maternal uncle of her half-siblings, Lord Melbury and Lady Aurora. Her other father figures facilitate or fail to prevent her exploitation by the commissary, but Lord Denmeath deliberately collaborates with him in order to keep Ellis from the inheritance

\(^{101}\) Burney seems to be using an earlier form of the French “goût” here, which appears in some of the Oxford English Dictionary’s citations for that word. This suggests that Burney ironically has Admiral Powel use the French language while expressing his anti-French sentiment.

\(^{102}\) Admiral Powel is also reminiscent of Evelina’s patriotic and misogynist sea-officer, Captain Mirvan; although Admiral Powel is harmless and charitable, as opposed to the violent Captain Mirvan, who is especially aggressive toward Evelina’s grandmother Madame Duval, the two characters use very similar chauvinistic language.
he wishes to allocate to his own niece and nephew. Ellis recognises that the commissary’s plans “were precisely in unison with the plan of his lordship, for making me an alien to my country” (752), and fears that Denmeath will succeed in sending her back to France, delivering her to her persecutor and cutting off her ties to her siblings, which heightens her sense of marginalisation and mobilises her continual flight. Under Denmeath’s threat, articulated by his relative and agent Mrs Howel, that she will be forced to return to revolutionary France, Ellis states, “I feel myself, though in my native country, like a helpless foreigner; unknown, unprotected” (214). The novel’s strongest father figure, then, exerts his authority in order to exclude Ellis, rendering her a social and economic exile, as well as an exile to her own family. Fear of Denmeath’s power prevents Ellis from appealing to Melbury and Aurora (757-758), thereby ensuring she continues as an outsider to the Granvilles. Denmeath’s exercise of his unlimited patriarchal authority also contributes to her sense of entrapment within her own disempowered place in a stifling social hierarchy. When he arrives at Mrs Ireton’s home to threaten Ellis with a return to France, Ellis is enclosed behind a screen in Mrs Ireton’s drawing-room by her employer’s mischievous son (612-613), symbolising Denmeath’s power to confine and paralyse her: “Her heart now beat so violently with terror, that her shaking hand could scarcely grasp a leaf of the screen, as she tried to make an opening for letting herself out” (612). The violence of Denmeath’s threat to return Ellis to the commissary translates into an overwhelming fear that overcomes and incapacitates Ellis’s physical person.

Lord Denmeath, moreover, employs agents to continue his programme of simultaneously excluding and imprisoning Ellis, showing how British elite society is willing to go along with his exertion of unlimited patriarchal power. As Denmeath’s agent, Mrs Howel becomes one of Ellis’s most brutal persecutors, without knowing Denmeath’s reasons for wishing to return her to France. Suspicious of her friendship with Aurora and Melbury during an outing to Arundel Castle, Mrs Howel detains and confines Ellis as an “adventurer” (565, 570), an “imposter” (571) and a spy, vaguely threatening her with “detection and punishment” (571) should she not return, passively, to Mrs Ireton’s service and stop all communication with the young Granvilles:

Mrs. Howel ... magisterially moved to the door; whence she took the key ...; but Juliet, struck with horror at such a preparation for confinement,
started up, exclaiming, “If you reduce me, Madam to cry for help, I must cast myself at once upon the protection of Lord Melbury;— and then assure yourself,— be very sure! he will not suffer this outrage!”

“This affrontery exceeds all credibility! Assure yourself, however, young woman, and be very sure, in return! that I shall not be intimidated by an imposter, from detecting imposition; nor from consigning it to infamy!”

With a scoffing smile of power, she then left the room, locking the door without. (570-571)
The ease with which Mrs Howell “magisterially” assumes authority over Ellis, who is in no way legally subject to her, to “reduce” her to the status of a criminal and perpetrate the “outrage” of confining her without cause, testifies to her confidence in her privilege as a member of the social elite to assert her power, and the power with which she is endowed as Denmeath’s representative, in any way she desires against her fellow citizens. Ellis concedes to Mrs Howel’s demand that she return to Mrs Ireton’s employment and suffers the additional threat that she “will be properly watched” (571), a statement that confirms Mrs Howel’s continued effort to exercise authority over Ellis. In fact, Mrs Howel persists in claiming Ellis’s subjection to her power up until the moment Aurora and Melbury recognise her as their sister. At Teignmouth, she continues to force exile upon Ellis, urging her to return to France, which she calls her “home” (806), and referring to her as an “imposter” (812) once more, in addition to subjecting Ellis to “public shame” (813) by accusing her of theft and sending for a peace-officer to inspect her bag for stolen articles (802-808). Mrs Howel, then, as Denmeath’s instrument, illustrates most clearly the power of traditional, patriarchal authority to humiliate, accuse, and mobilise the institutions of the law against those exploited by its rule.

If Burney uses the political family romance to indict both ineffectual and abusive patriarchal power, however, she also critiques the emergent, radical family romances that re-envision political society through images of heterosexual marriage and fraternity. Marriage is absolutely not, in The Wanderer, an escape from the patriarchal power of the father; the commissary’s brutal violence toward Ellis and her beloved Bishop, combined with his unlimited legal power over her, reveals The Wanderer to be, in Mark
Schoenfield’s words, “an anti-marriage novel, its narrative propelled by a secret, coercive marriage that overshadows the heroine Juliet’s struggles” (67). Moreover, Ellis’s forced marriage to the commissary is the key obstacle that keeps her from confiding in and attaching herself to her lover Harleigh, thereby functioning as a barrier to romantic love: as Straub claims, “marriage (ironically) alienates the hero from the heroine,” drawing attention to the failings of marriage as an institution (178). The family romance that envisions society as a marriage contract had been identifiable as radical since the 1790s, in representations of the family like Helen Maria Williams’s narrative of the victory of the younger du F—s’ romantic love over the abusive power of the family patriarch. 103 Burney draws on and revises this radical tradition by explicitly associating the figure of the abusive husband with revolutionary politics, thus critiquing the Revolution by extension. As a stand-in for the Revolution in general, and Robespierre in particular, the commissary is built around stereotypes of Jacobin violence; Deborah Kennedy writes that, “[f]ollowing conventional portraits of Jacobins from Burke onward, Burney makes the Commissary into a monstrous force of masculine aggression” (12).

By staging revolutionary violence in Ellis’s forced marriage to such a figure of “masculine aggression,” Burney voices her antirevolutionary stance, like her anti-patriarchal message, through her representations of the domestic. She uses the commissary, for example, to access tropes of antirevolutionary fiction, like the standard guillotine scene, which Ellis recounts to Sir Jaspar:

A scaffolding,— a guillotine,— an executioner,— were immediately opposite me! and in the hand of that hardened executioner, was held up to the view of the senseless multitude, the ghastly, bleeding head of a victim that moment offered up at the shrine of unmeaning though ferocious cruelty! Four other destined victims, kneeling and devoutly at prayers, their hands tied behind them, and their heads bald, were prepared for sacrifice; and amidst them, eminently conspicuous, from his dignified mien, and pious calmness, I distinguished my revered guardian! ... Oh moment of horror exceeding all description! I cast myself, nearly frantic, at the feet of the commissary; I embraced his knees, as if with the fervour

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103 See my discussion of *Letters Written in France* in Chapter 2.
of affection; wildly and passionately I conjured him to accept my hand and fortune, and save the Bishop!— He laughed aloud with triumphant derision; but gave an immediate order to postpone the execution of the priest. I blest him,— yes, with all his crimes upon his head!— and even again I should bless him, to save a life so precious! (743)

The “ferocious cruelty” of revolutionary justice, assessed negatively in Burney’s description of the guillotine as an “unmeaning” “shrine,” or a mechanism that usurps the cultural authority of religion while emptying itself of any moral content, contrasts with Ellis’s sense of the guillotine victims’ “devout[ness],” especially the Bishop’s “pious calmness,” and Ellis’s own passionate emotional ties to her surrogate father, which lead her even to “bless” her blackmailer for his apparent act of mercy. By staging Ellis’s moment of capitulation to the commissary at the instant of her traumatic confrontation with revolutionary justice, Burney demonstrates how institutions of public violence extend into the domestic sphere, as Ellis, the forced bride of her persecutor, is potentially subjected to the private, sexual violence that being the wife of an abusive criminal like the commissary could entail. Her forced marriage, therefore, stands in psychologically for the deferred moment of execution: she describes the location of her marriage as a “place ... of execution” (745), and refers to the prospect of leaving Aurora to return to the commissary as “a separation a thousand times more dreadful than any death!” (849). The “theatre” of Ellis’s wedding, farcically characterised as “a mockery of which the grossest of buffoons would have been ashamed” (745), likewise points to the theatre of revolutionary justice as a sham: although Ellis never “pronounce[s] an assenting syllable” (745), her marriage is considered legal, a travesty of revolutionary law and its implementation. Fittingly, Ellis is finally released from the marriage by the commissary’s execution; as with the death of Hamilton’s villain, Vallaton, the commissary’s death by the guillotine, the mechanism of his own power, encodes the Revolution’s self-implosion.

It is not only the power exercised by the commissary in the revolutionary state, however, that Burney exposes through her representation of the sham marriage, but the authority with which husbands are endowed in marriage generally. Like Evelina Anville, Ellis is legally barred from her birth family, but Ellis is additionally disqualified from the “moment of putative autonomy” Mary Poovey sees in Evelina’s exercise of choice in her
courtship with Lord Orville (“Fathers and Daughters” 39) by having her ability to choose a marriage partner terminated before her courtship with Harleigh even begins. The commissary, more importantly, exercises the control over Ellis’s physical person and public identity that is the husband’s legal right, exposing her to the humiliation of being advertised for in a London newspaper, for example. The advertisement reads,

ELOPED from her HUSBAND,

A young woman, tall, fair, blue-eyed; her nose Grecian; her mouth small; her cheeks high coloured; her chin dimpled; and her hair of a glossy light brown.

She goes commonly by the name of Miss Ellis.

Whoever will send an account where she may be met with, or where she has been seen, to *** Attorney, in *** Street London, shall receive a very handsome reward. (756)

In addition to causing Ellis “indigna[tion]” (663) at such public embarrassment and lending credibility to the assumption that she should be pursued as “a young female-swindler” (673), the advertisement asserts the commissary’s right of possession over Ellis: it criminalises her emigration as an illegal “ELOPE[ment]” and exercises his sense of ownership over her body through an itemised catalogue of her physical features. His offer of a “handsome reward,” moreover, confirms Ellis’s status as the commissary’s property, while his reference to “the name of Miss Ellis” asserts his control over her public identity by revealing his capacity to know and use the name she has chosen in repudiation of his claim to her, while alerting the public to her name’s function as an element of an extra-legal disguise.

The absolute authority established by a man’s legal possession of a woman, including his right to dispossess her, as Lord Granville does through his own weakness, or to claim and humiliate her, as the commissary does, motivates The Wanderer’s plot and Burney’s critique of gender relations. Even Ellis’s happy ending, her marriage to Harleigh, is fraught by the dynamics of masculine power Burney delineates throughout the novel. Straub notes that Burney’s plot only gives Ellis access to a companionate marriage after exposing her to the abuses of power that characterise husbands and fathers in the novel, writing that “in the working out of the very plot that finally embeds female happiness in
the ideology of romantic love, women are economically debased, socially humiliated, and psychologically maimed” (185). Although Harleigh is no Denmeath or commissary, the transfer of authority over Ellis’s person to him at the end of the novel shows how Ellis’s companionate marriage, instead of providing an escape from masculine power, serves to reinstate her within the hierarchy of the patriarchal family. As Maria Jerinic notes, “It is only once the Granvilles acknowledge her relation to them, and Juliet falls back into her proper and accepted place within the English patriarchal family structure, that Juliet’s marriage with Harleigh is possible” (77), indicating that Harleigh’s possession of Ellis at the end of the novel is endowed with the full legality of the transfer of the bride from the father’s family to the husband’s family that the commissary’s sham wedding lacks.

Ellis’s happy ending is further problematised by Harleigh’s combination of the weakness and passivity possessed by Granville and the desire to assert his own authority that leads, for Denmeath and the commissary, to the abuse of power. As a sentimental hero, Doody argues, Harleigh is “the least capable of emotional action” of all of Burney’s passive male characters (Introduction xxiv); in fact, Harleigh’s name marks him as the kind of paralysed hero of novels of sensibility found in Henry Mackenzie’s Harley, in The Man of Feeling, or Mary Hays’s Augustus Harley, of Memoirs of Emma Courtney, from whom he is literarily descended.104 Kevin Jordan argues in “Men of Feeling: From Alexandre d’Arblay’s Strength to Albert Harleigh’s Weakness” that Burney’s heroes constitute a revision of masculinity calculated to suit new expectations for companionate marriage (76) and are “unfairly judged against the standard of powerful patriarchs” (82). However, Harleigh’s passivity highlights his complicity with the masculine authority that the commissary and others use to exploit Ellis. In debate with the radical Elinor, Harleigh only tentatively asserts his politically moderate views, expressing his meliorism through the quasi-fearful statement that “[u]nbridled liberty ... cannot rush upon a state, without letting it loose to barbarism. Nothing, without danger, is suddenly unshackled: safety demands control from the baby to the despot” (18). His reliance on the anxious political principle of “safety” against Elinor recognises neither, on the one hand, the truth behind Elinor’s radical claims about female inequality, nor, on the other, the violent atrocities

104 See Doody’s discussion of Harleigh and his predecessors as Men of Feeling in her introduction to the Oxford edition (xxv-xxiv).
that Ellis is subjected to as the Revolution’s victim. Harleigh’s half-hearted commitment to “safety” appears further when he is unable to facilitate Ellis’s escape from the commissary. Intervening to help Ellis by asking the commissary “by what right do you act[?]” (727), he finds himself “suspended” (728) when the commissary replies “Ne suis-je pas son mari?” (727), an assertion to which Ellis responds by remaining “utterly silent” (728). Despite Ellis’s “mute[ness]” (728), Harleigh also accepts the legality of the commissary’s marital claim over her when he refers to Denmeath’s sanction of the marriage and promise of support from Ellis’s young half-brother, Lord Melbury (729).

When Ellis again refuses to speak to contradict the commissary and cast herself under Harleigh’s protection, he takes her silence for a recognition of the marriage, crying, “Speak, Madam, speak! Utter but a syllable!— Deign only to turn towards me!— Pronounce but with your eyes that he has no legal claim, and I will instantly secure your liberty,— even from myself!— even from all mankind!— Speak!— turn!— look but a moment this way!— One word! one single word!—” (729). Harleigh thereby replicates the travesty of justice that the forced marriage carries out, interpreting Ellis’s silence as consent, just as the revolutionary state does during the wedding ceremony (745).

Withdrawing his support for Ellis’s flight, Harleigh becomes a passive observer as the commissary prepares to take her away (730-733), leaving her elderly admirer, Sir Jaspar Herrington, to aid her in her escape (735-736).

Harleigh’s acceptance of the authority Denmeath and the commissary possess over Ellis aligns him with the exercise of patriarchal power, and he, moreover, asserts his own claim to act with masculine authority over Ellis throughout their courtship. He exercises his right to advise Ellis, attempting, for example, to prevent her “enter[ing] into a career of public life” (337) when she agrees to perform in Miss Arbe’s concert in order to support herself, with a view of her future entry into his own family as his wife (339). Such questioning of Ellis’s choices undermines her autonomy and constructs Harleigh as the voice of patriarchal social norms; as Doody states, “Harleigh is there to enforce the proprieties, to remind the heroine of ladylike standards which she cannot honourably maintain” (Introduction xxiii). Harleigh’s use of his perceived right to question and advise Ellis as her lover and future husband, more importantly, mirrors the social and sexual exploitation Ellis receives from her persecutors in the Brighthelmstone
community. Like the imperious and nosy women who require to know who Ellis really is, Harleigh demands disclosure throughout the novel, as his climactic cry, “Speak, Madam, speak!” (729), on the discovery of Ellis’s marriage illustrates Suzie Park’s comment that “Harleigh gives his money and advice freely, but more and more expects in return that the wanderer confide in him” (310) suggests the commodified aspect of their romantic relationship: Harleigh acts as though his charity toward Ellis grants him special emotional rights over her, legitimising her fear of accepting financial help from men and replicating the correspondence between the economic system and Ellis’s sexual victimisation that appears early in the novel when Sir Lyell Sycamore pursues Ellis at the milliner’s shop.

Harleigh also demonstrates a willingness to commit sexual violence against Ellis that undermines his status as a companionate husband. His curiosity about Ellis’s history, for example, translates into violence directed against her silence when he learns she is not sexually available to him:

The violence of his agitation, while he concluded her to be wrongfully claimed, was transformed into the blackest and most indignant despondence .... The dreadful mystery, more direful than it had been depicted, even by the most cruel of his apprehensions, was now revealed: she is married! ... indisputably married! and can never, never,— even in my wishes, now, be mine!

A sudden sensation, kindred even to hatred, took possession of his feelings. Altered she appeared to him, and delusive. (730)

In fact, Burney hints at the possibility of sexual violence like this from Harleigh earlier in the novel, showing his affinity to Ellis’s other potential seducers and rapists, Ireton, Sycamore, Melbury and the commissary, who repeatedly trap, abduct and detain her against her will. Feeling himself urged by her use of the money he has charitably given for her maintenance to press his declarations of love on her, he stops a door with his foot and detains her in a room alone with him. He only releases Ellis when a sound from outside the room reminds him of his improper conduct (595-596). Ellis’s recognition of his power to seduce her despite her quasi-legal status as a married woman heightens her sense of his danger: she describes him as “the most fatal of my enemies!” (598) and asks him, “Would you make me hate ... [m]yself ...[?]” (619). These affinities between
Harleigh and the novel’s patriarchs and libertines challenge Ellis’s happy ending as his wife, questioning, by extension, the assumption that companionate marriage can break from the abuses of old-regime, patriarchal configurations of the family.

Burney also presents a challenge to the fraternal revolutionary family romance through her presentation of Ellis’s relationship with her half-brother, Lord Melbury, and her inability to establish a sororal community of women that could provide an alternative to the models of patriarchy, fraternity, and heterosexual romance that subject women socially through their subordination within the family. Lynn Hunt’s book *The Family Romance of the French Revolution* demonstrates how imagined configurations of the family could underlie the political order of revolutionary France, especially focusing on how French literature and culture of the period conceived of “replacing” the model of the patriarchal family, which supported the exercise of absolute political power on the part of father figures, like the King, with a new family “in which the parents were effaced and the children, especially the brothers, acted autonomously” (xiv). Fraternity, therefore, stood in for political enfranchisement and liberty. The fraternal family, Hunt argues, was thought of as more open and inclusive than the patriarchal family it replaced: “In the early years of the Revolution, fraternity had a large and confident meaning because almost everyone could be imagined as participating in the community” (12). Burney plays with the idea of constructing a new family for Ellis on such open, fraternal principles by allowing her brother Melbury to combine with Harleigh, her companionate husband, in order to subvert the authority of Denmeath, the absolutist father figure, and the commissary, the figure of revolutionary excess and masculine tyranny, at the end of the novel (847-853). Yet, Burney also confronts what she sees as the possible danger of reconstructing the family and the community on the model of fraternity. According to Hunt, “During the radical years, 1792-94, *fraternity* was used more often in a narrow and fearful sense; fraternity defined a kind of ‘us’ and ‘them’ of revolutionary politics, especially on the popular level .... The slogan ‘fraternity or death’ seemed to capture this sentiment in dramatic fashion” (13). Although by the end of the novel, Melbury is willing to accept Ellis into the Granville family and grant her her rightful inheritance, earlier in *The Wanderer* he attempts to seduce Ellis incestuously, signifying the potential for disarray in a family where parents are absent and biological relationships unknown, and
illustrating the willingness of brother figures, like the revolutionaries of the Terror, to victimise individuals outside of their fraternal circle and under their power.

The potential fraternal incest underlying Melbury’s sexual proposals to Ellis, whom he does not yet know to be his sister, arises from Ellis’s position as a socially unknown entity. In the eighteenth-century novel, Hunt observes, “incest always depends on uncertainty about lineage and especially about paternity” (35). Such uncertainty appears in Burney’s work as early as *Evelina*,\(^{105}\) when Evelina’s illegitimate half-brother Macartney wounds his own father, Sir John Belmont, over his planned elopement with the young woman Belmont thinks is his daughter, but who is really the imposter Polly Green. In *Evelina*, the threat of incest arises from what Jones De Ritter calls “masculine misconduct” (229), or Belmont’s faults in failing to recognise his children.\(^{106}\) Granville, likewise, fails to integrate Ellis into his family during his lifetime, making another episode of what De Ritter terms “unwitting incest” (225) possible when Melbury is unable to identify Ellis as his sister. The threat of fraternal incest in *The Wanderer* is in part an exploration of what Hunt describes as “the consequences of a world without fathers” (36), the result of an encounter between siblings who cannot recognise each other. The father figure’s symbolic weakness or absence, therefore, combined with the Revolution that further erases Ellis’s legal belonging to her own family, leads to a fraternal community that, as a consequence of rejecting the father’s authority, is no longer able to trace its own biological lineage because of the completeness of its break with the past.

Ellis, however, is not only Granville’s unrecognised daughter, but an entirely unknown and thus completely vulnerable woman at the mercy of figures like Melbury, who is invested with the power of interpreting and defining her public position. As Doody notes, “Fraternal incest ... is one mode of breaking into society’s version of the use of women” (*Frances Burney* 329): the brother, a figure who should, in a fraternal

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\(^{105}\) In *Frances Burney: The Life in the Works*, Doody discusses at length the evidence that an incestuous relationship existed in Burney’s own family, between her elder brother James and half-sister Sarah, who “eloped” together in 1798 (277) and cohabited for almost five years (277-282). This liaison, of course, dates from twenty years after the publication of *Evelina*, in which Burney first fictionalised the possibility of fraternal incest.

\(^{106}\) Belmont is, thus, punished by the novel’s ending: *Evelina* concludes with “The vision of all these married brothers and sisters [Evelina and Lord Orville, Macartney and Polly Green] socializing happily at Evelina’s childhood home while the patriarch [Belmont] contemplates *his* guilt elsewhere” (De Ritter 231).
society, stand in solidarity with his sister, becomes her exploiter. It is only when Mrs Howel discovers that Ellis is unknown to Mrs Maple, and thus lacks the status that had been attributed to her, that Melbury detains Ellis alone in a parlour, preventing her escape with “determined opposition” (139) and causing Ellis greater distress than any of her other sexual pursuers: “Ellis now turned pale and cold: horour thrilled through her veins, and almost made her heart cease to beat” (139). She later responds to Harleigh’s question of whether Melbury could be romantically attached to her by crying “Heaven forbid!” (618). Ellis is, of course, aware that Melbury is her half-brother, and her response is thus the result of her fear of breaking the incest taboo; however, her air of “reproach” (140) when she refuses his offers also derives from a sense that he has betrayed the principles of fraternity owed to her as a friend of his sister, Lady Aurora, by endeavouring to declass her through his humiliating offer of an extramarital liaison, excluding her even more forcefully from the community she should belong to. His proposal, marking Ellis as an outsider to his community, replicates the “‘us’ and ‘them’” dynamic of the fraternal exercise of power that, according to Hunt, operated during the Terror (13). Ellis’s appeal to Aurora’s goodness, when she asks “is it, then ... from a brother of the pure, the exemplary Lady Aurora Granville, that I am destined to receive the most heart-rending insult of my life?” (140), then, attempts to recall Melbury to the principles of fraternal justice and inclusiveness from which he has departed by endeavouring to exploit Ellis as a disempowered, marginal figure.

Burney seems to suggest that Ellis’s sense of sororal community with her adoptive sister Gabriella and newly discovered half-sister Aurora could provide an alternative to patriarchal and fraternal models of the family. Doody proposes that the risk of incest created by Melbury directs Ellis away from her male relatives and closer to her sister figures, arguing that “[t]he male relative poses a kind of threat, expressed as the sexual threat, whereas the sisterhood is free of all base designs” (Introduction xxii-xxiii). Ellis does experience the kind of sympathy with Gabriella and Aurora that is absent from her other relationships. Her relationship with Gabriella is truly selfless: when they recognise each other at the seaside grave of Gabriella’s child, for example, “neither of them seemed to have any sensation left of self, from excess of solicitude for the other” (387). Aurora, likewise, takes Ellis on trust, before she is identified as Juliet Granville, valuing her as an
autonomous individual rather than demanding the superficial markers and labels the rest of the community expects. Aurora recognises her friend’s advantages of education, manners, conversation and sensibility (115-117), and continues to express public kindness to her after Ellis is banished from her company, acting as Ellis’s “trusting angel” (553). In fact, Aurora trusts Ellis to the extent that she is one of the few characters who does not demand disclosure; she actually refuses Ellis’s confidence, in order to diminish the pressure Ellis feels to tell her history despite the danger it might place her in. Aurora states,

No explanation can make you fairer, clearer, more perfect in my eyes. I take, indeed, the deepest interest in your welfare; but it is an interest that makes me proud to wait, not curious to hear; proud, my Miss Ellis, to shew my confidence, my trust in your excellencies! If, therefore, you will have the goodness to speak, it must be to others, not to me! I should blush to be of the number of those who want documents, certificates, to love and honour you! (554)

Such a statement of trust in Ellis’s capacity to choose for herself prioritises Ellis’s status as an autonomous subject over the “documents” and “certificates” that might legitimise her public identity. It is fitting, then, that Aurora is the first family member to recognise Ellis as a Granville, calling her “My sister!” (817), and immediately fulfilling “the duty of the daughter, in the acknowledgement of a sister” (820) when she learns of Ellis’s relationship to herself from Sir Jaspar. Ellis’s acceptance into the Granville family comes from the sister who has already publicly acknowledged her intrinsic worth and established an affective relationship with her external to the “documents” and “certificates” her social status demands.

The feminist features of this sororal community, however, are undermined by the conspicuous absence of Burney’s revolutionary feminist, Elinor Joddrel, from the sisterhood, which is the consequence of Elinor’s lack of solidarity with victimised women like Ellis and Gabriella. In Doody’s words, “Elinor ought to be the fourth member of the sisterhood, but she is not only a complement but an antagonist of Ellis-Juliet” (Introduction xxiii). The aural resonance between the two names, Ellis and Elinor,

107 Gabriella is the other (392).
suggests some kind of allegiance between the two characters, but it is ultimately an alliance that Elinor betrays by exploiting Ellis’s dependent position. Many feminist critics stress the affinities between Ellis and Elinor: Victoria Kortes-Papp, for example, argues that “we can see Juliet and Elinor as the two faces of the same coin” (103), while Doody states that Ellis’s difficulties “amplify” Elinor’s feminist positions by illustrating the real gender biases women face (Introduction xxx). Doody locates Elinor at the centre of Burney’s sisterhood, arguing that “[t]he novel as a whole has as its symbolic heart a kind of tripartite female being composed of Elinor—Ellis-Juliet—Gabriella. We can hear in their names the ring of elle ... elle. Ellis is” (Frances Burney 331).

This position, however, fails to recognise how Elinor’s lack of solidarity with the other women acts as a betrayal of the sisterhood to which she could belong. Elinor, in fact, does not understand Ellis’s victimisation, and expresses her own politics from a position of safety and luxury that Ellis lacks, as Kortes-Papp notes: she is “financially and socially secure enough to make her observations about ... injustices at leisure, ... [and] is protected by her family and income so as not to be made a complete outcast” (103). Elinor’s relationship with Ellis is that of a secure, wealthy patroness helping a social inferior, not of two equals bound by sisterly affection or feminist principles. Although she is a “revolutionary enthusiast” (204), she shelters Ellis out of a “spirit of contradiction” (55), indicating that she fails to see the real economic and social injustices Ellis faces. Describing Mrs Ireton’s authority over Ellis when she becomes a humble companion as “bolts, bars, dungeons, towers, and bastilles” keeping Ellis away from Harleigh (475), Elinor prioritises romantic, high-flown radical rhetoric over Ellis’s practical need to survive; Ellis responds to Elinor’s revolutionary statements about liberty by indicating that her own ability to make autonomous choices is circumscribed by her economic vulnerability, asking, “what is freedom but a name, for those who have not an hour at command from the subjection of fearful penury and distress?” (473-474). As Perkins notes, Elinor’s failure to understand that Ellis does not have the luxury of social and economic security “demonstrates that she has been blinded by the ideology of her culture—her radicalism dwindles into mere radical chic” (“Private Men” 79). Despite her radical claims, Elinor lacks the social sympathy and awareness of injustice that Ellis develops through her vulnerable position, suggesting that sorority and social sympathy
remain unrealised ideals rather than workable solutions to the problems Burney’s novel exposes.

Elinor’s lack of sympathy is heightened by her propensity to strike a revolutionary pose in order to get something that she wants. Her radicalism is selfish in addition to being unprincipled. Her feminism originates from her sense of dissatisfaction with her personal life: she wishes to end her engagement with Dennis Harleigh in order to court his brother, Burney’s hero, Albert Harleigh (151-157). She therefore marshals the revolutionary rhetoric she has absorbed while travelling in France in order to achieve this end, “confusing her own personal happiness with political justice” (Doody Introduction xxx). More crucially, in discussing revolutionary positions such as women’s rights, she refuses to address principles, stating, instead, that “all that I have time to attempt is my personal vindication” (175). Elinor’s self-identification as a revolutionary feminist is therefore an insincere political pose she adopts; her numerous suicide attempts are part of a performance of her version of revolutionary identity, a fact that her overtly theatrical language recognises. She attempts to author and act out her own revolutionary plot, concluding either in her happy marriage to Harleigh or in her successful suicide, a future she constructs as either “tragic or comic” (157).108 In her assumption of theatrical poses and urge to mix love and marriage with death, Elinor in fact parodies the realities Ellis—who is forced to adopt disguise after disguise for her own protection and who flees a sham marriage that she likens to an “execution” (745)—must confront. In addition, her own exaggerated pose determines her perception of those around her, especially encouraging her to see Ellis as likewise acting under a pretence: instead of supporting Ellis as a woman in need, she replicates the standards the Brighthelmstone community imposes on her by accusing her of deception and demanding disclosure, condemning Ellis as a figure of “double dealing, false appearances, and lurking disguise! without a

108 Before her first joint declaration of love for Harleigh and suicide attempt she describes humanity as “mere dramatis personae of a farce” and herself as “a principal buffoon” (153), proceeding to outline for Ellis “Scene the first” (158), “The second act of the comedy, tragedy, or farce, of my existence” (161) and hinting darkly at the conclusion of the drama as “an epithalamium—or a requiem!” (162) ending with either “a wedding-garment” or “a shroud” (168). Her second suicide attempt, at Ellis’s debut concert, shows her study of what Harleigh calls “public Effect” (365), and during her final suicide attempt in the church, in which she dresses in a shroud and sets the scene with a prepared coffin, she returns to her original theatrical language, calling the scene the “last act” of her “tragi-comedy” (581).
family she dare claim, without a story she dare tell, without a name she dare avow!”

Elinor is thus only superficially revolutionary, a parody of Wollstonecraftian radicalism in her elaborate suicide attempts and her dramatic references to “bolts, bars, dungeons, towers, and bastilles” (475), whose politics differ substantially from Wollstonecraft’s. Johnson argues that The Wanderer simply “rewrite[s] Wollstonecraft’s Wrongs of Woman from within the values of dominant culture” (Equivocal Beings 171), but this reading does not recognise how conflicted Burney’s re-imagining of Wollstonecraftian feminism is. Elinor alludes to but travesties Wollstonecraft’s politics: her fixation on her own “personal vindication” (175) relies on “personal” desires and vendettas rather than the political principles that motivate Wollstonecraft’s Vindications. In fact, Ellis’s experience is possibly more Wollstonecraftian than Elinor’s: like Maria, the heroine of Wollstonecraft’s Wrongs of Woman, Ellis learns to sympathise with women of all social and economic classes because of her own experiences, while Burney’s efforts to envision a political sisterhood for Ellis rewrites the sororal relationship Wollstonecraft develops for Maria and the prison guard Jemima.

Elinor, instead, betrays the sisterhood by using the power she exercises over Ellis as her patroness to force her into collaboration with her own sham performance of revolutionary feminism, sending her to begin “Scene the first” by delivering Elinor’s declaration of love to Harleigh (158). She thus gradually assumes an authority over Ellis that reproduces her victimisation at the hands of the commissary and Denmeath. Threatening further suicide attempts, Elinor extorts a promise from Ellis that she will not marry Harleigh (205), an intrusion into Ellis’s autonomy that reveals her affinity to the novel’s other revolutionary, the commissary, whose blackmail likewise acts to limit Ellis’s marital choices, and functions as an attempt to assert narrative control over Ellis by deciding for her, as Denmeath does in his efforts to return her to France. Elinor’s resemblance to these figures of masculine aggression, and especially to the commissary, is heightened when she appears at Ellis’s concert disguised as a “foreign,” “menacing,” male figure, immediately rousing Ellis’s fear that she is pursued (356). Elinor’s persecution of Ellis, therefore, aligns her with the male tyrants of both old-regime
England and revolutionary France, precluding her capacity to belong to the sympathetic sisterhood established among Ellis, Gabriella and Lady Aurora.

At Teignmouth, Ellis is invited into a new family, one that is aware of her virtues and receptive to her multitude of affective allegiances. Although Aurora is the first Granville to recognise Ellis, the new family unit is brought into being through a collaboration between Harleigh and Melbury, who combine against the allied Lord Denmeath and French commissary to release the Bishop and free Ellis from her legal entanglement (847-853). The transition from a community that rejects Ellis’s conflicted identity to a new community that is open to her multifaceted, multinational emotional commitments, represented by the reconfigured family, is signalled by the friendship established between her patriotic uncle, Admiral Powel, and her French, Catholic surrogate father, the Bishop (854-859). Moreover, the experience that constitutes Ellis’s subjectivity outside of the family and constructs her sense of sympathy with the disempowered and disenfranchised is validated by her new family’s retention of her multiple names: Harleigh calls her “Loveliest Miss Ellis! most beloved Miss Granville!” (862), while Melbury declares, “Take comfort, sweet sister! take comfort, loveliest Miss Ellis!— for I can’t help calling you Miss Ellis, now and then, a little while longer” (849), demonstrating their recognition that she has established her individual worth outside of the social and familial structures that would mark her value through external signs. As the novel concludes, Burney describes Ellis’s English family members sitting down to dinner together with the Bishop and his émigré companions, establishing Ellis at the centre of a new family that symbolises international reconciliation (867-870), before outlining the new domestic circle Harleigh and Ellis create together around Harleigh Hall (870-873).

However, there are some notable absences from the emblematic dinner that suggest that *The Wanderer*’s conclusion is not able to resolve the novel’s crucial conflicts. The snobbish and revolutionary demons who have persecuted Ellis throughout the novel, from “the three Furies; Mrs. Howel, Mrs. Ireton, and Mrs. Maple” (872) to Elinor, who is ultimately converted from her radicalism (872-873), are exorcised, but neither Gabriella nor Aurora, the two sister figures who are Ellis’s most steadfast supporters during her difficulties, are present for the Teignmouth resolution: Gabriella is recalled to France in the company of her cold, distant husband from an arranged marriage, M de*** (797-798),
while Lady Aurora is “forced to accompany her uncle,” Lord Denmeath, when he retreats from Teignmouth in defeat (867). Both of Ellis’s sisterly counterparts, therefore, remain subject to old-fashioned, patriarchal rule within their unreformed families. The absence of Ellis’s supportive sororal community and the proliferation of the father, brother and husband figures who have shown their inadequacy so clearly at the end of the novel poses a challenge to the assumption that Ellis’s new family is actually different from the other configurations Burney has explored.

Furthermore, the resolution is founded on negotiations for proving Ellis’s legitimacy, endowing her with her fortune and settling her marriage to Harleigh, conducted among four men, Melbury, Harleigh, the Bishop and the Admiral, whose enclosure in a bathing-machine once more excludes Ellis from having a say in her own future. The legal dimension of these negotiations once more poses the question of who can lawfully assert ownership over Ellis. Although Aurora loves Ellis as her sister in the absence of “documents” and “certificates” (554), her legal belonging to the Granville family is only confirmed by Admiral Powel’s possession of a copy of the destroyed codicil to Lord Granville’s will (839-840). The subsequent marriage settlements, legally transferring Ellis from the Granville family to the Harleigh family, can only produce more “documents” and “certificates” (554) designed to reshape Ellis’s identity according to their clauses, prioritising her new public, legal identity over the autonomous subjectivity she has worked to establish during her wanderings. Unlike Sara Salih, who sees the “supplemental” material that redefines Ellis once more at the end of the novel as further evidence of Ellis’s “plurality” (“Camilla and The Wanderer” 52, 51), I would argue that the re-establishment of a strictly legal identity for Ellis with these marriage negotiations is reductive, recognising only one aspect of her complex emotional allegiances and experiences: her legal belonging to one social rank and one family as Harleigh’s wife. This implies that Ellis can only belong to a community when she finally becomes Harleigh’s belonging.

The complications of Ellis’s happy ending signal Burney’s refusal to resolve the wider social and economic problems her novel exposes. In Doody’s words, even if Ellis’s

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109 Doody remarks that Burney’s presentation of “marriage as that which is to be escaped and rejected casts an ironic shadow over the kind of ‘happiness’ the end of the novel can offer” (Introduction xxxiv).
ending seems happy, “Happiness is not enough: ‘PERSONALLY ... I was happy’ is not a sufficient statement. How to contrive the happiness of Ellis-Juliet is not the riddle the novel poses” (Introduction xxxvii). Doody’s reference here comes from Burney’s description of life under Napoleon in a private letter to her friend Mary Ann Waddington, which outlines the distinction Burney makes between private happiness and public acceptance of a repressive political regime that victimises others: “PERSONALLY ... I was always well treated, & personally I was happy: but you know me, I am sure, better than to suppose me such an Egotist as to be really happy, or contented, where Corporal Liberty could only be preserved by Mental forbearance— — i.e. subjection” (Journals and Letters 8:283). As Doody suggests, this philosophy applies to The Wanderer’s unresolved outcome, even as Ellis gains the family she has sought throughout the novel. Ellis’s new family can solve neither the abuses inherent in all the configurations of the family and state Burney explores, nor the social and economic inequalities and injustices Ellis encounters before her elite status is ratified.

Living during the Revolution and its aftermath under Napoleon’s dictatorship in France and during an insular, anti-French backlash in Britain, Burney demonstrates her engagement with issues of political, social and economic reform in her twin critiques of old-regime Britain and revolutionary France. While the stifling economic and social hierarchies of unreformed Britain contribute to Ellis’s sexual victimisation and prevent her from achieving the independence she needs when her family and community fail to support her, the legal shams, blackmail and violence enabled by the Terror demonstrate that revolutionary France does not provide a safe, viable alternative social, political and

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110 This is the culmination of Burney’s extensive reprimand to her friend, who had expressed admiration for Napoleon:

How is it that my ever dear Mary can thus on one side be fascinated by the very thing that, on the other, revolts her? how be a professed & ardent detester of Tyranny; yet an open & intrepid admirer of a Tyrant? O had you spent, like me, 10 years within the control of his unlimited power, & under the iron rod of its dread, how would you change your language! by a total reverse of sentiment! yet was I, because always inoffensive, never molested: as safe There, another would say, as in London; but you will not say so; the safety of deliberate prudence, or of retiring timidity, is not such as would satisfy a mind glowing for freedom like your’s: it satisfies, indeed, NO mind, it merely suffices for bodily security. It was the choice of my Companion, not of my Taste that drew ME to such a residence. PERSONALLY, for the reason I have assigned, I was always well treated, & personally I was happy: but you know me, I am sure, better than to suppose me such an Egotist as to be really happy, or contented, where Corporal Liberty could only be preserved by Mental forbearance— — i.e. subjection. (Journals and Letters 8:282-283)
economic system for a vulnerable woman like Ellis. Burney thus condemns Britain’s abuses of power and exploitation of marginalised, disenfranchised figures while also censuring the Revolution’s violence, especially the ways in which its new institutions replicate or collaborate with the old regime’s exercise of authority. Like her contemporary Elizabeth Hamilton, Burney dramatises the conflict between the construction of autonomous subjectivity and the demands the community makes of the individual. However, while Hamilton optimistically imagines a reconstituted, post-revolutionary community that confirms her politics, Burney proposes no resolution for the conflict between the old regime and the revolutionary state. Throughout the novel, Ellis is powerless to achieve economic security despite her willingness to inhabit a variety of social and economic positions. Her geographical marginalisation from the British community—at the coastal fringes of Britain, in the emigrant quarter of Soho, and at the isolated ruins of Stonehenge—suggests that her outward-looking, inclusive approach to national identity and community never becomes acceptable to the British society that fortifies itself against her. Furthermore, her continued geographical isolation from that community at the moment that she claims her autonomous subjectivity at Stonehenge implies that Ellis can only begin to rebuild her sense of self in the absence of the social world. Finally, Burney is ultimately unable to reconfigure Ellis’s family into a model that eliminates power politics and becomes truly inclusive, suggesting her pessimism about the prospect of imagining a nation state without violence and victims. For Burney, a post-revolutionary community healed from the violence of the past seems impossible.
CHAPTER 5
BRITISH REFORM AND FRENCH REVOLUTION, 1815-1848

The period of 1789 to 1848 was a revolutionary era within Britain as well as in France and other parts of Europe. For David Collings, the revolutionary era in Britain meant the emergence of national protest in the form of “the mass radical movement for the reform of Parliament, which took shape in the early 1790s then emerged again shortly after Waterloo under the leadership of Henry Hunt and flourished, to varying degrees, through the passage of the Reform Bill and the years of Chartist agitation, ending only after the last great rally in London in 1848” (229). Collings’s indication that the radical movement “emerged again” after 1815 suggests that radical protest in Britain went underground in the repressive and patriotic atmosphere of the early war years, only to resurface when Napoleon’s defeat meant that the British population could turn its attention back to its own political state. As is apparent from the dates of Elizabeth Hamilton’s Memoirs of Modern Philosophers, published in 1800 at the height of the Anti-Jacobin novel, and Frances Burney’s The Wanderer, written over a number of years and finally published in 1814 at the climax of the Napoleonic Wars, the patriotic conservatism of the war years seems to have conduced to the writing of antirevolutionary novels. Certainly, as British radicalism embarked upon a new, revitalised phase from 1815 until 1848, the antirevolutionary novel disappeared, only to resurface at a position of historical distance in the 1850s, after the end of the revolutionary era. Perhaps this is the case because the end of war and the fraught political contests at home kept France on the political backburner during this period or because the mood of radicalism and reform in Britain made antirevolutionary texts suddenly unpalatable.

It is certain that there is a gap in the existence of antirevolutionary novels in these years, a gap that is interesting and expressive because it overlaps with the moment of transition between Romantic and Victorian literary periods and because it corresponds to a period of substantial political conflict and constitutional change in Britain. Reading this gap is the purpose of this chapter. As Nancy Armstrong argues in Desire and Domestic Fiction, “the gaps in any ... narrative [of a literary genre] are important. They tell us when this fiction could not deal with the important issues of the day, just as its reappearance in
startlingly new forms suggests that it was engaging a particular moment in history” (161). The gap Armstrong reads in the production of domestic fiction between 1818 and 1848 “implies,” she suggests, “that the work of organizing and interpreting reality continued in other symbolic modes when fictions of courtship and marriage did not serve this purpose particularly well” (161). I do not fully accept Armstrong’s theory that domestic fiction could not be written in the context of the cultural and industrial conflicts that occurred in the period between the end of Jane Austen’s career and the publication of the first novels by the Brontë sisters (161-163): as recent critical projects such as the recovery of the neglected literature of the 1790s indicate, canon formation in this period reveals more about the Romantic-era aesthetic biases that lasted into the late twentieth century than about the literature that people actually produced and consumed in this period. However, Armstrong’s proposal that a gap in the production of a specific kind of literary text speaks to its inadequacy for addressing the problems of certain historical moments is useful for my exploration of a cluster of novels whose function is to co-opt readers and commit representational violence against radical principles, narratives and symbols. This chapter examines British attitudes to the political state of the nation and to developments in France, especially the July Revolution of 1830 and what was known as the ‘springtime of the peoples’ in 1848, alongside the definitive British text on the French Revolution in this period, Thomas Carlyle’s 1837 *The French Revolution: A History*, in order to understand what was different about this phase in the revolutionary era in Britain and why the antirevolutionary novel re-emerged after 1848. In the context of the British public’s embrace of political reform in the 1820s and 1830s and celebration of revolution in France in 1830 and again, at least initially, in 1848, the antirevolutionary novel’s violence of representation could no longer serve its political purpose in the British community. However, when the threat of combined revolution in France and radical agitation in Britain and Ireland emerged again in 1848, British writers returned once more to the antirevolutionary representational tactics and political stakes of the 1790s.
“Reform or Revolution”: British Politics and the French Revolutions of 1830 and 1848

After its suppression in the war years, British radicalism revived after Waterloo, as did the political debates of the 1790s. Impassioned political contests in the press, mass protests, and the reform movement within and outside of Parliament characterise the years following the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. When revolution recurred in France in 1830 and 1848, then, the British responded by viewing French events in light of their own potentially revolutionary moment: reformist agitation was at its height in the early 1830s, and the Chartist movement, born out of working-class disillusionment with the 1832 Reform Act, peaked alongside the revolutions that took place across Europe in the late 1840s. While a Britain pushing for reform responded predominantly positively to the July Revolution of 1830, by 1848 the combined threat of revolution in France and Chartist agitation in Britain produced in the short term a revival of the fears of the 1790s and in the long term a confirmation of Victorian confidence in Britain’s political stability and superiority that contributed to the resurgence of the antirevolutionary novel in the 1850s.

Although the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars ended in 1815, the oppositional and vitriolic character of the political debates of the 1790s continued in Britain in the following decades, perhaps even intensifying as the end of the war years saw a revival of radical and reformist agitation. Venomous political exchanges in the press, violent and oppressive government reactions to political protest, and impassioned contests over constitutional change in the Parliament came to dominate the post-1815 British political landscape. What Kim Wheatley designates the “post-Napoleonic paranoid style” of British public discourse, especially apparent in politicised periodical reviews like the Quarterly and Edinburgh (323), strengthened when the war years drew to a close. According to Wheatley, Popular uprisings due to post-war economic distress made the threat of revolution real. Moreover, the Tory government was exploiting fears of revolution through its manipulation of subversive activities such as the Pentridge rebellion and the Cato Street conspiracy. When it became known that the government was using spies, informers, and agents
provocateurs, this served to increase public paranoia. At the same time, mass circulation of reformist newspapers, beginning with Cobbett’s Political Register in 1817, deepened a longstanding cultural concern over the dangers of publication. (323)

The years following Waterloo were characterised by acute economic and political distress in Britain that led to increased political agitation and repressive government measures, culminating in the confrontation known as the Peterloo Massacre in Manchester in 1819.111 The intensely vituperative contests in the post-war press thus complement the violent political activity of the period.

Nevertheless, despite the vitriolic nature of political contests after Waterloo, the period between 1815 and 1848 was the heyday of reform in Britain, and it is from within this moment of ongoing although gradual political change and a belief in British traditions of political liberty that the British viewed the 1830 and 1848 revolutions in France. The repeal of the Combination Acts in 1824 and Test and Corporation Acts in 1828, the abolition of slavery in British territories in 1833, and the profound constitutional changes of Catholic Emancipation in 1829 and the Reform Act in 1832 within Parliament, alongside anti-Poor Law and Chartist agitation outside of Parliament, demonstrate how widely reform of some kind was desired by the British public in this period. As in 1789, many British observers saw the July Revolution in 1830 as a French attempt to gain the political liberties that the British already possessed. As Georgios Varouxakis argues in Victorian Political Thought on France and the French, “Victorian smugness was thriving on the difficulties of France, for France was the first country that came to mind every time the Victorians saw themselves in a comparative light” (57).

Likewise, when the British evaluated the events of 1830 in France, many of them responded as an earlier generation had done in 1789, by congratulating a revolution they believed to be modeled on their own Glorious Revolution of 1688.

Early responses to the July Revolution in the British press celebrated French heroism while also glorying in supposed British political superiority. Quoting the Globe, the

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111 According to historian Edward Royle in Revolutionary Britannia?, “The immediate post-war years, 1815-21, proved as difficult as any during wartime itself, as unemployment and high bread prices coincided with renewed political discontent” (42). Some of the noteworthy events of this period include the Spa Fields riot (1816), the suspension of Habeas Corpus (1817), Peterloo (1819), the Cato St Conspiracy (1820) and the Caroline Affair and resulting public protests (1820).
*Times* of 2 August states, “If there is any city in Europe which is entitled to the epithet heroic, it is Paris— the centre of the civilization of Europe” (“France” 4). A *Times* editorial from the same date squarely blames the “inconceivable madness” of the French King and his ministers for raising “the storm” against themselves, and argues that “CHARLES does not merit the sympathy even of surrounding Sovereigns” (“The state of France” 4). The editorial continues to use the events in France to puff Britain’s King William IV through a comparison with the ousted Charles X, perhaps demonstrating the “smugness” Varouxakis associates with Victorian views of France (57):

What a contrast does the conduct of our own gracious Sovereign exhibit to that of the King of FRANCE! WILLIAM IV. glories in being the chief of a free people: he expresses a cordial sympathy with their enthusiastic attachment to their rights, and avows at once that it is his pleasure and his duty to co-operate in their preservation. CHARLES X. violates his oath of office, tramples on the Charter which it was his sacred duty to maintain, and justifies his breach of honour and of the laws by an appeal to the artillery and the sword: he destroys the liberties, and then the lives of his subjects. We confess that till the actual facts displayed themselves before us, we, with we trust a pardonable incredulity, did not conceive it possible that any human beings could be guilty of such infatuated, such wanton, violations of the laws and constitution, as have been perpetrated by CHARLES and his Ministers. One glance at the present state of England might have convinced even the most obstinate folly how immense is the superiority of the patriot King over even the most powerful despot. (“The state of France” 4-5)

While this editorial uses events in France to promote a sense of British superiority through its comparison of the two kings, it also, by glorifying a Hanoverian King like William IV, points to the tendency among the British in 1830 to read French events in light of 1688, as British radicals like Richard Price had done in 1789. The comparison is made explicitly in the *Times* of 3 August, in an excerpt taken from the French newspaper *Messager des Chambres* that exhorts, “Let us trust to history. It shows us in England that the substitution of the patriotic William, for the hypocritical Stuarts, secured both liberty
and order” (“France” 1). A sonnet printed among the letters to the editor on 28 August titled “Sonnet, on the Late Glorious Revolution in France” further cements the comparison between 1688 and 1830 that the Times promotes.

In fact, the Times appears to celebrate the July Revolution as Price and others had rejoiced in 1789, while disavowing the antirevolutionary, Burkean legacy that came later. In an article titled “Revolution in France. Manchester Meeting,” published on 30 August, the Times reported on a congratulatory meeting held in Manchester, quoting a speaker whose words press for reform in England while also holding up England’s moderate constitutionalism as a model of progress:

Let us not ... in our admiration of that glorious burst of freedom which has just been exhibited in France, forget for one single moment, that some of our own institutions at home are incompatible with the spirit of our age; let it not be a reproach to us, that whilst France is making rapid strides, England is standing still. Though slow in her movements, like the tortoise, she shall still in the end outstrip her antagonists whose outset was more quick. (5)

Such words suggest the tendency that underlies many of these responses to 1830 of seeing France as a beacon of political liberty while nevertheless tracing the July Revolution back to Britain’s political example. Furthermore, the Times editorial of 2 August aligns the nations of Europe with the revolutionaries and against the ousted monarch, rejecting Burkean antirevolutionary paranoia, and even citing Burke by name:

BURKE, in one of his tirades against the French revolution, had the insolence to say, that France should be blotted out of the map of civilized Europe. Heaven forbid! It would be the greatest evil that could happen to Europe, if it were possible. But while France is even in an unsettled state, all other nations must suffer in their civil and commercial relations. All other nations, therefore, have a right to feel that CHARLES X. is their enemy. (5)

Together, these Times pieces present a clear political picture of France, especially significant given the Times’s conservative affiliations, that unambiguously casts the July
revolutionaries as the heirs to the English Glorious Revolution and Charles X as a shared “enemy” for all of Europe.

A new generation of British writers and intellectuals also responded to the July Revolution, and British radicals and reformers were motivated by what they saw across the Channel. John Stuart Mill wrote a series of articles supporting the 1830 revolution in the *Examiner*, and Thomas Carlyle, whose enthusiasm for French affairs culminated in his *French Revolution* within the decade, expressed a tentative optimism in a letter to Gustave d’Eichthal of 9 August: “— I hear today that your foolish old King has come to England: between the Nations, who now begin to understand each other, there will be no War;— let us hope, never more!— With the Duke of Orleans, if that arrangement prove final, you may prosper all the better.— In any case, your task, if genuine, is not for a day or a generation, but for the whole Future” (5:138-139). Although Carlyle appears reluctant to place his faith in Louis-Philippe, he is hopeful about the revolution’s ability to produce political change. Nevertheless, writing to his mother the next day, Carlyle takes on the tone of a detached observer, stating, “You will soon see by the papers that there is to be disturbance in France, the King and his People having quarrelled. We are well out of it all, tho’ toiling, here in our own old Scotland” (5:140).

However, the British were not entirely “well out of it all,” as Carlyle believed them to be. The July Revolution in France occurred while Britain was in the midst of the 1830 General Election, which was fought on the interrelated, progressive issues of reform and abolitionism, and which corresponded with industrial strikes and agricultural unrest, including rick-burning and the destruction of threshing machines (Brock 102, 106).

According to Royle, there was a clear parallel between revolution in France and agitation for reform in Britain in the early 1830s:

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112 For a more detailed discussion of Mill’s responses to 1830 and 1848, as well as briefer discussions of the reactions of Carlyle, Matthew Arnold and others, see chapter 5 of Varouxakis’s book, “French Politics Through British ‘Glasses.’” According to Varouxakis, Mill’s articles respond to coverage in the press that had become more “alarm[ist]” later in the year (59). However, even Mill became disillusioned by Louis-Philippe’s government by the mid to late 1830s (59-66). This does not reflect a shift in Mill’s position, but a move toward reactionary politics within the French government.

113 Michael Brock argues in *The Great Reform Act* that “[t]here was a close connexion between the anti-slavery movement and Reform. The abolitionists believed that destroying the rotten boroughs represented the only way of defeating the West Indian interest ... The West Indians stood for the kind of old-established but declining interest which was over-represented in the old system, and could expect to be cut down to size in the new one” (80-81). Well-known abolitionists within Parliament like Lord Brougham also supported parliamentary reform (81).
Between 1830 and 1832 Britain underwent major constitutional change during a period of economic hardship, with unrest in both agricultural and industrial areas. At the same time, a new series of revolutions on the Continent reminded politicians of the impermanence of political regimes, as the Restoration settlement of 1814-15 was torn up first in Paris and then in Brussels. The July 1830 revolution in Paris was a clear warning of what might happen when an intransigent and reactionary government was faced with a strengthened opposition party, supported by popular pressure on the streets fuelled by economic discontents. (67)

While the eventual success of the Reform Bill and the subsequent quieting of the radical movement meant that the 1830-1832 period was retrospectively interpreted according to the safe and self-satisfied Whig value of political gradualism, revolutionary efforts persisted until the Bill finally passed. Like the retrospective critical tendencies—caused by periodisation divisions and inadequate attention to the revolutionary era’s complex political contests—that have caused the group of texts I examine here to be neglected, retrospective Victorian interpretations of the period leading up to the Reform Act failed to recognise the revolutionary potential of the early 1830s.

The revolts that occurred during the 1830 election, functioning as a kind of “do-it-yourself” Reform policy” (Brock 100), combined with the threat of revolution hinted at by events in France made a strong case for British parliamentary reform as a means of avoiding political violence. As historian Michael Brock argues, “In July the notion of a revolution in Britain would have been scouted among the governing class as absurd; by mid-September the prospect that London might follow Paris was being mentioned everywhere” (106). Violence and agitation continued as the Reform Bill encountered difficulties in Parliament. The October 1831 riots against the Bill’s opponents in the House of Lords, the 1831 Welsh insurrection, and the 1830-31 Swing riots indicate that from within these years, a British revolution appeared to be a genuine possibility. The climax of political action in this period occurred in the “two revolutionary peaks” (Royle 79) of October 1831, when the house of Lords rejected Lord Grey’s second Reform Bill,

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114 Royle writes that in the aftermath of the Reform Bill’s success, “The Whig version of history, whereby revolutions were to be directed peacefully by themselves from above, was confirmed; only, they no longer spoke of revolution but simply of Reform” (70).
and May 1832, when Grey’s government resigned, causing the crisis that ultimately led to the Bill’s success, when the Duke of Wellington convinced the Bill’s opponents in the House of Lords to abstain, allowing it to pass (Royle 69-70).  

Reform was the only way to prevent revolution, according to the radical press. The revolutionary Poor Man’s Guardian of 19 May 1832 records the presiding sense of crisis within the working-class radical movement as reform was delayed in an article containing excerpts from other newspapers titled “Sentences from the ‘Stamped’ Papers.” The New Weekly Messenger exclaims that if the King fails to

abjure the men [Wellington and the Tories] who would tumble him from his character of “the second ALFRED,” into that of “the second CHARLES THE FIRST,” and recall those [Grey and the Whigs] to his confidence who have been, and would still be, the great connecting link between him and the affections of his subjects— a revolution, a democracy, a republic is at hand! ... let Monarchy go to the right-about, and the lesser evil of Republicanism become dominant in England! (qtd. in “Sentences from the ‘Stamped’ Papers” 398)

The rage of a radical press that not only threatens revolution but goes so far as to predict the King’s execution, as a “second CHARLES THE FIRST,” as a result of the Reform Bill’s failure is clear. The Poor Man’s Guardian continues to quote another revolutionary statement, this time originating in the Dispatch:

“Reform or Revolution” is the cry of every man who deserves the name of Englishman. The idea of twenty-four millions of free men submitting to a denial of their undoubted rights by less than two hundred beings called Peers, is utterly out of the question. The only wonder is, that the people have so long submitted to the delay of their new Magna Charta. The time has at length arrived when Englishmen are called upon to act— to show their strength .... (399)

115 See Brock (248-258, 295-299) or Royle (67-89) for detailed discussions of these events.

116 The newspaper’s radical politics appear in the full wording on the masthead, which reads, The Poor Man’s Guardian, A Weekly Paper For the People. Published in Defiance of “Law,” To Try the Power of “Right” Against “Might.,” “It is the Cause; it is the Cause.”
Out of this “revolutionary situation” in 1830-32 came a “constitutional revolution” that was “contained within constitutional bounds by the middle-class political unions and the Whigs” (Royle 88, 89), ultimately fracturing the reform movement by dividing the middle-class reformers who benefited from the Reform Act and the working-class reformers whose exclusion from political power was confirmed by the Act. As Royle writes, “Out of this sense of betrayal, the Chartist movement was born” (89). Thus, although Grey and the Reform Act briefly defused the revolutionary situation of the early 1830s, radical protest persisted across the 1830s and 1840s, from anti-Poor Law agitation to the Chartist movement that launched with the publication of the People’s Charter in 1838 and continued for the next ten years.

By the late 1840s, revolution in Europe and public protest in Britain emerged in tandem once again. The disillusionment that Mill and others felt at the outcome of the July Revolution paved the way for another revolution in France. Mill was among the most enthusiastic British supporters of 1848, “appoint[ing] himself as the Tom Paine of this French Revolution” (Varouxakis 72). However, British responses to 1848 were much more conflicted than the predominantly celebratory reaction to 1830, reviving the range of hopes and fears of the 1790s rather than just the initial enthusiasm of 1789. While the Times had disavowed Burke in 1830, on 29 February 1848, in an article with the headline “The Ex-Royal Family of France,” the Times replays a familiar Burkean trope, an attack on a fleeing royal family in their home, the Tuileries, for its Victorian audience:

The Duke de Nemours had at this moment hold of the Count de Paris’s hand, the Duchess d’Orleans leading her second son, the Duke de Chartres. So frightful was the rush of the mob that both the young Princes were separated from their protectors, and it was with extreme difficulty that the Duke de Chartres was recovered, he having been lost in the mêlée for some time .... To the Invalides the Royal fugitives were pursued by the infuriated mob .... (2)

The article continues to cast England as “the only safe refuge for the Royal exiles” (2), aligning Britain with the royal family rather than with the revolutionaries, marking its difference from the 1830 Times articles that celebrated the July Revolution at Charles X’s expense.
However, the Times’s presentation of the royal family’s flight is not as straightforward as this article would suggest. In “The Revolution in France,” printed on 2 March, the Times quotes at length from the republican French newspaper the National, portraying the revolutionaries’ role in the King’s flight far more favourably:

The flight of Louis Philippe was marked by an incident which does so much honour to the feelings of our population that we hasten to mention it. At the moment the ex-King was escaping by the little low doorway nearly opposite the bridge, and going into the little carriage that waited for him, he found himself surrounded by the people. Two cuirassiers stationed in the Place de la Concorde rushed to his protection, and this brave regiment, without however using their arms, opened a passage. An officer seeing the danger cried out, “Messieurs, spare the King.” To which a stentorian voice replied, “We are not assassins—let him go.” “Yes yes; let him go—qu’il parte,” became the general cry. The people have been too brave during the combat not to be generous after the victory. (5)

It is unsurprising that the National would wish to present the revolutionaries as “brave” and “honour[able]” in their treatment of the King, but the Times’s decision to reprint such a depiction suggests that at this early stage in the 1848 revolution, at least, the Times appears politically conflicted about French affairs. Although the Times could have interpreted this incident as an appropriate expression of deference toward the royal family from the Parisian population, the fact that this passage comes from the republican National suggests that the political positions of the conservative and radical press were not as polarised or entrenched in 1848 as they had been in the 1790s and the war years.

However, as violence in France continued over the next few months and the threat of radicalism revived at home, the Times took a decidedly conservative stance. An editorial printed on 27 June, after radical agitation on the streets of Paris had been repressed by the new republican government, exclaims,

The annals of the whole French Revolution and of European warfare hardly present so terrible an example of civil war raging with unabated violence for at least three days and nights in the heart of a great capital ... [where] the density of a population amounting to nearly a million of
human beings only supplied a more inexhaustible array of combatants and a more enormous sacrifice to the ferocious passions of a democratic revolution. ("The Accounts We Continue to Publish from Paris" 5)

The suggestion that the short-lived June Insurrection could be described as a “civil war,” directly attributable to “the ferocious passions of a democratic revolution” indicates a return, on the *Times*’s part, to the most inflammatory, histrionic language of the antirevolutionary tradition. A second editorial of the same date likewise exaggerates, describing 1848 as “[t]he third and hitherto the bloodiest revolution of France” and exhorting, “It is the ambition of France to be the world’s guide, and her destiny to be the world’s warning” (“It is the Ambition of France” 5). The shift between the 1830 *Times* articles that cast the July Revolution as an imitation of the Glorious Revolution and this 1848 depiction of the so-called “bloodiest revolution,” “the world’s warning,” reveals the difference between early-1830s Britain, in which large segments of the population and Parliament, even the government itself, worked toward reform, and late-1840s Britain, when revolution in France roused fears of democracy and violence that were directed across the Channel but also at the possibility of radical, working-class agitation in Britain and Ireland.

