TELEOLOGY AND AWARENESS IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICAL THOUGHT

by

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Table of Contents

Abstract .............................................................................................................................. vii
List of Abbreviations Used .............................................................................................. viii
Acknowledgment .............................................................................................................. ix

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 - Introduction to the Problem and a Survey of Previous Views ........... 1
1.2 - Some Points About Aristotle’s Critique of Plato ......................... 14
1.3 - Teleology, Function and Awareness ................................................. 24

Chapter 2: Ethical Principles and Moral Education

2. - Introduction ............................................................................................................... 33
2.1 - The Participation of Moral Virtue in Phronēsis
   2.1.1 - Moral Virtue and the Law ......................................................... 39
   2.1.2 - Moral Virtue for the Sake of Phronēsis .............................. 53
   2.1.3 - The “Orthos Logos” and the “Horos” ......................... 71
2.2 - Ethical Principles, Moral Education and the Three Lives
   2.2.1 - Wish, Character, and the Appearance of the Good ............ 84
   2.2.2 - States of Character as Dispositions to Learn .................. 105

Chapter 3: Phronēsis as a Science and the Practical Syllogism

3. - Introduction ............................................................................................................... 115
3.1 - Deliberative Desire
   3.1.1 - Introduction ............................................................................. 119
   3.1.2 - The Temporal Standpoint of Animal Practical Cognition .... 130
   3.1.3 - The Temporal Standpoint of Human Practical Cognition ... 141
   3.1.4 - The Structure of Deliberative Desire .............................. 147
3.2 - The Practical Syllogism
   3.2.1 - Explanatory Reasons ............................................................. 160
   3.2.2 - Phantasia and the Practical Syllogism in the De Anima ...... 173
Abstract

In a famous argument at the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle argues that the function and good of the human being is the "actuality of the soul in accordance with virtue". Presenting a view critical of the widespread intellectualist reading of Aristotle's *Ethics*, in this thesis I argue that the characteristic function of the human being is constitutive of a distinctly human life as a dynamic formal cause teleologically operative in human awareness. I argue for the validity of my own view in a preliminary way in the introduction by way of Aristotle's critique of the Platonic forms.

In the second chapter, I argue that the processes of the non-rational part of the soul are acquired and actively operate once acquired independently of singular dictates of active reason within the individual. By this I mean that the virtues do not obey reason in the sense that they receive individual commands from discursive reason to desire or feel in certain ways. Rather, although the moral virtues are formed gradually by repeated acts of choice, as affective states, they are activated by being affected from without by external stimuli. These external stimuli produce impulses in the soul which are conducive to virtuous action, including a cognitive element: primarily, non-rational and non-discursive evaluative judgments of *phantasia*, which supply a human agent immediately with the ends of his action and the beginning-points of deliberation. These judgments are the awareness of sensible particulars as pleasant.

In the third chapter, I turn to the *De Anima* in order to illuminate the cognitive conditions of human *praxis*. Following on the arguments contained in the second chapter, I argue that there are two primary cognitive moments which are necessary conditions of action. While the ends of desire are immediate objects of awareness and move humans as unmoved movers, motivational desires, which move as efficient causes, are initiated by a distinct cognitive power: proclamations to pursue or avoid.
List of Abbreviations Used

Works of Aristotle

Pol. Politics
Phys. Physics
Meta. Metaphysics
Mem. On Memory and Recollection
DA On the Soul (De Anima)
EE Eudemian Ethics
NE Nicomachean Ethics
APo. Posterior Analytics
De Inter. On Interpretation (De Interpretatione)

Works of Plato

Men. Meno
Rep. Republic
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1.1 – Introduction to the Problem and a Survey of Previous Views

While in our own day it is assumed by many that the Aristotelian writings which have come down to us amount to lecture notes of some kind, compiled and organized into distinct treatises by Aristotle’s successors in the Peripatos in an effort to clarify and preserve for posterity the teachings of their master shortly after his death, none of the principal texts of the corpus evokes the genre of lecture as explicitly as the Nicomachean Ethics. Of the several passages which suggest that the work was at some point presented as a lecture, perhaps the most significant is a passage early in the treatise, where Aristotle delineates which traits a person must possess in order to be admitted as a student of practical philosophy.¹ The Greek word which Aristotle uses for student in this context is, revealingly, “akroates” (ἀκροατής), which means “hearer”. There are several conditions which a prospective student must meet before he can attend lectures on political and ethical matters. In order to take part, a student must: (1) have acquired a well-rounded and broad education, with the result that he possesses good judgment (κρινεῖν) and understands what level of exactness should be expected from the inquiries into ethical matters, given the science to which such questions belong, (2) he must have acquired a certain level of experience, because the content of ethical reflection is drawn from the lived experience of practical situations, (3) he must have lived for long enough to reach

¹ NE 1.3.1094b30-1095a13, NE 1.4.1095a31-1095b13
maturity, not only because it takes time to acquire the requisite experience, but also (4) because it is only once one has reached a certain age that the influence of the passions dwindles and (5) he must have been raised in good habits, because only then will he have access to the self-evident and indemonstrable principles (ἀρχαὶ) of the science.2

Two of these prerequisites, experience (ἐμπειρία) and good habits (ἔθεις), follow directly from the psychology which it is the explicit task of the first section of the Nicomachean Ethics to expound, at least according to one way in which Aristotle divides the treatise, into examinations of virtue, friendship, pleasure and happiness.3 This first section, which comprises books 2-6, is chiefly concerned with the two distinctly human parts of the human soul. Books 2-5 are about the part of the soul which feels and desires, a part not rational in itself, but rational by participation (μετέχουσα). The chapters are preoccupied with the corresponding acquired dispositions (ἕξεις) of this part of the soul, both what are commonly rendered in English as the moral virtues and their corresponding vices. Book 6 is about the part of the soul which is rational and which actively thinks, and whose corresponding excellences are the intellectual virtues.4 The first of these two prerequisites for moral education, experience, is, along with time, somehow associated with learning (διδασκαλία), either because experience and time amount to either the whole or part of learning, or because they are preconditions for learning, understood specifically in a specialized sense, as the manner of education whereby the intellectual virtues are acquired. The second, habituation, is a form of education to which one is

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2 NE 1.4.1095a31-1095b13
3 NE 10.6.1176a30-33, NE 10.9.1179a33-1179b3
4 Some reject the distinctness of the non-rational part of the soul from intellect. See, for example, McDowell (1988) and Lorenz (2009).
particularly susceptible as a youth, whereby one comes to possess the moral virtues, such as courage, temperance, liberality and justice. The association of each part of the soul with these two modes of education brings to mind the opening lines of Plato’s *Meno*, when Meno begins the dialogue by asking “whether virtue is taught; or if not taught, whether it is acquired by practice; or if acquired by neither teaching nor practice, then whether it comes to man by nature, or in some other way”. Aristotle himself poses this question, when considering the views of his predecessors and contemporaries, adding to the list, as Plato does in the course of his *Meno*, both chance and divine dispensation. At least so far as teaching and habituation are concerned, it is clear that to Socrates’ question, Aristotle answers “both”. Virtue is of two kinds, corresponding to the two rational parts of the soul, and each virtue is acquired in a manner appropriate to each, and both are necessary in order for a practical agent to be good and to perform noble actions.

Aristotle’s stipulations at the outset of the *Nicomachean Ethics* concerning who is eligible to be a student of Political Science, and the fact that those stipulations are formulated in terms of both his moral psychology and his theory of education, coupled with the literary form of the treatise as a lecture, intimates a certain correlation of literary form and philosophical content. By the orally communicated arguments contained in his

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5 *Men.* 70a1-3. All translations are mine unless otherwise noted. I have used the Greek texts from the Loeb editions. I have consulted the Loeb editions for my translations of Aristotle, except where otherwise noted. This translation is modeled after Benjamin Jowett’s interpretation in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*.
6 *NE* 1.9.1099b9-11, *EE* 1.1.1214a15-26
7 For a helpful account which locates Aristotle in the 5th- and 4th-century debate concerning whether virtue can be taught, and if so, how, see Bodéüs (1993) 47-51. Bodéüs recounts, not only the various views of sophists of this period, but also traces out the various steps in Plato’s development, attending particularly to the *Laws*, where Aristotle’s views are strikingly similar to those of Plato.
lecture, Aristotle seems to intend to inculcate with *phronēsis* precisely those individuals who are capable of acquiring it, in the precise manner in which it is both acquired and imparted, *viz.*, by teaching (*διδασκαλία*). Aristotle’s explicit remarks about the practical goal and purpose of theoretical reflections on ethical and political matters corroborate this way of understanding what Aristotle hopes to achieve with his inquiry. Nestled amongst the formal conditions one must meet before one can study practical philosophy, is the statement that, in the case of Political Science, “the end (*τέλος*) is not knowledge (*γνῶσις*), but action (*πράξις*)”, and that, for the person who already desires in accordance with right reason (*κατὰ λόγον*), political lectures are very useful (*πολυωφελὲς*). Elsewhere, he declares that “we do not inquire into the nature of virtue in order that we might know, but in order that we might become good (*ἵν’ ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα*), since otherwise there would be no use (*ὄφελος*) in investigating”. The philosophical reflection which the *Ethics* contains is itself in the service of an end beyond itself, presumably, the education of those who are capable of receiving it, those to whom Aristotle gives consent to attend lectures on practical philosophy.

But if conducting inquiries into ethical matters is *only* worthwhile if it serves to make those who participate better, exactly how does philosophical reflection on ethical and political matters enhance one’s capacity to do good deeds? What, by listening to philosophical lectures, is one able to learn, which will improve one’s abilities to do good? For what reasons does Aristotle permit only students of a certain kind to attend and learn from his lectures? How do the enumerated prerequisites equip those who possess them to

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8 *NE* 1.3.1095a6
9 *NE* 2.2.1103b27-29, *NE* 10.9.1179b2-4
learn from the lectures, and why in their absence is one unable to learn from them? Given that the declared purpose of practical philosophy as a whole would appear to be at stake in these questions, it is no surprise that they have generated considerable interest, and widely divergent interpretations, among contemporary commentators.\textsuperscript{10} There are two views which I shall here consider: those of Terence Irwin and John McDowell. I begin with these two views because both of these commentators present strikingly different interpretations of the \textit{Ethics}, while being critics of each other’s views.

For Irwin, ethics, conceived of as one of the Aristotelian sciences, “requires an appeal outside of ethics for the justification of ethical principles”.\textsuperscript{11} Specifically, in order to be secured in their validity, ethical claims and the science of ethics must appeal to the principles upon which the science of Metaphysics is based. Irwin argues that Aristotle’s method in the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} is dialectical, and he qualifies very precisely what he takes Aristotle to mean by dialectic. Dialectic first begins by eliminating falsehood from accepted opinions (ἔνδοξα) for the sake of uncovering first principles and for the sake of establishing a coherent view out of the accepted beliefs. It does this by collating all relevant opinions concerned with a specific subject-matter, subjecting them each to

\textsuperscript{10} Notably, this question did not escape the notice of medieval interpreters, and therefore is not a uniquely modern concern. See Cooper (2010) for a modern reading which, following Pierre Hadot, has attributed to Aristotle a conception of philosophy, in its practical aspect, as a “way of life”, precisely because the lectures have this pedagogical purpose. For another contemporary commentator who has produced the most elaborate and robust interpretation of what Aristotle takes the instructive capacity of his own lectures to be, see Bodéüs (1993). Burnyeat (1980), Reeve (1992) and Kraut (1998) also addresses this question.

\textsuperscript{11} Irwin (1981) 223. For a critique of Irwin’s view, which in forming a contrary position also assumes many of its tenets, see Roche (1988). Roche argues that Aristotle employs a “purely autonomous dialectical method in ethics” (49). The consequence of Roche’s view is that ethical reflection does not depend on claims from the science of metaphysics.
scrutiny individually while also comparing them to one another in search of inconsistencies between them, and purging them of contradiction. In the process of forming a consistent view on the basis of these compiled opinions, certain opinions must be discarded in order to produce a general coherence among them, but, says Irwin, since the opinions are themselves generally true, as few opinions ought be jettisoned as is possible. Irwin compares this process to Wittgenstein’s description of what a properly philosophical program is: by sorting through and scrutinizing opinion, one is, according to Irwin, assessing and comparing our various immediate, common sense views about some particular field of human inquiry in order to purify them of confusion. However, for Aristotle, as Irwin understands him, the task of philosophy is not limited to the cross-examination of opinion. Philosophy moves beyond opinion to an independent measure beyond it which validates opinions as true and justifies them, opinions being of themselves incapable of guaranteeing their own validity. Thus, dialectic passes through and scrutinizes common opinions, which are immediately known, for the sake of uncovering moral principles, which are more knowable in themselves.

Ethical science, for Irwin, poses a peculiar difficulty. Whereas demonstrative sciences proceed from necessary principles which cannot be otherwise, the principles of practical wisdom only obtain for the most part. Dialectic does not itself know first principles, but it is for the sake of uncovering them, and its result is to make them present to our awareness. Once first principles have become accessible objects of apprehension to the dialectician, they are known by what Irwin calls “intuition” (νοῦς). Following

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12 Irwin (1981) 198-200
Sidgwick, who Irwin takes as an elaborator of Aristotle’s view, Irwin defines principles as self-evident propositions which are known without “[need] of inferential justification”. Since ethical first principles, because they are only usually true, cannot be known without inferential justification, but, in fact, require such justification, ethical principle have a greater dependence on the opinions from which they emerge than do necessary first principles. As an example of this dependence, Irwin supplies as an ethical first principle: “we recognize that it is usually just to keep a promise, but sometimes it is not”. Whether it is or is not just to keep promises cannot be derived from the first principle itself, but the proposition must be supplemented by opinion. It follows that, so conceived, ethical “first principles” aren’t first principles at all, inasmuch as they require inferential justification. Subsequently, Irwin discerns a problem which follows from this formulation of the co-dependence of common beliefs (ἔνδοξα) and first principles: it appears that common beliefs are dependent on ethical first principles in order for them to be validated, yet at the same time, our first principles are justified by our common beliefs.

In the face of this problem, Irwin proposes that, beyond the “narrow coherence” of the mutual co-dependent justification of commonly believed ethical opinions and their corresponding first principles, there can be, in addition, a “broader coherence” of justification. He advocates that ethical first principles, which are only true “for the most part”, can receive their justification, not only from opinions, which results in a circular co-dependence of principles and opinions, but from the principles of other sciences,

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13 Irwin (1981) 203
14 Irwin (1981) 206
15 Irwin (1981) 207
which are necessarily and invariably true. Thus Irwin proposes that Aristotle’s ethical theory can rest on and is justified by his psychological theory, consisting of “his conception of the human soul and the human essence”, which is in turn founded in Aristotle’s metaphysics, which comprises “the general account of substance, essence, form, and matter”. Unlike the dialectical method which is proper to ethical reflection, psychological and metaphysical inquiry do not begin from *endoxa*, but instead, it is concerned with devising necessary and irrefutable proofs about the nature of essences. Knowing the human essence and knowing that the human being is rational, both belong to the sciences of metaphysics and psychology, but both can be applied derivatively to ethics, thus providing the basis for both ethical reflection and ethical conduct.

How does an abstract knowledge of human essence provide a philosophically reflective foundation for practical action? Irwin promotes a variation of the inclusivist reading of Aristotle’s view on *eudaimonia*. The inclusivist reading was first posed by J.L. Ackrill in his famous an influential article “Aristotle on Eudamionism”, where he presented his own interpretation as an alternative to Hardie's no less famous and influential "monolithic" or "dominant" end reading. According to the inclusivist interpretation, which has been defended by Irwin, in addition to others such as Wilkes and Price, the feature of human nature from which Aristotle is said to deduce precepts

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16 Irwin (1981) 208
17 Irwin (1981) 194. Irwin begins his essay by distinguishing the “moral agent” from the “moral theorist”, but suggests that there might be good reason, by the end of his article, to see them as inseparable.
18 Ackrill (1973)
19 Hardie (1965)
20 Wilkes (1980), Price (2011)
for practical action is his view that self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια) and completeness (τὸ τέλειον) are identified as two constitutive and necessary features of human happiness. Indeed, these two claims about human nature are taken to refer to the measure of success for a devised belief concerning eudaimonia. The correct conception of happiness is one of a coherent balance of elements, or, in other words, one in which what Ackrill and others after him call "constitutive goods" are integrated into harmoniously unified whole. Precisely what makes such a life self-sufficient, complete and whole is that there is not a conflict between these diverse goods. A happy person, for example, is not one who pursues contemplation at the expense of health, neglecting care for his body in order to engage in a more noble and desirable activity, since such a life would be incomplete because lacking in health. Rather, the happy person is one who recognizes the mutual necessity and inherent complementarity of such goods, and so makes choices in such a way as to maximize the presence of each constituent good in his life, but not to the excesses which would then inhibit one from enjoying goods which are equally necessary, even if less worthy. Continuing the above example, because contemplation is more valuable than health, one ought to be pursue it more than health, but one can be excessive in one's pursuit of it, and if this happens to be so, one's life ceases to be a coherent whole, and so on with each and every constitutive good in relation to each and every other.

This reading, which has been called the “blueprint” interpretation, including by some who advocate it, is so named on account of the consequences which follow for

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21 For a statement of this deduction in Irwin’s article on method, see (1981) 215.
practical reason when *eudaimonia* is conceived in such a way. The view requires that a
practical agent must construct in thought an intellectual conception of what constitutes
*eudaimonia*, or happiness. One can say either that such a conception is formed as a result
of personal experience, for example, by testing out various beliefs concerning happiness
and refining them by trial and error, or that one arrives at such beliefs by withdrawing to
a theoretical standpoint apart from any particular situation in which one might make a
choice pertaining to one's happiness. Regardless, it is essential to the view that once one's
beliefs concerning happiness have been cultivated, they stand apart from any particular
instances where one might pursue it, as the external measure or calculus whereby one
chooses whether to do this or that when one has the opportunity to do a diversity of
distinct actions. The beliefs about the good become a paradigm, model, or an ideal, which
inform the choices one makes, since all of one's choices ought to be made so as to
promote and bring about the preconceived ideal. Subsequently, since this paradigm or
model is present to the mind of a practical agent in his beliefs and is prior to and the basis
for each of his choices and deliberations, i.e., since the good must be known before it can
be chosen or willed, a certain understanding of the relation of thought to desire must
follow. Thought must be capable of rousing desire to ends which thought itself
establishes as worthy of pursuit. Thus, *boulêsis*, which is Aristotle's term for rational
desire and is often translated as "wish" or "will", is understood to be desire for the good,
distinguished from other forms of desire which have pleasure as their goal, the good
being in this or that practical circumstance an end which is born out of one's prior rational
reflections as to what is best for a human being to pursue.23

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23 For Irwin’s view on *boulêsis*, see Irwin (1980) 44-45, 128-129.
John McDowell has been a committed critic of Terence Irwin’s views on Aristotle’s ethical thought.\textsuperscript{24} In many of his articles on the subject, McDowell often forms his own reading of Aristotle against that of Irwin and the inclusivist which is so intimately associated with it. McDowell observes that the inclusivist reading is very hard to reconcile with one of Aristotle’s central claims about both \textit{eudaimonia} and the good for man, namely, that both consist in “the activity in accordance with virtue”.\textsuperscript{25} The inclusivist reading conceives of \textit{eudaimonia} as a generalized condition of life, a life filled with a maximal amount of each constituent good, conceived of as the result of virtuous action. As McDowell observes, according to Irwin’s view, the purpose of the desires which move practical action is to “promote” the acquisition of constituent goods, and therefore happiness, which are both set beyond the actions which produce them as their goal. For McDowell, \textit{eudaimonia} is not a goal set over and against action as the goal which it seeks to realize, but, rather, it is realized \textit{in} the actions themselves. \textit{Eudaimonia} consists in virtuous actions which are chosen and done for their own sake. In this way, McDowell maintains that he is able to uphold Aristotle’s claim that happiness consists in activity in accordance with virtue.\textsuperscript{26}

McDowell is critical of the blueprint view, because, as he sees it, it asserts, falsely, that Aristotle bases his view on “extra-ethical” or “external” validations. The distinction between extra-ethical reflection and the internal mode of reflection which is

\textsuperscript{24} In addition, McDowell often cites Cooper (1986) as an advocate of view which is closely associated with Irwin.
\textsuperscript{25} McDowell (1995) 25. See \textit{NE} 1.7.1098a16-18.
\textsuperscript{26} McDowell (1995) 26
the appropriate mode of practical thinking, falls on the difference between (1) abstract reflections on the “universal” good (i.e., the good, which one knows independently of and in abstraction from the particular situations in which one might act here and now, and to which one self-consciously orders one’s actions, so as to promote it as the result of practical action) and (2) the deliberations about what, in some particular circumstance, is the best end and action to perform here and now.27 McDowell accurately grasps the “blueprint” interpretation when he recapitulates it: practical agents deduce the ends of their particular actions from their devised beliefs concerning the “universal” good,28 with the result that one can err, not only in respect to one’s beliefs concerning what is best to do in some particular situation, but also in respect to one’s understanding of the universal good. In short, extra-ethical validations are reasons which, as a criterion, determine the rightness of right action, while falling outside of practical thinking itself, which, strictly speaking, is directed only with a view towards how to act here and now.

In contrast, McDowell proposes that Aristotle’s ethical reflection is an “internal” reflection, which he also calls by the name of “Neurathian” reflection.29 Importantly, McDowell takes Aristotle to overstate the difference between phronēsis, an intellectual virtue, and the states of character. This is especially the case in a passage such as NE

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27 McDowell (1996) 44-45
28 McDowell (1988) 45. He counts contemplation amongst the implausible “extra-ethical” concepts of the universal end.
29 McDowell (1995) 34-35. “We can picture the intellectual activity that would be involved in moving to the because, on this view, in terms of a version of Neurath’s image of the sailor who has to keep his boat in good order while at sea. In this version of the image, the fact that the boat cannot be put ashore for overhaul stands for the fact when one reflectively moves from mere possession of the that to the possession of the because one has no material to exploit except the initially unreflective perceptions of the that from which the reflection starts.”
6.12.1144a7-9, a passage where McDowell claims that Aristotle “risks obscuring” his own position, when he states that “virtue makes the goal right, practical wisdom the things with a view to the goal.” This passage potentially suggests, to McDowell’s mind, that the domain of non-rational states, which issues motivational propensities, and the domain of reason on the other, are mutually exclusive, thus resigning reason to an undesirable stature: by this reading, Aristotle’s theory of motivation is the Humean one, where ends are simply presupposed, and reason is subservient to them, having nothing more than an instrumental role.\(^{30}\) In contrast, McDowell maintains that the desiderative part of the soul is intellectual, and that the two parts are the constitutive parts of one divided intellect, which in collaborative exertion are able to issue motivational impulses. The “obedience” which Aristotle attributes to the non-rational part of the soul when it has acquired virtue is not a receptiveness to the commands of an external reason to issue desires; rather, \textit{phronēsis} actively, through habituation, forms the appetitive part of the soul, which is to the rational part as matter is to form.\(^{31}\) The result of habituation, then, is that the virtues acquire a certain capacity of discernment, having been inculcated with a conceptual content, “centrally, the concept of the noble”, an integrated content which endows that part of the soul with a capacity to see actions as noble.\(^{32}\)

\(^{30}\) McDowell (1988) 30-1. The translation of the passage from book 6 of the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} is his. I treat McDowell’s interpretation of this passage explicitly in section II.1.3 of this thesis.

\(^{31}\) McDowell (1996) 49

\(^{32}\) McDowell (1996) 52
McDowell adopts Burnyeat’s conceptual categories, when he identifies ‘the that’ with a primitive form of ethical knowledge, and ‘the because’ with its most developed form in an individual, with *phronēsis* or practical wisdom. The internal reflection which McDowell advocates is not extra-ethical because it derives from nothing but the acquired motivational propensities, which, having been cultivated by reason so as to possess a conceptual content, themselves move action to its ends in particular circumstances. The view is not extra-ethical because it does not assume reasons beyond the perceived and desired ends of action which justify them, but, rather, one who has acquired the right moral dispositions through the right upbringing accepts them immediately. It is from this immediate beginning-point that reflection begins. In this way, ethical reflection never departs from the motivations which realize action, and is in fact nothing more than a reflection on them.

**1.2 – Some Points About Aristotle’s Critique of Plato**

The blueprint interpretation is closely associated with what is often called the “intellectualist” interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of motivation. The *locus classicus* for the intellectualist view in 20th-century scholarship written in English is found in the work of D.J. Allan. The hinge upon which swings the difference between the intellectualist reading and non-intellectualist readings is the role of *boulēsis* in Aristotle’s theory of

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33 Burnyeat (1980)
34 Allan (1953) was very aware of the historical origins of his own view in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century scholarship, and, in fact, he saw himself as resurrecting an interpretation which, in his own day, had been neglected. While Allan provides a history of this debate in his article, see also Bodéüs (1993) for an even richer and broader account. Other recent prominent advocates of this view, with varying degrees of difference, include Joachim (1951), Gauthier (1958), Sorabji (1980), Mele (1984), Cooper (1996) and Lorenz (2006).
motivation. Central to Allan’s interpretation is the view that, in the case of purposive human action, "the judgment of the good [precedes] desire";\textsuperscript{35} or, in other words, the good, as the end of particular actions performed here and now, must be known before it can be willed. He substantiated his position by interpreting Aristotle in the following way: by a discursive reflection, practical reason can form a rational judgment or belief concerning what one's good is, and then, subsequently, as the result of its discursive process, it can "issue a command to the appetitive part", initiating in that part of the soul a "wish" (βούλησις) for the end of action. It is only once one has devised a belief concerning what one's good is that desire, in the form of a wish, can be directed towards an intentional object, "an end or aim (τέλος or σκοπός)"\textsuperscript{36} wished for in accordance with one's judgment about what the good is. In sum, reason not only can call on desire to pursue a definite end, in which case its reflections must specify which end ought to be sought, but the exercise of this power of reason is a necessary condition for the distinctly human form of motivation, choice (προαίρεσις), which is the efficient cause of action. \textit{Boulēsis} is a “rational” capacity, inasmuch as reason can initiate from within itself wishes for ends, and so produce a distinctly rational form of practical action, based on beliefs concerning what the good is.

There are many who are critical of both the blueprint interpretation, as well as the intellectualist theory of motivation,\textsuperscript{37} two views which almost always go hand-in-hand. The critics who have observed that those who, like Irwin, have attempted to disassociate

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{35} Allan (1953) 75
  \item \textsuperscript{36} Allan (1953) 75
  \item \textsuperscript{37} To name only a few, Tuozzo (1991), Troels-Engberg Pedersen (1983), McDowell (1996), Moss (2011).
\end{itemize}
Aristotle from the Humean theory of motivation – the view that desire supplies us immediately with the ends of action and that reason is consigned only to determining the means instrumental for attaining to those ends – have rendered Aristotle a Kantian in the process of forming their own interpretations of Aristotle against the Humean view. This is, in fact, reflected in the “blueprint” interpretation, which does bear a striking resemblance to the position laid out in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. The blueprint interpretation attributes to Aristotle a view much like the one which Kant advocates, namely, that thought is capable of formulating, by an abstract reflection (by which I mean an *a priori* reflection independent of any particular situations where one might act) axiomatic rules, whose necessity and truth are founded in thought alone. Subsequently, a subject can apply those universal axioms by deducing from them, as categorical rules, determinate ends of action which an agent can perform here and now in particular ethical situations. Rational agents are capable of determining which ends they ought to pursue, in order to affect change in their immediate environment and to order the world in accordance with their own needs and interests, needs and interests which agents articulate to themselves in thought, by an abstracted *a priori* reflection.

Regardless of how much or how little these various interpretations of Aristotle have to do with the philosophical positions of the historical figures to whom they are attributed, I suggest that it is at least helpful to think about the connections between these various contemporary interpretations of Aristotle in terms of the views of the philosophers who have been associated with them. Much as Kant was famously driven

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38 For example, Irwin (1975) begins his article “Aristotle on Reason, Desire and Virtue” with an objection to the “Humean” interpretation of Aristotle.
out of his dogmatic slumbers after he read Hume, and subsequently went on to form his own position against that of Hume, so too, Hegel famously developed his own position as a critique of the Kantian philosophy. I propose that this can be a helpful way adjudicate between the contemporary interpretations of Aristotle, which I mentioned earlier, inasmuch as it uncovers in Aristotle an internal measure for the validity of interpretations of his ethical view. I take it that, just as Hegel formed his own position in a profound way out of a deeply considered evaluation and critique of Kant’s philosophical standpoint, so too, and by means of similar arguments, did Aristotle form his own ethical position as a correction to deficiencies which he observed in the views of his teacher, Plato.

I believe that those who attribute to Aristotle the “Kantian” view actually attribute to him a view very much like the one of which Aristotle himself is critical and against which he forms his own position, namely, the position of Plato. Jonathan Lear has articulated succinctly and clearly the general force of the Aristotelian criticism of the Platonic ideas in the *Nicomachean Ethics*:

…from a purely formal principle of rationality one cannot derive any substantial conclusions about how to act. A purely rational will would be so divorced from concrete circumstances of action that it would have no basis for making any decisions about how to act. (Lear 156).

I shall provide an interpretation of Aristotle’s critique of Plato in what follows. I intend for whatever merit and validity my claims in the following chapters might have to rest on my treatment of individual passages from the Aristotelian corpus and the coherent view which emerges from their harmonious complementarity. However, as an ancillary and as a general beginning point to my interpretation of the relevant texts, I shall argue that Aristotle’s critique of the Platonic ideas reveals the deficiency of both the blueprint
interpretation and the intellectualist theory of action: such interpretations attribute to Aristotle precisely that view against which he defines his own position. Thus, to the extent that my interpretation of Aristotle’s critique is accurate, I shall indicate the need for an alternative to the intellectualist and blueprint interpretations, an alternative view similar to the one advocated by McDowell.

My purpose in looking to Aristotle’s critique of the Platonic ideas is not to take a stance on the historically fraught question of whether Aristotle accurately understood his master’s teachings, nor to examine whether he represents them truthfully. My present concern only necessitates that I describe how Aristotle depicts the ideas, because, at the present moment, I am only concerned with the Platonic ideas inasmuch as it is a view which Aristotle presents in detail and then consciously rejects. In addition, I shall only look selectively at those of Aristotle’s arguments about the forms which will most effectively convey how Aristotle presents the forms as coming to bear, or failing to come to bear, on practical action.39

On Aristotle’s account, the central deficient and contradictory feature of the forms is their univocality, a characteristic which is identified in most all of Aristotle’s arguments about the forms in NE 1.6, and is in most instances the feature which renders the forms incoherent or contradictory. This is reflected rather evidently in what is enumerated as the second of Aristotle’s arguments against the idea of the good, which I cite only in part:

The word “good” is said in as many ways as being (For it is said in respect

39 I have consulted MacDonald (1989) and Jacquette (1998) in interpreting NE 1.6.
to what it is [i.e., substance], that it is god or mind, and in respect to quality, the virtues, and in respect to quantity, measuredness…) …so clearly the good is not some one common universal term, for it would not be said in many categories, but only in one. (NE 1.6.1096a24-28).

The final remark of this argument most especially reveals what Aristotle assumes about the Ideas when he frames his arguments against them. First of all, the argument assumes, without explanation, the existence of the categories, and deduces that, if there were forms, given their nature as forms, certain limitations would constrict the predication of their correlative terms. The theory of the forms implies that each form is defined according to a single definition (λόγος), such that, if the form of the good existed, the term good would only have one definition, and each and every thing which was good would be good by participation in the form, meaning that it would share in the common definition of what it means to be good. However, as he observes, these restrictions do not in fact apply, as is indicated by observed empirical and linguistic phenomena: if there were a form of the good, the term “would not be said in many categories, but only in one.” It is an apparent fact that the good is predicated of things in different categories, which implies various definitions of the good. For instance, when the term “good” is predicated of god, what it means for god to be good, is different from what it means for the virtues to be good, and therefore, in each instance where the good is predicated in a different category, the definition (λόγος) of the “term” good is distinct. This argument exhibits that the forms are crucially deficient by virtue of their univocality: the univocal and invariable definition which accompanies each form is incapable of accounting for the vast differentiation which prevails amongst particulars of the common kind under which the particulars fall.
I want to suggest that Aristotle also has this point about the univocality of the form in mind when, in *NE* 2.6, he introduces the specific kind of mean which is involved in *technē* and which defines the moral virtues, the "mean relative to us", he contrasts it with the "mean according arithmetic proportion". The “mean according to arithmetic proportion”, as something which Aristotle dismisses as being incapable as a measure for action, features the same univocality which renders the forms inconsistent, in his account of them. In the case of both the mean relative to us and the mean according to arithmetic proportion, the mean is the point equally distant from two extreme values, although the arithmetic proportion specifically is a mathematical relation of several integers whose proportion to each other is determined without reference to any sensible realities which they could potentially quantify and to which they could potentially refer. So for example, if 10 is taken as the higher of the two extremes, and 2 as the lower, 6 is the mean because it is the arithmetic mean of the two numbers. Although this calculation expresses a relation which universally inheres between certain numbers, so far as the average of 10 and 2 will always be 6, it does not necessarily follow that this numerical value will coincide with the mean of virtue or of art in particular circumstances.

40 *NE* 2.6.1106a27-1107a8
41 While this is evidently true in Aristotle’s general statements about virtue (for instance, *NE* 2.8.1108b11-13), as well as his separate treatments of each individual virtue (for example, that courage is a mean state between the excess of confidence exhibited in rashness and the deficiency of confidence exhibited in cowardliness), elsewhere (*NE* 2.8.1109a1-20) Aristotle describes the way in which very often one particular of the two contraries which are opposed to the mean have a special relation to virtue that the other doesn’t. For example, it is rare for human beings to be deficiently capable of enjoying pleasure. However, it is very common for human beings to enjoy excesses of pleasure. Thus Aristotle at times says, for example, that intemperance is *more* opposed to the mean (πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον ἀντίκειται μᾶλλον) than the other contrary which is opposed to temperance, but this does not mean that virtue is any less a mean state.
In order to show the absurdity of assuming such a correlation, Aristotle provides as an example a weight trainer who might determine that, since 10lb. is a large ration of food for someone undergoing a physical training regimen, and 2lb. is a small ration, 6lb. is the mean, and therefore what ought to be administered in every case. But as a matter of fact, 6lb. for one person might be an excessive amount of food, whereas for another, it might not be enough; therefore, 6 lb., as a mean of a certain kind, will not in each and every case be the appropriate amount of food dispense to weightlifters. In this case, the arithmetic mean produces a mean which is relative in a troublesome and contradictory way. 6 lb. is both too much and too little, depending on the person to whom it is given as a ration, thus indicating the absurdity of attempting to ascertain how much food ought to be given by looking to the quantities of food, without reference to those to whom the food is being is given. The fact that the food is excessive relative to one person and deficient relative to another indicates that the arithmetic mean cannot of itself serve as the absolute measure of how much food ought to be given. Instead, it shows that the absolute measure or "limit" lies in the very individuals who are themselves being trained, because it is in relation to them that a quantity is either excessive or deficient.