Nevertheless, responses to the 1848 revolution were more diverse than the *Times* articles alone would indicate. In addition to Mill, whose April 1849 *Westminster Review* article responding to an antirevolutionary pamphlet written by Lord Brougham replayed the kind of debate that occurred between Burke and Paine in the 1790s,117 the radical press and literary figures like Charles Dickens and Thomas Carlyle responded enthusiastically to the revolution. The Chartist *Northern Star*’s headline, “The Revolution has been accomplished” (Chase 295), indicates the predictably celebratory nature of that newspaper’s coverage.118 On 29 February Dickens wrote to Emile de la Rue of the

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117 In *Dissertations and Discussions*, Mill revised the article into an essay titled “Vindication of the French Revolution of February 1848, In Reply to Lord Brougham and Others.” His use of the word “Vindication” also looks to the precedent of the 1790s, recalling Mary Wollstonecraft’s famous *Vindications*. Like Burke, Lord Brougham was part of the Whig establishment: he was Lord Chancellor in Grey’s and Melbourne’s governments in the early 1830s and thus was heavily politically invested in defending the success of the Reform Act against radical criticism.

118 For more on radical British enthusiasm for the 1848 revolution in France, see Malcolm Chase’s *Chartism: A New History* (294-300).
excitement the news of the revolution produced in London, noting the extent of public support for the change and indicating its potential impact on British politics:

I have never known anything at all like the sensation that is made here, by the French Revolution .... The aristocratic feeling of England is against it, of course. All the intelligence and liberality, I should say, are with it, tooth and nail. If the Queen should be marked in her attentions to old Papa Philippe, I think there will be great discontent and dissatisfaction expressed, throughout the country. Meantime, we are in a queer position ourselves, with great distress in the manufacturing towns, and all sorts of public bedevilments. (254)

Dickens’s letter to John Forster, of the same date, expressed his personal enthusiasm more explicitly:

MON AMI, je trouve que j’aime tant la République, qu’il me faut renoncer ma langue et écrire seulement le langage de la République de France .... Vive la gloire de France! Vive la République! Vive le Peuple! Plus de Royauté! Plus des Bourbons! Plus de Guizot! Mort aux traîtres! Faisons couler le sang pour la liberté, la justice, la cause populaire! ... et croyez-moi, CON CIToyEN! votre tout dévoué, CIToyEN CHARLES DICKENS. (256-257)¹¹⁹

Carlyle, at least initially, also voiced his enthusiastic support for the revolution, both publicly and privately. Carlyle’s excitement at the news of the revolution is evident in a letter of 26 February:

A strange business that of the French and their riots just now! ... Louis Philippe was deposed, and his little infant Grandson (“Count of Paris” so-called) appointed “King” in his stead, with a body of the hottest radicals and republicans for “ministry” round him;— and in brief ... Louis Philippe and his Queen &c &c were fairly on their travels, and had quitted Paris for good! ... Poor old Louis Philippe! An old man now, and has not yet

¹¹⁹ MY FRIEND, I find that I like the Republic so much that I must renounce my language and write only in the language of the Republic of France .... Long live the glory of France! Long live the Republic! Long live the people! No more royalty! No more Bourbons! No more Guizot! Death to traitors! Let blood flow for liberty, justice, the popular cause! ... and believe me, FELLOW CITIZEN! your devoted, CITIZEN CHARLES DICKENS.
learned to be an honest man;— he learns, or may learn, that the cunningest knavery will not serve one’s turn either. I begin to be really sorry for him, poor old scoundrel .... Guizot, his minister, is much more despicable .... (22:253)

The exclamation points and italics indicate Carlyle’s barely containable exhilaration at the news, traceable to his strong dislike of Louis-Philippe and his ministry. The “deep-seated pious satisfaction” at the revolution Carlyle divulges to Ralph Waldo Emerson in a letter of 28 February is but a part of a wave of public support, as he sees it: “All people are in a sort of joy-dance over the new French Republic” (22:257). Certainly part of Carlyle’s enthusiasm originates in his feelings for Louis-Philippe, as he writes, “We are immensely delighted, all and sundry in these parts, and thanking Heaven, each in his way, that the old scoundrel Louis Philippe has been packed about his business” (Letters 22:262).

However, Carlyle’s excitement can also be traced to his deeply held belief in revolution’s necessity for the production of a revitalised political culture. In a letter to Forster, the editor of the Examiner, Carlyle writes, “I am actually half-inclined to try my hand at a little thunder in the Examiner on French affairs; for the Event is indeed great, and ought to be affecting to all of us,— and didactic to the race of conscious and unconscious Humbugs on this side of the water too” (22:256). His hope that events in France prove “didactic” in Britain differs from the Times editorial’s description of France as “the world’s warning” (“It is the Ambition of France” 5) in the implication that 1848 provides a lesson in the importance of political change for those invested in the status quo, the “Humbugs,” as Carlyle sees them. The Examiner article, titled “Louis-Philippe,” publically proclaims Carlyle’s conviction of the necessity of revolution, drawing on the “stern, almost sacred joy” he believes “earnest men” must feel at the news that “Sophist Guizot, Sham-King Louis-Philippe, and the host of quacks, of obscene spectral nightmares under which France lay writhing, are fled” (145). The events of 1848, he argues, are a small part of a long-term revolution emerging out of the legacy of the 1790s and committed to the first Revolution’s unfinished business:

These wild men in blouses with their faces and their hearts all blazing in celestial and infernal lightning, with their barricades up, and their fusils in
their hands,—they are now the _grandsons_ of the Bastillers of ’89 and the Septemberers of ’92; the fathers fought in 1830, they in 1848 are still fighting. To the third generation it has been bequeathed by the second and the first; by the third generation the immense problem, still to solve, is not deserted, is duly taken up. They also protest, with their heart’s blood, against a universe of lies; and say, audibly as with the voice of whirlwinds, “In the name of all the gods, we will not have it so! We will die rather; we and our sons and grandsons, as our fathers and grandfathers have done. Take thought of it, therefore, what our first transcendant _French Revolution_ did mean; for your own sake and for ours, take thought, and discover it, and accomplish it, for accomplished it shall and must be, and peace or rest is not in the world till then!” (146)

The radical remaking of society that began with 1789 continues to be Carlyle’s goal and the goal he attributes to the revolutionaries of 1848, the heirs to the first Revolution. Carlyle’s sense of the revolution’s and his own corresponding radicalism appears again in a letter of 22 March, when he discloses to his mother that a second article he had prepared for the _Examiner_ was suppressed because it was considered too revolutionary to be published (22:274).120 Yet, by the end of March 1848, Carlyle’s letters begin to register a shift that closes the gap between his initial revolutionary enthusiasm and the misgivings apparent in the return to the antirevolutionary representational legacy in the _Times_.121 He continues to express his interest in French events, but tempers his excitement with fears and hesitation about what the final result in France and elsewhere could be. Writing to Thomas Erskine, Carlyle describes his increasingly conflicted opinion of the revolution:

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120 He writes of the article, “Alas, it was found to be unpublishable: it ope[n]ly approved of at least the _attempt by France to do something for the guidance and benefit of the workpeople_” (22:274). Alterations to the quotation belong to the editors of Carlyle’s _Letters_.

121 Already in the letter discussing his “unpublishable” article, he writes, And what a time of Republics and Revolutions it is! The whole world, with hardly the exception of one Kingdom but our own, has started up into a kind of insurrection, and said to its Kings, “Better Laws or—!” People here are in a great emotion about it; the incrediblest rumours are rife every day; and tho’ all are rather in the laughing vein as yet, I imagine all of us may get to be very serious before we see the end of it yet! (22:274) He thus slips quickly from support for political change to a more sinister warning about the potential “serious” outcomes of that change.
To us as to you this immense explosion of democracy in France, and from end to end of Europe, is very remarkable and full of interest. Certainly never in our time was there seen such a spectacle of history as we are now to look at and assist in. I call it very joyful; yet also unutterably sad. Joyful, inasmuch as we are taught again that all mortals do long towards justice and veracity; that no strongest charlatan, no cunningest fox of a Louis Philippe ... can found a habitation upon lies, or establish a “throne of iniquity” .... But, on the other hand, how sad that the news should be so new (for that is really the vital point of the mischief); that all the world, in its protest against False Government, should find no remedy but that of rushing into No Government or anarchy (kinglessness), which I take this republican universal suffragism to inevitably be. (22:276-277)

Carlyle’s equation of republican government with “No Government or anarchy” registers a distrust of democracy that undermines his early claims for his own radicalism, but also repeats the trajectory of enthusiasm, disillusionment and retreat from radicalism that characterised so many British responses to the Revolution in the 1790s.

Carlyle also believed that this new hesitation about the revolution is not just unique to him, but had already begun to dominate British public opinion:

All over London people are loud upon the French, Hôtel de Ville especially; censure universal, or light mockery; no recognition among us for what of merit those poor people have in their strange and perilous position at present. Right to hurl out Louis Philippe, most of us said or thought, but there I think our approval ended. The what next upon which the French had been thinking, none of our people will seriously ask themselves. (22:277)

This inability to process the “what next” underlying a democratic revolution thus, in this view, motivates the withdrawal of initial support as the British begin to contemplate the more complicated questions of what the revolution might mean beyond their simple dislike of Louis-Philippe. For Carlyle, the “what next” reveals the authoritarian trend in his political thinking that underlies his desire for a radical remaking of society. He writes,
Fraternity, liberty, &c., I want to explain, is not the remedy at all; but true government by the wise, true, and nobleminded of the foolish, perverse, and dark, with or against their consent; which I discern to be the eternal law of the world, and a rugged and severe but most blessed law, terribly forgotten in the universal twaddle, insincerity, and cowardly sloth of these latter times. (22:278)

Yet, even this turn toward the authoritarian strain in his beliefs indicates not just the apparent inconsistencies in Carlyle’s thought, but, more importantly, a representative British shift from his belief in the revolution’s “didactic” lessons for those invested with political power within Britain (22:256) to a new sense that somebody must teach the revolutionaries themselves a lesson in government.

Perhaps this shift in public opinion that Carlyle notes can be traced to the resurgence of English radicalism as the 1848 revolutions swept across Europe. French events inspired revolution elsewhere, and “gave new heart to the [Chartist] movement” in Britain (Royle 123). Although 1848 came to be understood as the swan song of Chartism in the following years, at the time many British people believed themselves to be on the brink of a revolutionary crisis, as in the case of reform agitation in the 1830s. As Royle argues,

Chartism in 1848 came to mean only the “fiasco” of 10 April. The idea that working people in Victorian Britain could threaten revolution became inconceivable and dropped out of the historical reckoning. Only by recovering that contemporary fear, and the reality behind that fear, can the historian come to address the question of how political stability was created and why there was no revolution in Britain. (135)

As in the case of 1830-32, a retrospective dismissal of Chartism in 1848 that focuses on the Kennington Common protest’s symbolic failure when it was banned and dissolved under the threat of physical force, in fact, conceals both the real revolutionary possibilities that existed at the time and the fear of revolution that underlies the increasingly paranoid public reaction against the 1848 French revolution and the

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122 The unsuccessful Chartist rally held at Kennington Common.
repression Chartists faced in Britain.\textsuperscript{123} Dismissing Chartism because the Kennington Common protest had been effectively policed by British authorities, in other words, means accepting what John K. Walton describes as “the propaganda of Victorian historians” (n. pag.). Carlyle’s intertwined excitement and anxieties about revolution tell a different story, one that emphasises the real possibility of radical political change in Britain that its citizens both hoped for and feared at the time: “Our turn ... will come before long: might we be a little readier for it, if we could!” (\textit{Letters} 22:279).

In 1848, then, radical political protest and the possibility of revolution were a reality in Britain as well as elsewhere in Europe. As Walton notes, the history of the Chartist movement “features moments of high drama when Britain came closer to revolution, and the possibility of a radically different long-term trajectory of future development, than at any point between the 1640s and the aftermath of the First World War” (n. pag.). Although as “a petitioning movement for the redress of grievances” Chartism could be understood as “a deeply traditional and (in principle, as some Chartists complained) even deferential way of proceeding” (Walton n. pag.), Chartists ratcheted up their “revolutionary rhetoric” to push their cause in 1848 (Royle 125). Newspapers as politically diverse as the \textit{Northern Star}, the \textit{Times} and the \textit{Morning Chronicle}, furthermore, printed “almost verbatim accounts of the [Chartist National] Convention’s proceedings,” demonstrating “growing alarm” in London as the Kennington Common protest approached (Chase 300). The royal family was sent away from London on 8 April (Saville 105-106), and, according to historian John Saville,

\begin{quote}
The most pervasive sentiment was undoubtedly that which equated the possible outcome of 10 April with what had occurred in France. It was revolutionary Paris, and the rapidity with which the revolution had spread, that was in most people’s perceptions of what might be the possible consequences of a large gathering in London of those hostile to the existing order. (106)
\end{quote}

Dickens’s plans for his so-called “Dombey dinner” (\textit{Letters} 267) on 11 April, to celebrate his completion of \textit{Dombey and Son}, were coloured by the Kennington Common rally’s

\textsuperscript{123} See Royle (126-127) or Chase (300-303, 312-317) for discussions of the sense of crisis leading up to Kennington Common and during its aftermath.
presence in the imagination of Londoners as the date approached. He wrote to Count D’Orsay on 31 March, “C’est possible que la révolution anglaise ait lieu, le même jour. Dans ce cas là, nous dînerons le lendemain. Ou, si M. le duc de Wellington serait tué d’un grand coup de fusil en Trafalgar Square lui donné par un de nous concitoyens, alors nous ne dînerons pas, jusqu’a le 15— comme une épreuve de notre respect à sa mémoire” (268). Although Dickens’s ability to joke about the “révolution anglaise” suggests how little he feared such a possibility, his detailed description of what might occur following the Kennington Common protest indicates the kind of anxieties circulating in London before the event.

The Northern Star heightened the stakes for the movement and for Britain in the days leading up to the 10 April rally:

“Reform or Revolution” is now the order of the day. How long, Men of Great Britain and Ireland, how long will you carry the damning stigma of being the only people in Europe who dare not will their freedom?

Patience! the hour is nigh! From the hill-tops of Lancashire, from the voices of hundreds of thousands has ascended to Heaven the oath of union, and the rallying cry of conflict. Englishmen and Irishmen have sworn to have THE CHARTER AND REPEAL, or VIVE LA REPUBLIQUE! (qtd. in Royle 125)

The ultimatum is clear: “Reform or Revolution,” or, in other words, “THE CHARTER AND REPEAL, or VIVE LA REPUBLIQUE,” are the Northern Star’s terms, and revolution is a real possibility should the movement’s demands not be met. Despite his reluctance to continue supporting the revolution in France, Carlyle, visiting London on 10 April, walked out to view “the ‘revolution’” firsthand (Letters 23:10). His account of the Kennington Common protest’s flop to his wife seems to register a simultaneous disappointment and relief that revolution did not in fact come to Britain: “Know however, O Goody, that there is no revolution” (Letters 23:11). As Carlyle’s dismissive depiction of Chartist unrest on 10 April suggests, the complacent Victorian attitude toward the Chartist failure was already beginning to form as early as the date of the Kennington

124 It’s possible that the English revolution will take place, the same day. In that case, we will dine on the following day. Or, if the Duke of Wellington is killed by gunfire in Trafalgar Square by one of our fellow citizens, we will not dine until the 15th— as proof of our respect for his memory.
Common protest. Despite Kennington Common’s symbolic resonance with the death of Chartism, and with it the revolutionary era, Chartist agitation continued for some months, until a number of raids and arrests in mid August finally repressed the movement permanently. In Royle’s words, “The revolution was over and the gaols were filled .... The danger was past” (134). The effective policing the British government implemented with “the overwhelming support” of the middle classes (Saville 112) stopped the Chartist movement at Kennington Common and in the following months. These government measures, rather than a lack of revolutionary will, seem to have been the key factor in defusing the situation in 1848 and bringing the revolutionary era to a close in Britain.

The urge to quickly dismiss the revolutionary threat posed by Chartism that Carlyle reveals as early as 10 April came to dominate the post-1848 perspective on both the events of the ‘springtime of the peoples’ and the revolutionary era in Britain more broadly. As Royle suggests, Victorians worked to construct a history of the revolutionary era that erased the possibility of revolution in Britain, concealing the sense of crisis beneath the confidence that the final peaceful outcome was inevitable: “The complacency of Victorian liberalism was already setting in but it was a view which, like stability itself, was created not inborn” (192). What Saville describes as “the myths of 10 April” (201) helped to obscure the historical facts that “Chartism was finally broken by the physical force of the state, and having once been broken it was submerged, in the national consciousness, beneath layers of false understanding and denigration” (202). Some enthusiastic Chartists who had been inspired by events in France were eventually converted to the view of history that framed radical political action in Britain as futile. One former radical recalls at the end of the Victorian period,

Before I entered my teens I was a sympathetic Chartist, and early in my life read with avidity the pages of the ‘Northern Star’ ... One Sunday night I read, for a houseful of listeners, ten columns of the proceedings on the banks of the Seine which culminated in the deposition and flight of Louis Philippe, king of the French. Of course the Chartists in England and

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125 See John Saville’s lengthy discussions of the spring and summer of 1848 in 1848: The British State and the Chartist Movement for more on government measures against Chartist agitation.
126 Chase’s ellipses.
the Young Irish Repealers in the sister isle were jubilant, for they nursed the delusion that the revolutionary waves would soon beat up against the White Cliffs of Dover. (qtd. in Chase 295)

This recollection of 1848 highlights both the “revolutionary” hopes that France had inspired and the completeness with which the failure of those hopes came to frame their collapse as inevitable in Britain’s historical imagination.

Even the *Northern Star* quickly came to accept this reading of British history. By late 1849, the Chartist newspaper appears disillusioned with the results of 1848 across Europe:

> The revolutionary earthquake which shook thrones to the dust, and scattered kings, queens, royal dukes and duchesses, princes and nobles, like sea birds in a storm, has passed away. What are its present results? The old tyrannies restored in almost every country where Liberty achieved a brief and fleeting triumph ....

127 The meteor has flashed, dazzled and disappeared, leaving profounder darkness behind it. That in the course of nature another convulsive upheaving of the forcibly repressed, but universal discontent which exists in these countries, will occur again, there can be no doubt— but is there any reason to believe with better results, if the conflicting parties are similarly composed? (qtd in Royle 192)

The *Northern Star* writer’s questions about what little can be expected from “revolutionary earthquake[s]” such as 1848 had to offer is followed by an expression of the newspaper’s conversion to Whig gradualism: “Popular progress in England supplies an answer. Inch by inch the ground has been forced from the oligarchy; every advantage thus slowly won has been as sturdily retained, and with each successive advance the power of the people grows stronger— that of their adversaries less, Can there be any doubt as to the ultimate issue?” (qtd in Royle 192-193). The question of “Reform or Revolution” (qtd in Royle 125) that motivated Chartist action in 1848 is finally decided in favour of reform by the very newspaper that had threatened revolution little more than a year earlier.

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127 Royle’s ellipses.
As in 1830-1832, 1848 saw a real revolutionary crisis in Britain; however, unlike 1830-1832, 1848 also resulted in the rebirth of the antirevolutionary representational tradition across the 1850s in novels by Anthony Trollope, Charlotte M. Yonge and Charles Dickens. The crisis of the 1830s was resolved with the success of the Reform Act, which divided reformers and radicals against each other and confirmed the exclusion of working people from the franchise while placating the middle class. The events of 1848 had two important effects on the revival of the antirevolutionary novel in the 1850s. In the short term, the presiding sense of revolutionary crisis stimulated a return to the antirevolutionary paranoia of the 1790s and war years that had fallen to the wayside during the years of British reform. Thus, a new generation of Victorians had to process the possibility of revolution and its threats for the first time; for this reason, many were led, like Carlyle, who represented the 1848 revolution as a continuation of the first French Revolution in his article “Louis-Philippe,” to confront the legacy of the 1790s. The return to a tradition of antirevolutionary paranoia in the 1850s, then, seems to grow out of the revival of antirevolutionary sentiment that 1848 inspired. In the long term, and beginning even as the Chartist movement took its last stand in 1848, Victorians were confirmed in their belief in their society’s stability, its resistance to revolution, and its confidence in gradualism and moderation. This confirmation of a vision of an unshakeable society underlies Yonge’s approach to the antirevolutionary legacy, and her commitment to moving on from the revolutionary era reveals her role in constructing that sense of stability for her Victorian readers. Yet, one of the most important Victorian works on the Revolution appeared in the midst of this period of reform and radicalism in Britain: Carlyle’s The French Revolution. Carlyle’s historical work would have been well-known to all three antirevolutionary novelists of the 1850s, and especially influenced Dickens’s Tale of Two Cities. Despite its place as an authoritative and influential text on the Revolution for Victorian readers, including the antirevolutionary novelists featured in my next chapters, however, I will argue that The French Revolution is not an antirevolutionary text like Burke’s Reflections and the novels explored in this study. Instead, Carlyle’s history reflects the revolutionary enthusiasm that characterises British responses to the July Revolution in 1830 and Carlyle’s initial embrace of 1848.
“Go and Do Otherwise”: Thomas Carlyle’s *The French Revolution*

Although the antirevolutionary novel disappeared in the period between Waterloo and 1848, one of the best known and most influential nineteenth-century British representations of the Revolution was written in the midst of these years: Thomas Carlyle’s *The French Revolution: A History*. Carlyle’s work, however, differs substantially from the template offered by the antirevolutionary texts this study explores. Writing from within the British revolutionary era, not from the 1790s, wartime or post-1848 perspectives that dominate the antirevolutionary legacy, Carlyle offers a work whose radical form and style replicate the politics of the revolutionary era he depicts. Carlyle’s *French Revolution* is thus an illuminating counterpoint to the antirevolutionary works that I trace here, and an indication of the kind of text about French Revolution that could be written in the middle of the heyday of British radicalism and reform.

By 1837, Carlyle faced the problems of representing the Revolution for a British audience that was already inundated with eye-witness accounts, contradictory newspaper reports and familiar anecdotes of revolutionary violence. Some critics would locate Carlyle’s narrative of the Revolution within the Burkean tradition of histrionic, conservative writing.\(^{128}\) In “Riot and Crowd Action in *The French Revolution*: Carlyle’s Histrionic Time,” for example, Jukka Tiusanen describes the work as “Carlyle’s classic expression of Victorian anxiety over rapid social change, which was his dire warning call to the Victorian elite to exercise active social leadership” (21). However, an examination of Carlyle’s representational strategies highlights his distinctness from the histrionic, antirevolutionary tradition I explore. Carlyle does not, as Tiusanen suggests he does, simply “silenc[e]” and “mythologiz[e]” the anarchical revolutionary crowd (24), reducing the Revolution’s incoherence into a more readily manageable, standardised narrative. Rather, he engages with the problem of representing the potentially unrepresentable on

\(^{128}\) Much of Carlyle’s writing, of course, could be read as reactionary: his penchant for hero-worship, nostalgia for feudal society and problematically racist attitudes in works such as his “Occasional Discourse on the Nigger Question” combined with his radical style suggest the difficulty of defining Carlyle according to the usual spectrum of right- and left-wing politics. However, for my purposes, *The French Revolution* provides an apt counterpoint to the representational strategies that shape the politics of the cluster of antirevolutionary works in which I locate Burke, Hamilton, Burney, Trollope, Dickens and Yonge. While Carlyle may not be considered a political radical—just as Burke, Dickens and Trollope, for example, are often understood as political liberals and reformers—his representations of Revolution celebrate incoherence in a manner that contrasts markedly with the often reductive or paranoid works that I examine.
the levels of form, style, and content in an attempt to mirror the Revolution’s chaos as well as the disenfranchised revolutionaries’ struggle to articulate their political wrongs.

For Carlyle, the problem of artistic representation overlaps with his historical actors’ struggle for political representation. Several critics have rightly noted the radicalism of Carlyle’s representational strategies throughout the work. John P. Farrell argues that “Carlyle was committed to the idea of revolution as the generative principle of his work and the inspiritor of his authorial voice” (192). *The French Revolution* is characterised by a particularly radical style, as Carlyle himself noted. In an 1837 letter to John Sterling, Carlyle describes *The French Revolution* as “a wild savage Book, itself a kind of French Revolution .... What I do know of it is that it has come hot out of my own soul; born in blackness whirlwind and sorrow ...” (9:116). What is so crucially radical about *The French Revolution* is that Carlyle constantly points to the Revolution’s incoherence, instability and multiple perspectives as generative forces behind his history, rather than problems that he must somehow narrate away. This quality in his writing marks his difference from the antirevolutionary tradition that frequently works to discredit radical thought and foreclose the explosion of dissenting political voices and perspectives that characterised the revolutionary historical moment, as we have seen, for example, in Elizabeth Hamilton’s *Modern Philosophers* and will see again in the Victorian novels featured in the next chapters. As Mark Cumming argues, “Because he feels that the truth of the Revolution lies beyond any partisan allegiance, he forces us to alter our perspective almost from sentence to sentence, forestalling judgment and expanding sympathy” (71). Shifts in perspective are complemented by what Mary Desaulniers describes as Carlyle’s “‘exploding’ technique,” appearing in his frequent use of “double exposure,” or constant “proleptic and retroactive digressions,” as well as in his prose, “which is composed of sentences frequently interrupted by bracketing and fragmenting devices” (70). Even Carlyle’s subtitle, *A History*, indicates, as John D. Rosenberg notes, the essential instability of such a vast representational enterprise: “The indefinite article announces that the writing of history has become problematic. As Carlyle dramatizes in the course of the work, there were as many different French Revolutions as participants in the event, and its consequences are still unfolding” (29-30).
Early in *The French Revolution*, Carlyle indicates that the events of the Revolution were fundamentally about giving a voice to inarticulate, silenced populations. Carlyle’s work is a literary, historical project, and thus does not literally mobilise the masses through speech, as did the popular orators that inspired revolutionary action in France or radical speakers such as John Thelwall, Henry Hunt and Feargus O’Connor in Britain. However, he nonetheless turns to the symbolic power of the voice to express the political discontent and disenfranchisement that motivate the Revolution and the subsequent hopes and fears that arise as events unfold. The pre-revolutionary masses are “A dumb generation; their voice only an inarticulate cry” (1:36), but as discontent with the old regime rises, “France at large, hitherto mute, is now beginning to speak ...” (1:43). The Revolution, in this formulation, is an experiment in granting a disenfranchised population a political voice, in speaking and acting out what had hitherto been unutterable: the demand for the meeting of the Estates-General, thus, is a “sound that rises,” or “the voice of all France” (1:124), while with the first election, “inarticulate buzzing becomes articulate speaking and acting” (1:128). Carlyle furthermore presents the Revolution’s violence in terms of its participants’ voices, both articulate and inarticulate. Before portraying the siege of the Bastille, he asks, “what low infinite groan, fast changing into a growl, comes from Saint-Antoine, and the Twenty-five Millions in danger of starvation!” (1:165), and as the republican phase that precedes the Terror begins, he suggests, the French become “filled both with hope of the unutterable ... and with terror of the unutterable” (2:191). Carlyle’s project of giving voice to the range of perspectives originating from the Revolution’s participants, victims and beneficiaries, then, parallels the Revolution’s democratic enterprise: figuring the revolutionaries’ claims for full citizenship as a raised voice, Carlyle lends support to those claims when he articulates that voice once more for his Victorian audience. This contrasts markedly with the predominantly reductive, silencing tendencies of the antirevolutionary works I explore in my other chapters.

Carlyle, furthermore, works to portray the range of conflicting ways in which the Revolution had been and could be interpreted. In defining “these two words, *French Revolution,*” Carlyle argues that “strictly considered, they may have as many meanings as there are speakers of them” (1:221). Because he recognises the proliferation of meaning
implied by the Revolution’s incoherence, representing the Revolution for Carlyle becomes not a problem, as it often is for the antirevolutionary writers, but a challenge that the writer must work toward achieving. Representing chaos is not a simple task, but by virtue of constantly pointing toward its difficulty, Carlyle manages to indicate the Revolution’s complexity to his reader: he asks, for example, “Who will paint the huge whirlpool wherein France, all shivered into wild incoherence, whirls? The jarring that went on under every French roof, in every French heart; the diseased things that were spoken, done, the sum-total whereof is the French Revolution, tongue of man cannot tell” (1:418). Although “paint[ing]” the revolutionary “whirlpool” in its completeness may be impossible, stressing its difficulty for the “tongue of man,” as Carlyle frequently does, highlights the complexity, instability and depth of perspective that, for Carlyle, are the Revolution’s distinguishing features.

One way Carlyle addresses the Revolution’s incoherence is by depicting non-authoritative, private and sometimes even discredited accounts that stress how much the event’s meaning arises from the collision of multiple, frequently conflicting, perspectives. As K. J. Fielding accurately states, Carlyle shows an “attraction to half-legendary or flawed accounts” (xiii). Carlyle actively discredits some of the apocryphal anecdotes that he includes in his narrative, such as his footnote on Madame Campan’s assertion that a candle blew out at the moment of Louis XV’s death, an account that he dismisses as “fantasy” but with which he “grudges to interfere” because of its “beautiful theatrical[ity]” (1:27). Carlyle likewise questions accounts of the attack on Versailles during what he calls the Insurrection of Women (1:288), an anecdote about criminals refusing to die alongside Philippe Égalité (2:337-338) that “seems not true” (2:338), Méda’s unreliable account of Robespierre’s suicide attempt, which he relegates to a footnote (2:414), and the legend of the patriotic sinking of the Vengeur (2:371-372), which he exposes as “falsehood,” originating “in the brain of Barrère” (2:371). This active questioning of popularised versions of revolutionary events marks one difference between Carlyle and the Burkean antirevolutionary tradition: while Burke privileges the emotional truth that he claims takes precedence over factual accuracy in his depictions of the October Days and of Marie Antoinette when he states to Philip Francis, “My friend, I

129 “The Insurrection of Women” is the title for Book VII.
tell you it is truth” (Cobban and Smith 91), Carlyle believes in probing his sources. His description of the Insurrection of Women likewise distinguishes him from antirevolutionary writers. Although by framing the October Days as an Insurrection of Women led by female revolutionaries described as Menads\textsuperscript{130} Carlyle seems to act as a link connecting Burke’s monstrous female revolutionaries with Dickens’s demonised Madame Defarge, Carlyle actually celebrates the energy of the female mob in a way that Burke and Dickens do not. For Carlyle, “The French mob ... is among the liveliest phenomena of our world. So rapid, audacious; so clear-sighted, inventive, prompt to seize the moment; instinct with life to its finger-ends! ... Your mob is a genuine outburst of Nature; issuing from, or communicating with, the deepest deep of Nature” (1:261). As an “instinct[ive],” “Natur[al]” response to the “lifeless Formality” of the political status quo (1:261), Carlyle’s female mob is radically different from the monstrous, “vilest of women” (72) who invade Versailles in Burke’s account.

Carlyle also confronts the Revolution’s complexity by describing unverified rumours to emphasise just how unstable knowledge of the facts of the Revolution could be, both at the time and from his own 1837 perspective. For example, he attributes the story of M De Sombreuil’s daughter drinking aristocratic blood to prove her father’s patriotism to “universal Rumour,” but does not discredit the account and, moreover, places his reference to “universal Rumour” in parentheses (2:153), suggesting that the anecdote itself should be represented regardless of its origin. The instability surrounding the facts about revolutionary events increases under the Terror, and Carlyle’s narrator, like participants in the Revolution, seems not to know what is truth and what is rumour: describing Robespierre’s execution of his enemies, for example, he states, “There is actually, or else there is not actually, a List made out” (2:405). Although they may not be factually accurate, such apocryphal accounts, rumours and outright lies may gain enough currency to constitute somebody’s version of the Revolution’s truth, and therefore continue to contribute to its range of meanings despite their lack of verification.

Carlyle, moreover, is drawn to private anecdotes and accounts, indicating that his version of universal, public history is constructed out of the fragments of eyewitness, individual and private narratives that proliferate under the Revolution. He describes, for

\textsuperscript{130}“The Menads” is the title of Book VII, Chapter IV.
example, the christening of an infant “Pétion-National-Pique” and claims that “Universal History is not indifferent” (2:63) to such seemingly insignificant events, private expressions of a prevailing public sentiment. His chapter “A Trilogy” (2:153-160), which provides three eyewitness accounts of the September Massacres from the perspective of potential victims in the prisons, suggests the significance Carlyle attributes to diverse, individual points of view on public events. As Cumming argues, “Carlyle adopts a limited, novelistic point of view to provide an individual perspective on the historical moment” (73). More importantly, however, Carlyle’s combination of three narrative perspectives in “A Trilogy” indicates his determination that all participants in the Revolution, including its victors and its victims, “shall speak” (2:153). The three voices of the September Massacres thus also stand in for those victims whose voices are silenced by their deaths:

Thus they three, in wondrous trilogy, or triple soliloquy: uttering simultaneously, through the dread night-watches, their Night-thoughts,—grown audible to us! They Three are become audible: but the other “Thousand and Eighty-nine, of whom Two-hundred and two were Priests”, who also had Night-thoughts, remain inaudible; choked for ever in black Death. (2:160)

By drawing attention to both his three eyewitnesses and the voices that are lost, or “inaudible” to history, Carlyle continues to point to the diversity and incoherence of the Revolution, to his own project of narrating its history, and to what remains unnarratable. 

The French Revolution thus gives a voice to the population that seeks political enfranchisement, to the apocryphal anecdotes that, although unverified or inaccurate, help constitute the manner in which the Revolution was perceived in the 1790s and in Carlyle’s time, and to the victims of revolutionary violence. However, as his nod to the “inaudible” (2:160) voices lost to history suggests, Carlyle also endeavours to express what remains inarticulate or unutterable about the Revolution, to give a space within his work to its silences and its shrieks. Shrieking, he claims, is a legitimate reaction to such chaos and violence, a natural response to events such as the September Massacres: “Well may mankind shriek, inarticulately anathematizing as they can. There are actions of such emphasis that no shrieking can be too emphatic for them. Shriek ye; acted have they”
Thus, while Carlyle’s effort to give voice to the participants in the Revolution focuses on spoken and written language, he also admits that inarticulate voices, like the shrieking responses to the September Massacres, have value. Silence also has representational value; like shrieking, silence is a valid means of responding to unutterable incoherence and violence, and, as historical distance increases, becomes a more valuable response than shrieking:

To shriek, we say, when certain things are acted, is proper and unavoidable. Nevertheless, articulate speech, not shrieking, is the faculty of man: when speech is not yet possible, let there be, with the shortest delay, at least—silence. Silence … [in the 1830s] is the thing we recommend and practise …. O shrieking beloved brother blockheads of Mankind, let us close these wide mouths of ours; let us cease shrieking, and begin considering! (2:170)

Although he vindicates shrieking immediately following the September Massacres, then, Carlyle stresses that histrionic, paranoid responses to the Revolution are not the final goal of the historian whose aim is “articulate speech.” Silence is not only the preferred representational method to suggest the necessity of contemplating what is incomprehensible about history, but is often the only means of indicating the depth of inarticulate meaning the Revolution carries. When considering Marie Antoinette’s trial, Carlyle asks, “To such changes of human fortune what words are adequate? Silence alone is adequate” (2:322). Nonetheless, striving to articulate complexity through language remains Carlyle’s goal. When examining his difficulty in representing the Terror (2:322-333), Carlyle argues that “History … strive[s] to name the new Things it sees,” but that, if this is impossible, as it is in the case of something as new and unknown as the Terror, “History renouncing the pretension to name it at present, will look honestly at it, and name what she can of it!” (2:333). Looking, naming, shrieking and silence, then, all have value for Carlyle’s project of representing what cannot and should not be reduced to simple, straightforward narrative. The French Revolution, Carlyle’s emphasis on representational strategies indicates, “is about the impossibility of depicting the event … and is also the most powerful account of the event in English” (Rosenberg 58). Stressing
the Revolution’s unnarratability, in other words, is, for Carlyle, the best means of narrating it fully and truthfully.

Carlyle, however, also stresses the political importance of his artistic endeavour in his final messages to his contemporary readers, reinforcing the parallel between artistic and political representation that his early portrayals of the French population’s rising voices point to. He uses the suffering of the Revolution to draw attention to contemporary suffering in Ireland, employing an analogous reading of French and Irish politics that had existed from the 1790s and that, as my next chapter will argue, is crucial to Anthony Trollope’s later representation of nationalism in the context of the Revolution in La Vendée. Carlyle writes, “Such things were; such things are; and they go on in silence peaceably:— and Sansculottisms follow them” (2:442). The “silence” of Irish affliction, Carlyle suggests, is more expressive of suffering than the shrieks raised against the radical stages of the Revolution, because it is the “silence” of the utterly disenfranchised, the “Dumb Millions” (2:443) whose pain produces revolutionary anarchy. Representing that silence is thus Carlyle’s aim and the lesson he provides for the Victorian reader: “The frightfullest Births of Time are never the loud-speaking ones, for these soon die; they are the silent ones, which can live from century to century!” (2:443). Carlyle’s famous moral, “That there be no second Sansculottism in our Earth for a thousand years, let us understand well what the first was; and let Rich and Poor of us go and do otherwise” (2:443), in this context, reminds his readers that in order to “do otherwise” they must “understand well,” or be receptive to what is inarticulate and anarchic about the Revolution, its silences and shrieks, as well as its recorded voices. Furthermore, Carlyle indicates his consciousness that the revolutionary era is not yet past: his description of Irish suffering and his exhortation that the “Rich and Poor of us go and do otherwise” suggests that Sansculottism does not belong only to the past, and that the stakes of the Revolution remain at play. In the context of this reference to the Revolution’s continued immediate relevance to the disenfranchised sufferers of the present, Carlyle’s radical commitment to a form and style that voices the Revolution’s fragmented chaos becomes a kind of political radicalism, drawing attention to the revolutionary era’s relevance beyond the 1790s and the importance of addressing the suffering and inequalities of his own time.
Writing in 1837, from within the revolutionary era, Carlyle argues that the stakes of the Revolution remain relevant for his readers. With the same commitment to a radical remaking of society that characterises his initial response to the ‘springtime of the peoples’ in 1848, Carlyle attempts to reproduce the Revolution’s complexity by voicing its diverse range of perspectives and meanings for those involved in the 1790s and for those who continue to look at its events from the beginning of the Victorian period. Despite *The French Revolution*’s radical form and style, however, Carlyle himself finally stepped back from his position of support for revolution as the events of 1848 triggered a revival of the fears and anxieties of the 1790s. However, the revived antirevolutionary fears of 1848 also, paradoxically, eventually transformed into a new confidence in Victorian stability, as the absence of a revolution in Britain seemed to confirm British faith in moderation in the 1850s. This legacy of 1848 came to define the two contradictory threads in the antirevolutionary novels of the 1850s: the revival of paranoia and an accompanying Burkean emotional excess, and an effort to contain and dismiss the revolutionary era as a thing of the past from a position of historical distance.
CHAPTER 6

“NOT ... GREATLY MISREPRESENTED”: MELODRAMATIC EXCESS AND HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN ANTHONY TROLLOPE’S _LA VENDÉE_

In his 1855 novel _The Warden_, Anthony Trollope caricatures Thomas Carlyle and Charles Dickens as Dr Pessimist Anticant and Mr Popular Sentiment, parodying their histrionic style and political one-sidedness in the matter of Hiram’s Hospital, and promoting, by contrast, his own writing’s realism and consciousness of ethical complexity. The novel that established his reputation in his own lifetime and became the starting point for most critical surveys of his work, _The Warden_ expresses Trollope’s artistic commitment to recognise in his writing “that in this world no good is unalloyed, and that there is but little evil that has not in it some seed of what is goodly” (194).

Trollope’s avoidance of the “glaring colours” of “[t]he artist who paints for the millions” (208) in _The Warden_, however, differs markedly from his own overwrought, melodramatic depiction of the French Revolution in his 1850 novel _La Vendée: An Historical Romance_, the work immediately preceding _The Warden_. _La Vendée_ tells the story of the Vendean War, a civil war fought between centralised, revolutionary France, led by the National Convention, and the insurgent, royalist population of western France between 1793 and 1796, from the perspective of the royalist rebels. Like Carlyle’s _The French Revolution_ and Dickens’s _A Tale of Two Cities_, Trollope’s fictionalisation of revolutionary history addresses the problems of synthesising and narrating complex historical events that occurred in a climate of extreme political polarisation. Moreover, he wrote for a British audience that had predetermined biases about the actors in those events, many of those biases established by the antirevolutionary fictional tradition to which Trollope’s novel belongs. Although Trollope recognises that a narrative of royalist suffering would necessarily be selective, unfair, and unable to sustain any prolonged interrogation of its audience’s received opinion about the Vendean War and the

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131 See Claude Petitfrère’s “The Origins of the Civil War in the Vendée” for more detail. Vendean insurrections also occurred in 1799 (Secher 254), 1815 and 1832 (Petitfrère 189). The area known as the Military Vendée, the western portions of France immediately south of the Loire, included the former French provinces of Anjou and Poitou, or, under the new revolutionary system, the departments of Loire-Inférieure, Maine-et-Loire, Vendée and Deux Sèvres. Uprisings known as the Chouannerie occurred north of the Loire in the former province of Brittany (Petitfrère 187).
Revolution more broadly, his use of the melodramatic mode and sister genres of the national tale and historical novel works to suppress and contain revolutionary plots and perspectives. His representation of the Vendeans as victims of an intrusive government attempts to establish sympathy with their cause, expressing a suspicion of the operation of power within the modern, revolutionary state and idealising the pre-revolutionary, patriarchal society that he promotes as a model community. However, Trollope’s efforts to contain the Revolution and idealise the pre-revolutionary past fail to erase the fragmentation and incoherence of the revolutionary historical moment that underlie La Vendée’s attempt to write the past, as disorder and anxiety continually burst into Trollope’s narrative and challenge its authority.

Trollopian realism has been contrasted with the kind of melodramatic plots and characterisation found in La Vendée, Trollope’s third novel, since his own time. In 1863 he wrote to George Eliot, in a note he enclosed with his newest novel, Rachel Ray, “You know that my novels are not sensational. In Rachel Ray I have attempted to confine myself absolutely to the commonest details of commonplace life among the most ordinary people, allowing myself no incident that would be even remarkable in every day life. I have shorn my fiction of all romance” (Letters 238). Even in The Eustace Diamonds, Trollope’s most sensational work of fiction, he argues that romance and heroism have no place in the novel: “We cannot have heroes to dine with us. There are none. And were these heroes to be had, we should not like them. But neither are our friends villains,— whose every aspiration is for evil, and whose every moment is a struggle for some achievement worthy of the devil” (1:319-320). As in The Warden, Trollope stakes a claim for his work’s balanced realism.

Although La Vendée: An Historical Romance intentionally works within the conventions of romance and heroism, for the most part Trollope’s claims to Eliot and in The Eustace Diamonds hold true for his work, and critical surveys of his fiction take the parameters of his realism as a given fact.\textsuperscript{132} According to Ruth apRoberts’s influential

\textsuperscript{132} There are other exceptions to this generalisation: in addition to the historical works La Vendée and The Noble Jilt and his Irish novels, Trollope departed from his typical realist mode in novels like his satirical dystopia, The Fixed Period. Readings of Trollope’s career that only focus on his realism thus miss a substantial amount of his material. He also features non-realistic modes within his broadly realistic novels: characters from the Palliser novels like George Vavasor and Ferdinand Lopez, for example, are melodramatic villains.
book *The Moral Trollope*, Trollope’s writing reflects the complexity of the moral and social situations in which his characters find themselves; apRoberts argues that Trollope’s style “communicate[s] the most tenuous nuances in a psychological state, or the most extreme subtleties in a social situation” (42), establishing a “corresponding Situation Aesthetics” to the “Situation Ethics” that she argues constitutes Trollope’s moral position in most of his writing (52). The characteristics of Trollope’s aesthetics apRoberts delineates include a “style so lucid that it does not show at all, writing which refuses attention to the words” (24), and, especially, “the de-symbolising of things for us, clear, terse verbal exposition, often so witty that we hardly realise we have apprehended a subtle psychological fact” (16). Such an understanding of Trollope’s subtle realism remains central to Trollope criticism, although examinations of his marginal work, such as Laurent Bury’s exploration of gothic tropes in “Trollopian Gothic” have contested this centrality in a limited way. For the most part, critics continue to emphasise Trollope’s strategy of “deflat[ing]” the romantic (Eastwood 399) and his “well known” “reject[ion] [of] the conventional ‘heroic’ hero along with all mystery, suspense and romance” (Skilton 89).

*La Vendée* is the least read of Trollope’s works, and it is, furthermore, entirely unlike his well-known novels, defying critical expectations by diverging substantially from the stylistic patterns Trollope critics find in his work as a whole. If Trollope novels typically construct an illusion of realism through his analysis of his characters’ psychological depths and the complexity of the real-world ethical situations in which they are placed,133 *La Vendée*, by contrast, presents flat, uninteresting characters engaged in a melodramatic war against the revolutionary government that appears to be an unproblematic confrontation between the forces of good and evil. It is unsurprising, then, that twentieth- and twenty-first-century Trollope critics have so little to say about *La Vendée* or that what they do say about the novel is harshly dismissive. Robert M. Polhemus addresses Trollope’s historical romance briefly in his 1968 survey of Trollope’s novels, describing

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133 For lengthier critical discussions of Trollope’s realism, his characterisation and the ethical complexity of his novels, see Ruth apRoberts’s *The Moral Trollope*, Joan Mandel Cohen’s *Form and Realism in Six Novels of Anthony Trollope*, David Skilton’s *Anthony Trollope and his Contemporaries* and Jane Nardin’s *Trollope and Victorian Moral Philosophy*. Critics have also turned to Trollope’s realism and psychological depth as a starting point for analyses of his novels’ positions on issues of identity politics: see, for example, Nardin’s *He Knew She Was Right: The Independent Woman in the Novels of Anthony Trollope* and Geoffrey Baker’s *Realism’s Empire: Empiricism and Enchantment in the Nineteenth-Century Novel*.  

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it as “the worst book he ever wrote” (20), a novel that “fails” because “the characters are not interesting in themselves. They have no more real substance than balloons with painted faces” (22). Donald Smalley’s collection of Trollope’s contemporary criticism, *Trollope: The Critical Heritage*, relegates *La Vendée*’s reviews to an Appendix (558-559) and glosses over the novel in the introduction by describing it as “a book much given to political argument and dreary factual detail” (3).

For many critics, the novel’s strong conservative political stance combined with its genre, historical fiction, unusual for Trollope, make *La Vendée* unpalatable. In his 1923 vindication of Trollope’s early play, *The Noble Jilt*, also set during the Revolutionary Wars and unpublished during Trollope’s lifetime, Michael Sadleir uses *La Vendée* as a negative example against which *The Noble Jilt*’s worth becomes apparent: he describes *La Vendée* as Trollope’s “only costume novel,” “a queer, unreadable lump of anti-revolutionary propaganda” (viii), which, “because it expressed only a reaction from disorder and has neither sense of character nor gleam of humour to relieve its doctrinising, may be neglected and forgotten” (viii-ix). Its fault lies in the primacy it gives to history over plot or characterisation; to Sadleir, it is “history with a faint, fictional disguise plastered along its front” (ix). Owen Dudley Edwards follows Sadleir’s cue and calls *La Vendée* an “ill-chosen foray into historical fiction” (8), and N. John Hall argues that commercial and critical failure were inevitable for the novel, which, “unlike the first two [novels, *The Macdermots of Ballycloran* and *The Kellys and the O’Kellys*] ... deserved its fate” (111). For Hall especially, *La Vendée*’s simplified politics and lack of realism condemn it:

*La Vendée* lacks the sense of immediate “reality” that one invariably discovers in Trollope .... The story is also un-Trollopian in its one-sidedness, being almost a hagiography of the royalists, with its pictures of fearless leaders and saintly French Catholic peasantry. *La Vendée* was Trollope’s weakest effort ever, his least convincing novel .... With *La Vendée*, Trollope’s writing career reached its nadir. (112)

Even Karen Faulkner’s “Anthony Trollope’s Apprenticeship,” a study of the narrative and stylistic strategies of Trollope’s earliest work, dismisses *La Vendée* as a failed attempt to mimic the style of Walter Scott’s historical fiction, in which “the land and
people ... seem peculiarly flat and stark” (175). Faulkner concludes that the novel “can be seen only as rather facile propaganda after the fact” and “stands out as his weakest novel, the only one of no intrinsic interest” (176).

Such harsh dismissals of Trollope’s “often floundering” historical novel (Sanders Anthony Trollope 11) are nonetheless exceptional in their willingness to devote one or two sentences to La Vendée, which is more often completely ignored even in broad surveys of Trollope’s work. David Skilton, for example, distinguishes between the “undoubted failure” of La Vendée and the “high quality” of Trollope’s first novel, The Macdermots of Ballycloran (2), but ultimately dismisses all three of Trollope’s pre-Barsetshire novels as “more important in view of what came after than interesting in their own right” (1). Critics who skip over Trollope’s earliest works do so in implicit acceptance of apRoberts’s statement in The Moral Trollope that “[t]o begin at the beginning is to begin with The Warden, which is, as generally agreed, the start of his oeuvre” (34).

If the problem with La Vendée for these critics is that it is somehow strangely different from Trollope’s other novels—too conservative, too historical, and too unrealistic—I would argue that its resistance to criticism arises not out of the novel’s inherent qualities, but from a critical failure to ask the right questions about its aims. This critical failure is exacerbated by the fact that notices of La Vendée published when the novel first appeared were mostly favourable, in the conservative press at least. This indicates that La Vendée spoke to Victorian concerns about revolution and nationalism for at least part of its contemporary audience. If Trollope had not yet developed the stylistic and narrative strategies that align his later works with realism, political and moral complexity, and psychological depth, then the question critics should pose when reading La Vendée is, what is this novel doing instead? Trollope’s historical romance should be read as a continuation of the Burkean and Anti-Jacobin traditions of antirevolutionary writing that emerged in the 1790s and as an expression of the revolutionary era’s continued grip on mid-Victorian imaginations and anxieties as the 1840s drew to a close, rather than as a predecessor to the Barsetshire or Palliser novels. Trollope’s representation of Revolution, in other words, is pragmatic rather than mimetic, more interested in citing Burkean, antirevolutionary fear and rage than in narrating a complex historical reality.
In *La Vendée*, Trollope elaborates on Burke’s histrionic set-pieces and Anti-Jacobin stock villains, like Hamilton’s Vallaton, to cast his characters in a full-fledged melodrama that converts revolutionary concerns with political rights and enfranchisement, the creation of a modern state and the convergence of national belonging and citizenship into simplified moral questions. The melodramatic mode’s emotional excess allows Trollope to engage in the kinds of histrionic representations familiar from Burke’s embrace of conservative sensibility, while its nostalgic promotion of clear-cut, social and moral visibility permits Trollope to idealise the supposedly organic, Burkean social affections of a deferential, pre-revolutionary community. Furthermore, by containing his melodramatic representations within an authoritative, historical narrative, Trollope reduces the dialogic potential for expressing diverse voices of political dissent associated with stage melodrama. This strategy of containing the conflicts of the Revolution in the past points to Trollope’s second major representational strategy in *La Vendée*: he uses the historical tale, heir to the Anti-Jacobin novel’s disciplinary tactics, to distance the Revolution, whose stakes were once more immediately relevant in the 1848 context in which the novel was written. His use of the interrelated historical and national tale genres marks Trollope’s attempt to silence revolutionary voices and to locate sympathy with the Vendeans as an insurgent population victimised by the modern state, akin to other minor European nations struggling for sovereignty against their more powerful neighbours. However, this formal choice also highlights the ways in which Trollope’s representation of his Vendean insurgents draws upon the connected democratic and nationalist movements that resulted in the revolutions that swept across Europe in the late 1840s: by writing the Vendean War as a national tale, an Irish genre, Trollope explores the triangular relationship that existed among Britain, Ireland and France in the revolutionary era and the link between revolution and nationalism that the 1848 European revolutions brought into British political consciousness.

“It is Known to Every One”: History and Revolution

As revolution spread across Europe once again in 1848, Trollope was drawn to the events of the 1790s as a means of confronting the effects political violence could have on a community. This appears to be a move toward history and away from the contemporary
Irish subjects that dominated his political thought in that period. However, in reality this turn toward the French Revolution suggests an effort to displace and contain the possibility of revolutionary violence that re-emerged in the late 1840s and the problem of political marginalisation that characterised 1840s Ireland, by relegating these issues to the past. As the events of 1848 revived the fears of the 1790s, Trollope returned to the antirevolutionary tradition as a means of simplifying a complex revolutionary legacy. Although Trollope expresses hesitation about the process of transforming an historical event characterised by its incoherence into a simplified narrative, the Preface and opening to La Vendée finally accept the public bias that Trollope believes informs his Victorian audience’s interpretation of the Revolution.

In 1848, after the failure of his first two novels, The Macdermots of Ballycloran and The Kellys and the O’Kellys, Trollope turned to the history of the French Revolution for his third artistic attempt. Although La Vendée appears to move away from the Irish novel as a genre and from the Irish political concerns that occupied Trollope across his career, but especially in the late 1840s, Trollope actually uses his historical novel to continue to engage with the generic experiments and political questions centring on Ireland that underlie his first two novels and polemical works like his letters to the Examiner on the Irish famine. Colonised Ireland and revolutionary France had been politically linked in the British imagination since the 1790s, especially following the 1798 Irish Rebellion. Ireland, moreover, had profoundly affected British politics by becoming the reason behind the first two major constitutional changes of the nineteenth century, the 1801 Act of Union that was Britain’s response to the 1798 uprising, and Catholic Emancipation in 1829, precipitated by Daniel O’Connell’s election to Parliament in 1828 (Royle 68-69). Irish nationalists were also heavily aligned with the Chartist movement within Britain: the Irish Confederation and British Chartists established a “working relationship” leading up to 1848 (Royle128), and the prominent Chartist leader Feargus O’Connor was an Irish nationalist. According to historian John Saville, 1848 brought British politics into “the triangle of revolutionary Paris, insurgent Ireland, and a revitalised native Chartist movement in London and the industrial North” (1). For the first time in 1848, Saville argues, “the stimulus to revolutionary action by the events in France [occurred] at the
same time as Ireland was apparently moving in parallel with the radical movement in Britain” (27).

Yet, in addition to being read as an analogue to revolutionary France, Ireland was also frequently understood from the 1790s as a victimised, marginalised nation, similar to the royalist Vendée under republican French government. A 1798 article in the *Morning Post* attributed to Samuel Taylor Coleridge (Barrell 645) titled “Ireland and La Vendée” establishes a comparison between the two places based on their shared experiences of “the savage fury and rage of civil war” (n. pag.). While the article concludes that the comparison is “sickening and shocking” because Ireland’s victimisation occurs “in a period not of convulsion, not of revolution on the part of the People, but under a Government which boasts that their whole administration has been to Ireland a course of concession; mild, merciful, and benignant” (n. pag.), Coleridge nonetheless uses the atrocities of the Vendean War to draw attention to the parallel sufferings of the Irish under British rule. In his 1797 poem, “Fire, Famine, and Slaughter, A War Eclogue,” set in “a desolated Tract in la Vendée” (440), furthermore, Coleridge blames the British Prime Minister William Pitt for the deaths of “thrice three hundred thousand men” (23) in the Vendée, as well as for Irish suffering. The allegorical figure Fire’s description of the destruction she has committed in Ireland before appearing in the Vendée (46-61)

134 This quotation from Coleridge’s description of his poem’s setting is cited by page number. All subsequent references to the poem are cited by line number.

135 Fire states,

Sisters! I from Ireland came!  
Hedge and corn-fields all on flame,  
I triumphed o’er the setting sun!  
And all the while the work was done,  
On as I strode with my huge strides,  
I flung back my head and I held my sides,  
It was so rare a piece of fun  
To see the sweltered cattle run  
With uncouth gallop through the night,  
Scared by the red and noisy light!  
By the light of his blazing cot  
Was many a naked Rebel shot:  
The house-stream met the flame and hissed,  
While crash! fell in the roof, I wist,  
On some of those old bed-rid nurses,  
That deal in discontent and curses. (46-61)
constructs a parallel between Irish and Vendean rebellion that Trollope later builds on when he writes the Vendean War as a national tale.\footnote{I will return to the issue of political marginalisation as it occurs in La Vendée and builds on an Irish representational tradition in the third section of this chapter.}

La Vendée, then, represents more of a displacement of Trollope’s early literary and political preoccupations, as he turns to a foreign land and a distant past to process the problems of political extremism and marginalisation that he faced in late-1840s Ireland, than a turn away from his previous work. In the spring of 1848, in the midst of the ‘springtime of the peoples’ across Europe and at the height of Chartist protest in Britain and Ireland,\footnote{For more on Irish involvement in the Chartist movement in 1848, see Edward Royle’s Revolutionary Britannia? (127-134).} Trollope wrote to his mother Frances Trollope\footnote{It is uncertain where Trollope wrote this letter from. Hall dates the letter from “Ireland” (Letters 17), and in his Autobiography Trollope writes, “It was my duty at that time [1847-1848] to be travelling constantly in those parts of Ireland in which the misery and troubles thence arising [from the famine] were, perhaps, at their worst. The western parts of Cork, Kerry, and Clare were pre-eminently unfortunate” (82). Trollope dates a letter of 27 March 1848 from Killarney (Letters 16), but he lived in Clonmel, in County Tipperary, from 1844 (Autobiography 71-72).} to reassure her that reports of Irish insurrection were exaggerated:

Everybody now magnifies the rows at a distance from him. You write of tranquillity in Tuscany, where we expected to hear of revolt, provisional governments, and military occupation. And I get letters from England, asking me whether I am not afraid to have my wife and children in this country, whereas all I hear or see of Irish rows is in the columns of the Times newspaper ....\footnote{Trollope’s or Hall’s ellipses.} Here in Ireland the meaning of the word Communism— or even social revolution— is not understood. The people have not the remotest notion of attempting to improve their worldly condition by making the difference between the employer and the employed less marked. Revolution here means a row. Some like a row, having little or nothing to lose. These are revolutionists, and call for pikes. Others are anti-revolutionists, having something to lose and dreading a row. These condemn the pikes, and demand more soldiers and police. There is no notion of anything beyond this;— no conception of any theory such as that of Louis Blanc. My own idea is that there is no ground to fear
any general rising either in England or Ireland. I think there is too much intelligence in England for any large body of men to look for any sudden improvement; and not enough intelligence in Ireland for any body of men at all to conceive the possibility of social improvement. (*Letters* 17)

This account of the parallel situations in Britain, Ireland, France and Tuscany in 1848 reveals a number of key points in Trollope’s thought process that contribute to an understanding of his move toward the history of the Revolution at this moment in his career. First, Trollope’s discussion of Irish and French affairs in light of each other and the republican, nationalist revolutions sweeping Italy and the rest of Europe in this letter suggests that he was constantly processing the parallels and differences between the political situations uppermost in European consciousness at the time he wrote *La Vendée*. Trollope’s mother and other loved ones[^140] lived in Tuscany in the late 1840s, at the height of the Young Italy movement and as revolt spread across Italy and continental Europe in 1848-1849. The Italian revolutions resulted first in constitutional governments in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the Papal States, Tuscany and Piedmont, then in the establishment of republics in Rome and Tuscany in early 1849 as democrats gained control, and, finally, in a wave of counterrevolution and reaction after the French and Austrian armies successfully laid siege to Rome and Venice (Riall 20-25). The connection between democratic and nationalist movements in the Italian Risorgimento—which Trollope later fictionalised in his short story “The Last Austrian Who Left Venice,” set in 1860[^141]—must have influenced Trollope’s understanding of the colonised Ireland where he lived and the republican France of the 1790s that resurfaced again in 1848. As he was writing *La Vendée*, in other words, Ireland and the European ‘springtime

[^140]: Trollope’s brother Thomas Augustus Trollope moved to Florence after the initial democratic phase in the 1848-1849 revolutions. Trollope wrote to his brother in autumn of 1849, when T. A. Trollope’s wife Theodosia was ordered abroad for her health, “It is well for you that some of the continental republican bubbles have burst. This time last year you would hardly have known where to pitch yourself. I suppose you can now go to Florence for the winter, if you so please” (19-20).

[^141]: Trollope’s story, focusing on the courtship and marriage of an Austrian soldier and Venetian woman during the 1860 war, is sympathetic to individuals on both sides in the conflict. For more on “The Last Austrian Who Left Venice” and Trollope’s attitude toward Italy more generally, see Toni Cerutti’s “‘The Last Austrian Who Left Venice’: Anthony Trollope’s Pictures of Italy.”
of the peoples\textsuperscript{142} continued to be uppermost in his mind and the lens through which he viewed French politics.

Furthermore, by dismissing the possibility of revolution in Britain and Ireland, Trollope follows the trend outlined in the previous chapter of responding to working-class protest in 1848 by trivialising it, as Thomas Carlyle does on the day of the Kennington Common rally when he writes to his wife, “Know however, O Goody, that there is \textit{no revolution}” (\textit{Letters} \textit{23:11}). Yet, Trollope’s lengthy and complicated description of Irish politics, including both the condescending claim that the Irish do not have “enough intelligence” to enact change and the seeming recognition that economic inequality, the “marked” “difference between the employer and the employed,” poses a legitimate problem in Ireland, indicates that he continues to think about and wish to discuss Irish affairs despite his disavowal of a revolutionary threat. His summary of his position on Irish politics in \textit{An Autobiography} when he recalls a situation in which he was warned in late-1840s Ireland that he must choose sides between Catholics and Protestants (72-73) further demonstrates his efforts to contain and dismiss the Irish threat while disclaiming revolt and political violence:

\begin{quote}
Home Rule no doubt is a nuisance,— and especially a nuisance because the professors of the doctrine do not at all believe it themselves. There are probably no other twenty men in England or Ireland who would be so utterly dumbfounded and prostrated were Home Rule to have its way as the twenty Irish members who profess to support it in the House of Commons. But it is not to be expected that nuisances such as these should be abolished at a blow. Home Rule is at any rate better and more easily managed than the rebellion at the close of the last century;\textsuperscript{143} it is better than the treachery of the Union; less troublesome than [Daniel] O’Connell’s monster meetings; less dangerous than [William] Smith O’Brien and the battle of the cabbage-garden at Ballingary;\textsuperscript{144} and much less bloody than Fenianism. The descent from O’Connell to Mr. [Isaac]
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{142}See Lucy Riall’s discussion of the ‘springtime of the peoples’ in \textit{Risorgimento: The History of Italy from Napoleon to Nation-State} for more on Italy in 1848-49 (20-25).

\textsuperscript{143}The Irish Rebellion of 1798.

\textsuperscript{144}The insurrection in Ireland in 1848.
Butt has been the natural declension of a political disease, which we had no right to hope would be cured by any one remedy. (73)

By describing Home Rule as a “nuisance” unlooked for even by its professed supporters, Trollope minimises its importance for the Irish political landscape. Yet, his subsequent catalogue of Irish “rebellion,” “monster meetings,” “dangerous ... battle[s]” and “bloody” political movements suggests that anxiety about political violence underlies Trollope’s strategy of trivialising and dismissing Irish nationalism. His representational strategies in La Vendée follow a similar contradictory pattern: his shift in focus from contemporary Ireland to the historically distanced 1790s Vendée is a means of displacing the more immediate political problems of the late 1840s, and of Ireland in particular, while working to contain the political stakes of his novel within the past. However, by also writing in the excessive melodramatic mode, Trollope chooses to “magnif[y] the rows at a distance,” to return to the histrionic fears of the 1790s as a means of confronting their public revival in the 1840s.

La Vendée, then, does not mark the end of Trollope’s preoccupation with Ireland. In fact, by 1848 Trollope had no option but to turn away from the Irish novel at least superficially and temporarily. On 11 November, his publisher Henry Colburn wrote to him to express dismay at the “small” sale of his second novel, The Kellys and the O’Kellys (Letters 17): “it is evident that readers do not like novels on Irish subjects so well as on others. Thus you will perceive, it is impossible for me to give any encouragement to you to proceed in novel writing” (Letters 17-18). Despite this warning to Trollope to discontinue his career as a novelist, Colburn continues to mention La Vendée and agrees to see it on its completion, as it was already “nearly finished” (Letters 18). In his Autobiography, Trollope attributes Colburn’s willingness to consider La Vendée to its shift in genre and subject after the failure of The Kellys, writing, “Perhaps the historical title had appeared more alluring to him [Colburn] than an Irish subject; though it was not long afterwards that I received a warning from the very same house of business against historical novels” (80). Trollope’s turn to the historical novel and to the Revolution for material at this point in his career is thus at least in part an attempt to please his publishers and to experiment with a new genre rather than continuing in a direction that had led to the failure of his early novels. Similar practical concerns also
certainly motivate his turn away from the historical novel after *La Vendée* failed to sell. The anecdote he recalls in *An Autobiography* of an unnamed agent of the publishers Hurst & Blackett advising him against writing historical novels recalls Colburn’s earlier warning against Irish novels: “‘I hope it’s not historical, Mr. Trollope?’ he said. ‘Whatever you do, don’t be historical; your historical novel is not worth a damn’” (110-111). In fact, when *La Vendée* failed just as the Irish novels had done, Trollope questioned whether “that was my proper line” (*Autobiography* 85) and decided to stop writing novels. Instead, he tried writing a play, *The Noble Jilt*, also an historical work set during the Revolutionary Wars, which never made it to the stage (*Autobiography* 85-86).

Rather than dismissing *La Vendée* as un-Trollopian, therefore, we should look at the novel’s place in Trollope’s career as an example of his practical concern for the demands of his publishers and the literary marketplace that resulted in his experimentation with a number of forms and genres across his career. Despite Trollope’s formal flexibility at this stage in his career, however, his primary political preoccupation in this period continued to be Ireland: he wrote seven letters defending the British government’s response to the Irish famine that appeared in the *Examiner* between 25 August 1849 and 15 June 1850 at the same time that he was writing *La Vendée* (*Autobiography* 81-84).

With *La Vendée*, Trollope confronts the difficulties of representing a world not, as in the Barsetshire and Palliser novels, or even his early Irish novels, much like his own, but geographically and temporally distant, and characterised by political confusion, disorder and violence. When he returned to the poor sale of *La Vendée* in *An Autobiography*, Trollope recalls his discomfort with this first foray into historical fiction, while he still defends the novel’s merit:

> I have no doubt that the result of the sale of this story was no better than that of the two that had gone before. I asked no questions, however, and to this day have received no information. The story is certainly inferior to those which had gone before;— chiefly because I knew accurately the life of people in Ireland, and knew, in truth, nothing of life in the La Vendée country, and also because the facts of the present time came more within the limits of my powers of storytelling than those of past years. But I read the book the other day, and am not ashamed of it.
The conception as to the feeling of the people is, I think, true; the characters are distinct; and the tale is not dull. As far as I can remember, this morsel of criticism is the only one that was ever written on the book.

(81)

Trollope’s admission that he “knew ... nothing of life in the La Vendée country” illustrates the problem he encountered as he turned to an historical subject that was well-rehearsed in public discourse by this time, but which he could only access as a writer through the received opinion and political biases of the Victorian audience he was addressing. Any Victorian wishing to write an historical or fictional account of the Revolution was faced with the tremendous challenge posed by the Revolution’s incoherence, the vast collection of diverse records representing the range of polarised perspectives held by its actors, witnesses and the historians who shaped its legacy, and received opinion, in which any Victorian audience would be versed. Unlike Thomas Carlyle’s much better known French Revolution, which celebrates the Revolution’s complexity through its radical narrative technique, La Vendée reduces the historical record to a simplified narrative that draws on bias as a kind of conventional knowledge. This prepares the ground for the representational violence Trollope’s novel commits against alternative politics and perspectives as he “magnifies the rows at a distance” (Letters 17), reflecting the re-emergence of fears about revolutionary violence in 1848 that underlie Trollope’s efforts to dismiss political insurgency in his spring 1848 letter to Frances Trollope and in his Autobiography.

Trollope attempts to negotiate and narrate an unthinkably complex series of traumatic historical events for a British reading public through pre-existing, received notions of what it means to represent the French Revolution. The early reviews Trollope’s novel received on its publication in 1850 illustrate the extent of British familiarity with the Vendean War, as well as a willingness to blur the lines between history and fiction that disappears in the later critiques of La Vendée discussed above. John Bull’s notice of La Vendée concludes that the Vendean War “is a theme as suited to the novelist as it is to the historian” (395), and the Athenaeum reviewer argues that “[t]his might almost be called ‘a romantic history,’ instead of a historical romance: so well known are the leaders in the war of La Vendée in England” (708). According to these responses, the familiarity of the
Vendean narrative causes the distinction between history and fiction to dissolve: the narrative’s currency determines some of its truth and impact for the audience. This familiarity also enables Trollope’s contemporary reviewers to accept the novel as a realistic portrayal of events and characters, differing substantially from the twentieth-century critics who condemn La Vendée’s “flat” (Faulkner 175) characters and “propagand[istic]” plot (Sadleir viii). Unlike the later literary critics who read the novel’s characters as little more than “balloons with painted faces” (Polhemus 22), the John Bull reviewer accepts that Trollope portrays French rural character with “singular fidelity” (395) and argues that “[t]he story is full of stirring interest, and is well calculated to convey to the mind a picture of the state of French society during the first revolution” (395). The Athenaeum reviewer, furthermore, voices strong sympathy for the Vendean royalists, quoting at length from one of the novel’s comic passages in order to avoid the emotional intensity of the central plot; the reviewer states, “Let it be treated ever so lightly, ever so philosophically, the Vendéan war is virtually a sad chronicle of noble blood poured like water, and of brave lives laid down with a but poor result of victory. We have dwelt on one of its lighter episodes from a natural wish to escape the painfulness of the main record” (708). The reviewer’s comments suggest an established knowledge of “the main record” of the war, as well as a predetermined bias in favour of supposed Vendean heroism. Although La Vendée was only noticed in conservative and moderate publications, indicating that political agreement rather than artistic merit may have motivated these favourable responses to the novel, these reviews nonetheless also demonstrate that Trollope’s novel spoke to at least some members of its contemporary audience in a way that it fails to do for later readers and critics.

La Vendée was in part familiar to its 1850 audience because of its resemblance, as historical romance, to Walter Scott’s popular novels, and literary critics who approach La Vendée through its relation to Trollope’s attitude toward history in his broader work find a point of access for the novel that critics concerned primarily with Trollope’s politically balanced realism ignore. W. J. McCormack argues that La Vendée exhibits a thematic likeness to Scott’s historical fiction, “retain[ing] its own importance [in the historical novel genre] by virtue of its cleaving to Scott’s central concerns— revolution and the collapse of an allegedly better past” (ix). Although most of Trollope’s fiction focuses on
contemporary English life, and not the problem of representing the past, characters dealing with the forces of historical change do feature in major Trollope novels like *Barchester Towers* and *The Way We Live Now*. *La Vendée* does, then, retain some likeness to Trollope’s later work for critics like Robert M. Polhemus, who emphasise the conflict between progress and commitment to the past in Trollope’s writing. Polhemus argues that Trollope’s first three novels have nothing directly to do with the anatomy of English life on which he made his reputation. Yet in them emerges the typical Trollopian situation of people unwillingly caught up and menaced by change. He found he could represent broad historical changes by a few carefully drawn characters rooted in a particular environment. Also, there began to develop the conflict between his emotional conservatism and his intellectual, pragmatic liberalism, which animates so much of his writing. (10-11)

*La Vendée* in particular “shows clearly the characteristic world view that shapes his fiction. What matters about it is not the story, but Trollope’s interest in political power and historical movement” (20). Polhemus’s position on Trollope’s conflicted politics, developed by critics like John Halperin, has been complicated by more recent Trollope criticism that expands politics to include constructions of identity in his novels.\(^{145}\) Perhaps Polhemus’s reading of Trollope’s politics is ill-equipped to deal with broader definitions of politics that have emerged in recent decades, as well as the nuances of Trollopian realism. Polhemus’s comments about historical change in Trollope’s work, however, aptly point to the fearful resistance to historical change and nostalgic commitment to the past that fundamentally shape his representational strategies in *La Vendée*.

In *La Vendée*, Trollope exploits his audience’s potential familiarity and sympathy with his subject matter, evident in the novel’s contemporary reviews, and asserts that selectivity is necessary to the process of synthesising the complex events of the Revolution and shaping them into a cohesive narrative. Trollope’s Preface acknowledges as his source “the delightful Memoirs of Madame de Larochejaquelin” (5), or *Memoirs of* 

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\(^{145}\) See, for example, Margaret Markwick’s *New Men in Trollope’s Novels* and *The Politics of Gender in Anthony Trollope’s Novels*, a collection edited by Markwick, Deborah Denenholz Morse and Regenia Gagnier.
the Marchioness de Larochejaquelein, translated into English by Walter Scott in 1816. By identifying such source material, Trollope immediately points to his narrative’s royalist bias. The Preface further establishes his royalist position by noting that he features the author of the Memoirs in the novel as Madame de Lescure, the wife of one of the royalist leaders, whose “singular and sad lot [it was] to lose two husbands in the two Vendeian wars” (5). Despite such obvious statements of allegiance to his royalist source, Trollope does claim to intend some degree of historical authenticity in the novel; his Preface opens, “It is hoped that the historical details of the Vendeian war have not been greatly misrepresented in the following pages; and that a tolerably correct view is given of the general facts of the revolt, although much fiction and many fabulous characters have been introduced, to give something of the nature of a tale to the narrative” (5). This opening claim expresses how tentatively Trollope mixes “general facts” with “much fiction and many fabulous characters”: his hopes that history is “not ... greatly misrepresented” and that his work is “tolerably correct” voice Trollope’s concern that factual accuracy is at least partially lost in the process of narrating complex, polarising historical events in which no historical actor or faction is clearly right or wrong. Despite his opening statements of sympathy with royalist figures and perspectives, then, Trollope still articulates anxiety about his attempt to transform the historical record into a fictional narrative.

Early in the novel Trollope returns to the problem of representing the Revolution to an audience saturated in anecdotes, verifiable or apocryphal, of its achievements and its violence. La Vendée’s opening points to the audience’s familiarity with Revolution narratives:

The history of France in 1792 has been too fully written, and too generally read to leave the novelist any excuse for describing the state of Paris at the close of the summer of that year. It is known to every one that the palace of Louis XVI was sacked on the 10th of August. That he himself with his family took refuge in the National Assembly, and that he was taken thence to the prison of the Temple. (7)

In describing the events of 1792, Trollope suggests that the representational problem posed by the Revolution is one of the audience’s familiarity, or pre-conceived opinion:
the Revolution’s major events are “too fully written,” “too generally read” and “known to every one,” and can therefore no longer be represented in any original or compelling manner. Although writers lack “any excuse” for choosing Paris’s role in the Revolution as a subject, given the audience’s inundation with its stories, Trollope suggests, the audience’s knowledge of the Revolution can be a tool for writers who choose to use received opinion in order to invest readers in lesser known versions of events, as Trollope continues to claim:

The doings on the fatal 10th of August, and the few following days had, however, various effects in Paris, all of which we do not clearly trace in history. We well know how the Mountain became powerful from that day; that from that day Marat ceased to shun the light, and Danton to curb the licence of his tongue; that then, patriotism in France began to totter, and that, from that time, Paris ceased to be a fitting abode for aught that was virtuous, innocent, or high-minded; but the steady march of history cannot stop to let us see the various lights in which the inhabitants of Paris regarded the loss of the King, and the commencement of the first French Republic. (7)

Here, Trollope indicates that the public is not only familiar with the history of the Revolution, but that this consciousness is highly selective: the “various effects” of 10 August are not “clearly trace[d] in history.” Yet, Trollope admits that he does not intend to correct this lapse, as “the steady march of history cannot stop” to recover the complexity of the historical moment in all of its “various lights.” Trollope’s claim for the interest in his own story, therefore, rests in an extremely narrow representational gap: he diverges from the central narrative of events in Paris, but recognises that the full complexity of the revolutionary story remains unnarrated in his work. Such an admission highlights La Vendée’s own selectivity, a quality that distinguishes the novel from Carlyle’s explosive, multi-vocal work. Moreover, despite the claim that the Revolution is too well known to be narrated, Trollope chooses to adopt the position of catering to what he supposes are universally held antirevolutionary biases in the language with which he describes Paris after 10 August. Trollope places the claim that after the attack on the Tuileries “patriotism in France began to totter, and that, from that time, Paris ceased to be
a fitting abode for aught that was virtuous, innocent, or high-minded” as part of his catalogue of events falling under the umbrella statement “We well know how ....” He thus positions this antirevolutionary rhetoric as part of the legacy of historical knowledge accepted by both narrator and audience, as the common ground upon which the remainder of the novel is constructed, thereby attempting to conceal its extremism, eliminating diversity of opinion, and exploiting what appears to be established bias in the novel’s favour.

While he expresses a tentative anxiety about transforming incoherent historical events into fictional narrative, Trollope surrenders to the simplifying, reductive impulses that render the Revolution narratable at the expense of its complexity. His effort to simplify the Revolution as an event echoes his dismissal of the 1848 “rows” that occurred across Europe in his letter to his mother (Letters 17). Accepting and even promoting a clearly biased, pro-royalist version of events as “well know[n]” fact (La Vendée 7), Trollope’s opening prepares the reader for the violence of La Vendée’s histrionic representations, as he “magnifies the rows at a distance” (Letters 17) through his polarising political melodrama.

“I Know That I Have Been a Traitor”: Deferential Culture and the Pragmatics of the Melodramatic Mode

Trollope’s use of loaded and excessive melodramatic language shows the limits of narrative possibility by which he felt the story of the Revolution, and of the Vendean War especially, was restricted: the fragmented perspective that could construct a picture of historical complexity could not produce a cohesive fictional narrative. As a mode characterised by emotional and moral excess, the melodramatic mode is an apt heir for the revolutionary period’s ideological extremism, Edmund Burke’s histrionic theatricality, and the affective representational contest that centred on sensibility in the 1790s. Its nostalgic commitment to moral, social and political visibility, moreover, aligns it with Trollope’s reactionary celebration of the Vendée’s deferential, royalist culture. Divorced from its populist, interactive roots on the stage and contained by an authoritative narrative voice, Trollope’s melodrama, furthermore, silences the
melodramatic mode’s capacity for expressing dissent and heightens the affective, pragmatic drive that characterises melodrama’s schematic morality.

By capitulating to representational polarisation and excess, or “magnifying the rows at a distance” (Letters 17), Trollope locates his narrative within the tradition of “extravagance” and “intensity of moral claim” that Peter Brooks finds in the melodramatic mode (ix). In The Melodramatic Imagination, Brooks argues that the melodramatic mode’s “high emotionalism and stark ethical conflict” (12) emerge out of the French Revolution:

The origins of melodrama can be accurately located within the context of the French Revolution and its aftermath. This is the epistemological moment which it illustrates and to which it contributes: the moment that symbolically, and really, marks the final liquidation of the traditional Sacred and its representative institutions (Church and Monarch), the shattering of the myth of Christendom, the dissolution of an organic and hierarchically cohesive society, and the invalidation of the literary forms—tragedy, comedy of manners— that depended on such a society .... It comes into being in a world where the traditional imperatives of truth and ethics have been violently thrown into question, yet where the promulgation of truth and ethics, their instauration as a way of life, is of immediate, daily, political concern. When the revolutionary Saint-Just exclaims, “Republican government has as its principle virtue; or if not, terror,” he is using the manichaeistic terms of melodrama, arguing its logic of the excluded middle, and imaging a situation—the moment of revolutionary suspension—where the word is called upon to make present and to impose a new society, to legislate the regime of virtue. (14-15)

The melodramatic mode, in other words, uses Manichaean oppositions as a means of morally relocating a society that has rejected the political and religious institutions of its past.
This “logic of the excluded middle” (Brooks 15) characterised the extreme phase of the Revolution, particularly Maximilien Robespierre’s government during the Terror. On 5 Nivôse Year II, Robespierre defended his methods in moral, manichaeistic terms:

The function of government is to direct the moral and physical forces of the nation towards the goal of its appointing ....

Revolution is the war of liberty against its enemies: the constitution is the system of liberty victorious and at peace.

Revolutionary government needs extraordinary activity, precisely because it is at war. It is subject to less uniform and less rigorous rules, because the circumstances in which it exists are stormy and shifting, and above all because it is continually forced to deploy new resources rapidly, to confront new and pressing dangers ....

Revolutionary government owes good citizens full national protection; to enemies of the people it owes nothing but death. (99)

By imagining his government “at war” with the “enemies” of liberty, Robespierre slots the supporters of his Republic, or “good citizens,” and his political opponents, “the enemies of the people,” into the positions reserved, in traditional Manichaean theology, for God and Satan, good and evil. This translation of political polarisation into moral extremes for Robespierre appears more clearly in his address to the National Convention of 18 Pluviôse Year II. He states, “If the mainspring of popular government in peacetime is virtue, the mainspring of popular government in revolution is virtue and terror both: virtue, without which terror is disastrous; terror, without which virtue is powerless. Terror is nothing but prompt, severe, inflexible justice; it is therefore an emanation of virtue” (115). For Robespierre and his allies, virtue and terror, like Manichaean good and evil, cannot exist without each other. As Brooks writes, “Robespierre and Saint-Just are the ultimate models of reference [for the melodramatic mode], in their increasingly manichaeistic struggle of virtue, personalized in the Comité de Salut Public, eventually in themselves, against vice, the enemies of the Republic, the traitors, the uncitizens, the nonpersons” (203).

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146 25 December 1793.
147 5 February 1794.
The Vendean War provides a perfect example of the moral extremism operating for royalists and revolutionaries during the Terror, and remains controversial to historians even today. Reynald Secher’s history of the Vendean War, for example, expresses its sympathy for the Vendean royalists in its inflammatory title, translated into English as *A French Genocide: The Vendée.* Secher argues that the Convention’s response to the Vendean insurrection was “the single and terrible solution of an order for systematic extermination” (97) and that “[a] war of unbearable barbarity, which nevertheless remained a war, was followed by a cool organization of genocide” (111). Such accounts of republican atrocities continue the tradition of Vendean suffering described in the Marquise de la Rochejaquelein’s *Memoirs*, recognised as “The most famous royalist history of the Vendée” (Petitfrère 191). The extreme positions adopted by both sides during and after the conflict articulate the “logic of the excluded middle” (Brooks 15) that characterises the melodramatic mode, and its tendency to view opponents as “uncitizens” or “nonpersons” (Brooks 203). According to Simon Schama’s interpretation of the Vendean War in *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution*, the republican pacification of the Vendée was “the logical outcome of an ideology that progressively dehumanized its adversaries and that had become incapable of seeing any middle ground between total triumph and utter eclipse” (792). In fact, Schama specifically locates the Vendean War within the tradition of melodramatic ideology Brooks discovers in the Revolution’s conflicts, arguing that “[t]he brutality of the Vendée rising, and of its repression, was a product of the Manichaean language of the revolutionary war” (693). The Vendée, therefore, seems to have functioned as the stage on which revolutionaries and royalists most fully acted out their ideological extremism, and continues to be a site of ideological conflict among historians today.

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148 The original French title is *Le genocide franco-française: La Vendée-Vengé.*

149 Schama’s history is also political. In their introduction to *Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities and the French Revolution*, Colin Jones, Josephine McDonagh and Jon Mee locate Schama’s book within a “reactionary and xenophobic English political trajectory as regards the French Revolution, leading from Edmund Burke’s *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790), through Dickens and the Baroness d’Orczy’s *Scarlet Pimpernel* (1903) to the *Citizens* (1989) of Simon Schama” (6-7). Despite its questionable historical objectivity, Schama’s work remains a valuable text in my discussion of the revolutionary context’s political extremism, not least because it continues to participate in that extremism two hundred years after 1789.
Melodrama is thus the perfect literary mode for articulating extreme ideologies; its use by both royalists and republicans, however, suggests that, like sensibility in the 1790s, the melodramatic mode became politically contested as it developed in the early nineteenth century. Its representational excess marks it as an apt heir to 1790s theatricality, particularly Burke’s histrionic parliamentary performances and overwrought Reflections; however, its importation from revolutionary France and presence as a populist form on the English stage emphasises its radical roots. Samuel Taylor Coleridge describes melodrama as “modern Jacobinical drama” (qtd in Hays and Nikopoulou Introduction viii), and, as Michael Hays and Anastasia Nikopoulou note, the earliest English melodramas were staged by the radical Thomas Holcroft, whose politics were known to be “grounded in the populist radical rhetoric that erupted in England in the aftermath of the French Revolution” (Introduction viii). Stage melodrama was a popular, in addition to a populist, dramatic form, associated with generic hybridity and illegitimacy. As Elaine Hadley writes, “Frequently labeled ‘monster melodrama’ because it was a form of ‘illegitimate drama,’ it was the result of mixed breeding, the contested bastard to ‘legitimate drama’” (63). Melodrama’s supposed monstrosity also suggests its aptness for representing what had become known among antirevolutionaries as the “monstrous tragi-comic scene” of the Revolution (Burke Reflections 10).

As it developed in nineteenth-century England, the melodramatic mode could voice resistance to dominant bourgeois culture, as well as nostalgia for a past characterised as a kind of Burkean, organic society, hierarchically bound by social sympathy and obligation. Hadley’s book Melodramatic Tactics: Theatricalized Dissent in the English Marketplace explores how melodrama influenced English public debate across the nineteenth century, “serv[ing] as a behavioral and expressive model for several generations of English people” (3) and appearing as a key representational mode in pamphlet and newspaper battles from the Old Price Wars to anti-Poor Law protest to agitation for marriage law reform. In all of these instances, Hadley finds, melodrama expressed dissent from the modern, capitalist state and the privatising, classificatory tendencies that resulted in increased secrecy and alienation among its citizens. The

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150 English melodrama originated as a literally illegitimate dramatic form, first emerging in theatres that were not licensed to “perform the ‘spoken drama’” (Hadley 66).
content of melodramatic representation, in this context of resistance to capitalist modernity, was frequently reactionary and nostalgic, seeking to restore public sympathy through an appeal to a conservative, hierarchical, patriarchal political model, like the organic society defended by Burke. If, as John P. Farrell argues in *Revolution as Tragedy*, tragedy was used to articulate the nineteenth-century moderate’s “feeling of cultural estrangement” (19), “mak[ing] visible the world the moderate sees ... [and] mak[ing] the moderate himself visible” (38), in a post-revolutionary world characterised by ideological extremity the melodramatic mode establishes a different kind of visibility, one that recalls pre-revolutionary social and political codes and expresses a nostalgic commitment to a patriarchal, deferential society whose operation was predicated on the visibility of each member’s place in an elaborate social hierarchy. Hadley suggests that “melodrama derives its ethic of visibility from traditional codes of social display” (70), and I would add that melodrama’s “broad public gestures” (Hadley 110) and “intensity of moral claim” (Brooks ix) work to transform the elaborate but clear-cut and eminently visible system of social gradations and obligations belonging to patriarchal, deferential culture into the moral content of the melodramatic plot, which places its characters in similarly visible positions as virtuous victims or sinister villains. In its idealised recollection of a clearly articulated, hierarchical culture, melodrama is an essentially nostalgic mode:

Hearkening back to a deferential society and its patriarchal grounds for identity, the melodramatic mode in its various manifestations was profoundly reactionary, if not precisely politically reactionary. It thoroughly idealized a passing deferential society and the status hierarchies such a society nurtured; it also shared many of its features with the nearly forgotten procedures of sentimentality— the fall of a tear, the sympathetic exchange. (Hadley 11)

Although Hadley’s study explores melodrama as a mode of political resistance, her description of its nostalgic content suggests its suitability for presenting an idealised pre-revolutionary society, like the royalist, Vendean community Trollope portrays. Trollope’s alignment of royalism with melodramatic virtue further cements the mode’s affinity to reactionary ideology.
Trollope thus enters a contested representational field in writing melodrama, and recognises that polarised stances appear on both sides of the revolutionary conflict. The Vendean population, for example, feels forced into armed resistance by the republicans’ readiness to see enemies everywhere; before rising against the Republic’s conscription measures, the Vendeans “ask each other whether they had better not act as enemies, if they were to be considered as enemies” (19). Negotiating, assuming a moderate position between the two extremes, or avoiding conflict are not options, the narrator states: “In France, at that time, political inactivity was an impossibility. Revolt against the Republic, or active participation in its measures, was the only choice left to those who did not choose to fly their own country...” (19). In this context of extremism, Trollope’s royalists and republicans frame the Vendean War in terms of moral absolutes: Barrère, a republican military leader, describes Vendean gallantry as “an inspiration of the devil” (220), while the Vendean General-in-Chief Cathelineau imagines the conflict as a “fight with demons” (210). The Vendeans at large reproduce this language: the old Marquis, Henri Larochejaquelin’s father, imagines the republican Westerman to be a “blacker demon” than his compatriot Santerre (176), and describes all of the republican military leaders as “those wolves of Paris” (176). Some of Trollope’s characters are aware that they exaggerate the reality of their situation, but ultimately cannot imagine the Vendean conflict in any other terms. When Marie de Lescure learns that Santerre has shown mercy to her friends the Larochejaquelins, she cannot reconcile this account of Santerre’s behaviour with her conceptual demonisation of him. She exclaims, “Oh! he is a most horrid monster! It was he that led out our dear sainted King to be murdered; it was he that urged on the furious mob to spill so much blood. They say that in all Paris there is not a greater wretch than this Santerre” (280). Although she is forced to revise her opinion of Santerre by this new evidence of his compassion, her modified attitude still retains its Manichaeian frame; she states, “People say that the father of evil himself is painted blacker than he really is” (281). Although Marie no longer locates Santerre opposite “our dear sainted King” as a “horrid monster” on her scale of virtue and villainy, and questions the accuracy of such excessive representation generally, she continues to conceive “the father of evil himself” as her ultimate imaginative reference point for Santerre.

151 Trollope departs from the usual spelling of Larochejaquelein or La Rochejaquelein and Westermann.
The narrator’s participation in such manichaeistic representation aligns Trollope with the royalist position, which characterises the Vendeans as saints and the republicans as demons. The narrator argues that the Revolution is “a beast of prey” (12) and the Committee of Public Safety is “the incubus which oppressed [the French]” (215). The narrator also demonises the Vendeans’ immediate opponents, including portions of the republican army and its leaders. Barrère, the novel suggests, has been twisted into monstrosity by the conditions of the Revolution:

Nature had not formed him to be a monster gloating in blood; the Republic had altered the disposition which nature had given him, and he learnt among those with whom he had associated, to delight in the work which they required at his hands. Before the Reign of Terror was over, he had become one of those who most loudly called for more blood, while blood was running in torrents on every side .... (218)

In addition, the narrator rewrites revolutionary symbols according to the royalist perspective: the Marseillais soldiers, whose zeal in the republican army became emblematic of revolutionary patriotism and was memorialised in the French national anthem, appear as negative symbols in La Vendée. For Trollope, the Marseillais are men who were as ferocious in the hour of victory, as they were prone to fly at the first suspicion of defeat—men who delighted in bloodshed, but who preferred finding their victims ready bound for the slaughter. It was the abject cowardice of these troops, which gave so wonderful a career of success to the Vendeans; it was their diabolical cruelty which has made the sufferings of the royalists more notorious even than their bravery.

(142)

This negative characterisation of the Marseillais troops retains their symbolic potential, but relocates them on the Manichaean spectrum of extremes, pairing their “abject cowardice” and “diabolical cruelty” against the Vendeans’ “bravery” and “sufferings,” thereby morally rewriting known revolutionary symbols in favour of the Vendean cause.

These re-imagined republican symbols appear alongside new symbols of Vendean moral victory. After taking Saumur, the peasants in the Vendean army destroy the revolutionary poplar tree and cap of liberty and burn the municipal documents that they
see as impinging on their local independence (155). More importantly, however, they construct symbols of their own that stand in for the sacredness of their cause in a world where sacredness has been radically challenged. These symbols take on the function that Brooks traces in the melodramatic mode, of “locat[ing] and ... articulat[ing] the moral occult” (5), or rendering hidden moral meaning visible. The most central Vendean moral symbol is Marie Jeanne, a cannon taken from the republican regiment at St Florent when hostilities commence as a result of republican conscription efforts, before it can be fired on the townspeople (26-29). Marie Jeanne is taken as a “trophy” of military victory (29), but comes to articulate occulted moral meaning for the community. The population ritually blesses and baptises the cannon as part of a ceremony of prayer and thanksgiving after the skirmish at St Florent (30-31), and a mythology surrounding its sacred power emerges:

The cannon was a lucky cannon, a kind cannon, and a good cannon— a *bon enfant*, and worthy to be blessed; it had refused to pour forth its murderous fire against the inhabitants of a town that was so friendly to the King. It was decidedly a royalist cannon; it had very plainly declared the side it meant to take; nothing but miraculous interference on its own part could have prevented its having been discharged on the people .... [I]t should never be used except in the service of the King, and against the enemies of the throne.

And so the priests blessed the cannon, and the people baptized it, and called it Marie Jeanne .... (30)

Marie Jeanne’s “miraculous interference” in favour of the royalists ensures that it becomes loaded with the evidence of their virtue and the justness of their cause. As the war progresses, Marie Jeanne’s reputation as a “staunch royalist” (74) grows and spreads, as does the myth surrounding its role at St Florent: “It was universally credited among the peasantry, that at Cathelineau’s touch, this remarkable piece of artillery had positively refused to discharge itself against the Vendeans ...” (74).

Objects and persons believed to be endowed with legible sacred, moral meaning also feature as motivation for the Vendeans when they are engaged in battle. Marie Jeanne and Cathelineau are both fetishised by the forces on the eve of the battle at Saumur:
Cathelineau had brought with him the celebrated cannon of St Florent, “Marie Jeanne,” and she now stood in the market place of Doué, covered with ribbons and flowers. Many of the men had never hitherto seen this wonderful piece of artillery, and they hastened to look at it. “Marie Jeanne” that night was patted, kissed, and caressed by thousands. Cathelineau was equally the object of their admiration; every peasant who had not yet seen him, hurried to gaze on him .... (121)

Although Marie Jeanne is lost to the republicans on the first disorganised Vendean attack at Saumur, on the entrenchment at Varin (133-134), Henri Larochejaquelin uses its loss to inspire his forces for the second attack, exclaiming, “let us be the men who rescue her from these traitors” (135).

The mysterious appearance of a man calling himself the Bishop of Agra who assumes symbolic power for the Vendeans after their defeat at Varin likewise exemplifies the process by which the melodramatic mode makes occulted moral meaning visible for Trollope’s characters. The Bishop of Agra is dressed in traditional religious costume, “the gorgeous robes of a bishop of the Church of Rome as he would appear at the altar of his cathedral when about to celebrate high mass,” but his splendid dress is accentuated by his physical person: he is “a very tall man—nearly seven feet high,” “his voice was full and deep, but very musical; his face was supremely handsome, but devoid of all traces of passion” (137). The Vendeans’ response to the Bishop’s procession through the army is more significant: they “congregated round him; and kissed his garments—if they could even touch the shoes on his feet, they thought themselves happy” (137). The Bishop’s visit has a “miraculous” effect on the peasants’ morale (139) because they trust that “the promises of a bishop were assurances direct from heaven: they would consider it gross impiety to have any doubt of victory, when victory had been promised them by so holy a man as he who had just addressed them” (137). Strangely, as Trollope indicates in a footnote on the Bishop’s appearance, the historical man was “an imposter,” posing as a Bishop and deceiving the Vendean troops and their leaders (137). The Vendeans’ faith in him despite his illegitimacy, however, speaks to the power of melodrama and deferential culture to produce the kind of visible, symbolic resonance that locates moral influence within the person of a man assuming a Bishop’s rank and appearance: it is significant that
Trollope only remarks on the Bishop of Agra’s deception in his footnote, leaving his legible, symbolic power intact for the Vendean characters within the body of his text.

Trollope, furthermore, continually articulates his novel’s melodramatic moral meaning by depicting historical figures as sainted or heroic characters. This feature of melodrama contributes to the psychological flatness of Trollope’s characters as they become representative of something outside of themselves rather than of their own subjectivity. Melodramatic characters are usually flat, underdeveloped and representative, rather than individual or psychologically complex. The nuanced psychological conflict that usually appears in Trollope’s later works, as fully developed characters navigate complex moral dilemmas, is exteriorised in La Vendée as characters take on symbolic meaning as figures for virtue or villainy. Trollope’s historical heroes seem to embody goodness, and are thus worshipped by their followers. Henri’s troops fight with red scarves tied around their waists in imitation of their leader and as a symbol of their military honour (172-174), and de Lescure establishes “extreme popularity” (349) among the peasants, whose love for him extends to the ladies of his family, who are “ador[ed]” by one poor man as “angels from heaven” (337). Cathelineau, however, is the historical figure who embodies the greatest amount of melodramatic virtue: he is imagined as the “future saviour of [the] country” (206), “the hero who first led [the Vendeans] to victory” (209), and, after his mortal injury, “the stricken idol of [Agatha Larochejaquelin’s] admiration” (207). He is most frequently figured as a saint, appearing as “the Saint of Anjou” (84, 159), the “sainted leader” (205) and “the sainted Cathelineau” (213). Cathelineau thus leads the Vendean by becoming virtue personified.

Trollope also uses his non-historical, fictional characters as representatives of melodramatic good and evil, which is perhaps his purpose in adding characters like Agatha Larochejaquelin, Marie de Lescure and Adolphe Denot to his historical cast. Agatha is inscribed with the same saintly virtue as Cathelineau and is the equal object of devotion from the peasantry (38). Just as Cathelineau is continually described as a saint, Agatha appears frequently as an inspiring “angel” (59) or “an angel upon earth” (204).

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152 Brooks argues that “[m]elodrama represents both the urge toward resacralization and the impossibility of conceiving sacralization other than in personal terms. Melodramatic good and evil are highly personalized: they are assigned to, they inhabit persons who indeed have no psychological complexity but who are strongly characterized” (16).
She is even imagined by the republican Barrère, however scornfully, as “one of those modern Joans of Arc” (229). Agatha’s position as an angelic counterpart to Cathelineau is most legible as she nurses him on his deathbed: Cathelineau’s feelings of “mysterious love” for her urges him to travel with his mortal wound to the hospital at which she volunteers in order to see the “glorious face” of “the fair angel” (207-208) before his death. When they both declare their love just before Cathelineau dies, he imagines her love as that of “angels” (211) and her speech as “heavenly words” from a woman he “almost worshipped” (212).

For Trollope, the melodramatic mode is a means of authoritatively expressing the pragmatic and affective drives that underlie his antirevolutionary political position. Trollope’s narrativised, novelistic melodramatic mode divorces melodrama from the public, interactive origins of melodrama on the stage, in pamphlets and in newspapers, submitting it to absolute authorial control and eliminating the theatrical audience’s role in expressing concurrence with or dissent from its histrionic excess. Hays and Nikopoulou argue that critics like Brooks who theorise and aestheticise melodrama “obscure the historical situation, the ideological dynamics, and the function of the melodrama in the nineteenth century in favor of overarching generalizations about affect” (Introduction vii). In fact, however, Trollope’s novelised melodrama intends precisely that: to enforce and naturalise related ethical and ideological positions through affect. Removed from the stage, where the audience is immediately, materially present and active in accepting or rejecting melodramatic excess, melodrama as a narrative project, contained and controlled by an authorial voice, loses its public role as a vehicle for popular or populist opinion, and is reduced to its nostalgic, histrionic content.

Reduced to its aesthetic features, melodrama simply produces and conveys emotion, as Walter Scott’s comparison between melodrama and Ann Radcliffe’s Gothic novels suggests:

The species of romance which Mrs. Radcliffe introduced, bears nearly the same relation to the novel that the modern anomaly entitled a melo-drame does to the proper drama .... [I]t attains its interest neither by the path of comedy nor of tragedy; and yet it has, notwithstanding, a deep, decided, and powerful effect, gained by means independent of both— by an appeal,
in one word, to the passion of fear, whether excited by natural dangers, or by the suggestions of superstition. (110)

The melodramatic mode’s appeal to fear, its “deep, decided, and powerful effect” (110), is what defines it when it is contained within the privatised, closed form of the novel. Nikopoulou’s examination of the differences between Scott’s novels and melodramatic stage adaptations of his plots suggests that, while stage melodrama is characterised by its expressiveness, its ability to give “back to history ... its voice, its street music, its market noise” (136), the historical novel, with its closed, authorial narrative “secured history’s compliance by silencing its material traces (its bodies, sites, localities, oral traditions), ... remain[ing] isolated from the public sphere of action, from the real drama of the public stage” (131). Following this logic, Trollope’s incorporation of the melodramatic mode into the historical novel genre divorces melodrama from its illegitimacy and populist origins on the stage and transforms its dialogic, material expressiveness into histrionic, authoritative narrative excess in the style of Burke’s Reflections. Melodrama’s complex, carnivalesque joining of voices of popular, often radical, dissent and reactionary political ideology thus disintegrates when it is subjected to the single controlling voice of an authoritative narrator like Trollope’s, which silences or contains diverse alternative perspectives, removes stage melodrama’s public, interactive quality and leaves only its moralistic, affective aesthetic content, or its “deep, decided, and powerful effect” (Scott 110).

Trollope’s fictional characters, then, adhere to a melodramatic vision that builds on antirevolutionary tropes established by Burke and Anti-Jacobin writers like Elizabeth Hamilton and encodes a silencing of revolutionary, and even moderate, plots and perspectives. Most notably, Trollope transforms Burke’s Versailles set-piece into an elaborate melodramatic narrative of potential home invasion and sexual violence perpetrated against Marie de Lescure, the embodiment of melodramatic, persecuted virtue. When a small band of Westerman’s forces attacks Clisson, the Lescure home, in the middle of the night (239-254), Trollope presents the threat to the family home as an attack on Marie’s virtue. Westerman offers Marie up to one of his men as a target for rape, or what he calls “some of our rough republican hospitality,” before the guillotine “dispos[es]” of her (240). When the republican forces reach Clisson, the resulting scene
replays and extends Burke’s famous description of Marie Antoinette’s potential rape (Reflections 71-72). Henri rushes into Marie’s bedroom, taking her in his arms and carrying her through the house to escape the soldiers:

As he began to descend the stairs the loud noise of the troopers’ boots, and the quick voice of Westerman giving his commands in the hall, told him at once that the house was already occupied by the blues .... He took a large horse pistol from his belt, and holding it by the barrel, jumped down three stairs at a time, and already had his foot on the sill of the open window, when Sergeant Craucher, who had been the first of the blues to enter the house, rushing up the stairs, succeeded in getting hold of the cloak which covered Marie. He pulled it from off her neck and shoulders, and her beautiful dark clustering curls fell down over Henri’s shoulder. Her pale face, and white neck and bosom were exposed: her eyes were fast closed, as though she expected instant death, but both her arms were tightly fastened round her lover.

Craucher stumbled in his hurry in rushing up the stairs, but he still held fast to the collar of the cloak.

“I must stop your further journey, my pretty dear,” said he: “the night air is not good for you— by heavens its the red—”

He never finished his speech, or attempted to make another .... As he pulled the cloak, Henri raised his right arm powerfully, and drove the butt-end of the pistol which he held, right through his skull, and scattered his brains upon the staircase. The grasp of the dying man was so firm that he could not extricate the cloak from his fingers. He saw that his only chance of escape was to relinquish it; he did so, and as he leapt from the window to the ground, poor Marie had nothing round her but her slight night dress. (248)

Marie’s exposure and passiveness, set against Henri’s active protection of her person, could be read as Trollope’s ratification of a system of gender inequality that opposes feminine weakness to masculine strength; Jane Nardin’s He Knew She Was Right: The Independent Woman in the Novels of Anthony Trollope uses this description of Marie’s
incapacitation as a point of contrast with Trollope’s presentation of women in his later work, comparing Marie specifically with *The Way We Live Now*’s assertive Winifred Hurtle (xiii-xvii). For Nardin, these contrasting characters are evidence of a “dramatic change” (xvii) in Trollope’s attention to women’s issues across his career. This interpretation, however, fails to recognize how very different *La Vendée*—a melodrama contained within an historical novel—is from Trollope’s later realist works: Marie can become a passive “fainting girl” (249) in the passage because she is a symbol for virtue under attack rather than a fully individualised person.

By writing the invasion of Clisson as an assault on a naked, helpless Marie de Lescure, Trollope redeployed the familiar trope of antirevolutionary writing, Burke’s imagined rape of Marie Antoinette, as the kind of “sign language” Brooks associates with melodrama’s “recognition of virtue” (28): the threatened rape of an unconscious victim is a sign of republican villainy, employing “a vocabulary of clear, simple, moral and psychological absolutes” (Brooks 28) that reinforces the novel’s opposition of Vendean saints to revolutionary devils and that figures Vendean virtue and victimisation through the symbolic republican attack on one representative woman. Moreover, Marie’s closed eyes and fainting fit combine with her silence to express the inexpressible: mute gesture, like Burke’s famous flinging of a dagger in the House,\(^\text{153}\) can speak to a histrionic pitch of emotion that words often cannot reach.\(^\text{154}\) Marie’s muteness draws attention to her exposed, fainting body, the sign of her virtue, and articulates that virtue more fully than language could, particularly through its resonance with earlier texts of victimisation by revolutionary violence, like Burke’s. Marie’s silent, passive victimisation thus heightens Trollope’s affective appeal, or, to use Scott’s language, the production of a “deep decided, and powerful effect” of “fear” in his reader (110).

Yet, Trollope’s reliance on the expressiveness of Marie’s mute gesture also indicates how his melodramatic representation of the Revolution silences potential voices of dissent: representation outside of the melodramatic moral and ideological terms.

\(^{153}\) See Chapter 2.

\(^{154}\) Brooks writes that gestures “often take the form of the message of innocence and purity, expressed in an immediate inarticulate language of presence: a moment of victory of pure expression over articulation” (72). Melodramatic gesture is often accompanied by muteness: “Mute gesture is an expressionistic means—precisely the means of melodrama—to render meanings which are ineffable, but nonetheless operative within the sphere of human ethical relationships” (72).
established by Trollope’s reactionary novel is impossible, as fully-developed, articulate voices are replaced by a code of affective, excessive melodramatic signs. Nardin is right to note the gap between articulate women in Trollope’s work and La Vendée’s virtuous but passive heroine: unlike Winifred Hurtle, Alice Vavasor or Emily Trevelyan, Marie cannot stake her own political position because, at the climax of her sexual victimisation, she has no voice. Even Elizabeth Hamilton’s Harriet Orwell and Frances Burney’s Ellis, heroines within the antirevolutionary tradition Trollope builds upon, articulate claims for women’s education or express resistance to their exploitation, gaining the voices that Marie, simplified to a melodramatic symbol of royalist virtue, is denied. The potential rape scene is described through the perspective of the male hero, Henri, and the subsequent passage, in which the narrator addresses Henri directly in present tense, exemplifies how Trollope attempts to carry Henri, Marie and the reader away by the scene’s emotional immediacy: “Run now, Henri, run your best ...; run, dear friend, and loving cousin; run faster with that precious trembling burden of yours, or all you have yet done, will have been done in vain” (249). Trollope’s immediate, present-tense exhortation suggests that the reader should be passively picked up and carried off, like Marie, by Henri’s heroic actions, as readers are similarly carried away by Sydney Carton’s plot, alongside the Manette and Darnay family as they escape Paris at the end of A Tale of Two Cities, through Charles Dickens’s use of the present tense. Marie’s silencing within the melodramatic plot thus exposes Trollope’s broader silencing of alternative positions and readings of the Revolution. Marie is reduced to an eloquent but passive female body, while the vast, complex Revolution is reduced to a fearful scene of home invasion and rape. Most importantly, the reader is treated as another passive, fainting figure like Marie, carried away by melodrama’s excess and in Henri’s heroic arms.

Trollope’s other major fictional character, Adolphe Denot, combines several key melodramatic and antirevolutionary roles: he is a melodramatic villain and traitor to the Larochejaquelin family, the sexually voracious male revolutionary that appears as a stock character in Anti-Jacobin texts, and the son or brother figure who disrupts the patriarchal

155 These characters appear in The Way We Live Now, Can You Forgive Her? and He Knew He Was Right, respectively.
family romance. By situating Denot as a traitor within an aristocratic, patriarchal family, Trollope aligns his code of melodramatic morality with the aristocratic, deferential culture that such families represent within the political family romance: Denot is raised by the Larochejaquelins, becoming a brother figure for Henri, and his conversion to the revolutionary cause thus takes the form of personal betrayal and victimisation of the family that had embraced him. According to Brooks, “Betrayal is the personal version of evil” (33) in the melodramatic mode, and after Denot leads the republican Generals in an attack on Durbellière, his adoptive family’s home (255-267), he becomes known to the Vendeans as “the traitor” (255), “that traitor Denot” (282), and “the worst of traitors, and the most cruel of enemies” (270). However, because Trollope figures Denot’s betrayal as an invasion of the patriarchal, aristocratic home, he casts Denot as the revolutionary son or brother of the political family romance, who attempts to cast off the affective bonds of the patriarchal family and thus challenge deferential culture more broadly. Stage and domestic melodrama both frequently locate their representatives of good and evil within the family, and in the Victorian domestic melodrama, Martha Vicinus argues, “The villain’s greatest crime is to destroy the family” (138). Yet, in Denot’s case, betrayal within the family implies an intention to destroy the entire patriarchal old-regime system the aristocratic family represents.

Trollope also merges the threat Denot poses to the patriarchal family with the sexual voraciousness of the stock Anti-Jacobin revolutionary villain, familiar as Hamilton’s Vallaton and Burney’s unnamed commissary. Although Denot betrays Henri and the old Marquis, his victimisation of Agatha constitutes his true threat to the family’s integrity. After Agatha refuses his marriage proposals, Denot threatens to return to Durbellière to “seize [her] as my own” (118), a warning of his eventual plan to rape her, carry her off and force her into marriage with republican backing when he betrays the Larochejaquelins. His adherence to the revolutionary cause, then, is primarily motivated by the opportunistic desire to revenge himself against and possess Agatha (226-227). When he returns to Durbellière with Santerre to “seize” Agatha (118), he particularly wishes to gain physical power over her, thinking, “Let me gain her person, and her heart will follow” (228). This rape fantasy dominates his perception of the attack on

156 Hadley notes that “all interactions are figured as familial; all people are family” (112).
Durbellière, aligning him with the soldiers who attack Marie at Clisson or the mob that invades Marie Antoinette’s bedroom at Versailles in Burke’s Reflections: “He had firmly resolved to thrust himself upon Agatha as a conqueror; to rush upon her as an eagle upon its prey, and to carry her off with a strong hand, disregarding her cries, as the eagle disregards the bleating of the lamb” (258). Even Denot’s own imagining of this potential rape replicates the moral terms of the melodrama, casting Agatha as an innocent victim, a “lamb” that becomes his “prey.”

As Denot’s recognition that Agatha is his innocent victim suggests, he is entirely aware that he is performing melodramatic villainy, and Trollope represents him as a familiar melodramatic type. His striking physical and emotional characterisation is recognisable and citational. Brooks argues that in melodrama, evil must be fully personalized, the villain highly characterized, in the post-sacred universe, where personality alone is the effective vehicle of transindividual messages. This does not mean that the villain is complex or nuanced as a psychological character. On the contrary, he is reduced to a few summary traits that signal his position, just as, physically, do his swarthy complexion, moustache, cape, and concealed dagger. But he is strongly characterized, a forceful representation of villainy. (33)

Trollope’s John Bull reviewer immediately recognised the exaggeration of Denot’s characterisation; although he has no “cape, and concealed dagger,” Denot appears to the reviewer as “a grotesque figure,” “repulsive,” “unnatural and incredible even in that period of moral horrors and monstrosities” (395). His grotesqueness arises in part from the physical disfigurement caused by the hatred and jealousy that mark his villainy: his potential for evil first appears when he makes a violent offer of marriage to Agatha (114-118), declaring his love with a “look intended to represent both thunder and lightning” (116) and becoming “ferocious” and “furious” when she refuses him (118).

Denot’s performance of melodramatic villainy, moreover, further marks him as a traitor and transforms his physical appearance. When Denot attempts to carry Agatha away from Durbellière, for example, the young Chevalier Mondyon strikes him across the face with a cherry switch (266-267), cutting his cheek and causing swelling (272). The cut from the cherry switch, however, is a superficial mark of Denot’s villainy, and
his physical appearance alters considerably apart from the cut and resulting scar simply because of his attempt to act out his plot of treason and rape. When de Lescure finds him in Vendean custody “he was scowling awfully, his eyebrows nearly met above his eyes, and he continued constantly curling and twisting his lips, sometimes shewing his teeth, and sometimes completely covering his under with his upper lip ...” (288). Slightly later, de Lescure observes

his sunken, sallow cheeks; his wild and bloodshot eyes; his ragged, uncombed hair, and soiled garments— as he thought of his own recent intimacy with him— as he remembered how often he had played with him as a child, and associated with him as a man— that till a few days since he had been the bosom friend of his own more than brother, Henri Larochejaquelin, the tears rushed to his eyes and down his cheeks. (291)

Denot’s character and conduct thus pervert a once-handsome face, rendering his villainy legible to the external world, and de Lescure’s observations reflect how much his altered appearance corresponds to his moral relocation from friend to traitor.

This is not, however, the final transformation Denot undergoes in La Vendée, and just as he performs melodramatic villainy he comes to act out an elaborate plot of repentance that finally consolidates the aristocratic culture and patriarchal family he had attempted to challenge. Denot resurfaces late in the novel as a royalist Chouan leader, having internalised the polarised language of the war and his own position as traitor, and wishing to atone for his actions. Denot’s new status as the “Mad Captain” (387) of La Petite Vendée in Brittany marks the final stage of his ever-intensifying characterisation by Trollope. W. J. McCormack writes that “Denot becomes a totally individualized and dehumanized figure, as he is transformed off-stage from uncertain lout into mindless ideologue” (Introduction xii). This interpretation of Denot as simultaneously “individualized” and “dehumanized” recognises the paradox by which he is a “fully personalized” melodramatic villain (Brooks 33), while he is also a representative revolutionary figure, lacking in psychological depth. In other words, the guilt that mobilises his ideological shift suggests his underlying subjectivity, but his representative place as the converted villain within the schematic morality of the melodramatic plot reduces him to a type. Another physical change reflects Denot’s return to royalism: he is
known among the Vendeans as a “young man ... of a fierce and hideous aspect; the under part of his face was covered with his black beard, and he always wore on his head a huge heavy cap, which covered his brows, shaded his eyes from sight, and concealed his face nearly as effectually as a visor” (387). His face also bears “an ugly cicatrice” (398), marking him as the villain and traitor subjected to the blow from the Chevalier Mondyon’s cherry switch.

Denot’s last transformation demonstrates his awareness of the villain’s role in the melodramatic plot, his wish to punish himself, and his ratification of the deferential culture that the Vendeans, and the Larochejaquelins particularly, represent: by embracing his role as the melodramatic villain, he consolidates melodrama’s moral code. Denot’s desire to conceal his face reflects his awareness of the shame of his actions and his wish to atone anonymously for his betrayal, and his words show his consciousness of his status as a villain and traitor; he meets his adoptive brother Henri in Laval as an enemy although they are now both fighting for the royalist cause (397-403), and when Henri indicates that he simply wishes to talk to him, Denot replies, “A man can’t very well talk quietly of hell-fire, when he’s in the middle of it. Now, I’m in the very hottest of hell-fire at this moment. How do you think I can bear to look at you, without sinking into cinders at your feet?” (400). Denot’s fixation on his own damnation shows that he has accepted the Manichaean terms of the melodrama, and placed himself in the demonised position. He additionally recognises his betrayal as the source of his villainy, stating to Henri, “I know that I have been a traitor—a base, ignoble, wretched traitor” (400) and “Henri, I say, why don’t you seize by the throat the wretched traitor who brought desolation and destruction into your family?” (401). When Henri assures him of his friendship and forgiveness, Denot shows that he also accepts the terms of Vendean saintliness that the text as a whole promotes, calling Henri an “angel” twice (402). Denot becomes the novel’s ultimate product of the extremism that characterises the Revolution and the Vendean War, but his transformation into the “Mad Captain” (387) also finally validates the melodrama’s ethical terms and his own role within La Vendée’s moral universe. His interactions with Henri near the end of the novel demonstrate both how he performs his own melodramatic punishment, and how he comes to support the values of the deferential culture his actions have threatened: he is never finally reincorporated into the patriarchal...
family he has rejected, but ultimately recognises the affective value of the family and its individual members, whom he has betrayed.

If Denot fully and consciously performs his own punishment as a melodramatic villain, then, he reinforces instead of challenging Vendean deferential culture and melodrama’s schematic morality. Yet, Trollope does briefly represent a world outside of his text’s melodramatic code that poses a threat to the novel’s moral universe in two chapters at the beginning of the third volume that diverge from the main narrative to describe Robespierre’s life and government in Paris. The Robespierre chapters are not an aberration from Trollope’s emphatic support for the royalist Vendeans that present Robespierre as “a well-meaning man whose brutality is largely determined by eighteenth-century history” (Polhemus 22), a “somewhat sympathetic” character who is prevented from coming into contact with the Vendeans so that Trollope might “[avoid] any confrontation that might force him either to modify his position or be explicitly unfair to the republicans” (Faulkner 176), as some critics have suggested. In fact, unlike Denot’s history, the Robespierre chapters exist outside of the novel’s melodramatic framework, and thus reveal what precisely Trollope is writing against when he represents his version of the Revolution as melodrama: the secrecy, suspicion and concealment that seem to characterise revolutionary government and throw melodrama’s commitment to stark moral and political legibility into question. This condemnation of a secret and suspicious modernity is consistent with Hadley’s claim that in early nineteenth-century Britain, melodrama became attractive as an articulation of dissent from increasing “alienation, classification, and privatization” in politics, economics and daily life (99), or a mode that rendered social and moral relationships public and visible.  

Robespierre’s government, as it appears in the Robespierre chapters, is a perfect example of the privatising, alienating impulses that characterise modernity, and against which melodrama works to produce moral legibility. Governance, Trollope suggests, becomes the function of secret committees that operate on the principle of suspicion:

157 Hadley argues, From the perspective of those who deployed the melodramatic mode, these private selves were always presumed to be engaging in secretive transactions, often represented as economic and sexual conspiracies designed to consolidate their self-interest. The publicizing representations of the melodramatic mode aimed to uncover these hidden selves and reintegrate them into a society where public exchange remained possible .... (31)
The whole government was then vested in the Committee of Public Safety—a committee consisting of twelve persons, members of the Convention, all of course ultra-democrats, over the majority of whom Robespierre exercised direct control. No despot ever endured ruled with so absolute and stringent a dominion as that under which this body of men held the French nation. The revolutionary tribunal was now established in all its horror and all its force. A law was passed by the Convention, in September, which decreed that all suspected people should be arrested and brought before this tribunal; that nobles, lawyers, bankers, priests, men of property, and strangers in the land, should be suspected unless known to be acting friends and adherents of the ultra-revolutionary party; that the punishment of such persons should be death; and that the members of any revolutionary tribunal which had omitted to condemn any suspected person, should themselves be tried, and punished by death. Such was the law by which the Reign of Terror was organized and rendered possible.

Committes, tribunals, the Convention itself, all present governing bodies in which power is invested in a few private men whose work is suspicion and surveillance.

Robespierre is the primary representative of this alienating government and its secret operations, even in his private life. He expresses suspicion of his allies in a letter he writes to his brother (306-307), and, furthermore,

turned over in his mind the names and deeds of those who were accounted as his friends, but whom he suspected to be his enemies. He had close to his hand slips of paper, on which were written notes of the most trivial doings of those by whom he was generally surrounded; and the very spies who gave him the information were themselves the unfortunate subjects of similar notices from others. The wretched man was tortured by distrust ....

Such confusion between friend or ally and suspect or enemy speaks to Robespierre’s increasing isolation and disconnection from any sense of community, as the novel’s representative of the modern individual operating under and within modern, supposedly
democratic government. Trollope’s Robespierre cannot even trust his beloved Eleanor Duplay: when Eleanor begs that he show mercy to the women and children of the Vendée, he suspects that some unnamed enemy has conspired to have her intervene in favour of the Vendean cause (314-315): “To his disordered brain it seemed that Eleanor was practising on him her woman’s wiles for some unworthy purpose, and that treason lurked in her show of humanity and affection. He believed that she, who had always believed in him, loved him, almost worshipped him, had become in an instant false and designing” (314). Robespierre’s “disordered” suspicion of Eleanor demonstrates the results of France’s turn away from the deferential culture that underlies the melodramatic mode and toward a modern state predicated on surveillance and distrust.

Trollope’s use of the melodramatic mode is thus a response to the alienating political, moral and social effects of modernity, and, particularly, the modern French state that Robespierre represents in the novel. As the European revolutions of the late 1840s resulted, at least temporarily, in the establishment of republics in France and parts of Italy, the operation of power in a modern, democratic state would once more have been immediately relevant for Trollope and his readers. Like the melodramatic texts Hadley examines, La Vendée turns to a seemingly nostalgic faith in the legible moral and social codes of the deferential old regime in order to produce the illusion of a possible stability to counteract the privatising, classifying and alienating impulses of modern culture as Trollope sees it. Hadley’s description of the melodramatic mode’s “profoundly reactionary” nostalgia (11) appropriately points to the ways in which Trollope opposes the Vendée’s legible moral and social relationships to the concealment and suspicion that characterise Robespierre and the regime he represents. The anomalous chapters on Robespierre thus reveal a key anxiety that underlies La Vendée and motivates Trollope’s use of melodramatic codes of morality and politics.

Melodramatic morality’s affinity to the legibility of the old regime’s social codes marks its aptness as a vehicle for reactionary politics, and Trollope’s containment of melodrama within an authoritative narrative that emphasises melodrama’s affective, pragmatic drives demonstrates his work to simplify the Revolution’s complexity and convert his reader to a royalist position. However, the suspicion and secrecy suggested by the Robespierre chapters conflicts with the melodramatic mode’s legible moral codes,
pointing to the anxieties about alienating modernity that underlie Trollope’s attraction to melodrama and Vendean royalism. Turning to an examination of his use of the conventions belonging to the sister genres of the historical and national tales, I will reveal Trollope’s commitment to building a sense of community to further counteract modern political, social and moral displacement. Trollope’s efforts to give his Vendean community a happy ending despite the historical record, however, also exposes the fracturing fears at the core of the novel’s historical perspective, as he is unable to contain the Revolution within the past.

“The Blood of our Poor People”: Historical Consciousness and Incipient National Identity

If Trollope uses melodrama’s schematic moral stakes to position Vendean individuals and families aligned with old-regime power, such as the Larochejaquelins, as victims of stereotypical revolutionary villains, he also draws on the conventions of national and historical tales to claim that the Vendée as a region and the Vendeans as a community are victimised by a repressive revolutionary state. While Trollope’s melodramatic depiction of deferential culture in opposition to the suspicion and secrecy that he believes characterise modern governments like Robespierre’s reveals his anxiety about the resurgence of republicanism in the late 1840s, Trollope also draws on the interrelated democratic and nationalist movements that produced the 1848 revolutions across Europe in order to represent the Vendeans as a victimised incipient nation. Trollope’s use of national and historical tale conventions works to establish sympathy for a marginalised Vendean community while containing revolution in the past by casting the royalist Vendeans as the true patriots and insurrectionists. La Vendée thus represents the Republic as a centralised, modern state and Vendean royalism as a means of resisting that state’s encroachment on local, populist independence. However, despite Trollope’s efforts to contain revolution by re-aligning it with the conservative, Vendean position, La Vendée is fragmented by anxieties about the threat the revolutionary era continues to pose in the late 1840s, when the novel was composed, which undermine his attempt to establish an authoritative, distanced historical perspective.
In addition to employing the tactics of the post-revolutionary melodramatic mode in *La Vendée*, Trollope draws on another generic tradition that emerged out of the revolutionary context: the allied genres of the national tale and the historical novel. Trollope’s subtitle to *La Vendée, An Historical Romance* identifies its genre, and the novel’s contemporary readers, like a reviewer for the *Athenaeum*, immediately recognised its affinity to the historical novels of Walter Scott (708). Trollope’s debt to Scott has also been noted by later critics, such as Robert M. Polhemus (21-22) and Karen Faulkner.158 *La Vendée*, however, is not the only example of Trollope’s experimentation with historical fiction and the Scott tradition in his early career: his first two works are Irish novels influenced by the national tale, the generic precursor to Scott’s historical novels, while his play *The Noble Jilt* is set, like *La Vendée*, during the Revolutionary Wars.

The national tale and historical novel emerged in tandem in early nineteenth-century Britain and Ireland, but literary critics today have reached little consensus about what defines and separates the two genres.159 For Gary Kelly and Nicola J. Watson, little separates national and historical tales, which both developed out of the political and literary contests of the 1790s as means of dealing with social and cultural crises. Kelly argues that both genres “developed to define the broader scale of national social identity, as it was supposed to have originated in some major crisis of the past” (*English Fiction of the Romantic Period* 92). The Vendean War, in Trollope’s novel, constitutes the “major crisis of the past” from which a kind of “national social identity” for the Vendeans emerges in opposition to the centralised national identity of the French Republic. For Watson, the genres developed more specifically out of the 1790s, Anti-Jacobin “project of disciplining revolutionary energy” (110) that attempted to contain revolutionary plots within authoritative, community-based, third-person narratives.160 In historical and national tales, Watson argues, “the revolutionary plot is finally immobilized by the authority of a central authorial discourse invested with the full competence of historical

158 Faulkner uses Scott’s writing as a yardstick by which to measure Trollope’s failure in the genre of the historical romance, writing that “Trollope discovered that he totally lacked Scott’s talent for imaginative reconstruction of remote events and characters” (175).
159 See Miranda Burgess’s “The national tale and allied genres, 1770s-1840s” for a summary of criticism on the national tale.
160 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed account of Anti-Jacobin fiction that addresses Watson’s claims.
hindsight” (111). For these critics, then, both genres work to stabilise social and cultural identities in the wake of a chaotic, revolutionary past.