The art of physical training, therefore, concerns individuals, and it is therefore to these which the art must look when it considers what to prescribe. This is precisely what Aristotle expresses when he speaks of a "mean relative to us" in the case of the arts: the technician looks to a need immanent in the object to be treated by the art, and he then seeks to make up its deficiencies, by supplying to it the precise amount which is necessary in order to do so, a quantity which is neither excessive nor insufficient, but
precisely that which is required by the object in and of itself. It is because this need can vary from individual to individual that the mean according to arithmetic proportion does not serve as an adequate model, and also why art is concerned with particulars. The inability of the “mean according to arithmetic proportion”, as a universal formula, to account for the variations which exist amongst particulars, is precisely the same deficiency inherent in the forms, as Aristotle presents them in NE 1.6. Forms, as self-subsistent and independent realities, are each defined according to a single correlating definition. Each particular participant in a universal substantial idea, to the extent that it shares in the form, itself possesses the property associated with the form only in accordance with the common definition, which is entirely univocal (i.e., all things which participate in goodness themselves possess goodness as it is defined, in only one way, in the form).42 The inability of forms to account for particularity amongst similar things is just as much the crippling deficiency of the mean according to arithmetic proportion.

Particulars vary, and in each particular situation, the mean will be whatever is best for the particular object which at that moment and place is the object of a craft. In this way, art is "objective" in a very literal sense of the word. The truth of an art depends on the sensibly perceived object which it treats, which has a defined characteristics prior to being engaged by a craftsman. Most importantly, the individual, sensibly perceived object has a mean contained within it, for instance, in the case of medicine: because

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42 For an explanation from NE 1.6 of why this is problematic, see NE 1.6.1096b21-26. There, Aristotle describes how the forms are incapable of explaining simple truisms, for example, that what it means for pleasure to be good and what it means for honour to be good are different. The goodness of honour is different from the goodness of pleasure. The theory of the forms cannot account for this kind of plurality.
health is the mean state, not of medicine, as the craft which is employed, but of the body which is healthy, the task of the doctor is to apply to a body whatever is necessary in order for that body to attain to its own proper condition, a condition which is defined, not by the doctor’s deliberations, but by that which is immanently constitutive of the body itself. The doctor’s activity works to “fill up deficiencies” which prevent the body from attaining to its proper excellence, thus realizing a tendency which the body already has in itself, independent of the doctor’s application of his art. When the doctor “hits the mean”, it is not simply because his reasoning is correct, as if technical thought had within itself the measure for its own correctness or incorrectness, but rather, his reasoning is correct because it realizes the inherent tendency of a body, of a sensibly perceived object, towards health. Therefore the arithmetic mean is distinguished from the object which has within itself a mean which serves an internal measure of what is best and ought to be done. The mean in this sense in no way depends on beliefs, formed in abstraction from sensibly perceived individuals, about what remedy ought to be applied in individual situations in order to make up for the deficiencies of those objects. Thus, medicine in its application as a deliberated art, must always begin with something external to the knower, it always presupposes a connection to something in one’s external environment.

I suggest that the description of the “mean of arithmetic proportion”, and the absurdity which follows when it is considered as a paradigm for technical production is closely connected with the last of Aristotle’s arguments when he scrutinizes the forms in *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.6.

It appears that the doctor does not in this way study health [in the abstract], but the man [in the abstract], or, even more so, this particular
man. For when he practices medicine he heals particular individuals. (*NE* 1.6.1097a11-14.)

Given that individuals are irreducibly particular, such that, what it means for each individual to be healthy varies from person to person, abstract reflections on health, the end of action, independent of particular situations where one might apply the medical art do nothing to enhance one’s capacity to practice one’s craft. The beginning-point of productive deliberation and activity must be some sensibly perceived particular, because it is the particulars which the arts heal.\(^43\) I take it, then, that, if my interpretation of Aristotle’s critique of the forms is correct, by rejecting the Platonic position, transitively, Aristotle would also reject the blueprint interpretation and the intellectualist interpretation, inasmuch as all three views are united to the extent that they claim that an abstract reflection, independent of any particular situation where one might act, is a condition of virtuous practical action.

1.3 - Teleology, Function and Awareness

The human function provides the metaphysical and biological basis for the distinctly human mode of life; it identifies, in a preliminary way, that which is constitutive of a characteristically human life, *i.e.*, those actions which most properly define the human as such, in addition to that which defines a good properly human life as opposed to a human life *simpliciter*. For every thing that has a function (*ἔργον*), its function is intimately bound up with its end (*τέλος*).\(^44\) So, for instance, the function

\(^{43}\)This is not to say that practical and technical reason in no way consist of universal knowledge of some kind. I treat this question at various points in the following two chapters.

\(^{44}\)See, for example, *Meta*. 3.2.996b7, or *EE*. 2.1.1219a8, where Aristotle says “the function of each thing is its end”. 
which characterizes an eye and defines it as such is the end for the sake of which it is, namely, its characteristic and most immanently defining activity, which is of course, in the instance of an eye, the activity of actively seeing. While categorically all eyes are defined by this common function, and are so constituted as eyes by their *erga* and end, eyes are distinguished specifically by the fact that some have an excellence, by virtue of which, when they see, they see well, and they are thus called good eyes. To use another example, while all knives are defined by their characteristic end and activity, namely, actively cutting, some knives additionally possess the feature of sharpness, which is the excellence (*ἀρετή*) of knives, in whose presence, when a knife cuts, it will cut well, thereby performing its function well, and is therefore a good knife. In the *Physics*, Aristotle identifies a connection between form and end, when he says that the formal cause and the final cause are the same thing. Aristotle’s famous function argument in *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.7 defines the human good by first identifying what is proper (.getColumnIndex(261, 179)) to the human being, its proper function being its capacity to reason actively.

45 *NE* 2.6.1106a15-19  
46 *Phys.* 2.8  
47 For considerations of this question, see Kraut (1979) and Whiting (1988) 36-38, 47 n.16. Kraut’s article addresses an apparent inconsistency in Aristotle’s argument. Aristotle identifies the peculiar (.getColumnIndex(261, 214)) human function of the human being as the capacity to exercise reason. Kraut finds this problematic: Aristotle deduces the active exercise of reason as the peculiar function of the human being because the human being alone is capable of reasoning; while the human can exercise their sensitive and nutritive capacities, other animals can perform these as well (*NE* 1.7.1097b33-1098a7). What is problematic for Kraut, is that the gods also are capable of reasoning, and therefore, reasoning does not seem to be “peculiar” to the human being at all. Whiting corrects Kraut’s view, to my mind rightly, by rendering the word *idion* not as “peculiar” but as “proper”. Her point is that reason is *idion* to the human being, not by the merely coincidental fact that only the human possesses it among all living beings, as if reason was “peculiar” to the human only in how it stands in comparison with other creatures (as an example, she suggests that only humans prostitute themselves, but we would not want to say that prostitution itself involves the exercise of the characteristically human
then proceeds to deduce from the fact that, since in the case of every function, that function’s good rests on its excellence (ἀρετή), in the case of the human function, as one kind of function, the human good must reside in active rational activity in accordance with excellence.

My central claim in this thesis is that human form is necessarily and always constitutive of human praxis as a teleology immanent in human awareness,49 or, to speak rather anachronistically, in “subjectivity”.50 That is to say, the form which is constitutive of the human being qua human being, is constitutive of individual human beings dynamically in awareness, which supplies, as the immediate perception of particular sensibles as good, the ends of particular actions (πράξεις) in particular circumstances in which the characteristically human activity can be active in actuality (κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν).

According to my reading, one must not lose sight of the common structure which the human function shares with all other functions, viz., that each function is defined by its end. There is a greater self-evidence and obviousness in describing the way in which a knife is constituted and defined -- having the particular kind of “artificial nature” that it does and being the particular of thing that it is -- in connection with its end. The end of

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48 NE 1.7.1098a6-7. Aristotle explicitly states that when he refers to “thinking” as the human function, he means active thinking (κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν).
49 My interpretation of the function argument is deeply indebted to Moss (2010) 68-72. Moss observes the connection between the good as an object of awareness and whose pursuit entails the realization of form.
50 One way in which my view is distinct from that of McDowell is that I place a far greater emphasis on the role of the human function in practical cognition. See, for instance, McDowell (1995) 28-30.
the knife, actively cutting, is something which we can observe easily, and it is easy to grasp conceptually how the end of a knife could constitute it: the material and physical structure of a knife is organized in such a way as to be most conducive to the active activity of cutting. It is less easy to conceive of what Aristotle wants us to think when in the *Physics* he compares artificial beings to natural beings, *viz*., how living organisms are also constituted by the ends that are immanently constitutive of organisms actively doing those things which are most characteristic of them. While in a formal sense, the human function is defined by the active exercise of reason, this function can be and is only realized concretely in particular circumstances in relation to particular ends, and these, I shall argue, are constitutive of action as immediate appearances of the good in the sensory field.

As Martha Nussbaum observes, the human function is not only operative in good, virtuous action, but also in the *praxis* of the non-virtuous. In the “subjective” awareness of each individual, the desire which one has for the immediately perceived ends of their own actions follows as a result of their acquired dispositions of character, moral states which are acquired through processes of habituation. In accordance with one’s character, one makes non-rational, by which I mean non-discursive, evaluative judgments by the cognitive power of *phantasia*. To those who have acquired good, virtuous dispositions of character, the good which appears and which is desired by wish

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53 I follow Moss (2010) 67-68 in using this word in the technical sense of a discriminatory power, translating the word *krinein*.
(βούλησις), which is a non-motivational desire\textsuperscript{54} for ends \textit{qua} ends, will be an end in which virtuous action is realized. To those who have acquired non-virtuous states of character, the end which appears is not an end in which virtuous action would be realized. The significance, I claim, of the fact that the appearance of the good is immediate in the cases of both virtuous and non-virtuous action, is that the end which appears is unconditional from the standpoint of the discursive, deliberative activities which motivate action. It is not until the end appears, as the beginning-point of deliberation, that thought \textit{comes on to the scene}. Furthermore, only deliberation, among the various modes of discursive reasoning, is preceded by the appearance of some end as desirable, and as such it is the only mode of thought capable of issuing motive desires. This is intimately connected with Aristotle’s critique of the Platonic forms, as I have interpreted them: one’s practical orientation towards the ends of action in particular circumstances is not at all conditioned by reflections which occur in abstraction from one’s desiderative propensities (e.g., the appearance of the good) or the discursive processes connected with them.\textsuperscript{55} In fact, in my view, there is no authentically “practical” thinking outside of the

\textsuperscript{54} In this thesis, I use the terms “motivational desire” and “motive desire” in a strict sense. By these terms I refer only to desires which move as efficient causes of action. I shall argue, following distinctions which Aristotle makes throughout the corpus, that motive desires, desires which move bodies from internal principles of motion, are only for “the things relative to the end”, and not for the ends itself. According to my own terminology, cognized ends are not themselves “motivational” because they do not of themselves bestow motive force, but, as moved movers, move only by being the end and goal of efficient desires. See section 2.2.1 of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{55} This explains, I take it, Aristotle’s curious and repeated claim that practical philosophy “is not for the sake of knowledge (γνῶσις), but action (πρᾶξις)” (\textit{NE} 1.3.1095a6, \textit{NE} 10.9.1179b1-3). The philosophical reflection contained in the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} also does not occur in abstraction from the desiderative impulses to act. This is why Aristotle requires his audience to have been raised in the right habits from youth: so that they have the correct desiderative impulses, and are capable of effectuating the reasons, which they acquire through participation in ethical inquiry, in action. As I shall argue in both sections...
deliberative processes which already presuppose one’s connection to one’s proximate, sensibly perceived external environment. This is true both when the end which appears to a subject is an end conducive to virtuous action, and when it is conducive to non-virtuous (or even, vicious action). Thus, form is constitutive of action, even in action’s deviations from what is best, the non-rational human part of the soul being capable of receiving both good (σπουδαῖος) and bad (φαῦλος) acquired dispositions.

What does the awareness of the end of action actually consist of in the case of virtuous action, and how is that awareness connected with the realization of the human function? Practical action raises a peculiar problem. On the one hand, Aristotle explains that practical action (πράξις) is distinct from technical production (τέχνη) inasmuch as, while the latter is a process for the sake of some end other than itself, the former possesses its end in itself, or, in other words, inasmuch it is for the sake of doing well (εὐπραξία), which Aristotle identifies with eudaimonia in several passages. Virtuous practical action is for its own sake inasmuch as the goal of action is nothing other than

II.1.1 and III.2.1, the knowledge acquired through ethical reflection also is not independent of the desiderative impulses to act: one acquires universal reasons which justify and explain the particular reasons acquired from experience and which motivate action. This is distinct from the views of Burnyeat (1980) and McDowell (1996), who suggest that the full ethical content is latent in one’s desiderative impulses (for McDowell, for instance, these have a content both “universal” and “conceptual”), and are made fully articulate to reason by a kind of reflection on them. In III.2.3, I raise numerous objections to their views.

56 The beginning-point of deliberation is in fact a non-rational judgment by phantasia which appears in the sensory field, associated with some sensible object. Aristotle refers to the beginning-point of deliberation as “the ultimate” (τὸ ἔσχατον), and, as a beginning-point, it is known immediately by nous, somehow fused with sensation (NE 6.11.1143b5-6). See also NE 3.3.1112b33-1113a3, where it is suggested that the beginning-point of deliberation is a sensible object.

57 NE 6.2.1139b1-5

58 See, for example, NE 1.5.1095a20 and NE 1.8.1098b21.
that the action should be done well; for example, if it is courageous on some occasion to
hold one’s ground in battle, the end of action consists in doing that action, and the action
is complete throughout the process in which it occurs. According to this description,
praxis closely resembles one of the two forms of actuality (ἐνέργεια) described in
Metaphysics 9. Yet, in another way, practical action is always for the sake of something
other than itself. This is true inasmuch as virtuous action involves rectilinear motion,
particularly, the active motion whose actuality prohairesis, as rational desire, is:
prohairesis is always for the sake of some end which is set over and against it, and it does
not operate for its own sake. In this latter dimension, practical action more closely
resembles the other of the two forms of actuality described in the Metaphysics, inasmuch
as it involves a process which is necessarily incomplete (κίνησις). The content of the
awareness of the end of virtuous action, I suggest, reflects and contains this two-
sidedness of virtuous practical action.

Aristotle explains in Nicomachean Ethics 1.7 that eudaimonia, in addition to
being the actuality of the soul in accordance with virtue, involves both self-sufficiency
(αὐτάρκεια) and completeness (τέλειον). I suggest that the appearances of the good, as
the ends which are constitutive of characteristically human activity, entail both of these
features. Human form, as immanently constitutive of the human being, is most fully
realized in virtuous action, precisely because in virtuous action, form unconditionally
shapes and determines the character of the action. In order to illustrate what this

59 Meta. 9.6.1048b18-36
60 NE 3.3.1112b33. So Aristotle says that “actions are for the sake of other things”, from
which he concludes that deliberation – and subsequently choice – is about things relative
to the ends, not the ends themselves.
unconditionality entails, one might look to the various forms of courage described in book 3 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.\(^{61}\) For example, some are moved to do virtuous deeds, not for the sake of the deeds themselves, but for the sake of pursuing honour or avoiding shame, or because they fear the punitive consequences which will be inflicted on them by their commanders if they disobey their orders. Each of these reasons for acting virtuously and which incite one to act involve some kind of instrumental purpose or utility to the action; they presuppose some need or deficiency in the agent, something which he lacks and does not yet possess, which he would acquire through performing his action. Genuinely virtuous action is beyond need and deficiency, and is self-sufficient and complete, being performed for its own sake. As such, virtuous action performed for instrumental purposes is *conditional* action, conditional on the basis of external dependencies. In contrast, genuinely virtuous action, performed for the sake of the noble, is unconditional: the action is performed for no end other than the full self-sufficient and complete realization of human form in active actuality. In virtuous action conducted for the sake of the noble, form alone is constitutive of actively performed virtuous action, sufficing for itself, unhindered by and independent of external necessities, and without need of something which it does not already possess.

The appearance of the good to a person of virtuous character, therefore, is the appearance of an end both noble and pleasurable. Virtuous action, by being complete (τέλειον), by possessing its end in itself, is accompanied by a certain supervening

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\(^{61}\) NE 3.8.1116a27-33. For an excellent exposition of these passages, see Richardson Lear (2004) 155-157.
pleasure.\textsuperscript{62} The end which appears as a good appears as pleasant even though the
cognized end is itself the end of an efficient motive desire, specifically, \textit{prohairesis}, the
end of a process which is necessarily incomplete. The cognized good appears as pleasant
because in and throughout the process which will be moved by a motive desire, the
process is in another sense complete, inasmuch as it is entirely moved from within. The
appearance of the good supplies specified ends, able to be performed here and now, in
which virtuous action, as a manifestation and realization of the human function, can be
performed.

\textsuperscript{62} \textit{NE} 10.4.1174b14-27
Chapter 2: Ethical Principles and Moral Education

2. Introduction

Commentators widely recognize that theoretical and practical thinking share analogous structures in Aristotle’s discussion of intellectual excellence in book 6 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In the case of theoretical thinking, *epistêmê* is the acquired state (*ἕξις*), which, once acquired, enables one to perform the discursive process of *apodeixis*. 63 Similarly, in the case of practical thinking, *phronêsis* is the acquired state, which, once acquired, enables one to perform the discursive process of good deliberation (*εὐβουλία*). 64 The two discursive processes are similar, although also importantly contrasting, in the way in which they presuppose first principles:

And mind is of [i.e., apprehends] the last things in both modes of cognition. For mind apprehends both the first definitions and the last things, neither of which are reached by reasoning. In the first case, *nous* is of [i.e., apprehends] the first, unchanging definitions of demonstration, and in the latter, in respect to practical things, it apprehends the last thing… for these are the principles and the end… It is necessary then to have perception of these things, and this perception is *nous*. (*NE* 6.11.1143a35-1143b6). 65

The immediate knowledge (or apprehension) of *nous* is necessarily beyond discursive reasoning, 66 in the case of both demonstration and deliberation. The two modes of discursivity diverge in respect to that of which their beginning-points consist: whereas in the case of demonstration, the principles which form the beginning-point of the

63 *NE* 6.3.1139b14-37
64 *NE* 6.4.1140b4-8, *NE* 6.7.1141b10-11
65 For an alternative reading, see Cooper (1986). Cooper rejects the common view that “to *eschaton*” refers to sensible particulars. The advantage of the reading I propose is that it is able to explain why Aristotle would have to claim that *nous* must somehow in some respect be identifiable with sensation, namely, to apprehend the objects which are made present to the awareness of a knower in sensation.
66 Polanksy (2007) 478 argues that the definitions do not even take a propositional or verbal form.
discursive process are most fully abstracted from sensible particulars, in the case of
deliberation, the beginning-point of deliberation is always a sensible particular, somehow
apprehended by nous in sensation. In the case of both practical and theoretical principles,
first principles apprehended by nous are known immediately, meaning that they are
known without a prior explanatory term.\textsuperscript{67}

In \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} 1.7, Aristotle describes how the first principles of
different sciences are acquired through different and distinct means: “of first principles,
some are studied by induction (ἐπαγωγῇ), some others by sensation, others still by some
kind of habituation (ἐθισμῷ τινὶ), and others in other ways. We must endeavour to come
to each in a manner natural to each”.\textsuperscript{68} It is only once one has been habituated, that is,
only once one has acquired good dispositions of character, that the principles unique to
ethical inquiry become \textit{present} objects of awareness to an individual, capable of then
being \textit{apprehended} by nous. There are numerous passages in the ethical writings which
indicate the connection between virtuous states of character and the presentation of the
principles of ethics and deliberation to a practical agent. For example:\textsuperscript{69}

The principle does not appear (οὐ φαίνεται ἀρχή) at all to someone who
has been corrupted by pleasure or fear, nor does he know that he ought to
do and choose all things for its sake; for evil is a corrupter of principle.
(\textit{NE} 6.5.1040b18-20).

But [the good] does not appear (οὐ φαίνεται) except to the good man. For
vice (ἡ μοχθηρία) corrupts and makes false things concerning practical
principles. (\textit{NE} 6.12.1144a34-36).

\textsuperscript{67} Aristotle explains why first principles must be known in themselves without being
known through some prior explanatory term in \textit{APo}. 1.3.72b5-18.

\textsuperscript{68} \textit{NE} 1.7.1098b3-5

\textsuperscript{69} For systematic treatments of the passages which suggest that the principles of ethics
appear to the one who has acquired virtue, and do not appear to those who have not, see
especially Tuozzo (1991) and Moss (2011).
For virtue preserves the principle and vice (μοχθηρία) destroys it, and in practical matters the first principle is the end of action. (NE 7.8.1151a15-17).

Recent commentators,\(^{70}\) who have sought an alternative to the intellectualist reading, have been especially attentive to Aristotle’s claim that the principles of ethics are said to “appear”, that they are made present by the discriminating cognitive power of phantasia. They have cited passages which spell out the full difference between phantasia and opinion (δόξα):\(^{71}\)

The thing desired and the thing wished for is either the good or the apparent good. Therefore, the pleasant is desired, for it is either an apparent good, or something good. For some suppose (δοκεί) it to be good, for others, it appears good even though they do not suppose (δοκεί) it to be so (for phantasia and opinion [δόξα] are not in the same part of the soul). (EE 7.2.1235b26-29).

Unrestrained men desire (ἐπιθυμοῦσιν) things other things than those which they wish for (βούλονται), for instance; he desires what is pleasant and harmful for himself against what he believes (τῶν δοκούντων) to be good. (NE 9.4.1166b8-10).

These passages indicate that the moral virtues, as states concerning what one finds pleasurable or painful, present the ends of action, and do so operating independently of discursive thought processes. Indeed, one’s thoughts can even be at variance with one’s desiderative impulses to act, as is the case in akrasia, because the cognitive power which presents the desired ends of action, and the cognitive power to think, are distinct, belonging to different parts of the soul.

In this chapter, I present an interpretation of the cognitive and affective powers of

\(^{70}\) Notably, Segvic (2009) and Moss (2010), (2011).

\(^{71}\) See also DA 3.3.428a20-28.
the moral virtues. My interpretation of the role of the moral virtues in Aristotle’s moral psychology is unlike the one which is asserted by those who espouse the intellectualist reading of Aristotle’s theory of motivation. To put it concisely, the difference between the intellectualist reading which I oppose and my own interpretation, is that where the intellectualists claim that the desired end of action is the result of a discursive process, I claim that the desired end of action can only be the beginning of practical discursive processes. It is more commonly thought that the contribution of virtue to action is that its presence ensures that an agent will be able to conjure up the motivational impulse necessary in order to carry out a desired goal, the failure of which is most fully exhibited in the akratic or "unrestrained" individual. According to this view, virtue is not at all responsible for specifying which goals ought to be sought by practical action, rather, this operation belongs solely to reasoning alone. Another less conventional view maintains that, even though the moral virtues do have a perceptual power to determine critically which ends ought to be desired as goals, in order for reason to effectuate itself as action, it must call upon the irrational part of the soul to produce the impulse to act. According to this interpretation, the desiderative part of the soul plays a necessary conative role in practical action in addition to a cognitive role. My own view turns the more conventional reading upside down: moral virtue ensures that the object of wish is correct, and therefore virtue does possess a cognitive role. Since boulēsis by itself has no direct motivational power, moral virtue is not conative of itself, at least so far as distinctly rational forms of motivation are concerned (i.e., leaving aside whatever way in which the passions and the emotions might influence action). If virtue is not itself responsible for inciting the

72 Allan (1953)
73 Fortenbaugh (1964) 80
impulse to act, some other power of the soul must be capable of inducing the motive
desires associated with practical action. I allude to this power – *prohairesis* – in the
second chapter of this thesis, but I treat it directly in the third.

In the first section of the chapter, divided into three sub-sections, I consider three
distinct occasions where Aristotle presents apparent instances of circularity (or circular
“logics”). My intention in all of these three sections is to make one key point. The
processes of the non-rational part of the soul are both acquired, and actively operate once
acquired, independently of singular dictates of active reason within the individual. By this
I mean that the virtues do not obey discursive reason in the sense that they receive
individual commands from it. Rather, they are obedient to reason in the sense that (1)
they are affective states, determined by habituation to be affected in certain ways
according to reason, and (2) in the sense that when they are activated by an external
stimulus, the impulses which they generate are conducive to virtuous action. In the first
sub-section, I address a chicken or egg problem: since *phronēsis* and the moral virtues are
co-dependent, one cannot be good without possessing one without the other. With this in
mind, it is not immediately clear how one comes to be in the individual soul before the
other, as it seems that, in each case, one must possess one before one can possess the
other. I argue that looking at the question in its political dimension can clarify the
problem. My solution shows the qualified independence of moral virtue: the virtues can
exist in individuals independently of *phronēsis*, inasmuch as one most always comes to
possess moral virtue before one is even capable of acquiring *phronēsis*. In the second
section, I address a circularity related to the acquisition of virtue, particularly, the famous
problem that one must do virtuous deeds before one can oneself become virtuous (i.e.,
acquire virtuous dispositions of character). In this sub-section I most directly elaborate an
alternative view to the intellectualist interpretation of the function and role of moral
virtue. In the third sub-section, I treat a problem which has been widely considered in the
scholarship, the problem of the horos and the orthos logos, which frames Aristotle’s
treatment of the intellectual virtues in book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics. Since most
commentators have examined the pertinent passages from an intellectualist perspective,
they have not been able to see that there is in fact an apparent problem of circularity. My
interpretation of the horos and the orthos logos, which depends on and derives its
persuasiveness as an interpretation from my account of the non-rational part of the soul in
the next two chapters, is also intended to support my claims in those chapters.

In the second section, which is divided into two subsections, I describe the four
basic human\textsuperscript{74} character-types which Aristotle treats in the Nicomachean Ethics: the
virtuous, the enkratic (“self-controlled”), the akratic (“unrestrained”) and the profligate
individuals. My central claim in the first subsection is that the cognition and desire of the
end do not themselves incite the movement of the body. I shall argue that wish is unique
because it is the only form of desire, which, without also being a form of cognition, is a
desire for ends as such. Because wish is only for ends, and not for the things “for the sake
of some end” (\(\text{ὅ ἐνεχύτινος}\)),\textsuperscript{75} it is best labeled a non-motivational form of desire: it

\textsuperscript{74} This is to distinguish from the “beasts” who, though taking a physical human form,
lack mind and therefore are not human in the proper sense, or the divine human beings,
which Aristotle describes at the beginning of book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics.

\textsuperscript{75} This phrase is used to describe choice, which, as a motivational desire, is not for the
end itself, but “for the things relative to the end” (\(τὸ \text{τὰ πρὸς τέλος} \tau \text{έλος}\)).
does itself bestow or initiate any direct efficient force which moves the body of a practical agent. In presenting my argument, I look to both the chapters on animal self-movement in the *De Anima* in addition to the treatment of akrasia in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. This anticipates the central claim of the interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of motivation which I present in the third chapter of this thesis. I shall then argue that there are two distinct cognitions involved in practical action: first, the cognition of the end, and then a judgment of pursuit or avoidance, which issues the desire which has the efficient power to move the body. In the second sub-section of the first chapter, I look to a question which has garnered much attention by contemporary interpreters of Aristotle. I consider on what basis Aristotle excludes certain character-types from participation in his lectures on ethical philosophy, particularly, how their psychological constitutions prohibit them from achieving the practical purpose which is the goal of practical philosophy.

### 2.1 - The Participation of Moral Virtue in Reason

#### 2.1.1 - Moral Virtue and the Law

At the outset of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle states that the goal of the science to which ethical and political inquiry belongs, Political Science (πολιτική), is not merely the accumulation of knowledge, but accumulation of a knowledge which can be applied in action. In the final chapter of the work, Aristotle again restates that formula which articulates a defining feature of Political Science, and considers how the practical knowledge which has been accumulated from the preceding philosophical reflection

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76 For a contrary view, see Cooper (1996) 267-270, (2010) 215-217. For Cooper, *boulēsis* is a motivational form of desire, particularly, one which has the good for its ends because the ends of the desire are determined in accordance with beliefs about value. For Cooper, as well as for Irwin (1980) 44-50, the good, rather than pleasure, is the object of intellect and wish because *boulēsis*, unlike non-rational forms of desire, is formed by belief.

77 *NE* 1.5.1095a6
might be practically applied. The argument having by its final chapter nearly reached its terminus, Aristotle looks back on what it has already achieved. He enumerates the various departments of ethical inquiry, all of which he has just examined separately -- happiness, virtue, friendship and pleasure -- and considers whether by having examined each of these several topics sufficiently (ἵκανῶς), the investigation that he had proposed at the outset of the work is not yet complete. Happiness, virtue, friendship and pleasure, as separate branches of the inquiry, have each been elucidated and brought to sufficient clarity; however, the investigation is not yet complete because knowledge on its own does not satisfy the demands of the discipline to which scientific inquiry into human affairs belongs. While the immediate, or proximate goal of \textit{politike} may be to obtain knowledge about political and ethical matters, its remote or ultimate goal, for the sake of which knowledge is attained, is the application of that knowledge in some form of action.\footnote{Bodéüs (1993) 125. I owe to Bodéüs the distinction between the “proximate” and “remote” goals of ethical inquiry, a distinction which he himself borrows from Günther Bien.} Therefore, when it is noted that the subdivisions of practical philosophy have each been treated exhaustively, it is likewise announced that the proximate goal of conducting ethical inquiry has been achieved. But since, due to the practical orientation of the science, knowing (τὸ ἐἰδέναι) is not alone sufficient (ἵκανὸς)\footnote{NE 10.9.1179b4} for achieving the ultimate goal of Political Science, another phase of the inquiry must now be carried out in order to realize the remote goal of practical philosophy, namely, a phase in which what has been learned can be implemented in action: "we must endeavour to possess and
practice [virtue], or in some other manner actually ourselves to become good". 80

So far as what follows the opening of the final chapter of book 10 is taken to be an effort to explain in greater detail how practical knowledge can be implemented in practice, few of Aristotle’s claims in that chapter suggest that he thinks there is a possibility for the dispositions of individuals to act to be transformed or substantially affected simply by hearing lectures on practical philosophy. Listening to lectures on practical philosophy can protreptically excite those who have already been born into nobility and who have already been raised in good habits to engage actively in good conduct. 81 But this response to hearing oral arguments does not entail any kind of transformation of the individual (as if one who was not already good became good by hearing orally communicated arguments), but, rather, it is only the appropriate response for a soul which has already been conditioned in a certain way. Teaching and argument, as modes of inculcating intellectual virtue, are variously effective on pupils, 82 in accordance with their diverse states of character because the capacity to listen to and learn from lectures is itself conditional on the basis of having acquired certain

80 NE 10.9.1179b3-4. See also NE 2.2.1103b26-29. Both of these passages, where Aristotle claims that we conduct practical philosophy so that we ourselves might become better are important for Cooper (2010), who argues that, not only is practical philosophy conducted in the interest of the lawgiver, but also in the interest of those common citizens who share in the life of the polis. Cooper claims that it is one-sided even to say that the purpose of ethical reflection is more so conducted for the sake of educating aspiring lawgivers than the private citizens. Alternatively, for Bodéüs (1993), the audience of the lectures is composed exclusively of aspiring statesmen.

81 NE 10.9.1179b7-11

82 See Bodéüs (1993) 97-106 for a detailed description of how orally communicated arguments can and cannot be effective in teaching.
dispositions, and on these hinge whether one is good or bad. In this way, the acquisition of habits is prior to and a condition for the acquisition of intellectual virtues. Inasmuch as we conduct philosophy in order that we ourselves might become good, Aristotle turns towards the art whereby individuals are inculcated with virtue, whereby they are capable of becoming good, viz., the legislative art. Lectures are not transformative because they are capable of themselves making those who listen to them good, but because they contribute to the acquisition of an art which enables those who practice it to make others good.

After having expressed why it is worthwhile to acquire a scientific knowledge of the legislative art, rather than a merely experiential knowledge, Aristotle asks, "from whom or how can the science of legislation be learned?" He notes that the sophists claim to be able to teach even though they do not themselves display the possession of political ability in their actions. The politicians (πολιτικοί) seem more likely candidates than the sophists, given that most arts, for example medicine and painting, are learned from those who actually practice them. The sophists, unlike the politicians, do not actually practice the science of child-rearing, even though they profess that they are able to teach it. Although politicians exhibit in their actions a certain know-how based on experiential knowledge, they neither purport to be capable of teaching others the abilities which they possess, nor do they in fact teach others, as is evinced by the fact that they

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83 See the beginning of section 2.1.2 of this thesis, where I treat explicitly the connection between moral dispositions and goodness or badness.
84 See NE 10.9.1180a14-1180b28 for a description of the relationship between the art of legislation and the art of child-rearing. They serve the same purpose, namely, the inculcation of habit in youth.
85 NE 10.9.1180b28-30
don't write treatises on politics, and that they don't make their sons or other friends into statesmen; given how valuable the benefits of being good are, Aristotle infers from the fact that statesmen don’t teach others to be good that they can’t teach others to be good. Therefore, neither of the two classes of people who are most likely able to teach are in fact able to do so.

Both the inability of statesmen, or *politikoi*, to teach, as well as their possession of empirical knowledge, reveal that they are uniquely disposed to receive a scientific knowledge of *phronēsis*, especially in its legislative form, through teaching. On the one hand, they already employ their empirical knowledge in their political engagements, indicating that they already possess experience, enabling them to act according to reasoned opinions, while also possessing those preconditions which are required of anyone who is eligible to participate in lectures on *politike* as students. On the other hand, the fact that they are incapable of teaching indicates that they do not yet possess a scientific knowledge of *politike* themselves, and thus that there is a knowledge which they do not yet possess which would benefit them if they did. One might recall a passage from the *Metaphysics*, where Aristotle says that “generally a sign of knowing or not knowing is the capacity to teach, and for this reason we believe that art is more so knowledge than experience. For those who have acquired art can teach, but those who have not cannot”. The *politikoi* do not yet possess those universals which would raise their knowledge of practical affairs to the level of scientific knowledge, to the level of art.

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86 *NE* 6.8 is devoted primarily to distinguishing *phronēsis* in its legislative (*φρόνησις νομοθετική*) form from the form it takes in individuals (*ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα*).

87 *Meta*. 1.1.981b7-10
and this shortcoming is reflected in their inability to teach.