For the opposing critical camp, however, national tales diverge from the strategies and aims of the historical novels Kelly and Watson primarily address. Katie Trumpener and Ina Ferris, for example, examine national tales as narratives of resistance, characterised by the sympathy and anxiety they produce in readers unfamiliar with the victimised populations they portray. The difference between early national tales and Scott-style historical novels, Trumpener argues, is that the national tale defines its world through geographical space while the historical novel emphasises how societies develop through time: the national tale is characterised by a “thick evocation of place” while the historical novel features a “plot of loss and growth through historical change” (131). In other words, Trumpener asserts that

The national tale before *Waverley* maps developmental stages topographically, as adjacent worlds in which characters move and then choose between; the movement of these novels is geographical rather than historical. In contrast, the historical novel ... finds its focus in the way one developmental stage collapses to make room for the next and cultures are transformed under the pressure of historical events. (141)

The basic plot of the national tale in this reading, then, follows the protagonist’s movement across borders and between cultures that often results in a marriage between characters representing their respective spaces, or “the contrast, attraction, and union of disparate cultural worlds” (Trumpener 141). In the historical novel, by contrast, “only through the forcible, often violent, entry into history does the feudal folk community become a nation, and only through dislocation and collective suffering is a new national identity forged” (Trumpener 142).

This recognition of cross-cultural reconciliation in the early national tale suggests that like Kelly and Watson, Trumpener sees consensus and social stability as one of the genre’s goals. However, according to Trumpener, the national tale became less interested in offering resolution and more focused on resisting dominant culture as it developed in the early nineteenth century. She writes that the genre’s
central political tendency shifts gradually from a celebratory nationalism, which both recognizes cultural distinctiveness and believes in the possibility of transcultural unions, toward a more separatist position; continuing meditation on a history of cultural oppression makes rapprochement and reconciliation increasingly inconceivable. (146)

Ferris emphasises the national tale’s cultural resistance more forcefully than Trumpener does, arguing that it is, like melodrama, primarily a performative, affective genre: in the national tale, Ferris argues, “representation [is] less a portrayal of something than a presentation to someone” (11). The national tale’s affective aim, according to this logic, is to produce sympathy in its readers for a marginalised population, but, for Ferris, this is a sympathy that causes anxiety by destabilising identity and perspective. Sympathy with an Othered people, Ferris argues, produces “a dynamic of dislocation” (59) that becomes “an often disconcerting encounter” (62) for readers of the national tale. Anxiety and instability, in these readings, are therefore central to the national tale’s pragmatics.

These two schools of critical thought diverge substantially, primarily because the field of novels that Kelly and Watson qualify as national tales is far broader than the more exclusive set of dislocating national tales Trumpener and Ferris focus on. However, both critical positions provide useful strategies for examining Trollope’s novel, which works to contain revolutionary plots and perspectives within its supposedly authoritative historical narrative, but fractures under its own anxieties. La Vendée is both a national tale and an historical novel, according to Trumpener’s criteria, because it defines national identity spatially by establishing the Vendée’s cultural distinctness as a feature of its geographical uniqueness, and cements the Vendean community through its experience of a shared historical crisis. Trollope’s preoccupation with Ireland, the original setting for the national tale, in his first two novels, The Macdermots of Ballycloran and The Kellys and the O’Kellys, and his interest in combining features of the national tale and historical novel, indicate that La Vendée, Trollope’s Historical Romance, is also a displaced and distanced national tale, dislocated from the Celtic fringe and the recent past, and narrating the failed struggle for local autonomy against an emerging modern nation in the Vendée. Furthermore, as Watson’s findings suggest, Trollope uses the authority of the historical novel genre to continue the Anti-Jacobin project of containing the Revolution. At the
same time, his novel is also fractured by an underlying consciousness of geographical and historical dislocation and anxiety that indicates that the kind of post-revolutionary reconciliation and stability that Watson and Kelly look for in the sister genres is impossible for his novel.

Although Trollope’s use of the historical novel’s plot of “the forcible, often violent, entry into history” (Trumpener 141) is self-evident in *La Vendée*’s subject matter, his interest in geographically based cultural difference first appears in his earlier work and continues across his career. Ireland, the typical location for the early national tale, is not only the setting for Trollope’s first two novels, but also reappears as a major preoccupation in his later work: he returns to Irish settings for *Castle Richmond* and *The Landleaguers*, makes the Irishman Phineas Finn a hero in his Palliser series, and features Irish problems, such as absentee landlords like Lord Fawn, throughout his work. Most importantly, Trollope lived in Ireland during the famine and while writing *La Vendée* in the late 1840s, at a time of political unrest and revived revolutionary hopes and fears across Europe. Ireland and the broader Celtic fringe also feature throughout Trollope’s work as spaces in which the place of romance in the modern world and in the novel can be explored. As Geoffrey Baker rightly notes in *Realism’s Empire: Empiricism and Enchantment in the Nineteenth-Century Novel*, “Trollope’s concern with romance and its disappearance manifests itself in spatial terms” (88). In Baker’s words, Trollope’s earliest fiction is “set, like Scott’s, at junctures of Englishness and Otherness” (112), bordering or within the Celtic fringe. However, Baker continues to suggest that Trollope’s later work, like the Phineas Finn novels, tends to disenchant traditional sites of romance, like the border, the Celtic fringe and the Continent (112-117). Unlike Trollope’s two previous novels *La Vendée* is not set in Ireland, but the specificity of its geographical location in its title, and the Vendée’s representativeness as a site of cultural difference to the 1850 British reader and to the French republican of the 1790s aligns the novel with the kind of spatially-imagined romance Baker explores. The full title of the novel, *La Vendée: An Historical Romance*, therefore, indicates Trollope’s overlapping historical and geographical concerns, pointing toward an emphasis on the Vendée as a site of cultural difference and to his novel’s cultivation of historical consciousness. Trollope’s novel thus examines how place and time intersect in the construction of national identity by
exploring negotiations of local and national autonomy, the border, and social, cultural and political difference.

Trollope’s two previous Irish novels, *The Macdermots* and *The Kellys*, rewritings of the early nineteenth-century national tale, manifest his interest in cross-cultural negotiations and representations of national difference. *The Macdermots* is preoccupied with Ireland’s social and legal problems, asking, for example, who is accountable when absentee landlords allow their tenants to be reduced to poverty and squalor (124-129). As Robert Tracy asserts in his introduction to the Oxford edition, *The Macdermots* may be read as a rewriting of Sydney Owenson’s *Wild Irish Girl*, the first national tale (xxiii-xxiv). The basic plot structure of *The Wild Irish Girl* is the marriage between characters representing disparate cultural groups.\(^{161}\) In *The Macdermots*, however, such cross-cultural reconciliation is impossible, and escape from oppression is unimaginable. In Tracy’s words, Trollope’s national tale is “about the obscure survivors of the old Irish Catholic gentry, trapped in the ironies and anomalies of their position .... They are doubly marginal, excluded from the society of their fellow landlords by religion and poverty, and from the peasantry by their still-remembered rank” (xiii-xiv). For the Macdermot family, difference destroys identity rather than producing social unification or voicing and validating their experience of victimisation. The marriage plot cannot, therefore, take place: Feemy Macdermot is engaged to a stakeholder of the Protestant Ascendancy, Captain Myles Ussher, but instead of marrying Feemy, Ussher seduces her and is killed by her brother Thady. All three characters ultimately die, Ussher at Thady’s hand, Thady as a result of his conviction for Ussher’s murder, and Feemy during premature labour brought on by the stress of her brother’s murder trial. Instead of representing a union between Irish Catholics and instruments of British authority like Ussher, a police captain, Trollope establishes a “blurred distinction between Ussher as sexual exploiter and Ussher as zealous British official” (Tracy xv). In *The Macdermots*, the sexual and cultural union of marriage degenerates into the threat of seduction, rape and political violence.

Although Trollope’s second Irish novel *The Kellys and the O’Kellys* is comic instead of tragic, it retains Trollope’s strategy of representing cultural difference in terms of

\(^{161}\) Trumpener argues that *The Wild Irish Girl* and other early national tales “envision cross-cultural marriage as a form of countercolonization …. In learning to live with those scarred by a history of English contempt, English characters are forced to see their own country from the perspective of its victims” (137).
violence between individuals. Miranda Burgess argues that The Kellys does not fit with the national tale’s political agenda because it “transmutes the national tale’s theme of a dispossessed native Irish aristocracy into a purely comic register” (51). However, Trollope’s comic plot does not simply neutralise the national tale’s political content: like The Macdermots, The Kellys presents an allegory for cultural victimisation in the relationship between two characters representing diverse populations, in this case a Protestant brother and his Catholic sister.162 Barry Lynch, enraged when his sister Anastasia inherits half of their father’s property, attacks her in a drunken frenzy, and plots to kill her even after she seeks refuge with her neighbours, the Kellys. In “The Anglo-Irish Threat in Thackeray’s and Trollope’s Writings of the 1840s,” Laura M. Berol rightly claims that “[t]he brother’s persecution of his sister replays on an individual level the history of oppression that the Anglo-Irish Protestant Ascendancy, established through England’s colonial exploits, enacted against the native Catholic Irish throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries” (103). By acting out the violence of colonisation on the individual level rather than writing reconciliation between cultures, Trollope’s Irish novels reject the plot structure of the early national tale, and correspond instead to what Trumpener observes in the national tales of the 1820s, marked by the emergence of the historical novel, in which “rapprochement and reconciliation [become] increasingly inconceivable” (146). After the emergence of historical novels like Scott’s, depicting violent and traumatic historical events, national tales by writers like Owenson and Charles Maturin shed their political optimism and instead exhibit what Trumpener describes as “historical paranoia and neurosis” (157). Trollope’s decision to offer his Irish characters fragmented identities further splintered by violence reflects the influence of these later national tales on his first experiments with fiction.

Trollope positions his Vendée as an analogue to the Ireland of the national tale, a peripheral geographical space ruled from a distance by a centralised, modern state. The affinity between such politically marginalised and oppressed regions has long been recognised: in 1936, historian Jean Yole wrote of the Vendée, “For the whole world it had become a sister of Poland and Ireland” (qtd. in Secher 1). Poland, like Ireland and

162 Like Phineas Finn and his sisters, the Lynches belong to different religious denominations as a result of a custom expecting women to inherit their mother’s religion and men to adhere to their father’s. Phineas is Catholic like his father, and his sisters are Protestant like their mother.
Italy, was another example of the significant link between insurgency and incipient nationalism in mid-nineteenth-century Europe. Unlike Ireland, Italy and Poland, nations that eventually achieved sovereignty, however, the Vendée can be seen as an example of what Ernest Gellner calls a culture “led to the dustheap of history” (46), a region whose independent development was curtailed by its absorption into the incipient nation of France in the revolutionary period. For Trollope, the Vendée is a geographically and culturally unique space, like conventional national tale settings, with its own distinct national vision, but lacking political autonomy or a voice in revolutionary governance. The Vendean War, in this political context, is a conflict between a disenfranchised regional population with a distinct character and an uncompromising centralised government with different political and social agendas, marking the historical novel’s forging of national identity and historical consciousness.

By combining the historical novel’s consciousness of time and national identity with the national tale’s recognition of cultural marginalisation and victimisation, Trollope positions his Vendeans, instead of the revolutionaries, as the real insurgents, rising up in resistance to political oppression as Polish and Italian rebels had done in the 1840s. In this effort, his strategies adhere to both interpretations of the national tale as a genre. For Ferris, by the 1820s “the national tale was now modulating into the novel of insurgency, folding into itself the Waverley model of historical fiction as it did so” (135). As “a novel of insurgency,” La Vendée casts its royalists as revolutionaries, drawing on the national tale’s tradition of gaining sympathy for victimised populations as it does this. However, Trollope’s move to imagine the Vendean royalists as insurgents also attempts to contain actual revolution in the past by shifting sympathy from the radical to the conservative position. In Watson’s findings, early national and historical tales feature “a transposition of Jacobinism into Jacobitism” (119) that neutralises the revolutionary threat by turning revolution into nostalgic political action fated to fail. According to Watson’s reading,

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Like Irish and Italian revolutionaries, Polish insurgents had strong connections to British Chartism. Historian Malcolm Chase notes that “[a]fter the Cracow insurgency of 1846, the Democratic Committee for the Regeneration of Poland emerged .... Popular Russophobia guaranteed particular sympathy for Polish nationalism in Britain, and ‘friends of Poland’ were to be found in many Chartist localities” (287). For more on Chartist internationalism, see Chase (286-289). Giuseppe Mazzini, the Italian nationalist and founder of the Young Italy movement, also had particularly strong British ties in the 1840s, especially with London intellectuals (Riall 18, 135-138; McAllister 193-218; Marjorie Stone “On the Post Office Espionage Scandal, 1844”).
Scott is the expert in this strategy of historical containment: “Scott’s novels succeed at once in containing the French Revolution and in transforming its historical significance, carrying out an essentially counter-revolutionary remaking of the national past” (127). Trollope’s Vendeans push this logic of transposition as historical rewriting further than Scott’s Jacobites: they are conservative insurgents whose military action locates insurrection firmly within a reactionary ideology, but they also oppose the French Revolution directly within the novel’s plot, and in doing so use the national tale’s production of sympathy with a disenfranchised, Othered people against radical forces. In *La Vendée*, Jacobinism is transposed into royalism.

Trollope presents the Vendeans as culturally different from the Parisian population that supports the Revolution, thus defining them as a marginalised community oppressed by the revolutionaries’ political dominance. When the novel opens, Henri denies that the revolutionary government acts in the name of the people by distinguishing between the “mob of Paris” and “the people of France” with whom he is familiar and whom he identifies as the people of “Anjou and Brittany,” “the people in the Bocage” and the “Marais” (13). Trollope thus immediately locates Vendean cultural and political difference in the population’s regional allegiances and distinct geography. Moreover, the novel suggests that Vendeans have a unique relationship with their landlords that prevents class conflict; the gentry of Poitou, the narrator indicates, possesses a special regional character that separates its members from the privileged elite nobility of France more broadly, or, analogously, the Irish absentee landlords Trollope challenges in *The Macdermots*: “The landlords of the country were not men of extensive property or expensive habits .... [T]hey lived at home, on their incomes, and had always something to spare for the poorer of their neighbours. Farming was their business— the chase their amusement— loyalty their strongest passion, and the prosperity of their tenantry their chief ambition” (34). The social and political character of the Poitevin gentry, Trollope argues, determines the loyalty that exists between ranks, preventing the Vendeans from attaching themselves to the revolutionary cause and establishing the local solidarity that allows them to organise their resistance efforts.

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164 Some historians, like Claude Petitfrère, trace the Vendeans’ political difference to the economic and social conditions attributable to the geography of the Bocage, which made the region less open to the Revolution’s administrative changes than the surrounding plains.
Local attachments, a consciousness of geographical and cultural uniqueness, a national vision opposed to that of the republicans, and a desire for political autonomy become the bases on which the Vendeans construct their distinct identity and fight in its defence against the Republic. The Vendean leaders justify protecting the region against an encroaching centralised government as a defence of local and domestic attachments: Cathelineau tells the population of St Florent that he will urge neighbouring towns to join the resistance against conscription by asserting that “they are as fond of their sons and their brethren as we are” and stating, “We will go and ask them whether they prefer the Republic to their homes— whether the leaders of the Convention are dearer to them than their own lords— whether their new priests love them, as the old ones did? And I know what will be their answer” (33). Henri likewise declares at the war’s onset, “We will be apt scholars in fighting for our wives, and our sisters, and our houses” (43). Furthermore, like Giuseppe Garibaldi, the “master of guerrilla warfare and general of Italian volunteer armies” (Stone and Taylor 236), the Vendean leaders use guerrilla tactics made possible by their consciousness of the region’s geographical distinctiveness from the remainder of France. When Westerman’s republican army marches into the Bocage on the road to Clisson the Vendeans take advantage of his unfamiliarity with local geography, firing on the republicans from the ground behind hedges and retreating with each shot further into the wooded areas surrounding the roads, forcing ten thousand opponents to retreat from a small party of seven hundred with only three or four rounds each of ammunition (233-236). Not only does the uniqueness of Vendean geography foster a sense of local community and distinct regional character, but the inhabitants’ localised knowledge of that unique geography determines their success in the early phases of the war. Trollope, moreover, opposes the disenfranchised region of the Vendée to Paris, the centre of the Republic, locating political power and oppression geographically. The narrator opens the novel by declaring that after the events of August 1792, “Paris ceased to be a fitting abode for aught that was virtuous, innocent, or high-minded” (7), making a moral

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165 Compare Garibaldi’s account of his 1849 defence of Rome in his memoir, My Life: “I ... ordered two small detachments to wait in hiding by the edge of the road near enough to enable them to ambush some enemy scouts. And indeed, when dawn broke, I found an enemy cavalry soldier on his knees in front of me, pleading for his life .... France was kneeling before me.” He continues, “They had forced a team of enemy scouts to flee, who, despite their greater numbers, had left behind several weapons in their panic. When the enemy is approaching, it is always useful to set up some ambushes on the roads which they are taking” (26).
judgment against the political centre of republican France that persists throughout the novel: when Henri’s father, the old Marquis, learns that republican military forces intend to repress the Vendean uprisings he exclaims, “my heart shudders, when I am told that the Republic has let loose those wolves of Paris to shed the blood of our poor people” (176). The Vendeans, or “our poor people,” are thus the marginalised victims of an aggressive central political power.

The Vendeans begin their revolt with a vision for France that conflicts with republican values, but it eventually transforms into a hope of establishing an autonomous Vendée: the war, therefore, exacerbates local difference, converting it into a strong sense of unacknowledged but distinct national identity. Early in the novel, Father Jerome, a militant Vendean priest, urges his congregation to “give your blood— nay your life for your country, your King, and your Church” (99), setting up an allegiance to “country,” “King” and “Church” as an alternative to the revolutionary slogan of liberty, equality and fraternity. He also imagines a future “when the courage of La Vendée restored the honour of France” (100), demonstrating that at this early point in the war the Vendeans still perceive themselves as members of the French nation who are concerned with its future. However, as the war progresses, the Vendeans’ violent break with republican France transforms their vision to include the possibility of creating an independent, politically distinct Vendée: a new national identity emerges for the Vendeans out of the trauma of civil war. As in revolutionary France and Italy during the Risorgimento, insurrection for the Vendeans functions as a kind of “‘foundation story’ [used] for the purposes of self-legitimation,” a “heroic narrative of events which would make nation-state creation seem the inevitable, and morally correct, outcome of what was, in reality, a political struggle for power” (Riall 39, 40).

The immediate trigger for the war is the Republic’s attempt to conscript unwilling Vendeans for its army, and they imagine their resistance to this measure in terms of individual liberty and local autonomy. When Peter Berrier, the first name on the conscript list at St Florent, is called, the Vendean leader Foret tells the republican colonel, “Peter Berrier is a free man” (25), and Cathelineau warns a corporal that the conscription will mobilise the Vendeans to fight against, rather than for, the Republic: “Peter Berrier does not wish to be a soldier, and, if you force him to become one, it is not on the side of the
Republic that he will be found fighting” (23). As the war develops, resistance to the revolutionary government’s intrusive authority becomes a wish for Vendean political autonomy. The dying de Lescure, for example, hopes that, though the original goal of restoring the monarchy seems out of reach for the royalists, “it was still probable that they might be able to come to such terms with the republicans as would enable them to live after their own fashion, in their own country; to keep their own priests among them, and to maintain their exemption from service in the republican armies” (359). The geographical and cultural uniqueness and urge to resist an encroaching centralised government with which the Vendeans begin the war, become, by the novel’s end, the assertion of a national identity distinct from that fostered by the Republic and a political agenda of negotiating for some degree of sovereignty.

Trollope thus indicates that the Vendeans are fighting a populist war defending local autonomy, and in this effort appear to be better supporters of democracy and equality than the republicans. The Vendeans are not absolutely opposed to revolutionary ideology: de Lescure is open to the Enlightenment principles that inspire the Revolution (9), and Marie and Henri jokingly refer to Agatha as “Reason personified” (330), drawing on the revolutionary practice of figuring abstract reason as a female icon. Most importantly, they organise their army meritocratically and foster a sense of cross-class regional solidarity. After Cathelineau, a postilion by trade, begins the revolt at St Florent, an impromptu council of gentry, including Henri and de Lescure, defers to him as “leader” (59), and he is elected General-in-Chief by the war council outside of Saumur (122-123), an office he assumes permanently after the successful attack on that city (158-169). Although the army’s reliance on enthusiastic regional loyalty over discipline has drawbacks, like the peasants’ disorganised, unplanned march on the republican camp at Varin (126-134) and lack of obedience among the ranks (144), what they lose in discipline they gain in the commitment the troops feel at being treated as equals to noble families like the Larochejaquelins. Henri encourages this cross-class solidarity, addressing the population of Echanbroignes, for example, as “partners” in their military “glory” (84). By framing the Vendean resistance around ideas of populist participation, partnership, and equality, Trollope presents the Vendean efforts as “patriotism” (74), a term usually reserved for revolutionaries in 1790s France, but gaining new resonance in the mid-nineteenth-century
context of nationalist insurgency in Europe. Many of his characters describe themselves as patriots, emphasising the extent to which regional loyalty imagined as incipient national identity mobilises them, and highlighting Trollope’s position that his Vendeans are truer to revolutionary principles than the republicans are. Patriotism is redefined in *La Vendée*: Jacques Chapeau uses “patriot” and “royalist” interchangeably (157), while de Lescure values the peasants’ “courage,” “generous loyalty” and “true patriotism” (351), thereby associating patriotism with the regional and ideological loyalty that inspires the peasants’ revolt. The Vendeans, then, seem to embody the values of revolution, thus underlining Trollope’s transposition of Jacobinism into royalism.

In the revolutionary context’s extreme, militant polarisation, evident in the novel’s melodramatic features, cross-class, regional loyalty replaces the early national tale’s plot of reconciliation through cross-cultural marriage. The romance between Cathelineau and Agatha Larochejaquelin stands in for the impossibility of union between the victimised region and the outside oppressor, and suggests instead the need for the Vendeans to close ranks against their external enemies. Cathelineau’s fear that he will not be socially accepted by his aristocratic allies “in his new position” (53) as a leader of the Vendeans initially fixes on Agatha (58), and his image of her as an angel seems to increase the social distance between them (75-76). As W. J. McCormack notes, the romance between the historical figure Cathelineau and Trollope’s invented character Agatha emerges “as a symbol of the alliance of all social classes in the royalist cause” (Introduction xxvii). Their relationship cements Vendean cross-class solidarity by redefining gentility in terms of the values of the resistance, rather than birth; when Henri suggests that Agatha should only marry “a worthy gentleman” (184), Agatha responds that “if valour, honesty, and honour, if trust in God, and forgetfulness of self, if humanity and generosity constitute a gentleman, then is Cathelineau the prince of gentlemen” (185). Although Cathelineau’s premature death prevents their marriage, she continues to insist on his social equality with the novel’s aristocrats to his mother, who refuses to believe that he could ever have been accepted by members of the nobility despite his heroism (370-377). Agatha declares to Cathelineau’s mother, “I am prouder of the dying hero’s love, than I could have been had a Prince knelt at my feet” (374), solidifying a value system which, through romance, pre-empts the traditional hierarchy of social rank in favour of commitment to a regional
cause held in common by people of all ranks. As a revision of the early national tale’s romance plot, this cross-class relationship indicates that, instead of leaving themselves open to compromise with the Convention, the Vendeans stress their difference from the rest of France and attempt to fortify themselves against outsiders by continually affirming Vendean, royalist identity from within their own borders.

Trollope’s inward-looking romance plot shows the impossibility of effecting a reconciliation between the Vendeans and their republican oppressors, and in the resulting conflict the Vendeans must undergo the traumatic experience of entering violently into history associated with the historical novel. Trollope uses a voice of dissent from the Vendean political cause, Michael Stein, to emphasise his anxiety about the emergence of national identity and historical consciousness in the Vendée. Michael, a blacksmith at Echanbroignes, tries to prevent his sons from leaving home to join the Vendean army (86-90), and even after the Vendée’s population is displaced across the Loire he continues to oppose to the war (382-384). Michael fights in Laval when he can no longer avoid it, defending his decision to help a cause he opposes by stating, “It wasn’t possible for a man not to fight on one side or the other— that’s the only reason I had for fighting at all” (415). His mobilisation against the republicans at the end of the novel is thus more a result of the violently polarised situation in which he finds himself than any decision to support the Vendean army’s politics. In fact, Trollope represents Michael as an exception to Vendean regional character and solidarity; when his daughter Annot marries Jacques Chapeau at the same time that Henri marries Marie near the end of the novel, Michael’s supposedly republican characteristics emerge:

Michael Stein, though change had thrown him among the loyal Vendeans, had in his heart but little of that love and veneration for his immediate superiors, which was the strong and attractive point in the character of the

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The name “Stein” would seem to suggest that Michael is Jewish, a possible reason behind his dissent from the Catholic majority in the Vendée. However, nothing else in the novel indicates that this is the case: his daughter Annot is certainly both a Catholic and a royalist, as Trollope specifically describes her attending “St Laud’s to receive mass from Father Jerome, and to hear the discourse which he had promised to give respecting the duties of the people in the coming times” at the onset of the war (91). Instead, Michael Stein’s name appears to be an example of Trollope’s imprecision with names generally: as noted above, he misspells Larochejaquelein or La Rochejaquelein as Larochejaquelin and Westermann as Westerman, but he also changes Echaubroignes to Echanbroignes and uses anglicised names like Michael, Peter and Agatha for some of his characters. Nonetheless, Michael Stein’s name is an interesting choice for a character who exists as an outsider to the community.
people of Poitou. Though he had lived all his life in the now famous
village of Echanbroignes, he had in his disposition, much of the stubborn
self-dependence of the early republicans; and he did not relish his position,
sitting in the back-ground as a humble hanger-on in the family of a
nobleman and an aristocrat. (432)

Michael, therefore, provides an exception to Trollope’s claim that the Vendeans exhibit a
kind of regional character that marks their cultural, social and political difference from
the remainder of France.

Michael furthermore resists the narratives of collective, historical Vendean experience
that construct their new sense of national identity. As Trumpener writes, “only through
the forcible, often violent, entry into history does the feudal folk community become a
nation, and only through dislocation and collective suffering is a new national identity
forged” (142). In Trollope’s novel, comic scenes of re-telling, in which characters like
Peter Berrier, Jacques Chapeau and the Chevalier Mondyon replay the violent events of
battle for new audiences, construct a narrative of a shared traumatic past. Although Peter
Berrier, for example, revises events to emphasise his own heroism at St Florent for the
servants at Durbellière (59-62), Trollope’s scenes of re-telling bring the narrative of
Vendean political victimisation and military success to new audiences, consolidating
their sense of belonging to the Vendean community, and reinforcing the historical
narrative already authorised by the narrator. In addition to fostering a sense of belonging
to a community and a cause through narrative, the stories of battle that circulate among
the Vendeans help construct the local legends that continually animate their success: the
stories about the Mad Captain of the Chouans that emerge in Brittany, for example,
motivate the Vendeans to military success at Laval (387-390) and continue to fuel the
Chouan resistance even under the Directory and Napoleon (396). Given the importance
of narrative to the construction of the Vendeans’ new sense of national identity and
shared historical trauma, Michael Stein’s resistance to stories of military success marks
him as a voice of dissent within the community, someone whose own sense of belonging
does not correspond to the imagined identity of the majority. Michael questions
Chapeau’s description of events at Saumur and the victory that Chapeau seems to expect:
he asks why the Vendeans look forward to English help if their victory is so complete and
whether the restored King will live at Saumur, and, furthermore, challenges Chapeau’s complete trust in Henri (194). In addition to marking Michael as an outsider to the emergent community, these questions about Vendean narratives of collective endeavour challenge the authenticity of the stories that circulate among the Vendeans and lay the foundation of their historical consciousness. Michael’s suspicion of narratives of Vendean resistance also suggests a challenge to Trollope’s own authoritative narrative: if historical actors like Michael express dissent from the narratives that emerge about history, then the authoritative voice of the historical novel loses some of its weight.

Michael Stein’s embodiment of dissent indicates that fissures exist in Trollope’s presentation of the Vendée as a geographically and culturally distinct space and as an emerging historically conscious community identifiable through its narratives of collective trauma. Although Trollope attempts to make sense of the chaotic violence of civil war by transforming historical events into a narrative following the conventions of melodrama, the national tale and the historical novel, anxiety about the representation of a traumatised community continually ruptures La Vendée’s narrative coherence, fragmenting the geographically and historically based identities Trollope attempts to provide for his characters. Because the Vendeans’ sense of local attachment and cultural difference is primarily a result of the geographical uniqueness of their region, their geographical displacement in the course of the war speaks to the anxiety underlying La Vendée’s national tale plot. When the army decides to retreat across the Loire into Brittany in order to face the republicans from the stronghold of Laval, they are joined by civilians forced from their homes with nowhere else to go; a “disordered multitude” of soldiers and their families, not a disciplined army, crosses into Brittany (334-335). When a narrative of geographical and cultural distinctness becomes instead a narrative of a displaced people fleeing political violence, La Vendée’s use of national tale conventions begins to bleed into the dominant plot of the historical novel, as the Vendeans’ faces violent and traumatic geographical and cultural dislocation. The Vendeans’ mass migration from Poitou and Anjou toward the Loire is replete with descriptions of poverty and want, such as the suffering the Lescure ladies encounter when they stay with an elderly, incapacitated curé, Father Bernard, during their journey (343-345). Trollope’s account of the community’s suffering reaches its climax when eighty thousand refugees
gather in St Florent to cross the Loire: “Eighty thousand people were there collected in and around St Florent, men, women, and children; the old and infirm, the maimed and sick, the mutilated and the dying. Poor wretches who had gotten themselves dragged thither from the hospitals, in which they feared to remain, were lying in every ditch, and under every wall, filling the air with their groans” (353). No longer defined by their geographical location when the population is exiled from its home provinces never to return within the limits of the novel, the displaced Vendeans find the source of their distinct identity removed from their geographical and cultural uniqueness and relocated within the emerging narrative of their shared suffering.

However, the Vendeans’ newfound historical consciousness is also fractured by anxiety, as historical narrative appears increasingly unstable as the novel moves toward its conclusion. The novel’s narrative anxiety originates in part in its preoccupation with England’s role in the Vendean resistance, which mirrors the complicated relationship between the Italian Risorgimento and the English public in the Victorian period. Giuseppe Mazzini, for example, condemned England’s position of neutrality regarding the nationalist European revolutions of the mid century in an 1852 article in the *Westminster Review* titled “Europe: Its Condition and Prospects”:

> What! you are in the midst of an uprising, not of a town, but of the whole human race; you have brute force on the one side, and right on the other; you march between proscription and martyrdom, between the scaffold and the altar; whole nations are struggling under oppression; generations are proscribed; men slaughter each other at your very doors; they die by hundreds, by thousands, fighting for or against an idea; this idea calls itself good or evil; and you, continuing the while to call yourselves men and Christians, would claim the right of remaining neutral? You cannot do so without moral degradation. Neutrality, that is to say, indifference between good and evil, the just and the unjust, liberty and oppression, is simply Atheism. (237)

England’s policy of hesitating between the established states and incipient revolutionary nations, Mazzini continues, “ha[s] brought England to the abdication of herself in the affairs of Europe; [it is] bringing her sooner or later to absolute isolation. Self-abdication
and isolation: is that a life worthy of England?” (248).\textsuperscript{167} Trollope’s preoccupation with English absence in *La Vendée*, therefore, explores topical debates of the 1840s and 1850s centring on England’s place in an international, European community and its responsibilities—framed by Mazzini as Trollope’s Vendeans often imagine political conflicts, in terms of sacred or religious duties—toward neighbouring peoples.

As in the case of the Italian Risorgimento, England does not officially intervene in the Vendée. The Vendeans believe their success depends on military aid from England that never arrives, and thus they can never act out their narratives of victory (161-162, 176, 194, 384, 385). In fact, they cross the Loire, completing their geographical dislocation, in hopes of “meet[ing] the succour which had been promised them from England” (321), and as the novel concludes they prepare to migrate to Granville\textsuperscript{168} to meet their English allies (427-428). The “disappointment” that the Vendeans never do receive English help in the course of the war haunts the final pages of *La Vendée* (439); the telling of the war’s final outcome is reserved for an English audience, a stranger who appears in the Chapeau home after the battle of Waterloo in order to inquire about the fate of the Vendeans heroes (437-442). This character could function as the traveller figure typical of the national tale, who stands in for the audience in which the plot aims to produce sympathy for its marginalised people; however, the appearance of this belated English stranger can only result in regret and discomfort. By this time, the good will existing between potential allies has disappeared, and Annot Stein, now Annot Chapeau, can only see the English as occupiers and enemies, not sympathisers and friends (435-436). Trollope’s emphasis on English absence throughout the novel is not simply a means of foreshadowing for a familiar audience that the Vendeans efforts are doomed to failure.

\textsuperscript{167} While Mazzini emphasises England’s “indifference” (237) in the mid-century nationalist conflicts, others suggested that English people, if not the English government, participated extensively in the Italian Risorgimento. According to Annemarie McAllister’s examination of the Risorgimento in *John Bull’s Italian Snakes and Ladders*, the *Illustrated London News* “fostered” “the myth that the Italians had gained their nationhood only by the help of the English” (195). The newspaper, for example, frequently featured images and descriptions of English soldiers fighting with Giuseppe Garibaldi (196-197). Although “England as a nation took no physical part in the conflict whatsoever,” the press tended to emphasise English diplomatic efforts on behalf of the Italian nationalists (199). In Trollope’s short story “The Last Austrian Who Left Venice,” both Italian nationalists and Austrian soldiers fighting in the 1860 conflict feel betrayed by the “false ... statesmen” (74) whose diplomatic machinations, instead of the population’s military efforts, determine the outcome for Italy.

\textsuperscript{168} The name Granville also resonates with the political context of the 1840s and 1850s: Lord Granville, who was Foreign Secretary from 1851-1852 under Lord John Russell’s Whig government, is targeted in Mazzini’s article (237).
without foreign intervention, but stresses the instability of historical narrative: the story of English intervention, which the Vendean characters repeatedly circulate as the cornerstone to their resistance narrative, is a fiction rather than historical fact, and the belated English traveller reminds Trollope’s reader of the failure of Vendean narrative. The Vendeans’ construction of their own narrative for the war is thus undermined by their emphasis on a plot point that never occurs, and the event that is intended to mark their final military success exists in Trollope’s text only as a gaping historical hole.

In addition to drawing attention to the narrative’s missing pieces, the conclusion to *La Vendée* expresses Trollope’s anxiety about historical narrative and about the revival of revolution in his own time by skewing the narrator’s sense of historical distance in the final pages. The novel’s opening reference to the “first French Republic” (7) shows the narrator’s consciousness of the historical distance between the novel’s action in 1793 and the time of its writing in the late 1840s, when revolution brings the Second French Republic, as well as temporary republics across Italy, into being. However, this reference to the re-emergence of republicanism in the 1840s also means that the novel does not conclude with this distance between action and narration intact. Instead, the narrative cuts off mid-war, concluding the main characters’ plots with the double marriages of Henri and Marie, and Chapeau and Annot in order to provide the closest thing to a fictional happy ending that the historical record could allow (434). Yet, the novel does not end where Trollope leaves his Vendeans, optimistically planning their march to Granville to meet with English aid. The narrator instead attempts to adopt a retrospective view on the events of *La Vendée* while leaping forward in time to describe first the post-Waterloo possession of Paris by Britain and its allies (434-435) and then the period following the 1848 revolution, collapsing time and rendering history a fragmented but repetitive collection of violent events with no real linear movement. This emphasis on historical repetition and fragmented plotlines undermines the novel’s attempt to use historical narrative to produce continuity, stability and identity out of events characterised by violent rupture and disorder.

In fact, *La Vendée*’s final pages provide competing perspectives on how to understand history by validating and granting finality to the Vendean narrative of resistance in the post-Waterloo restoration of the monarchy and then undermining that conclusiveness by
describing 1848’s return to republican government. After Waterloo, the revolutionary and Napoleonic periods of French history appear to be over, and with them, the source of the Vendée’s political grievances. Jacques Chapeau can state with confidence from 1815,

La Vendée was never conquered. Neither the fear of the Convention, nor the arms of the Directory, nor the strength of the Consul, nor the flattery of the Emperor could conquer La Vendée .... Revolt has never been put down in La Vendée, since Cathelineau commenced the war in St Florent ....

Through more than twenty years of suffering and bloodshed, La Vendée has been true to its colour, and now it will receive its reward. (441)

Chapeau’s assurance that the Vendée “will receive its reward” under the restoration corresponds with the narrative the Vendeans promote throughout the war, ending in royalist triumph. Yet, to the historically conscious, Chapeau’s list of governmental frameworks, the Convention, Directory, Consul and Empire, which precede France’s return to monarchy, indicates that French history between 1793 and 1815, far from working progressively along one trajectory toward one political end, actually consists of a series of ruptures with the political past, leading the reader to question why the restoration should be any more permanent than the earlier revolutionary phases. For Trollope’s 1850 reader, aware of the 1830 July Revolution and the subsequent ‘springtime of the peoples’ in 1848, Chapeau’s confidence is undermined by France’s discontinuous history.

From the post-1848 perspective, to which the novel lurches forward in its final paragraph, “Five-and-thirty years” since the Battle of Waterloo, the narrator’s capacity to produce an historical narrative of some distance and stability is even more questionable. The narrator asks, in light of France’s return to republican government, “How long will it be before some second La Vendée shall successfully, but bloodlessly, struggle for another re-establishment of the monarchy?” (442), revealing that the stakes of the Vendean War are once more immediate and unresolved. The narrator answers this question assertively, stating, “Surely before the expiration of half a century since the return of Louis, France will congratulate herself on another restoration” (442), but the confidence of this prophecy is destabilised by the narrator’s inability to bring the Vendean plot to some final conclusion and by the overturn of the first restoration by 1830 and 1848. Instead, the
history of La Vendée is fragmented, repetitive and disordered, and Trollope’s effort to bring coherence to violent and chaotic historical events fails in these final pages. If the stakes of the war remain unresolved from the historically distanced position the narrator takes up to the extent that the narrator must still continue to take sides as though the conflict is immediately relevant, then history collapses in on itself, refusing the novel’s narrative demand for order and finality. Revolution, finally, cannot be contained within the past: as these concluding anxieties about the post-1848 world suggest, the revolutionary era still poses threats to mid-nineteenth-century political stability.

_La Vendée_ is not a work of Victorian realism like the novels on which Trollope staked his reputation, but is instead engaged with the representational strategies and contests that emerged out of the revolutionary context and that were brought to the forefront of the British imagination once more as a result of the nationalist, revolutionary struggles of 1848. Trollope’s use of the melodramatic mode and the authoritative genre of historical fiction engages in the conflicts over histrionic excess, the pragmatics of affect and the establishment of consensus-based, stabilising literary forms that developed in the Revolution Debate and Anti-Jacobin fiction of the 1790s. Trollope furthermore attempts to formulate a stabilising model of a cohesive community by figuring the Vendeans as an emergent nation that develops organically out of deferential, feudal culture and appears to offer an alternative to the suspicious, centralised modern state that his version of the Revolution ushers into being. In marked contrast to Thomas Carlyle’s _French Revolution_—the most famous Victorian depiction of the Revolution available to Trollope— which celebrates the energy and incoherence of the revolutionary moment through its radical and chaotic representational strategies, _La Vendée_ reduces the complicated revolutionary decade and the Vendean War by writing them according to the extreme emotionalism of the melodramatic mode and the authoritative perspective of the historical novel. Trollope’s attempts to impose order and stability on a complex historical event by simplifying and containing revolution according to the logic of melodramatic morality and authoritative historical narrative, however, are fractured by the post-1848 anxieties that suggest the continued urgency of the political questions the novel explores. Writing from the end of the revolutionary era, Trollope demonstrates that Romantic preoccupations with the Revolution’s incoherence, the establishment of a post-
revolutionary community, and the role of narrative authority and representational excess in determining the Revolution’s legacy remain compelling for the Victorian writers who turn to the Revolution in their fiction in the wake of the 1848 crises.
CHAPTER 7

“WITH NOT A TRACE OF THIS DAY’S DISFIGUREMENT”: AFFECTIVE COMMUNITIES AND REPRESENTATIONAL VIOLENCE IN CHARLES DICKENS’S A TALE OF TWO CITIES

In his 1859 novel A Tale of Two Cities, Charles Dickens presents a hostile critique of old-regime power that could seem to challenge the novel’s place in the antirevolutionary tradition that this study traces. However, Tale also expresses an overwhelming fear of the alienating tendencies of modernity and the mechanisms of the revolutionary state that aligns the novel with the anxieties that appear in Trollope’s La Vendée. Dickens casts the techniques of state control that dominate the old regime and the modern state as oppressive political formations, and opposes to them the authority of an idealised Victorian home characterised by intimacy, affective bonds, and efficient but compassionate domestic management. Dickens’s novel thus retrospectively establishes mid-Victorian values such as allegiance to a domestic circle and sentimentalised virtue as the only viable alternatives to old-regime symbolic violence, represented by the public execution, and revolutionary coercion, represented by the ubiquitous carceral experience of the Terror. Tale shows that modern individual and community identities can emerge from loyalty to domestic morality, constructed around the feelings of affect and intimacy that Lucie encourages in the novel’s characters, and that Sydney Carton exploits in his self-sacrifice at the guillotine. However, in putting domestic values into competition with old-regime and revolutionary concepts of the individual and the community, Tale performs a kind of representational violence against what it attempts to expose as untenable constructions of identity.

Dickens’s Tale, in fact, represents the culmination of the legacy of antirevolutionary representational violence that emerged in the 1790s. While literary critics frequently note the violence that occurs within the novel’s plot,169 this analysis is unique in pointing to the kinds of representational violence Dickens commits within the novel as an engagement with the political and narrative contests of the 1790s. Dickens’s trial scenes

and representations of spying suggest that his novel is as much about the British experience of the French Revolution as the events that occurred in France. The British Treason Trials of the 1790s and a number of spying scandals beginning in the revolutionary period indicate the impact the Revolution had on the British state and public life. By depicting such techniques of state control as espionage and the public treason trial, Dickens continues to confront the repressive government measures of the revolutionary period as late as 1859. The political stakes of the Revolution, then, remain relevant in the mid-Victorian British state.

Dickens, furthermore, engages with the representational strategies I have identified with antirevolutionary works beginning with Edmund Burke’s *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. While literary critics have frequently read *Tale* in light of Thomas Carlyle’s *French Revolution*,¹⁷⁰ very little effort has been made to trace Dickens’s representations of the Revolution to the Romantic-era antirevolutionary texts I examine in this study. Critical explorations of dehumanising forms of old-regime and revolutionary governance (McWilliams 20; Frank 216) or of the “intrusive stare” of the revolutionary state (Gallagher 82) provide useful strategies for approaching Dickens’s critique of old-regime and revolutionary France as well as unreformed England. Furthermore, several literary critics have convincingly argued that Dickens establishes the family as an alternative to the “mechanistic,” dehumanising institutions that characterise the old regime and modern state (Marcus 24). Certainly, as Albert D. Hutter argues, *Tale* establishes a “correlation between family and nation” (38) and attempts to re-make the nation in the image of the family, as Elizabeth Hamilton’s and Frances Burney’s antirevolutionary novels also do.¹⁷¹

However, literary critics have not remarked on the crucial role the affective, domestic family plays in generating the kind of Burkean emotional capital that ultimately allows Dickens to convert sentimental, excess emotion into violence against revolutionary plots and narratives. In fact, interpretations of *Tale*’s characters as particularly flat (Stout 29-30), demonstrating, as Harold Bloom argues, “weakness” or “relative failure”

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¹⁷⁰ See Chapter 1 for a list of relevant criticism.
¹⁷¹ For more on family, domesticity and gender in *Tale*, see John B. Lamb’s “Domesticating History: Revolution and Moral Management in *A Tale of Two Cities*,” Catherine Waters’s *Dickens and the Politics of the Family* and Lisa Robson’s “The ‘Angels’ in Dickens’s House.”
(Introduction 7), have prevented critical explorations of domestic affect as a product of Lucie’s subjectivity. Only by recognising her subjectivity — her emotional depths — can we accept that Lucie actively constructs the affective ties within her domestic community that translate into the novel’s increasing acceptance of insular nationalism and Sydney Carton’s sentimental but militant self-sacrifice for her sake in the final chapter. This sentimentality performs the function of Burke’s conservative sensibility or Anthony Trollope’s melodramatic excess in *Tale* by allowing Sydney Carton’s emotional plot of self-sacrifice to pre-empt the revolutionary narratives and plots — Doctor Manette’s Bastille narrative and Madame Defarge’s record of old-regime abuse — that appear in the novel. I turn to critical arguments that read Carton’s death as an expression of his rivalry with Charles Darnay as a starting point for my analysis of the representational violence Carton commits through his sentimental plot. However, my argument goes further, finding in Dickens’s sentimentality a source of a histrionic, emotional excess that frequently permits explicitly violent outbursts against Dickens’s revolutionaries to occur within the text. Although Carton’s embrace of sentimentality works to conceal and contain his feelings of competition with Darnay, in other words, Carton and Dickens’s narrator, fueled by the excess emotionalism nurtured by Lucie’s affective domesticity and Carton’s sentimental death, frequently combine to commit more overt kinds of violence — spying and incitements to violence through spectacle, for example — as the feelings of victimisation that underlie Carton’s plot bleed into antirevolutionary rage.

“Putting to Death”: Old-Regime Spectacles of Power

Dickens’s old-regime France and eighteenth-century England are both governed by spectacles of privilege and power that enforce social and political barriers and dehumanise members of all social ranks by substituting abstract types for individuals. In the absolutist system *Tale* depicts, each person obtains social and political value only as a representative of his or her location within a static old-regime hierarchy. In London and

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172 Bloom applies the first description to Lucie and Darnay, and the second to Sydney Carton.
173 See Miriam Bailin’s “‘Dismal Pleasure’: Victorian Sentimentality and the Pathos of the Parvenu,” which I will return to in more detail below. See also Chris R. Vanden Bossche’s claim that the prophecy at the end of the novel introduces “unsettling ambiguity rather than closure” as “[t]he image of self-sacrifice created by this speech puts the authenticity of that very self-sacrifice into question” (211) and Jeremy Tambling’s argument that “[t]here is to be no heir for Charles Darnay: he is excluded from the prophetic future” (153).
Paris alike, individuals subjected to old-regime mechanisms of power are reduced to placeholders in an elaborate social structure or tortured bodies operating as signs of absolutist rule. However, as Dickens’s English trial and Versailles scenes suggest, the excess sensation and emotion spectacles of old-regime power produce can be easily manipulated or transformed into sentiments that are unwanted by the old regime’s stakeholders, preparing the political ground for the Revolution’s explosion into violence.

*A Tale of Two Cities* is set at the historical juncture Michel Foucault illuminates in *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Between the height of absolute power in the old regime and the establishment of modern democracy, Foucault argues, “From being an art of unbearable sensations punishment has become an economy of suspended rights” (11). Dickens’s first chapter, indicting abuses of power in France and social disorder in England, presents an example of the spectacle of punishment under France’s old regime:

Under the guidance of her Christian pastors, she [France] entertained herself ... with such humane achievements as sentencing a youth to have his hands cut off, his tongue torn out with pincers, and his body burned alive, because he had not kneeled down in the rain to do honour to a dirty procession of monks which passed within his view, at a distance of some fifty or sixty yards. (8)

Later in the novel, Dickens provides a description of Gaspard’s execution as a parricide for murdering the Marquis St Evrémonde, whose reckless driving killed Gaspard’s child on the streets of Paris. The mender of roads, who describes Gaspard’s punishment to the Defarges and the Jacquerie, dwells on the symbolic positioning of Gaspard’s body as an example for the villagers, claiming that “[h]e is bound ... and in his mouth there is a gag— tied so, with a tight string, making him look almost as if he laughed .... On the top of the gallows is fixed the knife, blade upwards, with its point in the air. He is hanged there forty feet high— and is left hanging, poisoning the water” (164). These accounts of torture and execution recall the punishment of Damiens for regicide, with which Foucault’s book opens:

On 2 March 1757 Damiens the regicide was condemned “to make the *amende honourable* before the main door of the Church of Paris”, where
he was to be “taken and conveyed in a cart, wearing nothing but a shirt, holding a torch of burning wax weighing two pounds”; then, “in the said cart, to the Place de Grève, where, on a scaffold that will be erected there, the flesh will be torn from his breasts, arms, thighs and calves with red-hot pincers, his right hand, holding the knife with which he committed the said parricide, burnt with sulphur, and, on those places where the flesh will be torn away, poured molten lead, boiling oil, burning resin, wax and sulphur melted together and then his body drawn and quartered by four horses and his limbs and body consumed by fire, reduced to ashes and his ashes thrown to the winds.” (3)

These descriptions of punishment reveal important information about power and spectacle in the old regime. First, Damiens’s and Gaspard’s examples function as violent warnings against parricide to Dickens’s villagers, as images of torture resonate in their collective memory; rumours about the spectacle of Gaspard’s punishment before it occurs are drawn explicitly from accounts of Damiens’s death, as the mender’s conspiratorial dialogue with the Jacquerie demonstrates:

They even whisper that because he has slain Monseigneur, and because Monseigneur was the father of his tenants—serfs—what you will—he will be executed as a parricide. One old man says at the fountain, that his right hand, armed with the knife, will be burnt off before his face; that, into wounds which will be made in his arms, his breast, and his legs, there will be poured boiling oil, melted lead, hot resin, wax, and sulphur; finally, that he will be torn limb from limb by four strong horses. That old man says, all this was actually done to a prisoner who made an attempt on the life of the late King, Louis Fifteen. (163)

Second, these accounts indicate the aptness of Foucault’s claim that torture in the old regime “must mark its victim” (34), displaying the truth of the crime and its corresponding punishment through a system of legible signs. Thus, Dickens’s villagers recognise the symbolic value of the weapon with which the act of parricide is committed, predicting its appearance in the spectacle of Gaspard’s punishment. Although Gaspard’s hand is not “burnt off before his face” as the old man expects (163), the knife still marks
Gaspard as a parricide; indeed, the knife’s symbolic value has become so entrenched in the villagers’ minds that its simple positioning on Gaspard’s gallows, “blade upwards, with its point in the air” (164), seems to contain the threat of Damiens’s more brutal punishment.

Third, these punishments function as exercises of absolute patriarchal power, or what Foucault calls “an exercise of ‘terror’” (49), illustrating the sameness of the old regime’s stakeholders, and their solidarity in enacting revenge against those who commit offences challenging their power. The punishments faced by Damiens, Gaspard and the youth are for offences against the three major powerful groups in the old regime— the monarchy, the clergy, and the aristocracy— and react against offences that are imagined as rejections of these authorities as father figures. It is significant that both Damiens and Gaspard are represented as parricides, and the “youth” tortured for failing to “honour” a procession of monks (8), his age suggests, is likely a person thought to be still under his father’s authority. As Foucault argues, crime in the old regime is conceived of as an act against the sovereign, and punishment is thus “a way of exacting retribution that is both personal and public” (48). Punishment, then, functions as an identifiable, predictable and spectacular public warning for a population, indicating the absolute power of the monarch and his political counterparts, and marking the body of the criminal with signs of that power.

In fact, the spectacle of punishment is part of a cluster of rituals and spectacles confirming old-regime power in the early chapters of A Tale of Two Cities. In Foucault’s words,

The public execution ... belongs to a whole series of rituals in which power is eclipsed and restored (coronation, entry of the king into a conquered city, the submission of rebellious subjects); over and above the crime that has placed the sovereign in contempt, it deploys before all eyes an invincible force. Its aim is not so much to re-establish a balance as to bring into play, as its extreme point, the dissymmetry between the subject who has dared to violate the law and the all-powerful sovereign who displays his strength. (48-49)
Dickens characterises old-regime society as a whole with this kind of spectacle and excess, particularly through the image of the “Fancy Ball” (103), Dickens’s name for the aristocratic circle portrayed in the chapter “Monseigneur in Town.” The narrator clearly aligns spectacles illustrating aristocratic privilege with spectacles exercising the power to punish by indicating that the “Fancy Ball” (103) of aristocratic society extends from the monarch to the executioner:

Dress was the one unfailing talisman and charm used for keeping all things in their places. Everybody was dressed for a Fancy Ball that was never to leave off. From the Palace of the Tuileries, through Monseigneur and the whole Court, through the Chambers, the Tribunals of Justice, and all society (except the scarecrows), the Fancy Ball descended to the Common Executioner: who, in pursuance of the charm, was required to officiated “frizzled, powdered, in a gold-laced coat, pumps, and white silk stockings.” At the gallows and the wheel— the axe was a rarity— Monsieur Paris, as it was the episcopal mode among his brother Professors of the provinces, Monsieur Orleans, and the rest, to call him, presided in this dainty dress. And who among the company at Monseigneur’s reception in that seventeen hundred and eightieth year of our Lord, could possibly doubt, that a system rooted in a frizzled hangman, powdered, gold-laced, pumped, and white-silk stockinged, would see the very stars out! (103-104)

The spectacle of aristocratic dress as a “talisman and charm” marking social privilege is shown to be implicit in government, from the regulation of “Tribunals of Justice” to the practice of punishment, as the executioner’s dress mirrors the “charm,” and thereby the spectacle, of social privilege.

Just as the villagers witnessing Gaspard’s execution are inundated with the signs of political power, the inhabitants of the Paris slums are subjected to the “spectacle” of the “Fancy Ball” passing through the streets (107). After the Marquis’s carriage kills Gaspard’s child, the Parisian poor return to the streets to witness the scene of privilege: the Minister, the State-Projector, the Farmer-General, the Doctor, the Lawyer, the Ecclesiastic, the Grand Opera, the Comedy, the whole Fancy
Ball in a bright continuous flow, came whirling by. The rats had crept out of their holes to look on, and they remained looking on for hours; soldiers and police often passing between them and the spectacle, and making a barrier behind which they slunk, and through which they peeped. (107)

This passage creates further slippage between images indicating social privilege, like “the Grand Opera” and authority within the state, “the Minister, the State-Projector, the Farmer-General ....” In addition, the narrator illustrates the ways in which the static, stratified positions within the old-regime hierarchy are enforced through both the “spectacle” that displays the signs of privilege and the “barrier” composed of “soldiers and police” that excludes the poor.

The Marquis St Evrémonde exemplifies the rule of aristocratic privilege in Dickens’s representation of the old regime, continually exercising his power to punish. As John Kucich argues in “The Purity of Violence: A Tale of Two Cities,” aristocrats like the Marquis enact violence as a “symbol of the mastery of the rich,” taking advantage of the opportunity to “kill as spectacle” (66). In addition to carelessly killing Gaspard’s child and imprisoning Doctor Manette in the Bastille, transforming him into a traumatised “spectacle of ruin” (Dickens 328), the Marquis unapologetically threatens his nephew Charles Darnay with punishment obtained through a lettre de cachet for his rejection of the Evrémonde name and values, only regretting that his power to punish is diminished by his lack of influence at court. He complains to Darnay, “These little instruments of correction, these gentle aids to the power and honour of families, these slight favours that might so incommode you, are only to be obtained now by interest and importunity” (116). In Kucich’s words, the aristocracy, represented by the Marquis, is characterised by the “non-humanity” of its violence (66).

In fact, the Marquis’s inhumane exercise of power translates into his dehumanisation within Dickens’s narrative, which mimics the old-regime hierarchy that views individuals as “allegories for groups,” “treated as social positions” (Stout 34). Within the absolutist structure, individual identity and the relation of individuals to the larger national community are constructed by each person’s positioning within the system of power and privilege. The impoverished Parisians, therefore, become “scarecrows” (103) or “rats” (107) in their positioning relative to the “Fancy Ball” (103). Even individuals with
comparative influence within the absolutist system are dehumanised as a result of this over-deterministic social structure; individuals become simply instruments of power or abstract types such as “the Minister, the State-Projector, the Farmer-General, the Doctor, the Lawyer, the Ecclesiastic” (107). Although Dickens frequently uses caricature or reduces characters to a few specific physical or personality traits—Jerry Cruncher’s spiky hair and rusty fingers, or Lucie Manette’s expressive, compassionate forehead—the difference in Tale’s old-regime France is that Dickens’s characters can only be depicted as social types, representing their places within a rigid social hierarchy. The Marquis’s symbolic, stony, mask-like face reduces him to a type for aristocratic tyranny: Dickens’s positioning of the chapter following him to his château, “Monseigneur in the Country,” just after that describing the patron with whom the Marquis seeks favour, “Monseigneur in Town,” blurs the lines between the two Monseigneurs, reinforcing their primary existence as representatives of their rank over their individual roles in the novel. The Marquis’s physical appearance also diminishes his individuality, as his “face that was like a fine mask” (115), which the narrator likens to “any stone face outside the château” (120), functions as a theatrical image that conceals any humanity the Marquis might possess behind the static privilege deriving from his property, the château, while it heightens the reader’s sense of the importance of spectacle in reinforcing the rigid absolutist social structure. Unlike Lucie, whose expressive forehead denotes her compassionate subjectivity, the Marquis’s mask-like face suggests only a surface, a lack of depth.

England, however, is by no means excluded from Dickens’s indictment of social privilege and the power to punish, nor is old-regime torture at odds with modern English commerce. Contrary to David Marcus’s claim that A Tale of Two Cities portrays England as “a culture in which personality can be multidimensional, in which the publicly visible self is but one part” (32), Dickens represents an England in which the justice system retains the spectacular elements that characterise old-regime punishment, and commercial institutions, like Tellson’s Bank, are implicated in the most archaic of traditional abuses. Dickens invests Tellson’s with the qualities of the antiquated England that appears in the novel by explicitly situating the Bank “on a par with the Country” (51). Tellson’s prides itself on being “old-fashioned” (51), mirroring the traditionalism of the nation’s judicial
institutions: “the Old Bailey, at that date, was a choice illustration of the precept, that
‘Whatever is is right;’ an aphorism that would be as final as it is lazy, did it not include
the troublesome consequence, that nothing that ever was, was wrong” (58). Furthermore,
Tellson’s appears as a space co-opted by military and judicial purposes, resembling both
a fortress and a prison with its dark, hidden vaults: “If your business necessitated your
seeing ‘the House,’ you were put into a species of Condemned Hold at the back, where
you meditated on a misspent life, until the House came with its hands in its pockets, and
you could hardly blink at it in the dismal twilight” (51-52). Cates Baldridge’s reading of
Tellson’s recognises its association with “the decidedly unreformed England of 1780”
(643) and with the prison, but suggests that images of the prison and death link Tellson’s
with the Revolution (643-644).

I would argue, however, that Tellson’s is most clearly analogous with the justice
system of the old regime, characterised by tortured bodies, rather than the more utilitarian
executions by guillotine staged by the Republic. The type of violence Dickens ascribes to
Tellson’s marks its affiliation with absolute power and archaic punishment. The Bank’s
old-fashioned attributes, the narrator indicates, are its “weapon[s]” (51), and Tellson’s
and the commercial values it represents are complicit in the old regime’s judicial logic of
“putting to death” (52):

at that time, putting to death was a recipe much in vogue with all trades
and professions, and not least of all with Tellson’s. Death is Nature’s
remedy for all things, and why not Legislation’s? Accordingly, the forger
was put to Death; the utterer of a bad note was put to Death; the unlawful
opener of a letter was put to Death; the purloiner of forty shillings and
sixpence was put to Death; the holder of a horse at Tellson’s door, who
made off with it, was put to Death; the coiner of a bad shilling was put to
Death; the sounders of three-fourths of the notes in the whole gamut of
Crime, were put to Death. Not that it did the least good in the way of
prevention ... but, it cleared off (as to this world) the trouble of each
particular case, and left nothing else connected with it to be looked after.
(52)
Tellson’s and the English financial system are as much bound up with old-regime justice and government as France’s “Fancy Ball” (103), as the passage’s equation between Tellson’s, a representative of “all trades and professions,” and English legislation attests. Moreover, punishment appears not as “prevention” but as a hypocritical form of revenge against unlawful intrusion into the Bank’s business: as the novel’s early statement that “the highwayman in the dark was a City tradesman in the light” (8) implies, the capitalists who benefit from old-regime punishment could also engage in unlawful forms of economic activity. The English commercial sector, then, is hypocritically invested in both the institutions of the law and economic illegality.

In addition to demonstrating the correspondence between commercial and judicial power, Tellson’s is intimately associated with the spectacle of old-regime torture in its physical proximity to the Temple Bar, the traditional site of the theatre of English execution; at the time in which the novel opens, the room Tellson’s uses for storing personal papers is “but newly released from the horror of being ogled through the windows, by the heads exposed on Temple Bar” (52). However, the image of heads at the Temple Bar also further emphasises the blame Dickens casts at Tellson’s for participating in the old-fashioned judicial system, for the Bank itself “had taken so many lives, that, if the heads laid low before it had been ranged on Temple Bar instead of being privately disposed of, they would probably have excluded what little light the ground floor had, in a rather significant manner” (52). Finally, Tellson’s, like the French hierarchy, dehumanises individuals by subordinating personal identity to type, in this case, that of the Tellson’s businessman: Jarvis Lorry, a Tellson’s employee, accepts this, stating, “We men of business, who serve a House, are not our own masters. We have to think of the House more than ourselves” (78). Lorry’s use of the word “masters” speaks to the dominance of the institution, implying that Lorry’s business relationship with the Bank is inflected with notions of feudal power.

Charles Darnay’s treason trial further exemplifies the ways in which old-regime power continues to operate in eighteenth-century England, while highlighting Dickens’s position that the Revolution is concurrently a French and an English event. Although Darnay’s trial occurs in 1780, well before the revolutionary decade, Dickens’s courtroom recalls old-regime Britain’s exercise of state power over voices of dissent in the repressive
measures of the 1790s, especially the famous Treason Trials of 1794. Dickens’s contemporary reviewer James Fitzjames Stephen identified the 1780 trial of a French aristocrat named De la Motte as a source for Darnay’s treason trial, and this reading of the trial has been accepted by later critics (Stephen 743); however, an exploration of Darnay’s trial alongside the 1794 cases yields a fuller understanding of how Dickens draws on the stakes of the 1790s for Britain as well as for France throughout his novel, and not just in the revolutionary scenes. My analysis of Darnay’s English trial in light of the Treason Trials establishes, for the first time, that Dickens’s novel draws upon a particularly British experience of the French Revolution based in the repressive government measures that the 1794 trials represent. By plotting an English treason trial for Darnay, in other words, Dickens recognises, as many of the other antirevolutionary writers in my study do, that the French Revolution can also be revisited from the British perspective and as an event with significant political stakes for Britain.

In 1793-4, a number of well-known English and Scottish reformers were prosecuted for sedition in Scotland and transported; in the spring of 1794, just before suspending Habeas Corpus, the government arrested twelve reformers on charges of treason in London. Thomas Hardy, John Horne Tooke and John Thelwall were eventually tried and acquitted, and the others were released without trial. The treason charge against Darnay, of course, differs from those levelled against the 1794 defendants; Darnay is accused of having “assisted Lewis, the French King, in his wars against [George III]” (61), a crime probably falling under the third clause of the 1351 Treason Act, 25 Edward III, that prohibits “levy[ing] war against our lord the King in his realm,” while the 1794 defendants were accused of “compass[ing] or imagin[ing] the death of our lord the King.” Yet, as the most important British trials of the 1790s, the Treason Trials are an

174 See Andrew Sanders’s explanatory note in the Oxford edition (377).
175 For detailed accounts of the Treason Trials, see E. P. Thompson’s *The Making of the English Working Class*, Alan Wharam’s *The Treason Trials, 1794* and John Barrell’s *Imagining the King’s Death: Figurative Treason, Fantasies of Regicide 1793-1796*.
176 The translated text of 25 Edward III, as recorded in Appendix I of Wharam’s *The Treason Trials*, reads:

1. Item, whereas opinions have been before this time in what case treason shall be said, and in what not: the King, at the request of the lords and commons, hath made a declaration in the manner as hereunder followeth, that is to say:

(i) When a man doth compass or imagine the death of our lord the King, or of our lady his Queen or of their eldest son and heir;
important model for any English trial scene in an historical novel set primarily in the revolutionary decade.

Although Darnay’s trial does not directly fictionalise the 1794 trials, Dickens does leave several clues in his novel to suggest this crucial moment in Britain’s experience of the French Revolution for a Victorian audience for whom the Treason Trials were a recent memory. Doctor Manette’s shoemaking is one direct reminder of English radicalism in the revolutionary era, as the shoemaker became an icon of English Jacobin politics in the 1790s and later. The involvement of shoemakers in the Cato Street Conspiracy in the early nineteenth century\(^\text{177}\) is one example of their role in working-class radicalism, but Manette’s shoemaking recalls even more specifically the figure of Thomas Hardy, the first defendant in the Treason Trials and a shoemaker by trade. Moreover, Dickens incorporates rewritten versions of some of the Treason Trials’ distinguishing features into Darnay’s trial. Lucie’s swoon in the courtroom (73) recalls the histrionic atmosphere of the 1794 trials, and specifically defence lawyer Thomas Erskine’s “tendency to swoon at strategic moments” (Pascoe 48). Lucie’s position as a witness for the prosecution also suggests a rewriting of the role of Jane Partridge, a witness against Hardy, in 1794. Like Lucie, Partridge was named as a witness for having travelled with a stranger she was later to identify as the defendant. According to Alan Wharam’s account of the trials, The Treason Trials, 1794, Hardy was “parade[d]” (134) around the Tower so that Partridge might identify him as he passed as “a man in a stage coach [with whom she had travelled] from Nottingham to London two years previously ... [who] had said to her that he would no more mind cutting off the King’s head than

shaving himself” (134-135). Although Lucie, unlike Partridge, is reluctant to implicate Darnay in any crime, her testimony is used to prove his identity as the man who “conferred together” (68) with two French men with whom he exchanged some papers, identified by Dickens’s prosecutors as the condemning “lists” Roger Cly had taken from Darnay’s desk (65). More importantly in terms of Dickens’s recollection of Partridge in Lucie’s testimony, Lucie describes Darnay’s offhand political comments for the court as Partridge had described her travelling companion’s irreverent political statements. The stage coach passenger’s casual reference to “cutting off the King’s head” and Darnay’s statement that England’s opposition to the American Revolution was “wrong and foolish” and joke that “perhaps George Washington might gain almost as great a name in history as George the Third” (69) do not provide any actual evidence of treasonous actions. However, such statements of political beliefs are thought, in the courtroom, to constitute key evidence of treasonous intentions: Darnay’s joke about George Washington, after all, is the “tremendous heresy” that seems to establish his guilt in the Judge’s eyes (70).

Finally, Partridge, like Lucie, swooned during the proceedings; in fact, she fainted twice when she was called to testify and never did manage to give her evidence against Hardy (Wharam 166). According to Wharam, “Hardy always believed that it was her intention to perjure herself; but in those days many people were going around saying how they would like to decapitate the King, so her story was almost certainly a case of mistaken identity” (166). The argument of mistaken identity that Sydney Carton puts forth in Darnay’s defence (71) thus further suggests the importance of the kinds of tangential evidence used against 1794 defendants such as Hardy in Dickens’s imagining of treason in the eighteenth-century British courts.

In addition to these small references to the Treason Trials, Darnay’s trial reflects the 1794 cases in the crucial roles narrative, imagination and spectacle assume in the courtroom. As Marjorie Stone argues in “Dickens, Bentham, and the Fictions of the Law,” Dickens was drawn to the problem of legal fictions throughout his career, engaging in the “Benthamite campaign against legal fictions” that was influential in the periodical press and the Victorian novel in the mid-nineteenth century, as “the work of

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178 As Wharam notes, Partridge’s statements were contested: Hardy’s “friends found witnesses who could prove that Hardy had never been out of London for a whole year both before and after the time she was going to swear to” (135).
the law reform commissions helped to make legal fictions a topical issue” (132). The narrative, fictional aspect of the British legal system that Stone explores was apparent in the 1794 charges, which were by their very nature imaginative; the defendants, after all, were alleged to have ‘compassed’ or ‘imagined’ the King’s death, to use the language of 25 Edward III. Although this clause intends to suggest only the crime of literally plotting to kill the King, the 1794 prosecutors depended upon a much broader reading of the law to include so-called ‘constructive’ treason, or any political action that might endanger the constitution of which the monarchy forms a part. Opponents of the charges argued that it was the prosecution, not the defendants, who therefore committed the crime of ‘imagining’ the King’s death by construing efforts for parliamentary reform as acts of ‘compassing or imagining.’ As John Barrell writes in *Imagining the King’s Death*,

> It is as if, once the indictment has released the word [imagine] into the courtroom, a subject has to be found for it. Someone has been imagining treason. The defendant, by pleading not guilty, insists that it is not him; who else then can it be but his accusers?— who on the basis of actions that import no apparent intention to kill the king have conjured up an imaginary scene of regicide. (41)

The figurative, imaginative nature of the charges in 1794 meant that the Treason Trials became a series of contests between different narratives, or fictionalisations, of criminality and innocence. In the historical moment, the stories told in the courtroom and the real consequences of the cases were impossible to disentangle, as Miriam Wallace rightly notes in “Constructing Treason, Narrating Truth”: “In 1794, English law itself came to seem overly-fictionalized, and fictional projections became materially dangerous” (n. pag.).

The prosecutors’ ‘constructive’ interpretation of 25 Edward III further stressed the supposed imaginative nature of the alleged treason. According to Wallace, “the charge of ‘Constructive Treason’ is oddly fictive in its form, relying on an extended narrative of logical and likely events stemming from an action other than a direct threat of assassination” (n. pag.). In other words, for the reformist actions and words of the defendants to be perceived as treason by the jury, the prosecutors had to construct an elaborate narrative connecting their supposed crimes with the eventual resulting
possibility of the King’s death and proving that it was also their intention that this should be the result of their agitation for reform. The frequently metaphorical nature of the defendants’ political writings, used as evidence of their regicidal impulses, added a further layer to this narrative contest, as Thomas Pfau explores in *Romantic Moods*: Once committed to the charge of high treason (rather than of sedition) ... the prosecution knew that it had to proceed by building a highly circumstantial, inference-driven, and elaborate narrative case; for only in this manner would it be possible to overcome the resistance within the very writings entered into the record ... to yielding up its evidentiary import. (167)

The combination of the language of the treason act, the prosecutors’ ‘constructive’ case and the coded, metaphorical political writings used as evidence against the accused suggests that the outcome of the Treason Trials would depend on which side could construct the most compelling narrative case, the best fiction of innocence or guilt.

Charles Darnay’s trial, likewise, is more about telling the best story than it is about determining whether or not Darnay actually committed the crime of which he is accused. Dickens uses the metaphor of tailoring a suit of clothes to describe the importance of narrative in shaping the case: “Mr. Stryver fitted the prisoner’s case on the jury, like a compact suit of clothes; showing them how the patriot, Barsad, was a hired spy and traitor, an unblushing trafficker in blood, and one of the greatest scoundrels upon earth since Judas— which he certainly did look rather like” (71). Next, Mr. Attorney-General turned the whole suit of clothes Mr. Stryver had fitted on the jury, inside out; showing how Barsad and Cly were even a hundred times better than he had thought them, and the prisoner a hundred times worse. Lastly, came my Lord himself, turning the suit of clothes, now inside out, now outside in, but on the whole decidedly trimming and shaping them into grave-clothes for the prisoner. (72)

Darnay’s conviction depends more on how Stryver, the Attorney General and the Judge succeed in “trimming and shaping” narratives about the backgrounds of Barsad and Cly and the resulting reliability of their testimony against Darnay, than in any objective analysis of the evidence that might exist against him. Dickens further complicates the
conflict between the narratives presented by the prosecution and defence by adding the implied fiction that Sydney Carton or another possible Darnay double could in fact have committed the alleged acts of treason (71), and a fourth narrative, the most compelling in this case, of Darnay’s “gentleness and kindness” (68), presented in Lucie’s testimony and her visible compassion for the prisoner.

This complex contest between available narratives in the courtroom means that the jury must decide the case based not on specific evidence, but on which version of the events presented to the court can command the most attention; Dickens thus also presents the courtroom as a space in which different kinds of spectacles designed to provoke different results in the audience come into conflict. In the theatre of the 1794 courtroom, as Judith Pascoe notes in her chapter on the Treason Trials in Romantic Theatricality, “[p]olitics and histrionics unite” (34). According to Pascoe, “Adherents of either side were acutely aware that they were performing for a rapt audience— the attorney for the accused [Thomas Erskine] would swoon at key moments in his defense like an actor in a melodrama— and were also quick to accuse their opponents of playing to the audience, of striking an affected pose” (33). In Darnay’s trial, the courtroom stages the imagined spectacle of his punishment, consistent with the operation of power in Dickens’s depictions of old-regime France. As with French old-regime punishment, Darnay’s crime is conceived as a personal offence against the sovereign, as the court characterises him as “a false traitor to our serene, illustrious, excellent, and so forth, prince, our Lord the King, by reason of his having, on divers occasions, and by divers means and ways, assisted Lewis, the French King, in his wars against our said serene, illustrious, excellent, and so forth ...” (61).

Furthermore, as in the French case, punishment is imagined as public and spectacular. The spectacle of torture ever present in the public mind in France appears to be displaced onto the ritual of the trial in this presentation of English justice, but this is only a superficial shift, as Darnay’s trial only achieves value for its audience as a voyeururistic opportunity for predicting and imagining his tortured body in the expected punishment. The public gaze at the trial focuses unabashedly on the spectacle of Darnay’s body:

Eager faces strained round pillars and corners, to get a sight of him; spectators in back rows stood up, not to miss a hair of him; people on the
floor of the court, laid their hands on the shoulders of the people before them, to help themselves, at anybody’s cost, to a view of him—stood a-tiptoe, got upon ledges, stood upon next to nothing, to see every inch of him. (60)

This interest in the criminal, the narrator reveals, is inseparable from the violence of his potential punishment: “Had he stood in peril of a less horrible sentence—had there been a chance of any one of its savage details being spared—by just so much would he have lost in his fascination. The form that was to be doomed to be so shamefully mangled, was the sight; the immortal creature that was to be so butchered and torn asunder, yielded the sensation” (60). For the purpose of the crowd, Darnay’s body is already a “sight” marked with the signs of torture, gaining its spectacular value as a “form that was to be doomed,” a “shamefully mangled” body creating the “sensation” of vicarious violence in the public mind. Like the French villagers at the fountain, the English audience at the trial already knows what signs Darnay’s body will yield when it is punished, as the man who informs Jerry Cruncher of the likely sentence’s details demonstrates: “‘Ah!’ returned the man, with a relish; ‘he’ll be drawn on a hurdle to be half hanged, and then he’ll be taken down and sliced before his own face, and then his inside will be taken out and burnt while he looks on, and then his head will be chopped off, and he’ll be chopped into quarters. That’s the sentence’” (59). The sentence appears to be not only the inevitable result of the trial, but the very reason for the trial’s occurrence; the English trial is completely implicated in the state’s exercise of the power to punish.

Darnay is finally acquitted by the jury, but this plot point does not suggest that English justice or the jury are more democratic or rational than the French system or the voyeuristic audience at the trial. Instead, Darnay’s acquittal illustrates the extent to which spectacle manipulates its audience’s sensations, producing emotional excess that is unstable, changeable and ultimately unpredictable. Darnay’s fate in reality rests with Lucie’s appearance as a sympathetic spectacle during the trial, which displaces the audience’s sensations away from the violence to be committed against Darnay’s tortured body and focuses them on the anxiety marking Lucie’s face:

Any strongly marked expression of face on the part of a chief actor in a scene of great interest to whom many eyes are directed, will be
unconsciously imitated by the spectators. Her forehead was painfully anxious and intent as she gave this evidence .... Among the lookers-on there was the same expression in all quarters of the court; insomuch, that a great majority of the foreheads there, might have been mirrors reflecting the witness .... (69-70)

The audience spontaneously and unconsciously sympathises with the spectacle of compassion Lucie presents, even to the extent of “mirror[ing]” the marks of her concern on their own bodies. Although this temporarily suggests the spectacle’s potential for rechanneling violent passions toward pity and mercy, the crowd’s behaviour at Darnay’s acquittal undermines this brief glimpse of the positive possibilities of spectacle in producing sympathy when it rushes into the street as though “in search of other carrión” (75). The legible sympathy marking Lucie’s body positively counters the image of the mutilated criminal body, but the public display of the marked body functions the same in Lucie’s case as in that of Gaspard and Darnay, inspiring the spectators with extreme emotional excess that can translate into violent or sympathetic action, depending on the prevailing passion.

Dickens’s portrayal of the power of spectacle in converting the audience’s desire to see Darnay punished engages with the historical realities of the 1790s English courtroom as well as eighteenth-century philosophical ideas about social sympathy current during the revolutionary decade. The spectacle of Lucie’s public compassion for Darnay replicates the kind of “domestic narratives” (34) that, according to Pascoe’s research, feature women as “inadvertent actresses in melodramatic tableaux” (57) in the courtroom of the Treason Trials. Pascoe’s primary example of the gendering of spectacle in the 1794 trials is the case of Thomas Hardy’s deceased wife, whose death along with her unborn child off-stage, as it were, when a mob attacked Hardy’s home while he was in prison, ensured her constant imagined presence in the courtroom and in public efforts to gain sympathy for the accused (60-63). The link between spectatorship and social sympathy that Dickens’s courtroom and the historical courtroom of 1794 explore arises from Adam Smith’s influential Theory of Moral Sentiments, a key text in debates about sensibility in the late eighteenth century and for Dickens’s construction of sympathy in Tale. Lucie’s ability to attract and channel the emotions of her audience during Darnay’s trial is an
example of what Smith sees as the exceptional instances when emotions can transfer from one person to another through spectacle alone:

Upon some occasions sympathy may seem to arise merely from the view of a certain emotion in another person. The passions, upon some occasions, may seem to be transfused from one man to another instantaneously, and antecedent to any knowledge of what excited them in the person principally concerned. Grief and joy, for example, strongly expressed in the look and gestures of any one, at once affect the spectator with some degree of a like painful or agreeable emotion. (13)

Lucie’s expressive face, therefore, is enough to recruit an emotional loyalty to Darnay in the courtroom independent of any knowledge of the facts of his case or of the specific relationship between Lucie and Darnay that inspires her personal compassion for him.

However, Dickens is more willing than Smith to explore the unstable, potentially dangerous and violent dimensions of such transferrable emotion. Spontaneous, changeable passion, like that of the crowd in the English courtroom, appears in several passages representing mobs in the novel, particularly in Dickens’s French scenes. The Revolution, the narrator indicates, provides the political conditions for “a wild infection of the wildly shaken public mind” (270-271). During the September Massacres, the mob vacillates between the “mad joy” of saving its potential victims and the “mad ferocity” of killing them (260). Darnay’s first trial by the French republican court exemplifies the function of spectacle in evoking emotion during the Revolution, repeating the process by which the crowd’s passions shift from the urge to kill to the desire to save, this time through Manette’s intervention. The audience first cries “Take off his head!” (272), but quickly transfers its allegiance to Darnay when Manette, a former Bastille prisoner, appears in his defence: “Cries in exaltation of the well-known good physician rent the hall. So capriciously were the people moved, that tears immediately rolled down several ferocious countenances which had been glaring at the prisoner a moment before, as if with impatience to pluck him out into the streets and kill him” (272). The suspicion with which the narrator treats the crowd’s sudden sentimental loyalty to Darnay is evident in the language that describes its sympathy as capricious and emphasises the violence that continues to mark the “ferocious countenances” of the spectators. Like the bodies that
mirror Lucie’s in the English courtroom, the experience of vicarious violence through the display of public justice in the republican court is portrayed as a primarily physical experience, focusing on the sensation spectacle creates. During Darnay’s second Parisian trial, for instance, the physicality of the passions provoked by spectacle is imagined through the metaphor of hunger: the “craving” look of Jacques Three on the jury “gave great satisfaction to the spectators” (303), while Madame Defarge appears to be “feasting” on Darnay (305). The audience replicates this physical sensation of vicarious violence linked to hunger, releasing “A sound of craving and eagerness that had nothing articulate in it but blood” (318).

The appearance of spectacle in the revolutionary courtroom suggests that republican justice reproduces the system of absolutist punishment that it attempts to replace. In fact, the revolutionaries manipulate spectacle throughout the novel in order to subvert the old regime’s order and displace violence in new directions. Foucault notes that, although spectators often functioned during ceremonies of public punishment as witnesses and guarantors of the old regime’s power, the excess emotion inspired by scenes of torture could easily transform into intervention on the part of the crowd against absolutist authority (58-65), demonstrating that the public execution was an “uncertain festival in which violence was instantaneously reversible” (63). It is not coincidental that the first example of sympathy as imaginative identification through spectacle that Smith introduces in Theory of Moral Sentiments describes a sufferer “upon the rack” (11), a victim of the state’s power to punish. The reversibility of spectacle is heightened in the revolutionary context, as Marie-Hélène Huet asserts: “Inherent in the notion of the spectator is that of the future actor; part of the pleasure of the spectacle lies in anticipation of another spectacle in which the spectator will finally be actor” (Rehearsing the Revolution 34). Dickens’s revolutionaries, especially the Defarges, recognise the degree to which violence incites retaliatory violence and the adoration and sentiment evoked by celebratory spectacles could translate into negative emotions like anger, revenge, and hatred: part of their revolutionary effort aims at transforming the “spectator[s]” of the old regime into the “actor[s]” of the Revolution.

The chapter “Knitting,” representing the pre-revolutionary interaction between the rural mender of roads and the Defarges and Jacquerie, most clearly illustrates the use to
which revolutionaries put old-regime spectacle. The mender of roads shows himself to be extremely attracted to theatricality, as his “performance” (160) of Gaspard’s execution demonstrates. He acts out the display of power by the soldiers who arrest Gaspard, showing how the villagers are drawn to the “spectacle” (161):

“They bring him into the village; all the village runs to look; they take him past the mill, and up to the prison; all the village sees the prison gate open in the darkness of the night, and swallow him—like this!”

He opened his mouth as wide as he could, and shut it with a sounding snap of his teeth. (162)

The mender’s “performance” (160) indicates his susceptibility to spectacle, including the kind of physical “craving” Jacques Three later exhibits on the revolutionary tribunal (303) and the ways in which spectacle can provoke him to his own theatrical action.

The Defarges foster the mender’s attraction to theatricality, taking him to witness the spectacle of Versailles, where his “temporary intoxication” and outburst of “sentiment” exhibit the blurred lines between adoration and violence in the display of power:

“throughout Defarge held him by the collar, as if to restrain him from flying at the objects of his brief devotion and tearing them to pieces” (167). Madame Defarge makes the explicit connection between spectacle and violence when she explains the purpose of the visit to Versailles to the mender:

“If you were shown a great heap of dolls, and were set upon them to pluck them to pieces and despoil them for your own advantage, you would pick out the richest and the gayest. Say! Would you not?”

“Truly yes, madame.”

“Yes. And if you were shown a flock of birds, unable to fly, and were set upon them to strip them of their feathers for your own advantage, you would set upon the birds of the finest feathers; would you not?”

“It is true, madame.”

“You have seen both dolls and birds to-day,” said Madame Defarge, with a wave of her hand towards the place where they had last been apparent; “now, go home!” (167-168)
The mender’s revolutionary education by the Defarges seizes on and exploits the slippage between sensations of adoration and urges toward violence, displacing and subverting the old regime’s display of power by manipulating its own tools for social control.

Spectacles of old-regime authority, therefore, are unstable in the novel, often inscribing power and privilege in legible ways on the theatre of punishment, but, just as frequently, permitting emotional excess to transform from violence and anger to sympathy and adoration, or the reverse. The Defarges’ marshalling of the power of spectacle illustrates their capacity to recognise and channel the old regime’s mechanisms against its stakeholders. However, it also suggests the revolutionaries’ willingness to engage in their own methods of coercion when they succeed in establishing their Republic.

“A Multitude of People, and Yet a Solitude!”: Discipline, Surveillance and the Modern State

Although the novel’s revolutionaries manipulate spectacle for their own purposes, endowing their own system of justice with some of the spectacular elements of absolutist punishment, especially in the ritual of the trial, for the most part the Revolution ushers in an era of discipline that exacerbates conditions of individual isolation and encourages secrecy, surveillance and subtle coercion in the enforcement of political commitment to the state. The modern state thus does not solve the problems arising from old-regime privilege and authority, but merely displaces them onto new techniques of power. Republican France and modern England, according to Dickens, fail to provide feasible frameworks for creating social and political identities or a sense of community for their citizens.

Modern, urban England is already characterised by secrecy and isolation before the Revolution, as the narrator’s lengthy meditation at the opening of “The Night Shadows” chapter\textsuperscript{179} attests:

\textsuperscript{179} See Beth Kemper’s article, “The ‘Night Shadows’ Passage in \textit{A Tale of Two Cities}: Narrative Anxiety and Conscious Fiction-Building.” Kemper offers an overview of critical discussions of the passage before exploring it as a challenge to the narrator’s supposed omniscience, later countered by the creation of “fictions” such as Sydney Carton’s prophecy (24).
A wonderful fact to reflect upon, that every human creature is constituted to be that profound secret and mystery to every other. A solemn consideration, when I enter a great city by night, that every one of those darkly clustered houses encloses its own secret; that every room in every one of them encloses its own secret; that every beating heart in the hundreds of thousands of breasts there, is, in some of its imaginings, a secret to the heart nearest it! Something of the awfulness, even of Death itself, is referable to this .... My friend is dead, my neighbour is dead, my love, the darling of my soul, is dead; it is the inexorable consolidation and perpetuation of the secret that was always in that individuality, and which I shall carry in mine to my life’s end. In any of the burial-places of this city through which I pass, is there a sleeper more inscrutable than its busy inhabitants are, in their innermost personality, to me, or than I am to them?

(16)

Individualism, this passage claims, is “constituted” through the ubiquity of secrecy and “inscrutab[ility]” in social life. Not only are strangers in the “great city” isolated in darkness and silence from each other, but each individual, the narrator argues, is a secret even “to the heart nearest it.” The solemnity of the passage’s tone is heightened by the narrator’s description of the “awfulness ... of Death” as the logical extension of individual secrecy and loneliness, its “consolidation and perpetuation.”

Modern individualism, Dickens suggests, then, may offer an alternative means of constituting identity from the old regime’s rigid social hierarchy, but by its very nature precludes the possibility of constructing any kind of community. Charles Darnay’s reaction to the sound of echoing footsteps in the Manettes’ house in Soho encapsulates the extent to which the urban environment produces the impersonality that guarantees this sense of isolation; as the sound of footsteps seems to approach he exclaims, “A multitude of people, and yet a solitude!” (98). The crowd, according to this view, is an image of individual segregation, not of collective action. The condition of isolation also prevents any positive communication and, instead, engenders suspicion between individuals, as Dickens shows in his description of the travellers to Dover:
Not one of the three could have said, from anything he saw, what either of the two was like; and each was hidden under almost as many wrappers from the eyes of the mind, as from the eyes of the body, of his two companions. In those days, travellers were very shy of being confidential on a short notice, for anybody on the road might be a robber or in league with robbers. (11)

The Dover passengers’ physical seclusion beneath their “wrappers” replicates their condition of mental remoteness; like the bodies of the old regime’s criminals, marked by the torture that symbolises their crimes, the bodies of the travellers bear the signs of a fear of universal criminality encouraged by the secrecy of modern individualism.

* A Tale of Two Cities also suggests that the identity constructed through individualism does not constitute subjectivity, but, instead, dehumanises the subject through his or her interactions with impersonal institutions like the prison.\(^{180}\) Although in 1849 Dickens seems partially to accept the “mystery” surrounding the prison system in his argument in the Times against the practice of public execution (*Letters* 654),\(^{181}\) in Tale and elsewhere he rejects secret punishment. Dickens’s essay “Philadelphia, and its Solitary Prison,” from his 1842 work *American Notes*, condemns the Eastern Penitentiary’s system of “rigid, strict, and hopeless solitary confinement” as “cruel and wrong” (99). Solitary confinement, according to Dickens, is an extreme example of the secrecy of prison discipline; it is a form of “secret punishment” (99), or “unknown punishment” in a “silent cell” (100). The prisoner is “a man buried alive; to be dug out in the slow round of years”\(^{180}\)

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\(^{180}\) Although I have discussed Tellson’s as an archaic institution in line with the values of the old regime, it has some qualities that are consistent with the dehumanising techniques of modern impersonal institutions, such as factories, prisons, workhouses and madhouses. Lorry, for example, calls himself “a speaking machine” (25) and “a mere machine” (26). Cates Baldridge’s argument that there is a “sense of the Bank as a single organism, staffed only by a host of undifferentiated cells” (642) is worded interestingly, given this interpretation and the prevalence of images of vaults and dungeons in Dickens’s description of Tellson’s. The word “cells” seems to apply, but not in Baldridge’s sense of organic parts; instead, Tellson’s parallels the Panopticon’s system of secluding and objectifying its various members.

\(^{181}\) He writes,

The “mystery” of private executions is objected to; but has not mystery been the character of every improvement in convict treatment and prison discipline effected within the last 20 years? … I cannot understand that the mystery of such an execution as I propose would be other than a fitting climax to all these wise regulations, or why, if there be anything in this objection, we should not return to the days when ladies paid visits to highwaymen, drinking their punch in the condemned cells of Newgate, or Ned Ward, the London spy, went upon a certain regular day of the week to Bridewell to see the women whipped. (*Letters* 654)
(101), physically and psychologically marked by the carceral experience and dehumanised through his or her treatment by the justice system. Much Victorian literature and medical discourse exhibits what Anne C. McCarthy describes as a “live-burial complex” (231)\(^{182}\) that “hinges on the loss of signifying power” (230), as signs of the body that appears dead cannot be accurately read. In addition to challenging the body’s ability to signify, the image of premature burial often questions the existence of the “submerged sources of personal identity” explored, for example, in Matthew Arnold’s poem “The Buried Life” (235): “In [Alfred Tennyson’s] *Maud,*” McCarthy concludes, “the ‘buried life’ is revealed as empty of significance and possibly nonexistent” (237).

The prisoners who are “buried alive” (101) in “Philadelphia, and its Solitary Prison” and *A Tale of Two Cities*\(^{183}\) likewise face crises of identity and of the body. Dickens argues that solitary confinement “MUST” affect the mind by making the prisoner “morally unhealthy and diseased” (109) and also “makes the senses dull, and by degrees impairs the bodily faculties” (109), citing as evidence the testimony of his conductor at a similar prison in Pittsburgh, which notes the “complete derangement of the nervous system” (105) on prisoners’ releases. Moreover, as the prisoners become objects of penal discipline, they lose their individual identities and become uniform; their faces, except for those of the women prisoners, are characterised by sameness (108-109), and the person who enters the prison is replaced by a number over the cell door and an entry in the prison’s book, “the index of his history” (101).\(^ {184}\) Charles Darnay’s consignment “in secret” to La Force (246) in revolutionary France reaffirms Dickens’s earlier position on solitary confinement. The very language of solitary confinement, “in secret,” or *en secret,* supports its representation in *American Notes* as “secret” (99) and “unknown” (100). In prison, Darnay loses his personhood, becoming simply “the prisoner” to the narrator (247), and exhibiting the signs of compulsion such as pacing (247) that indicate the kind of psychological trauma experienced by the Philadelphia prisoners. Finally, La Force,

\(^{182}\) McCarthy focuses on Alfred Tennyson’s *Maud,* but also discusses works by G. H. Lewes, Edgar Allan Poe and Matthew Arnold.

\(^{183}\) *Buried Alive* was Dickens’s original title for *A Tale of Two Cities.*

\(^{184}\) The sense of desolation and uniformity that pervades Dickens’s description of the Eastern Penitentiary also characterises his account of the entire city of Philadelphia. The failed United States Bank’s appearance as a “Tomb” or “Great Catacomb” (98) foreshadows the image of the “man buried alive” in the prison (101) and emphasises, as Tellson’s does, a link between commerce and state power. The city itself, furthermore, like the ordered, disciplined, uniform space of the prison, is “distractingly regular” (98).
like the Eastern Penitentiary, buries people alive. Dickens describes Darnay’s fellow prisoners as “Ghosts all!” (245) and when Darnay is first left alone he thinks, “Now I am left, as if I were dead” (247).

The idea of being buried alive applies most significantly to Doctor Manette’s prison experience. Although the Bastille and the lettres de cachet that enable Manette’s imprisonment are institutions enforcing aristocratic privilege in the old regime, intended to mark Manette’s social subordination to the Evrémonde brothers, the prison’s effects on Manette exacerbate the condition of modern isolation, aligning his experience with those of Darnay and the modern prisoners Dickens observes in Philadelphia. In *Dickens, Violence and the Modern State*, Jeremy Tambling attempts to associate the prison with the positive construction of individual identity: in the “Night Shadows” passage, he argues, “investment in secrecy and mystery becomes normative and constitutive of identity, and the experience of prisoners has become a pattern for considering how everyone’s experience is carceral” (136). In *Tale* more broadly, he continues, “locks and keys ... guard individuality” (137). Although the discussion above demonstrates how individuals in the novel are associated with criminality, concurring with Tambling’s recognition of the primacy of a “carceral” experience in *Tale*, Manette’s incarceration shows that the segregation enforced by the prison does not “guard individuality,” but, rather, isolates the individual so extremely that all markers of identity linked to the outside world disappear and individuals become exchangeable, dehumanised units. Manette’s personal and professional identities, for example, disappear completely in the Bastille, as his recollections of his family are buried in the past and he loses his status as a doctor, becoming a shoemaker simply through the habit he develops to keep his hands busy.

The narrator conveys the extent of Manette’s dehumanisation through the nouns and pronouns used to replace his individual personality. After his release, Manette speaks of his overwhelming fear in the prison of the possibility that “in the next generation my place was a blank” (182), and his status as a “blank” solidifies the barrier between him and the outside world: when Lucie first meets her father with Defarge and Lorry, the narrator reminds the reader that “[n]o human intelligence could have read the mysteries

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185 *Tale’s “Book the First,”* in which Manette is released from the Bastille, is titled “Recalled to Life.”
of his mind, in the scared blank wonder of his face” (48). Like the Dover travellers, wrapped in their seclusion, suspicion and secrecy, Manette’s body shows the signs of the insurmountable isolation and dehumanisation, the “mysteries” and “blank[ness],” that the prison imposes. In addition to being a “blank” (Dickens Tale 48, 182), he becomes “an ‘it,’” as Tom Lloyd rightly notes (188). His own daughter Lucie first expresses this fact when she meets her father in Paris with Lorry:

“Come in, come in!” [Lorry urges]
“Of it? What?”
“I mean of him. Of my father.” (28)

The prison disrupts even the closest familial ties, intensifying Manette’s strangeness to Lucie to the extent that he becomes a nonperson. Despite his recovery from the trauma of the prison, carceral isolation and dehumanisation remain part of Manette’s experience, reappearing during his relapse in Paris after Darnay’s condemnation, when Lorry, Sydney Carton and the narrator treat the doctor like an object: “He [Carton] helped him [Lorry] so far to arouse the rocking figure before the dying embers, as to get a cloak and hat put on it, and to tempt it forth to find where the bench and work were hidden that it still moaningly besought to have. He walked on the other side of it and protected it to the courtyard of the house ...” (331). Manette’s status as a nonperson, it seems, is as permanent as his repressed memories of the Bastille.

The carceral experience in the novel, however, is not limited to actual prisoners, as the revolutionary period ushers in a system of state control based on discipline and surveillance that imitates the prison’s suspicious, isolating techniques. Such mechanisms of state power are not confined to revolutionary France alone; most of the evidence against Darnay in his 1780 British treason trial, after all, comes from witnesses who are also government spies, Roger Cly and John Barsad. In fact, the frequency with which Dickens employs spies on both sides of the Channel in Tale speaks to an increased public awareness of and desire to confront and expose state spying in Britain in the 1790s and first half of the nineteenth century. A number of high profile cases of spying occurred across this period, including the ineffectual employment of spies against the defendants in the 1794 Treason Trials, anecdotes concerning the misguided surveillance of William
Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge at Alfoxden,\textsuperscript{186} public disgust concerning the use of spies and provocateurs such as John Castle and William Oliver in the 1810s,\textsuperscript{187} and the 1844 Post Office espionage scandal.

Reformers were outraged by the government’s use of spies: pamphlets and articles written against the practice of spying, including John Thelwall’s 1794 published lecture *On the Moral Tendency of a System of Spies and Informers* and William Hazlitt’s 1817 *Morning Chronicle* articles “On the Spy-System,” pit the reality of state spy systems against the myth of British rights and freedoms. For Hazlitt, Lord Castlereagh’s public defence of “the characters of Castles and Oliver” (208) and of spying generally tends to “undermin[e] all our moral sentiments and national habits” (210), and Thelwall, the victim of extensive spying himself, vehemently describes government spies and provocateurs as “a mob” (vii) or “a banditti” (x), and condemns the “INQUISITORIAL ASSOCIATIONS and every species of ILLEGAL CONSPIRACY and Cabal, ( ... revealing, through the thin disguise, the clenched hand and thirsting dagger of POLITICAL ASSASSINATION) [who] are plotting the destruction of Truth and Virtue, and meditating the annihilation of our remaining liberties” (8). Such Gothic images linked to criminality and continental politics suggest that for Thelwall the use of spies and informers is, or should be, foreign to Britain, a practice belonging to “despotic countries” (24) and “unparalleled in the former annals of this or any free country” (18).

Controversy about spying continued into the Victorian period, most notably in 1844 when radical MP Thomas Slingsby Duncombe presented a petition in the House of Commons revealing that the British government had been opening the letters of exiled Young Italy leader Giuseppe Mazzini and sharing information with the Austrian government.\textsuperscript{188} Although the letter-opening scandal resulted in a change of practice in Post Office espionage,\textsuperscript{189} it indicates that spying was still a topic of public controversy in the early years of Dickens’s career. Dickens was certainly aware of the scandal, as Stone

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{186} See Nicolas Roe’s *Wordsworth and Coleridge: The Radical Years* (248-262).
\item \textsuperscript{187} See E. P. Thompson’s *The Making of the English Working Class* for an account of the use of spies and paid informers across this period, as well as a more specific description of Oliver’s activity as a spy (532-540, 711-734).
\item \textsuperscript{188} For fuller descriptions of the letter-opening scandal, see Marjorie Stone’s “On the Post Office Espionage Scandal, 1844” or Bernard Porter’s *Plots and Paranoia* (77-78).
\item \textsuperscript{189} According to Porter, “Britain’s most continuous and systematic domestic espionage agency for probably two hundred years had ceased operating entirely in the political field” (78).
\end{itemize}
notes in “On the Post Office Espionage Scandal, 1844”: he read Thomas Carlyle’s letter defending his friend Mazzini in the *Times* of 19 June and “expressed anti-Graham sentiments at the time of the incident, writing a letter to Thomas Beard on 28 June 1844 in which he wrote on the envelope flap, ‘It is particularly requested that if Sir James Graham should open this, he will not trouble himself to seal it [again]’” (14). Carlyle’s letter to the *Times*, moreover, suggests that the British public’s response to the letter-opening scandal echoes the terms of Thelwall’s and Hazlitt’s Romantic-era protests against spying. Carlyle writes,

> it is a question vital to us that sealed letters in an English post-office be, as we all fancied they were, respected as things sacred; that opening of men’s letters, a practice near of kin to picking men’s pockets, and to other still viler and far fataler forms of scoundrelism, be not resorted to in England, except in cases of the very last extremity .... To all Austrian Kaisers and such like, in their time of trouble, let us answer, as our fathers from of old have answered:— Not by such means is help here for you. (‘To the Editor of the *Times*” 6)

Carlyle, like Thelwall and Hazlitt, characterises spying as despotic, un-English and criminal. Such public denunciations of state surveillance in the 1790s and nineteenth century suggest the paradox that, although the spy system was believed to be starkly at odds with myths of British liberty and political rights, the British public became increasingly aware of the state’s practice of espionage across this period.

My effort to trace *A Tale of Two Cities* to the political contests of the 1790s, then, reveals that by representing spying Dickens is confronting a particularly scandalous legacy of the Revolution for Britain. Even though much of *Tale’s* exploration of surveillance appears in the novel’s French scenes, revolutionary-era state espionage made its way into Dickens’s political consciousness through the British spy controversies that surfaced across the decades. Madame Defarge and other revolutionaries manipulate and replicate some elements of the absolutist system of justice, as discussed above; nevertheless, for the most part the Revolution redirects the public gaze away from the

190 Stone’s brackets. Sir James Graham was the British Home Secretary and received much of the blame during the scandal (Porter 77).
spectacle and toward friends, neighbours, and the self. Catherine Gallagher notes the importance of surveillance in the novel, recognising that the “intrusive stare” of spying is associated with the revolutionary characters, Madame Defarge and the members of the Jacquerie, and is prefigured by the image of the Gorgon that appears at the Evrémonde château (82). Revolutionary discipline attempts to conceal its own operation, functioning in secrecy and denying the power of the gaze. The Defarges share a secret language of coded signs (35), while the Jacquerie is both “secret” and “authoritative” (162).

Revolutionary power as Dickens represents it becomes extensive when the old regime falls. The multiple Jacques are characterised by exchangeability and uniformity, but also by the geographical reach and simultaneity that mark the unfolding of the Revolution’s authority across France: they permeate the rural landscape, inciting uprisings and burning châteaux, “stopped by no obstacle, tending to centres all over France” (224). More pervasive than any technique of revolutionary power, however, is the disciplinary gaze. Madame Defarge in particular is characterised by a “watchful eye that seldom seemed to look at anything” (35); the narrator continually repeats that she “saw nothing” (37), or “knitt[ed], and saw nothing” (49, 50) in the early pages of the Tale. Her knitting, of course, contains the coded record of her observations, and features prominently in places where the narrator emphasises her gaze. When the Marquis St Evrémonde runs down Gaspard’s child in the carriage, Madame Defarge “looked the Marquis in the face” and “still knitted on with the steadfastness of Fate” (107), documenting the data that later becomes useful to her exercise of power in the Republic.

It is the ubiquity and universality of surveillance, however, that proves the strength of revolutionary coercion. Although Madame Defarge keeps the record of the Marquis’s offences, the entire crowd at this point in the novel has been trained to exercise and conceal the power of the gaze; from the Marquis’s perspective, “There was nothing revealed by the many eyes that looked at him but watchfulness and eagerness” (106). Discipline, according to Foucault, “regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise” (170), and after the Revolution, Gallagher notes, “A whole population practices surveillance on itself” (82). Dickens marks the shift from old-regime authority to revolutionary discipline as a change in the extent of surveillance: in the old regime, the only spies are Barsad and Cly, mercenaries who will work for any government and who
are despised by the population, but under the Republic everyone becomes a spy and the entire state becomes a prison. When Darnay returns to revolutionary France, each village functions as a barrier, an “iron door” of separation from England (237), mimicking the architecture of the prison, and he is called a “prisoner” (240-241) on his arrival in Paris, despite his claims that “he was a free traveller and French citizen, in charge of an escort which the disturbed state of the country had imposed upon him and which he had paid for” (241). Just as the boundaries between the traveller’s escort and the prisoner’s guard dissolve during the Revolution, so each citizen becomes a spy for the state and an object of surveillance. Darnay’s journey is affected by France’s “universal watchfulness” (237), which exacerbates the kind of isolation and suspicion that appears in the Dover passage at the opening of the novel: as the narrator notes, “The escort and the universal watchfulness had completely isolated him” (244). Darnay becomes the object of surveillance, detaintments and threats during his journey to Paris (237-241), but the carceral experience of his journey is also characterised by the sense of seclusion and segregation that Dickens associates with the Philadelphia prison.

Moreover, Dickens’s characters internalise the discipline imposed by surveillance, experiencing the operation of power that Foucault describes as panopticism. In the Panopticon, Foucault argues, power is “visible and unverifiable” as individuals become accustomed to the gaze, and, eventually, subject themselves to discipline whether they are actually watched or not (201); the object of surveillance, in this formulation, “becomes the principle of his own subjection” (203). Dickens’s narrator states of the spy Barsad that “all secret men are soon terrified” (289), but in A Tale of Two Cities everyone is secret, even in England before the Revolution’s onset. When Lorry and Miss Pross destroy Manette’s workbench in order to facilitate his recovery from trauma, for example, the characters’ fear of secrecy is undermined by their secret sense of criminality: with closed doors, and in a mysterious and guilty manner, Mr. Lorry hacked the shoemaker’s bench to pieces, while Miss Pross held the candle as if she were assisting at a murder .... The burning of the body ... was commenced without delay in the kitchen fire; and the tools, shoes and leather, were buried in the garden. So wicked do destruction and secrecy appear to honest minds, that Mr. Lorry and Miss Pross, while engaged in
the commission of their deed and in the removal of its traces, almost felt, and almost looked, like accomplices in a horrible crime. (197)

While this passage and the Dover chapter near the beginning of the novel show how suspicion and surveillance are both encouraged and hindered by individual isolation and secrecy, at the same time under the revolutionary state everything secret and suspect becomes visible. The Republic demands that each household publicly name its inhabitants on a sign at the door (277-278), and Parisian life requires that characters internalise this sense of the ubiquity of the public gaze: Lucie keeps no servant “partly to avoid a domestic spy” (277), Miss Pross and Jerry keep a “wary eye” when shopping for groceries (282), and Miss Pross feels as though she is watched even when she is alone in the lodgings (350-351).

The revolutionary regime also mobilises the machinery of discipline in the workings of its justice system. According to Foucault, panopticism is a mechanism that “automatizes and disindividualizes power” (202), and under the Revolution power is exercised by everyone and no one, and justice is executed by the impersonal and utilitarian guillotine. Power is anonymous in the Terror, as Darnay recognises: he knows “that he was virtually sentenced by the millions, and that units could avail him nothing” (332). In addition, La Guillotine normalises the new republican form of punishment as, under the revolutionary regime, it “grew as familiar as if it had been before the general gaze from the foundations of the world” (262). Although the guillotine represents the state’s ubiquitous exercise of discipline and surveillance, it eliminates the spectacle of old-regime punishment and functions simply as a reminder that each individual is both the instrument and the object of the public, disciplinary gaze by emphasising the sheer number of its victims over their personal identities. This means that each individual is more powerful as the instrument of discipline, but less powerful as the object of a universally applicable, completely democratic surveillance. Dickens examines this contradiction in the figure of the republican executioner, who is both “stronger” than his predecessors because of the guillotine’s extensive reach and “blinder” (263) because his role has been democratised, an image that positions the executioner himself as the object of the gaze, as Foucault characterises the prisoner in the Panopticon: “He is seen, but he does not see” (200). Daniel Stout argues in “Nothing Personal: The Decapitation of
Character in *A Tale of Two Cities*” that “the guillotine does not just publicize the individual moment of death, it pluralizes it” (47), adding that this “made it impossible for individuals to think even of their deaths as their own” (49). Historian Dorinda Outram’s research in *The Body and the French Revolution* confirms that the guillotine “eliminated much of the drama” of the public execution (110), as crowds tended to watch the guillotine operate “with indifference” (114). This, Outram suggests, is at least in part because of the quick increase in the number of public executions enabled by the use of the guillotine and encouraged by the policy of the Terror: group executions became common, and there is at least one example, when Maximilien Robespierre and his followers were executed, when 109 people were guillotined in two days (110).

Dickens’s portrayal of the revolutionary crowd corresponds to Outram’s findings. When Darnay is arrested the public is no longer interested in observing what under the old regime constituted the spectacle of power: “As they walked on in silence, he could not but see how used the people were to the spectacle of prisoners passing along the streets” (243). The tumbrils carrying prisoners to their deaths become familiar in Paris (356) and executions are emptied of all emotion, as the victims, who do not appeal to the crowd’s pity (357), seem to recognise. Although some of the Defarges’ associates show interest in the potential spectacle Lucie and her daughter would make as beautiful victims (344), revolutionary purists like Jacques Three, who suggests that the group target Manette also because he “would count as one head” (345), are interested only in the number of victims. Indeed, the revolutionaries attend executions only to count heads, a fact that indicates most forcefully Dickens’s emphasis on the shift away from justice that inscribes power on the individual, symbolic, criminal body, as in the old regime, and toward justice that erases its own operation and recognises only the quantity of its victims:

Crash!— A head is held up, and the knitting-women who scarcely lifted their eyes to look at it a moment ago when it could think and speak, count One.

The second tumbril empties and moves on; the third comes up.
Crash!— And the knitting-women, never faltering or pausing in their work, count Two. (358)

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Darnay, an intended guillotine victim, emotionally rejects its meaningless utilitarianism in what are supposed to be his last hours. He wishes for a death characterised by “quiet heroism” (334), but also becomes obsessed with understanding the guillotine, moved by a “strange besetting desire” for knowledge of it, “a desire giganticly disproportionate to the few swift moments to which it referred” (334). These urges reflect Darnay’s wish to assert control over the narrative of his own death and rewrite the guillotine with an emotional or intellectual significance which it simply does not possess under a justice system in which quantity is the determining characteristic, not meaning.

Discipline and surveillance under the revolutionary regime, especially as they operate through the machinery of the guillotine, do produce power, but do not constitute identity (136) or “guard individuality” (137), as Tambling argues they do. Instead, they deny individuality while intensifying the reality of isolation, treating people like discrete but exchangeable units. Modern individuals, and especially citizens of the revolutionary state, are not subjects: they are subjected to the mechanistic operation of power, objectified by the gaze, and turned into instruments of discipline.

“A Very Harbour from the Raging Streets”: Domestic Management, the Revolutionary Threat and British Nationalism

The modern, revolutionary state, as Dickens represents it, then, does not provide a viable alternative to the old regime. Instead, its mechanisms of coercion reproduce the dehumanising tendencies of absolute power in their promotion of an isolating, carceral experience and a sense of suspicious disconnection from any kind of community. Against these dehumanising techniques of social control Dickens establishes the home as a space that helps constitute individual subjectivity and creates community through intimacy, privacy and affect. Lucie’s domestic community is a model for a more compassionate and efficient state, but, as her family increasingly comes under threat by the mob and the revolutionary state, that community abandons its cross-Channel affiliations, becoming progressively paranoid, defensive and defined by Miss Pross’s nationalist extremism.

Dickens depicts the Manette home as a model domestic space, and Lucie as an ideal manager of that home. Foucauldian critics Nancy Armstrong and Elizabeth Langland trace the role of the novel in constructing domestic discourse in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries in their respective books, *Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel* and *Nobody’s Angels: Middle-Class Women and Domestic Ideology in Victorian Culture*. For Armstrong, domestic fiction during this period endowed the domestic woman with a new kind of power: “To her went authority over the household, leisure time, courtship procedures, and kinship relations, and under her jurisdiction the most basic qualities of human identity were supposed to develop” (3). Langland extends this argument more specifically to the moral management of class conflict, arguing that “a mid-Victorian man depended on his wife to perform the ideological work of managing the class question and displaying the signs of middle-class status, toward which he contributed a disposable income” (9) and that “[a] management of class focused on moral vocabulary found its logical expression in the Victorian home rather than in the factory” (14). John B. Lamb follows the lead of these critics in “Domesticating History: Revolution and Moral Management in *A Tale of Two Cities*” by exploring the kind of power Lucie’s home possesses in the novel, but focuses on domestic authority as a destructive rather than productive power. He claims that “Lucie’s threads... are the ‘invisible’ counterpart to the Evremondes’ more brutal and arbitrary forms of incarceration and disguise that violence at the heart of domestic ideology” (241). Lucie, however, is presented positively by the narrator, and the type of moral influence she exercises produces identity and community by nurturing a domestic space founded on affect. For this reason, Armstrong’s interest in the ways domestic discourse shapes modern subjectivity and structures the home more aptly reflects Dickens’s position regarding domesticity than Lamb’s equation of Lucie’s “domestic discipline” (Lamb 232) with old-regime absolutism. If, as Armstrong claims, “the modern individual was first and foremost a woman” (8), then Lucie’s role in *Tale* is to produce a kind of identity that refutes the dehumanising techniques of absolutist and revolutionary power.

The interior of the Manettes’ home in Soho speaks the language of domesticity, and in doing so establishes Lucie’s individual subjectivity and confirms her identity as the manager of the household:

Simple as the furniture was, it was set off by so many little adornments, of no value but for their taste and fancy, that its effect was delightful. The

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191 “The Golden Thread” is the title of *Tale’s* “Book the Second,” which focuses on Lucie’s home.
disposition of everything in the rooms, from the largest object to the least; the arrangement of colours, the elegant variety and contrast obtained by thrift in trifles, by delicate hands, clear eyes, and good sense; were at once so pleasant in themselves, and so expressive of their originator, that, as Mr. Lorry stood looking about him, the very chairs and tables seemed to ask him, with something of that peculiar expression which he knew so well by this time, whether he approved? (89-90)

This passage contains a catalogue of Lucie’s characteristics, her “taste and fancy,” “thrift” and “good sense,” expressed materially in the ordering of her home and indicating her economic and aesthetic knowledge as a domestic manager. In addition, Lorry’s sense of the space as “expressive of [its] originator” establishes the depths of Lucie’s individual subjectivity, showing her personality and her home to be unique, identifiable and communicable to those who “knew [her] so well.” The double meaning of “disposition,” signifying both order or arrangement and mood or feeling, further identifies the Manettes’ home with Lucie’s individual character, while the “peculiar expression” of the furniture completes Lorry’s recognition of Lucie’s subjectivity in her home by equating their physical appearances. Lucie’s home actually displays the signs of her subjectivity. Finally, the question of “whether he approved” raises the issue of Lucie’s political position with respect to patriarchal authority, demonstrating that her domestic status defers to and complements Lorry’s as a man of business, suggesting the alliance between the middle-class man’s income and the middle-class woman’s display of status Langland discusses (9). Lucie’s position as a domestic manager, furthermore, draws on both her economic and her moral standing. This is evident when she remains “true to her duties ... truest to them in the season of trial, as all the quietly loyal and good will always be” when Darnay is imprisoned at La Force; as soon as possible upon the family’s establishment in Paris, “she arranged the little household as exactly as if her husband had been there. Everything had its appointed place and its appointed time” (264). Dickens here aligns domestic order with the morality of “dut[y],” “loyal[ty]” and “good will,” illustrating Langland’s claim about the typical Dickens heroine: “representations of her ‘virtue’ are so entwined with depictions of the order she establishes that virtue subtly becomes defined for us as managerial skill” (81).
In fulfilling a domestic ideal, Lucie is also able to create a community characterised by intimacy and affect, located in the private space of her home. She is the “golden thread” (202) that holds this domestic community—including her father, husband and children, but also Lorry and Carton—together. As Simon Petch argues, Lucie acts “as the fulfilment of various masculine needs” (“Economies of Love and Law” 71). The first masculine need Lucie addresses is her father’s crisis of identity following his release from the Bastille. When she first meets Manette, she is able to remind him of his past domestic ties through her physical resemblance to both of her parents and her adoption of the sentimental language of affect:

If you hear in my voice—I don’t know that it is so, but I hope it is—if you hear in my voice any resemblance to a voice that once was sweet music in your ears, weep for it, weep for it! If you touch, in touching my hair, anything that recalls a beloved head that lay on your breast when you were young and free, weep for it, weep for it! If, when I hint to you of a Home that is before us, where I will be true to you with all my duty and with all my faithful service, I bring back the remembrance of a Home long desolate, while your whole heart pined away, weep for it, weep for it! (47)

In this speech to Manette, Lucie constructs the “Home” as a safe space in which identity can be reconstituted according to the values of “duty” and “faithful service” that her later organisation of the house in Soho and lodgings in Paris expresses.

Lucie’s home also manages to domesticate Lorry, giving the man of business “a Home” (95) revolving around intimacy and affect. Lorry’s initial inability to reconcile the business of Tellson’s with the promptings of his own heart, when he insists that he acts on behalf of Manette and Lucie as “a mere machine” (26), gradually dissolves as he becomes incorporated into Lucie’s domestic community. This is most evident when he defends Lucie against Stryver’s assumption that she will readily accept his marriage proposal. Lorry angrily declares that I will hear no disrespectful word of that young lady from any lips; and that if I knew any man—which I hope I do not—whose taste was so coarse, and whose temper was so overbearing, that he could not restrain
himself from speaking disrespectfully of that young lady at this desk, not even Tellson’s should prevent my giving him a piece of my mind. (139)

Although Tellson’s retains its high place in Lorry’s esteem, he begins to elevate his private feelings for Lucie above business concerns.

Finally, Lucie integrates Sydney Carton into her intimate, domestic community. Although he initially exists “on the edge of groups to which he belongs only tangentially, and at home nowhere” (Petch “The Business of the Barrister” 27), Carton’s devotion to Lucie draws him into the Manettes’ domestic circle and reinforces the attractiveness of the domestic woman, as it is motivated by the characteristics that make Lucie the community’s “golden thread” (202). When he intimately confides in Lucie by declaring his love for her, he begins, for example, by ratifying her angelic qualities: “God bless you for your sweet compassion!” (144). In fact, Lucie appears universally desirable, attracting Carton, Darnay and even Stryver192 as suitors, and, as Catherine Waters claims, this “rivalry ... strengthens the authority of the ideal she represents by demonstrating its ability to attract and accommodate such diverse desiring subjects” (147). Lucie’s power as an ideal lies in her ability to draw isolated subjects like Manette, Darnay, Carton and Lorry into the domestic community she constructs and to consolidate that community based on the intimacy she inspires and the virtue she represents. Carton’s self-sacrifice is the novel’s final confirmation of the community of affect; he is motivated by love, but also by a desire to preserve Lucie’s domestic community, and his success is evident in the prophetic vision that reinforces his own sentimental place in that community. As Waters states, “The narrator’s record of his final words offers a vision of a new kind of lineage based not on blood, but on commemoration of his devotion to Lucie and all that she represents” (148). Carton’s death provides for the continuity of Lucie’s role as the “golden thread” (202) and the integrity of her affective household economy.

192 Like Uriah Heep’s desire for Agnes in David Copperfield, Stryver’s attraction to Lucie forcefully consolidates her identity as the ideal domestic manager, confirming Elizabeth Langland’s claim that “[t]he bourgeois narrative ... bonds gentility with monetary gain, cultural with material capital, dictating that a man’s acquisition of wealth must be matched by his winning a genteel wife” (30). The type of marital partnership expected is apparent when Stryver links his progress in his career with Lucie’s worth when outlining his plans to Sydney Carton: “I don’t care about fortune: she is a charming creature, and I have made up my mind to please myself: on the whole, I think I can afford to please myself. She will have in me a man already pretty well off, and a rapidly rising man, and a man of some distinction: it is a piece of good fortune for her, but she is worthy of good fortune” (134).
The contrast between Lucie’s home and the mismanaged French old regime and aristocratic household as well as the revolutionaries’ subversion of domestic norms heightens the reader’s awareness of Lucie’s virtue as a domestic manager. The waste and stasis of the Marquis St Evrémonde’s château parallels old-regime mismanagement on a national scale. The château’s physical appearance indicates its frozen impersonality and reactionary political position; it is “[a] stony business altogether, with heavy stone balustrades, and stone urns, and stone flowers, and stone faces of men, and stone heads of lions, in all directions. As if the Gorgan’s head had surveyed it, when it was finished, two centuries ago” (113). Everything that is normally natural or dynamic is petrified in the aristocratic château. For Darnay, the symbolic qualities of the château extend to its economic, social and political failures in the broader community. The property is, as he tells his uncle the Marquis, “a crumbling tower of waste, mismanagement, extortion, debt, mortgage, oppression, hunger, nakedness, and suffering” (119). The comfort of aristocratic homes like the Marquis’s and Monseigneur’s, Dickens indicates, is a symptom of a national failure to address social and economic problems:

For, the rooms, though a beautiful scene to look at, and adorned with every device of decoration that the taste and skill of the time could achieve, were, in truth, not a sound business; considered with any reference to the scarecrows in the rags and night-caps elsewhere ... they would have been an exceedingly uncomfortable business — if that could have been anybody’s business, at the house of Monseigneur. Military officers destitute of military knowledge; naval officers with no idea of a ship; civil officers without a notion of affairs; brazen ecclesiastics, of the worst world worldly, with sensual eyes, loose tongues, and looser lives; all totally unfit for their several callings, all lying horribly in pretending to belong to them, but all nearly or remotely of the order of Monseigneur, and therefore foisted on all public employments from which anything was to be got; these were to be told off by the score and the score. (101-102)

Dickens indicts the whole of the French governing classes here, but he also clearly locates the site of national failure in “the house of Monseigneur.” Lucie’s efficient and ordered domestic economy, he implies, is the real “sound business,” a middle-class
model for the internal functioning of the “stony business” of the château (113), and, by extension, the mismanaged national business of France.

The link between domestic economy and national affairs is solidified by Dickens’s inversions of domestic order in the “Monseigneur in Town” chapter. Monseigneur, for example, is secreted within “his inner room, his sanctuary of sanctuaries, the Holiest of Holiests to the crowd of worshippers in the suite of rooms without” (100), a subversion of the moral sanctity of the home in its emphasis on luxury over order and images of privacy as exclusion rather than intimacy. However, Dickens’s representation of women of fashion and their homes is the real point of contrast with the domestic ideology Lucie maintains:

Such homes had these various notabilities left behind them in the fine world of Paris, that the spies among the assembled devotees of Monseigneur ... would have found it hard to discover among the angels of that sphere one solitary wife, who, in her manners and appearance, owned to being a Mother. Indeed, except for the mere act of bringing a troublesome creature into this world— which does not go far towards the realisation of the name of mother— there was no such thing known to the fashion. Peasant women kept the unfashionable babies close, and brought them up, and charming grandmammas of sixty dressed and supped as at twenty. (102)

This description of old-regime domestic failure is placed at the end of the passage concerning the inefficiency of national business, functioning as the culmination of Dickens’s catalogue of mismanagement and confirming the ideological dominance of Coventry Patmore’s “angel in the house” image through his exposure of the distorted “angels of that sphere.”

The Revolution, however, does not produce a viable image of the home to contrast with the old regime’s domestic incompetence. As Petch argues, “This repression of female labour by fashion is a mark of the radical dysfunctionality of French society before the revolution; but republican society’s main female representative in the novel, the childless Madame Defarge, is even less of a mother” (“Economies of Love and Law”)

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193 See Patmore’s poem *The Angel in the House.*
Madame Defarge and other revolutionary women in the novel subvert the domestic sphere’s gender norms, as they are distorted from figures of order and compassion, like Lucie, into instigators of anarchy and violence. Dickens’s revolutionary women exhibit the same chaotic energy as Thomas Carlyle’s Menads, the force behind his Insurrection of Women. However, as I discuss in Chapter 5, for Dickens, as for Edmund Burke, this energy is misdirected and monstrous rather than “instinct[ive]” and “Natur[al]” as it appears to Carlyle (Carlyle French Revolution 1:261). The time’s “dreadfully disfiguring hand,” Dickens tells the reader, transforms Madame Defarge into a “tigress” (347), while the rituals of the Revolution encourage the confusion of sexual identities in a context in which gender subversion is a partner to violence. The disordered dance of the Carmagnole, for example, in which “Men and women danced together, women danced together, men danced together, as hazard had brought them together” is “terrible” (267), “a means of angering the blood, bewildering the senses, and steeling the heart” (267-268); its mixing bodies articulate violent intentions in their movements, “keeping a ferocious time that was like a gnashing of teeth in unison” (267).

Dickens, furthermore, portrays the violence of revolutionary women as directly proportionate to their abdication of domestic responsibilities. This is evident when Saint Antoine rises to attack Foulon:

the women were a sight to chill the boldest. From such household occupations as their bare poverty yielded, from their children, from their aged and their sick crouching on the bare ground famished and naked, they ran out with streaming hair, urging one another, and themselves, to madness with the wildest cries and actions .... With these cries, numbers of the women, lashed into a blind frenzy, whirléd about, striking and tearing at their own friends, until they dropped into a passionate swoon, and were only saved by the men belonging to them from being trampled under foot. (214-215)

Several articles, such as Lisa Robson’s “The ‘Angels’ in Dickens’s House: Representation of Women in A Tale of Two Cities,” Linda M. Lewis’s “Madame Defarge as Political Icon in Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities” and Barbara Black’s “A Sisterhood of Rage and Beauty: Dickens’ Rosa Dartle, Miss Wade, and Madame Defarge,” feature detailed discussions of Madame Defarge’s relation to Victorian gender norms.
In their mass exodus from the home and into the violent political arena of the streets, the women of Saint Antoine neglect the vulnerable members of their own community and endanger not only their enemies, but also their friends and themselves. Madame Defarge, likewise, ignores the expectations of domestic ideology, refusing to hear Lucie’s appeal for her husband’s life “[a]s a wife and mother” (257).

Madame Defarge’s distortion of appropriate, feminine work is the ultimate symbol of the Revolution’s rejection of domesticity: unlike Lucie, who functions as a domestic “golden thread” (202), binding her community together through affect and intimacy, Madame Defarge uses images of domesticity to produce discord. Her knitting is a record of violence and retribution. As Catherine Waters writes, “The knitted register produces a shock in its implicit linkage of images and emotions normally opposed in Victorian middle-class ideology. The creativity, nurture and maternal affection, conventionally associated with knitting, are connected here with vengeance, violence and death” (127). In addition, her feminine appearance is called into question through its politicisation; the rose Madame Defarge places in her hair, appealing to what Waters calls “the aesthetics of feminine adornment,” is, like the register, a revolutionary “code for political intrigue” (128). Madame Defarge’s rejection of domesticity is most emphatic when she replaces her knitting needles with instruments of violence at the Revolution’s onset: “Madame’s resolute right hand was occupied with an axe, in place of the usual softer implements, and in her girdle were a pistol and a cruel knife” (207). This description reflects both elements of Madame Defarge’s disfigurement of domestic ideology, as female work becomes violent action and feminine appearance becomes an arming for conflict.

In addition to subverting the order of domesticity, the Revolution threatens to invade and disrupt Lucie’s home. The house in Soho initially appears as a place of safety and privacy. Its positioning on the fringes of London makes Lucie’s home “a very harbour from the raging streets” (88), while the nearby church provides the necessary seclusion for an appropriately private wedding between Lucie and Darnay, “where no strange eyes looked on” (186). Nevertheless, the streets of London provide an external threat to domestic stability. The scene describing Roger Cly’s funeral provides an early glimpse of the workings of the English mob. The narrator presents the mass of people protesting the spy’s funeral as both comic and dangerous. On the one hand, the people’s reaction to Cly
acts as a carnivalesque “caricaturing of woe” (151), but on the other hand, it poses a real threat to the public, producing fear and disorder: as the narrator comments, “a crowd in those times stopped at nothing, and was a monster much dreaded” (150). In fact, the mere rumour of approaching Guards succeeds in dissolving the mob (151), indicating its internalisation of its own discipline, but in the meantime the carnivalesque protest of the spy’s funeral transforms into violence against private citizens and property: “Chase was given to some scores of inoffensive persons ... and they were roughly hustled and maltreated. The transition to the sport of window-breaking, and thence to the plundering of public-houses, was easy and natural” (151). The mob’s actions show the narrator’s initially semi-comic description of it as “a monster”—a precursor to what Burke describes as the “monstrous tragi-comic scene” of the Revolution (Reflections 10)—to be warranted.