The conclusion of the *Nicomachean Ethics* clearly indicates that in the work’s announced sequel, in the lectures concerning constitutions, political institutions and laws which are to follow the lectures on the distinctly human parts of the soul contained in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle will conduct a study whose purpose is to impart scientific knowledge to those who have already attained the requisite experience. Since neither the sophists nor the politikoi are able to teach the science of legislature, Aristotle himself must break new ground in treating this subject-matter philosophically: “as then the question of legislation has been left uninvestigated by previous thinkers, it will perhaps be well if we consider it ourselves”. In doing so, he will inculcate his students by “study” (θεωρητικῷ) with knowledge both universal and scientific, through which they will acquire the science of legislation in its most fully realized form. One might note that these remarks are placed at the very conclusion of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in the midst of describing a new inquiry which lies beyond the present treatise as its sequel, thus suggesting that they do not pertain to the treatise in which they are written, but rather, only to its sequel. On the contrary, these remarks illuminate certain methodological claims which preface Aristotle’s treatment of the virtues in books 2-6, thus suggesting that there is a continuity uniting the *Nicomachean Ethics* with its announced sequel. In *NE* 1.13, Aristotle says that much as the more honourable doctors are those who have acquired a knowledge of the body, so too, only “the true statesman” (ὁ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν

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88 *NE* 10.9.1181b13-15
89 *NE* 10.9.1180b22
πολιτικὸς has studied (θεωρητέον) the soul.\textsuperscript{90} Reading these passages from \textit{NE} 1.13 in light of \textit{NE} 10.9 clearly suggests that the course of study on which Aristotle embarks at the beginning at the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, and which comprises examinations of virtue, friendship, pleasure and happiness, is itself intended to assist \textit{politikoi} by endowing them with a knowledge which more fully realizes their capacities to perform their characteristic function. This transformation consists in inculcating aspiring lawgivers with a universal and scientific knowledge of the soul, which will be an aid towards better attaining the goals of the art of legislation in practice, \textit{viz.}, the inculcation of a citizenry with good habits by drawing up good laws.

As Aristotle states in \textit{NE} 1.13, the physician must become acquainted with the organization of the body and its parts in order to attain to a universal and scientific understanding of medicine which enables him to become most proficient at restoring bodily health to his patients.\textsuperscript{91} So too, the statesman, in order to acquire a scientific, universal and applied knowledge of statecraft, must become acquainted with the soul if he is to attain a scientific practical knowledge which would enable him to found good laws. The intention (τὸ βούλημα) of all legislation, Aristotle says, is to make citizens good by habituation,\textsuperscript{92} which reveals not only that the acquisition of virtue and the laws are closely connected, but it also indicates how knowledge of the soul might be beneficial to a lawgiver: if a legislator knew the best possible condition of the soul, he would then know that the best laws would be those which are most conducive to inculcating citizens

\textsuperscript{90} \textit{NE} 1.13.1102a18-27  
\textsuperscript{91} \textit{NE} 1.13.1102a18-27  
\textsuperscript{92} \textit{NE} 2.1.1103b3-7
with the best acquired dispositions of character. Alternatively, if he knew the worst conditions of the soul, he would know not to establish laws which promote those more deplorable conditions. In the context of the present chapter I cannot offer a very robust account of how the philosophical content of the *Nicomachean Ethics* can be understood to be either scientific or universal. However, there are several interpretative problems which I think can be answered most effectively by looking at the treatise in its political dimension. Specifically, there is a detail at the core of Aristotle's moral psychology, which, as commentators have observed,\(^9\) appears to entail a vicious circularity and threatens to render it incoherent. Approaching the question of this circularity from the standpoint of the political dimension of ethical inquiry, particularly, from the standpoint of the role of the lawgiver in forming the characters of young citizens, will do much to dispel a seemingly paradoxical aspect of Aristotle's moral psychology.

The apparent circularity involves the co-dependence of moral virtue and practical wisdom (φρόνησις). On the one hand, it appears that virtue is defined by practical wisdom. This is conveyed by the concise definition of virtue in *NE* 2.6, where it is stated that virtue is a mean state, "defined by reason, such as the practically wise man (φρόνιμος) would determine it".\(^9\) Moral virtue is defined as a mean state between two extremes, and, in every case, practical wisdom is constitutive of virtue because it is responsible both for determining what the mean is and for affecting the desiderative part of the soul so that it conforms to it. On the other hand, when Aristotle states that "virtue

\(^9\) For example, Smith (1996) and Sorabji (1980). Both interpreters, for different reasons, deny that ultimately the logic is an irreducibly circular one.

\(^{94}\) *NE* 2.6.1107a1-2
makes the goal right, and *phronēsis* the things towards it (τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον)

he clearly denotes the dependence of *phronēsis* on moral virtue. In order for *phronēsis* to begin its characteristic activity of deliberation, there must already be some end which it presupposes and about which it deliberates. The puzzle at issue is a simple chicken or egg problem: each of moral virtue and *phronēsis* seems to presuppose the other in order for each to carry out its characteristic function. It is unclear which comes first: whether one somehow precedes the other in some manner despite their mutual co-dependence, so as to shatter the semblance of circularity. The moral virtues can only supply *phronēsis* with the ends about which it deliberates after *phronēsis* has determined it as a mean state, but at the same time, *phronēsis* cannot begin to deliberate until moral virtue presents it with its end. In what follows, I shall argue that both sides of this question – whether there is some priority on the part of either *phronēsis* or moral virtue which can break the circular logic of their co-dependence – are best addressed when considered in their connection to the role of the statesman and his practice of the legislative art.

The active function of the legislative art presupposes a certain continuity between nature and the nomoi with which a lawgiver inculcates his citizenry. David Keyt has argued, in contrast with the view which I shall shortly outline, that Aristotle’s claim that the polis comes to be by nature entails an irreconcilable contradiction gone unnoticed by

95 *NE* 6.12.1144a8-9
96 For a full defense of this claim, see chapter 3.
97 *NE* 6.12.1144a8-9. Other passages expose acutely the problem which I am outlining. See also *NE* 6.13.1144b30-32 and *NE* 6.13.1145a2-5, where Aristotle says that one cannot possess *phronēsis* without moral virtue, nor moral virtue without *phronēsis*. For another passage which expresses the mutual co-dependence of *phronēsis* and moral virtue, see 10.8.1178a16-19.
Aristotle. According to Keyt, Aristotle fails to recognize that it is inconsistent to claim both that the *polis* comes to be by nature and that the legislator plays a central role in the organization of the *polis*. Since the organization of the *polis* requires the work of the legislator, whose work constitutes the exercise of a craft, Aristotle should have noticed, says Keyt, that the opposition of nature and craft which he observes in book 2 of the *Physics* prevents him from claiming that the *polis* is natural. The full development of the *polis* requires the technical work of legislature, as an efficient cause, at the exclusion of nature, as an internal principle of motion, to bring about its complete realization. In my view, Keyt’s interpretation fails to grasp a crucial aspect of, not only the legislative art specifically, but *technê* generally.

Two statements, one from the *Politics* -- “for the deficiencies of nature are what art and education seek to fill up” -- and another from the *Physics* -- “generally art partly completes what nature cannot bring to a finish, and partly imitates her” -- suggest that nature and art are ordered towards a common purpose and end, leaving room for a continuity between natural and technical processes, despite the fact that they contrast as modes of efficient causality. Sometimes nature is incapable of bringing its own processes to completion by its own efficacy, and when that occurs, art can be employed in order to complete what nature could not on its own. But the fact that the efficient cause which generates and unifies the *polis* as a composite whole is not a natural efficient cause, but

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98 Keyt (1987)  
99 See *Phys*. 2.1  
100 *Pol*. 7.17.1337a2-3  
101 *Phys*. 2.8  
102 Cf. *Rep*. 341e
an efficient cause arising from technical production, does nothing to change that in both
cases the end achieved is a natural end. The work of the legislative art, then, is not
opposed to nature, but rather, it serves to realize tendencies inherent in nature, which
nature, as a principle of motion, cannot realize by itself. Much as medicine, as a form
of technical production, assists a body in realizing its own innate tendency towards
health, a tendency which bodies cannot always fully effect by their own power, so too the
legislative art, through education, serves to bring to full fruition the human soul’s

103 Meta. 1.1.980a22. One might think here of the innate desire of all human beings to
know, a desire which, in the course of the first chapter of the Metaphysics, culminates in
theoretical contemplation, in the fullest and most complete realization of human life. I
take it that this natural desire to know is an internal principle of motion, by virtue of
whose presence the human being has within itself the efficient power to realize from
within itself its full development and realization, i.e., to bring about its full maturation
from out of its most nascent stages. Desire, as a motive force, strives, in the human’s
undeveloped conditions, to overcome its estrangement and separation from its most
mature state, and in striving, brings the soul through all of its phases of development and
ultimately to its completion. Therefore, as the inherent tendency to mature, the end is in a
certain sense present both at the beginning of human growth and through all of its stages.
In the course of the argument of the Metaphysics’ first chapter, the presence of the end at
the beginning is manifest in the love that humans have in their own senses, i.e., in the
most primitive form of knowing, which indicates that the love of knowledge is an
intractable feature of human nature, expressing itself even when it can only do so in a
relatively unsophisticated way. As I go on to show, the human is not capable of passing
through the gradual process of maturation self-sufficiently. The human’s inborn
propensity to mature requires an organized program of education in order for it to attain
to its complete fulfillment, which is perhaps both why Aristotle says that human beings
are by nature political animals, i.e., because humans are dependent on others to attain to
their completion, and why they have a natural impulse (ὁρμή) to form partnerships in
political communities (Pol. 1253a30). I cannot, in the context of this chapter, defend
these theses. For a fuller treatment, which is actually rather unlike my own, of the natural
desire to develop in relation to Aristotle’s description of man as a political animal, see
Kraut (2007) 202-207. Kraut sees the natural impulse as one among the other impulses,
e.g., the impulses cultivated by habit. In contrast, I take the natural impulse to be an
inchoate impulse which is superseded and brought into a more complete form by habit.
inherent desire to attain to its full development and maturation, a result which youths cannot bring about unaided.

In the *Politics*, Aristotle observes that a hierarchical order exists among the parts of the human soul: among the primary parts into which the human soul is divided, a non-rational part capable of obeying reason, and a rational part which itself thinks, the end (τέλος) of the human being resides in the best part, that is, the part which is itself rational. He states in this context that amongst “the works of art and nature”, the worse is always for the sake of the better. Later, when Aristotle addresses the question of whether programs of education first ought to develop the habits of young men or the rational part of their souls, he effectively explains how, in the case of the parts of the soul, the worse part might serve the better. The lawgiver ought to follow the natural pattern of human maturation in devising programs of education. Since in the natural course of human development, the capacity to desire develops at a much earlier age than the capacity to think, young men ought to be trained in the right habits before they are able to be inculcated with the intellectual virtues. But even though, by natural necessity, the acquisition of the moral virtues must come before the acquisition of the intellectual virtues in time, the intellectual virtues are nonetheless prior in another sense. Aristotle says that mind is "the end of nature" (ὁ νοῦς τῆς φύσεως τέλος), i.e., the

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104 Pol. 7.4.1325b40-1326a8  
105 Pol. 7.13.1133a16-23  
106 Pol. 7.13.1133a23  
107 Aristotle on several occasions in the *Ethics* observes a special connection of moral virtue and youth. See, for example, NE 2.1.1103b24, NE 2.3.1104b10-14, NE 10.9.1179b32-34.  
108 Pol. 7.13.1134b16
full, natural development of the human being, in which what is most properly
characteristic of the human is most fully realized, consisting in the full development and
actuality of mind. Therefore, the lawgivers ought to look to the full maturation of the
human being when designing programs of education for the youth: lawgivers ought to
inculcate citizens when they are young with habits in anticipation of their full
development, habits which will be conducive to and promote the full activity of mind
when at a later age their mental capacities mature. In other words, even though the moral
virtues exist in the individual soul before the intellectual virtues do, the virtues of the
non-rational part of the soul, ought to be ordered to mind as its end, even when mind has
not yet fully come into existence; the best moral virtues are those which are “for the
sake” of mind.109

Looking to the role of the art of legislation in the development of human beings, I
suggest, can dissolve the interpretative difficulty which I alluded to earlier, the question
of the circular co-dependence of phronēsis and moral virtue. While human beings possess
an inherent tendency towards their full maturity and development, that propensity is not
necessarily reflected in the desires which they might have at a given moment in their
youth. To this effect, Aristotle says:

And it is difficult to obtain the right education from youth up without
being brought up under the right laws; for to live temperately and hardily
is not pleasant to most men, especially when young. (NE 10.9.1079b32-
34).

109 Pol. 7.13.1334b
The propensity which fledgling human beings might have towards their full development as a remotely desired end does not necessarily manifest itself in the ends which they desire proximately, or, in other words, what the young happen to find pleasant and painful before they begin to cultivate virtue does not necessarily promote the acquisition of virtue. In fact, says Aristotle, it is more typical that, in youth, human beings not only do not desire and find pleasant what is most conducive to their full maturation, but they very often even find it painful and therefore resist it. The need for the law follows from this: the law is “a compulsive force emanating from some practical wisdom and mind” (ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὁν ἀπό τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ),\footnote{NE 10.9.1180a22-23} which is able to bend youthful passion to reason, and thereby inculcate in the young moral virtues which, at a later stage of development, will be conducive to and promote the operations of mind, most especially and most directly, the operations of phronēsis.\footnote{See Keyt (1987). He argues, following J.A. Stewart, that when Aristotle says that man is by nature a political animal, it does not mean that by nature man is endowed with the capacities required for social and political life, but that he has the capacity to acquire those abilities by nature. I add to this the following: given the inherent tendency of man for political life requires the compulsion of law in order to be realized, the term “political animal” also denotes that the full realization of man can only occur within the polis, inasmuch as the proper development of the human being cannot come to fruition without the cultivation of habit wrought by political institutions.}

An answer to the question of the circular logic and the co-dependence of moral virtue and phronēsis has, I think, emerged from these considerations about the role of the lawgiver and the law in education. While in the individual, the moral virtues come to exist in the soul before phronēsis in time, and thus exist temporally prior to phronēsis, practical wisdom is nonetheless logically prior to the moral virtues, inasmuch as the
moral virtues come to be for the sake of phronēsis. However, even though phronēsis is generated subsequently to the moral virtues in the individual soul, practical wisdom is not posterior in time according to the whole. Practical wisdom exists in the mind of the lawgiver and in the laws prior in time to the emergence of the moral virtues in the young, and therefore, in another sense, phronēsis is prior to moral virtue even in time.

### 2.1.2 - Moral Virtue for the Sake of Phronēsis

The claim that moral virtue is for the sake of mind, a claim which Aristotle also makes elsewhere in his ethical writings,\(^{112}\) is intimately connected with another, more famous circularity, specifically, the question of why one must have the acquired state of virtue in order to act virtuously. Aristotle identifies and explicitly addresses this apparent problem himself, when, at the beginning of NE 2.4, he raises an aporia after having described in earlier chapters how the virtues are cultivated. If the moral virtues are acquired by performing precisely those activities which the virtues enable one to perform, i.e., if someone becomes courageous (i.e., comes to possess courage as a state of character)\(^{113}\) by doing courageous deeds, whoever becomes virtuous must be capable of acting virtuously before he possesses the character-state of virtue. But if someone is already capable of acting virtuously, why does one need to acquire virtue at all? Aristotle’s answer in NE 2.4 is cryptic, and poses more questions than it answers. There are three formal conditions which must obtain in order for action to be virtuous: (1)

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\(^{112}\) See, for example, EE 8.2.1248a29 and Pol. 7.13.1334b25-28.

\(^{113}\) For an explanation of why one “is virtuous” by possessing virtue as a state of character, see my interpretation of NE 6.12.1144a11-22 at the conclusion of section II.2.2. It is clear from NE 1.5.1095b27-1096a4 that Aristotle thinks that one is capable of “possessing” virtue as an acquired state independently of one’s active exercise of one’s virtuous state of character in action.
virtuous action must be done with knowledge, (2) it must be chosen, and chosen for its own sake, and (3) it must stem from a moral disposition. Although Aristotle identifies these formal conditions in response to the puzzle which he had already raised, merely delineating virtue as a necessary condition of virtuous action is hardly a satisfying answer to the initial problem. One is left wondering why virtue is a necessary condition of virtuous action; that is, what virtue contributes to the action of the truly virtuous person, and what is absent in the actions of those who perform virtuous actions without having developed virtuous states of character. In what follows, I shall attend to this second problem about circularity by attending to certain metaphysical features of acquired states (ἕξεῖς). In doing so, I hope to explain in what way the moral virtues are for the sake of phronēsis.

The part of the soul which receives the moral virtues and their corresponding vices is without any inherent determination, except for the capacity to receive determinacy by a process of habituation. The need for the inherent indeterminacy of the non-rational part of the soul is exemplified in the stone which is thrown upwards a thousand times without being altered, i.e., without adopting the inward tendency of moving upwards; or in fire, which is by violence forced downward against its own natural tendency. It is precisely because the stone and the fire already have their own inherent propensities to move in certain directions, because this tendency defines them and inflexibly makes them what they are, that they are incapable of acquiring the contrary tendencies, namely, in the first case, to move upwards, or in the latter, to move downwards. Because the stone, for example, by nature, or necessarily, possesses the
tendency to move downward, its movement upward only occurs when an act of violence is exerted upon it, thus indicating how this inherent tendency, as a property of stone, stands in relation to its contrary. The act of violence constitutes a form of negation: the stone's own intrinsic tendency cannot be preserved when a direction contrary to its own is imposed upon it. Its intrinsic movement can only be suspended when, from without, it is compelled into a direction other than its own, but its inevitable return back to earth only affirms that it has not assimilated, through that violence, a trait contrary to what is had already possessed.

What does it mean for the moral virtues to be acquired states, and by what part of the soul are they acquired? As acquired states of capacities belonging especially to the non-rational but human part of the soul, virtues and vices differ from the intractable and inherent tendencies of inborn capacities, inasmuch as they are not properties possessed by nature, or innately, but properties acquired and received neither by nature nor against nature (οὔτ᾽ ἀρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν). This follows from Aristotle’s categorical distinction in *NE* 2.1: whereas capacities (δυνάμεις) such as sight are possessed by nature, such that one can actively exercise them immediately from one’s birth, the virtues are acquired. The potential states which receive the virtues are of themselves without any inherent, definite quality, in respect to precisely that to which they are receptive, and are therefore capable of receiving multiple definite characteristics.

The alteration whereby the potential states become determinate coincides

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114 *NE* 2.1.1103a24
115 *NE* 2.1.1103a27-33
approximately with what commentators often refer to, in relation to *De Anima* 2.5, as the transition from a “first potentiality” state to a “first actuality”. Indeed it is an essential and defining feature of dispositions, as “first actuality” states, that they are acquired. This is indicated by the relation of virtues to the capacities (δυνάμεις) to feel emotions and desires, which is addressed, in the course of his investigation, when he provides a generic definition of virtue in *NE* 2.5. In this context, he briefly considers whether it is possible for the virtues themselves to be either capacities (δυνάμεις) or emotions, and he concludes that they cannot be either: they can only be states (ἑξεῖς). While one possesses in a purely formal sense the undifferentiated capacity to feel a certain emotion or desire *by nature*, the precise character of those emotions and desires, how much or how little this particular person feels in response to occurrent stimuli, is the purview not of the capacity, but of its corresponding disposition, precisely *because* that specification cannot inhere by nature. For example, a human being might be capable of becoming angry *simpliciter*, by virtue of being endowed with the capacity to be affected in that way. However, the *degree* to which he is angered when affected by some external stimulus is determined, not only by the intensity of the stimulus, but also by the acquired disposition to be affected *in a certain way and to a certain degree*. Thus, in *NE* 2.5, Aristotle distinguishes capacities, which are possessed by nature, from virtues: virtue and vice involve goodness and badness, but since goodness and badness are properties which cannot be possessed by nature, the virtues must not be possessed by nature. The virtues are distinguished from the capacities, for the very reason that are they not innate, but they

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116 *DA* 2.5.417a22-417b28

117 See also *NE* 1.13.1102b3-13, where Aristotle determines that nutritive soul cannot be a distinctly human part of the soul, because it is not receptive of contrary determinations, specifically, the determinations of good and bad.
can only come to be in the individual soul by being acquired, importantly, through a process occurring in time, specifically, through habituation. The dispositions, then, are posterior to the unadulterated capacities, at least in time in the individual, because they are specifications of precisely how the capacities are activated and affected in particular circumstances, in a particular practical agent, who has acquired some specified disposition.

Because the natural capacities to feel and desire do not possess one of either of the contrary characteristics innately, they are capable of receiving any determination within the range of two opposed possibilities, or in other words, they are able to receive either of two contraries, rather than already possessing only one. In less abstract terms, because the capacities in the earliest developmental stages of human life do not inherently possess either of their corresponding particular virtues or their correlative vices, they are capable of acquiring, in respect to each particular virtue, either of the vices, or some other determinate state lying in between the two vices which constitute the two extremes, including the virtue which lies at the midpoint. To put it concisely, because the irrational part of the soul is in and of itself indeterminate, it is beyond contrariety in a way that the elements are not, not already possessing a contrary, but capable of receiving either of two contraries. One might at this point recall *Metaphysics* 9.2.1046b4-13, where Aristotle distinguishes rational powers (δυνάμεις) from non-rational powers. Rational capacities are able to produce either of two contrary effects, a positive state and its privation; for example, medicine is able to produce both health and its privation, disease. Fire is an example of a non-rational power, which, so far as it produces anything, can
only produce one property in whatever it affects, namely, heat, and it cannot produce the contrary property, coldness.

One might be tempted to count the capacities receptive of virtue and vice amongst the rational powers, for the reason that they are receptive of contrary affects. However, if it is correct to call the potential states of character rational potencies, it is not because the potential states of character are self-affective, as if they possessed in themselves a rational capacity to generate contrary affects, but because the states, as capacities, are defined by being able to be passively affected in contrary ways by rational powers which are other than and distinct from themselves. The fact that potential states of character are essentially states which are passively affected by other rational powers is prominently displayed in various images which Aristotle employs to illustrate how virtues and vices are formed in an individual soul, particularly at *NE* 2.2.1104a12-27:

First then it must be observed that the moral virtues are of such a nature that they are destroyed by excess and defect, such as we see (ὁρῶμεν) in respect to strength and health (for it is necessary to explain the visible by the invisible images). For excessive exercises and deficient exercises destroy strength, and similarly, too much or too little food destroy health, but things conducive to health and strength, make, augment and preserve them. (*NE* 2.2.1104a12-27).

In this passage, Aristotle uses certain *technai* as images to describe the precise manner in which states of a certain kind are passively affected, following the methodological principle that “it is necessary to explain the visible by the invisible”. By this, Aristotle

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118 I take it that this is Aristotle’s point exactly at *NE* 5.1.1129a12-17, when Aristotle contrasts acquired states with faculties (δυνάμεις) such as *epistêmê*.

119 *NE* 2.2.1104a12-27

120 *NE* 2.2.1104a14
means that there is a commonality between how parts of the body, under specific
descriptions (e.g., health, or fitness), and as states (ἕξεις), are affected, and how the
psychological states of character are affected. The alterations of the bodily states are
perceivable by sensation and are therefore more immediately and easily knowable than
psychological states. Bodily states and states of character share a common structure,
whose features I shall describe in the coming paragraphs. Because of this common
structure, Aristotle is able to employ a pedagogical device when he outlines features of
the states of character. While bodily states are tangible and perceivable, states of
character are incorporeal and can only be known as conceptual abstractions, and are
therefore less knowable to us; however, because they share a common structure, the
states of character can be known through bodily states, which are known by sensation.

Aristotle selects very carefully the crafts which he uses to illustrate the receptivity
of psychological states of character. Not all technai have the same relation to states as the
processes of reasoning which produce states of character, and therefore, Aristotle chooses
only technai which are similar to and thus can illustrate the generation of virtues and
vices. For example, Aristotle does not have medicine in mind when in this passage he
mentions an art which, when it observes the mean, is conducive to health. Even when a
doctor is his own patient, the art of medicine directly alters the states over which it
presides as its object. One who practices medicine first deliberates about how he will
affect a bodily state, and once he has completed his calculations, by a single act of
choice, his action conforms the state which is the object of his art to the form present in
his mind.\footnote{\textit{Meta.} 7.7.1032a13-1033a23} This, however, is not the pattern or structure which defines either the arts described in \textit{NE} 2.2, or of the production of moral states. Instead, in that chapter, Aristotle has something like an “art” of dieting in mind, or at least a rationally-based calculus which determines at some given moment what would be an excessive amount of food, what would be a deficient amount, and what would be just the right amount.

The difference between such a calculus from crafts such as medicine is that the former does not immediately affect the \textit{hexis} which it presides over, as if it were directly the object of its activity. Rather, such a calculus is outwardly directed, as a measure which determines how one ought to act towards objects in the immediate environment of the agent, rather than to the state which is affected by such actions itself. A weight-lifter, to use another one of Aristotle’s examples, cannot by a single act of will decide in a moment that his muscles ought to be augmented. Rather, by repeatedly performing actions of a certain kind, the weight-lifter gradually alters his body, not directly, but indirectly. While one does choose each of one’s individual actions in relation to external objects, one is incapable of affecting the correlative \textit{state} corresponding to the action directly by a single act of choice. In the case of moral dispositions, the states, residing in the soul, are only affected as an accidental and accumulative consequence of repeated outwardly-directed action, actions and choices in relation to objects outside of the soul.\footnote{See \textit{NE} 3.5.1114b30-1115a3, where Aristotle states a similar principle in relation to acquired states of character. While we are aware of our actions as we do them “from their beginning until their end”, we are not aware of each additional alteration wrought to our characters as the result of each individual one of our actions.}

Thus, one can only form one’s character gradually and indirectly, through repeatedly
making choices of a similar kind in relation to objects in one’s immediate environment.\footnote{Kosman (1980) 112-113. Kosman is right to point out that for Aristotle it is philosophically significant that our characters are formed by repeatedly making deliberate decisions. Aristotle observes that, if we possessed our characters by nature, and did not somehow have a hand in shaping them, we could not be responsible for our own actions, given the prominent role of our characters in forming our actions. Only if we are also accountable for our characters, even if only remotely, can we also be responsible for our actions. The following section of this chapter (2.2.1) will make clearer how our character influences our actions.}

Later passages in the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} display the common features of psychological states of character and bodily states, such as health or fitness, in a way which illustrates some of the more counter-intuitive consequences which follow from the prominent role which Aristotle gives to \textit{hexeis} in his moral psychology. Specifically, in \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} 3.5, Aristotle uses several medical analogies in order to clarify certain features of moral states.\footnote{\textit{NE} 3.5.1114a12-22, 1114a22-30, 1114b30-1115a3} The most notable of these analogies stresses the inability of agents to affect their states of character by direct acts of will (βούλησις). Just as much as one cannot choose at a given moment to be healthy, as if by a simple act of will one could alter the condition of one’s body from being ill to being well, one cannot alter one’s character by \textit{wishing} to change it. I take it that Aristotle here assumes that the fixity and lack of plasticity of states such as health and moral virtue is a property which belongs to them by virtue of being states: they are only able to be altered through a very specific kind of procedure, which I have already outlined.

While the point that he makes about health in our bodies is rather banal, it is quite striking that he finds that same fixity to be just as much a feature moral states. In several
passages from *NE* 2, Aristotle defines moral states as states of the non-rational part of the soul which are concerned both with pleasure and pain, and with “being affected and actions” (περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις). The person who has come to acquire a courageous character is the kind of person who finds doing courageous deeds pleasurable, and who finds doing cowardly or rash deeds painful. The effect that this general feature of states has in the case of moral states specifically is that one is not capable of choosing at any present moment what one finds pleasurable and painful, or, how one is affected passively, by which I mean, how one feels emotionally when affected from without by some external stimulus. When, at some one present moment, one is passively affected, one is brought to feel pain or pleasure, fear or confidence, desire, love, anger and so on, the extent to which one feels such emotional states is determined by the states of character which one has already acquired through habituation. Someone who has acquired virtuous

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125 *NE* 2.6.1106b17. For an excellent extended treatment of the meaning of this phrase, see Kosman (1980), who compares moral states as capacities to affect and to be affected to the account of poiein and paschein in *On Generation and Corruption* 1.7. A full consideration of moral virtue (“first actuality” moral virtue, not “first potentiality” moral virtue) would attend to the virtues under the description of passive states; a being affected which psychologically and experientially coincides with the feeling of emotion. 126 I cannot treat in detail the connection of the emotions, or the passive affections of the non-rational part of the soul, in relation to the cognitive power to discern that something is either pleasurable or painful. As I shall soon argue in a subsequent section of this thesis, the discrimination of an end is intimately connected with one’s states of character. However, my treatment does not account for how the discriminating power is associated with and results from the affectivity of states of character. For example, it seems likely that, in the case of courage, the extent to which one feels fear and confidence will determine what appears to someone as pleasurable. For example, a timid soldier standing in a phalanx, racked with fear, will most likely, given his emotional constitution, find fleeing and breaking rank to be pleasurable, while at the same time finding holding his ground painful, because of his emotional condition. In other words, the extent to which one does or does not feel fear and confidence when one is affected by the some external stimulus, determines what one finds pleasurable and painful at some moment. These causal relations are not deliberated, dictated by a self-conscious reasoning, but rather, they all occur prior to and without any rational processes.
states of character, such as courage for instance, will feel “what is necessary, and for the sake of the right things, in the right manner and at the right time”, whereas the vicious will feel either more than or less than what is necessary. Therefore, the “mean” is not a measure of action present in the mind of a practical agent as a concept, which he uses to regulate his practical calculations and deliberated actions, but rather, it is immanently constitutive of virtue as a non-rational and affective moral state. The possession of virtue ensures that the passions of a virtuous person are those which are conducive to virtuous action: so far as they are passive states, states of character are fixed hexeis concerned exclusively with how we are disposed to feel in relation to external stimuli, independently of our occurrent deliberations.

Consequently, at any present moment, when one feels, one is incapable of altering one’s feelings or desires by a deliberate choice: when one feels or desires, it is an irrevocable and inalterable fact, which one cannot change by one’s own deliberate efforts, that one feels and desires whatever and to the extent that they feel and desire at that moment. This is because, from the standpoint of the present moment, one’s moral states, which determine one’s affections, are themselves fixed and rigidly defined, and therefore, so too are the emotions and desires which stem from them. This is the striking aspect of

127 3.7.1115b17-19. See also 3.12.1119b16-18. Because he has acquired the virtue of temperance, the temperate man “desires (ἐπιθυμεῖ) the right thing in the right way at the right time, which is what principle ordains”. His non-rational desires are correct, as a result of having acquired temperance, but he does not necessarily act correctly. That his epithumia is correct indicates only that the desires issued directly by the non-rational part of his soul are correct. However, in order for his action to be virtuous, he must additionally be moved by a rational motivation to act, viz., choice.

128 For a contrary view see Lorenz (2009). Lorenz does not think, at least so far as the Nicomachean Ethics is concerned, that Aristotle associates the moral states of character
Aristotle’s assumption of the common structure of bodily states and psychological states. While it is obvious that one cannot make oneself healthy by a simple act of will, one might expect that humans would have a greater control over their inner emotional states than over their bodily states, if only because of the greater intimacy and closeness of proximity of our emotional states to our wills than to our body. For Aristotle, that isn’t the case: our affections are “not up to us” so far as the present moment is concerned, but only from the standpoint of the long stretches of time that it takes for habituation to occur. All of this about the moral virtues comes to a final point: in whatever way the *phronimos*, according to the definition of moral virtue in *NE* 2.6, is able to shape the non-rational parts of the soul receptive of formed moral states, in effect, producing virtuous states by “determining” or engendering them with the mean, it will not be by any single act of choice.\(^\text{129}\) Likewise, the moral states do not issue pain and desire and various other affective psychic conditions at the urging or at the command of the rational part of the soul,\(^\text{130}\) but they issue feelings *only* as a result of being passively affected by external

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129 For an alternative view, see Kraut (1989) 335. For Kraut, the mean is not an immanent constitutive component of the non-rational part of the soul, but rather, a general rule which is known conceptually by practical reason, and serves as the basis for reasoning to determine how to act here-and-now. With the mean known by reason, one can then form one’s desires in accordance with a rationally devised judgment as to how one’s feelings ought to be given the actions one must perform.

130 This is a popular intellectualist interpretation of the relation of practical reasoning to the moral virtues. See, for instance, Allan (1956), Mele (1984). For both Allan and Mele, practical reasoning is able to give the irrational part of the soul an order to issue *boulēsis*. These interpreters often look to the initial description of the two human parts of the soul in *NE* 1.13, where Aristotle uses the word “obedience” to describe the relation of the non-rational part of the soul to the rational. For an account which thoroughly explains five different interpretative possibilities of how virtue is receptive of practical reasoning, see Korsgaard (1986).
stimuli in the environment of the agent, independently of the dictates of active thinking.

While a state is capable of receiving contrary determinations through a specific procedures, once such a determination is fixed and a state takes on a definite character, it can only produce one effect, and it cannot produce its contrary effect. To use one of Aristotle’s examples, a body may be capable of receiving either one of two states, health or the lack of it, but once a body has acquired the state of health, by virtue of the presence of that state, the body’s movements and activities can only be performed in a healthy manner, in accordance with the state, and they cannot be done in an unhealthy manner.\(^{131}\)

This is another instance where bodily states illustrate a defining features of psychological states (ἐξεῖς). The moral virtues have a special connection with boulēsis, a form of desire which plays a very prominent role in Aristotle’s theory of motivation.\(^{132}\) In the same way that health can produce only healthy acts, so too, good character states can only produce wish for the right things, and bad character states can only produce wish for the wrong things. In book 5 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle states that:

We see that everyone says that justice is such a state from which people become agents of just deeds, which causes them both to do just things and to wish for them. In the same way also concerning injustice, unjust states are those from which men wish for and do unjust things. (NE 5.1.1129a6-10).

\(^{131}\) *NE* 5.1.1129a12-17

\(^{132}\) Whether boulēsis is a form of desire issued by the irrational part of the soul, or the rational part of the soul, is unclear. The passage from *NE* 5.1.1129a6-10 suggests that boulēsis is issued by the irrational part of the soul. Other passages suggest that it is a rational desire, such as *Topics* 4.5.125a13. For a fundamentally philological argument that boulēsis is in fact not a non-rational form of desire, see Lorenz (2009) 183. Irwin (1980), Cooper (1988), (1996), (2010) and Lorenz (2009) interpret boulēsis as a distinctly rational form of desire, issued by the rational part of the soul: Cooper calls it ‘reasons own desire for the good’.

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Up until this point, I have described moral virtues under the description of being affective states. Before they have acquired definite states of character, the non-rational part of the soul has initially only the potential to be able to be affected by some external stimulus, although it is potentially able to be affected in multiple distinct ways, in accordance with the multitude of ways that the non-rational part of the soul can be determined by habituation. Once the part of the soul has acquired determinacy as either virtue or vice, it can only be affected in one way, in accordance with the condition of the moral state. However, the special relationship that moral states have with wish indicates that there is a feature which defines moral states in addition to their affectivity. Moral states are also defined by possessing, albeit indirectly, cognitive, or discriminating, powers.