The home’s vulnerability to external disorder increases in revolutionary France. As Waters notes, Dickens’s revolutionary society functions through the deployment of a public gaze that enables “invasions and public expositions of the private” (145). The Republic, for example, requires the names of each household’s inhabitants to be written on the door, subjecting private, domestic arrangements to public scrutiny (277-278). More importantly, the revolutionary atmosphere of “universal fear and distrust” (278) alters the very economy of the home. For example, the simple act of shopping for food becomes less efficient when conducted under the Republic’s gaze: “the articles of daily consumption that were wanted were purchased every evening, in small quantities and at various small shops. To avoid attracting notice, and to give as little occasion as possible for talk and envy, was the general desire” (278). More importantly, Lucie is unable to keep a servant, “partly to avoid a domestic spy” (277); in addition to the disruption of daily life caused by the absence of an extra servant, the image of the servant as spy works as an inversion of the normal internal supervision of the well-regulated household, where all activity falls under the surveillance and authority of the domestic manager, Lucie.

In addition to disturbing the economics of domestic management, the revolutionaries threaten to dismiss domestic and affective ties as subordinate to what they see as public interest. When Darnay is arrested for the second time in Paris, an unnamed citizen advises Manette, “If the Republic demands sacrifices from you, without doubt you as a
good patriot will be happy to make them. The Republic goes before all. The People is supreme!” (281). The impersonality of the singular “People” as a mass grouping rather than a collection of private individuals replicates the Revolution’s demand for impersonality in the performance of patriotism. This argument for the Republic’s supremacy reappears at Darnay’s trial, when the President argues that “nothing can be so dear to a good citizen as the Republic” (304) and “that the good physician of the Republic would deserve better still of the Republic by rooting out an obnoxious family of Aristocrats, and would doubtless feel a sacred glow and joy in making his daughter a widow and her child an orphan” (319). Madame Defarge is the product of such impersonality, as she understands individuals only in terms of their class or descent. The narrator notes that in her persecution of Darnay “she saw, not him, but them [his ancestors]” and in her pursuit of Lucie and her daughter she can only perceive them as “her natural enemies and her prey,” who “as such had no right to live” (347).

The mob’s most crucial threat to domestic stability, however, seems to consist in the equation between an invasion of the home and an attack on Lucie’s sexual integrity that recalls the home invasion scenes of Burke’s Reflections and Anthony Trollope’s La Vendée as well as the dangers of seduction and rape that appear in Elizabeth Hamilton’s Modern Philosophers and Frances Burney’s The Wanderer. This is unsurprising, given the connection between domestic order and the domestic manager’s virtue, discussed above. The echoing footsteps audible in the Soho house symbolise, to Lucie, “a great crowd bearing down upon us” (98), and foreshadow the “footsteps” (206) and “thronging feet” (225) rising to violence in France. The French mob finally succeeds in invading Lucie’s home when a group of citizens arrests Darnay in the family’s Parisian lodgings, first becoming audible, importantly, as the sound of “strange feet upon the stairs” (280). Miss Pross, Lucie’s loving servant and lieutenant in household regulation, interprets the invasive power of the mob in explicitly sexual terms. Her fear of “crowds and multitudes of people” (91) is paired with her exaggerated wariness against the “[h]undreds of people” supposedly courting Lucie in her home (95). This image of the mob, the narrator comically points out, stands in for “only Two” (97), Charles Darnay and Sydney Carton. Although Miss Pross’s fear of Darnay and Carton is unwarranted, her positioning as the defender of the household and Lucie’s virtue is significant: it reinforces the link between
the space of the home and Lucie’s subjectivity, but also constructs Miss Pross as a second domestic authority figure. As Lisa Robson notes, “Miss Pross is masculine only in a superficial sense; in terms of her spiritual nature and moral sensitivity, she is another feminine angel” (207). Her devotion to “servitude without question” (Robson 208) consolidates Lucie’s authority and affirms her own place in the home economy just below Lucie in terms of responsibility and virtue.¹⁹⁵

If Miss Pross is paranoid in her perception of the threat posed to Lucie by her suitors, it is because the violence deployed against Lucie’s sexual and domestic identities is displaced onto Madame Defarge, and as such takes on the tones of national conflict instead of sexual violation. As in the case of Burke’s depiction of the raid on Versailles, violence against Lucie and the domestic sphere amounts to violence against the national family that Dickens models on the home. Dickens’s characters create an imaginative continuity between the home and the nation early on in the novel. Darnay, for example, envisions England as his “Refuge” (119), an image that recalls the narrator’s description of the Soho house as “a very harbour from the raging streets” (88). Miss Pross, the defender of the class and gender norms of domesticity, is also the novel’s most staunch nationalist. Her insular feeling first appears when she accompanies Lucie to Dover to meet Lorry and refuses to cross the Channel: “If it was ever intended that I should go across salt water, do you suppose Providence would have cast my lot in an island?” (30). Like her fear of the “Hundreds of people” (97) who are really “only Two” (97), Miss Pross’s patriotism initially appears ridiculous. However, Dickens’s attitude toward her patriotism shifts when national and domestic identities come under threat by the Republic. By declaring her “maxim” to be a lesser known verse of the British national anthem, “Confound their politics, Frustrate their knavish tricks, On him our hopes we fix, ¹⁹⁵ Simon Petch makes an interesting claim about Miss Pross’s role in the consolidation of middle-class domesticity in “Economies of Love and Law”: “Pross’s business efficiency is coded as feminine alliance, which disguises the fact that the domestic economy in which Lucie holds pride of place is the product of the labour of others as much as a reflection of Lucie; the menials who actually prepare the food get no more significant attention than the cook who prepares Monseigneur’s chocolate” (70-71). However, Dickens is clear that Miss Pross performs at least some of the household labour herself; Dickens describes Miss Pross’s efforts to learn French cuisine, for example, showing that she is intimately involved in producing the household’s dinners alongside her very small “staff of domestics,” consisting only of a “woman and girl” (95). What is important about Miss Pross, then, is not her disguising of household labour, but the ways in which her defence of Lucie’s status and virtue enforces the domestic manager’s economic and moral authority.
God save the King!” (279), Miss Pross reorganises her nationalist sentiment around a specific set of enemies, the revolutionaries in France. Although her patriotism is still comic, she succeeds in aligning it with the narrative’s rejection of the revolutionary regime.

The movement of the characters also reflects the novel’s progressive ratification of nationalist values. Although the Manettes, Darnay and even Carton and Lorry, who lived in Paris as a student and businessman respectively, initially self-identify as partly English and partly French, the escape from France at the end of the novel constitutes a withdrawal to a domestic life located in London, the centre of the British national community. Dickens’s early indictment of British society thus dissolves into an increasing acceptance

196 “God Save the King” first appeared in Gentleman’s Magazine at another time of national paranoia, during the Jacobite uprising of 1745, under the title “A Song for two Voices. As sung at both Playhouses.” The lyrics were as follows:

God save great GEORGE our king,
Long live our noble king,
   God save the king.
Send him victorious,
Happy and glorious,
   Long to reign over us,
   God save the king.

O Lord our God arise,
Scatter his enemies,
   And make them fall;
Confound their politics,
Frustrate their knavish tricks,
On him our hopes we fix,
   O save us all.

Thy choicest gifts in store
On George be pleas’d to pour,
   Long may he reign;
May he defend our laws,
And ever give us cause,
To say with heart and voice
   God save the king.

Rosa Bud’s kind guardian, Mr. Grewgious, also paraphrases “God Save the King” with reference to Edwin Drood’s sinister uncle John Jasper in Dickens’s last novel, The Mystery of Edwin Drood. When Rosa tells her guardian that Jasper has made advances toward her, he responds with a rewriting of the same lines Miss Pross quotes in Tale:

   Confound his politics,
   Frustrate his knavish tricks!
   On Thee his hopes to fix?
   Damn him again! (178)

The connection between sexual integrity and national sovereignty that Dickens establishes through Miss Pross’s defence of Lucie’s virtue is even more explicit in Grewgious’s nationalistic response to Jasper’s violent sexuality.
of insular nationalism and a retreat into the home that mirrors the historical shift in public mood and British politics that occurred across the 1790s and into the early nineteenth century. Dickens’s characters abdicate their French identities in favour of the anglicised family name, Darnay, and leave the xenophobic Miss Pross to cover their retreat in a confrontation with Madame Defarge described in explicitly nationalist terms: “Each spoke in her own language; neither understood the other’s words” (351). Miss Pross’s victory over Madame Defarge is that of a woman who identifies herself as “an Englishwoman” (351), “a Briton” who “[does not] care an English Twopence for [herself],” over a “wicked foreign woman” (352). The equation between British insularity and domestic privacy emerges through Miss Pross’s motivation in mounting her attack on Madame Defarge, as she acts to protect Lucie, her “Ladybird” (352), from “the family’s malevolent enemy” (351). The national enemy and the enemy of the family are one, and the domestic community constructed around the home in Soho becomes an analogue for the national community. *A Tale of Two Cities*, then, offers a centralising definition of national identity that normalises nationalism as an important part of domestic ideology, and Miss Pross, Lucie’s angelic counterpart, polices the borders of the nation and the home against the revolutionary threat.

By proposing the domestic ideology that Lucie represents as a viable alternative to the mismanagement of the old regime and revolutionary state, Dickens constructs a parallel between the home and the nation. Although Lucie and the Soho home constitute an ideal community that is both inclusive and compassionate, the threats that revolutionary violence pose to that community result in its increasing politicisation as it comes to represent the paranoid British nationalism that characterised Britain’s response to the revolution in the late 1790s and across the revolutionary period as conservative nationalism gained political currency in the war years. The characters’ final retreat to London, then, ratifies insular patriotism by equating domestic privacy with a home space fortified against the turbulent streets and the revolutionary national enemy, Madame Defarge.
“A Haunting Spirit”: Sydney Carton’s Sentimental Death and Representational Violence

If the family’s retreat to their London home at the end of Tale represents the novel’s attempt to defend the domestic sphere against a revolutionary threat, then Sydney Carton’s self-sacrifice demonstrates Dickens’s effort to take the values Lucie and her community represent on the offensive. Carton’s death ensures the domestic community’s survival into the future, but also spreads its values of sentimental affect into the broader community, from the seamstress who shares his death to the reader on whom Dickens’s sentimentalism works. However, in enacting his plot of self-sacrifice, Carton commits a kind of representational violence that wrests narrative authority away from characters with alternative stories to tell.

Sydney Carton’s self-sacrifice at the end of A Tale of Two Cities functions as his intervention into the narrative of the Revolution and the novel, consolidating domestic ideology and inscribing the guillotine with heroic and sentimental meaning. Although critics such as Tambling and Petch argue that Carton’s death confirms middle-class domestic norms, Jennifer Ruth reads the ending of Tale as evidence that the domestic circle is “unravelling” and can only be “restored not by one of its own members but by a modern professional” (287). Ruth’s claim is partly based on the assumption that Lucie fails to influence Carton the way a domestic angel could, and that, instead, “It will be Carton who will serve Lucie” (295). Ruth’s conclusions, however, do not take into account the extent to which Carton’s self-sacrifice is motivated by Lucie’s influence and, more importantly, Dickens’s insistence that Carton and Lorry experience a sense of belonging within Lucie’s domestic community. If, as I have argued above, Carton is incorporated into the community of affect and intimacy that Lucie constructs around the house in Soho, Carton is the member of the domestic circle who most forcefully asserts its integrity by finally protecting it from revolutionary violence, allowing its remaining members to escape to England. Carton’s self-sacrifice is clearly motivated by his devotion to Lucie and his recognition of the value of her “sweet compassion” (144), as his “last confidence” (146) with Lucie demonstrates: Lucie, Carton claims, “inspired” him with “unformed ideas of striving afresh, beginning anew, shaking off sloth and sensuality, and fighting out the abandoned fight” (145). Although he denies that he is
really capable of making these changes even under Lucie’s influence, claiming that the vision of “striving afresh” is “A dream, all a dream” (145), he makes the promise of self-sacrifice he will later fulfill under the Revolution at this moment of confidence and intimacy with Lucie, begging her to remember that “[f]or you, and for any dear to you, I would do anything .... O Miss Manette ... think now and then that there is a man who would give his life, to keep a life you love beside you!” (147). The ending, insofar as it demonstrates Carton’s adherence to the promises inspired by affect and intimacy, confirms the significance of the companionate, domestic circle in constructing his sense of identity and community. Furthermore, in plotting the family’s retreat to London, Carton validates the double sense of home defence— as a literal fortification of the home against intruders and as a militant, insular effort to exclude potential foreign invaders— that Miss Pross’s nationalistic policing of the family produces.

In addition, Carton’s preoccupation with domestic ties and community intensifies in the days that precede his death. His frequent recollections of childhood (298) and the burial service he witnessed at his father’s death (301), and his new bond with Lorry as a father figure (296) mark his enhanced awareness of affective ties. Most importantly, Carton extends the sympathy of affect outward beyond the limits of Lucie’s domestic circle to include the broader community when he wanders through Paris at night, in a scene that acts as a counterpoint to the “Night Shadows” chapter:

With a solemn interest in the lighted windows where the people were going to rest, forgetful for a few calm hours of the horrors surrounding them; in the towers of the churches, where no prayers were said ...; in the distant burial-places, reserved, as they wrote upon the gates, for Eternal Sleep; in the abounding gaols; and in the streets along which the sixties rolled to a death which had become so common and material, that no sorrowful story of a haunting Spirit ever arose among the people out of all the working of the Guillotine; with a solemn interest in the whole life and death of the city settling down to its short nightly pause in fury; Sydney Carton crossed the Seine again for lighter streets. (301)
Carton’s “solemn interest in the whole life and death of the city” writes urban life with a new vision of sympathy, counteracting the image of modern isolation and suspicion the novel’s early chapters portray.

Through his death, Carton seizes representational authority, protesting against the “death which had become so common and material, that no sorrowful story of a haunting Spirit ever arose among the people out of all the working of the Guillotine” (301) and inscribing the guillotine with heroic and sentimental meaning. Dickens’s contemporary reviewer James Fitzjames Stephen famously criticised Tale’s sentimentality in the Saturday Review, accusing Dickens of writing with false, “mechanical” (742) pathos. Stephen argues,

> With a little practice and a good deal of determination, it would really be as easy to harrow up people’s feelings as to poke the fire. The whole art is to take a melancholy subject, and rub the reader’s nose in it, and this does not require any particular amount either of skill or knowledge .... It is an old remark, that if dirt enough is thrown some of it will stick; and Mr. Dickens’s career shows that the same is true of pathos. (742)

However, Dickens’s use of sentiment in representing Carton’s death is part of his strategy to rewrite revolutionary images with new emotional and moral meaning. The echoing footsteps that pose the threat of invasion against the private sphere, for example, are rewritten by Carton’s awakened sympathy as he walks the streets of Paris just before his death: the religious words of the burial service, the narrator tells the reader, “were in the echoes of his feet, and were in the air” (302).

Just as Carton’s decision to sacrifice himself changes the meaning of the footsteps that echo across Paris and into the Manettes’ lives, his enactment of self-sacrifice repudiates the guillotine’s utilitarianism and ubiquity, challenging the reader to see it differently from the head-counting revolutionary crowd. According to Dorinda Outram, the guillotine’s functionality “evacuated emotional content from the scene” (118), but its intended victim, Charles Darnay, wishes to die with “quiet heroism” (334), a desire that would restore emotional content to the site of death. Sydney Carton’s decision to switch places with Darnay enables Dickens to endow the guillotine with heroic potential by re-imagining its victim as a hero willing to sacrifice himself for the sake of others instead of
one number of the lengthy list of condemned. Several critics read Carton’s plot as an
illustration of a Carlylean notion of heroism. His transformation from a good-for-nothing
failure at the beginning of Tale to a self-sacrificing hero by the end of the novel follows
the trajectory of a “broadly Carlylean quest for a vocation” (Adams “The Hero as
Spectacle” 223) that culminates when he physically becomes Charles Darnay by
switching their clothing in a scene that is “nothing less than an enactment of the
Carlylean clothes philosophy as Dickens perceived it and wanted his readers to
understand it” (Timko 192).197 According to Michael Timko, “Carton’s death and
resurrection ... demonstrate the interest of Dickens, influenced by Carlyle, in history as
prophecy and as human action rather than an indulgence in sentimentality” (193).

However, I would argue that Carton’s death and prophecy are precisely an
“indulgence in sentimentality,” and that, in fact, such sentimentality is central to the
novel’s antirevolutionary purpose. Carton’s resistance to the revolutionary state, for
example, is evident in his effort to restore meaning to the utilitarian, functional guillotine
through the sentimental death that is motivated by emotion, his devotion to Lucie, which
comes from his belief in her “sweet compassion” (144). The reader is separated from the
observers in the revolutionary crowd by special knowledge of Carton’s action and its
motivation, and the crowd’s dehumanisation of the guillotine’s victims is intensified by
the contrast provided by Carton’s moment of sympathetic union with the seamstress, his
fellow victim:

She kisses his lips; he kisses hers; they solemnly bless each other.
The spare hand does not tremble as he releases it; nothing worse than a
sweet, bright constancy is in the patient face. She goes next before him—
is gone; the knitting-women count Twenty-Two.

“I am the Resurrection and the Life, saith the Lord: he that believeth in
me, though he were dead, yet shall he live: and whosoever liveth and
believeth in me shall never die.”

The murmuring of many voices, the upturning of many faces, the
pressing on of many footsteps in the outskirts of the crowd, so that it

197 See Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus for his full articulation of the clothes philosophy.
swells forward in a mass, like one great heave of water, all flashes away.

Twenty-Three. (360)

The combination of emotion and religion here, and the importance of Lucie’s influence as a figure of virtue and compassion, draw the reader’s attention to the function of sympathy as a moral force. The reader’s sympathy for Carton and the seamstress mirrors Carton’s “solemn interest in the whole life and death of the city,” and Carton becomes the “haunting Spirit” that, through contrast, draws attention to the guillotine’s status as simply a “common and material” (301) object, functional and familiar to the crowd. Likewise, the utilitarian guillotine and mechanistic, counting crowd define and heighten the emotional content of Carton’s self-sacrifice for Dickens’s audience.

Carton’s sentimental death, furthermore, works to educate the reader in the moral and social values Lucie represents. Unlike Stephen, who condemned Dickens’s sentimentality, Fred Kaplan and Mary Lenard examine Victorian uses of the sentimentalist discourse that emerged out of eighteenth-century philosophy as a tool of moral and social instruction in their respective books, Sacred Tears: Sentimentality in Victorian Literature and Preaching Pity: Dickens, Gaskell, and Sentimentalism in Victorian Culture. For Victorians, these critics argue, sentimentality enabled the construction of social ties and a sense of community. In using sentiment to build social and moral consciousness, Dickens follows Adam Smith’s theories of sympathy. As discussed above in the context of Lucie’s role at Darnay’s English trial, Smith locates sympathy in the experience of the spectacle, in which, he argues, spectators imaginatively identify with victims of suffering:

Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what are his sensations. Neither can that faculty help us to this any other way, than by representing to us what would be our own, if we were in his case. It is the

Kaplan distinguishes between Victorian sentimentality and Romantic sensibility on this basis, arguing that Victorians “were attracted to sentimentality as a moral and communal ideal rather than to sensibility which promoted separation and withdrawal” (34). According to this argument, Victorians were influenced more by eighteenth-century writers such as Adam Smith and Samuel Richardson than by the Romantics. See Chapters 2 and 3 for more on the Romantic discourse of sensibility.
impressions of our own senses only, not those of his, which our imaginations copy. By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them. His agonies, when they are thus brought home to ourselves, when we have thus adopted and made them our own, begin at last to affect us, and we then tremble and shudder at the thought of what he feels. For as to be in pain or distress of any kind excites the most excessive sorrow, so to conceive or to imagine that we are in it, excites some degree of the same emotion, in proportion to the vivacity or dulness of the conception. (11-12)

This kind of physical sympathy for distress through imaginative identification occurs in *Tale* when characters witness painful spectacles, such as when the crowd at Darnay’s trial begins to physically mirror Lucie’s anxiety (69-70), as well as when characters become the audience for a story: when Lucie hears the story of her father’s imprisonment she experiences a “strange and new sensation” and a “strange thrill” (181) that dramatise the physical experience of imaginative identification with suffering Smith outlines.

This connection between witnessing a spectacle of suffering and receiving a distressing story encourages the reader of *A Tale of Two Cities* to become a sympathetic spectator to Carton’s death. For Lenard, fiction played a major role in perpetuating sentimentalist discourse and building the Victorian community:

> Since middle-class Victorian readers were increasingly isolated from the suffering caused by social problems, often the only contact they

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199 Smith also makes an explicit connection between the effects of spectacle and of literature:

> Whatever is the passion which arises from any object in the person principally concerned, an analogous emotion springs up, at the thought of his situation, in the breast of every attentive spectator. Our joy for the deliverance of those heroes of tragedy or romance who interest us, is as sincere as our grief for their distress, and our fellow-feeling with their misery is not more real than that with their happiness. We enter into their gratitude towards those faithful friends who did not desert them in their difficulties; and we heartily go along with their resentment against those pernicious traitors who injured, abandoned, or deceived them. In every passion of which the mind of man is susceptible, the emotions of the by-stander always correspond to what, by bringing the case home to himself, he imagines should be the sentiments of the sufferer. (13)
themselves would have with this suffering would be through the medium of written discourse, usually through fiction. Fiction, then, became the principal medium by which affective bonds were constructed between different social groups. (53)

Readers, according to this formulation, compose an audience ready to sympathise with Carton’s sentimental death, allowing Dickens to construct a community of affect between Carton and his readers that urges readers to reject the familiarisation of violence, death and discipline propagated by the Revolution and repudiated by Carton’s act of self-sacrifice.

Carton’s assumption of representational authority, however, is underwritten by violence, as my interpretation of Tale as an example of the antirevolutionary legacy’s violence of representation reveals. Carton, for example, plots an ending for the novel that empowers himself as the agent of action but renders his rival, Darnay, completely passive. His “flush of pride” when he holds the fainting Lucie after Darnay is sentenced to death (321), moreover, indicates that he is motivated by some passions that are less admirable than his belief in Lucie’s “sweet compassion” (144), and his rivalry with Darnay appears in the authority he assumes over Lucie’s husband when he performs the exchange of identity. When he demands that they switch clothing, for example, “he forced all these changes upon him. The prisoner was like a young child in his hands” (336). Carton also dictates a letter to Lucie in Darnay’s hand that signals that the authority he claims is a kind of textual authority and acts as Carton’s intrusion into the Darnays’ intimate marital relationship, reminding the reader of his rivalry with Darnay (336-337). In addition, he debilitates Darnay by drugging him (337-339), facilitating the substitution of identities, but characterising the escape from Paris by a passivity that extends beyond Darnay and touches all of the carriage’s passengers. Darnay is “in a swoon” and “insensible” (341) in the carriage, while Manette, whose influence with the revolutionaries fails where Carton’s intervention into the revolutionary plot succeeds, is even more disempowered, a “helpless, inarticulately murmuring, wandering old man” (340). Finally, passivity reaches even to the reader and narrator, who are carried away by Carton’s plot, as the collective, present-tense, first-person plural of the escape scene suggests (342-343). The reader, Garrett Stewart rightly notes, is “catapulted into the
scene of escape, deposited in the same carriage that rushes Darnay, Lucie, and the rest from Paris” (Death Sentences 95-96). Although this works to intensify the reader’s sense of the escape’s immediacy, even, possibly, as Stewart claims, acting as “a displacement of fatality for the reader as well as Darnay” (Death Sentences 97), it also manages to place the reader and narrator in the same position as Darnay with respect to Carton’s narrative authority: we all become the necessary participants in the plot behind which Sydney Carton is the agent. Darnay, Manette, Lucie, the narrator and the reader become interchangeable members of a sympathetic audience for Carton’s sentimental death, as Dickens writes them into the position of the passive “by-stander” consuming the emotional content of a spectacular scene that Smith imagines (13).

Carton also claims textual authority at the end of the novel by creating a narrative that competes with the many revolutionary texts that feature in Tale, and ultimately eliminating the traces of the Revolution and erasing Darnay’s aristocratic and biological lineage. Several texts embedded in the novel perpetrate what Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse call “the violence committed through representation” (2). Two of these, Madame Defarge’s knitted register and Manette’s prison narrative, are texts of victimisation and revenge, heirs to English Jacobin narratives of old-regime abuse. Manette’s narrative of old-regime tyranny and Darnay’s rejection of his inheritance as an Evrémonde together construct an embedded plot that follows the pattern of the revolutionary family romance familiar from radical English representations of the Revolution like Helen Maria Williams’s du F— family story.\(^\text{200}\) The inflexibility with which Dickens’s revolutionaries adhere to their texts of revenge and the plot Sydney Carton authors as an alternative to revolutionary narratives, however, suggest that according to Dickens the radical family romance provides only an incomplete version of the Revolution. Critics like Lawrence Frank and Albert D. Hutter, who focus on Tale as a version of the family romance, then, miss the degree to which Dickens’s critique of the revolutionary revenge narratives urged by Madame Defarge and the Jacquerie necessitates a rejection of the family romance and other radical emplotments of the Revolution. Instead, Murray Baumgarten’s claim that Manette’s narrative “provides a model of mis-reading, in which writing is taken absolutely, and becomes an imprisoning

\(^\text{200}\) See Chapter 2 for my discussion of Williams’s family romance.
“code” (162) is a more apt interpretation of Dickens’s use of these radical embedded plots. As Baumgarten and John R. Reed note, Dickens’s revolutionaries treat their revenge texts as scripts for revolutionary action: Baumgarten calls Madame Defarge’s register and Manette’s prison narrative “pledge[s] to be redeemed by the future” (161), while Reed describes Manette’s narrative as “a prescribed fate, ... the official text that the revolutionaries are determined to play out” (260). The mender of roads recognizes Madame Defarge’s intense adherence to her script when he meets with the Defarges in Paris after Gaspard’s execution: “he felt assured that if she should take it into her brightly ornamented head to pretend that she had seen him do a murder and afterwards flay the victim, she would infallibly go through with it until the play was played out” (166). Finally, however, it is Carton’s counter-narrative of self-sacrifice for the sake of the domestic community that assumes authority in the Tale.

Not only does Carton succeed in subverting Madame Defarge’s revolutionary plot, but the narrator foreshadows some characters’ later recollections of his heroism, showing that the perpetuation of his story and its inscription in the future of each character’s life is already determined. Miss Pross, for example, “recalled soon afterwards, and to the end of her life remembered, that as she pressed her hands on Sydney’s arm and looked up into his face ... there was a braced purpose in the arm and a kind of inspiration in the eyes, which not only contradicted his light manner, but changed and raised the man” (286). Carton’s heroism is already written in memory even before it is performed; foreshadowing makes the success of Carton’s plot inevitable, memorable and authoritative. Little Lucie’s memory of Carton’s heroism lends him even more authority by extending his memory into distant posterity: “It was remembered afterwards that when he bent down and touched her face [the elder Lucie’s] with his lips, he murmured some words. The child, who was nearest to him, told them afterwards, and told her grandchildren when she was a handsome old lady, that she heard him say, ‘A life you love’” (322). The repetition of “afterwards” in both foreshadowed memories indicates Carton’s importance in shaping the future, and, in so doing, rewriting the narrative of the past that motivates revolutionary texts like Manette’s and Madame Defarge’s.

Carton’s representational authority reaches its apex at his death in the form of the prophecy that is attributed to him and to the narrator, and it is at this point that Carton’s
story and Dickens’s *Tale* become one. The prophecy consolidates his narrative’s intrusion into posterity:

I see the lives for which I lay down my life, peaceful, useful, prosperous and happy, in that England which I shall see no more. I see Her with a child upon her bosom, who bears my name ....

I see that I hold a sanctuary in their hearts, and in the hearts of their descendents, generations hence .... I see her and her husband, their course done, lying side by side in their last earthly bed, and I know that each was not more honoured and held sacred in the other’s soul, than I was in the souls of both.

I see that child who lay upon her bosom and who bore my name ... bringing a boy of my name, with a forehead that I know and golden hair, to this place— then fair to look upon, with not a trace of this day’s disfigurement— and I hear him tell the child my story .... (360-361)

“My story” here pre-empts the revolutionary story asserted in Madame Defarge’s registry and Manette’s revenge narrative, and erases the “trace[s]” of the revolutionary plot, pushing the revolutionaries off-stage and demanding narrative attention for the spectacle of Carton’s act of heroism.\(^{201}\) In addition, like the letter to Lucie Carton dictates to Darnay, the prophecy allows Carton to intrude himself into the domestic community envisioned for Lucie’s future, writing Darnay out of his own family and imagining Lucie’s descendents as Carton’s heirs instead of Darnay’s. As Miriam Bailin argues in “‘Dismal Pleasure’: Victorian Sentimentality and the Pathos of the Parvenu,” “Carton’s vision effectively cancels Darnay from his own hereditary line and achieves for Carton himself an illustrious and successful self who, combining the attributes of both himself and Lucie, rises to prominence in Carton’s own profession” (1030). The future Carton foresees is a continuation of the domestic community Lucie constructs throughout the novel that precludes Darnay by minimising biological and genealogical ties and, instead, elevates the ties of intimacy and affect that Lucie has always endeavoured to emphasise.

\(^{201}\) David Craig argues that “[t]he centre of his [Dickens’s] stage is occupied ... by the lonely noble martyrdom of Darnay/Carton, doing his better thing and going to his better place” (80). Although I object to Craig’s conflation of Darnay and Carton as a move that fails to acknowledge the extent to which their rivalry continues at the moment of Carton’s death, the stage image seems appropriate for the ways Carton’s death rewrites the guillotine as a spectacle of sentiment.
in her home, values that guarantee Carton’s sentimental death will be emotionally remembered. There is a subtle distinction between Madame Defarge’s violence and Sydney Carton’s here; Carton’s prophecy does not “[continue] the desire of the terrorists to eliminate the Evremondes ... [by] nearly effac[ing] Darnay” as Chris R. Vanden Bossche claims it does (216). In fact, Carton’s prophecy intervenes in genealogy rather than rigidly adhering to the principles of descent like Madame Defarge’s revenge narrative does. Carton, in other words, rewrites the family according to domestic, affective values, which eliminates the possibility of pursuing the Evrémondes to extinction: Lucie’s children are no longer the heirs of the Marquis, or even Darnay, but are the affective heirs of Sydney Carton. In this way, both Darnay’s future in Lucie’s family and Madame Defarge’s narrative of revenge are eliminated through Carton’s prophecy.

The narrator’s identification with Carton in the prophecy, furthermore, confirms his authority. As Stewart argues, “Carton’s dramatized and consummating death scene is displaced into an articulate exemplum discovered at the very moment of his death to be recoverable in the telling, time out of mind. And so the tale recounted by Lucie’s son becomes ... the title scene of the Tale that earns its closure by foreseeing it” (Death Sentences 93). Carton’s “story” (361) is Dickens’s Tale, as told by Miss Pross, little Lucie and Lucie’s son, but also by the narrator. Reed asserts that the narrative we have just read becomes, at its conclusion, a story of a time gone by but made ever present by retelling, just as Carton’s life, at the moment it ends, becomes an exemplary story worthy of being repeated ....

In letting Carton tell the story of the beneficent future, the narrator endorses his own task, for his novel is the calling to life of a communal memory .... (267)

By identifying with Carton’s text and the future community of audience members represented as Carton’s heirs, however, the narrator also endorses Carton’s version of the revolutionary story, at the expense of Manette’s and Madame Defarge’s embedded narratives and the suppressed narrative of Darnay’s future with his family.

Not only does Carton’s “story” (361) preclude and pre-empt alternative narratives of the Revolution and the future, but his plot also participates in several of the dehumanising
strategies for social control Dickens critiques earlier in the novel, including spying, manipulating spectacle, and urging physical violence. The violence of Carton’s narrative is thus only part of a broader trend toward antirevolutionary violence in his actions and within *Tale* as a whole. Carton deploys techniques of surveillance, relying on his “inscrutability” (290) to outplay Barsad at his own game and observing while avoiding observation himself in the Defarges’ shop (324-327). His confidential disclosure of his love for Lucie, which requires her to keep their intimacy a secret from Darnay (200), also exacerbates the social condition of mystery that is so threatening to the Dover travellers and which Dickens condemns in the prison system; his final self-sacrifice confirms his intimacy with Lucie as it fulfills the promise he has secretly made her, and acts as a circumscription of their private relationship, excluding Darnay. In this sense, Carton’s vision of a future that writes Darnay out is merely the logical extension of his intimacy with Lucie, from which Darnay has always been barred.  

It is in his manipulation of spectacle to provoke emotion in the reader, however, that Carton most obviously employs the techniques that Dickens earlier condemns. John Kucich argues in “The Purity of Violence: *A Tale of Two Cities*” that Dickens’s goal for the novel is “the staging of acceptable— as opposed to cruel— violence” (58), but it is difficult to determine which extreme emotions in the novel are acceptable and which are not. As discussed above, even Lucie’s compassionate ability to influence the crowd at Darnay’s English trial is simply an instance of spectators mirroring the emotions of the spectacle (69-70), and the sympathy produced in this manner is easily convertible from violence, and back to violence again. According to Bailin, “Sentimentality may in part be defined in relation to other structures of literary affect by its incitement to excess within a narrowly prescribed set of relationships and range of feelings— what might, in short, be called its prescriptive excess” (1019), but spectacle in *Tale*, as we have seen, often incites excessive emotion outside of the prescribed appropriate “range of feelings.” For Bailin, sentimentality endeavours to contain and suppress what Smith calls “unsocial passions” (Smith 41-47), but its excess often causes the failure of such containment:

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Lucie and Carton are not the only members of the domestic community with secrets: Darnay keeps his journey to France a secret from everyone (233-235), Miss Pross and Lorry hide Manette’s relapse from Lucie (187-197) and Lorry conceals the trouble “in his secret mind” during the September Massacres from Lucie (258).
The correspondence of feeling between the object of sentimentality and the sympathetic subject ... [is] achieved through a struggle to suppress or transvaluate supervening obstacles to sympathetic identification (anger, hatred, and resentment, for instance) whose traces can still be felt in the outpouring of emotion that is meant to signal their absence. (Bailin 1020)

Dickens expresses his own suspicion of the spectacle of public death in his letter to the *Times* of 17 November 1849, describing an execution he had attended that week:

> Nothing would have been a greater comfort to me—nothing would have so much relieved in my mind the unspeakable terrors of the scene, as to have been enabled to believe that any portion of the immense crowd—that any grains of sand in the vast moral desert stretching away on every side—were moved to any sentiments of fear, repentance, pity, or natural horror by what they saw upon the drop. It was impossible to look around and rest in any such belief .... I hold that no human being, not being the better for such a sight, could go away without being the worse for it.

*(Letters 652)*

Observers of public executions are supposed to be instructed morally through contact with death, but the spectacle Dickens describes fails to evoke any of the sentiments, such as “fear, repentance, pity, or natural horror,” that he associates with teaching morality.

In *Tale*, spectacle nearly always incites its witnesses to violence. Dickens makes this especially clear when the narrator and sympathetic characters are provoked to hatred and rage as spectators of scenes of revolutionary violence. The sharpening of the grindstone during the September Massacres, in particular, affects the narrator:

> The eye could not detect one creature in the group free from the smear of blood .... Hatchets, knives, bayonets, swords, all brought to be sharpened, were all red with it .... And as the frantic wielders of these weapons snatched them from the stream of sparks and tore away into the streets, the same red hue was red in their frenzied eyes;—eyes which any unbrutalised beholder would have given twenty years of life, to petrify with a well-directed gun. (252)
The narrator here experiences the resurgence of the “anger, hatred, and resentment” Bailin identifies as the “traces” of excessive sentimentality (1020). Armstrong and Tennenhouse argue that “[t]o regard certain practices as violent is never to see them just as they are. It is always to take up a position for or against them” (9), and while witnessing the September Massacres, Dickens’s narrator passes judgment on revolutionary violence in a manner that implies the novel’s own violence against the Revolution. The words “eye,” “eyes” and “beholder” emphasise the role of spectacle in producing the narrator’s violent sensations, while “frantic,” “frenzied” and “unbrutalised” set up an oppositional relationship between what appear to be the sub-human, animalistic actions of the revolutionary mob and the spectator/narrator, whose own violence, in the form of the “well-directed gun,” is represented as both civilised and necessary. The position the narrator takes up, then, encourages antirevolutionary violence while it condemns the September Massacres. Sydney Carton later experiences similar urges to commit antirevolutionary violence. Hearing the wood-sawyer, formerly the mender of roads, joke about the number of guillotine victims, Carton is “sensible of a rising desire to strike the life out of him” (300), and after listening secretly to Madame Defarge orate on the extent of her rage against the Evrémondes he feels “that it might be a good deed to seize that arm, lift it, and strike under it sharp and deep” (327). Likewise, readers, who are separated from the head-counting revolutionary crowd through their special knowledge of the emotional content of Carton’s death, are affected as spectators. If spectacles of violence incite violence, and if the narrator and Carton in particular are associated with excessive, antirevolutionary emotion, then Carton’s sentimental death could be read as an attempt to motivate readers to accept unthinkingly, and even identify with, the representational violence Carton and the narrator commit against his enemies and rivals.

Violence, then, is at the core of Sydney Carton’s self-sacrifice, and Tale attempts to make the reader identify with that violence by provoking and manipulating extreme emotions. Vanden Bossche argues that the content of Carton’s prophecy “puts the authenticity of that very self-sacrifice into question” (211), but I would argue instead that the sentimental spectacle of Carton’s death commands narrative attention by violently wresting it away from his rivals for authority, Madame Defarge, Manette and Darnay. In
this way, his self-sacrifice is consistent with the violence his story enacts against the revolutionary story and Darnay’s future. Bailin’s exploration of the violence contained within sentimental narratives makes this point, as she argues that “[t]he fundamental link between rivalry and sympathy and their essential convertibility within the relational configurations of Victorian sentimentality allow ‘disagreeable’ passions like envy and resentment to remain the suppressed content of scenes which elicit our compassion through the renunciation or denial of such feelings” (1022). Sydney Carton’s self-sacrifice, for Bailin, is an example from a Victorian tradition of renunciation that “may represent not only the required self-suppression but also the acquisitive pathos of not having what you want and think you deserve” (1028); Carton’s representational victory could not be effected without the self-sacrifice that conceals his violence against the revolutionaries and Darnay, converting his aggressive and competitive urges into sentimentalised victimisation. The “suppressed content” Bailin is interested in (1022), however, breaks out in moments like the description of the September Massacres, Carton’s violent reactions to the revolutionaries and the final prophecy, which frames the entire Tale as an act of representational violence against the alternative texts Carton’s “story” (361) silences. The novel’s opening warns the reader against the extreme positions of the age’s “noisiest authorities” (7), but ultimately the narrator’s identification with the excessive sentimentality of Carton’s death scene and the vision of Carton’s prophecy as the story that makes the Tale possible constructs Carton’s authority as absolute, to the exclusion of other political positions and voices.

Although Dickens proposes the domestic community as an alternative to old-regime and revolutionary social and political structures, then, that community is not without its own forms of coercion and violence. The family’s retreat within the private sphere is accompanied by a paranoid insularism that consolidates the borders of the home and nation, while Sydney Carton’s spectacular self-sacrifice encourages an excessive emotionalism that readily spills over from sentimentalism to anger, fear and violent hatred. Dickens’s narrator finally validates the representational violence Carton’s plot commits against revolutionary texts and alternative visions of the past and future by collapsing the Tale into Carton’s “story” (361), justifying and mirroring its violent, antirevolutionary urges. Despite the historical distance between the 1790s and Tale’s
publication in 1859, the novel’s emotional urgency suggests that the violence of the Revolution and of reactions against it still could not be fully contained in the past. Like 1848, which replayed the history of the revolutionary decade, the text’s imagined rehearsing of Carton’s “story” (361) by subsequent generations of Lucie’s descendants indicates a Victorian compulsion to return to the political and representational conflicts of the revolutionary era.
CHAPTER 8
“FROM THE SUBLIME TO THE OTHER THING”: CHARLOTTE M. YONGE’S 
DYNEVOR TERRACE AND BRITISH COMMUNITIES AT THE END OF THE 
REVOLUTIONARY ERA

In her 1857 novel *Dynevor Terrace*, Charlotte M. Yonge turns to the French revolution of 1848 rather than the revolutionary decade for her examination of the impact of France and radicalism on nineteenth-century British identity. Although Yonge’s novel appeared two years before *A Tale of Two Cities*, I have chosen to address it last in this study because it depicts the end and not the beginning of the revolutionary era: the 1847 invasion scare in Britain, the intensification of Chartist protest in the time leading up to the last great Chartist rally at Kennington Common, and the 1848 revolution in France. Yonge, furthermore, consciously turns away from the antirevolutionary representational legacy when she relegates revolution in France—and British responses to the French Revolution—to history. In fact, for Yonge, the 1848 revolution is a turning point for British national consciousness: instead of defining itself against an encroaching, invasive, radical France, the British community in Yonge’s novel moves away from the insular, cross-Channel fixation of the previous decades to re-imagine itself in a global, especially transatlantic, context. Yonge thus represents the 1848 revolution and the accompanying invasion scares as the swan-song of the revolutionary era and France’s threat to Britain. She works to contain domestic, British radicalism and the possibility of revolution in France by reducing working-class politics to problems of patronage and charity, according to the conservative values of unreformed, deferential culture, and, furthermore, distacts from the Chartist political demands of the late 1840s by subordinating class politics to patriotism: as in the 1790s, national solidarity against the French threat for Yonge’s characters entails burying domestic radicalism for the good of the nation.

Yet, Yonge’s dismissal of the revolutionary threat is part of her larger vision for a nation modeled on the domestic community, giving her novel a pragmatic purpose that places her writing in a conservative, didactic tradition similar to that of early Anti-Jacobin novelists like Elizabeth Hamilton. Like Hamilton, Yonge locates the individual’s identity and sense of belonging to a community within the home and family, and works to
domesticate the political arena by disciplining revolutionary violence and excess. However, in suggesting that Britain must turn away from its anti-French fixation and look outward into the increasingly globalised world to test the new boundaries of Britishness in imperial and neo-colonial contexts, Yonge also works to contain the excessive Burkean paranoia and insular sentiment that appears, for example, in Dickens’s description of a retreat to London at the end of *A Tale of Two Cities*. Because the contained radical and French threats Yonge’s characters encounter in the 1840s are defused by her confidence in the victory of the conservative forces of order and stability over protest and insurgency and by her framing of Chartism and revolution from within the patriarchal and paternalistic values of hierarchical, pre-revolutionary culture, the histrionic sentiment that underlies much of the antirevolutionary representational tradition appears to be unwarranted. Yonge thus turns away from the revolutionary era and its representational legacy, focusing her anxieties about British belonging on transatlantic locations of distance and exile from the home and homeland. However, just as antirevolutionary fiction imagines British contact with a cross-Channel site of difference as the threat posed by a voracious male revolutionary intent on violating the sovereignty of the British home, Yonge focuses her exploration of transatlantic movement by registering the impact of potentially invasive, Othered figures such as Mary Ponsonby’s exotic Limenian stepmother Rosita or the returned emigrant Oliver Dynevor on the family and domestic community. Thus, while the focal point for Yonge’s construction of British identity and community shifts across the novel, *Dynevor Terrace* still engages with problems that are central to the other antirevolutionary novels I have explored here, especially the limits of the domestic community and its role in producing feelings of belonging or exile among its members.

Yonge’s immense popularity as a novelist in the 1850s marks her work as an effective gauge of British public opinion and influential force in shaping that opinion; the shift in *Dynevor Terrace* from anti-French patriotism to a more complicated understanding of Britishness at the height of Victorian stability and imperial reach can thus be read at least in part as a reflection of a broader public move away from the antirevolutionary and insular fears, especially the fears of home invasion and rape associated with the Revolution and popularised by Edmund Burke’s *Reflections*, that dominate the works in
this study. By 1854, her first popular success, *The Heir of Redclyffe*, “had become one of the best-selling novels of the century” (Thompson *Reviewing Sex* 87). Yonge’s work also had an international appeal that lasted across the century: an 1898 article titled “Women Writers” claims that “[h]er books are read wherever the English language is spoken” (374). Perhaps one of the most telling illustrations of Yonge’s popularity after *Heir*’s success appears in a hostile 1858 *Household Words* lampoon co-written by Charles Dickens and Wilkie Collins and titled “Doctor Dulcamara, M. P.” Dickens and Collins describe Yonge’s work condescendingly, but, in doing so, indicate *Heir*’s entrenched popularity:

We abstained from reading it, solely from dread of the effect which it might have in unfitting us for enjoying any other works of fiction afterwards. We were well aware, from our own personal knowledge, of the disastrous influence, in this respect, which the work had exercised over that large and discriminating portion of the reading public of England which is chiefly composed of curates and young ladies. Among other sad cases, in our own circle of acquaintance, we met with two which especially struck us. One instance was that of a curate ... who, after reading *The Heir of Redclyffe*, expressed himself critically in these frantic terms:— “There are only Two Books in the world. The first is the Bible, and the second is *The Heir of Redclyffe*.”

The other instance is perhaps still more afflicting. A young and charming lady ... read this fatal domestic novel on its first appearance some years ago, and has read nothing else ever since. As soon as she gets to the end of the book, this interesting and unfortunate creature turns back to the first page, and begins it again .... (622)

Although Dickens and Collins attempt to marginalise and trivialise Yonge’s work by fitting it only for “curates and young ladies,” the lampoon registers the public’s almost compulsive reading of her work in the 1850s, as well as her male rivals’ insecurity at her

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203 See Nicola Diane Thompson’s chapter on *Heir* in *Reviewing Sex: Gender and the Reception of Victorian Novels* and Barbara Dennis’s introduction to the Oxford edition of the novel for detailed accounts of *Heir*’s reception. Amy Cruse’s *The Victorians and Their Books* and Georgina Battiscombe’s *Charlotte Mary Yonge: The Story of an Uneventful Life*, although dated, also provide numerous examples of Yonge’s popularity that have become anecdotal in Yonge scholarship.
success. *The Heir of Redclyffe* went through twenty-two editions by 1876 (Thompson *Reviewing Sex* 101) and *The Daisy Chain*, Yonge’s second most popular novel, went through nine editions in the twelve years after its initial publication in 1856 (Foster and Simons 61). According to her biographer Georgina Battiscombe, Yonge received a fan letter from the German princess Margaret, Princess Reuss, at the height of her popularity, and became so famous that “strangers would try to force themselves into her home” (77, 78). Yonge’s readership, moreover, was not limited to “curates and young ladies” as Dickens and Collins suggested it was: her work was admired by literary women and men with a range of political views. Writers with medievalist sympathies were particularly affected by Yonge’s work: Alfred Tennyson stayed awake all night reading one of Yonge’s novels by candlelight (Battiscombe 118), and the young Pre-Raphaelites D. G. Rossetti, William Morris and Edward Burne-Jones admired Yonge (Thompson *Reviewing Sex* 90) so much that Morris modelled himself on *Heir’s* hero Sir Guy Morville as an undergraduate and Rossetti cried over Guy’s death (Battiscombe 76-77). However, Yonge also found readers among writers in the realist tradition: G. H. Lewes read *Heir* aloud to George Eliot when Anthony Trollope recommended the novel to them (Thompson *Reviewing Sex* 101) and Henry James also admired the novel, claiming that it revealed “a first rate mind ... a mind which is the master and not a slave of its material” and describing Yonge as “almost a genius” (qtd. in Thompson *Reviewing Sex* 101).

Yonge’s work is also mentioned in a number of other novels across the nineteenth century, although references to her novels by rival writers are, as in “Doctor Dulcamara,” not always admiring. Jo March cries over *Heir* in Louisa May Alcott’s *Little Women* (Alcott 27), and characters in James’s novel *Watch and Ward* also read Yonge’s most successful novel (Tillotson and Tillotson 51). References to *The Daisy Chain* appear in Edith Nesbit’s *The Wouldbegoods* and Margaret Oliphant’s *Phoebe, Junior* (Foster and Simons 65-66).

The links between Yonge’s novels and the “curates and young ladies” segment of the reading public that Collins and Dickens describe contributed to Yonge’s fall from popularity and critical attention across the twentieth century. In the twentieth-century...

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204 In “Why Jo Didn’t Marry Laurie: Louisa May Alcott and *The Heir of Redclyffe*,” Karen Sands-O’Connor argues that Alcott imagined the relationship between and characterisation of her Laurie and Amy as an Americanised rewriting of Yonge’s Guy and Amy.
Modernist reaction against Victorian culture, Nicola Diane Thompson suggests, Yonge and Heir “seemed likely candidates for the critical guillotine,” and her re-appearance in academic criticism in the 1980s and 1990s was limited by her conservative, antifeminist politics, which made her writing “seem unpalatable to contemporary taste to the point of being taboo” (Reviewing Sex 103, 107). Much Yonge criticism, therefore, has been devoted to examinations of her Tractarian religious doctrines, didacticism and domestic values, the most conspicuous features of her work, but also the source of its ideological tensions, especially with respect to Yonge’s gender politics. In “Heaven and Home”: Charlotte M. Yonge’s Domestic Fiction and the Victorian Debate over Women, June Sturrock notes the possible conflicts that could emerge from the three central relationships in her life, with her father and the patriarchal institutions he represented, with her sense of writing as a vocation, and with the Oxford Movement leader John Keble, whose conservative religious doctrines reinforced Yonge’s family’s Tory politics. 205 Although Yonge’s conservative religion and strong belief in filial obedience encouraged her overt opposition to reform focusing on women’s rights, Sturrock argues, Yonge’s identification with Keble in particular fostered the religious views that made her “think of women’s activities as a serious issue” (24). According to Sturrock, in “Keble’s version of Christianity ... behaviour associated with the feminine and the domestic became prescribed more generally as Christian behaviour” (23).

The kind of female empowerment within the home that Nancy Armstrong finds in the domestic novel in Desire and Domestic Fiction, then, expands outward from the home in Yonge’s work. In Sturrock’s words, Yonge “represents the domestic—and by implication, the feminine—as morally, spiritually, and culturally central for male as well as female” (25). 206 Yonge’s Tractarian belief in “good works” also encouraged her to confront, as Hamilton had in Modern Philosophers, women’s issues outside of strictly domestic limits, “so that many of the concerns of less conservative contemporary women,

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205 See Sturrock’s introduction, “A Daughter of the Church,” for more detail on these three key relationships (15-28).
206 Gavin Budge follows Sturrock’s lead in his 2007 book, Charlotte M Yonge: Religion, Feminism and Realism in the Victorian Novel. He writes, “The Tractarian perspective radicalizes both domestic ideology and the common Victorian belief in women’s immaterial moral ‘influence’ by suggesting that moral progress is only possible on the basis of a feminization of society in which immaterial moral values become incarnate in social institutions in the way that is characteristic of the home” (213). For a discussion of Armstrong’s Desire and Domestic Fiction as it relates to this study see Chapter 1.
such as education, work, and political and social change, were also inescapably her concerns” (Sturrock “Heaven and Home” 16). In Sturrock’s view, like Victorian women writers such as Christina Rossetti and Anne Brontë, for whom religious beliefs led to a challenging of gender norms, or feminists such as Josephine Butler and Frances Power Cobbe, whose “foregrounding of the domestic” (25) in their writing is a political tactic, Yonge’s commitment to Oxford Movement Anglicanism and domestic ideology in her work often offered revisions to conventional Victorian values. These were more “modest” (25) than some of her contemporaries’ critiques, but nonetheless complicated her generally conservative, antifeminist politics (25-26).

The contradictory impulses in Yonge’s writing have, however, been extremely frustrating for critics for whom her overt and outspoken antifeminist beliefs belie the kind of female and domestic empowerment her novels often promote. Some feminist critics represent their efforts to retrieve Yonge’s work for literary study as a struggle: Thompson writes, “While feminist criticism makes it possible in principle to recover forgotten women novelists, its ideological basis has limitations: what, for example, do you say about a conservative woman novelist like Charlotte Yonge once you’ve discovered her?” (“Responding to the woman questions” 2). Talia Schaffer likewise argues, in an article with a revealing subtitle, “The Mysterious Magnum Bonum: Fighting to Read Charlotte Yonge,” “if we read Yonge’s narratives against the grain as a realist author, we misrepresent her central motive; yet if we read her as a pious pedagogue (as she would prefer), we can find nothing to say” (245). For Schaffer, the key question for Yonge studies is always, “How can we approach work whose explicit function is to co-opt us and whose narratives enthusiastically depict the conversion of people who are often like us?” (“Taming the Tropics” 204). Yonge, like Hamilton, thus illustrates how unattractive and difficult the political positions assumed within the neglected antirevolutionary dialogue I am recovering here can appear to literary critics working with very different values and ideological backgrounds from a novelist like Yonge.

207 Yonge clearly states her antifeminist positions in her 1877 treatise Womankind: “I have no hesitation in declaring my full belief in the inferiority of woman, nor that she brought it upon herself” (1). She continues to argue against female enfranchisement (235), stating that the position of women “entirely depends on what we are in ourselves, not what we claim [as legal rights]” (236).
However, in recent years the critical question of “what ... [to] say” (Thompson “Responding to the woman questions” 2) about Yonge’s novels is beginning to be answered in new ways, as the critical attention bestowed on Yonge’s antifeminism, domesticity and conservative religion has extended into examinations of masculinity and cross-gendering, missionary work and imperial projects, and military culture and national consciousness in Yonge’s seemingly endless body of work. While little critical attention has been directed toward either Dynevor Terrace or Yonge’s representation of France, these recent critical discussions open up new fields of debate for Yonge’s work. My goal here is to situate Yonge’s domestic fiction and values within the more public, national problems she addresses: although the home is the focal point for her novels, the political questions she confronts are not limited to domesticity, or even to gender ideology or the Woman Question. Yonge’s engagement in Dynevor Terrace with the construction of a national consciousness in her exploration of military matters, Britain’s place in a supposedly threatening cross-Channel relationship with France and new sources of national anxiety in the broader international, transatlantic context makes her work important to mid-Victorian projects of testing out and re-imagining British and English identities and provides numerous access points and avenues for critical examinations of her writing today.

This chapter therefore has two interrelated aims: to suggest that Dynevor Terrace is a watershed text within this antirevolutionary literary cluster for its rejection of the antirevolutionary representational legacy, and to point to the recovery of works by this immensely popular Victorian novelist as a productive enterprise, crucial to tracing British concepts of national identity in the period. The kinds of ideological tensions Sturrock


210 See Lynn Shakinson’s “Domestic History and the Idea of the Nation in Charlotte Yonge’s The Heir of Redclyffe” (2009) and Susan Walton’s Imagining Soldiers and Fathers in the Mid-Victorian Era: Charlotte Yonge’s Models of Manliness (2010).

211 Sturrock’s “Literary women of the 1850s and Charlotte Mary Yonge’s Dynevor Terrace” is currently the only critical work specifically focusing on that novel.
discovers in Yonge’s work are central not only to her representations of gender relations and the domestic sphere, but also to her engagement with mid-Victorian public matters including home defence, domestic radicalism and class conflict, European revolution, emigration, informal imperialism and international commercial investment. While Yonge’s conservatism means that she works to dismiss questions of political reform within Britain and to contain the possibility of revolution to the pre-1848 past, her confidence in mid-Victorian stability, as represented by her orderly homes and safe communities, allows her to also reject the more histrionic and paranoid elements of the antirevolutionary tradition, including self-fortification within the home, militant nationalism and the emotionalised interpretation of revolutionary violence as a sexual threat. Yonge finally turns away from France as a point of difference from Britain, and instead addresses the issues of community and national identity that dominate antirevolutionary novels by focusing on Peru, a site of transatlantic exchange, emigration and informal imperialism for the nineteenth-century British public, and focal point for Yonge’s exploration of domestic and national belonging, exile, and anxieties about middle-class acquisitive culture. Although *Dynevor Terrace* is a domestic novel, Yonge’s extension of domestic ideology into public life demonstrates her thorough investment in the public and political debates of the revolutionary era and the 1850s.

**“That Infant Yellow Moustache”: Domestic Politics, Invasion Scares and Militant Patriotism in the 1840s and 1850s**

In her presentation of military and revolutionary dangers in 1847-1848 Britain in *Dynevor Terrace*, Yonge combines a late-1840s setting with the distanced perspective of the mid 1850s. From her position of relative order and stability in the 1850s, Yonge has the luxury of retrospectively dismissing, even ridiculing, the paranoid nationalism that accompanies the 1847 invasion scare and 1848 French revolution for her characters, unlike her contemporary Charles Dickens, whose *Tale of Two Cities* was published after the 1858 invasion scare and accompanying revival of anti-French paranoia as well as the 1857 Indian Mutiny, an event that brought violent rebellion once more into public
consciousness in Britain. Her protagonist Louis’s patriotism and enthusiasm for home
defence is excessive and absurd, and demonstrates Yonge’s willingness to critique the
romanticised, medievalist conservatism that accompanies the home defence movement’s
militant nationalism. However, Yonge is only able to distance the 1847 invasion scare
and the intensification of radical protest in 1840s Britain by containing them within the
past as well as within the non-threatening values of conservative, deferential culture: she
reduces the politically complex Chartist movement, for example, to the personal and
paternalist relationship between the working-class radical Tom Madison and his
aristocratic patron, Louis. Furthermore, although Yonge is critical of Louis’s excessive
patriotism, she uses the invasion scare and British nationalism as a distraction from
working-class radicalism within Britain, attempting to subordinate class politics to
patriotism. The possibilities of radical protest and French invasion that Dynevor Terrace
addresses thus reveal a tension at the heart of Yonge’s politics between her confidence in
the conservative values of order and stability and the rejection of paranoid,
antirevolutionary reaction that such confidence entails.

Yonge’s depictions of reassuring political stability paradoxically coexist with her
portrayals of scenes of violence and war across her career, and these seemingly
contradictory impulses in her writing underlie many of her readers’ and critics’ responses
in the nineteenth century and later. In A Literature of Their Own, Elaine Showalter
somewhat dismissively notes this apparent split between Yonge’s image as a domestic
novelist removed from the battlefield and her fascination with war, writing, “Even the
good grey Charlotte Yonge has a fiercer side, which astounds her biographers; it is not
simply a quirk in her character that she loved the military and preferred above all to talk
about military strategy in the Peninsular War” (137). Showalter’s comment recognises
the ways Yonge’s military interests complicate her conventionally feminine, maternal
persona while simultaneously reinforcing stereotypical interpretations of Yonge’s life and
career in her trivialising description of Yonge as “good” and “grey.”

However, more recently literary critics have begun to question simplistic readings of
Yonge and her work that would reduce her, as Showalter partially does, to “the good grey

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212 See Priti Joshi’s article “Mutiny Echoes: India, Britons, and Charles Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities” for
Charlotte Yonge.” Most recently, Susan Walton’s 2010 book, *Imagining Soldiers and Fathers*, complicates received notions of Yonge’s domesticity by reading her writing in the context of a mid-Victorian revival of military culture and her biographical experience in a military family, adding to readings of Yonge’s life and work, like Sturrock’s, that emphasise her Tractarian upbringing and close relationships with her father and John Keble. Yonge’s father William fought in the Peninsular War, her brother Julian enlisted at the time of the Crimean War, although he returned home without seeing action because of illness, and her uncle, Lt-Gen. Lord Seaton commanded the drilling at the Clobham camp in 1853, an event which Walton identifies as a key moment in raising public consciousness of military affairs (*Imagining Soldiers* 38-40), and which Yonge attended. Far from being “the good grey Charlotte Yonge” whose “fiercer side” appears a contradiction in character (Showalter 137), Yonge, according to Walton’s re-contextualisation of her work, was steeped in military tradition and actively engaged in constructing mid-Victorian military discourse. Her 1850s novels, Walton argues, are interested in “the significance of the imagination in creating soldiers and providing them with communal sanctions for their deeds; and, secondly, the possible function of women in persuading their menfolk to be manly champions who must fight the nation’s battles” (*Imagining Soldiers* 26). Yonge’s role as a domestic novelist is, in this reading, not at odds with her engagement with the masculine field of war, but is instead crucial in articulating the whole community’s need to participate in the national military experience.

Yonge’s interest in contributing to British patriotism and military culture from within the home and domestic community is perhaps one aspect of her writing that fuelled her

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213 See Walton’s first two chapters, “Happy Warriors? Military Matters and the 1850s” and “Shaping Brothers and Sons into Soldiers I” (23-70) for a discussion of the military in historical context and in Yonge’s biography. The historical factors Walton focuses on include the 1853 Clobham encampment, the beard movement, and the volunteer movement, all of which I will return to below.

214 Walton focuses her critical attention on two of Yonge’s novels in which war and the military feature heavily, *Kenneth* and *The Young Stepmother*, which narrate the Napoleonic army’s retreat from Russia and the build-up to the Crimean War respectively (*Imagining Soldiers* 71-95). Such novels, Walton suggests, “can be seen as the rehearsal rooms for productions of patriotic English men” (*Imagining Soldiers* 4). Most influential in this process, perhaps, was Yonge’s first best-seller, *The Heir of Redclyffe*, which was a popular success among diverse groups of Victorian readers, but, most importantly, with soldiers in Crimea. The hero Guy Morville’s embodiment of “an ideal of a contained, non-violent masculinity” deriving from notions of chivalry, Walton argues, was “internalized” in Crimea (*Imagining Soldiers* 20); Yonge’s widely circulating novels thus “gave substance” and “wider dissemination” to a mid-Victorian “discourse of sanctified violence executed by upright moral men” (*Imagining Soldiers* 24).
popularity during the mid-Victorian military revival of the 1850s and later in the Second World War. On 27 November 1939, the *Times* published an anonymous piece titled “Books for Black-Outs: Charlotte Yonge in These Days,” only one indication of Yonge’s revival in popularity during the war years. The article begins, “Searchers after ‘escapist’ literature would do well to raid second-hand book shops for the 95 volumes of Charlotte Yonge’s novels, historical romances, and family chronicles and tales .... They are worth rediscovery in these days” (9). The correspondent’s categorisation of Yonge’s novels as “escapist” literature in wartime establishes a nostalgic view of Victorian Britain as a peaceful time and place, safely removed from twentieth-century violence and upheaval. The article continues,

The novels proper will take the reader into an unfamiliar world .... It is a world as delicately charming as the world below the waters of a calm, fern-fringed pond: a world where are no wars and rumours of war, no aeroplanes, no cars, no wireless, no psycho-analysis, no scarlet claws and tortured eyebrows .... Chaos is not shown, dark and grinning, behind a set of puppets jerked to and fro in the hands of Fate: there is serenity here, peace, the beauty of holiness, all visibly present in those funny little lives that go dutifully along life’s common ways. (9)

Locating stability and a simpler life within the pages of Yonge’s novels is not original to this 1939 *Times* writer, however: an 1857 review of *Dynevor Terrace* in *John Bull and Britannia* attributes the same kind of distance from sites of political upheaval to Yonge’s work that “Books for Black-Outs” would later find comforting. *Dynevor Terrace*, the 1857 reviewer suggests, “mark[s] that peculiar gift which is Miss Yonge’s own, the genius of portraying and illustrating the little heroisms of our common life— the nobleness and self-sacrifice of the boudoir, which may often equal that of the battle-field. In this class of fiction Miss Yonge has no equal” (299). Yonge’s removal from “the battle-field” and emphasis on “common life” are, to these two readers separated by eighty years, the defining qualities of her work.

Yet, an underlying military presence disturbs the surface stability such readings of Yonge’s supposedly apolitical, domesticated, inherently comforting novels intend to impart: after all, the “battle-field” finds its way into the *John Bull* review, while “Books
For Black-Outs” urges its readers to “raid” book shops for Yonge’s novels. This military language suggests a consciousness of the prevalence of war and violence in Yonge’s work, even as it is disavowed by readers who recognise in her novels only “life’s common ways” (“Black-Outs” 9). In fact, “Books for Black-Outs” explicitly pairs Yonge’s novels with times of war, going far beyond valuing her work simply as an indulgence in nostalgia, as the title itself suggests. The article concludes, “They say that the war should last three years. So should a complete course of Charlotte Yonge” (9), indicating how completely reading Yonge’s novels and being at war in some way correspond in the Times writer’s logic. Reading Yonge, moreover, is somehow part of the home front’s war effort: “patriotic citizens,” the article states, should not “read their Yonges lazily in bed. They should form an agreeable accompaniment to sock-knitting and the winding of wool” (9). Reading Yonge thus does not allow war-time British citizens to escape from their place in history, but encourages them to re-engage with their “patriotic” identities as they contribute to the war effort from their homes. Yonge’s revival during the Second World War, however, goes far beyond one article in the Times, demonstrating how compellingly her novels spoke to the World War II generation. Ernest Hemingway’s mid-war collection Men at War: The Best War Stories of All Time includes Yonge’s story “The Pass of Thermopylae,” one of only four stories by women writers in a collection of eighty-two pieces, while Graham Greene’s post-war revisions for The Ministry of Fear include headings from Yonge’s children’s book The Little Duke for each chapter and as an epigraph for the whole novel.\footnote{In his autobiography A Sort of Life Greene writes, “The books on the nursery shelves which interested me most were The Little Duke by Charlotte M. Yonge (the memory of this book returned to me when I was writing The Ministry of Fear and when I revised the novel after the war I inserted chapter headings from The Little Duke) ...” (49).} The seeming paradox of Yonge’s commitment to both the home and the battlefield in her work fulfills two specific but interrelated needs for her World War II audience, acting as a nostalgic point of access for an idealised lost childhood and Victorian past, but also mobilising Britain’s “patriotic citizens” (“Black-Outs” 9) to protect a home front somehow represented by Yonge’s domestic fiction. Just as Yonge turned to British foundation myths like the Arthurian tradition to promote a pan-British identity in the nineteenth century, a subject which I will discuss in more detail below, the mid-twentieth-century British community turned to
Yonge’s work and the myth of an idealised Victorian past that her novels represented as a means of constructing the “patriotic” (“Black-Outs” 9) British identity of the war years.

In fact, the strange link between the domestic safety and stability Yonge’s novels promote and the need to confront the possibility of war and violence within many of her plots that these responses to Yonge trace is central to Dynevor Terrace, which presents foreign, radical and military threats only to redirect and eventually dismiss them in order to restore faith in mid-Victorian British order and stability. Yonge simplifies and dismisses British political reform movements through her Chartist character Tom Madison, whose class antagonism is represented as no more than an articulation of his sense of personal betrayal at his neglect by his young Viscount friend, Louis Fitzjocelyn, and is easily defused by Louis’s renewed patronage. Moreover, Yonge diverts attention from domestic politics by emphasising cross-class patriotism in her representation of the home defence efforts that accompany the 1847 French invasion scare and ultimately neutralises Tom’s working-class politics by recruiting him in service of British economic imperialism in South America and raising him to the lower middle class. Yonge’s focus on sites of cross-Channel and transatlantic difference thus attempts to convert internally divisive political issues such as working-class disenfranchisement into patriotic British solidarity.

By locating a military threat to the British community in late-1840s France, Dynevor Terrace reflects Yonge’s imaginative commitment to British military matters as well as her interest in French affairs in the 1850s and throughout her lifetime. Yonge visited Lord Seaton’s military encampment at Clobham in 1853 while Queen Victoria and Prince Albert were present (Yonge Letters 114), and wrote to her colleague Jemima Blackburn after her brother had arrived in Gallipoli in preparation for action in Crimea that “Clobham was a useful little rehearsal last summer” (Letters 141). In 1857, the year of Dynevor Terrace’s publication, Yonge and her cousin Anne were audience members for another military spectacle, devised by Lord Seaton for their entertainment while they visited him in Ireland for a family wedding (Yonge Letters 187-190). Yonge was thus a witness to her uncle’s militant assertion of British rule in colonised Ireland. France was also foremost in Yonge’s mind during this period. She wrote numerous books of French
history for young audiences throughout her career,\textsuperscript{216} and befriended the family of François Guizot, a conservative French minister in Louis-Philippe’s government ousted by the 1848 revolution, in the 1860s (Walton \textit{Imagining Soldiers} 64).\textsuperscript{217} Her writing shows a sustained interest in revolutionary French events: in addition to \textit{Dynevor Terrace}, her novel \textit{Kenneth} is set at the end of the Napoleonic Wars and her very first publication, at age fifteen, was a translation of several French stories framed by a narrative set just after the battle of Waterloo (Yonge \textit{Letters} 25-26). Yonge’s imagination was also clearly engaged by the exiled French royalty in the years after 1848: in 1853 she learned that the deceased Louis-Philippe’s family was residing at Kitley, neighbouring and socialising with her cousins at Puslinch, a fact which recalled for her numerous romantic anecdotes about the royal family (Yonge \textit{Letters} 115-117).

\textit{Dynevor Terrace}’s first reference to the possibility of military action appears in Yonge’s description of the invasion scare of 1847-1848, in the period building up to France’s 1848 revolution. Yonge’s account of this panic incorporates cultural concerns about Britain’s defences from the 1850s, when \textit{Dynevor Terrace} was published, as well as those of the late 1840s, when her novel is set. Invasion scares did not disappear after the 1848 revolution: in his 1862 pamphlet “The Three Panics: An Historical Episode,” Richard Cobden identifies periods of fear about a French invasion threat occurring in 1847-1848, 1851-1853, and again after the publication of Yonge’s novel, in 1859-1861. Yonge locates the source of the 1847-1848 panic in what historian Hugh Cunningham identifies as its historical cause, the fear of France establishing a large steam navy, possibly “enabl[ing] the French to throw up to 30,000 men across the Channel in a single night, and ... allow[ing] the Navy no time to organise itself in opposition” (5). However, she also uses the 1847-1848 scare as a platform for exploring the military preoccupations of the 1850s: the revival of popular military culture and the re-establishment of a volunteer movement. Although the volunteers of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were disbanded in 1814 and volunteers were not authorised again until 12 May 1859

\textsuperscript{216} See Susan Walton’s “Charlotte M. Yonge and the ‘historic harem’ of Edward Augustus Freeman” for an account of her fraught involvement in one textbook series.

\textsuperscript{217} Some British writers blamed Guizot for the 1848 revolution, and welcomed his removal from office in France. Dickens exclaimed, “Plus de Guizot!” (Dickens \textit{Letters} 256), and Thomas Carlyle wrote “Guizot, his [Louis-Philippe’s] minister, is much more despicable [than the King]” (Carlyle and Carlyle \textit{Letters} 22:253).
Yonge, writing in 1857 about 1847, establishes a volunteer Yeomanry for her characters to participate in, relocating the political debate about and popular pressure in favour of volunteering backward into the previous decade. Yonge’s representation of the Yeomanry also points to the popularity of military display as entertainment in the 1850s. The Clobham encampment, Walton suggests, was primarily about creating spectacle for its Victorian audience: “Rampant masculinity was centre-stage and sanctioned, with excursion trains transporting family groups to gaze in wonder” (Imagining Soldiers 40). By incorporating 1850s attitudes about popular military exhibitions and citizens’ participatory urges to volunteer, Yonge endows her novel with a retrospective view of this early panic, firmly locating her narrative perspective in the post-1848 world.

Yet, home defence and invasion scares were still topical political issues in 1850s Britain, as France’s political situation changed at the end of the revolutionary era. In France, Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte was elected President in late 1848, in the wake of the revolution that saw the birth of the Second Republic, and remained in power for over two decades. According to historian Roger Price, Louis-Napoleon came to power in the context of an “intense mid-century crisis—economic, social, and political—lasting from 1845 until 1852, and marked by widespread popular protest, revolution, civil war, and the prospect (or threat) of a démocrate-socialiste electoral victory” (9). Benefitting from a “sentimental cult of Napoleon” that continued to exist in France, the “opportunistic” support of the conservative politicians who dominated the National Assembly (Price 15, 17) and a strong support base among French peasants, Louis-Napoleon was elected President in December 1848 with an enormous 74.2% share of the vote (Price 17-18). His ability to position himself in opposition to both conservatives and radicals facilitated his efforts to seize control in an 1851 coup with very little resistance: conservatives saw him as a force of order and stability, preferable to continued revolution or the possibility

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218 For a more detailed discussion of the debate leading up to the Volunteer Force’s establishment in 1859, see Hugh Cunningham’s The Volunteer Force: A Social and Political History 1859-1908 (1-17).
220 For example, in a May 1851 speech Louis-Napoleon argued that “France neither wishes for a return to the old order of things, in no matter what form that may be disguised, nor for ventures into dangerous and impractical utopianism. It is because I am the most natural enemy of both these alternatives that France has given me its confidence” (qtd. in Price 26).
of a socialist government, while workers and republicans were unwilling to risk their own safety “to defend the rights of a conservative assembly against a president who now promised to restore manhood suffrage, who presented himself as a defender of popular sovereignty, and who enjoyed still the prestige that went with the name Bonaparte” (Price 28). Two plebiscites, one in December 1851 to confirm Louis-Napoleon’s authority and one in November 1852 to re-establish the French Empire, with Louis-Napoleon as its Emperor (Price 34-37), successfully launched his authoritarian regime.

In Britain, the fear of French invasion revived after Louis-Napoleon’s coup, spurring public debate over home defence. As Elizabeth Woodworth explores in her article “Elizabeth Barrett Browning, Coventry Patmore, and Alfred Tennyson on Napoleon III,” literary men and women were quick to take sides for or against the home defence movement. Coventry Patmore and Alfred Tennyson were strongly in favour of militant defence efforts: Patmore established a rifle association himself, and wrote to the Times to describe its organisation and his plan to present a petition in support of rifle corps to Parliament soon after Louis-Napoleon’s coup.221 As Woodworth notes, Tennyson included some stanzas of poetry titled “Rifle-Clubs!!” in a letter to Patmore he wrote in early 1852, expressing the “inflammatory jingoism” (545) that characterised his attitude toward France following the coup:

Ready, be ready! they mean no good,
Ready, be ready! the times are wild!
Bearded monkeys of lust and blood
Coming to violate woman and child!

We love liberty; they love storm:
Riflemen, form! Riflemen, form!

Riflemen, riflemen, riflemen, form! (qtd. in Woodworth 545)

As late as the 1859 invasion scare, two years after the publication of Dynevor Terrace, Tennyson published a somewhat less jingoistic version of the same poem titled “The War” in the Times, advocating immediate attention to the situation in France even at the expense of political progress within Britain, and, in doing so, aligning the militant home

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221 Patmore’s letter is titled “A Rifle Corps” and was printed on 22 January 1852.
defence movement with domestic political conservatism. Other writers, such as Algernon Charles Swinburne, Dante Gabriel Rossetti and John Ruskin, volunteered in Rifle Corps. However, although the Poet Laureate promoted militant patriotism, some poets, like Elizabeth Barrett Browning, whose support of Louis-Napoleon grew out of her enthusiasm for the Italian Risorgimento, criticised the “self-defense movement in England” in her 1860 Poems Before Congress (Woodworth 552). Although the 1848 revolution that Yonge’s novel depicts belonged to the past after Louis-Napoleon’s essentially counterrevolutionary regime took control, then, debates about British patriotism and anti-French paranoia remained relevant across the 1850s.

*Dynnevor Terrace* pre-dates the 1859 invasion scare, but, in fictionalising British fears of the late 1840s, responds to the militant patriotism of the 1850s in a complex manner that voices both conservative nationalism, like Tennyson, and criticism of insular paranoia, like Barrett Browning. Yonge’s focus on the 1847 French invasion scare is also, as in the case of Tennyson’s “The War,” a diversion from the domestic politics of the 1840s, part of her strategy of containing Chartism, reform efforts and class conflict more broadly in the past from her dismissive post-1848 position. In fact, the Yeomanry, for which Louis volunteers, had been an important instrument of government repression and symbol of class antagonism in the turbulent post-war years. According to historian Edward Royle,

222 Part of the poem reads

Let your Reforms for a moment go,
Look to your butts and take good aims.
Better a rotten borough or so,
Than a rotten fleet or a city in flames!
Form! form! Riflemen form!
Ready, be ready to meet the storm!
Riflemen, riflemen, riflemen form! (“The War” 10)

The government listened: Tennyson’s poem was printed in the *Times* on 9 May, and the Volunteer Force was officially re-authorised only three days later.

223 See Sandra Donaldson’s note to Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s “A Tale of Villafranca told in Tuscany” in her edition of Barrett Browning’s *Works* (579).

224 In “A Tale of Villafranca told in Tuscany,” Barrett Browning ironically exclaims, “call out / The rifles! be not slack about / The national defences” (47-49). She returns to the subject in “Italy and the World”:

I cry aloud in my poet-passion,
Viewing my England o’er Alp and sea.
I loved her more in her ancient fashion:
She carries her rifles too thick for me,
Who spares them so in the cause of a brother. (96-100)

225 See Chapter 5 for more detail on how quickly Victorians came to dismiss Chartism as inevitably doomed to failure after the repressive government measures of 1848.

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The yeomanry, with 17,818 was to be the mainstay of public order, supplemented by the 11,000 pensioners called up in the emergency of 1819. The disastrously undisciplined performance of the yeomanry at St Peter’s Field, Manchester, on 16 August 1819 exposed the weakness of relying upon a part-time, armed civilian force to maintain order, particularly in large towns. Thereafter when dealing with localised disturbances, magistrates looked to regular troops to support their special constables. (180)

Louis’s Yeomanry efforts, therefore, are not only a throwback to the anti-French paranoia of the war years, but are also a reminder of the legacy of public violence in Britain in the revolutionary period and its aftermath that Peterloo represents.

Louis’s commitment to the Yeomanry indicates Yonge’s interest in enforcing law and order as part of her promotion of a conservative Victorian British stability, and her representation of Chartism reflects this. Chartism was historically a complex political movement structured around alliances among diverse disenfranchised groups, including trade and political unions, anti-Poor Law protesters, advocates for women’s rights, working people affected by economic depression, British socialists, Irish nationalists and exiled European radicals seeking asylum in Britain. These groups, moreover, came together to advocate a coherent political agenda articulated in the Six Points of the People’s Charter.²²⁶ However, in Dynevor Terrace the Chartist movement is reduced to the petulant resentments of one working-class character, Tom Madison. Yonge represents Tom’s political views as simply bad behaviour: he is “more and more disposed to be saucy and disobedient, taking up with the most good-for-nothing boys in the town, haunting those Chartist lectures, and never coming home in proper time at night. The very last evening, he had come in at eleven o’clock, and when his master rebuked him, came out with something about the rights of man” (74). For Yonge, radical politics are one of Tom’s many “temptations” (3): “the orator who inflamed the crude imaginations and aspirations that effervesced in the youth’s mind” (76) is a particularly bad moral influence on Tom, according to Yonge’s conservative, Tractarian political views. The

²²⁶ The Charter’s Six Points are: Universal Suffrage, No Property Qualifications, Annual Parliaments, Equal Representation, Payment of Members and Vote by Ballot.
ator educates Tom in the abstract principles of political rights, but often also leads Tom to contemplate political violence. Tom’s statement, “We are all equal by birth, so the orator proves without a doubt, and we’ll show it one of these days” (2), contains a vague threat of the demonstration of force implied in Tom’s idea of “show[ing] it.”

In addition to using Tom to reduce Chartism to the bad behaviour of a misguided youth and subsequently reject its political validity, Yonge uses his relationships with Charlotte, the Frosts’ maid, and with her protagonist Louis to personalise class politics, converting radical political demands into problems easily solved by the apt exercise of friendship and patronage rather than through institutional and constitutional change. Charlotte frequently challenges Tom’s political beliefs: when Tom, using William Shakespeare as an example of a self-made, self-educated man, claims “Anybody may rise hisself as has a mind to it!” Charlotte responds by warning her lover that “[i]t isn’t right to want to be out of our station” (2). For the most part, in Dynevor Terrace class antagonism is personalised and contained within one specific relationship, the relationship between Tom and Louis, which is framed around Tom’s sense of betrayal at Louis’s broken promises and Louis’s later efforts to restore friendship through his exercise of conservative patronage. By forgetting his promises to Tom, Louis leads his friend to declare, “there’s nothing gentlefolks forget like poor folks. But I’ve done with he! Let him look out—I kept my promises to him long enough; but if he don’t keep his’n”—” (3), in an expression of class antagonism that is purely personal. The radical orators Tom listens to convert Tom’s unhappiness into political consciousness, but that political consciousness nevertheless remains superficial, no more than an emotional response to Louis’s unfaithfulness to their friendship: Yonge writes that Tom is “hardened and soured by Louis’s neglect, and rendered discontented by Chartist preachers” (76). Because Tom’s radicalism is not actually political, but is, instead, the result of his personal sense of betrayal by a British aristocrat and can be rectified through a restoration of Louis’s patronage, then, Yonge indicates, the class system and political institutions do not need to be reformed. Instead, class antagonism is simply an expression of the improperly exercised or irresponsible patronage that Louis’s education in his responsibilities as a Viscount cures. In fact, Tom ultimately does manage to “rise hisself” (2) by following Louis’s advice and taking advantage of his friend’s patronage: by the end of the novel he
has become an educated, lower-middle-class clerk in a mining company owned by Louis’s relatives.

Yonge, furthermore, uses Louis to convert class issues into a question of nationalist loyalty, just as Britain’s patriotic mobilisation against France in the 1790s and early nineteenth century shifted the focus in domestic politics away from British radicalism and toward the foreign threat represented by the Othered, revolutionary community across the Channel. Class, in other words, becomes subordinate to British patriotism. Louis describes the family of Mr Dobbs, a superintendent at the Illershall copper and tin factory where Tom begins his career, and thus a representative of industrial Britain and the attendant pace of political change, for example, as “the right sort of sound stuff that old England’s heart is made of” (22). When Louis begins drilling with the Yeomanry, furthermore, he claims that the volunteer forces “are a happy meeting of all classes in the common cause” (91). This assertion disassociates the Yeomanry from its aristocratic roots and historical role enforcing domestic order and stability at the expense of the working classes, exemplified by the fate of the protesters at St Peter’s Field in 1819. Yonge and Louis thus imagine the home defence movement as a patriotic endeavour that transcends and distracts from class divisions, concealing the class politics that underlie the revolutionary moment in 1848 in Chartist Britain and across Europe.

However, because Dynevor Terrace is so invested in 1850s culture, Yonge is free to distance her narrative from the fears her characters feel at the particular 1840s events the novel addresses: the radical, working-class agitation that culminated in the Chartist rally at Kennington Common in 1848, the imminent threat of French invasion in 1847 and the 1848 revolution in Paris. She also distances herself from their paranoid, patriotic and insular reactions to these 1840s events. Yonge’s ambivalent portrayal of medievalist discourses of patriotism and militarism suggests her criticism of extreme reactionary responses to the revolutionary and French threats of the late 1840s. The patriotism of characters like Louis Fitzjocelyn and his teenaged cousin Clara, for example, appears as a kind of romantic game to the narrator and more mature characters. In Women Writers and Nineteenth-Century Medievalism, Clare Broome Saunders notes that Edmund Burke’s famous lament that “the age of chivalry is gone” (Reflections 76) “summarizes the prevailing mood of nineteenth-century medievalism, that of yearning for a past Golden
Age” (Broome Saunders 2). Although Broome Saunders reads this “yearning” as an articulation of Victorian nostalgia for a less complex world—much as Yonge’s World War II readers idealised and sentimentalised the Victorian past—her use of Burke also points to the antirevolutionary impulses of Victorian medievalism: Burke’s “age of chivalry” is, importantly, the pre-revolutionary age. Broome Saunders’s analysis of the historical reasons behind the medievalist turn in the 1830s likewise indicates the anxieties about social and political instability that underlie Victorian medievalism:

Medieval scholarship and the popularization of medieval history and texts coincided with a time of contemporary social, political and religious unrest that, for many, made the Middle Ages preferable to the nineteenth-century present. In the face of an enlightened French Revolution turned monstrous, wars with France and America, misery and discontent of a whole class through Industrial Revolution, and religious upheaval prompted by scientific discovery, what was considered the simplicity of the Middle Ages seemed a Golden Age when juxtaposed with the complicated present. (3-4)

Viewed as a more stable and orderly time, the medieval past served the ideological purpose of enforcing order and stability in the present. During the Crimean War especially, Broome Saunders argues, supporters of the British war effort turned to medievalist discourses to counteract criticism of the war:

To muster support for the war effort, the government and press used images of medieval chivalry and legendary heroic deeds, popularized in early nineteenth-century medievalism, to propagate the idea of glorious British Armies fighting an oppressor. These patriotic images jarred with accusations of gross mismanagement and reports of the actual horrors of the war once fighting began, presented in first-hand accounts. (63)

The “identification of the Crimean War with an aristocratic chivalry” (Broome Saunders 65) was part of what Walton sees as the broader connection between the 1850s revival of the military and Victorian appetites for medievalism; the Rifle Brigade, although a modern unit, for example, “had a special romantic resonance through presumed resemblances to a medieval army of yeoman longbowmen” (Imagining Soldiers 52).
Such medieval resonance appears in *Dynevor Terrace*—a novel set in the late 1840s, but written just after the Crimean War—in the volunteer cavalry unit of the Yeomanry to which Louis belongs. Even in the early years of volunteering during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the Yeomanry was considered an old-fashioned, land-interested force. According to historian J. E. Cookson, the Yeomanry was “the force most closely identified with ... county loyalties, rural background and concern for order” (876); during the 1794-5 volunteer rush, the force was “raised almost exclusively by the landowning classes,” but was already being outnumbered by urban volunteers, led by the middle classes (873). Louis’s Yeomanry, therefore, is not only a force left over from the pre-1814 movement, but would have been symbolic of old-fashioned, romantic patriotism and landed interest even during the war years. When Louis excitedly tells Clara that “[i]t is a time when a display of loyalty and national spirit may turn the scale,” she replies, “You ought to take your vassals, like a feudal chief!,” indicating the degree to which romantic, aristocratic medievalism invests the cousins’ thinking about national defence. As discussed above, Louis’s suggestion that volunteer forces “are a happy meeting of all classes in the common cause” (91) implies that nationalist sentiment mobilises cross-class solidarity against a common threat; however, in the Yeomanry at least, volunteers submit to the command of the “feudal chief,” who assumes romanticised, pseudo-medieval authority in local and national affairs.

Louis’s and Clara’s idealisation of military service and the social stratification of aristocratic medievalism suggests their investment in reactionary politics as well as anti-French, militant patriotism. Yet, their views are significantly not Yonge’s views. Broome Saunders singles Yonge out among female medievalist writers as an example of unqualified conservatism, arguing that “many writers, such as Charlotte Mary Yonge, used medievalism in support of the traditional, conservative gender ideas of the age, and applaud chivalry as a discourse in which men can inhabit an active sphere, while women remain passive and iconic” (9). However, the politics of medievalism in *Dynevor Terrace* are far more complex and nuanced, articulating the kind of patriotic enthusiasm Louis and Clara embody, while also criticising excessive romantic sentiment by disciplining the romanticised militarism that Louis eventually comes to see as “volatile Quixotism” (108).
In fact, Yonge’s use of medievalism in the novel actually expresses the kind of political complexity that Broome Saunders finds in Felicia Hemans’s medievalist poetry: beneath the apparent simplicity of many of her patriotic eulogies, Hemans’s work often manifests the same tension that was apparent in public opinion of the day, between the celebration and romance of patriotism that iconized heroes such as Nelson and Wellington, and the growing concern about the wars that had dominated the first quarter of the century. (32)

Yonge, in other words, continues to identify British militarism with “aristocratic chivalry” and “medieval heroism,” as Broome Saunders argues that supporters of the Crimean War did, but she also, like the war’s “[d]etractors,” “parodied this very element” (65).

Yonge focuses her criticism of romantic medievalism, and, by extension, of excessive, militant British patriotism, around the ridiculousness and childishness of Louis’s war games. Louis’s attraction to Yeomanry service, in fact, develops out of his youthful idealism and enthusiasm for romantic projects rather than from any legitimate need for maintaining a local defence force. His loyalty to the Yeomanry resembles the idealism of the young servant Charlotte, described by Louis in medievalist terms as “a perfect Lady of Eschallot” (39), whose reading encourages her dreamy excesses and romantic notions of heroism, or the escapist medieval fantasies of Isabel Conway, whose obsessive composition of the romance she titles “Sir Roland” distracts her from her real life and domestic responsibilities. Yonge tells the reader that Charlotte “had always coveted a battle field in France” for her lover Tom (52), suggesting the ease with which romantic sentiment translates into arbitrary commitment to military matters in the novel. Isabel’s mania for medievalism, furthermore, impacts the family in significant material ways: by neglecting household management, the Conways allow their servants, led by the deceitful butler Delaford, to perpetrate extensive fraud against the family. Yonge attributes this problem directly to the family’s medievalist fantasising, arguing that “[t]he Conway family knew rather less about their own servants’ hall than they did of feudal establishments five hundred years ago” (370). Isabel’s lack of training in domestic management and continued neglect of household superintendence in favour of writing her
“Sir Roland” romance after her marriage, furthermore, adds stress for the family and work for the servants:

Isabel knew nothing of management, and did not care to learn. She had been willing to live on a small scale, but she did not understand personal superintendence; she was careless of display, and perfectly happy as long as she was the guest of the grandmother [Mrs. Frost], but she had no comprehension of petty tidinesses or small economies. (337)

In Isabel’s and Charlotte’s cases, romantic medievalism must be disciplined and subjected to the responsibilities and realities of daily life, or it can lead to domestic confusion and disorder.227

Louis’s patriotism is similarly arbitrary, excessive and distracting. When he learns about the threat of the French steam navy, his “patriotism had forthwith run mad .... There was a fervid glow within him of awe, courage, and enterprise” (82). The “mad[ness]” of Louis’s patriotism speaks to its disproportion in terms of the level of threat, and his enthusiasm for “enterprise” aligns the Yeomanry with Louis’s other immaturesly conceived and disregarded projects: he has already, at this early point in the novel, begun and abandoned a garden, a set of plans for new cottages on the estate, and the construction of a set of stone stairs, the neglect of which results in a broken foot, as he descends them without having cemented them to ensure their safety. Significantly, Louis introduces his cousin Mary to “[his] Yeomanry charger” at a moment in the novel that sees him plan to visit his neighbours at Dynevor Terrace before quickly changing his mind in favour of resuming his neglected gardening, further demonstrating his youthful unreliability (33). His commitment to the Yeomanry, then, is simply one illustration among many of Louis’s enthusiastic but inconsistent character and conduct early in the novel.

227 Once Isabel learns to prioritise her domestic responsibilities, Yonge allows her to return to her writing, and even publish her work. See Sturrock’s “Literary women of the 1850s and Charlotte Mary Yonge’s Dynevor Terrace” for a detailed discussion of Isabel’s literary work and educational trajectory within the novel’s plot. Sturrock argues,

In the conflict which Yonge acknowledges between the literary and the domestic in the life of a woman writer, she accords a clear priority to the domestic .... All the same, Yonge manipulates her narrative so that literary ambitions are represented as permissible, even laudable, in a woman if they are duly subordinated. Moreover she presents honor and success in both fields as not only attainable but desirable. (124)
Yeomanry drilling also takes on the appearance of a juvenile war game, like the kind Louis and Mary recall playing as children, which highlights Yonge’s displacement of militant and nationalist discourse and behaviour into the domestic sphere. Looking over the old furniture in his room, Louis reminds his cousin,

“Jem Frost had set us up there bolt upright for sentries, and I saw the enemies too soon, when you would not allow that they were there. I was going to fire my musket at them; but you used violence to keep me steady to my duty—pulled my hair, did not you?”

“I know you scratched me, and we both rolled off together! I wonder we were not both killed!”

“That did not trouble Jem! He picked us up, and ordered us into arrest under the bed for breach of discipline.” (26)

Military game playing, this passage suggests, directs and expends excessive childish energy, but easily descends into violent scuffles like hair-pulling and scratching, and cultivates overbearing authoritarianism among those possessing power within military and patriarchal political culture, like the eldest child, Jem. Louis’s Yeomanry drilling, in this context, hints at his continued engagement in childish activity, where the same results can be expected.

Despite their seeming earnestness, Louis and Clara think of volunteering as part of a game of national defence, as their playful use of slogans of ideological extremity indicates: Clara resists, with Louis’s backing, older family members’ attempts to have her apply herself to serious matters when she is away from school on vacation, exclaiming with laughter, “Britons never shall be slaves!,” and Louis takes up the cry, mixing revolutionary slogans with the militant sentiment of “Rule Britannia” in his response, “‘Britons never shall be slaves!’ Liberty, fraternity, and equality! Tyrants, beware!” (96). Although Clara and Louis are not sincere in these utterances, their playful exclamations show how their enthusiasm for game playing pushes them toward ideological extremes, from the militant nationalism and romantic medievalism of “Rule Britannia”228 to the democratic but potentially violent cry of the French Revolution, whose appearance

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228 “Rule Britannia” first appeared on the stage in 1740 in James Thomson’s *Alfred: a masque*, a play about the reign of Alfred the Great, under the title “An ODE” (42-43).
alongside the statement “Britons never shall be slaves!” ironises Louis’s and Clara’s militant British nationalism.

Louis, moreover, comes to recognise the absurdity of his militant paranoia about French invasion, indicating that Yonge dismisses pre-1848 political threats and antirevolutionary fears from her position of relative safety in the 1850s, even allowing her characters to adopt statements made famous by political radicals and national enemies like Thomas Paine and Napoleon Bonaparte. Louis’s decision to participate in Yeomanry drilling as a sign of his patriotism despite his broken foot appears to him in hindsight to be one of his many “follies” (102): other characters, like his father the Earl of Ormersfield and his cousin Jem, agree that “[h]e had made a fool of himself every way,” and the narrator comments that Louis’s anxiety over his poor performance of the drills “was another piece of absurdity” (103). This conclusion does not merely designate Louis’s conduct absurd, but applies the language of ridicule to paranoid patriotism generally. This appears when a disillusioned Louis paraphrases the English radical Thomas Paine in his statement that “[u]nluckily, these things descend from the sublime to the other thing” (101).229 This proverb became a compelling tool for processing and interpreting revolutionary events across the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. On 9 April 1848, the day before the Chartist Kennington Common rally, for example, secretary to the Privy Council Charles Greville expressed an “uncertain[ty]” (Royle 126) as to whether the preparations for the protest were “very sublime or very ridiculous” (qtd. in Royle 127). Alternately a statement by radical and conservative writers— and expressing fear and ridicule simultaneously in the context of Greville’s 1848 paraphrase—this proverb demonstrates the intertextuality of radical and antirevolutionary writings across this period. Yonge’s paraphrase of Paine takes on a meaning different even from the conservative Greville’s: although for Greville, as his “or” suggests (qtd. in Royle 127), the radical threat on 9 April 1848 continues to loom even as he attempts to dismiss it, Louis’s “sublime” is imaginary and romantic, becoming “the other thing” when his foot injury exposes his impetuosity for engaging in the spectacle of Yeomanry drilling (101). This statement, furthermore, becomes one of

229 The Oxford English Dictionary cites Paine’s statement in The Age of Reason, “One step above the sublime, makes the ridiculous” in its definition of “ridiculous” as a noun. Variations on this statement have also been attributed to Napoleon, as I discuss in Chapter 1.
Yonge’s favourite sayings in the novel, as Mary later paraphrases, “is not half the harm in the world done by not seeing where the sublime is invaded by the ridiculous?” (146). Yonge’s emphasis on the comic absurdity in her characters’ lives, especially with respect to their encounters with military and revolutionary threats, challenges the tradition of histrionic antirevolutionary nationalism that begins with Burke’s *Reflections* and peaks with Dickens’s *Tale of Two Cities*. Instead, Yonge, like the satirist Elizabeth Hamilton, uses her sense of the ridiculous to minimise and subsequently dismiss the dangers of revolution and Britain’s enemy across the Channel and the accompanying histrionic paranoia of antirevolutionary reaction.

Another means by which Yonge combines her 1850s re-valuing of the military with her retrospective dismissal of the fears of the revolutionary era appears in her engagement with what has become known as the beard movement of the 1850s. In “From Squalid Impropriety to Manly Respectability: The Revival of Beards, Moustaches and Martial Values in the 1850s in England,” Susan Walton identifies the trend toward facial hair with the same events that re-popularised the military in the early 1850s. These events, she argues, “instigated a new respect for martial virtues, encouraged public opinion to become stridently belligerent and had the unexpected side-effect of endorsing chin-whiskers and moustaches as attractive additions to young men’s faces” (230). After the army began to allow facial hair in 1854, “Moustaches came to be an essential marker of the British soldier: as late as 1908 the rule was that no soldier was permitted to shave his upper lip” (Walton “Squalid Impropriety” 240). Yonge was evidently familiar with the beard movement’s association with the military, jokingly writing to her cousin Anne when her brother Julian returned from Crimea that they should be disappointed that he did not “come home in big red whiskers” (*Letters* 152). Christopher Oldstone-Moore’s work on the beard movement also recognises its link to the 1850s military revival, suggesting that “civilian men who grew mustaches and beards were to some extent embracing the image of the warrior” (13), and citing the volunteer movement as “help[ing] both to militarize the English population, and ... to popularize the bearded style” (27). For Oldstone-Moore, however, the military revival alone cannot account for the beard movement, given facial hair’s association with radical and revolutionary politics in the years leading up to the 1850s. He argues, “It was not war, technology, or
fashion, but the passing of the revolutionary era that triggered the rise of beards” (10), continuing to assert that “[w]hen Chartism and the revolutions of 1848 failed and the specter of radicalism receded, British men found little reason why this image of historic manliness should not be reclaimed for themselves” (16). The 1850s beard, in this account, is a sign of mid-Victorian political stability, and a dismissal of the revolutionary threats, often associated with unruly facial hair, of the previous fifty years. Like the Victorian responses to 1848 and Kennington Common discussed in Chapter 5, the revival of the beard was part of the process by which the myth of Victorian British stability was constructed and confirmed.

Yonge’s decision to anachronistically endow Louis with a Yeomanry moustache, therefore, participates in these two, possibly contradictory, cultural currents of the 1850s: an embrace of the military and a turning away from the revolutionary past. Like his 1850s counterparts, Louis grows his moustache to signal his commitment to volunteering, but Yonge uses his attempt at growing facial hair as another indication that Louis’s military pretensions are no more than a romantic, childish game of home defence. Positing that “[t]here was a fervid glow within him of awe, courage, and enterprise, the outward symbol of which was that infant yellow moustache” (82), Yonge aligns Louis’s physical youthfulness with his emotional immaturity. The “infant yellow moustache” also marks Yonge’s dismissal of the revolutionary threat, in the forms of invasion from France and Chartist agitation at home. Justifying Louis’s participation in the Yeomanry drills, Clara exclaims, “Here are the enemy threatening our coasts, and our towns full of disaffection and sedition .... The tranquility of all England may depend on the face our yeomanry show,” to which her brother Jem responds most literally, “On Lieutenant Fitzjocelyn’s yellow moustache!” (99). That the “infant yellow moustache” could be thought to be part of a display of military might intended to prevent invasion and political violence further emphasises the absurdity of Louis’s home defence efforts and wild patriotism.

The prominence of Louis’s ridiculous moustache in Yonge’s description of the 1847 invasion scare thus serves as a comic reminder for her 1850s reader that the aggressive patriotism of the revolutionary era is no longer warranted in the context of the mid-Victorian stability Yonge promotes. Yonge’s simultaneous emphasis on the ridiculousness of insular, antirevolutionary paranoia and effort to contain and dismiss
radicalism by framing it from within the values of conservative, deferential culture in her portrayal of the 1847-1848 invasion scare prepares her reader for her representation of the crisis at the mid-point of her novel: the 1848 June Insurrection in Paris. Dismissing the French revolutionary threat as she had contained the dangers of invasion and radicalism within Britain, Yonge relegates the revolutionary era to the past.

“The Feather-Bed Fortress”: Dismissing the Revolutionary Era

When Louis and the Conway family find themselves in Paris in the midst of the 1848 June Insurrection, Lady Conway begs Louis to construct a “feather-bed fortress” (218) to protect the family against the threat of domestic invasion, in a parody of the antirevolutionary trope of self-fortification against a foreign, radical enemy usually imagined as a sexually voracious male revolutionary intent on penetrating the home and disrupting the domestic community. Yonge presents such panic in 1848 Paris as unwarranted, disciplining both aggressive revolutionary violence and anti-French histrionics. By containing French socialism and working-class insurgency within the bounds of traditional, hierarchical culture, as she had transformed British Chartism into a question of the responsible exercise of patronage, Yonge neutralises the revolutionary potential of the June Insurrection and disavows the extreme reactionary positions of the antirevolutionary representational legacy. Yonge further dismisses any possibility of a remaining revolutionary threat or need for paranoid British nationalism by constructing Louis as a multinational figure with complementary French and British identities and associating him with national histories and mythologies, especially connected with French royalty, that are no longer put at risk by revolutionary action. In confidently carrying her characters— and especially Louis, a British aristocrat affiliated with the French monarchy— through the events of 1848, Yonge indicates that the revolutionary era is truly over.

Yonge’s determination to minimise and move beyond the revolutionary era underlies her representation of the 1848 revolution, and Louis’s rejection of his extreme patriotism after his failed Yeomanry exertions, signalled by his decision to shave off his Yeomanry moustache, aligns him with Yonge’s dismissive position as he comes to accept the lessons Yonge’s plot provides for him. The lessons Louis learns as part of his Yeomanry
experience are part of a larger disciplinary project in *Dynevor Terrace*, which marks Yonge as an inheritor of the conservative didactic tradition to which the Anti-Jacobin novel belongs. Yonge was recognised in the Victorian period as a writer of character above all else,230 and, like the Anti-Jacobin Hamilton, she uses social situations in order to subject her characters to communal discipline. Louis’s humiliation in the Yeomanry thus marks the first stage of his educational trajectory and prepares him to become the competent man of business that emerges as a model for Yonge’s readers as the novel progresses. In the second half of the novel, Louis succeeds in his projects of building cottages on the Ormersfield property and employing the displaced inhabitants of Marksedge, as well as taking the Inglewood farm on his father’s land into his own hands. He becomes a Member of Parliament and gains a reputation as a man of business: when Lady Conway learns that her butler Delaford and most of her other servants have been stealing money from her, Louis “entered into the matter with the head of an accountant, and the zeal of a pursuer of justice” (396), demonstrating that his youthful inconsistent, conflicting projects have developed, through his mature efforts at focus and concentration, into a diverse and useful set of interests and skills. When Oliver Dynevor is unable to attend to his affairs in Peru because of illness, Louis is the only member of the family capable of both making the journey and investigating the company’s accounts; “in fact,” the Earl realises, “Fitzjocelyn, and no other, was the trustworthy man of business” Oliver is looking for (445). Yonge clearly indicates that Louis’s business abilities derive from his time spent on projects for the family property, originally reflecting his wide range of enthusiastic hobbies, but finally reflecting his self-discipline as he absorbs the lessons of his Yeomanry experience and other youthful mistakes: the last five years had considerably cultivated Fitzjocelyn’s natural aptitude for figures, by his attention to statistics, his own farming-books, and the complicated accounts of the Ormersfield estate,— so that both his father and Richardson [the family lawyer] could testify to his being an excellent man of business; and his coolness and mildness of temper made

230 The *Edinburgh Review*’s 1905 tribute to Yonge, “The Novels of Miss Yonge,” states that “[h]er simple aim was after the primitive and essential object of the novel— to display character through the medium of a story” (361), and *Dynevor Terrace*’s Louis Fitzjocelyn is “single[d] out” as an example “where a type of character very rare, and yet not the less recognisable, is extraordinarily well drawn” (376).
him better calculated to deal with a rogue than a more hasty man would have been. (445)

When Louis finds himself in revolutionary Paris precisely midway through the novel, then, he is also at a turning point in Yonge’s didactic plot: the historical crisis that marks the end of the revolutionary era corresponds to a key moment in Louis’s education in self-discipline. In February of 1848, spurred by years of bad harvests and famine, suppression of strikes and the deferral of political reform (Lévêque 97), what is known as the Third French Revolution began, resulting in King Louis-Philippe’s abdication on 24 February and the proclamation of the French Republic on 27 February. 231 Political uncertainty caused “chaos” in the French financial system; this, combined with rising unemployment and a collapse of agricultural prices that accompanied a year of good harvests and oversupply, meant that the economic situation remained dire after the revolution (Price 12). Many radicals quickly became “dissatisfied” (Price 13) with the new Republic: although the declaration of universal male suffrage meant that ten million French citizens could vote, the election of 23 April resulted in a National Assembly composed mostly of conservatives (Price 12-13). Louis accompanies his aunt Lady Conway and her family in their travels to a Paris that Yonge’s characters believe to be more stable in June of that year. Violence and insurgency against the new conservative republican government, however, broke out in late June, triggered by the closure of the National Workshops, which had provided employment for large numbers of urban workers and “which to radicals symbolised the hope of a better world, [but] for conservatives increasingly came to represent the threat of renewed revolution” (Price 14). Twenty to thirty thousand people participated in this “mass insurrection,” most of them “skilled workers” (Price 14). Although Yonge’s depiction of the insurrection’s violence focuses on the death of Archbishop Affre, who was shot in the back while mediating the crisis (Daniels 221-222), the June Insurrection was most important as an example of the republican government’s willingness to crack down on radical insurgents, initiating a long-term phase of government counterrevolution and repression: the National Guard, Mobile Guard and regular army were sent in to restore order, and twelve thousand arrests

231 For a discussion of British responses to the 1848 revolution in France, see Chapter 5.
were made (Price 14-15). Following the June Insurrection, in Roger Price’s words, “The Parisian left was to be decapitated for a generation” (14).

Yonge’s representation of June 1848 reflects this long-term conservative victory of order and authority over revolution in France, and, like the French government, whose repressive measures aimed to enforce stability, works to contain and defuse political disorder. Louis arrives in Paris before the June Insurrection begins, and takes the opportunity to indulge in sentimental nostalgia for the past as he tours the sites of the 1790s Revolution with Lady Conway’s stepdaughter Isabel, revealing his conservative, royalist leanings:

They had walked all over Versailles together, and talked under their breath of the murdered Queen; ... they had marvelled together at the poor withered ‘popular trees,’ whose name had conferred on them the fatal distinction of trees of liberty; they had viewed, like earnest people, the scenes of republican Paris, and discussed them with the same principles, but with sufficient difference in detail for amicable argument. (209)

Louis’s and Isabel’s impressions of Versailles, the “popular trees” and “republican Paris” align them with the antirevolutionary tradition from Burke to Trollope: the image of the “murdered Queen” resonates with Burke’s description of the October Days as a physical attack on Marie Antoinette, and what Louis and Isabel see as the negative symbolism of the “popular trees” recalls the Vendeans’ royalist gesture of destroying the revolutionary poplar tree and cap of liberty in Trollope’s *La Vendée* (155). However, their visit to Paris also reveals the distance from which they view the 1790s: their shared Tory principles are no longer invested so much in the events of the Revolution that they cannot make its history the topic of “amicable argument.”

When the insurrection breaks out, Louis, having learned from his Yeomanry experience to discipline his histrionic paranoia, calmly assesses the situation, rather than panicking like his travelling companions, Lady Conway and Delaford, her butler. The sense of removal from the revolutionary period that Yonge cultivates throughout the novel facilitates Louis’s ability to negotiate the dangers of the June Insurrection. He views the revolution in which he finds himself from an historically distanced perspective, reading it as an inevitable part of French political history, “a sort of periodical spasm”
(211), rather than as a moment of crisis in which he is involved and endangered. The “authority” he assumes by exhibiting “calmness” during the June Insurrection (212) suggests that Yonge endows her aristocratic Englishman with the political and social capital necessary to defuse the crisis, and, furthermore, links him to the narrator’s authority within the text. In fact, Louis’s response to the revolution aligns him with the narrator, as “the cool, almost ludicrous light in which he placed the revolution” (211) replicates the narrator’s emphasis on his own absurdity in his earlier patriotic efforts at home defence: in accepting the folly of his earlier actions, Louis learns to be critical of the histrionic paranoia his fellow travellers exhibit in Paris while also embodying aristocratic, English authority over the French, revolutionary mob. He thus balances between the two divergent pulls of Yonge’s narrative, between Yonge’s disapproval of excessive, romanticised militarism and insular paranoia, and her cultivation of an authoritative, parochial British conservatism.

Just as the narrative restrains Louis’s “mad” (82) patriotism early in the novel, Louis is positioned in Paris to prevent the excesses of revolutionary violence and paranoid hysteria alike. The kind of male revolutionary energy associated with sexual violence in Hamilton’s Vallaton, Burney’s commissary and Trollope’s Adolphe Denot appears possible in Dynvor Terrace when Louis and Isabel have their carriage requisitioned “for the service of the nation” (211) and are trapped between two barricades on the streets of Paris. However, this threat is successfully dispersed and diverted as Louis manages to talk down the crowd at the second barricade, allowing the pair to pass through (213-215). Louis establishes his authority over the mob by referring to the principles of political economy (214), and gains the revolutionaries’ respect when he refuses to “cry La liberté, l’égalité, et la fraternité” as they demand (214). Instead of voicing the battle-cry of revolution as he had glibly done in Clara’s company during the invasion scare (96), Louis calmly considers the meaning of the slogan in the context of his own understanding of the words, showing that his politics have acquired a thoughtful seriousness since his Yeomanry days. He responds to the crowd, “Liberty! ... what we mean by liberty is freedom to go where we will, and say what we will. I wish you had it, my poor fellows. Fraternity—it is not shooting our brother. Equality—I preach that too, but in my own fashion, not yours. Let me pass—si celà vous est égal” (214). Louis’s understanding of
equality is markedly different from the political meaning of the French revolutionaries of the 1790s or the socialists who orchestrated the June Insurrection, as his explanation to his Chartist friend Tom indicates earlier in the novel: “Put all that stuff out of your head about one man being equal to another. Equal they are; but some have the trial of ruling, others of obeying, and the last are the lucky ones” (79-80). Such a belief in spiritual equality that attempts to naturalise and legitimise social hierarchy on religious grounds hardly addresses the political demands of the 1840s British and French radicals Yonge depicts. Nonetheless, Louis’s capacity to thoughtfully engage with revolutionary concepts that had previously only assumed playful meaning to him marks his maturity at the barricade, as he later recalls to Isabel that he could not utter the slogan “in their sense, poor things, and on compulsion,” but admits that “[i]n a true sense, it is the war-cry of our life” (216). Louis’s calm decision to engage the members of the mob in a serious and honest discussion of political principles instead of panicking or threatening, moreover, serves to dispel the danger he and Isabel face at the barricade, as his moral courage “raise[s] an acclamation of le brave Anglais ... and shouts of high applause followed them as they sped along the blood-stained street” (215).

However unlikely this outcome, it demonstrates Yonge’s commitment to minimising the revolutionary danger her characters face and advocating a calm, regulated response to political conflict. Moreover, although the idea that an aristocratic English tourist could receive “high applause” from a crowd of French, working-class insurrectionists seems like conservative wishful thinking, Yonge is not alone in narrating such accounts of defused hostilities in order to minimise the 1848 revolution’s violence. The French republican newspaper the National, quoted in a Times article of 2 March 1848, for example, depicts the revolutionary crowd’s willingness to step back from its violent intentions in its description of Louis-Philippe’s escape from Paris:

The flight of Louis Philippe was marked by an incident which does so much honour to the feelings of our population that we hasten to mention it. At the moment the ex-King was escaping by the little low doorway nearly opposite the bridge, and going into the little carriage that waited for him, he found himself surrounded by the people. Two cuirassiers stationed in the Place de la Concorde rushed to his protection, and this brave regiment,
without however using their arms, opened a passage. An officer seeing the
danger cried out, “Messieurs, spare the King.” To which a stentorion voice
replied, “We are not assassins— let him go.” “Yes yes; let him go— _qu’il
parte, _” became the general cry. The people have been too brave during the
combat not to be generous after the victory. (“The Revolution in France”
5)

Yonge seems to owe her description of Louis’s ability to talk down the mob to such
circulating accounts of 1848, which were, as this narrative’s publication in the French
republican _National_ and conservative, British _Times_ suggests, politically useful tools for
radical and antirevolutionary writers alike. As Armstrong and Tennenhouse argue, “To
regard certain practices as violent is never to see them just as they are. It is always to take
up a position for or against them” (9). Similarly, to represent a revolutionary event as
non-violent or easily defused can either express support for that event as a kind of
peaceful, democratic protest, as the _Nation_ likely viewed the Parisian population’s
decision to “spare the King,” or compose part of an effort to contain and dismiss the
political voice of the insurrectionary crowd, as Yonge’s depiction of Louis’s ascendancy
over a mob willing to submit and defer to an aristocratic, English leader does.

For Yonge, then, the revolutionaries behind the June Insurrection are not politically
organised, working-class socialists expressing opposition to the conservative French
government and disillusionment with how the 1848 revolution had unfolded, but an
appropriately deferential, starving and suffering population that rises out of desperation.
Yonge, in other words, re-frames the June Insurrection according to the paternalist values
of deferential culture, just as she had imagined Tom Madison’s Chartist politics as an
articulation of his sense of personal neglect and betrayal by his aristocratic patron, Louis.
Although Yonge does briefly mention the closure of the socialist National Workshops,
the immediate trigger for the uprising,²³² her depiction of the insurrectionists indicates
that the appropriate response to what she sees as an expression of poverty and suffering is
pity, rather than political support or solidarity. Louis, for example, states, “Poor wretches,
I believe they are starving” (210), while Isabel balances “pity” for their suffering with

²³² This reference in buried in Lady Conway’s paranoid, anti-French speech, “It is all those savage
wretches, mad because the national workshops are closed. Delaford declares they will massacre all the
English” (210).
approbation for their deference, claiming, “Poor creatures, they look as if misery made them furious; and yet how civil they were” (212). This outsiders’ view of the insurrection is confirmed by the nun attending Louis’s wounds, who argues, “It is misery that drove them to rise” (220). She describes a starving revolutionary telling her “No, mother ... I shall not eat; I shall get myself killed,” and gives an account of the distress of the Parisian poor to which Louis, ever the aristocratic patron, responds by “nearly empt[y]ing his travelling purse for the sufferers” (220). The June Insurrection, in this view, is a desperate last resort for the poor that should be addressed through paternalist, charitable gestures like Louis’s, rather than an articulation of legitimate political demands by an engaged, and enfranchised,\textsuperscript{233} citizenry.

Louis’s ascendancy over the revolutionary crowd is paralleled by Yonge’s depiction of the historical Archbishop Affre’s attempt to mediate the crisis and his resulting death. Like Louis, the Archbishop is an authoritative figure to whom the insurgents and government forces alike defer. The “gardes mobiles,” an important force in the government’s repressive measures to restore order, valorise him (219). Furthermore, when he is fatally injured, “followed by the weeping and horror-struck insurgents, he was borne into the curate’s house, severely wounded, while the populace laid down their weapons, to sign a declaration that they knew not who had fired the fatal shot” (219). The Archbishop’s death is a tragic accident, and, significantly, an opportunity for the revolutionaries to submissively and respectfully lay down their arms. Louis and the Archbishop are both representatives of patriarchal, deferential culture, and the revolutionaries’ recognition of their authority signals their acceptance of the conservative values of that culture. By framing the June Insurrection around the authority of figures like Louis and the Archbishop and promoting gestures of pity and charity as the most appropriate responses to the uprising, Yonge contains revolution within the unthreatening, conservative codes of a traditional, hierarchical society, thus dismissing the potential threat revolution could pose to the orderly and stable society \textit{Dynevor Terrace} promotes.

\textsuperscript{233} Universal male suffrage was granted in France following the revolution in February 1848, enfranchising ten million French citizens (Price 12).
The June Insurrection, furthermore, is containable and non-threatening because it does not offer the sexual violence and danger of domestic invasion prevalent in antirevolutionary representations of French Revolution. Just as she converts revolutionary violence into applause for Louis’s courage and recognition of his authority as a “brave Anglais” (215), Yonge diverts the potential sexual threat posed by the mob away from Isabel and onto Louis. She thereby minimises the typical antirevolutionary danger of rape that originates with Burke’s imagined rape of Marie Antoinette and that figures prominently in the other antirevolutionary texts I have discussed, from Julia’s seduction by the villainous Vallaton in Hamilton’s novel and the many attempts to seduce or rape Ellis that occur in Frances Burney’s The Wanderer, to the scenes of sexualised home invasion that arise in the attacks on Clisson and Durbellière in Trollope’s La Vendée or the image of the mob of suitors pursuing Lucie Manette in her Soho home in A Tale of Two Cities. When they reach the second barricade, Isabel is greeted by “mutterings of belle” directed at her by “fierce black-bearded men,” and “cling[s] the closer to her guardian” (214), revealing that the antirevolutionary association of revolution with a sexual threat is still intact in Yonge’s novel. Louis takes his chivalrous duty toward Isabel very seriously, literally guarding her with his own body by “pressing her into the recess of the closed doorway of one of the houses, and standing before her” during a rush on the barricade by the National Guards (213). During this rush, Louis receives a bullet wound in his right arm (214) that stands in for the diverted sexual threat by marring his physical integrity and marking his body with the effects of revolutionary violence. Louis’s youthful, feminine appearance, furthermore, allows him to assume the role of the rape victim in Isabel’s place with more ease: the revolutionaries, for example, note his “fair cheek” and view Isabel and Louis almost as feminine twins, describing them as “poor children” resembling “waxen images” (214). Yonge thus requires Louis to bear the burden of revolutionary violence instead of Isabel, protecting her from the excessive male energy associated with revolution in other antirevolutionary texts. By transforming the threat of rape into a manageable minor injury incurred by a male character, Yonge contains and reduces the impact of revolutionary violence in her novel.

In addition to regulating and diverting revolutionary energy, Yonge uses the 1848 revolution to discipline the kind of paranoid, antirevolutionary hysteria that appears in
Burke’s histrionics and, two years later, in Dickens’s violent rage against Madame Defarge and the Jacquerie. When Isabel and Louis return to their hotel, they discover Lady Conway and Delaford performing a parody of the kind of fear of home invasion that appears in Burke’s raid on Versailles and the self-fortification by which Dickens’s Miss Pross attempts to protect Lucie’s home from revolutionary intruders. Lady Conway “shriek[s]” (215) and “scream[s]” (216) at Louis’s injury, while Delaford begs the family to fly from Paris immediately, leaving Louis behind (216). When Isabel refuses to go until Louis recovers (216-217), Lady Conway “in restless despair, predicted they would all be massacred, and that her nephew would bleed to death” (217). At Delaford’s word that “thousands of armed men were marching on the hotel” (217), Louis finds Lady Conway pleading with the hotel master to fortify the hotel with “feather-beds to defend them from the shot” (218):

“Oh, Fitzjocelyn!” she screamed, “tell him so— tell him to take us to the cellars. Why will he not put the mattresses against the windows before they fire?”

“I should prefer a different relative position for ourselves and the beds,” said Louis, in his leisurely manner, as he advanced to look out. “These are the friends of order, my dear aunt; you should welcome your protectors. Their beards and their bayonets by gaslight are a grand military spectacle.”

“They will fire! There will be fighting here! They will force their way in. Don’t, Virginia— I desire you will not go near the window.” (218)

Louis’s confidence in and support of the conservative French government’s repression of the June Insurrection underlies Yonge’s dismissal of the revolution of 1848. The display of force represented by the “grand military spectacle” of these “friends of order,” like the Yeomanry of Peterloo, with which Louis allies himself, or the 1853 Clobham encampment and 1857 military spectacle in Ireland Yonge witnessed, indicates the government’s power to police and prevent radicalism and revolution. From Yonge’s 1857 position, nearly ten years after repressive measures in Britain and France had destroyed Chartistism and the French left, the antirevolutionary tropes of sexual violence against women and the danger of home invasion become unwarranted threats, policed into
extinction by the “grand military spectacle[s]” of militant, conservative victory over British and French radicalism. Lady Conway’s “feather-bed fortress” (218) is an absurd rewriting of the antirevolutionary trope of home invasion that undermines antirevolutionary hysteria, just as Louis’s ridiculous Yeomanry drilling challenges the anti-French paranoia so prevalent in British nationalism across the revolutionary era and beyond. However, Lady Conway’s paranoia and Louis’s militant patriotism are only excessive because government force has already successfully relegated revolution to the past. The conservative French response to the repression of the June Insurrection as “victory gained by the cause of order, of the family, of humanity, of civilisation” (qtd. in Price 14), in other words, is validated by Yonge a decade later, in Louis’s declaration to Lady Conway, “These are the friends of order ...; you should welcome your protectors” (218).

Yonge’s concurrent challenge to antirevolutionary histrionics and expression of confidence in the conservative values of order and stability achieved through physical force is reinforced through her construction of Louis as a composite figure who embodies a transnational affinity to British national and French royal histories and mythologies and who also symbolises the authority of a patriarchal, monarchical ideal. Departing from the anglicising tendency within the antirevolutionary tradition, as apparently multinational characters such as Burney’s Ellis or Dickens’s Darnay family become increasingly identified as English over the course of those authors’ works, Yonge permits Louis to embody the history of a unified Britain while she still aligns him heavily with France and the French. Yonge occasionally expresses anti-French prejudice, allowing Louis to distinguish between real gentility and “French polish” (202), for example, or depicting a friendly sea captain, reminiscent of Burney’s insular English characters, recalling “Robert Spear and them old times” (243). She moreover uses the 1848 French revolution as an opportunity to reflect on the “contrast” (222) between Britain and France, bringing Louis to the conclusion, favourable to the British status quo, “We may think of home, and be thankful!” (218).

However, Dynevor Terrace’s engagement with fears about French invasion and revolution does not result in a paranoid nationalism that constructs British identity in

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234 The original quotation comes from the *Journal des Débats.*
opposition to a French enemy across the Channel, or what Linda Colley describes as “an obviously hostile Other [that] encouraged [the British] to define themselves collectively against it” (5). Instead, Louis’s composite British identity is complemented by his apparent Frenchness. When Louis refuses to voice the revolutionary slogan at the barricades, the crowd cheers him as “le brave Anglais” (215), locating his ascendancy over the mob in his Englishness. This, along with Louis’s earlier commitment to home defence, would seem to construct Louis as another character like Burney’s insular English patriots or Dickens’s anglocentric Miss Pross. Yet, Yonge positions Louis more ambiguously: he is not just a “brave Anglais,” asserting his superiority to a group of French revolutionaries by virtue of his Englishness, but a figure who bridges national divisions.

Louis’s family history and individual character suggest that he evades national categorisation. His family name, Fitzjocelyn, indicates that he descends from the Anglo-Normans, and his mother’s name, Louisa Villiers, suggests a French origin. Like his cousins, Louis is Welsh by way of his grandmother, a Dynevor. As a composite figure, Louis reflects Britain’s history and inherits his identity from the diverse groups—from the original Celtic inhabitants to the Norman invaders—that made up Victorian Britain’s population. The name Dynevor in particular suggests a kind of mythologised Britishness. The historical Dynevor family participated in the demographic trend Colley identifies with the creation of a new British national consciousness during the Georgian period, in which “an almost entirely new and British landed establishment [was created] in place of the old and local gentry” as families died out and often distant estates were merged (157). Families like the Dnevors and others acquired estates across Britain, so that “[w]hether these families wanted to be British or not ... became immaterial. The shift of landed property virtually compelled them ... to think in terms of Great Britain, and often in terms of the United Kingdom as a whole” (157-158).

For Yonge, the Dynevor family represent nineteenth-century Britain’s appetite for a shared, mythologised past. Like many writers across the Victorian period and especially in the late 1850s, most famously Alfred Tennyson and William Morris, Yonge looked to the

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235 Morris’s The Defence of Guenevere, and Other Poems was published in 1858, the year after Dynevor Terrace, and the first of Tennyson’s Idylls of the King appeared in 1859. Broome Saunders features an
Arthurian tradition as a means of exploring contemporary issues: in her case, the problem of defining the British national community. Jem designs a family tree for Louis’s benefit, positioning the Dynevors as descendants of “KING ARTHUR” via “Pendragons and Dynevors innumerable” (11). The stuff of national legend thus becomes a source of fabled family pride and identity. The Dynevors clearly rehearse their Arthurian mythology as the key factor in their sense of national belonging and family heritage; when Louis jokingly suggests that his cousin Jem outranks a Viscount Fitzjocelyn, he imagines Jem’s Welshness and his mythologised descent to be inseparable, as he recites to his aunt Catharine, “‘Why, what do you think of Roland ap Dynasvawr ap Roland ap Gruffydd ap Rhys ap Morgan ap Llywellwyn ap Roderic ap Caradoc ap Arthur ap Uther ap Pendragon?’ running this off with calm, slow, impressive deliberation” (230).

This sanitised version of Arthurian genealogy, which glosses over Arthur’s childless and adulterous wife Guinevere and illegitimate and incestuously-conceived son Mordred, figures traditionally associated with the fall of Camelot, demonstrates the Victorian impulse for revisionism that Broome Saunders finds in the “sober portrayal of the Knights of the Round Table as individual moral qualities, epitomizing chivalric greatness” that appeared in Queen Victoria’s Robing Room frescos (136).

Most importantly, however, the Dynevors’ Arthurian genealogy suggests both their aristocratic heritage and their belonging to a British community that traces its origins back to a shared foundation myth. In *Dynevor Terrace*, in other words, family identity and national identity are merged.

Yonge’s characters, however, do not simply represent a pan-British identity that asserts itself in opposition to Frenchness. In fact, as Jem appears to the family circle to embody Welsh national character, Louis seems more French than British: even before the family tree that identifies Louis as a Dynevor by inheritance appears early in the novel (11), Jem calls Louis “debonnaire” (9), a descriptor that stays with him throughout *Dynevor Terrace*, complementing his British lineage. Yonge uses the tag of “debonnaire” to suggest a Frenchness of character and physical appearance that is easily identifiable for the other characters; when Louis is faced with Jem’s anger, for example, he “shrugged:

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extensive discussion of Arthurian figures, especially Queen Guinevere, in Tennyson, Morris and a number of women poets and visual artists in *Women Writers and Nineteenth-Century Medievalism.*

236 Jem’s full name is James Roland Frost Dynevor.
like a Frenchman, looked *debonnaire*, and said ‘Good night’” (130). However, like the Dynevors’ fabled Arthurian connection, the nickname “Louis le Debonnaire,” originating in Louis’s childhood (20), not only suggests a French pronunciation of Louis’s name and indicates what appear to be superficial marks of Frenchness like his shrugging gesture, but aligns him with France’s mythologised past.