Having by now provided an interpretation of the role of the moral virtues as affective states, and having alluded to the cognitive aspect of the moral virtues, I can now address the primary question of this section. That is, I can explain how the moral virtues are for the sake of the reasoning part of the soul, and, most especially, how they are for the sake of phronēsis. My answer to this question will depend substantially on my treatment in the upcoming section of how the principle (ἀρχή) of right deliberation appears, and my account of prohairesis in the next chapter. Although the passage from NE 5.1 suggests that states of character coincide directly with the objects which one wishes for, moral states and wish are not directly related, but rather, they are related through another term. Moral states do not directly issue wishes for the ends of actions. Rather, wish is only issued once it is presented with the appearance of some good through the non-discursive and non-rational discriminating power of phantasia. Neither
states of character, as affective states, nor wish, as a form of desire, are themselves evaluative powers, which can discern independently without the aid of a cognitive power what the object of wish ought to be. Instead, the cognition of the goodness of some object takes the cognitive form of an appearance, so that how the good appears, i.e., what the end is in each case when it is cognized, stems and results from the kind of character one has. Wish is not in itself an evaluative power, because it is not by wish itself that some agent judges that something is a good, but rather, by the non-rational critical evaluation of phantasia, which, as I shall argue in a later section of this chapter, is performed in close connection with the state of one’s character, i.e., whether one is virtuous or vicious.133

The indirectly cognitive power of moral virtue and the status of moral virtue as a hexis prohairetike, are both intimately connected with the sense in which moral virtue is “for the sake of” phronēsis. There are two passages, both from Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, which are particularly pertinent to my answer to the question:

"Hence inasmuch as moral virtue is a disposition of the mind in regard to choice (ἕξις προαιρετική), and choice is deliberate desire, it follows that, if choice is to be good, both the principle must be true (τὸν τε λόγον

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133 There are several ways to explain what makes the cognitive discernment of “ethical values” appear as the result of character. Burnyeat (1980), for example, describes the immediate cognition of the noble as a residual affect of one’s moral upbringing by habituation. By learning how to ski well through processes of habituation, one also learns, not only how to ski well, but also to want to ski well. Burnyeat’s view differs from mine to the extent that he does not emphasize the specific role that phantasia has in perceiving ends, although he does recognize the states of character’s “cognitive” ability to perceive “ethical values”. I provide an explanation of the causal connection between states of character and cognition of desirable ends in an earlier footnote (see footnote 125), where I follow the suggestion of Kosman (1980) 109, when he states that the connection between the affective and cognitive sides is not merely an accidental one.
ἀληθῆ) and the desire right (τὴν ὀρεξίν ὀρθὴν) and the thing proclaimed (τὸν μὲν φάναι) and the thing pursued must be the same things". (NE 6.2.1139a23-26).

Now the cause of action (the efficient, not the final cause) is choice, and the cause of choice is desire and reasoning and mind directed to some end. Hence choice necessarily involves both intellect and thought and a certain disposition of character. (NE 6.2.1139a32-34).

The first of these two passages clarifies the meaning of the controversial phrase which Aristotle uses twice in the Nicomachean Ethics to describe the moral virtues, the term "hexis prohairetike". The passage indicates that there is a connection between “right desire” and moral virtue; namely, it implies that moral virtue makes the desire right. The phrase “right desire” is important in the context of NE 6.2. Importantly, the phrase does not describe the motive potential of desire, as some have argued. According to those interpreters, moral virtue ensures that the appetitive part will issue desires corresponding to reason’s order, when reason issues a command to the appetitive part of the soul to desire in accordance with the prior reasoning of deliberation. These commentators, in observance of Aristotle’s claim that “thought by itself moves nothing”, take the desiderative impulses, which produce motion in the form of efficient causes, to spring exclusively from the appetitive part of the soul. Even rational desire, they say, has its proximate origin, as a desire, in the desiring part of the soul, even if that principle of motion is remotely initiated from the reasoning part. The “right desire” which virtuous moral states contribute to action is desire which is responsive to reason’s orders to act,

134 NE 2.6.1106b36, 6.2.1139a23. See also NE 2.5.1106a3-5.
135 Scholarly debate has rendered this term in many ways. For example, a state determined by choice, as Kosman (1980) renders it, or a “state issuing choice” or a “state regarding choice”.
136 See Allan (1953) and Mele (1984).
137 NE 6.2.1139a36
whereas non-virtuous states of character will refuse, or “disobey”, the orders of reason. Against this view, I have already shown how the obedience of the non-rational part of the soul to the rational cannot consist in the appetitive part’s compliance to reason’s individual dictates. Rather than being passively affected by commands of reason, it is passively affected from without, but in such a way that the feelings and desires which it inspires are conducive to virtuous action.

As I shall argue in the third chapter of this thesis, the rational form of motivational desire, specifically, prohairesis, is a form of desire which has its self-initiating principle (ἀρχή) of motion and rest, not in the desiderative part of the soul, but in the rational part itself. This configuration circumvents altogether the interpretive need to associate Aristotle’s term “right desire” with motivational impulses of the non-rational part of the soul which are responsive to reason. In the third book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states that “while we wish for the end, we deliberate and choose the things in relation to the end”. This formula reveals an important co-dependence between wish (βούλησις) and choice (προαίρεσις). Since wish is desire only for an end qua end, rather than desire for the things leading up to the end, it does not have its own motivational force, and therefore it depends on some other form of desire, prohairesis, in order to be realized in and as action. But on the other hand, prohairesis itself requires some desired end against which it is set and towards which it is directed. As Aristotle states in NE 6.2, “choice, then, is a principle (ἀρχή) of action, but not the

138 NE 3.1.1110a17-18
139 NE 3.5.1113b3-4
final cause (ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ οὐ ἐνεκα), the efficient cause (ὁθεν ἓν κίνησις)". While not itself the desire for the end, the very actuality (rather than potentiality) of prohairesis, as the desire for “the things towards the end” (τὸ τὰ πρὸς τέλος), consists in the active motion which moves the agent who desires in space to an end, an end which he desires as an end, not by prohairesis, but by wish. I shall argue in the next chapter that rational judgments justifying courses of action constitute the self-initiating principle which propels the motion of prohairesis. In this way, both the discursive and efficient-desiderative processes, which are conditions of rational motivation, occur in independence of the non-rational part of the soul. One might say that, as a union of discursive and desiderative processes, prohairesis is reason’s own capacity to incite the locomotion of the body.

What, then, does Aristotle mean by the term “right desire”? The term “right desire” alludes to the end (τέλος) of prohairesis, which is first (1) presented to the awareness of an agent through phantasía in accordance with one’s state of character, then (2) apprehended as an immediate object by nous and (3) desired by wish (βούλησις); from there, it is (4) the beginning-point (ἀρχή) from which deliberation proceeds. Quite simply, then, the desire in “right desire” is boulêsis, which is right (ὀρθός) when

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140 NE 6.2.1139a32
141 For a more complete consideration of this point, see 3.2.1 and chapter III of this thesis.
142 One might here recall Aristotle’s formula at NE 6.2.1139b5-6, that choice is desiring thought or thinking desire.
143 See 6.2.1139a32-34 cited above. When Aristotle states that the cause of choice is “reasoning (διάνοια) and mind (νοῦς) directed to some end”, he is in fact designating two distinct mental powers, which must each be present in order for choice to cause action: nous in order to grasp the end of action, and dianoia as the process of deliberation antecedent to prohairesis.
the end which it desires is the best possible end for the human being in some particular situation. Such ends always appear to persons of good character, at those moments when, in a circumstance when and where they might act, their moral dispositions are passively affected by external stimuli. Therefore, in what sense is moral virtue for the sake of *phronēsis*? Human beings can both be right and err in respect to both their ends as well as in respect to their deliberations about the things which are for the sake of the ends.\(^{144}\) The function of all forms of intellect is to arrive at the truth. The function of practical intellect, as a particular part of intellect, and the function of *phronēsis*, as the virtue of that part of intellect, is to arrive at the truth in relation to right desire.\(^{145}\) Moral virtue is for the sake of *phronēsis*, therefore, to the extent that it is one of the necessary conditions for true practical reasoning. Virtue makes the goal right, and, in doing so, makes one’s deliberations, as discursive processes, true, by supplying the correct beginning-point of thought’s practical calculations, and it makes one’s choices, as desiderative impulses initiated by thought, good, by supplying the correct end of action. It is because virtuous action is not possible unless it has right desire for its end that Aristotle says in *NE* 2.4 that virtuous action must stem from a virtuous disposition of character.

**II.1.3 - The “Orthos Logos” and the “Horos”**

There is yet another problem of circularity, which is an ancillary to those two already mentioned and which can be answered easily in light of them. The question concerns the relationship between the right reason (ὀρθὸς λόγος) and the limit (ὁρος),

\(^{144}\) See *Pol*. 7.12.1331b24-38

\(^{145}\) *NE* 6.2.1139a29-32
two terms whose connection is only loosely identified in the prologue of book 6 of the

Nicomachean Ethics:

For in the case of all the virtues we have spoken of, and in the case of others, there is a certain target, or goal, (τις σκοπὸς) relative to which the man who possesses reason (ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων), while observing, increases or relaxes the tension, and there is also some limit (ὅρος) of the mean states, which we say are intermediate between both excess and defect, being in accordance with the right reason. (NE 6.1.1138b22-25).

Both the meaning of each of these terms in themselves and their relation to each other appears to be of exceptional import: Aristotle concludes the prologue of book 6 by asking, "what is the right reason, and what is its corresponding limit (ὅρος)?" The prominent place of the question at the beginning of book 6 suggests that providing an answer to it is the singular defining purpose of the book, and that it drives the whole of the philosophical investigation which the book contains. While the problem of the relation and meaning of these two terms has received considerable attention from contemporary commentators, it seems that few have considered their connection without assuming that a general intellectualist tendency governs the whole of Aristotle’s ethical thought.\(^{146}\) Interpreters have asked what the most adequate English rendering of each of

\(^{146}\) Rowe (1971), 109-113, for example, understanding the word (ὅρος) to be best rendered into English as “standard” or “criterion”, thinks that Aristotle is incapable of answering his own question without surrendering to inconsistency. For Rowe, if there were a \textit{horos}, it would be a universal standard for determining, by a process of discursive reasoning, in particular circumstances of conduct, what the mean is. Therefore, according to this view, the \textit{horos} is a universal standard responsible for determining the right reason. Yet because the ultimate judgment concerning what ought to be done falls, not on reason, but on the perceptual discernment of the practically wise person, the \textit{phronimos}, a standard of reasoning cannot determine the mean, and so ultimately Aristotle cannot consistently maintain that there is such a \textit{horos}. In a somewhat similar vein, Kraut (1989), 335, holds that \textit{horos} ought to be rendered as “definition”. For Kraut, the \textit{horos} has a meaning which is consistent with the rest of Aristotle’s teaching, and which can be found in the sixth book of the \textit{Ethics}. A \textit{horos} is a definition of what right reason is. If
the two terms are individually, and by doing so have attempted to account for what each of the terms signify. They have asked what the connection is between the two terms thus defined, and they have assessed, not only whether in the course of book 6 Aristotle does in fact provide an answer to his own question, but even whether he can provide an answer, consistently with the rest of his view.

The beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics'* sixth book constitutes a transitional moment in the argument contained in the treatise. At one and the same time, it acknowledges a deficiency in the investigation which Aristotle has been conducting up to this point, while also promising finally to address and make better on that deficiency. Each of the moral virtues expounded in books 2-5 is defined as a mean between excess and defect, and each mean is defined as a limit whose position between the two extremes of excess and defect is determined by right reason. The concise definition provided in book 2 also alludes to the constitutive role of the right reason in fixing the mean: "virtue then is a disposition concerning choice (ἕξις προαιρετική), consisting in a mean relative to us, a mean determined by reason, and that how the practically wise man (φρόνιμος) would determine it".\(^ {147}\) Despite the fact that the right reason appears to be constitutive of the mean, and therefore would seem to hold a prominent role in Aristotle’s account of the individual virtues, in the course of the exposition of the moral virtues which occupy the

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\(^ {147}\) *NE* 2.6.1106a36-1107b3
earlier books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the formula is only used in a provisional way.

At the beginning of book 6 Aristotle recognizes the tentative or provisional use of the term, but he also recognized the same much earlier. At the very outset of his treatment of the virtues, Aristotle briefly alludes to the formula and concedes that, an elucidation of it will have to wait:

The formula ‘to act according to the right reason’ is commonly known and may be assumed (it will be discoursed about later, as well as what the right reason is, and how it is maintained relative to the other virtues). (*NE* 2.2.1103b32-35).

While the exposition of the virtues can continue without first attending to what is meant by the right reason, a full account of it and its relation to the other virtues will follow. The provisional use of the right reason, and the remarks which express explicitly that it is only employed in a provisional way in books 2-5, reveal an intimate connection between the philosophical argument contained in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the structure and sequence of the work. Much as the moral virtues require and are constituted by the right reason, and depend on it in order to be what they are, so too, as Aristotle expressly indicates, the explanation of the moral virtues, treated in books 2-5 apart from the intellectual virtues, will not be complete until book 6, when Aristotle provides an account of what the right reason actually is, something which had been merely taken for granted in the earlier books, and self-consciously so.

The precise way in which the formula has a merely preliminary status in books 2-5, when it has not yet been made a direct object of investigation, is clarified at the
beginning of book 6. "It is true to have spoken in this way" (ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως ἀληθὲς μέν), that is, to have said that the mean, as a limit between the two extremes of excess and defect, is determined in accordance with right reason, but "it is not clear" (οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές):\(^{148}\) it does not possess sufficient explanatory power on its own. Up until this point in the general argument of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the investigation has only been concerned with the formal conditions which determine the mean. Aristotle tells us that "a person knowing this truth [that the mean is determined according to right reason] will be no wiser than before, for example, he will not know what medicines to take merely from being told to take everything that medical science or a medical expert would prescribe.\(^{149}\) It is true that the mean is situated between two extremes, but an awareness of this truth of itself does nothing to inform an agent, someone who is considering, in some particular situation, at some particular time and place, what course of action ought to be taken, and in what way, and what the mean is. It merely describes the features which universally belong to the logical framework of the mean, without providing any insight into the actual content of any particular mean.

Despite its limitations, Aristotle is emphatic that in its abstract and provisional form in books 2-5, the formula is true, twice using the word “true” (ἀληθῆ) to describe its standing in its provisional form, and thus again implying a continuity between book 6 and those which precede. The provisional use of the right reason, at least up until the beginning of book 6, needn’t be corrected. It is commonly accepted as true, and it is true; subsequently, nothing about the earlier considerations, which had taken the truth of the

\(^{148}\) NE 6.1.1138b25-26

\(^{149}\) NE 6.1.1138b29-32
formula for granted, will be undermined when a fuller description of the right reason is supplied. The only problem is that the term as it has been used up until this point has been insufficiently explained, having a merely formal character. Therefore, Aristotle promises to make better on this deficiency, in the qualified sense in which it is in fact a deficiency, by making the right reason a direct object of inquiry in book 6 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Supposedly, he announces this as his aim when he concludes the prologue to the book by asking, "what is the right reason, and what is its corresponding limit (ὅρος)?"

I suggest, in contrast with interpreters who argue to the contrary, that not only can Aristotle consistently maintain that there is a horos of the mean, but also that the conclusion of book 6 provides the material out of which a definitive answer to the question at the beginning of the book can be produced, which addresses the deficiencies of the right reason when it is used in a provisional manner earlier in the work. Because

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151 A complete attempt to resolve the problem at hand would require a systematic treatment of the final two chapters of book 6. Aristotle’s starts the argument anew at the beginning of NE 6.12, when as Joachim (1951) 215-217, observes, Aristotle presents several *aporiai*, although, where Joachim counts two, I count three (6.12.1143b18-28, 6.12.1443b28-33, 6.12.1143b33-37). While the connection between the *aporiai* and their solutions is opaque, it is clear that the *aporiai* make presuppositions about *phronēsis* which are patently false, and that Aristotle corrects them by showing, in his solutions, how *phronēsis* and moral virtue are mutually co-dependent and constitutive of each other, hence obviating the concerns which the puzzles raise. The structure in which Aristotle presents the solutions to the problems reflects the philosophical content of the solutions themselves. He first treats the way in which *phronēsis* is dependent on moral virtue (6.12.1144a11-37), and he then goes on to show the dependence of moral virtue on *phronēsis* (6.13.1144b1-30). That he describes this co-dependence by looking at each of *phronēsis* and moral virtue and identifying how each requires the other in order to perform its characteristic activity is further confirmed by the conclusion which follows the considerations of the two virtues: “it is clear from the things that we have said that
commentators have thought that the term *horos* refers to some generalized or universal verbally-articulated rule, they have not been able to see how the very first description the limit and the right reason at the very beginning of book 6 implies an apparent circular logic, like the ones I have treated in the first two sections of this chapter. On the one hand, one who deliberates looks to a *skopos* as he determines how to act in relation his goal or target, as an archer relaxes and tightens the tension of his bow in order to hit his target. On the other, there is the limit, which determines the mean, and which is itself defined by the right reason.\textsuperscript{152} It is noteworthy, for example, how closely this formula from NE 6.1 resembles the one from NE 6.12: “virtue makes the *skopos* right, and *phronēsis* the things relative to it”.\textsuperscript{153} One cannot deliberate until one has first been presented a goal in relation to which one deliberates. As I have already suggested, this goal, which appears in some particular context where one might act, is not the direct result of discursive processes, but rather, of a fixed state which has been determined as a state lying between excess and defect as the result of repeated rationally motivated action, which gradually and indirectly defines and constitutes the moral states of the non-rational part of the soul.

I take it that, when Aristotle speaks of a *horos*, he alludes to the limit which, having been fixed by the *orthos logos*, determines the disposition of the non-rational part of the soul as a mean state. The *horos*, then, does not moderate action as a general rule, present to the mind as a thought, but rather, as a component of the non-rational part of the

\textsuperscript{152} NE 6.1.1138b22-25. The quotation is cited on the first page of this section.
\textsuperscript{153} NE 6.12.1144a8-9
soul, which, once acquired through habituation, determines un-deliberated psychic processes. Subsequently, given the limited way in which reason can affect the non-rational part of the soul, the term “right reason” also cannot refer to reason as a thought in the mind. Rather, by the term “right reason”, Aristotle must allude to the only kind of reason which can reside in the non-rational part of the soul: reason which, while not itself being actively thinking reason, is derivative of and “participates in” actively thinking reason. It is reason of this derivative variety which, having been imparted to and passively received by the non-rational part of the soul through habituation, determines the horos.

The difference between “actively thinking reason” and “derivative reason” is precisely what Aristotle alludes to when he returns to and revises his formula that virtue is a state according to the right reason (κατὰ τὸν ὁρθὸν λόγον), adding that, in addition to being according to reason, virtue must also be with the right reason (μετὰ τοῦ ὁρθοῦ λόγου). He revises the initial formula in the context of arguing that the moral virtues require the presence and the active operation of nous (by which he means thought in the generic sense, rather than the power to apprehend ends) in order to be fully realized as genuine virtue (κυρίως ἀρετή). It is in recognition of the dependence of moral virtue

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154 NE 1.13.1102b13
155 NE 6.13.1144b4-17
156 NE 6.13.1144b13. Moss (2011), 247-248, observes that the distinction between natural virtue and moral virtue on the one hand, and that of cleverness (δεινότης) and prudence on the other, are analogous. Whereas natural virtue is effectively moral virtue unaccompanied by the power distinct from itself yet upon which it depends for its own activity, viz., the activity of phronēsis, cleverness (δεινότης) is practical reasoning, operating independently of the power upon which it depends, specifically, moral virtue. Neither power on its own can ensure that action will be good and virtuous: cleverness
on active thinking that he states at *NE* 6.13.1144b26 that “it is necessary that something small must be changed”: it is not enough only to say that virtue is defined according to right reason, but, in *addition*, it must be also said to be *with* right reason. When Aristotle says that virtue is determined *according* to the right reason, he alludes to the manner in which non-rational character states acquire determinacy indirectly, not by either themselves thinking, or by being affected immediately by a direct command of reason, but through habituation, as an incidental consequence of repeated choice which produces the *horos*, which is constitutive of the mean. Even though virtue is not itself constituted by direct acts of reason, it nonetheless cannot be fully realized without the co-operative activity of discursive reasoning. The term “with right reason” refers to such an active presence of thought. More specifically, “with right reason” in this context alludes to deliberation, which comprises discursive processes which order rationally initiated desires, and, according to the formal conditions of virtue outlined in *NE* 2.4, which must be present in addition to moral virtue in order for action to be virtuous action. The contrasting terms “*kata ton orthon logon*” and “*meta tou orthou logou*” therefore refer to reason in the two distinct modes in which it can exist in the human soul, in accordance with its bipartite bipartition: the first is the derivative reason of the non-rational part of the soul, the second as actively thinking reason which resides in the rational part of the soul. When Aristotle revises the formula, he states that *both* of these forms of reason equally define virtue, the former because it is constitutive of it, the latter because virtue cannot be fully actualized except in cooperation with active, thinking reason.

*indiscriminately realizes both good and bad ends when unaccompanied by virtue, whereas “the things relative to the goal” can be either good or bad when virtue is operative without practical reasoning.*
The formula, “meta tou orthou logou”, conceived of as deliberative reason, provides a solution to the second of the two aporiai presented in NE 6.12. The meta tou orthou logou can only be phronēsis in the form that phronēsis takes in the individual, and not the form that it takes as externalized and “objectivized” in the law. In the aporia, Aristotle asks why one must oneself possess phronēsis if one could just as easily be told by another person who already possesses phronēsis what dictates practical wisdom would command, much as one can learn how to heal oneself by taking the advice of a doctor. The false assumption about phronēsis contained in this aporia is that phronēsis is a form of opinion which can be separated from desiderative impulses to act, present within an individual and shaped by his character. In order to indicate what I mean by this, one might consider the possibility that phronēsis, in the form of the law, might be as effective as the meta tou orthou logou in the form that it takes in the individual (i.e., as active, self-conscious reasoning). The law cannot act as phronēsis, or as the meta tou orthou logou, because when the law moves an individual, it does so in the form of external compulsion. Practical wisdom, as I have already suggested, deliberates for the sake of issuing desires from the rational internal principle of motion within individuals. It is only

157 See 6.12.1143b33-37
158 See section 3.1.4 of this thesis where I elaborate this point. Such opinions do not presuppose that one’s thinking has taken what I call a ‘practical orientation’, as it does in instances of deliberation, which are processes of thought elicited by the appearance of some end as good, which occur with a view to action and with a view to forming, as the efficient cause of action, a rational, motive impulse to act. The investigation which considers how to act cannot itself be separated from either the desire for the end which initiates it, or from the motive desiderative impulse which is its consequence. This, I take it, intimately related to Aristotle’s un-argued assertion that choice is “desiring thought” and “thinking desire” (NE 6.2.1139b5-7).
159 See NE 10.9.1180a21-22, and also my interpretation of the passage in section 2.2.2.
when actions are chosen for their own sake, i.e., as the result of deliberation which incites the internal principle of action and inaction (ἡ ἀρχή, ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν καὶ μὴ)\(^\text{160}\) to generate a motive desire, that they are virtuous. This is equivalent to saying that, in order for action to be virtuous, it must be motivated by a rational desiderative impulse incited from within, and not one coming from without by external compulsion. Of course, virtuous action cannot be compelled, because action which occurs under compulsion is also necessarily involuntary. To the contrary, virtuous action, which must be chosen, cannot be involuntary, just as much as choice, by definition, cannot be involuntary.\(^\text{161}\)

Before I conclude this section, there is another point that I must make about *NE* 6.13, because it pertains to the next section of the present chapter. Aristotle observes in *NE* 6.13 that the moral virtues cannot exist without *phronēsis*, and, in fact, he even identifies the right reason which determines the mean with *phronēsis*.\(^\text{162}\) Some interpreters have taken passages such as these as license to collapse the distinction between the rational and non-rational human parts of the soul. Most notably, John McDowell\(^\text{163}\) has claimed that Aristotle “risks obscuring” his own position when he states that “virtue makes the goal right, *phronēsis* the things relative to it”.\(^\text{164}\) For McDowell, this passage potentially misleads inasmuch as it can suggest that the organization of one’s “motivational propensities” and practical wisdom belong to two distinct powers. In contrast, he argues that practical wisdom possesses a “double aspect”, comprised of both

\(^{160}\) *NE* 3.1.1110a17-18

\(^{161}\) *NE* 3.1.1111a22-3.2.1111b11

\(^{162}\) *NE* 6.13.1144b22-28

\(^{163}\) All citations from McDowell (1988) 30-32.

\(^{164}\) 6.12.1144a7-9
the perceptual capacity to perceive ends and “correctness of motivational orientation”. In attributing both of these powers to *phronēsis*, he collapses the distinction between the rational and non-rational parts of the soul. While he recognizes that our conception of ends is the result of “the moulding of [an agent’s] motivational propensities in upbringing”, he suggests that the apprehension of our ends which result from our habituated states are nonetheless intellectual apprehensions, because *phronēsis* is both the power which is cultivated by such habituation and the power which, once cultivated, cognizes ends.  

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In the next section, I shall present an interpretation of Aristotle’s view on the cognition of ends. But first I want to conclude by indicating that, by my own reading, the passage which identifies *phronēsis* with the “*kata ton orthon logon*” does not indicate that *phronēsis* itself has the capacity to cognize ends. So far as it is a power operative in human agency, *phronēsis* is nothing more than the capacity to deliberate well with a view to practical action in relation to presupposed ends and to issue rational motivation in accordance with its deliberations, an operation which presupposes that the moral virtues, without direct individual commands of reason, supply the ends of action. Only in its

165 McDowell (1980) 31-32. He says that one’s conception of the right end is not an “exercise of the practical intellect”, and he also disassociates his view from the one that “practical wisdom […] makes it the case that the goal is right”. However, he nonetheless claims that practical wisdom’s active discernment of the goals of action is an intellectual operation. I take it that he is suggesting that *phronēsis* itself is an evaluative intellectual power immanent in sensation, which makes ends present to an individual in accordance with an acquired evaluative attitude, not as the result of discursive reasoning, but as the result of active non-discursive judgment.
legislative form\textsuperscript{166} does \textit{phronēsis} establish the right reason which defines the \textit{horos}, operative as a teacher’s guidance ordering the actions of youths so that they act well and therefore through their actions cultivate within themselves the virtues of the non-rational part of their souls. The cognition of ends occurs independently of the activity of the \textit{phronēsis} of practical action, which exists in the individual practical agent only as a deliberative discursive power. The presence of the right reason in the non-rational part of the soul ensures that, when the part is passively affected, it will be affected in a certain way. When a properly disposed moral state is affected from without, the end of action which \textit{phantasia} discerns following the passive affection will be an end conducive to virtuous action, \textit{i.e.}, it will be right desire. These processes, though given their structure as the result of previous deliberated rational processes, are themselves non-rational and occur independently of reason, insofar as they are not directly carried out by the oversight of active and deliberate thought.

Having presented an interpretation of the relation of the right reason to the limit, I take it that I have shown (1) that it is possible for Aristotle to answer the question he poses at the beginning of book 6 while doing justice to his other philosophical commitments, (2) how Aristotle does provide an answer to the question by the end of the book and (3) how the \textit{horos} moves beyond the merely formal description of the right reason assumed in books 2-5 by supplying an agent with a basis for acting here and now. How identifying the mutual co-dependence of \textit{phronēsis} and moral virtue does in fact

\textsuperscript{166} For Aristotle’s account of the difference between \textit{phronēsis} as a legislative art and \textit{phronēsis} as the virtue of practical reasoning for an individual agent, see \textit{NE} 6.8.1141b23-1142a12.
move beyond the merely formal description of right reason, alluded to problematically at
the beginning of book 6, follows evidently from my formulation of the relation of the
horos to the right reason. The horos is the limit which constitutes the mean, and which
therefore constitutes virtue, because virtue is defined by being a mean state; it resides in
the non-rational part of the soul, and it ultimately results in the appearance and cognition
of the ends which an agent can act upon in particular “here-and-now” situations; in doing
so, the horos is in fact a kind of “guide” to action, though not as a general rule or as an
abstract measure of right action.

2.2 - Ethical Principles, Moral Education and the Three Lives
2.2.1 - Wish, Character and the Appearance of the Good

In Nicomachean Ethics 3.4, after having treated in previous chapters of book 3
deliberation and choice, which are both “for the things relative to the end”, Aristotle turns
to expound the characteristics of wish, which is desire for ends only insofar as they are
ends (or, as I shall say elsewhere, desire for ends as such). In accordance with his typical
aporetic mode of investigation, before presenting his own view, he considers two
opposed understandings of wish, out of which his own position emerges as a response.
The point at which the two positions contrast is in respect to what they propose the object
of wish to be. On the first view, if something is wished for, it must be the good, so that
the good alone is the object of wish. Contemporary scholars often associate this view
with the position championed by Socrates in Plato's Protagoras and Gorgias. The
objectionable feature of the Socratic view is that, in order for it to remain consistent with
its own presuppositions, it must deny a plainly evident observed phenomenon, namely,
that we sometimes wish for things even though they are bad. The second view is

167 Segvic (2009)
associated with the teachings of the fifth-century sophist Protagoras, who famously maintained that man is the measure of all things, of things that are, that they are, of things that are not, that they are not. For Aristotle, the unfavourable consequence of this view, which follows necessarily from its asserted premise that "what appears good is wished for" is that there is "no such thing as what is by nature (φύσει) wished for". Since goods appear to each person in accordance with his or her held opinions, which vary from person to person, the things which appear to each individual person as good and are wished for by them can differ from the goods which appear to and are wished for by each and every other person, so that what the good is and what appears as good is "different, and it may be the opposite" from person to person, amounting to a kind of subjective relativism.

To the extent that the first, Socratic view claims that there is in each instance a normative object of wish, an object which ought to be wished for independently of whether it is in fact wished for, and to the extent that the latter supposes that there is no measure which by nature (φύσει) determines what ought to be wished for, but instead that to each individual what happens to be wished for is good, the Socratic and Protagorean positions are diametrically opposed. Yet though this is the case, both arguments make the same error, although in different ways, thereby making explicit the philosophical question which Aristotle must address in formulating his own statement on the matter if it is to be successful. Both the Socratic and Protagorean views fail to

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168 Aubenque (1963), Segvic (2009)
169 NE 3.4.1113a21
170 NE 3.4.1113a23
establish a standard or measure by which the right (ὀρθός) goods, and therefore correspondingly the right wishes, might be distinguished from the wrong goods and the wrong wishes. The first does this by denying altogether that there can be wishes for the wrong goods, declaring that wish can only for the right good, therefore denying that there is such a thing as a wish for the bad, the second by maintaining the relativistic position that in each instance, there is no right or wrong good per se, but only what seems good to each person at a particular circumstance and at a particular time. Aristotle in turn moves beyond the shortcoming common to the Socratic and Protagorean positions by identifying a measure which distinguishes apparent and rightly desired goods from wrongly desired goods: true goods appear to those with good (σπουδαῖος) states of character, whereas merely apparent goods appear to those with bad (φαῦλος) moral dispositions.

In establishing his own position, Aristotle is just as much sympathetic to both the Socratic and Protagorean arguments as he is critical of them, which is evident from the fact that he integrates and synthesizes elements of each into his own position, while formulating a position which does not suffer from the deficiency which they both share. Wish is, as Socrates says, only for the good, but in accordance with the view of Protagoras, the good only as it appears to each. In conformity with their distinct cultivated characters, to some, true goods appear, while to most, only merely apparent goods appear; to some others still, both true apparent goods and merely apparent goods appear. In a subsequent sub-section of this chapter, I shall address directly the philosophical significance of Aristotle’s insistence that the good is only present to the awareness of human subjects as appearances by the power of phantasia, an aspect of
Aristotle’s view which displays fully his debt to Protagoras. In the third sub-section, I shall address both the political consequences of this aspect of Aristotle’s view, as well as the consequences which it has for the practical ambition and purpose of Aristotle’s lecture series on practical philosophy. In the present sub-section, I shall describe certain salient features of the true good and the merely apparent good in themselves, and in their relations to wish. I make three central claims in what follows. First, the two kinds of apparent goods are two distinct ranges of good, each made present to the awareness of a practical agent by distinct cognitive powers. Second, wish, as a form of desire for the ends thus made present, is a desire for ends qua ends, and as such it confers no motivational force of its own, or at least not directly (i.e., it is not itself the efficient cause of action, but it only moves by being the fixed, unmoved end towards which motive desire, as a movement, is directed). Third, the cognition of ends must be a moment independent of the desiderative impulse which functions as an efficient cause, and cannot itself spur the impulse to move by being an efficient cause.

The De Anima provides several crucial distinctions which I must first identify before I can directly treat the connection between wish and apparent good in the Nicomachean Ethics. While both treatises outline similar psychological structures, there

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171 Cooper (1996). The central argument of Cooper’s article is that there are three ranges of good, each one corresponding to the form of desire associated with each of the three parts of the soul in Plato’s tripartite division of the soul in the Republic. The most striking aspect of his claim is that thumos, as desire for the noble, always moves virtuous action, inasmuch as it is for the sake of the noble. Lear (2004) 137-146 endorses Cooper’s view. In the course of this section, it shall be evident that I endorse a modified form of it. In my view, prohairesis is associated with the noble more intimately than with thumos.
are some differences in terminology which I shall attend to once I treat the account of wish in the *Nicomachean Ethics* directly. In the *De Anima*, Aristotle states:

…it appears well said that the efficient movers are two, desire (ὄρεξις) and practical thinking (διάνοια πρακτική). For the desired object moves, and thought moves according to it (διὰ τούτο), because the desired object is the principle (ὁρισμός) of practical thinking (αὐτῆς). And whenever imagination moves, it does not move without desire. That which moves then, is a some one thing. (*DA* 3.10.433a17-22).

This passage indicates that the appetitive power (τὸ ὀρεκτικόν), the power which issues desires, is itself one, but it is intentionally oriented to objects by two distinct cognitive powers. In order for desire to be directed to some object, the faculty of appetite must be directed by some cognitive power distinct from itself which specifies this or that goal as the end of action in some individual instance when and where an organism can moves itself. In other words, how the object of locomotive desire is specified, is a power not of appetite, but of appetite in collaboration with a cognitive faculty. In human beings, both *nous* and *phantasia* are capable of performing this cognitive function, and there is a direct correspondence between the content of the object which each power perceives and the cognitive power by which it is perceived. When mind is the cognitive power through which appetite is directed towards some end, the end is necessarily right (πᾶς ὀρθός), and when *phantasia* is the cognitive power through which appetite is ordered to an object, the end is the *phainomenon agathon*, the apparent good. The *phainomenon agathon* is only coincidentally right, being able to be both the right as well as the wrong end (καὶ ὀρθὴ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθή). Importantly, the mere cognition of the end is only one

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172 For a description of how *to orektikon* is ordered to the ends of mind by a cognitive act, see III.1.4 of this thesis.
173 *DA* 3.10.433a27-28
structural component of desire.

In addition to the fact that the objects of both *nous* and *phantasia* are apprehended by two distinct forms of cognitive awareness, they also differ by each being the objects of correlative kinds of “efficient” or “motive” desires: deliberative desire (*boulēsis* in the *De Anima* and *prohairesis* in the *NE*) is the efficient desire whose end is *nous*, and appetite (*ἐπιθυμία*) is the desire which is for the sake of the goals of action presented by evaluative *phantasia*. I shall indicate later that, this is not an entirely inflexible correlation, as is evident in cases of intemperance. Aristotle enumerates three moving components of desire:

The mover is one in species, *viz.*, the faculty of appetite *qua* appetite, but first of all things is the desired object (for this moves, by being thought or imagined [τῷ νοηθῆναι ἤ φαντασθῆναι], while being unmoved), but the things which move are many in number. Therefore there are three components of desire: first, the mover, second, the thing by which it is moved, and thirdly the moved… the practical good is unmoved, the thing which moves and is unmoved is the appetite (for the thing moved is moved *qua* desiring, and desire is some kind of motion *qua* actual (*ἡ ὀρεξις κίνησίς τίς ἐστιν, ἣν ἐνεργείᾳ*), and the moved thing is the animal. (*DA* 433b10-18).