Yonge’s entry for “Louis” in her 1863 *History of Christian Names* points to the model she had in mind when developing Louis Fitzjocelyn and, furthermore, demonstrates the conservative, royalist sympathies that underlie her need to contain revolution in *Dynevor Terrace* and her characterisation of Louis as an aristocratic hero. Yonge’s section on “Louis” (403-407) falls under the category of “Karling Romances,” or names deriving from the Carolingian dynasty. “Louis,” Yonge claims, originates from the name of Charles the Great’s son (404): “‘Lluduicus’ is now known to the French as Louis le Debonnaire, a title that some ascribe to his piety, others to his weakness” (405). Louis Fitzjocelyn’s affinity to this historical “Louis le Debonnaire” is evident in Yonge’s adoption of the nickname for her hero, as well as their apparently shared characteristics of “piety” and “weakness.” Therefore, although Louis and the Dynevors are associated by birth with the fundamental legend of British national identity, the Matter of Britain, Yonge aligns Louis equally with the historical and mythological origins of France through the Carolingian dynasty.

Yonge’s entry on “Louis” continues to stress the name’s association with French history and royalty. It is “chiefly a French importation” (405) in other parts of Europe, she writes, and is strongly linked to the French monarchy:

Three monarchs of the Karling line bore this favourite name, and the fifth descendant of Hugh Capet brought it in again, to come to its especial honour with the saintly Crusader, ninth king so called, from whom it became so essentially connected with French royalty, that after the succession of the Bourbons, no member of the royal family was christened without it. Indeed, hardly any one of rank or birth failed to have it among their many names, till its once-beloved sound became a peril to the
owners’ heads in the Revolution, and it has in the present day arrived at sharing the unpopularity of François.\(^{237}\) (405)

Despite the “present day ... unpopularity” of “Louis” after the Revolution, Louis Fitzjocelyn’s success at the barricades suggests that revolution no longer poses any threat to a figure, like Louis, aligned with France’s royalist past. Louis’s apparent Frenchness, while emphasising Yonge’s critique of insular British national identity and paranoid anti-French sentiment, also contributes to her programme of dismissing the revolutionary era and its potential dangers: Louis, a figure emphatically aligned with the origins of French royalty and particularly with the Bourbon dynasty, can escape revolutionary violence and even talk down an insurrectionary crowd, asserting his aristocratic ascendancy over the mob. This, in combination with the resonance of his name with nineteenth-century French royalty— with the July monarch Louis-Philippe and self-appointed monarch Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, or Napoleon III— reminds Yonge’s reader of France’s return to its past and to more conservative forms of government at the expense of its revolutionary and republican legacies. Because Louis is a representative of the monarchy and Yonge’s royalist sympathies, his role in defusing the June Insurrection aligns him with the French soldiers who march in to police the uprising, becoming Lady Conway’s “protectors” (218) and ensuring the conservative victory of order and stability over radicalism that allows Yonge to relegate revolution to the past.

With her dismissal of the revolutionary threat, Yonge also rejects the antirevolutionary representational legacy. She engages with the paranoid insularism and fear of home invasion that appear so frequently in the texts in this study only to render those anxieties about revolution and France absurd from the mid-Victorian perspective from which she re-imagines 1847-1848. Yonge moreover transforms the sexual threat that represents revolutionary violence in the antirevolutionary tradition into a much more manageable, superficial injury, minimising and containing revolutionary violence and critiquing antirevolutionary histrionics. She also constructs her hero Louis as a figure embodying British and French identities, and especially aligned to French royalty and to its re-emergence in the nineteenth century. Although Louis’s composite identity suggests

\(^{237}\) Yonge remarks that ironically the feminine version of “Louis,” “Aloys” (405), underwent a resurgence in popularity during the revolutionary period: “Heloïse had nearly died away in France when Rousseau’s romance of \textit{La Nouvelle Héloïse} brought it as well as Julie into fashion again” (406).
Yonge’s efforts to reconcile Britain to its national enemy, France, his royalist affinities point to Yonge’s support of the recent repression of radicalism and revolution in Britain’s policing of Chartism and France’s counterrevolutionary repressive measures and return to conservative, monarchical and imperial government in the mid nineteenth century. Through her plan of dismissing revolutionary conflict, Yonge uses Dynevor Terrace to propose that the revolutionary era—and with it, radical politics—should be relegated to history.

“The Place of Exile”: Home, Community and Transatlantic British Identities

Although Yonge works to move beyond imagining France and revolution as sources of anxiety for her mid-Victorian characters, she still tests out British identity against another site of difference. Dynevor Terrace in fact marks a shift away from a cross-Channel anxiety about British national identity toward a transatlantic apprehension about Britain’s place in an increasingly globalised political, economic and social context. The threat of French invasion and revolution gives way after the first half of the novel to a focus on transatlantic commerce, as the Ponsonbys’ and Dynevors’ participation in neo-colonial investment in Peru results in fractures within families and produces a presiding sense of exile among those characters who emigrate, like Mary, or return to Britain to live as outsiders in their own homes, like Oliver. As with her portrayal of Chartism in the first half of the novel, Yonge continues to use Tom Madison to subordinate class politics to national interest by enlisting him in the service of informal British imperialism in Peru. Yet, in choosing South America, a place strongly associated with failed investment in the first half of the nineteenth century, Yonge criticises the middle-class acquisitive culture that accompanies British commercial expansion abroad. Instead, she promotes a sense of British identity that finds its source in the home and domestic community. Like other antirevolutionary writers such as Hamilton and Dickens, Yonge uses the home to stand in for the national community and to explore the question of who belongs and who does not belong to that community in a world in which British identity is challenged and expanded in new ways.

A number of the antirevolutionary writers and texts in this study engage with points of national difference and imperial endeavour outside of the dominant cross-Channel
relationship between Britain and France. Hamilton’s philosophers imagine emigrating to an idealised Hottentot community, Burney’s Ellis is mistaken for a “tawny Hottentot ... [or] fair Circassian” (*The Wanderer* 12), Trollope’s Vendée is an analogue for colonised Ireland, and Dickens’s *Tale* has been read as a response to the Indian Mutiny of 1857.\(^{238}\) *Dynevor Terrace*, however, is unique among these antirevolutionary works in its turn away from the cross-Channel relationship central to British representations of revolution in France and toward a transatlantic construction of subjectivity and community.

Transatlantic studies offers new ways of thinking about literary works like *Dynevor Terrace*, which contains contrasting English and Peruvian settings and numerous ocean crossings that contribute to Yonge’s characters’ senses of identity, home, and belonging. In their introduction to *Transatlantic Literary Exchanges 1790-1870*, Kevin Hutchings and Julia M. Wright argue that

> through the transatlantic— images of crossing from one side to the other, of the fluid space between, the juxtaposition of ‘old’ and ‘new’ worlds, and so forth— authors from the northern Atlantic region investigated and refigured the boundaries that organized nineteenth-century culture, including the borders of the nation-state, the limits enforced on gender and sexuality, the divisions of emergent notions of ‘race’, and the very nature of intercultural exchange. (2-3)

In fact, in some of the works featured in this study, cross-Channel movement and exchange perform this same function: Ellis’s liminal ethnic, national and familial status is symbolised by her marginal position on the coast of France and the Channel crossing with which Burney’s *The Wanderer* opens, and the numerous Channel crossings that occur in *A Tale of Two Cities* point to the complex of class, national and political affiliations Dickens’s characters negotiate before they ultimately retreat into the home, domestic ideology and British patriotism at the end of the novel. The transatlantic, which “offers the possibility of considering the subject in motion, evading and moving between national categories and models of national identity and citizenship at the dawn of modern nationalism in an already globalizing West in which territorial boundaries were highly contested” (Hutchings and Wright 10) for many nineteenth-century writers, becomes the

\(^{238}\) See Joshi’s “Mutiny Echoes.”
principle site for Yonge’s exploration of national and domestic belonging. Yonge imagines subjectivity and citizenship for her characters as primarily emerging out of their place within the domestic community. However, she investigates the family’s social identity through its contact with national and ethnic Others in South America and through the relationship between class and wealth acquired through modern, neo-colonial investment outside of Britain’s national and imperial borders. She thus transforms the intrusive revolutionary who threatens to invade the home in the antirevolutionary novel into figures like Mary’s unwanted Limenian stepmother Rosita, whose presence continually points to Mary’s deceased mother’s absence and Mary’s resulting feelings of domestic upheaval, or Oliver Dynevor, whose undesirable Peruvian wealth disrupts the family and home to which he returns in England.

The triangular relationship connecting Britain, France and South America— in this case Peru— that Dynevor Terrace explores is not new to the mid nineteenth century. As Rebecca Cole Heinowitz discusses in her book, Spanish America and British Romanticism, 1777-1826, politically engaged Romantic-era writers such as Helen Maria Williams, Richard Brinsley Sheridan, Robert Southey and John Thelwall all produced literary works reflecting “the important complex of exchanges taking place between Britain and what historians have called its burgeoning ‘informal empire’ in Spanish America” (2). Frequently politically radical but also invested in legitimising “Britain’s imperial intervention in the Spanish colonies” (7) in the period that saw those colonies gain independence from Spain, Romantic-era texts such as Williams’s Peru, Sheridan’s Pizarro, Southey’s Madoc and Thelwall’s The Incas, Heinowitz finds, “shift uncomfortably between assertions of revolutionary solidarity and gestures of cultural appropriation, and between fantasies of intercultural intimacy and schemes of colonial domination” (15). In the revolutionary context, these works also often offer a triangulated understanding of British sympathy for revolution in Spanish America and France, antirevolutionary reaction and government repression, and burgeoning British imperialism in the Romantic period.239

239 See Heinowitz for nuanced readings of these works and others. She argues that Williams’s Peru “initiated a tentative reconciliation between revolutionary sympathy and the pursuit of empire” (17) that the other works she studies built upon. Sheridan’s Pizarro proposes a “timely identification of Napoleonic France with colonial Spain” (17) that allowed for the expression of revolutionary and radical sympathy
Although Yonge is far more conservative than any of these Romantic writers, her novel also reflects ideological tensions surrounding British “imperial intervention” (Heinowitz 7) in Peru: she rejects commercial investment in South America and the importation of wealth acquired through such economic imperialism into Britain, but uses the opportunities available to Tom Madison in Peru to raise him gradually into the middle class and divert his attention away from class politics and toward the kind of missionary work he performs among the exiled British miners he lives with in the Andes. Similarly, she stresses that Mary Ponsonby’s ethnically and religiously Othered young stepmother Rosita can never truly be family to Mary, and, instead, heightens Mary’s sense of national dislocation and homelessness, but teaches the Frosts to work at reincorporating their returned emigrant uncle Oliver into the domestic community. Peru thus becomes a focal point for Yonge’s exploration of the relationships between home and national community, of class, family and wealth, and of belonging and exile in a world in which being British does not necessarily mean being in Britain.

Yonge’s writing frequently explores nineteenth-century colonial enterprises, especially missionary work, and Dynevor Terrace in particular examines the ways in which British characters living overseas experience life away from Britain as a spatial dislocation from their homes that results in an emotional disconnection from their families and communities. Walton argues in Imagining Soldiers that missions, “an army within which women could enlist as a respectable baggage train” (141), resulted for Yonge’s personal circle in an extension of the “web of community” or “warm imaginative embrace of those at home” (173) that compensated for the physical distance between Britain and the British abroad. However, this claim fails to accommodate the overwhelming feeling of exile that dominates the second half of Dynevor Terrace as Yonge turns to South America instead of France as a point of contrast for England and Britain.240 Emigration as an experience of spatial and emotional dislocation from one’s

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240 Emigration as an experience of spatial and emotional dislocation from one’s

(18). Thelwall’s “‘Jacobin’ play” (Scrivener Introduction 83) The Incas allegorises the French Revolution and conservative reaction in Britain (Heinowitz 17, Felsenstein and Scivener 13). According to Heinowitz, Southey’s Madoc “mount[s] a defense of reformed British colonialism” but “undercut[s] the ostensible humanity of Madoc’s conquest by conscripting it in the service of English colonialism in the Celtic periphery” (19). Britain, France and Spanish America are inextricably politically entangled in these works. Even her bestselling Heir of Redclyffe, which does not feature emigration or missionary activity, emphasises the ways in which exile and inheritance shape British identity for Yonge’s characters. Lynn Shakinovsky argues in “Domestic History and the Idea of the Nation” that Heir “investigates what it means
home, family and nation is crucial to the construction of nineteenth-century English and British identities. In *Out of Place: Englishness, Empire, and the Locations of Identity*, Ian Baucom writes that the “localist discourse” that emerged during the Romantic period in the writing of Edmund Burke and William Wordsworth, and was developed by Victorians like John Ruskin, “identified English place, rather than English blood, as the one thing that could preserve the nation’s memory, and, in preserving its memory, secure England’s continuous national identity” (16). The vast, foreign space of the British Empire was thus distinguishable from familiar, English place (18). This localist spatialisation of English heritage, Baucom argues, defined England “against France, and, in time, Englishness against the British Empire” (30).

Although *Dynevor Terrace*’s Peru is not properly part of the British Empire, it is a focal point for the informal, economic imperialism whose instability and boom and bust cycle colour Yonge’s representations of national belonging, family inheritance and class. British investment in South American mining, like Ponsonby’s and Oliver Dynevor’s in Peru, formed part of a wave of neo-colonial activity in the early nineteenth century that paralleled British imperialist expansion elsewhere around the globe. Britain’s intervention in Spanish America accompanied the dissolution of the Spanish Empire:

> As Spain’s transatlantic empire continued to deteriorate during the late 1810s and early 1820s, the ranks of Britons working to aid (and to benefit from) the Spanish American revolutions swelled. British soldiers rushed to enlist in the revolutionary armies of Simón Bolívar and José de San Martín. Joint stock companies bought up abandoned mines and imported English scientists and workers to increase their productivity. Spanish American emissaries issued solicitations inviting Britons to emigrate to their new republics. And prominent banking firms such as Herring, Graham, and Powles contracted enormous loans to support the nascent American governments. (Heinowitz 21-22)

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Sir Guy and Philip Morville, Yonge’s two male protagonists, alternately experience exile from their domestic circle (81-85), leading Shakinovsky to conclude that “[t]he foreign and the unfamiliar ultimately come to constitute the context in which the two young men are forced to contemplate the true nature of their home and their inheritance” (89).
However, Britain’s “veritable mania for speculation,” especially apparent in the 1822-25 boom (Heinowitz 183), gave way when the South American bubble burst in 1825. Yonge’s exploration of British identity against the backdrop of South American commercial activity is thus coloured by Victorian consciousness of the risks of speculation and unsafe foreign investment.

The shift in focus from France to a transatlantic site of otherness in Dynevor Terrace follows the trajectory Baucom traces across the nineteenth century as British people stopped viewing themselves in opposition to France, and instead turned to the spaces and subjects of the British Empire—or, in this case, a site of informal British imperial activity—against which to construct their national identity. Expansion, emigration and international commerce, then, become sources of anxiety for Victorian domestic novelists like Yonge, struggling to establish the home circle and family as the foundation of individual and community identities. As Baucom writes, “in creating an empire whose commercial, political, demographic, and cultural economics depended on a continuous traffic between the English here and the imperial there, England rendered its spaces of belonging susceptible to a virtually infinite, and global, series of renegotiations” (38). Localist discourse, he continues, “suggested that identity is, finally, locale; that we are the product of the spaces we inhabit” (38). In Dynevor Terrace, emigrant characters like Oliver and the Ponsonbys either lose their sense of belonging when they exile themselves from England, or disrupt the homes they should belong to when they return from abroad. The threat to the home and nation that had been posed by French political volatility for the other novels in this study, and for the first half of Yonge’s novel, dissolves under the pressure of a new source of domestic and national instability, embodied in the unwanted

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241 According to Heinowitz, “In only three years, the new Spanish American governments floated approximately £20 million in bonds while British capitalization of Spanish American mining companies reached over £30 million” (183). The “stock market crash and ‘panic’ of 1825” was immense: Heavy overspeculation in Spanish American imports had resulted in a surplus that caused stock and bond prices to plummet. The much-anticipated Spanish American markets for British commodities had proven woefully inadequate to their supply. A frightening number of prestigious British trading firms and banks collapsed, taking smaller country banks along with them. The gold reserves of the Bank of England ran dangerously low. A freeze was placed on credit, and payments were suspended. Shareholders defaulted on their purchase installments, began to sell their shares at enormous loss, and even dissolved their associations. Trading at the Foreign Stock Exchange ground to a halt. In the last three weeks of December alone, over seventy financial institutions failed or suspended payments. By the end of the year, over 1,000 private bankruptcies had been reported …. (Heinowitz 202)
Peruvian stepmother and the returned emigrant Oliver, whose liminal places as both members of the domestic and national communities and outsiders challenge the affective discourse that underlies domestic ideology.

The Ponsonbys are already emotionally divided when *Dynvor Terrace* opens, and their residence in Peru exacerbates Mary’s sense of separation from her mother’s family and highlights the distance between her estranged parents. As Catharine Frost explains to her grandson Jem early in the novel, the elder Mary’s emigration to Peru occurs when she returns to a failed marriage after a separation from her husband that breeds hatred between the two sides of Mary’s family:

The fact was, that things had come to such as pass from Mr. Ponsonby’s neglect and unkindness, that Lord Ormersfield, standing in the place of her brother, thought it right to interfere. His mother went to London with him, to bring poor Mary and her little girl back to Ormersfield, and there they were till my sister’s death, when of course they could not remain. Mr. Ponsonby had just got his appointment as British envoy in Peru,²⁴² and wished her to go with him. It was much against Lord Ormersfield’s advice; but she thought it her duty, poor dear. I believe he positively hates Lord Ormersfield; and as if for a parting unkindness, he left his little girl at school with orders to spend her holidays with his sister, and never to be with us. (10)

Mrs Ponsonby’s residence in Peru, this passage suggests, marks her removal from a family circle that protects her from her husband and a return to his “neglect and unkindness.” Mary, furthermore, spends her youth either separated from her parents by an ocean and a continent, or inhabiting the broken home afforded to her in Peru when she joins them after her schooling is complete. The narrator notes that “the home she found at Lima” is marred by her parents’ continued estrangement:

Mr. Ponsonby was excessively fond of her; but his affection to her only marked, by contrast, the gulf between him and her mother. There was no longer any open misconduct on his part, and Mrs. Ponsonby was almost

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²⁴² Ponsonby joins Oliver’s investment company when his appointment expires during the course of the novel (88). His career thus joins the British Empire’s administrative reach with transatlantic commercial investment.
tremblingly attentive to his wishes; but he was chill and sarcastic in his manner towards her, and her nervous attacks often betrayed that she had been made to suffer in private for differences of opinion. (28-29)

Mary’s “home ... at Lima” is, in fact, not a home, but a space fractured by emotional and psychological abuse and a source of anxiety for Mary rather than a nurturing space allowing her to constitute her individual identity as a member of a domestic circle and, by extension, the broader British community.

Mrs Ponsonby’s return to Ormersfield during her fatal illness is therefore a homecoming for both Marys, as they locate the source of their subjectivity in their recollections of it as what Baucom calls “English place” (16). The narrator states, for example, that “[i]t had been the home of Mrs. Ponsonby’s childhood; and the slopes of turf and belts of dark ilex were fraught with many a recollection of girlish musings, youthful visions, and later, intervals of tranquillity and repose. After fourteen years spent in South America, how many threads she had to take up again!” (15). Ormersfield Park’s familiar landscape allows Mrs Ponsonby to “take up” the “threads” of her past and reconstruct her identity after her years of displacement from “the home of ... [her] childhood.” While Mrs Ponsonby returns to the home from which she has been exiled, Mary is attracted to Ormersfield as a remedy for her feeling of homelessness, a place that erases the anxiety and unhappiness caused by her parents’ marriage:

Mary Ponsonby had led a life of change and wandering that had given her few local attachments. The period she had spent at Ormersfield, when she was from five to seven years old, had been the most joyous part of her life, and had given her a strong feeling for the place where she had lived with her mother, and in an atmosphere of affection, free from the shadow of that skeleton in the house, which had darkened her childhood more than she understood. (27-28)

Happiness at home, “free from the shadow of that skeleton in the house,” allows Mary to establish the “local attachments” to Ormersfield that help produce her English identity. Ormersfield becomes for her “more of a home than any other place” (85), and Yonge bases much of Mary’s character in her Englishness, despite her years in Peru. When Louis asks her about Peruvian tree ferns, she replies, “Oh! I am so glad to exchange them
for our home flowers. Primroses look so friendly and natural” (21), indicating that she is at “home” in England, and tracing that feeling to her connection to the local landscape: as Baucom suggests, in localist discourse “identity is ... locale” (38). Mary furthermore succeeds in exporting her Englishness to her parents’ house in Peru, an effort that produces domestic ease and stability built on supposedly English values: Yonge writes, “The English comfort which she brought into the Limenian household was one element of peace; and her brisk, energetic habits produced an air of ease and pleasantness that did much to make home agreeable to her father, and removed many cares which oppressed her mother” (29). Mary’s Englishness thus allows her to transform a “Limenian household” into a “home,” and although she is removed from England proper and cannot replicate English landscape at a distance, she successfully “produce[s]” an interior domestic space that mirrors the English home.

Mary’s return to Lima after her mother’s death, however, features in the novel as a lengthy period of exile from her true home at Ormersfield and a displacement from the domestic circle to which she belongs. Lord Ormersfield questions whether Mary will be able to find a home with her father in Peru, telling Louis while Mrs Ponsonby is dying that “Lima is her destiny .... I have told her mother that I will go with her, and not leave her without seeing what kind of home that man has for her” (191). Yonge characterises Mary’s experience in Peru in the second half of the novel through her sense of homelessness and isolation. Catharine J. Vaughan-Pow’s claim that colonies in Yonge’s novels serve vaguely as “primarily ... points of arrival and departure” (254) is belied by Dynevor Terrace’s lengthy descriptions of Mary’s lonely life in the neo-colonial contact zone of Lima and Oliver Dynevor’s corresponding arrival home in England after a lifetime in South America. Mary’s first voyage out after her mother’s death with Lord Ormersfield ends in disaster when she learns that her father has hastily and scandalously married a young Peruvian novice out of a convent only weeks after his wife’s death. She returns to Ormersfield shocked that she and her mother have been erased from her father’s family and household, and regretfully tells Louis, “I found I was not wanted” and “I must be glad to be at home again” (251), indicating that Ormersfield, and not her father’s residence, has now become her home. Nonetheless, the breakup of her family at her mother’s death and father’s remarriage makes her feel that she must face
a “desolate world” with her relationship with Louis as her only comfort (253). In England Mary has a home, but that home is nevertheless compromised by the fractures within her family.

After her father’s second marriage, Mary perceives the Peruvian household she had previously succeeded in rebuilding on an English model as a place of exile and loss. When Ponsonby orders Mary to dissolve her engagement to Louis and return to Peru immediately, Yonge contrasts her anxieties during the sea voyage with her hopes when she had first arrived in Peru years before:

Then she had been full of hope and eager ardour to arrive, longing for the parental presence of which she had so long been deprived, hailing every novel scene as a proof that she was nearer home, and without the anticipation of one cloud, only expecting to be loved, to love and to be useful. And now all fond illusions as to her father had been snatched away, her very love for him rendering the perception doubly cruel; her mother, her precious mother, far away in Ormersfield churchyard—her life probably shortened by his harshness—her place occupied by a young girl, differing in language, in Church, in everything—...; and her heart was so entirely in England, that had her home been perfect, her voyage must still have been a cruel effort .... [S]he could gladly have prolonged the voyage for the rest of her life. (282)

Mary’s fears about returning to a Peruvian household that is both familiar and foreign now that her mother has been replaced by a young Spanish girl is similar to the anxiety Vaughan-Pow finds in Yonge’s representation of British colonies: the colonies for Yonge are, in Vaughan-Pow’s words,

an extension of British society, and thus comfortably familiar, and also a threat to that apparently stable existence that she valued. Consequently, her emphasis on the alien, uncivilized, and dangerous aspects of these colonies stresses the distance, both physical and emotional, between the locations occupied by colonizer and colonized, while minimizing any possible similarities between these entities. (256)
Although Mary’s Peru is not an English colony, her familiar former home is now a space enforcing unwelcome contact with the “alien” Peruvian girl who takes her mother’s place, and emotionally “distance[d]” from her English home at Ormersfield.

Mary’s arrival and her life in Lima do not remedy her sense of emotional and physical exile. She “saw nothing of her own” (282) when she disembarks with nobody to meet her at the ship, and contrasts this arrival with her previous one, when “her father had come and fetched her from on board, and ... dear mamma was waiting in the carriage!” (283). Her arrival at Ponsonby’s house further indicates her dislocation from home, as “[a]ll was gloom and stillness” in her father’s and stepmother Rosita’s absence (284). Mary’s emotional exile is exacerbated by the traces of her own and her mother’s efforts to establish an English domestic space in the empty house to which she returns: “Mary stood in the large dark room, with the soft matted floor, and the windows high up near the carved timbered ceiling, the single lamp, burning in rum, casting a dim gleam over the well-known furniture, by which her mother had striven to give an English appearance to the room” (284). The house is “well-known,” but, in its emptiness, it is also lonely, dark and isolating. When Ponsonby and Rosita do arrive, the conversations occur in Spanish (286-287), and Mary’s sense of the house’s strangeness increases when she dwells upon Rosita’s apparent incongruity as a member of her family: “it was painful to see her where Mary had been used to see that dear suffering face; and it was impossible not to feel the contrast with her father as painfully incongruous .... [He was] altogether as dissimilar a partner as could be devised for the slender girlish being by his side” (286). While as a “slender girlish being” Rosita is exotically “incongruous” alongside the English Ponsonby and his tomboyish daughter, highlighting her ethnic otherness, the real source of Mary’s feelings of strangeness and dislocation on her return to Peru is Rosita’s difference from her mother. Just as the antirevolutionary tradition registers contact with radical politics and cross-Channel national difference through images of home invasion and threats to the family, Yonge focuses Mary’s experience of cultural and national difference and the resulting challenge to her sense of identity and belonging within the home. Rosita’s exotic, non-English status is heightened by her inability to become Mary’s mother, while Mary’s sense of exile within her home and new family is exacerbated by Rosita’s “painfully incongruous”— read foreign— presence.
Mary, furthermore, feels the impact of Rosita’s difference from herself and her mother on her daily domestic life. She is struck by how household habits have changed in her absence and under a new mistress as she adjusts to her new life, rising early, for example, to discover that “[t]he English breakfast, ... [established] by her own exertions, had quite vanished; each of the family had a cup of chocolate in private” (287). When Mary resumes the English breakfast in the following days, Ponsonby still “never came near it” (288). In time, Mary comes to terms with her father and Rosita, but the household is fundamentally altered: “She had to form her habits for herself, for her importance in the house was gone” (291). Thus, Mary’s efforts years before to transform her father’s household into an English domestic space are no longer possible when that space becomes a contact zone in which Mary’s English habits are subordinated to Rosita’s, who takes precedence as the new Mrs Ponsonby. Although Mary settles into her own routine, her father’s Peruvian home can no longer be a home to her, and her sense of exile from England and Ormersfield does not diminish during her residence in Lima. When she finally returns to Ormersfield as Louis’s wife after her father’s death, she states with pleasure, “You know this always seemed more like home than anything else” (474).

Emigration outside of Britain’s borders in Dynevor Terrace results in a sense of exile that divides Mary from the English home she leaves behind, but also strains her feelings of belonging to the new domestic space and community in which she moves in Peru.

Mary’s feeling of dislocation in Peru is complemented by the corresponding disruption caused in England by Oliver’s return to his home and family after decades in South America: in fact, the returned emigrant brings a feeling of homelessness into the English domestic circle he re-enters. Vaughan-Pow notes that Yonge struggles to allow colonists to reintegrate into Britain in her work (261-262), pointing to the paradox in Yonge’s writing that “participation in the affairs of the British colonies was an activity that could render an individual incapable of returning to the very society that apparently upheld that participation” (262). Oliver’s return to England, mentioned for the first time in the novel at the moment that Mary disembarks in Peru (283), highlights the reciprocal effects of transatlantic, neo-colonial commerce: as Mary struggles with her dislocation from her home, Oliver fails to reintegrate into his, and brings British anxieties about expansion home to the mother country’s domestic circles.
A dispute about what constitutes home is the focal point for Yonge’s exploration of these anxieties, as Oliver’s notions of home deviate from those espoused by the rest of the family. When Catharine Frost Dynevor loses her family estate, Cheveleigh, because of her husband’s speculation (12-15), the different reactions of her two sons Henry and Oliver set up the division that later breaks the family apart when Oliver returns from Peru to restore his mother to her lost home: Henry equates his home with his domestic circle, stating “home is wherever we are together,” while the younger Oliver claims “I will win it back” (13), suggesting his fixation on lineage and family possessions. At stake are two competing middle-class definitions of gentility, one emerging out of domestic ideology’s conflation of domestic intimacy, home management and the family’s cultivation of virtue, as embodied in Dickens’s Lucie Manette, and one deriving from middle-class acquisitive impulses, in which status is conferred through possessions. The fact that Cheveleigh was initially lost through risky investment points to Yonge’s disapproval of Oliver’s acquisitive quest to regain the property through foreign commerce.

From the time he goes out to Peru as a teenager, Oliver is obsessed with the idea of regaining Cheveleigh, a goal that jars against the rest of the family’s focus on domestic companionship. Oliver’s first words on his return to England are “Mother, I can take you home—Cheveleigh is yours” (296), but Catharine’s cry, “My boy! my boy!” (296), suggests that she places more value on her reunited family than on the restored property. The narrator indicates that Oliver’s dramatic statement falls flat for his audience because he is out of touch with their values of domestic intimacy and companionship: “Those words? They might be out of taste, but Fitzjocelyn guessed that to speak them at the first meeting had been the vision of Oliver’s life— the object to which he had sacrificed everything. And yet how chill and unheeded they fell!” (296). Although Louis sympathises with Oliver’s devotion to his family, he recognises that Oliver’s obsession with status and wealth and his geographical distance from the Frosts for so many years has amplified the gap between the differing value systems that Henry’s and Oliver’s initial responses to the loss of Cheveleigh show. The narrator, moreover, explicitly relates this widened gulf between Oliver and the rest of the family to his commercial activity in Peru, stating that “Oliver had two ideas—Cheveleigh, and the Equatorial Steam Navigation Company” (298). Ironically, the fixation on family status and his ancestral
home that motivates Oliver’s emigration to Peru in the first place results in his failure to reintegrate into his home country and family life on his return and generates an emotional distance between Oliver and the rest of the family that the returned emigrant cannot surmount. Oliver is thus different from the rest of the family in two respects: in terms of his national belonging and in terms of his class identity. Because he privileges Cheveleigh and identity as “locale” (Baucom 38), Oliver must engage in the acquisitive commercial activity that removes him from the domestic values of his family as well as from the very “locale” that is so important to him.

Oliver’s return thus splits the family into Dynevors and Frosts, corresponding to the members of the older generations who still have some loyalty to Cheveleigh and the younger family members who have known no home except Dynevor Terrace and adopted the Frost name to signal their acceptance of their lowered social position. Yonge writes, He came down on Dynevor Terrace as a consequent, moneyed man, contemptuous of the poverty which he might have alleviated, and obtruding tardy and oppressive patronage. He rubbed against the new generation in too many places for charity or gratitude to be easy .... If such repugnance to him were felt even by Louis, the least personally affected, and the best able to sympathize with his aunt; it was far stronger in James, abhorring patronage, sensible that, happen what might, his present perfect felicity must be disturbed, and devoid of any sentiment for Cheveleigh that could make the restoration compensate for the obligation so unpleasantly enforced .... (299)

Oliver, of course, retains an “unbroken allegiance” to Cheveleigh (299), suggesting that the family’s humble habits at Dynevor Terrace will be “remedied at home” (298) when the return to Cheveleigh occurs, and Catharine’s devotion to her son and former life outweighs her more recent ties: “it was her own son, and her own home, and Oliver and Cheveleigh were more to her than even James [her grandson] and Dynevor Terrace” (311). She regrets parting from her neighbours at Dynevor Terrace, but views the return to Cheveleigh as a homecoming, stating when she leaves Northwold, “Don’t think I’m too glad to go away; but I cannot but be thankful that my dear boy is bringing me home to lay me down where my father and his father lie” (313). Louis, conversely, is “jealous
for this old house [Dynevor Terrace]” (307), and Jem states emphatically, “To me, Dynevor Terrace is home” (301), finally refusing to become heir to Cheveleigh and Oliver’s Peruvian fortune (303-307). Oliver instead makes Jem’s sister Clara his heir (310), increasing the tension within the family and forcing Clara’s physical and emotional removal from her brother Jem and cousin Louis when she joins Catharine and Oliver at Cheveleigh. The intimate domestic circle featured in the novel’s first half is thus irreparably broken by both Mary’s removal and Oliver’s return.

The family members who re-claim their Dynevor heritage leave Dynevor Terrace for Cheveleigh, becoming physically and emotionally distanced from the remaining Frosts, but their reintegration into life at Cheveleigh is as unsuccessful as Oliver’s reintegration into his English family home. The restoration is, in fact, more like a displacement than the homecoming Catharine and Oliver expect. When their carriage approaches Cheveleigh, Catharine’s cries of “See, Clara, that is where your dear grandfather lies!—My last home!” give way to her confused question, “where am I? This is not Cheveleigh” (315), as time has rendered the streets and inhabitants unrecognisable. The pompous reception Oliver plans is more of a display of social status than a genuine expression of pleasure at the family’s return to its old neighbourhood, as “there was a strange sense of unreality; she [Catharine] seemed like one performing a part to gratify her son. Clara asked her cousin if it were not like acting in a play; and it was plain to him that the spectators beheld it with more curiosity than sympathy” (316). Moreover, the restoration is more a disruption than a resumption of old habits, and the Dynevors must adapt to their new lives as much as Mary must adapt in Peru: Catharine’s new neighbours are entirely unfamiliar to her, as Cheveleigh’s former inhabitants have mostly died (316-317), and Clara understands her rounds of empty socialising and maintaining rank as an experience of exile from her home and habits (340-341). When Catharine dies Clara’s homesickness and loneliness at Cheveleigh intensify, and her “heart yearned after home!” (352). Despite the Dynevors’ efforts, the ancestral estate never becomes a home for the family. Oliver’s acquisitive understanding of his family identity and class status has led the family into exile instead of home.

The Frost household fares just as poorly when the domestic circle is split apart. Without Catharine’s guidance, Isabel is unable to manage Dynevor Terrace: she has poor
relationships with her servants (312) and is uninterested in domestic supervision (337-338), her children and her daily tasks (355-356).\textsuperscript{243} The bad temper and excessive pride that underlie Jem’s break with Oliver also result in his dismissal from his position as a schoolteacher (371-384). Moreover, Jem’s intimacy with Clara cannot be sustained when they are geographically and emotionally divided, and he writes to his sister “as if a barrier were between them” (354). Yonge, then, parallels and complements her emphasis on Mary’s exile in Lima through her representation of the mismanagement, fragmentation and unhappiness that invade her English homes on Oliver’s return with his Peruvian fortune to a family that hardly recognises him. The chapter titles of the second half of \textit{Dynevor Terrace} further highlight this double emphasis on emigrant homelessness and domestic disruption,\textsuperscript{244} as transatlantic movement and the resulting challenges to domestic identities replace the novel’s earlier interest in revolution, cross-Channel invasion and national defence.

However, after Catharine’s death and the crash that leaves Oliver nearly bankrupt, Yonge introduces a project of reintegrating Oliver into domestic life and reconciling the Dynevor and Frost branches of the family that challenges Vaughan-Pow’s claim that returned emigrants could not be re-assimilated to English life in Yonge’s work (261-262). Clara’s decision to make a home for Oliver when her grandmother dies (348-353) results from Catharine’s sadness that Oliver’s life has been one of exile and homelessness. Yonge characterises Oliver as non-English to emphasise his removal from the home circle: his foreignness is apparent when Louis recognises the irony of guests at the Cheveleigh restoration banquet singing “The Fine Old English Gentleman” in his honour (319), and Catharine continually laments, “he has been so long away from home, poor fellow!” (307), or, “If I had but kept him at home!” (89). Before her death, Catharine

\textsuperscript{243} See Sturrock’s article “Literary women of the 1850s and Charlotte Mary Yonge’s \textit{Dynevor Terrace}” for an in-depth discussion of Isabel’s domestic education.

urges that “he must not be left with no one to make a home for him, and to go out to Lima again” (349). Yonge’s stress on the importance of reintegrationing Oliver into the family circle also occurs alongside her emphasis on reconciliation between the two branches of the family, as Jem is chastened by his own domestic trouble and urged to sympathise with his uncle when he learns of Oliver’s insolvency and subsequent illness (419-430).

Yonge’s plot of reconciliation between family members thus performs the function of domesticating Oliver to English home life, as his financial losses and helplessness in illness make him dependent on the humble domestic life at Dynevor Terrace that his family pride had led him to reject. Jem suggests that Clara should return to her “natural home” with her brother, bringing Oliver with her (429), while Clara views the financial crash as a release from her exile away from her “dear old home” (426), Dynevor Terrace. Even Jane Beckett, a servant loyal to the Cheveleigh days, “had begun to call Northwold home” (430) in anticipation of her return to the Terrace. Clara’s sense of homecoming as the train enters Northwold, where “[e]very house, every passenger, were tokens of home” (434), contrasts with the Dyevors’ empty display of status on their arrival at Cheveleigh, and her efforts to integrate Oliver into the intimate home circle constitute a process of educating the wayward, independent emigrant in the values of her mid-Victorian, middle-class domestic community. Clara attempts, in fact, to construct her uncle’s sense of belonging to the domestic community as a means of accommodating him to the English life from which he has been removed, and produces that community by fostering sentimental family ties and intimate domestic relationships: before leaving Cheveleigh, she outlines her strategy for re-aligning Oliver’s value system in her assertion, “We shall teach my poor uncle that home love is better than old family estates” (431), and she later states to Oliver himself, “what could you have more than your nephew and niece to— to try to be like your children!” (434). Yonge’s narrator clearly supports Clara’s project of reincorporating Oliver into English life through contact with an intimate and loving domestic circle, concluding the account of Clara’s happiness on returning to her brother’s home with the statement, “Poor Uncle Oliver! could he but have known how little all this had to do with Cheveleigh!” (438). Oliver’s integration into his family and development of a sense of belonging to the domestic community after his years in Peru thus depends on his loss of his South American investments and the failure of his ambition to regain
the family property: only after his allegiances to Peruvian commerce and Cheveleigh are entirely destroyed, can Yonge begin to produce in him a new sense of belonging to an English home and domestic community. Domestic ideology finally outweighs both middle-class acquisitive culture and identity as “locale” (Baucom 38).

However, the faults in the second half of Dynevor Terrace do not lie entirely with Oliver, as Yonge suggests that Jem’s closed-mindedness to his uncle’s sacrifices and insular rejection of his Peruvian wealth are as much to blame for the family’s fragmentation as Oliver’s misguided commercial exploits. While the family can only be reunited after the crash that exorcises Oliver’s Peruvian fortune from the plot, Jem’s decision to support the insolvent Oliver and Clara by bringing them home to Dynevor Terrace accompanies an awakening of sympathy for his uncle and regret that he had not accepted the legacy of Oliver’s hard work and his own Dynevor heritage when it was still possible. He regrets, for example, that he had not taken the opportunity to be useful at Cheveleigh as a clergyman (431), and that his rejection of his uncle’s wealth had entailed a rejection of his own family identity: he states, for example, “After all, Clara, I was a Dynevor before my uncle came home. It might have been my birthright” (431). When Cheveleigh is lost in the crash, Jem develops sympathy for Oliver’s prolonged efforts to win it back, and is for the first time “painfully conscious of being disinherited” (433). The second loss of Cheveleigh therefore allows Jem to realise that his rejection of the property and his uncle’s money is tantamount to a rejection of family, an abdication of his affective relationships with Catharine and Clara and his responsibility for facilitating Oliver’s reintegration into his family and home. Jem’s and Isabel’s decision to please Oliver by naming their first son Roland245 according to Dynevor tradition (478) finally indicates that Jem accepts his family history and his uncle as a fully included member of the domestic circle. Returned emigrants in Yonge’s novels, therefore, can be reintegrated into English life if the impact of their prolonged geographical and emotional distance from home and community is countered by efforts to produce a sense of belonging to the home circles to which they return. Emigrants like Oliver, moreover, can even instigate those who have remained at home, like Jem and Isabel, to recognise family legacies and inheritances that they have previously ignored. Crucially, for Yonge, family members

245 The baby boy is introduced as “Woland” by his toddler sisters (478).
who remain at home, such as Catharine, Clara and Jem, have the responsibility to reconstruct domestic allegiances for returned emigrants like Oliver, just as much as emigrants are responsible for accommodating themselves to English life, domestic values, and household habits.

*Dynevor Terrace*, therefore, does not simply represent transatlantic mobility or neo-colonial commerce and emigration as a threat to English life and domestic values, but presents contact between people belonging to English domestic places and international spaces as an opportunity for educating English family circles and exiled emigrants alike in Yonge’s domestic values. While it would seem that Louis’s educational trajectory, which sees him reject patriotic paranoia in the early chapters of the novel, is pre-empted by the transatlantic anxieties that dominate Mary’s and Oliver’s plots later in *Dynevor Terrace*, Louis’s domestic education actually parallels Yonge’s exploration of Mary’s residence in and Oliver’s return from the contact zone of Lima. As the cross-Channel touchstone for British identity fades against Yonge’s South American plots, Louis replaces his preoccupation with France with an engagement in local projects that also feature the themes of exile, the construction of a sense of belonging within the community, and allegiance to domestic values. In “Taming the Tropics: Charlotte Yonge Takes on Melanesia,” Talia Schaffer notes that Yonge often constructs parallels between colonial spaces far removed from the British imperial centre and local English towns where education, employment and health are neglected by England’s stakeholders; in *The Daisy Chain*, Schaffer argues, “Yonge positions Cocksmoor as a local equivalent of Melanesia” (209), thus encouraging the same “missionary cultivation” (210) on the local level that her missionary clergymen conduct far from home.

Marksedge is *Dynevor Terrace*’s version of Cocksmoor, and allows Louis to experience the anxieties Yonge attaches to South America without going far from home. Just as Louis’s exertions of patronage in Tom Madison’s favour and patriotic efforts to cultivate cross-class solidarity against the common French enemy early in the novel distract from the complicated domestic politics of the late 1840s, especially class conflict and the demands of the Chartist movement, Yonge’s depiction of Marksedge as a site to be colonised by an aristocratic patron, Louis, subordinates class politics to national belonging and community. Unlike Melanesia and Cocksmoor, Lima and Marksedge are
not sites of missionary activity, but the focus of the novel’s presiding sense of homelessness, and thus must be integrated into the British community. Like Lima, Marksedge is identified as “the place of exile” by Louis, who feels responsible for the village’s removal in a previous generation away from Ormersfield property and onto an isolated moor “away from all amenities of the poor man’s life” (24). Louis and Mary, moreover, see Marksedge’s inhabitants as an “analogous class” to the “wretched crowds of brown beggars” with whom Mary meets in Peru (30), suggesting that Yonge’s characters read class difference as national and ethnic otherness, even though the Marksedge residents populate the centre of England.

Marksedge’s status as a site of exile and neglect paralleling the non-English spaces that divide Mary and Oliver from home, family and community is introduced early in the novel, even before the mid-point shift away from cross-Channel anxieties about revolution and toward exploring the results of transatlantic movement. Marksedge does, however, also reflect Yonge’s shift in focus and strategy of containing class politics by subordinating them to questions of national belonging and community: early in the novel it is associated with Chartism (74), illegal activity such as poaching, and the problems of exercising legal authority over a population that feels victimised. Louis, for example, interferes to defend a youth in a poaching case (33-38) out of his sense of “common justice and humanity” (34) and in order to protest “against tyranny” (36): although the youth proves to be guilty, Yonge invests Marksedge with importance as a location for contests about “common justice” and “tyranny,” the political preoccupations of the revolutionary era. However, Louis’s emotional investments in Marksedge as the novel progresses begin to cultivate a sense of belonging that extends Louis’s affective commitment to his domestic circle outward into the local community, participating in Yonge’s project of constructing community through domestic values. He brings his father the Earl to Marksedge for the first time, surprising Lord Ormersfield as to “the real aspect of the hamlet” (164): trusting to agents, Lord Ormersfield has never come into contact with Marksedge or its inhabitants, and is shocked at its poor cottages and unhealthy atmosphere (164). He learns, for example, that “there had been a seasoning fever as a welcome to the half-reclaimed moorland; ague and typhus were frequent visitors, and disabling rheumatism a more permanent companion to labourers exhausted by long wet
walks in addition to the daily toil” (164), and finally sympathises with Louis’s suggestion that he lay out his own income in improving the Ormersfield property to provide better employment opportunities for these local labourers (165).

Contact with this “place of exile” (24) therefore provides the same opportunities for building community for Louis and Lord Ormersfield as Oliver’s return from Peru does for Clara and Jem. In addition to building cottages on the Ormersfield estate for the Marksedge labourers’ convenience, Louis takes a farm into his own hands and begins a draining project to create employment (362), while cultivating his affective ties to the community. He is already well-loved by local inhabitants early in the novel, a popularity that arises from “his loving everyone” (87), and the entire community’s pleasure at Louis’s wedding banquet contrasts with the hollowness of Oliver’s display when the Dynevors return to Cheveleigh:

there was scarcely a person present who did not feel ... the right to claim Lord Fitzjocelyn as a personal friend ....

Again and again did the cheers break forth— hearty, homely, and sincere; and such were the bright, tearful, loving eyes, which sought those of Fitzjocelyn on every side, that his own filled so fast that all seemed dazzled and misty ....

The Earl, who had studied popularity as a useful engine, but had never prized love beyond his own family, was exceedingly touched by the ardour of enthusiastic affection that his son had obtained,— not by courting suffrages, not by gifts, not by promises, but simply by real open-hearted love to every one. (483)

By the end of Dynevor Terrace, then, Louis succeeds in transforming a “place of exile” (24) into a community bound by real affection.

Louis’s relationship with Tom Madison, a Marksedge resident, most clearly reflects the parallel Yonge constructs between Marksedge and Peru, as well as Louis’s achievements in producing a sense of belonging to an English community centred on domestic values that overcomes distance and includes people removed from English locales to “place[s] of exile” (24). As discussed above, Tom initially appears as a political radical, urged toward Chartism (74) and class antagonism (1-3) by his consciousness that
Louis has neglected him. However, part of Louis’s experience of domestic discipline teaches him that his actions affect both his domestic circle and the larger community, including members of the working classes, for whom he is an important patron. For example, Louis refers to their shared stone steps project, which he abandons and Tom neglects out of anger, as “the making of us both” (482) since the resulting accident pushes them toward a reconciliation that sets them on their paths for life. Louis shows his continued confidence in Tom by referring him for a manufacturing position (75-80), and advises Tom to take advantage of evening school (80), so that when an opportunity arises for Tom to work for Ponsonby and Oliver in Peru, Tom is selected (201-202).

Again, Yonge uses the problem of national belonging to distract from domestic radicalism and class politics: by engaging Tom in informal imperialist projects, Yonge subordinates his class identity to his Britishness, and suggests that ultimately he can only rise in the world by abandoning Chartism and embracing his national identity. Like Mary, Tom is heavily associated with English identity while in Peru. When he meets Mary at the San Benito mines, his face “carried ... [her] home to Ormersfield in one moment” (330). More importantly for Yonge, he is able to import his Englishness into the mining community, primarily as a result of his continued friendship with Louis and Mary. Mary recognises in Tom’s cabin the signs of Louis’s taste that remind both of home:

It was rudely built, and only the part near the hearth was lined with matting; the table and the few stools and chairs were rough carpentry, chiefly made out of boxes; but upon the wall hung a beautiful print from Raffaello, of which she knew the giver as surely as if his name had been written on it; and the small bookcase suspended near contained, compressed together, an epitome of Louis’s tastes— the choicest of all his favourites, in each class of book. (330-331)

By transforming the interior space of his “rudely built” mining cabin, Tom is able to reproduce Ormersfield in miniature, to replicate an English home in the middle of the Andes. Tom’s ability to import Louis’s tastes as a means of reproducing a sense of English place, moreover, enables him to begin building a community at San Benito. Mary’s pleasure at seeing Tom and his living space encourages her to suggest that he establish an Anglican service for the other English residents of the mining village (333),
and he is pleased with the friendships this effort helps develop the next time he sees her (335). Tom acts as an informal missionary and coloniser of his fellow emigrants, and San Benito becomes a place of cultural colonisation, where Tom’s sense of exile and loneliness are replaced by a community that establishes English institutions as its centre. Rather than rejecting his English past in Peru, as Oliver and Ponsonby at least partially do, Tom affirms his identity by importing English taste and institutions into his new living space.

Yonge emphasises Tom’s ability to import the values of Louis and Ormersfield into Peru by contrasting Tom with the fraudulent emigrant characters Delaford and Robson, who take advantage of poor domestic and commercial management to destroy homes and exploit their positions of trust within the companies and families they infiltrate. Delaford first appears in the novel as Lady Conway’s butler, but is exposed as a fraud when Louis learns he has been leading the young Sir Walter into expensive habits and embezzling the money Lady Conway entrusts to him to manage her household expenses (394-397). After he flees English justice, Louis recognises him as Ford, a new clerk at the Peruvian company (462) involved in defrauding the partners after Ponsonby’s death and in Oliver’s absence. Delaford’s illegal activity is facilitated by Lady Conway’s poor domestic management. As discussed briefly above, Yonge notes that “[t]he Conway family knew rather less about their own servants’ hall than they did of feudal establishments five hundred years ago” (370), suggesting that because of their romantic fantasies the Conways are ill-equipped for the kind of hands-on approach to building domestic and local loyalty and trust that exists between Louis and Tom. Robson, Ponsonby’s trusted clerk, likewise exploits the family and the business, finally absconding with both money and the newly widowed Rosita, having taken advantage of his privileged position in the household to attract Mary’s naive young stepmother (462-463).

Tom, by contrast, exposes the fraud to Louis in the letter that brings him out to Peru (442-444) and earns the good opinion of Lima’s respectable businessmen and diplomats that Robson lacks: “He [Louis] found that the Consul and Mr. Ward had both conceived a bad opinion of Robson, and had wondered at the amount of confidence reposed in him; whereas Madison had been remarked as a young man of more than average intelligence
and steadiness” (461). Louis’s and Mary’s affective investment in Tom thus establishes the ties that keep him aloof from the fraudulent atmosphere of the company, while Ponsonby’s and Lady Conway’s neglect of effective domestic and commercial management allows Delaflord and Robson to infiltrate homes and businesses and embezzle their wealth. Tom’s continued connection to home and the Ormersfield community even while inhabiting a “place of exile” (24) is crucial to the discovery of the crimes and the final reintegration of the community when the crash and frauds cause the dissolution of the Peruvian company and the return home of emigrants like Tom and Mary who have never been completely severed from England and their domestic circles. Although Tom returns to England with the appearance of a “Spanish gentleman” (471) and is described by Louis as “a marvel of Peru” (472), his separation from Ormersfield has cemented rather than destroyed his loyal friendship to Louis and commitment to his English home and community. Louis’s efforts to build affective relationships locally with Tom and other Marksedge inhabitants, like Clara’s and Jem’s attempts to reintegrate Oliver into their family circle, finally demonstrate Yonge’s confidence in the power of domestic values and emotional ties to bind local, national, and even international British communities together and to consolidate a version of British identity originating in the home that can succeed in collapsing the physical distance created by transatlantic movement.

Yonge’s shift from a focus on France and cross-Channel national anxieties in the first half of *Dynevor Terrace* to an exploration of transatlantic emigration and return reveals her decision to move on from the representational legacy of the antirevolutionary tradition. Although Yonge engages with a number of antirevolutionary positions familiar from the other works in this study, including the paranoid insularism of her home defence scenes, the fear of home invasion and subsequent fortification of the home, and anxieties about revolutionary violence as a sexual threat, she minimises and contains the dangers of revolution, while also critiquing antirevolutionary excess. Turning away from France as a site against which the British can define and explore their own identities, Yonge relegates anti-French and antirevolutionary versions of Britishness to the past, and instead tests out British identity within a framework of transatlantic movement. Yet, like many of the antirevolutionary works I have examined, Yonge roots her exploration of national
identity in the family and domestic community. While Yonge suggests that emigration results in a sense of exile and homelessness and return from abroad often fractures families and destabilises domestic communities, she remains confident that efforts to cultivate community through an espousal of domesticity can consolidate a sense of belonging to a British nation even for characters finding themselves removed to “place[s] of exile” (24) from their homes and homelands. Yonge’s move from cross-Channel to transatlantic sites of distance, then, does not finally illustrate a new source of anxiety about British identity in an imperial age, but works as a ratification of her domestic values and an affirmation of a version of stable national identity rooted in the home.
In his introduction to the Oxford edition of *Little Dorrit*, Lionel Trilling remarks on the “force” of the “prison image” that “dominates” the novel, arguing that “the prison haunted the mind of the nineteenth century, which may be said to have had its birth at the fall of the Bastille” (vi). Perhaps the nineteenth-century mind was born “at the fall of the Bastille” as Trilling suggests: certainly the prison is a recurring image in much nineteenth-century British literature, especially by radical, liberal and reformist writers. Prisons like *Little Dorrit*’s Marshalsea or the many prisons—including the Bastille—that appear in *A Tale of Two Cities* point to the abuses of power and institutional inefficiencies that haunt nineteenth-century reformers like Charles Dickens. The Bastille and other prisons are also prominent metaphors for the unjust laws and customs and political inequalities that radical and liberal writers fought against in the 1790s and into the nineteenth century. Helen Maria Williams’s Mons du F— is unjustly imprisoned by his father by lettre de cachet, the symbol of aristocratic and monarchical abuses in old-regime France (114-140), and Mary Wollstonecraft’s Maria is “bastilled ... for life” by the institution of “[m]arriage” (*The Wrongs of Woman* 115). The prison also appears in poetic and philosophical contexts that are not explicitly political, most famously in the “Shades of the prison-house” that represent the restrictions of mortality in William Wordsworth’s “Ode: Intimations of Immortality” (604), an image that Charlotte M. Yonge echoes when Louis describes his cousin Clara’s boarding school as “her prison-house” in *Dynevor Terrace* (97). This “haunt[ing]” (Trilling vi) by the Bastille underlies the literary and political imagination of nineteenth-century Britain.

However, in addition to being “haunted” by the Bastille, a symbol of outdated absolutist power, nineteenth-century literature, as this study shows, is also possessed by revolutionary violence. The most obvious negative symbol of the French Revolution, of course, is the guillotine, as an exchange between Lord Silverbridge, the son of the great liberal statesman Plantagenet Palliser, the Duke of Omnium, and his conservative friend Frank Tregear in Anthony Trollope’s *The Duke’s Children*, reminds us:
“It is only the conservative feeling of the country which saves such men as your father from being carried headlong to ruin by their own machinery. You have read Carlyle’s French Revolution.”

“Yes, I have read that.”

“Wasn’t it so there? There were a lot of honest men who thought they could do a deal of good by making everybody equal. A good many were made equal by having their heads cut off. That’s why I mean to be member for Polpenno and to send Mr. Carbottle back to London. Carbottle probably doesn’t want to cut anybody’s head off.”

“I dare say he’s as conservative as anybody.”

“But he wants to be a member of Parliament; and, as he hasn’t thought much about anything, he is quite willing to lend a hand to communism, radicalism, socialism, chopping people’s heads off, or anything else.”

“That’s all very well,” said Silverbridge, “but where should we have been if there had been no Liberals? Robespierre and his pals cut off a lot of heads, but Louis XIV and Louis XV locked up more in prison.” And so he had the last word in the argument. (439)

This “argument” between Silverbridge and Tregear about whether “prison” or “chopping people’s heads off” is the greater political evil replays the representational contest surrounding the French Revolution that I have traced here, sometimes with both positions even appearing in the same text, as in the competition between Doctor Manette’s Bastille narrative and Sydney Carton’s plot of self-sacrifice at the guillotine in *A Tale of Two Cities*, for example. Tregear’s conflation of “communism, radicalism, socialism, chopping people’s heads off, or anything else,” furthermore, replicates the reductive impulses of antirevolutionary writers like Yonge and Elizabeth Hamilton, who work to contain radical politics and philosophy as much as revolutionary violence.

Yet, by depicting the Revolution as simply concerned with “chopping people’s heads off,” Frank Tregear departs from the central tropes of the antirevolutionary tradition as I have analysed it here: the tropes of home invasion and sexual violence that emerge out of Edmund Burke’s representation of the October Days. After all, the first British antirevolutionary text, Burke’s *Reflections*, pre-dates the Terror and the accompanying
fear of the guillotine. Furthermore, more than the violence of the guillotine, the subsequent antirevolutionary novels I have examined emphasise the related images of sexual assault and domestic attack made famous by Burke’s raid on Versailles: only *A Tale of Two Cities* focuses extensively on the guillotine’s operations. *Memoirs of Modern Philosophers* and *The Wanderer* only feature short and tangential guillotine scenes, while the threat of the guillotine remains offstage in Trollope’s *La Vendée* and does not apply to Yonge’s depiction of 1848 in *Dynevor Terrace*. The October Days image of domestic invasion and sexual threat, conversely, is the centrepiece for Burke’s *Reflections*, the focal point of Hamilton’s disciplining of revolutionary desire through the figure of the seduced Julia, the motivation for Ellis’s continued flight from her male pursuers in Burney’s *The Wanderer*, the climax of antirevolutionary fear in the scenes of attack on Durbellière and Clisson in *La Vendée* and the object of Yonge’s ridicule in the image of the absurd “feather-bed fortress” that Lady Conway wishes to protect herself with (218). Even in *A Tale of Two Cities*, in which the guillotine scene provides the emotional climax, Sydney Carton sacrifices himself for the sake of preserving the domestic sovereignty that is so intimately connected to Lucie Manette’s sexual integrity.

Ultimately, however, the only character in any of these works who is actually the victim of sexual assault is Madame Defarge’s sister in *Tale*, and she is attacked by the aristocratic Evrémonde twins, a victim of old-regime, rather than revolutionary, violence. Although Ellis, Trollope’s Marie and Agatha and others are pursued by sexual violence, they always escape, and Hamilton’s Julia is seduced willingly. This fact points to an important trait of the works I have discussed: the antirevolutionary British novel can never allow its worst fears to come true. The home can always be fortified against the foreign, revolutionary invader, and the royalist woman can always escape through the window in her lover’s arms, as Marie does in *La Vendée*. Burke raises the spectre of home invasion as the rape of Marie Antoinette, only to permit her to “fly almost naked ... to seek refuge at the feet of a king and husband” (71). Particularly in the works most invested in domestic ideology— *Dynevor Terrace* and *A Tale of Two Cities*— the revolutionary violence that threatens the home and the domestic woman must be absolutely defused or diverted by the plots that aim to contain and overwhelm the Revolution. The ultimate goal of the antirevolutionary plot as I see it is to raise the
haunting image of Burke’s October Days, and then to prevent the violence it threatens by retracing Marie Antoinette’s footsteps, escaping through the secret passageways of Versailles. A desire to find a “refuge” (Burke Reflections 71) from violence within the home and within a patriotic British community modelled on the home, a wish to self-fortify, protect against and ultimately prevent revolution, underlies the antirevolutionary text’s emphasis on home invasion and sexual attack instead of the guillotine: Marie Antoinette can escape the raid on Versailles by flying to the King, but neither she nor the antirevolutionary writers I examine can escape the historical facts of the Terror and the guillotine.

The prevalence of the October Days image in this cluster of antirevolutionary works, furthermore, indicates their authors’ interest in conflating the home and the nation. The Queen is both the national mother of the family romance and the ideal domestic woman in Burke’s Reflections. Trollope’s Vendeans go to war to defend their homes and families from an encroaching, violent revolutionary state and fortify themselves against the possibility of reconciliation by retreating behind regional solidarity. Lucie Manette, a figure of compassion and efficient housekeeping, is the last hope for Britain and France, both of which are fractured by suspicion and ruined by mismanagement. The victims featured in radical and revolutionary narratives are frequently attacked from within the home: Maria is “bastilled ... for life” (115) by the institution of marriage and the husband who confines her to the madhouse, and Mons du F—— is locked away by his own father. By contrast, the victims of violence in these antirevolutionary works are assailed by outsiders, typically French and radical, home invaders whose incursions into the private home are equated with foreign attacks on a sovereign nation.

These works, then, exploit the correspondence between two meanings of the word “domestic,” its resonance with both home and homeland.246 In doing so, they use the images of home invasion and violence against the family popularised by Burke to justify patriotism, militarism and xenophobia against the French, radical outsiders who are figured as perpetrators of revolutionary violence. Characters who threaten the home and national community such as Hamilton’s Vallaton and the French Goddess of Reason,

246 “Of or belonging to the home, house, or household; … household, home, ‘family’” (def. 2.a), or, “Of or pertaining to one’s own country or nation; not foreign, internal, inland, ‘home’” (def. 3.a).
Burney’s unnamed commissary and Dickens’s Madame Defarge must be punished and exorcised from the community by the patriotic efforts of heroes like Sydney Carton and Miss Pross, whose militant nationalism is primarily an articulation of affection for and loyalty to the home and domestic circle. However, a few of the writers I have examined here hesitate to wholeheartedly embrace the xenophobic and insular dimensions of the antirevolutionary legacy. Burney, for example, attempts to imagine a family for Ellis that recognises her transnational upbringing and includes both her patriot uncle, Admiral Powel, and her French, Catholic guardian, the Bishop: while French radicals like the commissary are given their due punishment, the fear of the voracious French revolutionary that Burney develops in her depiction of the commissary’s sexual pursuit of Ellis does not extend to the French broadly. Yonge, furthermore, ridicules the excessive, militant patriotism behind the home defence movement, and works to incorporate outsider characters like Tom Madison and Oliver Dynevor into her domestic and national communities. Although she does so by converting the Chartist Tom and independent Oliver to her conservative, domestic values, she also teaches those who already belong to the community, such as Jem and Isabel, lessons about becoming more open and inclusive to individuals with different backgrounds. The antirevolutionary novel, then, provides a forum in which writers could tackle not just political violence, but also the conceptual link between domestic ideology and affection for the homeland and national community.

Finally, by rooting their representations in the exaggerated but dispersible violence of the October Days trope, these antirevolutionary texts are more about the French Revolution’s fictions than its history, more pragmatic than mimetic. Antirevolutionary representations are, in the words Ina Ferris uses to describe the national tale, “less a portrayal of something than a presentation to someone” (11). Strategies of representational violence, such as Hamilton’s, Trollope’s and Yonge’s attempts to contain the Revolution to the past and subject it to their own controlling narrative authority, or the excess emotionalism generated by Burke’s histrionics, Trollope’s melodrama and Dickens’s sentimentalism, contribute to antirevolutionary projects of converting characters and readers to patriotism, conservatism, or even political moderation. Above all, they continually cite each other and return to the conflicts of the 1790s in their efforts to address the traumas of a history of political violence.
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