The transitions within the passage very clearly indicate that when Aristotle states that the things which cause motion are many in number, the “many” which he alludes to are the constitutive parts of desire: he first states that the movers are many in number, and then proceeds to itemize the various movers, classifying them as unmoved movers, moved movers (consisting of both psychological desires, and the bodily apparatus which these desires employ as a moved moving instrument) and the moved. Both *nous* and *phantasia* are identified as two distinct powers which are capable of functioning as objects of
desire, which move while themselves being unmoved. The direct correlation of the
cognitive, critical capacities, on the one hand, to forms of motive desire, on the other, is
most clearly expressed at DA 3.10.433a17-22 (cited above). Aristotle further corroborates
this description of the two forms of efficient desire:

Now mind not does appear to move unless desire is present (for rational
desire (βούλησις) is desire (ὀρεξίς), and whenever something is moved
according to calculation (κατά τὸν λογισμὸν), it is also moved according
to rational desire). But desire (ὀρεξίς) also moves against the dictates of
calculation. For appetite (ἐπιθυμία) is also some kind of desire (ὀρεξίς
τίς). (DA 3.10.433a23-27).

Mind, here spoken of in the generic sense, rather than in the specific sense of the
cognitive power which grasps the end, is able to initiate desires which are preceded by
calculation, a distinctly rational form of desire which in the De Anima Aristotle calls
boulēsis.174 This form of efficient desire most typically has the end apprehended by nous
as its corresponding goal. In contrast, epithumia is the moved moving desire which
correlates to the ends of phantasia; it cannot desire the ends perceived by nous. This
passage, as well as DA 3.10.433a17-22, indicate that the awareness of ends, by either the
power of phantasia or nous, cannot cause locomotion without correlative motive desires,
which function as efficient causes for the sake of the perceived ends.

In the next chapter of this thesis, I shall describe, and argue that there are, distinct
cognitive powers which actually initiate the moved moving desires whose actuality
consists of the actual movement of living organisms. At the present moment, however, I

174 In the De Anima, boulēsis is a rational form of desire which functions as an efficient
cause. It is analogous to prohairesis in the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics, which is
also rational desire, preceded by deliberation. The distinct kind of desire which boulēsis
is in the Nicomachean Ethics has no analogous moment in the De Anima.
wish to make a suggestion about why unmoved movers and moved movers must be
distinct components of desire. Importantly, the desires which move as efficient causes are
not desires for the end, but only for the things leading up to the end. This makes wish an
exception amongst the desires, inasmuch it alone appears to be desire for ends as such. In
a passage which I have already cited, Aristotle states that “desire is some kind of motion
qua actual” (ἡ ὀρεξίς κίνησίς τίς ἐστίν, ἣν ἐνεργείᾳ).175 So far as deliberative desire and
epithumia are forms of desire whose actuality produces locomotion, which is defined in
the strict sense as movement in place, both forms of desire must move a body to a place
which it does not yet occupy. It presupposes some end distinct from itself, a tangible
object which is present to its awareness as a sensible object, and its movement towards
the end which is its goal is impelled in order to overcome the difference and separation of
the desire from its goal, a separation which initially amounts to the physical distance of
the agent from his desired object.

In an effort to show why unmoved movers cannot themselves have efficient
power, and why they must be distinct from the moved moving forms of desire which do, I
shall examine some of the ontological aspects of desire before proceeding to my account
of wish in the Nicomachean Ethics. Motion and, as kinds of motion, motive desires such
as boulēsis (in the De Anima) and epithumia, only exist as incomplete actualities. They
are defined as being active motion moving towards the ends from which they are distinct

175 See DA 3.10.433b16-18. My interpretation of this line is influenced by Aristotle’s
definition of motion in the Phys. 3.3 and the interpretation of it by Kosman (1969).
from and against which they are themselves limited.\textsuperscript{176} Motive forms of desire, so far as they belong to a certain ontological class, are one of the two kinds of actuality (ἐνεργεία), specifically, they are kinetic actualities:\textsuperscript{177} they are processes which are necessarily incomplete, because, to the extent that they are actual, they are necessarily on their way to their ends and not yet in possession of them, so much so that for motions to achieve their ends is nothing but for them to \textit{terminate} and to \textit{cease to be}. Locomotive desires, such as deliberative desire and epithumia, only exist, that is, they are only actual, as active motion moving \textit{towards} an end, an end which must be set over and against the motion itself. Recall again the description of prohairesis, that it is not itself the end (οὐ χ οὐ ἐνεχά) but the efficient cause (ὁθὲν ἢ κίνησις) which is for the sake of some end (ὁ ἐνεχά τινος).\textsuperscript{178} Furthermore, motive desires only exist as actively moving motion when they are in a state of being actual (ἐνεργεία): if the desires, as forms of motion, were not actual motions, if they were not actively \textit{in} motion and on their way towards their ends, they would not be motions at all: they would be at rest. To the extent that the motive desires are actual, and therefore moving, their actuality as moved movers coincides directly with and brings about the movement of the body of the organism which it moves as the “moved” component. In other words, as the desire itself moves towards its end, it moves with it the body of the organism in which it resides, just as when wind blows, the wind’s own movement moves the sails of a ship only as much as the wind itself blows.

The goal of action, which is the cognized end of an efficient desire, must be separate and

\textsuperscript{176} I take it that this is in part why, at \textit{NE} 6.2.1139a32-33, Aristotle describes choice as a principle, only by being the source of motion and \textit{not} by being the final cause.

\textsuperscript{177} See \textit{Meta}. 9.6.1048b18-36 for the difference between the two kinds of actualities, actualities which have their ends in themselves, and actualities which are for the sake of some end beyond themselves (which are perhaps more properly called “motions”).

\textsuperscript{178} \textit{NE} 6.2.1139a32
distinct from the efficient movement itself because the motive desire is essentially defined by being distinct and separate from its corresponding end.  

Therefore, the unmoved moving and moved moving moments of desire must be distinct, as the motivational desire must be distinct from its corresponding end.

I shall very soon describe how in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the two distinct forms of cognitive awareness -- which each discern a correlative kind of good, and which, having been made present to the mind, are each the objects of correlative forms of motivational desire -- amount to two distinct, and potentially opposed, ranges of good which can both be present in human cognition. First, however, I ought to address several terminological differences in the ethical writings and the *De Anima*. In the *De Anima*, the object of practical intellect is referred to simply as the good (τὸ ἀγαθὸν) and the object of *phantasia* is given the name “the apparent good” (τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν). Generally, Aristotle seems to oppose *phantasia* and *nous* as mutually exclusive cognitive powers capable of grasping ends. This would appear to conflict with Aristotle’s position in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, *phantasia* is not only responsible for discerning the merely apparent good, but it also plays a role in making what might be

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179 See McDowell (1996) 49, when he claims that “actions that manifest excellence… need not result from deliberative thought”. To my mind, McDowell here misses the force of what deliberation is. Deliberation, as the mode of thought which initiates a distinctly rational form of motive desire, initiates *prohairesis* upon its completion. Importantly, *prohairesis* is the only efficient cause appropriate to distinctly human action, which is why Aristotle says in *NE* 2.4 that virtuous action must be chosen. Since virtuous actions can only have choices as their motivation impulses if they are to be virtuous at all, they can be said to require deliberation just as much as they require an efficient cause to make them occur. For a more developed explanation of my view on this, see the next chapter.  

180 *DA* 3.10.433a27-30. Both of these are forms of the practical good (τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν), which is distinguished from the good *simpliciter* by the fact that it can be otherwise (ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν).
called variously (1) the end of action, (2) “the right desire” (i.e., the right desire of wish) and (3) the beginning-point of deliberation present to the mind of a perceiver. Unlike the De Anima where it appears that nous is responsible both for making that good a present object of awareness and for apprehending it, in the Nicomachean Ethics, it is only after the principle of action is initially made an object of awareness by phantasia that nous subsequently is able to grasp it. The mutual exclusivity of phantasia’s grasp of ends and that of nous appears to be affirmed by several of the passages which I have already cited in this subsection.

One of my central claims in the present subsection of this chapter is that the two distinct cognitive powers through which ends can appear correspond to two distinct ranges of goods. Now that I have outlined the difference between nous’ awareness of the ends which typically correspond to boulēsis (calculative desire, rather than desire for ends), and phantasia’s cognitive discernment of the ends corresponding to epithumia (non-rational or appetitive desire) in the De Anima, I can identify the various similarities between the psychological structures presented in the De Anima and those in the Nicomachean Ethics. The ethical writings contain philosophical material which extends

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181 The “double duty” of phantasia should not be confused with Aristotle’s twofold distinction between calculative phantasia and sensitive phantasia in DA 3.10-11. In the next chapter of this thesis, I shall describe the difference between these two forms of imagination. Importantly, calculative phantasia is not a power to perceive objects or to make discriminatory evaluations in the sensory field, but rather, it is the form of phantasia which is necessary as the condition for active thinking.

182 See DA 3.10.433a17-22 DA 3.10.433a23-27, DA 3.10.433b10-13. While the Nicomachean Ethics and the De Anima appear to contradict each other on this point, in the third chapter of this thesis, I shall argue that phantasia must play the same role in making the beginning-point of deliberation an object of awareness in the De Anima as it does in the ethical writings.
beyond the philosophical concerns of the *De Anima*. Particularly, the *Nicomachean Ethics* provides descriptions of the psychological conditions which determine which configuration of the two ranges of good appears to an agent, whether one of the two, or both. As Aristotle says in *NE* 3.4, each perceives in accordance with his own particular state (ἕξιν ἰδιά) of character. Those who have from habituation acquired a good (σπουδαίος) character, in accordance with their disposition, perceive and judge (νομίζειν) the truth, wishing for goods which are both noble and pleasant: the true apparent good (I shall refer to these as “upper-level goods”). One here would rightfully recall a passage from elsewhere in the third book of the *Ethics*, where Aristotle identifies the noble (τὸ καλὸν) with the end of virtue. In contrast, those who have acquired a bad (φαῦλος) state of character perceive in accordance with their character, but they wish for goods which are only pleasant, the merely apparent goods (“lower-level goods”).

In *NE* 7.8, Aristotle elaborates on the relation of the two distinct states of character and the connection of states of character to the distinct appearances of the good which stem from them. It is worthwhile quoting a passage from this chapter at length:

For virtue preserves the principle, and vice destroys it, the principle being in practical action the end for the sake of which, such as hypotheses in mathematics... the man who is temperate is such a man who possesses the principle, the intemperate man is not... the akratic man, who is better than the undisciplined man, is not a bad man absolutely (οὐδὲ φαῦλος ἀπλῶς). For in him the best, that is, the principle, is preserved (οὐ λέγεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἢ ἀρχή). There is another man opposed to this man, who abides and does not lose himself to passion. It appears from what has preceded that there is a good condition (σπουδαία ἐξερευνῶσα) and a bad condition (φαῦλη). (*NE* 7.8.1151a15-28).

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183 *NE* 3.7.1115b17-23
This passage indicates that what it means to be good (σπουδαῖος), or to possess a state which is good (σπουδαία), is to possess a state which makes one capable of perceiving that which is both the end of action and the beginning-point of true deliberation. It is similarly the case that the state of the self-controlled individual is good (σπουδαία) and that the principles of ethical action appear to him. In addition, however, he is divided against himself, with goods of the lower-level range appearing to him which are opposed to the goods of the upper-level range. The self-controlled man is spoudaios because he remains steadfast to the true apparent good, ultimately being moved by a motive desire which is for the sake of that end, rather than one which is for the merely apparent goods, goods which correspond to and have epithumia as their motive desire.

Virtue’s defining characteristic as a mean state is reflected in its cognitive powers in the appearances of the lower-level range of goods, especially in respect to the desires associated with temperance and its derivative forms (i.e., enkrateia, akrasia, and intemperance). One might recall the formal condition of virtue, that action must be chosen in order for it to be virtuous, and also Aristotle’s claim in his treatment of temperance that the temperate person desires (ἐπιθυμεῖ). Since the lower-level range of goods are associated with epithumia, if the temperate individual does in fact desire by epithumia in addition to both boulēsis and prohairesis, it must be the case, not only that he does in fact perceive lower-level goods, but that when he acts virtuously, two desires,

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184 I am considering temperance the forms of continence, incontinence and vice which correspond to it because, as Aristotle says, restraint and unrestraint proper are concerned with excessive body pleasure, and all other forms of restraint and unrestraint are merely derivative relative to the former. See NE 7.5.1149a22-24.
185 NE 3.11.1119b14-19
both prohairesis and epithumia, move him to act virtuously.\textsuperscript{186} The suggestion that an agent can be moved by more than one form of motive desire at once is not without textual support. For example, in a passage in book 3, Aristotle describes how the courageous individual is moved by both choice and spirited desire (θυμὸς)\textsuperscript{187} at the same time.\textsuperscript{188} Similarly, the temperate person at one and the same time is moved by choice,

\textsuperscript{186} The reason why someone would be moved by two desires is a complicated question, which falls outside of the bounds of the work of this thesis. I shall only say for now that it reflects the way in which Aristotle does maintain a certain kind of soul-body dualism. Both courage and temperance are virtues of the irrational part of the soul (NE 3.10.23-25). It is no coincidence that, being designated in such a way, these virtues pertain to the pains and pleasures which are inflicted upon the body. In the treatment of pleasure in book 7, Aristotle contrasts two kinds of pleasure, pleasures associated with the body, which are kinetic in form and pleasures associated with the soul, which take the form of energeia. At the conclusion of book 7 (NE 7.14.1154b16-35), Aristotle associates the former with the body, and the latter with the soul. Similarly, in book 10 (NE 10.8.1178a20-24), Aristotle notes that one reason that the life of action is happiness only secondarily, in comparison with the life of contemplation, is because the former entails the passions, which belong to man as a composite being, whereas contemplation is an activity of mind in its independence from the body, mind being what man is in the most proper sense. The appearances of lower-level goods and the corresponding desires for them are desires which are in the interest of the good of the body, whereas the “higher-level” goods are in the interest of the soul. While I cannot develop these ideas in the context of my present work, it is important that happiness is defined as the activity of soul, and that these ends, in the case of virtuous activity, are present as the appearances of “higher-level” goods. In respect to the initial question, the fact that a human being is moved by both epithumia and prohairesis attests to his composite nature: the former desires for the sake of sustaining the body, whereas the latter desires in the interest of the soul, desiring to do virtuous actions for their own sake. Man, being a composite of body and soul, must just as much desire to preserve his body as to delight in the happiness of virtuous action. For two helpful discussions which flesh out the difference between these two forms of desire, see Rapp (2009) and Aubrey (2009).

\textsuperscript{187} For views on the status of thumos in Aristotle’s thought, see Aristotle’s treatment of unrestraint in relation to thumos at NE 7.6.1149a21-1149b14. The passage is difficult, but most interpreters agree that thumos has a more intimate connection with reason and imagination than epithumia does, which is more intimately connected with sensation. For expositions of these passages, see Cooper (1996) 256-263 or Pearson (2011) 144-158.

\textsuperscript{188} See NE 3.8.1116b31-32: “Courageous men act in accordance with the noble (διὰ τὸ καλὸν)(i.e., for the sake of an upper-level good), and in them spirited desire operates in cooperation [with choice] (ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς)”. Contrast this with the description of a form of action which only resembles (ἴσους) courageous action. That
which is preceded by both true deliberation and the appearance of the principle of right
desire, as well as by *epithumia*, which is for the sake of a lower-level good. Yet, because
he possesses virtue, his *epithumia*, as a motivational impulse, will in no way be opposed
to the motivational impulse which is initiated by his reasoning. It will not move him to do
anything other than what his choice moves him to do. As Aristotle says, “the temperate
man desires (ἐπιθυμεῖ) the right thing in the right way at the right time”. In contrast,
the appetitive desires (ἐπιθυμίαι) of the self-controlled individual, who does not possess
the mean state of temperance, are in excess of what such an individual desires by
*prohairesis*. The lower-level goods which appears to him will be opposed or will at
least conflict with the upper-level appearances of the good.

The man of unrestraint, the akratic, is bad (φαῦλος), to the extent that he in the
end succumbs to his passions, although he is not absolutely bad (οὐδὲ φαῦλος ἁπλῶς),
as the man of intemperance is. This is because the akratic has not become so psychically
disfigured that he not does recognize the principle (ἀρχή) which ought to serve as the

latter form of action only appears to be virtuous because it accompanies choice, but it is
for the sake of a lower-level end desired by *thumos* (ἡ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν). “This
configuration is much like that of the profligate, who deliberates on the basis of and
desires by choice the end which is also desired by *epithumia*.

189 *NE* 3.12.1119b17-19
190 *NE* 1.13.1102b25-29. Importantly, the harmony which Aristotle alludes to in *NE* 1.13
is a concord of two parts of the soul, each of which independently of the other issues
motive desiderative impulses. The harmonious state of the virtuous individual’s soul
consists of the agreement of non-rational motivations, which are initiated independently of
direct commands of reason as the result of their corresponding state’s being passively
affected, with rational motivations, which are initiated directly by beliefs. The virtuous
individual desires the same goods by *prohairesis*, by deliberative desire, as he does by
non-rational *epithumia*. The condition of the enkratic is not harmonious because,
although he in the end does what he knows to be best, he is moved only by rational
motivations, and not at all by non-rational motivations; i.e., he is moved only by the
motivational impulses of one human part of the soul, and not by both in concord.
beginning point of his rational deliberation. Rather, the true good does in fact appear to him, and in some cases, as I shall indicate in what proceeds, he does deliberate, beginning from the right principle of action, but the desire which springs from his reason fails to move him to action, being superseded by a contrary motive desire. Thus the akratic is bad (φαῦλος), although only relatively, because his act follows only from a temporary lapse in his conviction at the moment when he was compelled to pursue a merely apparent good, though he had some awareness of the truly apparent good. Therefore, the akratic is good to the extent that principle is preserved in him. In contrast, the profligate is phaulos absolutely, because, being wholly without the imperative to act for the sake of the noble, since he lacks the capacity to perceive the principle (ἀρχή), he deliberately seeks, being motivated by choice, the ends of lower-level goods, which are merely pleasurable, as ends in themselves (NE 7.7.1150a16-25), in ignorance of the wickedness of his actions.

While both the temperate (virtuous) individual and the profligate (vicious) individual deliberate from beginning-points and desire in accordance with their deliberations by prohairesis, the difference between them is that the former acts with the principle of right desire as the beginning-point of his deliberation, whereas the beginning-point from which the latter begins his deliberations is not the right desire, but a good from the lower-level range of goods.

Both akrasia and enkrateia are conflicts of two opposed motive desires within a soul, each directed towards some distinct end, and each capable of moving the body in space. The Nicomachean Ethics is shown in the following passage to be in concord with the De Anima in respect to the opposition of rational to irrational desire:
And the akratic person acts by desiring (ἐπιθυμῶν), but not by choosing. And reversely, the self-restrained man acts by choosing, but not by desiring. And appetite (ἐπιθυμία) is opposed to choice, but appetite (ἐπιθυμία) is not opposed to appetite (ἐπιθυμία). (NE 3.2.1111b12-18).

One might claim that choice is not itself a motive desire, but rather that choice employs epithumia on its behalf in order to move an agent towards his desired goal. The above-cited passage renders that interpretation impossible, by implying that, in the case of the unstrained and self-restrained persons, there are conflicting desires, implying two desires, each with distinct and correlative ends. The defining feature of the man of self-restraint is that he is moved by a desire towards wicked ends, but in the face of inclinations towards things he knows to be bad, he nonetheless elects to do what he ought (NE 7.2.1146b-16, 7.8.1151a26-28). The clash of desires in the man of self-restraint cannot be one of epithumia against epithumia, because, as Aristotle tells us, without any explicit explanation,191 “desire is not opposed to desire”, that is, epithumia cannot conflict with epithumia. Therefore, if in the self-restrained man, one desire is to triumph over the other, it will be choice which overcomes epithumia, and subsequently, choice must be a unique form of desire, distinct from epithumia. The opposition of choice to epithumia must be the variance of two separate, independent kinds of desire, a discord of deliberate, rational desire and appetitive non-rational desire, each present in the soul at the same time and

191 Aristotle does not explain why two of the same kind of desires cannot exist at the same time in the same soul, but he does state that one cannot have two wishes at the same time nor two appetites in the Metaphysics. See Meta. 9.5.1048a21-24. I take it that Aristotle’s point is that if there are two of the same kinds of desire active in the same soul at the same time, that there will be nothing to resolve the opposition, and that neither desire will be capable of effecting motion, thus resulting in rest. While enkritic and akratic conflict does involve an opposition of desires, it does not involve an opposition of desires of the same kind. A resolution follows from akratic and enkritic conflict, for one reason or another. In cases of each, either rational desire or appetite is able to overcome the other and initiate locomotion, despite the presence of the other.
providing impulses to act in contrary ways. Therefore, *prohairesis*, deliberative desire, is a motive desiring principle which, in the cases of akратic and enkratic conflict, stands opposed to other non-rational forms of desire which also have the capacity to move the body.

Aristotle's remarks concerning the unrestrained, or akратic, individual indicate that *boulēsis* is not itself the desiderative power which moves practical action as its efficient cause. The defining feature of the akратic individual is that he knows what is right, specifically because, since the *archē* is preserved in him, the true apparent good appears to him, but he does not actually realize his deliberations in action, and thus he does not do what he knows to be right. Aristotle distinguishes between two distinct forms of *akrasia*:

There are two forms of akrasia: impetuosity and weakness of resolution. For [the latter] deliberate but do not abide by those things which they have deliberated, due to their passions. (*NE* 7.7.1150b19-22).

In what follows, I shall only be concerned with the weak (τὸ ἀσθένεια) kind of akrasia, and not the impetuous kind. The weak akратic deliberates on the basis of the principle which rightly appears to him, although the action about which he deliberates is unrealized because, since his choice is inefficacious as an efficient cause, he is overcome by some desire extraneous to his deliberations and his choice. Specifically, his choice is not actualized because of a contrary *epithumia* which moves him “against his choice”

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192 *NE* 7.8.1151a24-27
193 *NE* 7.10.1152a7-10
194 For a description of such a character-type, see *NE* 7.7.1150b19-28.
Even though he cognizes the end of action, and desires it by wish, which is the desire for ends *qua* ends, he does not desire by *prohairesis* “the things relative to the end”, and for that reason his action goes unrealized.

That *boulêsis*, as desire for the end, does not itself motivate action as an efficient cause is indicated by two passages from the *Nicomachean Ethics*:

...nobody willingly suffers injustice. For nobody wishes (*βούλεται*) for it, not even the unrestrained person, but he acts against his wish (*παρὰ προαίρεσιν*), for nobody wishes for what he does not suppose to be good, and the unrestrained man does that which he supposes he must not do. (*NE 5.9.1136b6-9*).

The unrestrained men desire (*ἐπιθυμοῦσιν*) things other than those which they wish for (*βούλονται*), for instance; he desires what is pleasant and harmful for himself against what he believes (*τῶν δοκούντων*) to be good. (*NE 9.4.1166b8-10*).

The object of the unrestrained man's *wish* is the true apparent good, but he is incapable of bringing to fruition “the things relative to the end”, in which his action would be realized. That wish is not the motive principle of rationally directed action is clear from the first of these two passages, when it is stated that the action which the unrestrained man does (*πράττει*) is opposed to his wish. The agent wishes for the true apparent good, and begins to deliberate about the “things relative to the end” in the interest of issuing a *prohairesis* which would move him to the true apparent good. But as it turns out, some other desire moves the agent, against his *wish* for the true apparent good, to the object of the merely apparent good. If one is to take Aristotle fully at his word in this passage, it cannot be that the agent’s wish changed before *epithumia* moved him to act against his choice, so that it

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195 *NE 7.4.1148a10, NE 7.8.1151a7*
became fixed on the merely apparent good, the end which is always the goal of *epithumia*. If his wish had in fact changed to correspond with the motive desire that in fact caused him to act, he still would have acted according to his wish, a wish for the mere apparent good. As Aristotle says, the akratic acts against his wish (παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν). Therefore, he must at once wish for the true apparent good, while being moved by *epithumia* for the sake of the merely apparent good. Among the diverse characters, it is only the profligate who wishes for the merely apparent good as his end, and, after wishing for it, chooses it for its own sake.

In conclusion, from my treatment of the various configurations of how goods can appear to individuals in accordance with the diverse states of character, I shall deduce several points about the nature of wish, looking particularly to the *weak* kind of *akrasia*, rather than the “impetuous” kind (See *NE* 7.7.1150b19-22, cited above). First, wish, as a form of desire, desires ends which appear and are made present to the mind through the cognitive power of *phantasia*. Thus, the desire itself is not an evaluative or discriminative power: it desires an end, presupposing the discriminating judgment which makes the object of wish an object of awareness. The priority of the appearance of the good to wish is not necessarily a temporal priority, but it is necessarily a logical priority. Second, in cases where both ranges of good appear, it seems that wish ineluctably desires the better of the two, as is evidenced by the case of the akratic wishes for the good, despite the fact that he acts contrary to his wish.

Third, I believe that it follows from my treatment of the weak form of akrasia that
cognition and desire for the end, the latter of which moves only as an unmoved mover, does not of itself have attractive or repellent motive force, such that the movement of an organism follows from a single cognitive act, from the cognition of an end as either good or bad, or pleasant or painful. If this were the case, the cognition of the end would annex the place of the moved mover, inasmuch as the cognition of the end would by itself impart motivational force, i.e., the cognition of the end would itself incite active motion in the form of an efficient cause of locomotion. Rather, the cognized end moves only as an unmoved mover, and what it means for the end to cause movement must be understood in a restricted sense. The unmoved mover causes movement (while not itself being in motion) only inasmuch as it is the fixed and unmoved end for the sake of which and to which efficient desires, which are necessarily distinct from the end, move.\textsuperscript{196} It serves merely as the unmoved and cognized limit against which motive desires are formed, to which they are directed, for the sake of which they are, and from which they are necessarily distinct (see my discussion above concerning the passage from the \textit{De Anima} where Aristotle says that “desire is some kind of motion \textit{qua} actual”).\textsuperscript{197} This is

\textsuperscript{196} This is a very important point, anticipating a central claim which I shall make in the third chapter of this thesis. In addition to the arguments which I have presented here about the difference between the unmoved moving and moved moving components of desire, in the next chapter I shall argue that the cognition of the end cannot itself incite efficient motion \textit{because} another psychic activity, specifically, proclamations of pursuit and avoidance, issue the desires which serve as efficient causes. The awareness of the end is only implicitly or indirectly motivational inasmuch as it elicits an agent to make a judgment concerning an end, a judgment which itself will incite movement. The cognition of the end is the cognition only of the unmoved moving component of desire, whereas the judgment of pursuit or avoidance issues the moved moving component, which in the case of rational judgments is deliberative desire (\textit{prohairesis} in the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} and \textit{boulêsis} in the \textit{De Anima}), and which in the case of sensitive judgments is \textit{epithumia}. I shall argue that practical reasoning is unintelligible without making this distinction.

\textsuperscript{197} \textit{DA} 3.10.433b16-18
particularly evident in the case of the akratic, inasmuch as the akratic apprehends the end by *nous* and desires the end by wish, and, in some cases (such as in the case of the weak akratic, but not the impetuous akratic) even deliberates using it as the beginning-point. But even though he clearly apprehends the upper-level good, that apprehension does not itself bestow the motivational *force* which incites him to move. The resolution of the conflict of desires which results in him being moved by *epithumia* rather than by *prohairesis* occurs at the level of his motives desires, both of which are desires for ends, but distinct from them.

### 2.2.2 - States of Character as Dispositions to Learn

I wish to indicate in the final section of this chapter how Aristotle’s stipulation at the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, that good states of character are a necessary condition for participation in lectures on practical philosophy, follows directly as a consequence of his moral psychology. The way the question has been posed in recent scholarship is first, whether Aristotle would seek to try to convince a moral skeptic, such as Thrasymachus in Plato’s *Republic*, that it is best to pursue a life of virtue, and second, whether he thinks that it is possible to convince someone such as Thrasymachus of the merits of the virtuous life by rational argument. In other words, does Aristotle think that he can, by argument, persuade someone who does not already believe that the lives of contemplation and virtue are the best lives worth living? Or, are the first premises,

198 See for example Burnyeat (1980) 90 n.15, where Burnyeat says that there is no reason why Thrasymachus would assent to the validity of the function argument. For Burnyeat, discursively articulated ethical truth is a reflective form of what is already known by the evaluative attitude which is furnished by habit. See also Kraut (1998) 282-285 for a similar view. For a contrasting view, see Irwin (1978) 292, who says that “Aristotle does not imply that dialectic cannot rationally justify the Aristotelian virtues to a vicious person.”
from which all correct ethical inquiry must begin, only accessible to the mind of one has first acquired the right habits? Another pertinent question is, who does Aristotle exclude from participation in lectures on practical philosophy, and on what basis does he do so? In what follows, I shall attend to the remarks that Aristotle makes about the profligate in order to answer these questions. In my view, those whom he accepts and those whom he denies admission to practical philosophy are divided along the lines of the distinction of the various character-types. He accepts those who have good (σπουδαῖος) states of character, viz., the virtuous and the self-controlled, and denies those with bad (φαῦλος) states of character. His refusal of those who are “profligate” and “unrestrained” from participating in his lectures as students is based on the psychology which he expounds throughout the work. Several passages\(^{199}\) indicate that Aristotle identifies the psychological configuration of the profligate with the great masses of people (οἱ πολλοί).

The purpose of this subsection is to show how Aristotle’s description of the profligate throughout the \textit{NE} corresponds to “the many”, who, among the three lives described in \textit{NE} 1.5, live the life of pleasure. On the basis of the four character-types described in the ethical writings, I shall argue that participation in ethical lectures is the privilege only of an aristocratic class of well-born citizens, and among those, only individuals who have been raised in good habits from youth.

Aristotle is very clear that the vicious man, especially, the profligate, is incapable of being persuaded into believing the wrongness of his ways. This is closely associated

\(^{199}\) \textit{NE} 1.5.1095b14-22, \textit{NE} 2.4.1105b9-18, \textit{NE} 3.4.1113b1-3, \textit{NE} 10.9 1179b11-16. I shall argue that a coherent picture emerges from these various passages when they are brought together to describe features of the profligate.
with a feature of the psychological condition of the profligate that I have already alluded to in passing, namely, that in his case alone, amongst the various configurations of the two ranges of he good, only lower-level goods appear. In the case of akratic individuals, the deficiency of their character results in their inability to act and to produce in action what they know is right; yet even though they act wrongly, they are able to discern and be aware of the wrongness of their actions, inasmuch as their actions do not conform and live up to the standards of their beliefs. The akratic is internally divided, as is reflected in his dual cognitions of the good: there is in him both a measure of good action – the appearance of the true good, and thus a certain cognition of the pleasurable virtue of virtuous action – against which he recognizes his incontinent actions to be a deviation and to fall short. This not the case with the profligate, however. In the case of the profligate, however, because he does not perceive the first principles of right deliberation, he is incapable of holding beliefs which are conducive to right action:

…and temperance does preserve our opinions about the good. Pleasure and pain do not destroy and corrupt all belief, for example, the belief that it does or does not hold that the three angles of a triangle equal two right angles, but only beliefs concerning action. For the first principles of action are the that-for-the sake-of-which of our actions; the principle does not appear to someone corrupted by pleasure of fear, nor does it appear to him that it is necessary to do and to desire all things for the sake of it, for vice is a destroyer of principle. (NE 1140b13-20).200

200 Aristotle does not single out temperance amongst the virtues simply because he observes an etymologically significant relationship between the two words, as if liberality or courage could just as well have another name which connoted a capacity to preserve opinions concerning action. Rather, I take it, he finds the etymological relationship to imply a conceptual distinction, a distinguishing property peculiar to temperance, belonging to it under the description of being the virtue whose object is the pleasures and pains associated with the body's physical contact with tangible existence. The peculiar province of moral virtue is repeatedly defined as "pleasure and pain" throughout book 2 of the Nicomachean Ethics, and in one passage, it is suggested that all of the moral virtues, alongside the differences amongst them, are ultimately reducible to dispositions
When Aristotle distinguishes those beliefs which cannot be held by someone with a vicious character from those which can, the example of mathematical opinions as instances of beliefs which can be maintained no matter what one’s state of character, do not indicate that he thinks that, given a clear distinction between theoretical matters and practical matters, all theoretical beliefs can be held with indifference to one’s state of character, and all of one’s practical beliefs are ineluctably conditioned by one state of character.

Rather, Aristotle recognizes two distinct kinds of practical beliefs as well, for example, those of understanding (σύνεσις) and phronēsis. It is these two kinds of opinions which he is particularly concerned with here. The former consist of generalized opinions about practical matters, for example, that friendship ought to be preserved at all costs. In contrast, the latter variety of belief concerns exclusively the practical judgments concerning pleasure and pain, inasmuch as they are all formed states of character according to which we are either well- or ill-disposed in respect to the emotions: "by emotions, I mean desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, longing jealousy, pity; and generally those states of consciousness which are accompanied by pleasure or pain" (2.5.1105b21-24). See Kosman (1980) 109, when he describes the causal relation between the affective and cognitive functions of virtue. If the virtues are reducible to pleasure and pain, it is sensible that the one virtue which alone is concerned with pleasure and pain as such would hold a certain priority over the rest, reflected in Aristotle's claim that temperance preserves "practical wisdom" (phronēsis).

Such an interpretation would harness its validity on the basis that the division would correspond approximately to the division of intellectual part of the soul. See for example, NE 6.7.1141a17-30, where Aristotle identifies phronēsis as a power concerned exclusive with the well-fare of the individual who employs it, and contrasts it with epistêmē. While phronēsis might necessarily imply that one is practically oriented in relation to desire, the acquired state is only the virtue of that part of the soul, and therefore its properties do not reflect the properties and functions of all the powers associated with that part.

For this distinction, see NE 6.10.1143a5-10. I more fully elaborate on it in section 3.1.4 of this thesis.
which are constitutive of deliberations, judgments formed at some present moment exclusively for the sake of determining how one might act at that moment.\(^{203}\) With this distinction having been made, the way in which temperance would preserve certain kinds of practical beliefs, and the way in which vice would destroy them, becomes somewhat clearer. True deliberation depends on the appearance of the right principle as the fixed place from which it begins reasoning; without the appearance of the principle, one would not have it as a guide for noble action. Without the appearance of the right principle, in its place, a profligate comes to possess deliberative judgments which would be conducive to attaining the ends which such an individual finds desirable, namely, the ends of lower-level goods. Such judgments would take the place of those of which \textit{phronēsis} most rightly ought to consist, judgments which are for the sake of attaining upper-level goods by deliberation. Temperance, then, preserves \textit{phronēsis}, not only because it ensures that the end about which it deliberates is correct, which is necessary if \textit{phronēsis} is to be true, but by preserving the judgments themselves out of which \textit{phronēsis} is composed: not only can deliberation be false because it is for the sake of the wrong goal, but the judgments which make up deliberation can themselves be false if the right good does not appear.\(^{204}\)

There are additional reasons for believing that Aristotle identifies the beliefs

\(^{203}\) Moss (2011) 233

\(^{204}\) This interpretation can only make sense if practical reasoning is not conceived of as merely instrumental reasoning. If \textit{phronēsis} were merely instrumental reasoning, then the absence of it would result in nothing more than an inability to secure and attain ends, rather than a condition of moral deplorability. See 3.1.4 of this thesis, where I argue that it does not necessarily follow from the fact that practical reason cannot posit ends that it is nothing more than instrumental reasoning.
related to deliberation with those which are destroyed by the corruption of character, and that he distinguishes them from the beliefs of understanding (σύνεσις), which can be held despite one’s character. In *NE* 2.4, Aristotle describes the perverted interest which “the many” (οἱ πολλοί) take in practical philosophy:

> But the many (οἱ πολλοί) do not do such things [do virtuous deeds in order to become virtuous] but they suppose that, when they seek philosophical arguments, they are doing philosophy and in this way that they are becoming good; in some such way they are like those who are ill who listen carefully to the doctors, but do nothing of the things that they prescribe. The latter will not be healed by being treated in this way, nor will the former possess a good soul by philosophizing. (*NE* 1105b13-18).

The passage suggests that those who have not been equipped with the correct moral dispositions are in fact capable of conducting inquiries into practical philosophy and that they can, through those inquiries, come to possess a philosophically reflective grasp of practical matters. These beliefs coincide with those which Aristotle attributes to the faculty of understanding (σύνεσις): they are of the kind that have nothing to do with bringing one’s beliefs into efficacy as action. However, although these beliefs concern practical matters, from the standpoint of the proper kind of ethical reflection, which Aristotle understands to be philosophy conducted not for the sake of knowledge, but for action, the kind of philosophical reflection performed by the many is futile. The proper purpose of philosophical inquiry is to cultivate the practical part of the intellectual soul, namely, *phronēsis*, which is actually capable of issuing desires based on reason. Practical philosophy ought to cultivate those kinds of beliefs and judgments: the kind which are actually capable of initiating motion. Without the active cognitive discernment of upper-level goods, even when equipped with philosophical ideas about what the good life

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205 *NE* 1.3.1095a6
consists of, an individual will lack the motivational propensity to act virtuously. For this reason, Aristotle reprimands those who are so fool-hearted as to think that they can become more capable of doing good deeds, without developing the correct states of character, simply by conducting philosophical inquiry.

The difference between generalized opinions about the good life and the judgments which are constitutive of deliberation, as two distinct forms of practical belief, reveals something about the connection between belief, desire and \textit{eudaimonia}. Aristotle again alludes to “the many” in book 1 of the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, when, in his discussion of the three lives, he describes those who live lives of pleasure:

The great many (οἱ πολλοὶ), most vulgar people seem not unreasonably to suppose on the basis of their lives that the good and happiness is pleasure. (\textit{NE} 1.5.1095b14-17).

This passage suggests that one is oriented to one’s final good, to whatever happiness is for that individual, independently of one’s general beliefs about what the good life entails. One can hold beliefs about what the good life consists of which are altogether distinct from the judgments which motivate one’s actions. The judgments which an agent makes in deliberation are conditioned by his moral dispositions, unlike one’s generalized beliefs about what constitutes the good life. Importantly, in Aristotle’s consideration of the three lives, the view of “the many” is contrasted with the view of “men of refinement” (χαρίεντες), those who live the life of virtue.\textsuperscript{206} The treatment of wish in \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} 3.4 suggests that Aristotle sees these two lives as correlating approximately with the profligate on the one hand, and all of the other character-types on

\textsuperscript{206} \textit{NE} 1.5.1095b23
the other. In that chapter, Aristotle identifies “the many” as being those to whom, on the basis of appearance and wish, the good is defined as that which is pleasurable and therefore ought to be pursued, and the bad, and that which ought to be avoided, is defined as that which inflicts bodily pain.207 This evaluative attitude about what is pleasurable, which is manifested in one’s non-discursive judgments by the power of *phantasia* is what the content of the appearance of the good consists of as a cognitive perception.208 This is true even in the case of the virtuous individual, who, by desiring the true apparent good, desires not only what is noble, but also what is pleasant.209 However, the virtuous individual and the vicious individual perceive what is pleasurable and painful according to two entirely different criteria of what it means for something to be pleasant.

The contrasting ways in which vicious individuals and virtuous individuals relate to the law reveals something characteristic of the awareness that each has of the ends which define his own activity, in the cases of both the virtuous and the vicious man. Uncultivated people stand in an external relation to the law. That is, they do not follow the dictates of the law because they themselves recognize the law’s claim to rationality,

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207 *NE* 3.4.1113b1-3. See also 1111b15-18 and 1111b33-35. Aristotle contrasts choice, which concerns good and bad, with *epithumia*, which is for the pleasant and the painful. Importantly, in the case of the profligate, it is not that choice no longer concerns good and bad, but rather that good and bad have pleasant and painful as their defining criterion.

208 As the cognitive apprehension of an end, the cognitive apprehension of something as pleasant or painful does it itself incite motivational force as an unmoved mover; it moves by inciting in an agent a certain practical orientation, by eliciting an agent to take a stance, or to make a judgment, on whether to act. This judgment takes the form of a proclamation of pursuit or avoidance, in relation to some end perceived as pleasant or painful. Explaining what this practical orientation entails, and describing the philosophical motivations which necessitate it, form the basis of my discussion about rational motivation in the next chapter.

209 *NE* 3.4.1113a32. See also *NE* 10.5.1176a17-19.
as if they followed it because they recognized in it a pattern which displays the best life
to lead and recognize it as worthy of emulation. Rather, if they abide by the law at all, it
is only because they anticipate, through fear, the repercussions of disobeying it. The
criterion by which they measure their actions is only a kind of calculus of bodily pleasure
or pain: it is only because of the threat of painful punishment inflicted on their bodies
that they obey, and thus only because the law has compulsive force that it is effective.
In contrast, virtuous individuals have internalized the law in their desires, so that the law
does not stand as an imperative over and above their actions, as an ought or as an
externally imposed duty which they stand apart from and to which, in that relation, they
must actively and self-consciously conform themselves. Rather, the opposition between
the ought (between what is normatively best) and the is (what is in fact the case) is
collapsed in the desires of the virtuous agent: he desires what is best for him to do, not
because he recognizes it as a duty, but because, as a result of his good habits, he want to
do that which is best for him to do, so that it is a pleasure to do so. This is in part what
it means for him to desire virtuous action for its own sake: the virtuous agent desires
virtuous actions for no reason other than because he wants to do them, and for that
reason, doing them brings him pleasure.

The extreme consequences of Aristotle’s view that virtuous states of character, as

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210 NE 3.4.1113b1-3
211 NE 10.9.1180a22-23
212 For a precedent in Aristotle for thinking about the human in terms of the law, see
1152a24-25. Aristotle compares the akratic individual to a city which cannot keep its own
laws.
213 NE 10.5.1176a17-22
214 See the conclusion of my treatment of the practical syllogism in section 3.2.1.
acquired states which are intimately connected with an evaluative attitude to discern what is pleasurable and painful, are a necessary condition of virtuous action cannot be overemphasized. As Aristotle states in *NE* 2.4, one cannot be virtuous simply by doing virtuous deeds, but rather, one must become a virtuous person. The full weight of the injunction which Aristotle places on human beings to be good, that is, that one must become the kind of person who finds doing virtuous deeds pleasurable, is difficult to accept. One might look, for example, to *NE* 6.12.1144a11-22:

> For we also say that there are some people who do just things yet are not at all just, such as the ones who do the things ordered by the law, or the ones who do it unwillingly, or in ignorance, or according to some other end but not for their own sake, even though they do the things they ought and things that behoove the wise man. Yet so it seems, there is a manner of doing each thing such as the good man does. I say that [manner] is to do each thing according to choice and for the sake of the things done themselves. (*NE* 6.12.1144a11-22).

Even the individual who recognizes the imperative of the law and acts in accordance with that imperative does not act in the manner of the *phronimos*, because he does not desire good ends for their own sake, but for the sake of obedience to the law. While “the many” who have not received the right education from youth will never taste true happiness, a mere few shall: to be virtuous “is not within everyone’s power, and it is not easy, so that to do these things properly is rare, praiseworthy, and noble”.

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215 *NE* 2.9.1109a28-30
Chapter 3: Phronēsis as a Science and the Practical Syllogism

3. - Introduction

In the previous chapter, I discussed ethical principles under the assumption that there is a profound and in large part mutually exclusive difference between the domains of imagination (φαντασία) and of opinion (δόξα). I have up until this point argued on only one side of this distinction, outlining how the good appears to us, as the result of judgments of phantasia, immediately as the ends which we desire by boulēsis. I have argued that what a human agent wishes for at some particular moment is not "up to us", since the goods which appear to us are immediate objects of consciousness; that is, they are not the result of discursive and rational processes which determine why in each event which occasions action, the end is specified as the end which it is. Rather, there is no discursively accessible reason why this particular end which now appears to me as good is the particular end which it is, but, from the standpoint of the moment when I presently find such-and-such end desirable, the fact that I find this end desirable rather than another, is manifest to me as an appearance, seemingly given to consciousness with the same immediacy as sense-perception.

I have also argued that the fact that the appearance of something as good always appears to a mind with the same immediacy as sense-perception, points at once to a structural similarity and an important difference between the two faculties. Both perceiving by sensation and perceiving something to be good depends on capacities of the soul being affected from without by external stimuli. For this reason, both forms of cognition are produced by being acted upon by an external agent. While human capacities
for sensation are possessed as inborn powers to be affected, moral states are not. Instead, they are acquired, not as the result of any single act of choice, as if one could singularly at one moment decide what their moral state was to be, but through the process of habituation; that is, as the result of repeatedly making similar choices.

I have also observed that there are two closely-connected and significant points which follow from the fact that states of character are acquired as the result of repeated choice. Choice, as a specifically rational form of desire, is defined by being preceded by deliberation, which is a discursive rational process of reason. Therefore, since reason is a free and spontaneous power, by being capable of desiring in accordance with deliberation, each individual is free to determine his conduct in accordance with his own capacity to generate reasons spontaneously. It thus follows that the ends which we wish for and which appear to us as good are in each instance specified as this particular end as an indirect result of our moral dispositions. Furthermore, since each individual's moral states are shaped by his own previous choices, it can be said that the objects of wish are up to us, not because we choose them directly, but only indirectly by gradual habituation. From this follows the second point. Each individual is free to choose for himself how he conducts himself in his deliberations, in relation to the ends which are supplied by his character through various operations of the non-rational part of the soul. Therefore, moral dispositions are passive states which are activated by being affected. They are historically formed a priori conditions of consciousness which are not perceptible in themselves, but their activation produces the cognition of the ends of action. Therefore, whether one is virtuous or vicious in character, depends on one's own personal history of conduct.
In the following chapter, I turn from imagination (φαντασία) to opinion (δόξα), which, in the sphere of practical action, concerns not the ends of our actions, at least not directly, but "the things towards the end". While the ends of action, present to the mind as phenomena, are, from the standpoint of the present moment of an action, immediate and thus not "up to us", the domain of opinion is the domain of that which is "up to us", inasmuch as by deliberating and choosing an agent can determine how he will conduct himself in relation to those immediately given ends. In this way, one might say,

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My intention in forming my view has been to provide an alternative to certain tendencies of the intellectualist interpretation of Aristotle's theory of motivation. The central claim which I contest is the view that rational forms of motivation are preceded by reflections on values, and that the good, as a range of value, is defined against other values (pleasure, for example) by the fact that it is associated with a distinctly rational form of motivation preceded and inspired by considered beliefs. Another way to put this is that the intellectualist interpretation maintains that the good is the object of intellect alone in its practical mode, whereas pleasure, for instance, is the object of epithumia, and, according to some interpreters, the noble is the object or "value" of thumos. See, for example, Cooper (1996) or Lear (2004) 137-146. Another crucial aspect of the intellectualist view is that reason is capable of determining by conscious reflection what the ends of action ought to be (see my introduction for a more detailed account of this aspect of the reading). My interpretation attempts to preserve certain aspects of this interpretation while also attempting to accommodate a view, recently argued for by Heda Segvic (2009) and Jessica Moss (2010), that all desire, both rational and non-rational, is desired "under the guise" of the good, a view whose result is that the good is not peculiarly the end of intellect. I attempt in what follows to indicate how the view that the ends of action are presented immediately in awareness rather than as the result of a discursive process is not subject to common criticisms of that view: (1) the fact that the ends of action are immediately perceived does not relegate deliberation to an exclusively instrumental role and (2) the fact that the ends immediately appear does not diminish reason's capacity to function as an efficient cause of action. One might argue that if the ends of desire appeared immediately, that this would reduce rational motivations to a kind of determinism. Because the good would appear immediately in accordance with one's character, if the appearance of the good itself bestowed motivational force, the desire itself would be as immediate as the appearance of the good, and thus there would be no room for a discursive process to stand between the goal and the process, which would determine how to act. In what follows, I shall argue that even if the ends appear immediately, reason can still play robust role in forming rational desires.
opinion furnishes rational animals with a distinctly human capacity for practical self-determination and freedom. In what follows, I shall first provide an account of what Aristotle identifies variously as rational, or calculative (λογιστικόν), desire, and deliberative (βουλευτική) desire, the "efficient cause" of human locomotion and self-movement. Deliberative desire is distinguished from epithumia, or "appetitive desire", the distinctly animal form of motivation, both because each is ordered towards its own distinct correlative end, although this distinction is not without exception, as well as because the former is necessarily preceded and determined by deliberation, whereas the latter has no direct relation to deliberation. By deliberation, one first devises a plan as to how to conduct oneself in relation to a certain end, and then, one's deliberation being complete, one is moved by deliberative desire to carry out that plan in action. My interpretation will draw from both the account of human locomotion in the De Anima, where Aristotle uses the word "boulēsis" to refer to the distinctly rational and human form of human motivation, in addition to the accounts of prohairesis, which in the ethical treatises is the word which Aristotle uses to refer to this same rational motivation.

I shall then move on to consider deliberation in itself. At the beginning of book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle outlines the two rational parts of the soul: the first part, whose objects are necessary, eternal and unchanging, is the theoretical part of the soul, and its distinctive virtue is sophia. The second part of the soul, the part of the soul that forms opinions and whose objects can be otherwise, has phronesis for its distinctive virtue, the practical intellectual virtue. While the function (ἔργον) of both

\[217\] NE 6.1.1138b35-1139a16, NE 6.5.1140b25-30
parts of intellect is the attainment of truth, the specific function of the practical intellect, as distinct from the theoretical, is truth in relation to right desire. Later in book 6, Aristotle restates this description of the practical part of intellect when he observes that "to deliberate well is the most characteristic function of the phronimos". In other words, phronésis, as an acquired state of the soul, guarantees that one’s deliberations are truthful. In order to make sense of the conditions which must obtain if deliberation is to be true, I shall provide an account of the practical syllogism in the second section of this chapter, thereby explaining the internal structure of deliberation as well as certain salient features of practical wisdom. Practical wisdom is a knowledge of both universals as well as particulars, but it is "scientific" and ensures the truth of deliberation more so to the extent that it involves universals, inasmuch as universal judgments are capable of explaining and justifying particular judgments derived from experience, and only to a lesser degree because it involves particulars.

3.1 - Deliberative Desire
3.1.1 - Introduction

Practical reasoning, or deliberation, is structurally analyzable into two prominent constitutive parts: the two premises of the practical syllogism, a universal and a particular premise. It is concerned with establishing a rational justification for acting in a certain way, a justification whose conclusion provides the efficient impulse to act. The efficient cause of action, which is the conclusion of deliberation, follows from the union of the universal and particular premises, as Aristotle states in NE 7.3:

For one is a universal opinion, and the other concerns particular things, which are the province of sensation. And whenever a unity is made from

218 NE 6.7.1141b10-11
these two, it is necessary that, when these things are joined together, the soul proclaims (φάναι) thereupon, and in practical matters, it is necessary to do at once [what is proclaimed]. (NE 7.3.1147a25-29).

As soon as the two premises of the practical syllogism – the particular and the universal – are united, as a direct and necessary consequence of their union, the action which they command is performed. Here, the role of affirmation and negation in intellect’s theoretical and practical modes, which Aristotle observes in both NE 6.2 and NE 7.3, is important. In NE 7.3, Aristotle notes that the conclusion which in practical intellect results in an action is analogically similar to theoretical intellect’s affirmation or denial, \(^{219}\) i.e., the affirmation which it posits when it perceives the truth established as a conclusion following the union of a universal and a particular premise. The final term in a “theoretical” syllogism, proceeding from the universal and particular premises, is an affirmation of truth, thus realizing, according to a mode appropriate to mind in its theoretical aspect, the function common to both parts of intellect. Analogously similar to affirmation and negation in theoretical syllogism, in the case of practical intellect, the conclusion, which follows from the intellect’s recognition of the truth and the necessity displayed in the union of the two premises in a practical syllogistic, is a proclamation (φάναι) of pursuit or avoidance.

The various steps leading to the formation and completion of rational motive desire indicate the essential connection of prohairesis and deliberation. Their inextricable relation is expressed, for example, in the Eudemian Ethics, when Aristotle says that “we deliberate about all things which we choose, but we do not choose all things about which

\(^{219}\) NE 6.2.1139a21-22. “Pursuit and avoidance in the sphere of desire correspond to affirmation and denial in the sphere of the intellect.”
we deliberate". Prohairesis is a rational form of motivation because, unlike epithumia, discursive reasoning and opinion must precede it, and in doing so, reason determines how desire moves the body according to the following steps:

1. In accordance with one’s character, phantasia makes a non-rational evaluative judgment, by which the principle of practical action appears as an object of awareness. The content of the appearance of the good is the awareness of something as pleasurable.

2. The principle is apprehended intellectually by nous and wished for by boulēsis. It is apprehended by nous as the beginning-point of deliberation and wished for as the desired end of action.

3. Deliberation, in its broadest dimension, consists of the active formation and union of universal and particular premises in relation to a beginning-point (ἀρχή). The particular premise is a judgment from experience, a statement of “the that”, whereas the universal premise is an explanatory statement, which justifies and explains why the particular premise is true. Through deliberation, one arrives at both an action which one can perform here and now, and a reason why it is best to do that action, relative to an immediate end perceived as desirable.

4. The formation of both a statement of fact (particular premise) and a justifying reason (universal premise) in a unified practical syllogism, necessarily results in a judgment of pursuit or avoidance. Whether the judgment is to pursue or to avoid follows from the deliberation. For example, if the particular premise urges to perform an action, the conclusion will be a proclamation of pursuit, whereas if the particular premise asserts to avoid an action, the conclusion will be a proclamation of avoidance of the perceived end which was the beginning-point of deliberation.

5. The proclamation of pursuit or avoidance is the “bridge” which connects deliberation -- which is a discursive process concerned with what course of action to take in relation to some end which presents itself as desirable -- to the motive desire, prohairesis, which realizes one’s immediately prior deliberations in and as action through the course of its duration. The proclamation is both at one and the same time the result of deliberation, and as being the result of deliberation, also that which initiates motive prohairesis. In this way, opinion is able to initiate desires which actually move the body, by initiating a distinctly rational form of motivation. Also, since prohairesis, which moves the body as an efficient cause, is the conclusion of the deliberation, prohairesis and deliberation are inextricably

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220 EE 2.10.1226b18-19
221 See the conclusion of III.1.4 and the footnote at the end of III.2.1 below, where I describe D.J. Allan’s reconciliation of the two forms of deliberation which he identifies: as I note there, he suggests that the a certain kind of instrumental reasoning produces the particular premises of the practical syllogism as its result.
connected. The completion of practical deliberation necessarily results in the formation of a motive desire.

6. *Prohairesis*, having been initiated, is *itself* a motion. Under the description of being a motion, it is for “the things relative to the end”; thus, it terminates at the end against which it is defined and whose attainment results in its cessation and annihilation. The end having being arrived at, what has resulted is an action performed in accordance with belief. Coincidentally, the action, having arrived at its end and goal (τέλος), is completed where it began, at the beginning-point of deliberation.

In both animal and human locomotion, the two moving components of desire -- the unmoved moving desire for an end as such, which moves another desire while not itself moving -- and the moved moving desire -- which moves the body towards its end while it itself is moved -- are each associated with a separate corresponding cognitive power. Since in every instance the self-movement of animate beings requires that both unmoved moving desire and moved moving desire be present, both of these cognitive powers, as the psychological faculties which issue the two distinct forms of desire, must be operative in order for locomotion to occur. I have already argued that, in the case of human beings, there are two distinct ranges of good: an upper-level range of goods, which are made present objects of awareness by evaluative judgments of *phantasia* and are apprehended by *nous* as the beginning-point of deliberation, and lower-level goods, which are made present objects of awareness by *phantasia* without being apprehended by *nous*, except in the case of the profligate, who deliberates and chooses such ends for their own sake. *Phantasia*’s presentation of the end, which only presents the end as an unmoved mover, does not by itself incite the motivational force which moves the body of an organism to act, as if the mere cognition of the end as desirable by itself had either

222 For several arguments concerning the relation of motive desires (understood as *kinetic* motions) to their ends, see II.2.1.
attractive or repellent motivational (i.e., efficient) force. Rather, the awareness of the goal of action as the result of evaluative judgments by phantasia is the awareness of a fixed and stable end which elicits another cognitive power to determine how to act in relation to that presupposed end.

In my brief summary of the processes whose result is the formation of rational desire, I identified the discursive and rational procedure which culminates in a cognition productive of the motivational impulse which moves the body: a proclamation of pursuit or avoidance. In the case of both rational and non-rational forms of desire, some other cognitive power, aside from the one which discerns the end of action by active discrimination, makes the judgments which produce the moved moving desire. That cognitive power presupposes the logically prior active discrimination of phantasia which makes the end, i.e., the unmoved mover of action, a currently present object of awareness. Phantasia’s discrimination is a prerequisite for the latter form of assessment inasmuch as the judgment to pursue or to avoid must be made in relation to some stable or fixed end. Such an assessment amounts to a judgment to either pursue or to avoid the perceived end, and in instances of animal locomotion and non-rational desire, sensation is the faculty of the soul which issues such proclamations of pursuit or avoidance. It is this power of “proclamation”, or “judgment”, which issues the moved moving desire, or the motivational desire, a judgment which actually incites the organism to move, either towards or away from its end: when sensation judges to pursue, by producing a moving desire which carries the body of the organism towards the end perceived by phantasia, and when sensation elects to avoid, it incites a moved moving desire to flee, in
accordance with its judgment.

The inextricability of the composite elements of desire is revealed in that the judgment to pursue or to avoid an end occurs contemporaneously with cognizing an end as desirable. The cognitive discernment of an end happens at the same time as the judgment to pursue or to avoid it is made, the judgment which, once made, initiates movement in space towards or away from the end. While the unmoved moving and moved moving elements of desire are analytically or conceptually distinct moments from the standpoint of philosophical reflection, in time they are indivisibly united, inasmuch as they occur concurrently. When the end is cognized immediately as a quasi-sensory object, so too, in unison with that apprehension, sensation issues a judgment either to pursue or avoid that end, a judgment which brings about a motive desire, which actually moves the body of a living organism towards the end which it desires as the efficient cause of its locomotion. Because the judgment to pursue or avoid is immediate, animals are incapable of determining how they act in relation to their ends: they act only in response to the present moment, in accordance with instinct.

In contrast, in the case of rational motive desire, a form of motivation issued by an organism in light of its awareness of past and future, the unmoved moving and moved moving elements of desire are temporally distinguished. While the end or goal of action is present to the mind of an agent as an immediate phenomenal appearance, the judgment either to pursue or to avoid the end does not occur concurrently with the apprehension of

\[223\] DA 3.2.426b25-29
the end. Rather, rational agents are capable of forming by a discursive process of thinking the judgment either to pursue or avoid some given end, and therefore the motivation which initiates their movement in relation to it, is rationally justified, instead of instinctual. In other words, first the goal of action appears, and the judgment to pursue or avoid is temporally subsequent to the awareness of the end.

I have already treated *NE* 2.4, where Aristotle outlines three conditions which must be present if an action is to be truly virtuous, among which is the condition that they must be chosen, and chosen for their own sake. *NE* 6.2 contains the material out of which one might construct an explanation for why an action must be chosen if it is to be virtuous. While the function of all parts of intellect is the attainment of truth, the distinct function of practical mind is the attainment of truth in relation to right desire. Whereas in theoretical thinking, the attainment of truth consists in affirmation and negation in respect to true and false, in the sphere of desire, affirmation and negation correspond to pursuit and avoidance.\(^{224}\) In what follows, I shall contrast animal motivation and human motivation in order to illustrate the full significance of Aristotle's claim that in order for an action to be virtuous it must be chosen. In the famous function argument, Aristotle defines the distinctly human function of the human being as the capacity to think actively,\(^{225}\) and describes virtue as that by which this unique capacity is done well. Action is virtuous when it displays, not only the moral virtues, that is, the proper discernment of and orientation towards noble ends, but perhaps more especially, when it displays the virtue associated with the defining feature of the human being, that is, its capacity to

\(^{224}\) *NE* 6.2.1139a19-32

\(^{225}\) See footnote 48.
think. In respect to practical thought, the intellectual virtue *phronēsis* is displayed when one forms *true* judgments either to pursue or to avoid some rightly desired end. The proclamation of such a judgment itself issues a motive desire, specifically, a rational motive desire, thus realizing the distinctive function of the practical intellect, by moving one to act in accordance with true reasons. The fact that action results from the union of the two propositions indicates that either the affirmation, to do some action, or the negation, to avoid some end, follows from a necessity established by thought, a necessity whose observance must compel action. That choice is able to elect both to pursue and to avoid on the basis of devised reasons is intimately associated with the conditions upon which Aristotle maintains that humans are responsible for their own actions: because human beings, when determining how to situate themselves in relation to the ends they wish for, are just as much capable of doing as they are of not doing actions, they are truly the cause of their own deeds.

In the *De Anima*, Aristotle identifies the awareness humans have of time, which is intimately wed with the fact that humans possess the power of thought, as the condition which makes akratic and enkkratic conflict in human beings possible as psychological conditions. Animals do possess a capacity to cognize the ends of action by *phantasia*, and subsequently the ability to initiate their own movement towards those ends by *epithumia*, a form of desire which, based cognitively on imagination alone, is incapable of exercising any kind of foresight when it judges whether to pursue or avoid some perceived end, but rather judges on the basis of the present moment alone. Human beings,

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226 *DA* 3.10.433b5-10
however, who, because they possess the power of thought, are capable of making present judgments on the basis of past experiences, with prudential foresight\textsuperscript{227} and anticipation of the future consequences of present actions, are capable of suffering akratic conflict because they possess both mind and imagination and are capable of being aware at one and the same time of the ends corresponding to each distinct cognitive power. Both the enkratic (self-controlled) and the akratic (un-controlled) individuals are both aware of two conflicting ends at the same time, while also containing within themselves conflicting motivations driving them to move and act in opposed ways.\textsuperscript{228} Another way to state this is that, in enkratic and akratic individuals, human cognition and motivation, and animal cognition and motivation, are opposed, each separately desiring at one and the same time different ends, cognized by different powers, what in the \textit{De Anima}, Aristotle calls the good (τὸ ἀγαθὸν), on the side of rational desire, or \textit{boulēsis}, and the apparent good (τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν), on the side of irrational desire.

In order to account fully for the distinct temporal standpoints of human and animal practical cognition, I shall provide a brief excursus of some of the differences which distinguish sensation from thought as described in the \textit{De Anima}. Here is my

\textsuperscript{227} I deliberately use this phrase to describe \textit{phronēsis}, which medieval translators rendered into Latin as \textit{prudentia}. The operation of \textit{phronēsis}, I suggest, in certain ways is actually conveyed quite well by the meaning of the English word which is derived from the Latin one.

\textsuperscript{228} Nussbaum (1995) 17 observes, rightly in my view, that when an individual is not virtuous and good, he is no less human for not being a good human. The rationality of the non-virtuous is reflected in their acquired states of character. Morally deficient individuals have acquired their states of character according to reason, even if not the right reasons. When the sensitive power issues an \textit{epithumia} against an akratic individual’s choice, the sensitive power activates a tendency which it has acquired according to reason, inasmuch as character is acquired by it.
central claim in what follows. In *De Anima* 3.10, Aristotle is explicit that there is “no desire without imagination” (ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἀνευ φαντασίας),\(^{229}\) although he goes on immediately to add greater nuance to his claim: there are two forms of desire, “all *phantasia* [being] either calculative or sensitive” (φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητική);\(^{230}\) in addition to a third form of imagination mentioned in *De Anima* 3.11, imagination which moves indeterminately,\(^{231}\) which is the form of imagination present in animals unequipped with the remote senses of sight, hearing and smell. The difference between calculative and sensitive imagination provides the key to understanding the contrast between the temporal perspectives of human and animal in respect to their practical cognition.

As a variety of *phantasia* distinct from *phantasia* in its sensitive form, calculative imagination is not simply an enhanced version of sensitive *phantasia*, somehow more capable of assessing sense-impressions critically and more able to discern the ends of action, nor is it a form of *phantasia* which enables an agent to decide what the ends of their action are. Rather, since thought is dependent on imagination, calculative imagination is the necessary form of imagination required in order for thought to make the rational judgments which are, in its practical mode, thought’s own affirmations of pursuit or avoidance in relation to presupposed and fixed ends, what in the *De Anima* is generally called calculation (λογισμός), and in the ethical writings is generally called deliberation (βούλευσις). The difference between sensitive and calculative imagination

\(^{229}\) DA 3.10.433b29  
\(^{230}\) DA 3.10.433b30  
\(^{231}\) DA 3.11.433b32-434a5
reflects a methodological principle which is found in *De Anima* 2.3. While a primitive power of the soul has its own independent activity in the context of an individual organism in which that power is the highest, in the context of an organism where that same primitive power is present alongside an additional higher power, the lower power is transformed in order to serve peculiar needs of the higher. For instance, while the nutritive activity of plant life functions independently of any higher activity, in the context of animal life, where sensitive activity is present in addition nutritive activity, nutritive activity is transformed for the sake of better realizing the ends of the higher power of soul. In animal life, the nutritive power furnishes the sensitive part with the sense-organs which are the material conditions required by sensitive awareness in order for it to realize its distinctive psychic activity.

This is similarly true of imagination, which takes on a different form in the context of merely sensitive animals than in rational animals. Organisms which are not equipped with mind, but only with the remote senses, possess sensitive *phantasia*, a form of imagination which is suited to an organism which does not possess the capacity for thought. However, in the case of rational animals, *phantasia* is transformed so as to be able to function, as the material potentiality to thought’s formal actuality. Thought requires *phantasia* as one of its conditions, and calculative *phantasia*, in contrast with sensitive *phantasia*, is alone that particular form of *phantasia* which is internally structured and constituted so as to serve the needs of thought. Aristotle describes the

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232 This way of understanding the relation of the powers of the soul which are presupposed by other powers to the powers which they presuppose is a defining element of Diamond’s interpretation of the *De Anima*. See Diamond (2007).
internal structure of calculative imagination in a brief passage in *De Anima* 3.11.  

Although I shall briefly discuss my interpretation of this passage in the following subsection of the present chapter, a more robust examination will accompany my account of the practical syllogism.

### 3.1.2 - The Temporal Standpoint of Animal Practical Cognition

Before looking specifically to how thought in its practical aspect is liberated from the present moment and capable of thinking both past and future, it is important first to observe the differences between sensation and thought which result from the dependence of thought on imagination. There are several passages in the *De Anima* which highlight both the mutual separateness of thought and imagination, as well as the dependence of thought on imagination. For example, in *DA* 3.3, Aristotle says that “imagination always implies perception, and is itself implied by judgment. But clearly imagination and judgment are different modes of thought”. Elsewhere, going on at greater length, he states:

> But since apparently nothing has a separate existence except sensible magnitudes, the objects of thought… reside in sensible forms. And for this reason, no one could ever learn or understand anything without the exercise of perception, so even when we think speculatively, we must have some mental picture of which to think; for mental images are similar to objects perceived except that they are without matter. But imagination is not the same thing as assertion or denial; for truth and falsehood involve a combination of notions. How then will the simplest notions (νοημάτων) differ from mental pictures? Surely neither these simple notions (τὰ δὲ πρῶτα νοηματα) nor any others are mental pictures, but they cannot occur without such mental pictures. (*DA* 3.8.432a3-14).

An exceptionally important claim in this passage is the statement that “mental images

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233 *DA* 3.11.434a6-13
234 *DA* 3.3.427b16-17
235 This translation is by W.S. Hett, from the Loeb edition.
(φαντάσματα) are similar to objects perceived (αισθήματα) except that they are without matter”. The phrase “without matter” is a somewhat surprising one in the context of the wider argument of the De Anima as a whole, inasmuch as what characterizes sense-objects, as distinct from the external objects of nutritive soul, is that they are received by the sense-organ as form without matter.  

Sense-organs are capable of receiving the sensible form of objects without their matter by being acted upon from without by a filled medium, which activates perception, whereas plants have no bodily organ whereby they can receive the perceptual content of external objects as form. Because only an external object can provide sensation with not only the intentional content which sensation perceives (sensible form separated from matter) but also the stimulus which initiates the ontological transition from potential to actual perception. What is surprising about Aristotle’s claim that phantasmata are like aisthemata without matter is that precisely what characterizes aisthemata is that they do not possess matter.

What Aristotle must here intend when he says that phantasmata are like aisthemata without matter is that phantasmata provide an acquired content which can become present to the individual’s mind without the stimulation of an external object, that is, a material object, in the immediate, external environment of the organism. In contrast, aisthemata do require the presence of such an object, first to impact or fill the medium, and then through the medium, to affect the organism’s sense-organ.  

The phantasmata are assimilated into the mind, and it is in the power of a thinker who has already acquired the contents of phantasia to spontaneously make a thought object which

236 DA 2.12.424b2-3  
237 DA 2.5.417b22-28
he has already assimilated and acquired from without present to his mind, not because *phantasmata* are thoughts themselves, but because they are one of the conditions of thoughts (νοήματα) and active thinking. They supply the individual mind with a pre-linguistic content out of which it produces the propositional statements which contain thought, but I shall return to this later. One who has acquired *phantasmata* as the latent content of thought is capable of spontaneously initiating within himself the transition from actual acquired *epistêmê* (first actuality) to active thinking (second actuality), independently of whatever is immediately present to him in his environmental and bodily context, according only to his own wish. Therefore, thinking in its theoretical mode is unlike sensation to the extent that active thinking, does not require the active influence and presence of external stimuli in the proximate environment of the organism; this is because of the dependence of thought on *phantasia.* Because of the origin of the latent content of knowledge in *phantasia,* the content of thought is derived from the prior awareness of sensible particulars, and therefore it necessarily follows that thought thinks a content which ultimately comes from without, although it is capable of thinking the content of sensation even when the corresponding content is absent from a rational animal’s immediate environs.

Before considering the similar as well as the contrasting psychological conditions which make both animal non-rational self-movement and human rational self-movement possible, I must address one final point about the relation of *aisthēmata, phantasmata,*

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238 DA 1.3.407a24-26. See also DA 3.8.432a3-14, cited above.
239 See subsection III.2.2.
240 DA 2.5.417b22-28
241 DA 2.5.417b22-28
and noemata. In *On Memory and Recollection*, Aristotle makes a statement which reveals something about how a living organism relates to time by virtue of possessing acquired memories in *phantasia*:

> There can be no memory of something now present at the present time, as has been said, but sensation refers to what is present, expectation to what is future, and memory to what is past. All memory, then, implies lapse of time. Hence only those living creatures which are conscious of time can be said to remember, and they do so with that part which is conscious of time. (*Mem.* 1.449b26-30).\(^{242}\)

Sensation not only requires the active presence of some object in the environment in order to stimulate the faculty, so that an animal only perceives at that present moment when its sense-organ is affected by the external object through the mediation of a medium. In addition, the sentient organism who does not possess memory has no awareness outside of the present “now”, precisely because there it *only* has an awareness of the continual and constantly changing presence of the impressions of external objects, an awareness which only occurs at that moment when the sense-organ is affected by some presently active external stimuli, and no awareness of anything else. In contrast, the retention of *phantasmata* provides the soul with an inner pre-conceptual content, by which an organism has access to some intentional object of awareness which stands outside of the flux of the present moment, outside of the present “now”, which, without interruption, passes into the future while the present moment simultaneously becomes past. It is because of this “indifference” to the present moment, first granted by emergence of retained sense-impressions in consciousness, that certain organisms are conscious of time, by which Aristotle means they are capable of standing outside of the

\(^{242}\) This translation is by W.S. Hett.
present moment, by being aware of something other than it.

The difference between the awareness of time of an organism equipped with sensation and sensitive phantasia on the one hand, and that of an organism capable of deliberative phantasia and thought on the other, is reflected in Aristotle’s description of the differences between sensation’s practical affirmations of pursuit and avoidance, and those of thought. Aristotle describes sensation’s capacity to make practical affirmations and negations at DA 3.7.431a8-14:

Sensation is like (ὁμοῖον) mere proclamation (φάναι) and thinking. And whenever something is pleasurable or painful, just like in affirmation or negation, [an animal] pursues or avoids. And feeling pleasure or pain is the actuality of the sensitive mean in respect to the good or bad, as such (τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ἢ τοιαύτα). And this is what avoidance and desire are in actuality (καὶ ἡ φυγὴ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁρέξις ταὐτό, ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν)... (DA 3.7.431a8-14).

The desiderative capacity (τὸ ὀρεκτικόν), the power of pursuit, as well as the capacity to avoid, are both integrated components of the unified sensitive faculty. This is displayed in the claim that “sensation is like (ὁμοῖον) mere proclamation (φάναι) and thinking”\(^\text{243}\), by which he refers to sensation’s capacity to make assertions of pursuit and avoidance, a power which he also attributes to thought shortly after.\(^\text{244}\) I take it that by being like “mere proclamations and thought”, the proclamations of sensation are similar to those of thought: they perform a similar function, viz., issuing motive desires which result in the actual movement of the organism in space, but they do so in a less sophisticated form.\(^\text{245}\)

\(^{243}\) DA 3.7.431a8-9
\(^{244}\) DA 3.7.431a14-17
\(^{245}\) This is a similarity which sensation shares with thought in both its practical and theoretical modes. Both practical and theoretical thought involve affirmation and negation, although only practical thought issues desires on the basis of its proclamations.
Attributing the capacity to make proclamations of pursuit or avoidance to the sensitive power and evoking the sensitive mean recalls a feature of the sensitive power which Aristotle describes in *DA* 3.2.²⁴⁶ The time when sensation makes its judgments, and the time to which its judgments pertain are not incidentally related, but rather, a sense-judgment, when made at this present moment, also necessarily pertains to this present moment when it is made, and cannot apply to some past moment or some future moment.

The reason why the sensitive power to make proclamations is a more primitive form of proclamation than that of thought is because, while thought is capable of issuing motive desires prudentially, with anticipation for the future in light of the past, the sensitive power only possesses an awareness of the present moment, and is thus only able to make its proclamations on the basis of that limited awareness of time. Sensation has only the present moment before it, and therefore, since it is an integrated critical component of the unified sense-power, sensation’s judgments to pursue or avoid likewise only pertain to the present moment. It is for this reason that, as Aristotle states in *De Anima* 3.10 *epithumia*, “does not look to the future” (διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν τὸ μέλλον):²⁴⁷ because the proclamations of pursuit and avoidance which initiate *epithumia*, as the motive desire for some end, are made by a power whose awareness is only of the present moment. Even if the presence of sensitive *phantasia* in certain sentient organisms implies a capacity to retain previously observed sense-impressions, or memories, this does not in turn mean that whatever primitive awareness of time some non-rational animals possesses is able to be harnessed when it makes its proclamations of pursuit or avoidance.

²⁴⁶ DA 3.2.426b25-29
²⁴⁷ DA 3.10.433b10
Although Aristotle might think that most sentient animals must also have some awareness of time by virtue of possessing sensitive *phantasia*, since the unified sense power, which has no awareness beyond the present moment, issues non-rational motive desire, animals cannot have the capacity to act with prior deliberation, or to practice foresight, in relation to present practical matters. The power of sensitive *phantasia* is exclusively engaged in the activity of discerning ends, an operation of the soul, which, in the case of neither human nor animal cognition, has a deliberative component, as I have argued in the previous chapter.

This is not to diminish the central role that *phantasia*, particularly sensitive *phantasia*, can and in fact must always play in non-rational animal cognition, nor does attributing the judgments of pursuit and avoidance to sensation contradict in any way Aristotle’s claim in *DA* 3.10 that there cannot be appetitive desire without *phantasia*. The power of *phantasia*, among other things, is a discriminating and discerning power which assesses and orders the raw, disorganized sense-impressions which are received by the mind as the proper sense objects. As I have suggested in the previous chapter of this thesis, and earlier in this one, *phantasia* is a necessary condition for an organism’s self-movement. It supplies an organism with the ends about which it makes its judgments to pursue and avoid, the ends which motivational desires, as moved movers, exist for the sake of, and which are the limits against which desires, as kinetic movements, are defined. This discriminating power is alluded to in *DA* 3.7: “such as when a man perceiving a beacon sees that it is fire, then, when he sees it moving, he knows that it

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248 *DA* 3.10.433b29
249 See subsection 2.2.1 of this thesis.
signifies an enemy". The distinct steps in the sequence of discernment, beginning with perceiving the beacon, and concluding with the recognition that it is an enemy, do not describe a process of discursive thought occupying sequential temporal moments, but rather relations of logical priority which occur instantaneously, at what could be a single moment in time.

I wish to address now a view contrary to the one that I am presenting. Hendrik Lorenz has argued that it *phantasia* is capable of initiating the motion which moves the body. He claims that since *phantasia* is a power to spontaneously generate images, and since animals possess this capacity, that animals have a capacity to exercise prospective foresight. He argues:

> What a lion typically anticipates in seeing (say) a stag is having a meal, rather than, for instance, copulating. This fit between prospective and present situations cannot be a mere coincidence. It must stem from an ability that lions and many other kinds of animals have as a matter of being naturally constituted the way they are, namely, to envisage prospects that are, more often than not, suitable to their present circumstances… Thus Aristotle must, I take it, assume that there are certain circumstances in which lions can be relied on, when presented with some prey, to have some suitable *phantasia* that will in some way or other represent eating the prey, rather than having no *phantasia* at all, or having some quite different *phantasia*. (Lorenz [2006] 150).

Lorenz derives the example of a lion hungering after a stag from *NE* 3.10.1118a17-23. Lorenz attributes to *phantasia* the power which I attribute to sensation, namely, the power to initiating motivational desires on the basis of cognitive acts. There are two reasons why I disagree with Lorenz on this point. The first is a more general philosophical reason. I think when Aristotle says that deliberation is something which is

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250 DA 3.7.431b5-7. The translation is that of W.S. Hett.
251 Lorenz (2006) 150
“up to us”, he attributes to human agency a characteristic which is not present in animal cognition, specifically, the capacity of humans to determine themselves in their conduct in relation to their ends. When Lorenz claims that phantasia, by spontaneously generating images, is capable of determining how an organism acts within the context of its environment, he attributes to animals to greater a degree of “inner independence”, i.e., a capacity to determine how they conduct themselves in relation to their ends, than I would. In contrast with Lorenz, I have argued that such an awareness strictly speaking belongs only to humans. This claim is central to my argument in this chapter: practical cognition grants to rational animals a greater capacity of self-determination than that of animals because it implies an awareness of past and future, in addition to present, which is the exclusive purview of animal awareness.

There is one passage which does seem to give some interpretive weight to Lorenz’s view, but ultimately, I argue, it does more to affirm my own view. This passage is found in Aristotle’s treatment of phantasia in the third book of the De Anima:

But clearly imagination and judgment are different modes of thought. For the former affection is up to us whenever we choose (βουλώμεθα)… but it is not in our power to form opinions as we will; for we must either hold a false opinion or a true one. Again, when we form an opinion that something is threatening or frightening, we are immediately affected by it, and the same is true of our opinion of something that inspires courage; but in imagination, we are like spectators looking at something dreadful or encouraging in a picture. (DA 3.3.427b18-22).  

In this passage, Aristotle states that one can employ imagination freely in order to form images according to one’s will (βουλώμεθα) and stresses the role of phantasia as a power of the mind to represent visual images of objects previously perceived.  

252 Translation is by W.S. Hett.
independently of whether they happen to be present. Aristotle goes so far as to say that it is in fact imagination which is “up to us”, and he in fact denies that thought is up to us, to the extent that thought must be either true or false. However, it must be noted that he does go on to say that, even if opinion is not “up to us” because it must be either true or false, this does not imply that we are not capable of forming our opinions freely in relation to those imagined images. Contrary to Lorenz’s view, this passage suggests that it is not the imagined image which itself inspires a motive response; in fact, one is capable of perceiving imagined images with emotional and motivational indifference, observing what is fearful without feeling fear. However, it supports my view because it is not until one has formed an opinion that something is either fearful or that it is not, that an emotive response follows, i.e., one feels fear. This suggests that phantasia does not by itself produce the motivational impulse which causes the movement of the body, but rather, that there is no motivational impulse until an additional cognitive act is present. Furthermore, this passage does not necessarily imply that, when phantasia forms its images and thought makes judgments about them, that the result is a motivation to act; it could easily be the case that such emotional responses are more similar to theoretical cognitions than to the practical cognitions, inasmuch as they are felt independently of one’s external environment, and do nothing to inspire action. This suggests that the perception of an end is a cognitive moment distinct from the cognition which produces the motivational desire.

In contrast, the passages from which Lorenz derives his example of a stag can easily be read to suggest that it is the sensitive faculty which makes the judgments which
initiate movement. As Moss argues:

…an animal pursues her food not because she judges ‘This is food,’ or ‘This is a banana,’ and then reasons or intuits that she needs to eat such things in order to survive, but because when she smells or eats it, she gets a special feeling: pleasure. (Moss [2010] 71).

A lion’s awareness of a stag as good does not require, first, a recognition of some animal as a stag, and then the further deduction that the stag is food, and then again another inference ordering desire. Rather, the pleasure which is attached to the sensitive cognition of the scent is itself an awareness of the good. The pleasure which an animal experiences is smelling something which can be food for it itself incites the motivation to act. As Moss argues, an awareness of the good does not require one first to recognize self-consciously certain ends as good and then, once they are known, to choose them in accordance with one’s belief concerning their goodness. Rather, I suggest, the felt experience of sensitive pleasure is itself an awareness with motivational power, a phenomenal experience in awareness which is capable of initiating motion. To use an example from NE 3.10, the pleasure that a hound takes in smelling a hare is a sensitive awareness of the hare which initiates his motivational impulse in relation to it, specifically, to eat the hare.

The judgment that the perceived object is an enemy amounts to the discernment of the end of an action. The non-verbal judgment that “this is an enemy” does not of itself equal an assertion of pursuit or avoidance, but rather, it elicits sensation to make such a proclamation, a proclamation which will issue a motive desire appropriate to the cognitive power which makes the proclamation, which in the case of sensation is an appetite (ἐπιθυμία). The contrasting roles of sensation and phantasia, while occurring in
one instantaneous moment in time, are nonetheless the operations of two distinct powers: the distinctive role of sensitive phantasia (φαντασία συνειδητική), then, is its discriminating cognitive power to discern ends of a certain kind, the ends about which sensitive awareness makes its affirmations of pursuit and avoidance, namely, the “apparent good” (τὸ φαίνόμενον ἀγαθόν). Therefore, the difference between sensation’s power to make judgments of pursuit and avoidance and the power of phantasia to discern ends corresponds approximately to the difference between the structural moments of desire. The second power initially makes present to the awareness of an organism the ends to which motivational desires are directed and which moves as unmoved movers, i.e., without themselves bestowing any efficient power. In relation to that end, sensation is then capable of initiating a motive desire which is for the sake of that end, the component of desire which Aristotle refers to as a moved mover in DA 3.10.253.

3.1.3 - The Temporal Standpoint of Human Practical Cognition

Up until now I have presented an interpretation of sensation’s capacity to make assertions of pursuit and avoidance, and the role that sensitive phantasia plays as a necessary condition of those proclamations. I shall now turn to the role which deliberative phantasia plays as a necessary condition of practical thinking, and the relation of such thinking to the practical affirmations and negations which initiate a distinctly rational form of motive desire, a form of desire which contrasts with non-rational epithumia. Deliberative phantasia performs not only the operation characteristic of sensitive phantasia, the discernment of the ends of action as a non-deliberative and

253 DA 3.10.433b10-16
non-discursive judgment, but it also possesses an additional power which sensitive
phantasia does not. When in *De Anima* 3.7, Aristotle says “for the thinking soul,
phantasmata are such as aisthemata”,\(^{254}\) he states exactly what he re-iterates in *De Anima*
3.8, when he says that phantasmata are like aisthemata without matter. What is true of
thought in its theoretical mode is equally true of it in its practical mode: while sensation
is the present awareness of some external object currently present in the proximate
environment of the perceiving organism, in the case of thought, phantasmata take the
place of aisthemata, by supplying it with a content which the soul possesses
independently of whatever might be present to a rational animal in its proximate, external
environment. Thus, even though practical deliberations and calculations, which result in
declarations of pursuit or avoidance, are necessarily made in relation to particulars (i.e.,
the ends which are perceived as the result of non-rational phantasia),\(^{255}\) because thought
possesses an awareness beyond the present moment, it is capable of “standing outside” of
it in forming its judgments of pursuit and avoidance, in contrast with sensitive awareness.

A difficult passage from *De Anima* 3.11 illuminates the role that phantasia plays
as a condition of thinking. It is important to recall that both sensitive phantasia and
deliberative phantasia are conditions of practical thought, but each in very different
ways. While the passage as a whole sheds light on the practical syllogism in addition to
the dependence of thought on phantasia, for the moment, I shall only consider its

\(^{254}\) *DA* 3.7.431a15

\(^{255}\) See *DA* 3.7.431b10-13. “The true and false are in the same genus, and good and bad
are in the same genus, (τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐστὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ
cαὶ τῷ κακῷ) but they differ in respect to difference of universal and particular (ἀλλὰ
tῷ γε ἀπλῶς διαφέρει καὶ τινί).”
relevance to the latter question, and return to the former question later in this chapter.

Imagination in the form of sense (αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία) is found, as we have said, in all animals, but deliberative imagination (βουλευτικὴ) only in the calculative; for to decide whether one shall do this or that calls at once for calculation, and one must measure by a single standard; for one pursues the greater good. This implies the ability to combine several images into one. This is why imagination is thought not to involve opinion, because it does not involve opinion which is based on inference, whereas opinion involves imagination. Hence appetite does not imply capacity for deliberation. (DA 3.11.434a6-13).

The passage alludes at the same time to the separation and the distinctness of phantasia and opinion (δόξα) from each other, while also remarking on the dependence of thought on phantasia. The power of phantasia does not of itself imply the soul’s power to produce the multiple opinions (i.e., the universal and particular judgments), which make up syllogisms, as is evidenced by the fact that there are sentient organisms who possess phantasia, specifically, sensitive phantasia, without possessing the capacity to reason. However, in every instance of an organism which is in fact able to think, opinion does require phantasia, but only phantasia of a certain kind. Hence, phantasia does not itself, without qualification, imply thought, but only a particular kind of phantasia, and even then, it is not phantasia which itself thinks, but some other power of the soul, with the aid of phantasia. Having distinguished the two forms of phantasia, Aristotle is able to make an inference about the relation of appetite to deliberation. No organism is capable of desiring and cognizing the ends of desire without imagination, and therefore all animals which are capable of self-motion necessarily possess it. However, if phantasia itself implied deliberation then, by extension, any organism which was capable of phantasia would also be able to deliberate about its ends. It is important to observe the full distinctness of sensitive phantasia and calculative phantasia, which are actually quite
different despite both being forms of *phantasia*. Whereas sensitive *phantasia* entails the evaluative capacity to discern the ends of action, calculative *phantasia* is the form of *phantasia* required in order for thought to possess an intentional content.

*De Interpretatione* can potentially illuminate and clarify Aristotle’s comments about the relation of imagination to thought in the *De Anima*. As Aristotle says in that treatise, propositions are formed by a process of combining and separating, or of weaving together, the elements of speech, namely, nouns and verbs,\(^\text{256}\) of which individual instances considered in isolation (such as "man" or "horse", or "to run") constitute meaningful utterances, but not propositions. That thought is a weaving together of units is stated in the *De Anima*, not only in *DA* 3.8.432a3-14, but also in *DA* 3.6:

> For the false is always in the combination. For if white is said to be not-white, it is because not-white has been combined. But it is not only a matter of true or false that Cleon is white, but also that he was or will be. For in each case mind is the maker of unity (τὸ δὲ ἑν ποιοῦν ἔκαστον, τοῦτο ὁ νοῦς). (*DA* 3.6.430b1-6).

Only those sentences which are composite unities of nouns and verbs amount to affirmations and negations, or, in other words, sentences, which are defined as statements admitting of either of truth or falsehood. What the *De Interpretatione* offers us by way of clarification is presented in its opening lines, when Aristotle states that "words spoken are symbols (σύμβολα) or signs of affections or impressions (παθήματα) in the soul".\(^\text{257}\) The mental states of which words are symbols are not referred to directly in this passage as *phantasmata*, but as *pathemata*. Nonetheless, given that *phantasmata* are retained by the soul as memories after being repeatedly acted upon by sense-impressions, or, in other

\(^{256}\) *De Inter*. 1.16a10-19

\(^{257}\) *De Inter*. 1.16a4-5
words, by the soul being passively affected, it is not at all a beyond the bounds of possibility that the pathemata\textsuperscript{258} in the opening of the De Interpretatione in fact refer to the phantasmata spoken of so frequently in the De Anima.

The implication of calling words symbola is that the phantasmata are not themselves linguistically expressed, but that the words out of which propositions are woven have their basis in and refer to the phantasmata while not themselves being phantasmata. Aristotle contrasts simple notions (τὰ δὲ πρῶτα νοήματα) with phantasmata. By ta prota noemata he alludes to the units of thought which are articulated as speech, such as nouns and words, and by the word phantasmata, he refers to mental states resulting from retaining sense-impressions which approximately correspond to the units of speech\textsuperscript{259}. When Aristotle remarks on thought's dependence on imagination, implied in the claim that the noemata do not exist without phantasia, the meaning of his claim is that, before one can employ a certain concept in producing judgments, one must first possess a corresponding affection of the soul, e.g., before one can incorporates the word "dog" as a unit of linguistically formed thought into one's judgments, one must first have acquired a corresponding mental state. One cannot be entirely certain whether this

\textsuperscript{258} A passage from Posterior Analytics 2.19 (99b36-100a6) describes in greater detail, although still obscurely, various conditions under which this retention can occur in different sorts of animals; that is, animals which innately possess the capacity to perceive objects sensibly. Some animals are capable of retaining and recalling objects in the mind to memory objects as remembered images, while others are not. This distinction is similarly found in the first chapter of the Metaphysics (1.1.980a27-980b28); some animals have the capacity for memory, whereas others do not. Beyond this distinction is yet another which distinguishes those animals which possess memory and only participate in experience, and thus possess it in only a derivative way, from human beings, who possess full-blown experience; what this distinction entails is elaborated in the Posterior Analytics.

\textsuperscript{259} Polansky (2007) 478
means that there is a one-for-one correspondence, that is, whether in each and every case, for each word there is a corresponding mental state in the soul, specifically, a memory, or whether there will be multiple memories for each word, or whether in some cases a single memory will contain multiple words. Aristotle says little about what this correspondence of noemata and phantasmata entails, although in the De Interpretatione he does use the word symbola to describe the relation which obtains between a thought, taking a linguistic form, and its mental states. At the very least, this indicates that there is a correspondence between the noemata and the phantasmata.

The analogy of aisthemata and sensation to phantasmata and noemata does not indicate that phantasmata play the same role in sensation as the external stimuli, to the extent that both aisthemata and phantasmata present to the mind a visual image. Rather, the comparison applies only inasmuch as phantasia supplies the form separated from matter to the mind. The phantasmata, unlike the aisthemata, are present as a latent, pre-conceptual content out of which are generated the propositions which, taking a linguistic form, contain thought, and, because they are assimilated and retained by the mind, are capable of being generated independently of whatever is present in the proximate environment of the thinker, as thought. The difference between thought-judgments and sense-judgments is indicated in De Anima 3.6, where Aristotle explains that opinions can be true or false, in relation to time: whereas in sense, judgments can only apply to the moment when they are made, judgments made by thought in the present moment can apply to the future or to the past, and judgments that have been made or will be made can
pertain to the present moment.\textsuperscript{260} As I shall argue in this following section, practical thought can only pertain to the past or future in a qualified sense. As Aristotle states in \textit{De Anima} 3.7, thinking soul is capable of “deliberating and calculating about future things (τὰ μέλλοντα) with a view to the present” (πρὸς τὰ παρόντα).\textsuperscript{261} This passage doesn’t seem to accommodate the reading that practical thinking considers in the present moment what it might do at some future time. Rather, practical thinking determines at some present moment, what it might do at that present moment, while exercising prudential foresight into the consequences of acting presently in such-and-such a way for the future, on the basis of its acquired knowledge of the past.

\section*{3.1.4 - The Structure of Deliberative Desire}

All practical thinking has limits (for all practical thinking is for the sake of something else), and likewise theoretical thoughts are limited by verbal formulae. And every formula is a definition or a demonstration. And demonstrations are from ends, and in some way hold their end, as an inference or a conclusion. (\textit{DA} 1.3.407a24-27).

Practical mind is distinguished from theoretical mind by the fact that practical mind is thought combined with desire. While there is an analogical similarity between theoretical and practical thought inasmuch as both begin from indemonstrable and underived principles, practical thought, unlike theoretical thought, is thought whose beginning-point (ἀρχή) is not a definition of essence, but a practical goal. The thinking of practical mind is distinguished from that of theoretical mind by being end-directed, but of course, the mere fact that practical thinking is end-directed does not of itself explain the full difference between practical and theoretical mind. In addition to being oriented

\textsuperscript{260} \textit{DA} 3.6.430b1-6
\textsuperscript{261} \textit{DA} 3.7.431b6-8
towards goals, the fact that practical mind is end-directed shapes what practical mind thinks. Practical mind, in its most strict sense, thinks exclusively with a view towards some action which the agent who thinks can himself bring about in his immediate circumstantial context.

Even though they are inextricably connected, the end-directedness of practical mind more properly defines practical mind than the fact that it is concerned with practical matters. The strict definition of practical mind is articulated when in NE 6.2 practical mind is described as the rational power to make proclamations of pursuit or avoidance, thus defining the power more by virtue of its function (ἐργον) than because it is concerned with some particular conceptual content. Therefore, practical thought, in the strict sense of the term, as a power to deliberate, thinks only with a view to establishing how some action is to be performed.262 Several passages in book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics suggest that this is so, for example, when Aristotle distinguishes understanding (σύνεσις) from phronēsis, the virtue whose discursive thought process is deliberation about “the things relative to the end” (τὰ τὰ πρὸς τέλος), phronēsis is described as

262 Allan (1955) 328-329. Curiously Allan claims that deliberation is “not a distinctive operation of practical reasoning”, but he substantiates his interpretation only by citing NE 6.9.1142a31, where Aristotle “locates [deliberation] more precisely by saying that it is ‘one species of search’”, which would seem just as much to affirm that deliberation is uniquely practical – inasmuch as deliberation could be the specific form of search which is ordered towards action – as the contrary. In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle does state that there can be deliberation without choice, but even that does not necessarily imply that deliberation isn’t always practical. But this could easily mean only that deliberation exists without choice, inasmuch as sometimes deliberation will not terminate in a choice, such as when its investigation is not able to be completed, as in instances where one recognizes that an action is not within one’s power to act, and so to issue a motive desire. In contrast with Allan, it seems more likely to me that deliberation is the specific form of investigation which is practical.
“commanding” (ἐπιτακτική) because “its end is ascertaining what it is necessary to do or not to do”, as opposed to sunesis, which merely forms opinions about practical matters without inducing the soul to act.263

The *De Anima* also suggests that the singular, or at least the preeminent purpose of practical thought is to issue the proclamation to act, given the unique union of thought and desire which it entails. For instance in *De Anima* 3.9, in the course of surveying the various “parts” of the soul to discover which one is capable of initiating the body’s movement in space, he states the following about whether mind might fill this role:

But the calculative capacity which is called mind is not the mover. For theoretical mind thinks nothing practical, nor does it say anything about what ought to be pursued or avoided; but movement is either something pursued or something avoided. But whenever theoretical mind thinks (θεωρῇ) some such thing as would be either pursued or avoided, it does not order pursuit or avoidance. For example, when it thinks something fearful or pleasant, it does not order fear; but the heart is moved, and if something is pleasant, some other part. (*DA* 3.9.432b26-433a1).

The repeated use of the words *theorein* and *theoretikos* indicate clearly that, throughout the whole of this passage, Aristotle is discussing the feasibility that theoretical mind, and not practical mind, might be able to move the body. Theoretical mind is able to reflect on thoughts which are able to elicit emotional and desiderative responses without in fact rousing those responses. This is because when the soul is affected to feel pleasure, it is not thought itself which is affected, but “some other part”, by which Aristotle alludes to the appetitive part of the soul. The uniquely practical orientation of practical thought results from the combination of mind with desire. The cognitive power of mind discerns and specifies in some particular instance what the end of action is, but the appetitive part

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263 *NE* 6.10.1143a8-12
of the soul prompts mind to carry out its activity of discerning the end, and therefore indirectly, it also prompts practical mind’s discursive deliberation and calculation about the *ta to pros telos* after the end has been made an object of awareness.

A crucial contention of my interpretation of both rational as well as irrational locomotion is that the desirability of the apparent end is not itself an attractive or repellent force which on its own power is capable of initiating movement, as if the cognitive power which apprehended the goal of action was itself capable of inciting movement towards it without any intermediary steps. While non-rational desires are instigated by a judgment of the sensitive power to avoid or pursue, which occurs simultaneously at one and the same time as the apprehension of the end by *phantasia*, in the case of rational desire, such judgments are in thought’s power to proclaim. The desiderative influence of the cognition of the end is no more directly motivational, no more attractive or repulsive, for rational desire than for appetitive desire. Instead, it is better said that, in instances of rational desire, the cognition of an end of action *elicits* deliberation to begin its investigation. The apprehension of the end effectively amounts to an act of cognitive discernment which prompts the rational part of the soul to make a proclamation of pursuit or avoidance, and this is precisely what deliberation is, a process of thought whose result is a judgment to pursue or to avoid. The reason why virtuous actions must be chosen, *i.e.*, moved by a distinctly rational form of desire, is because only rational desires are initiated on the basis of reasons, or rational justifications, for acting in
a certain way.\textsuperscript{264}

The sole purpose of deliberation, as a form of investigation, is to find, through a discursive process, a reason to act, a reason which will itself initiate, in the form of a proclamation to pursue or avoid, a motive desire which will move the body in space as the efficient cause of locomotion. This is displayed in the two archai which are the key structural components of deliberation and rational desire. See, for example, in DA 3.10:

> And every appetite is for the sake of something. The that-for-the-sake-of-which of desire is itself the principle (ἀρχὴ) of practical mind, and the end is the principle of action (ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως). (DA 3.10.433a16-17).

Aristotle describes two principles, one which is the beginning-point because it is both the goal of action and the fixed beginning-point from which deliberation begins, the principle

\textsuperscript{264} Scholars have been divided on how best to understand what Aristotle means when he says that deliberation is about “ta to pros telos”. Some have defended the view that by ta to pros telos Aristotle refers to “means” in the conventional sense of ‘the means of obtaining some end’. In such a case, the process of deliberation ascertains what sequential steps of action are required instrumentally in order to realize some practical goal or bring some end into reality. For a passage which seems most explicitly to attribute this structure to practical reasoning, see book 3 of the Nicomachean Ethics, especially NE 3.3. For another passage where Aristotle seems to have this form of deliberation in mind, see Metaphysics 7.7, where Aristotle provides an example of what deliberation of this sort would look like. Alternatively, others have advocated a view like my own, where practical reason does not ascertain the means of attaining to some goal, but rather establishes a justification for why I should act in such-and-such a way in relation to some fixed goal. Wiggins (1980) 221 acknowledging both of these distinct readings, identifies the first with the treatment of deliberation in book 3, and the second with that of book 6-7, and calls the first “means-end” deliberation and the latter “rule-case” deliberation. I cannot consider in this context whether these are in fact mutually exclusive interpretative possibilities, that is, whether they are truly distinct, or whether they are incompatible, nor whether the practical syllogism, which I have described as a descriptive account of the internal structure of deliberation, can explain both of these operations. Given all of the evidence that I have gathered in favour of the latter view, especially in respect to the practical syllogism, which I will present in the following section, it is difficult for me to see how by ta to pros telos Aristotle could refer to means at the full exclusion of justification.
which Aristotle refers to in *NE* 6.2 as “right desire”. The other, which is called the
“beginning of action” (ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως), does not refer to the apprehensible fixed-principle presupposed by deliberation, but rather to the originating source in the soul of its body’s locomotion, which coincides with the termination or completion of deliberation’s discursive process. From this latter principle, a rational animal can spontaneously issue from within himself the efficient cause of his own actions on the basis of devised reasons which justify why he should act in some such way in relation to presupposed ends.265 Two passages directly confirm this way of understanding deliberative reason’s bond with the principle of action:

For it is the apparent good which is the object of appetite, and the real good that is the object of wish. Desire is the result of opinion rather than opinion that of desire; it is the act of thinking (νόησις) that is the starting-point (ἀρχὴ). (*Meta.* 12.7.1072a27-30).

For each man stops investigating into how he will act when he is led to himself, the principle (τὴν ἀρχήν), and in him, to the part that rules. For this is the part that chooses… (*NE* 3.3.1113a4-8).

Both of these passages indicate that established reasons, or *doxai*, are the initiating source of movement in practical action. Both passages allude to a beginning-point of rational desire residing in thought or in the rational part of the soul. The presence of the principle

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265 McDowell (1996) 50 criticizes the view of Cooper (1999) 267-270, *viz.*, the view, summarized by McDowell, that “a reflective ethical agent has a double motivation for an action that displays excellence of character: one motivation issuing from a non-rational motivational propensity, a result of habituation, and another motivation independently generated by an exercise of intellect.” I have already suggested (see II.2.1) that virtuous action can be motivated by several different desires at once, both rational and non-rational. I agree with Cooper that there must be distinctly rational forms of motivation independent of non-rational forms of motivation, non-rational forms of motivation being issued by the non-rational part of the soul, the former being issued by the rational part of the soul. However, I differ from Cooper in identifying *prohairesis* as the rational desire which moves the body, rather than *boulēsis*.
in the rational part of the soul accounts for why *prohairesis* is defined as “deliberative desire” in the ethical writings: by virtue of its capacity to issue “deliberative desire”, reason itself has the capacity to issue the motivation to move the body on the basis of justifying reasons. A completed sequence of deliberation initiates and is the cause of this form of motive desire, which moves as a moved mover, rather than the unmoved mover which is the end apprehended by *nous* and desired by wish.

The fundamental point which I wish to observe about the two principles is that rational motivational impulses, the distinctly rational efficient causes of action, have no independence outside of the devised beliefs which initiate them. The thinking (νόησις) or belief (δόξα) which produces a motivational impulse, a *prohairesis* (which Aristotle calls *boulēsis* in the *De Anima*), is in the following sense an unconditional beginning-point (ἀρχή): the motivation has no cause prior to and aside from the rational justification to act (or, in other words, the belief devised by deliberation) so that nothing but deliberation determines *how* the desire moves the body. It is because there is no immediate cause of *prohairesis* except for deliberation that the desire is wholly constituted and commanded by reason. Also, it is for that reason that the desired end cannot have either attractive or repulsive motivational force. If it did, reason would not unconditionally and independently incite the motivation to act, and thus one could not justifiably call the principle of motion which issues *prohairesis* a beginning-point (ἀρχή). Deliberation would not then be the unconditional and single source of rational motivation, but rather, rational motivation would be a composite of discursive and non-discursive elements: the attractive or repulsive awareness of the end could potentially conflict with reason’s
orders, such that the rational motivation which results from formation would be an admixture of discursively and non-discursively inspired elements.

Even though the rational motivation to act, the *prohairesis*, has, as an efficient cause, no direct cause other than deliberation, deliberation does itself in turn presupposes an unconditional beginning-point (*ἀρχή*), viz., the cognized end of action. For this reason, while deliberation may *unconditionally* be the *immediate* cause of *prohairesis*, deliberation itself has no independence outside of the awareness of some end as pleasurable and good. This is yet another reason why I say that the awareness of an end is not itself motivational, by being either attractive or repellent; instead, it is more sound to say that the awareness of the end *elicits* the mind to begin deliberating, or, in other words, it incites it an agent to take a *practical orientation* towards his environment. When one begins deliberating, one does so *only* with a view towards issuing a motive desire which necessarily presupposes some fixed limit. Motive desires, as forms of *kinetic* motion, are defined by the difference from yet dependence on the cognized ends of action (see section 2.2.1). Because the motive desire initiated by deliberation will necessarily presuppose that end once it is issued as the result of a proclamation of pursuit or avoidance, so too must deliberation, as the immediate cause of *prohairesis*, presuppose it. Therefore, it is not until one perceives some end as desirable that one is able to begin deliberating: deliberation itself has as its unconditional condition the awareness of some end as good. For this reason, one might say that, while rational motivation has no independence outside of deliberation, in turn, one might also say that deliberation has no
independence outside of the initial non-motivational desire for an end as such.266

The cognition of an end of action, as a certain form of cognitive apprehension in some situational context, is double faceted. First, it includes a definite awareness that it is best to act, as is indicated by the universal claim that deliberation is never about ends, illustrated by the doctor who does not deliberate about whether he is to heal his patient.267 Second, it includes a merely tentative awareness that it might be possible to act. The cognition of the end, of course, does not guarantee that action is possible, as is clear from Aristotle’s description of one whose deliberation terminates before it leads to action, when in one’s deliberations one comes upon a step which cannot be achieved by the agent deliberating. Thus deliberation and not the cognition of the end is the form of awareness which recognizes that a certain action is impossible, or at least the cognitive discernment of ends can make present to an agent ends that he cannot possibly achieve.268 Both of these points are directly related to Aristotle’s claim that the principle of action is just as much a principle of acting as well as not acting, as much a principle of motion as of rest. Reasons are the initiating force of action, and therefore on the basis of reasons one can just as much elect to refrain from act as to avoid or pursue some end.

There is yet another important confluence between the De Anima and the Nicomachean Ethics. The De Anima states that “the thing moved is moved to the extent

266 The two previous paragraphs are intended as the explanation, promised in footnote 151, of Aristotle’s description of prohairesis as both desiring thought and thinking desire. See section 2.1.3.
267 NE 3.3.1112b13-16
268 NE 3.3.1112b25-29
that there is desire, and desire is some kind of motion *qua* actual*. Rational appetites are actual at those moments in time when they are actually moving the body of an organism, and the actuality of appetite is nothing other than that movement. The most explicit evidence in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that *prohairesis*, or "choice", is the efficient cause of action, is Aristotle’s description of *prohairesis* as the “source of movement” (*ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις*). The following passage is consistent with and brings greater clarity both to the designation of *prohairesis* to the "things relative to the end":

Now the cause of action, the efficient (*ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις*), but not the final cause (οὐκ ἐνεχασάν), is choice, and the cause of choice is desire and reasoning directed to some end (*ὅ ἐνεχασά τινος*). Hence choice necessarily involves both intellect and thought and a certain disposition of character. (*NE 6.2.1139a32-34*).

According to this passage, *prohairesis* is a form of desire which stands "in relation to some end" (*ὅ ἐνεχασά τινος*), but which also is not itself the end (οὐκ ἐνεχασάν). In other words, choice does not itself desire the goal of action, but rather, it is a desire which has the end set over and against it as a goal, and it desires those things which are conducive to the end, those things which will bring the wished for goal into fruition as action, terminating, that is, ceasing once the end is attained, and the organism is brought to the place in space which was the goal of his desire. The end of the action set over and against *prohairesis* directs the motive desire to some specific end. But that is not to say that the only end of action is the end set over and against choice. Rather, as Aristotle says, the goal of action is “acting well” (*εὐπραξία*), meaning that the goal of action is the action itself. Though desire is for the cognized end of action, in another way, desire is

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269 *DA* 3.10.433b16-18. “*κινεῖται γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον ἕ ὁρέγεται, καὶ ἕ ὁρεῖς κίνησις τίς ἐστιν, ἕ ἐνεχασά*”.

156
also for nothing other than the action itself.\textsuperscript{270}

That the \textit{actuality} (ἐνέργεια) of desire consists in the movement of the body indicates something of what it means for desire to be for the action itself.\textsuperscript{271} There is a mutual co-dependence of wish, as desire for the end (τέλος) and \textit{prohairesis}, as desire for the \textit{ta to pros telos}. Without wish, the desire for the end which stands over and against \textit{prohairesis}, there would be no terminus (i.e., no cognized goal) towards which the action would be ordered and directed. But without \textit{prohairesis}, the action itself would not exist, because action is a present, existing reality only at that time when \textit{prohairesis} is actual, i.e., when it is actively moving the body. Therefore, the end for the sake of which the action exists, the goal of wish, is only realized and only has a subsistent reality in the action itself, in the action which is for the sake of the wished for end, but distinct from it. To put it concisely, it is by virtue of the actuality of \textit{prohairesis}, when it is actual as an active movement, that the action which it moves is actual itself.\textsuperscript{272} While in one sense the

\textsuperscript{270} NE 6.2.1139b4-5
\textsuperscript{271} McDowell (1988) and Wiggins (1980), Allan (1955) 339. My own view attempts to provide an explanation of how choice can be chosen for its own sake while also having an end set over and against it. My view is that these are two distinct ends, which serve two distinct roles in the structure of \textit{praxis}.
\textsuperscript{272} See Wiggins (1980) 224. “It is a commonplace of Aristotelian exegesis that Aristotle never paused to analyze the distinction between two quite distinct relations. (A) the relation that \( x \) bears to \( telos \ y \) when \( x \) will bring about \( y \), and (B) the relation \( x \) bears to \( y \) when the existence of \( x \) will itself constitute \( y \)... The expression \textit{toward the end} is vague and perfectly suited to express both conceptions.” One could think here of Aristotelian hylomorphism as an illustrative image in order to grasp how, the latter of these two descriptions of deliberation is constitutive of action. Doing well (\textit{eupraxia}), as the end of action, only exists as it is embodied in some particular action. Deliberation determines how \textit{eupraxia} subsists by postulating a rational justification for acting in some way, in relation to some presupposed end, \textit{i.e.}, the end of wish and the beginning-point grasped by \textit{nous}. Doing well takes on a determinate form \textit{in} and \textit{as} the action which deliberation commands.
end of action is the goal set over and against *prohairesis* as the point at which it terminates as a movement, in another sense, the end of action and the object of desire is nothing other than the action itself and that it should be performed well, and this desire is in fact consummated at every stage of the action as it is carried out. As an example, if one determines by deliberation that doing well consists of holding one’s ground in battle, one is doing well, and thus realizing the end of action, at those moments when one performs the action, and one ceases to do well at the conclusion of one’s action.\(^{273}\) To put it simply, action is an end in itself because the goal of action is nothing but the action itself. Aristotle does not explain why action has this structure, that is, why it has its end in itself, but he distinguishes it from technical production, which as its end in its product rather than in itself.\(^{274}\)

Actions which are chosen and deliberated about are chosen for their own sake, *i.e.*, for no other reason than for the actions themselves, which, so far as they involve movement in space, only exist so far as *prohairesis* itself exists in actuality as active movement. I have already observed that locomotion, as a kind of movement, is defined by its relation to its end. To the extent that it is a movement, it is an incomplete process

\(^{273}\) McDowell (1988) 25-27 and Wiggins both speak of the power of deliberation to “specify” in some instance in what doing well consists. Deliberation, not as instrumental reasoning, but as “rule-case” deliberation (see following note), determines how one can attain to the goal of doing well in the here-and-now, by determining an actually achievable action in which doing well would consist. McDowell is, in my view, rightly critical of Irwin’s description of action as something which “promotes” happiness, rather than as being something in which happiness consists. For McDowell (1988) 30-31, the universal premise of the practical syllogism is a specification of the end; reason specifies the end, as a specification of doing well. I do not think that the practical syllogism specifies the action as a form of doing well by discerning the end of action, but rather by forming the conduct of the agent in relation to his end.

\(^{274}\) *NE* 2.4.1105a26-1105b5, *NE* 6.2.1139a36-1139b6
because it never possesses its end, but rather, it is always moving towards its end with its end standing over and against it. I have also argued in the introduction of this thesis that, the apparent good – the end made an object of awareness by evaluative phantasia, apprehended by nous, and desired qua end by wish – is only one of the constitutive ends of action. The apparent good is only the end of action inasmuch as it is the constitutive limit or end against which prohairesis, qua active movement in actuality, is defined. In another sense, action has its end in itself, inasmuch as the action is performed for its own sake. Against the view which maintains that if the end of action is immediately given, practical reason can only be consigned to the debased rank of instrumental reasoning, the interpretation which I am proposing ennobles practical reasoning. Deliberation does not simply determine the means to some end (i.e., the sequence of steps which would be necessary in order to produce some result which is the desired end), but rather, as I shall show in my treatment of the practical syllogism, it is concerned with the justification of action. As such, deliberation is not “morally indifferent”: it does not devise reasons whose moral value comes from without, as if it were the ends which were either good or bad, and reason is only concerned with how to attain them end instrumentally. Rather, practical reason devises motivation-inspiring beliefs concerning what is best do to, and why, in relation to some perceived end, which is the limit of prohairesis qua active locomotion in actuality.

In NE 7.3, it is said that, just as the union of universal and particular propositions in theoretical reflection results necessarily in the mind’s affirmation of the truth of the syllogism’s conclusion, so too, in practical syllogisms, the union of the two premises
results in an action, which takes the place of the conclusion. Action follows directly on the combination of the two premises because the two opinions together display a necessity and truth to the proposed action which cannot but compel the motivation to act. This being the structure of deliberation, it remains to consider what the necessity is which the universal and particular premises entail.

3.2 - The Practical Syllogism
3.2.1 - Explanatory Reasons

Art is concerned with particulars because art is always practiced in relation to particulars. Both in the second common book of the major ethical writings and in the Metaphysics, Aristotle says that, because art is concerned with particulars, sometimes men of experience (οἱ ἔμπειροι) are in fact more capable of practicing art successfully than those who possess only a knowledge of the universals pertaining to that art. In the final chapter of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle provides some examples which explain why a knowledge (γνῶσις) of particulars is necessary for the practice of art. He describes a boxing trainer who doesn't teach all of his pupils the same fighting style, but, because he recognizes that each has his own inherent potential, teaches each disciple the style most appropriate to each. As another example, he describes a doctor who may follow a general rule and heal fevers by prescribing rest and fasting, but who also recognizes the limitations of such general rules, and so in certain instances provides patients with treatments which deviate from the general rule, when it is demanded by the

275 That the conclusion of the practical syllogism results in the movement of the body is explicitly stated at NE 7.3.1147a25-29. However, some commentators have argued for an alternative reading, notably, Dahl (1984) and Charles (2009).
276 Meta. 1.1.980a12-24, NE 6.7.1141b14-23
particularities of the situation.\textsuperscript{277} In both of these examples, universal rules are shown to be inadequate because they lack an attentiveness to the irreducible particularity of unique circumstances, an inattentiveness which would adversely affect the outcome of the application of art if the general rules were implemented without modification. In another example from the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics},\textsuperscript{278} Aristotle shows that the man without knowledge of particulars has no reasoned basis for acting in one way or another, thus displaying the necessity of knowledge of particulars for action. The man of experience, who knows that “chicken is healthful,” is able to procure health on the basis of his knowledge of particulars, but the man who knows only universals without experience pertinent to the situation in which he finds himself, is not equipped with a knowledge which enables him to make a decision based on informed reasons.

All of these passages clearly stress the way in which, at least so far as productive reasoning is concerned, there is a priority of particular judgments and the knowledge of particulars to both universal judgments and their corresponding form of knowledge. But this is not the whole story.\textsuperscript{279} Despite the practical efficacy of the knowledge of particulars, knowledge of universals is in fact more properly characteristic of art than knowledge derived from experience. In \textit{NE} 10.9, Aristotle states that “a physician or trainer or any other director can best treat a particular person if he has a general

\textsuperscript{277} \textit{NE} 10.9.1180b9-28
\textsuperscript{278} \textit{NE} 6.7.1141b14-23
\textsuperscript{279} For example, the general purpose of the argument in \textit{Metaphysics} 1.1-2 is to show that human beings have a higher estimation of and call wisdom those forms of knowledge which are instrumental to a lesser degree and are intrinsically worthwhile to a greater degree. The argument suggests that Aristotle does not only esteem knowledge for being practically efficacious.
knowledge of what is good for everybody”.\textsuperscript{280} Knowledge of universals is not only worthwhile and advantageous to practitioners of art because it allows one to practice one’s art more widely, but in fact, knowledge of universals serves a practical purpose. It makes a craftsman more capable of performing his art, though he might have been able to act by experience alone, the additional possessing of theory enhances his capacity to practice his art. Aristotle identifies the possession of universal knowledge with $\textit{epistêmê}$, and describes the acquisition of universal judgments as the full possession of art. He even goes so far as to define art in terms of the universal, rather than in terms of the particular, when he says that “art is of the universal”.\textsuperscript{281} A similar notion is suggested by the quotation of Polus which Aristotle cites with approval -- that “experience produces art, but inexperience chance”\textsuperscript{282} -- and his subsequent interpretation of it in the first chapter of the $\textit{Metaphysics}$. While experience endows one with a knowledge of particulars, this knowledge does not itself constitute art, but rather it is a step towards acquiring it, because art itself is a knowledge of universals.

Despite the evidence to the contrary, there have been numerous interpreters who have objected to attributing a knowledge of universals to practical reasoning. One might argue that, since all of Aristotle’s examples of the practical syllogism are drawn from instances of craft, and since $\textit{phronêsis}$ and art are distinct in species, even though art may be of universals it need not be the case that $\textit{phronêsis}$ is of universals.\textsuperscript{283} However, there

\textsuperscript{280} \textit{NE} 10.9.1180b13-15
\textsuperscript{281} \textit{NE} 10.9.1180b23
\textsuperscript{282} \textit{Meta.} 1.1.981a4-5
\textsuperscript{283} Louden (1991) 162. “In the case of the arts there often exist codifiable techniques and canonical rules which can be imparted to suitably talented individuals… In the practical
are several passages which invalidate this view. For instance, in *NE 2.2*:

…and matters of conduct and of expediency are not firm, any more than matters of health. And if such is the case with universal reasons (τοῦ καθόλου λόγου), still more are the reasons concerning particulars (ὁ περὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἑκάστα λόγος) inaccurate. For these come under no art or guidelines (ὑπὸ τέχνην οὐθ᾽ ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν), but the agents must always look to the individual circumstances, such as also in medicine and in navigation. (*NE 2.2.1104a4-10*).

There are several important points which can be derived from this passage. First of all, when Aristotle claims that particular judgments are inaccurate, this is not a claim made about practical reasoning alone, but rather about both practical reasoning and productive reasoning. This is clear from the fact that the explanation of their inaccuracy, that they come under no art or guidelines, applies equally as much to medicine and navigation as to practical knowledge. While the knowledge of particulars associated with both art and *phronēsis* do not fall under an art or guidelines, that doesn’t mean that the *universals* are not themselves guidelines of a certain kind. I take it that Aristotle’s point here is that since knowledge of particulars is only acquired by empirical observation, there are no guidelines or general premises from which one can derive ‘particular reasons.’ However, this does not necessarily apply to universal knowledge, which of course need not and – as I shall show – cannot be acquired by sensation.  

Louden’s interpretation is not the stronger claim which I have made in the body text. He acknowledges exceptions in both the arts as well as practical science; he recognizes, in the case of the former, instances where there will not be universal rules for art, and in the case of the latter, instances where there will be. His distinction between *phronēsis* and art is merely that there is “greater non-codifiability” in the practical sciences than in art, a claim which he makes in order to account for the inexactness of practical knowledge.

284 Achtenberg (2002) 70-71 observes, no doubt rightly, that this passage also indicates that the inaccuracy of the both practical and productive sciences does not stem from the difficulty of applying universal rules to particular circumstances, as is often assumed.
unambiguously that “phronēsis is not knowledge of universals only, but it must also
know particulars”.285

There is yet another reasonable contention that one might raise against me for
identifying art and practical knowledge with universals. One might ask quite reasonably
whether Aristotle can without contradicting himself maintain that the universal has any
relevance to matters of practice and production. In book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics,
science (ἐπιστήμη) is said to be a state belonging to a different part of the soul than art
and phronēsis, since the objects of the former state are necessary, eternal and unchanging,
while those of the latter are able to be otherwise. This seems to indicate that the
theoretical sciences on the one hand, and the productive and practical sciences on the
other, represent mutually exclusive and irreconcilably different standpoints. It has even
been argued that this is confirmed expressly by Aristotle’s claim that “it is clear that
practical knowledge (φρόνησις) and science (ἐπιστήμη) are not the same”.286 However,
the qualifications which accompany this statement reveal that it does not oppose
epistemic science and phronēsis absolutely, but only in respect to a single point. Science
and phronēsis are opposed only in respect to the ultimate beginning-point which each
apprehends, which, in the case of epistêmē, is a definition wholly abstracted from what is

Rather, this passage clearly denotes that while the universal reasons are inaccurate in
themselves, the particular reasons are also inaccurate in themselves, and even more so
than the universals.

286 NE 6.8.1142a24. For a similar view, see Kirkland (2007).
perceived sensibly,

whereas the beginning-point of *phronēsis* is the ultimate particular thing (*τὸ ἐσχατὸν*), *i.e.*, sensibly perceived objects. Indeed, Aristotle very clearly does at times use the word “*epistêmê*” more generically than his narrow description of the term as a *hexis* which enables scientific demonstration. For example, in his descriptions of the practical syllogism in both the *Nicomachean Ethics* and in the *De Anima*, Aristotle explicitly associates the universal proposition of the practical syllogism with science, using in both contexts the phrase “*to epistemonikon*” as a descriptor of the universal premise.

Before providing a positive account of how art is more prominently defined by consisting of universal knowledge despite the fact that it must always be practiced in relation to particulars, I shall first describe quickly what is entailed by knowledge of particulars. Much as universal judgments are associated with *epistêmê*, particular judgments are associated with experience (*ἐμπειρία*). This is both because particular knowledge is acquired by empirical observation through sensation and because, once acquired, particular judgments concern particulars. The origin of such judgments in

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287 See *APo* 1.2.71b35-72a6, where Aristotle says that what is more knowable in itself is necessarily more distant from the sensible.
288 *NE* 6.3.1139b18-36
289 *DA* 3.11.434a16-22, *NE* 7.3.1147b13-16. In the *De Anima*, the phrase is the subject of both *ou kinetai* and *menei*. The point is that the universal premise, which Aristotle refers to paraphrastically as *to epistemonikon*, remains still, while it is the particular premise which moves, or at least more so than the particular. Aristotle is making a similar point in the passage from the *Nicomachean Ethics*.
290 It is unclear precisely how generic this knowledge of particulars can be. For example, in *NE* 6.7, the example of a particular judgment, the minor premise of the practical syllogism, is “chicken is heathful”. This judgment does not concern an *individual* chicken, but chicken generally. However, in the example of a particular judgment from *Meta*. 1.1., Aristotle clearly has individuals in mind, when he uses Callias and Socrates as
observed occurrences explains the nature of the relationship and the degree of necessity or contingency, which obtains between the subject and predicate which make up particular judgments when rendered in propositional form. The proposition “when Callias was suffering from this or that disease, this or that cured him,”\textsuperscript{291} bears the mark of having been acquired as the result of repeated observation of the same or at least similar occurrences. In the case of this example, nothing attests to the effectiveness of a particular treatment and guarantees the validity of the observation except that it has been repeatedly witnessed. Another way to put this is that nothing ensures that the relation between subject and predicate which the proposition asserts occurs consistently except for the fact that it has occurred consistently in the past. For this reason, empirical judgments do not entail a necessary connection, but a merely regular connection.\textsuperscript{292} The relation between subject and predicate is merely a contingent one, which does not ensure that the relation of subject and predicate which it asserts will necessarily and always prevail. In other words, although one might have observed in the past that this treatment cured Callias when he had this disease, in some future instance, the same result might occur just as much as it might not the next time when Callias is given the same treatment to cure the same disease.

\textsuperscript{291} \textit{Meta}. 1.1.981a7-10

\textsuperscript{292} Devereux (1986), 489. Devereux uses this phrase. Much of my account is similar to those of Frede and Devereux, and at several points my thinking has been clarified by their work.

Aristotle also describes the properties of universal judgments in the first chapter of the *Metaphysics*. While men of experience know only “the fact” (τὸ ὅτι), men of art, who know universals, know the reason why (τὸ διότι) and the cause (τὴν αἰτίαν). The example of a universal premise provided in that chapter, which accompanies the premise “when Callias was suffering from this or that disease, this or that cured him,” is “it benefits all persons of a certain type, considered as a class, who suffer from this or that disease (e.g., the phlegmatic or bilious when suffering from burning fever).” The most salient and obvious feature of this premise is that it is, in fact, universal, meaning that it states a universally applicable rule. I argue, however, that it is in fact more definitively characteristic of universal premises that they express a causal explanation of empirical judgments. The qualified descriptions of the disease – that it is “phlegmatic” and “bilious” – both are causal descriptions in the Socratic sense of definition. That is, they demarcate causes by virtue of which all things which possess a certain common property possess that property, and in whose absence all things which do not possess that property do not. In this case, the universal statement that in any instance where the disease is, say, phlegmatic, such-and-such a treatment will cure it demarcates in what instances such-and-such a treatment will be effective and in what instances it will not. In this way, the major premise, by being a universal claim, thus establishes the validity and necessity of the minor premise by comprehending the particular premise, as an instance of that cause, within itself. This same structure is reflected in an example of the practical syllogism from the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The examples universal premises from *NE* 6.7, “that light meat is easily digested and therefore wholesome” and “chicken is light meat”, are claims

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293 *Meta*. 1.1.981a28-30
294 *Meta*. 1.1.981a10-13
explanatory of their corresponding particular premise, “chicken is wholesome”.\textsuperscript{295} The universal premise explains why chicken is wholesome, viz., because chicken is one instance of light meat, all instances of which are wholesome.

According to the view I have been defending, not only in demonstration, but also in practical reasoning, the more abstract a claim, by which I mean the more it is distant from sense-perception, the more explanatory and the more knowable it is. Michael Frede\textsuperscript{296} has argued that it is wrong to depict Aristotle as an empiricist because, for Aristotle, all demonstrable knowledge is deduced from first principles which are immediately known, meaning that they require no explanatory term beyond themselves in order to be known to be true, and therefore first principles do not depend on empirical observation in order to confirm their truth. Even though an individual mind might become initially aware of first principles through a process of epagoge, which implies sense-perception, epagoge neither justifies nor explains the first principle, but rather, through epagoge, one becomes aware of principles which are able to be known immediately. The result is that Aristotle is able to claim, as he does in the Posterior Analytics, that what is more abstract, or more distant from sense-perception, is always more universal, prior, more knowable in itself, and more explanatory, than what is closer to sense-perception.\textsuperscript{297} Aristotle illustrates this vividly later in the Analytics:

This is why if we were on the moon and saw the earth screening it, we would not know the explanation of the eclipse. We would perceive that it is now eclipsed but not why; for we have seen that there is no perception

\textsuperscript{295} NE 6.7.1141b14-23
\textsuperscript{296} Frede (1996) 157-160
\textsuperscript{297} APo. 1.2.72a1-6
of universals. Nevertheless, if we observed this happening often and then hunted for the universal, we would possess a demonstration; for it is from many particulars that the universal becomes plain.\(^298\) (APo. 1.31.87b39-88a5).

The moon residing between the sun and the earth and blocking the sun’s light is the explanatory cause of a solar eclipse, but even when if one were able to observe this occurrence directly by sensation, one would not have comprehended the cause of the solar eclipse. Therefore, even though one might observe precisely that occurrence which explains another, one cannot be said to have acquired a knowledge of the latter’s cause by sensation. Sensation is incapable of observing anything but the fact (τὸ ὅτι) that things are so; explanatory reasons why things are the way they are reside beyond its purview, and are only accessible to thought. I take it that it must follow from this view that explanatory knowledge cannot be passively acquired as experience through sensation, but can only be actively devised by and in thought.\(^299\)

The practical syllogism might at first seem incompatible with Aristotle’s descriptions of demonstration in the Posterior Analytics. Since, when it comes to demonstrable knowledge, the first principles are self-explanatory, self-justifying, immediately known and that by virtue of which all else in a science is explained and justified, they must also be the most distant from the sensible of anything known by the science of which they are principles. This apparently conflicts, however, with Aristotle’s account of the archai of deliberation. As I have already mentioned, the first principle of phronēsis is the “ultimate particular thing” (τὸ ἐσχατὸν), which “is not known by

\(^{298}\) This quotation is from the translation of the Posterior Analytics by Jonathan Barnes.  
\(^{299}\) Meta. 1.1.981b10-13
knowledge, but by sensation”.\textsuperscript{300} This is confirmed by another passage, when it is said that “it is necessary to have perception, and perception is \textit{nous}”,\textsuperscript{301} i.e., that \textit{nous}, as the power to apprehend the first principles of both theoretical and practical sciences, is somehow operative in sensation, as the power which grasps practical principles. This configuration of cognitive powers seems to be at odds with Aristotle’s account of first principles in the \textit{Posterior Analytics}. How can the first principles of practical reasoning be known in sensation if first principles are always the most explanatory, but sensation is never and cannot be explanatory?

In my view, this very problem reveals something of what distinguishes intellect in its practical mode from theoretical mind. Quite simply, the principles of practical intellect \textit{are} perceived sensibly, and, as a result, they are not at all explanatory. This is closely associated with the unique function of practical reasoning, namely, that it is concerned with deliberation about what course of action to take in relation to some presupposed end. \textit{Phronēsis}, as a more abstract and universal knowledge is \textit{not} concerned with justifying and explaining the end,\textsuperscript{302} but only with justifying and explaining the course of action which deliberative reasoning elects to pursue, a course of action rendered syllogistically in the form of a particular judgment. In other words, the particular judgment alone designates what action to pursue in relation to some presupposed end, and the universal

\textsuperscript{300} \textit{NE} 6.8.1142a28
\textsuperscript{301} \textit{NE} 6.11.1143b6
\textsuperscript{302} \textit{NE} 6.12.1143a31-37
premise explains why that action is the best action to take. Therefore, according to my reading, the rule from the *Posterior Analytics* is preserved: that which is more knowable in itself and the more explanatory is in fact what is abstracted from sense-perception to a greater degree. The point of divergence which separates demonstrable sciences from practical sciences is that, whereas in demonstrable sciences, the principles are both the foundational beginning-points of science and are the most universal, most abstract and most explanatory reasons, in practical science, the principles are beginning-points only, being perceived sensibly and therefore being without any explanatory power.

My interpretation also affirms that the principles of practical action are, like all principles, incapable of being justified or explained by a prior explanatory term. Aristotle unambiguously states early in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that ethical principles, granted to a human so long as he has acquired good dispositions of character, like all other first principles, require no prior explanatory and justificatory terms:

For the starting-point or first principle is the fact that a thing is so; if this be satisfactorily ascertained, there will be no need also to know the reason why it is so. (*NE* 1.4.1095a7-8).

Likewise it is not necessary in all things to seek the cause, but it is sufficient in some to establish well the fact (τὸ ὅτι), and such is the case with first principles. For the fact is first and a principle. Of first principles some are known by induction (ἐπαγωγή), others by sensation, others still by habituation, and others in other ways. (*NE* 1.7.1097b34-1098a4).

303 Both the *De Anima* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* are consistent in attributing the power to move to the minor premise, the particular judgment, of the practical syllogism. I mention this earlier in this section.

304 Both Burnyeat (1980) and McDowell (1995), (1996) make an exception for ethical first principles. This is most evident in Burnyeat’s case when he identifies “the that” with the cognitive awareness made accessible by the possession of virtue, and then makes “the because” explanatory of “the that”.
The result is that the man of practical wisdom knows why his action is the best action to perform, but he does not know why the end for the sake of which he acts is the best end, or, in other words, why the end of his action is good.³⁰⁵ The only sense in which the principle of practical action can be said to be justificatory is inasmuch as, by presenting some situation, it necessitates that some action be taken and not some other; however, the principle on its own does not explain why one course of action is better than another. The immediacy of the principle, “right desire”, is closely associated with Aristotle’s claim that we do not deliberate about ends, but only about the “things relative to the end” (τὸ τὰ πρὸς τέλος).³⁰⁶ Even by virtue of calling the principle a principle, it must follow that ethical principles are not the result of investigative processes of discursive thought, but rather, they can only be the beginning-point of practical reasoning.³⁰⁷ Principles are defined by not being preceded by any explanatory terms, which is precisely what such a discursive process would serve to do: it would deduce the end of action from prior explanatory terms.

The validity of this interpretation of the immediacy of the principle is further supported by its consistency with my treatment of moral virtue in the first chapter of this

³⁰⁵ See the final paragraphs of 2.2.3, where I describe what it means for the virtuous agent to desire an end for its own sake. If there were reasons which justified the goodness of an end, one could not desire the end for its own sake, but only for the reasons which justify it.

³⁰⁶ NE 3.3.1113a13-14

³⁰⁷ Allan (1955) 338. Allan quite feasibly reconciles the means-end mode of deliberation presented in book 3 of the Nicomachean Ethics with the “rules-case” mode described in books 6-7 by making the particular judgment the result of means-end judgment, which is then supplemented by the addition of a universal judgment which does not alter the meaning of the minor premise of the practical syllogism. The universal judgment is thus the rule which validates the means-end deliberation as a case.
thesis. The non-rational cognitive act whereby the principle appears is an evaluative judgment conducted by phantasia, a cognition which amounts the present awareness of the appearance of the good, which is known under various descriptions: “right desire”, the end of action, the beginning-point of deliberation, and also as the cognition of something as pleasurable or painful. When Aristotle describes the principle as a fact without a why, he argues for the immediacy of the apparent good, in a terminology appropriate to accounts of the structures of reason, describing the appearance of the good under the description of being the beginning-point of deliberation. But similarly, the immediacy of the appearance of the good is also necessitated by the fact that it exists under the description of being the cognition of something as pleasurable or painful. The immediacy of one’s character after it has been formed by repeated acts of deliberate action, the immediacy which is reflected in the fixity of one’s character once it has been acquired, is also manifest in the inflexibility of one’s acquired attitude towards pleasure and pain. One’s evaluative judgments concerning what is pleasurable and painful cannot be the result of a discursive process, but, as I have argued in earlier sections of this thesis, it can only be the result of non-discursive phantasia. That the presentation of the beginning-points of deliberation is immediate (i.e., without an explanatory term) and that pleasure is immediately perceived displays that the appearance of the good is uniform in character in two of its dimensions.

3.2.2 - Phantasia and the Practical Syllogism in the De Anima

In earlier sections of this chapter, I briefly examined the obscure and difficult passage DA 3.11.434a6-13. I there argued that calculative phantasia and thought are
altogether different and distinct from each other, while at the same time, the latter is
dependent on the former. This, I suggest, is the meaning behind Aristotle’s claim that
“imagination is thought not to involve opinion, because it does not involve opinion which
is based on inference, whereas opinion involves imagination”. In *phantasia* there is a
latent content which, while not itself being active thinking, supplies active thinking with
its content. I shall now return to *DA* 3.11 in order to explain certain features of calculative
*phantasia* which I think are made clearer in light of what I have said about the practical
syllogism.

I believe that, by providing an interpretation of the practical syllogism, I have
produced sensible reasons for identifying what Aristotle refers to when he mentions a
"measure" by virtue of which someone determines whether one should do "this or that" in
*DA* 3.11.434a6-13 (cited earlier in chapter 3.1.3). The measure which determines what
the "greater" is should be identified with the universal judgment of the practical
syllogism, while the calculation which determines what to do in "this or that" situation is
to identified with the particular judgment. This interpretation gathers its plausibility from
the aptness of describing the universal premise as a "measure". As I have already
observed, in both the *Nicomachean Ethics* as well as the *De Anima*, Aristotle attributes
the power to actually move the body to the particular judgment, stating that it either
moves the body, or that does so more than (μᾶλλον) the universal premise. It is the
particular judgment more than the universal judgment which actually moves the body in
instances of locomotion; the particular premise is capable of moving the body even if
there is no universal one.
In instances where deliberation results in a motivational desire which is not guided by a universal premise, the particular judgment concerning what ought to be done can be said to have no external measure which determines whether one ought to do “this or that”. In such an instance, one is as a person who, without the aid of some an explanatory reason, deliberates about whether he will abstain or pursue some particular pleasure which in some particular situational context presents itself as desirable. Because he isn't equipped with some explanatory reason (or scientific knowledge) which dictates what to do in any situation like the one he finds himself in, there is no reason which justifies either abstaining or pursuing the pleasurable object which he desires. In other words, he is without any guidance, outside of the knowledge which he has acquired from experience, as to what is the better course of action to take in forming a particular judgment concerning what one ought to do. This, I suggest, is precisely what it means for his deliberation to lack a measure. Alternatively, when the practical agent is equipped with an explanatory reason, it is clear why it is appropriate to call the major premise of the practical syllogism a measure. The universal proposition states why the particular premise must be what and as it is, and also why it cannot be otherwise. To continue our example, if one knows that one is in such-and-such a situation, and if one knows as a general rule that in such-and-such a situation it is better to abstain from pleasure than to indulge in it, the minor premise follows by necessity: clearly, one ought to abstain. The particular judgment, which concerns whether one ought to do "this or that", is formed by deduction, and follows from the explanatory reason, the universal judgment, which, as a measure, determines what is better in each situation.
Chapter 4: Conclusion

In the second chapter of this thesis, I presented an interpretation of Aristotle’s claim in *NE* 1.13 that the non-rational and appetitive part of the soul is obedient to the rational part of the soul. I argued that the obedience of the appetitive part does not entail a responsiveness to reason’s individual commands to desire ends and the means to them which are specified by practical mind. According to such a view, if one possesses a moral virtue, one possesses a state of character which is capable of producing the motivational desires which realize in action the commands which are prescribed to it by reason. As an alternative to that reading, I have argued that the non-rational part of the soul is obedient to the rational part of the soul when, as the result of habituation, it is determined in such a way as to be properly affected by external stimuli. A virtuous moral character is one which, when affected, produces desiderative and emotional impulses which are conducive to virtuous practical action. In this way, the virtues are both affective and cognitive states. When the moral states are affected from without, they incite *phantasia* to make an evaluative judgment whose result is the awareness of ends of action which are conducive to virtuous action. The processes which furnish a human agent with the content of the ends of virtuous action occur independently of the direct influence of discursive, rational processes. In fact, deliberation, or practical reasoning, cannot begin until it is supplied with its beginning-point by *phantasia* as a result of the passive affection of the non-rational part of the soul.

In presenting my interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of action in the third chapter of this thesis, I have attempted to address potential criticisms which might be raised
against me for maintaining that the good appears immediately as the result of a non-rational evaluative judgment of cognitive phantasia, rather than as the result of a discursive process of reasoning. I have responded to the philosophical and interpretative question of how, if the good is an immediate appearance, reason can continue to play a robust role in the structure of practical action. There are at least two ways in which reason might have a diminished role in practical action if the good appears immediately. First, if the good appears, not as the result of a discursive process, but immediately, it seems that reason must be resigned to playing the trifling role of merely instrumental reasoning. Character would present either good or bad ends, and reason would be concerned only with determining instrumentally how to attain those ends. Second, if the good appeared immediately in accordance with character as a cognized motivational impulse, and, if the very cognition of an end as good moved the agent, desiderative impulses would not result from discursive processes, but would rather result from the immediate awareness of ends. This would result in a kind of determinism: one would be moved in accordance only with one’s acquired state of character, because motivating ends of action would appear to an agent by virtue of one’s character. Reasoning in particular circumstances would play no role in determining how an agent would act, thus diminishing the role of reason and deliberation in forming one’s motivational impulses.

I have attempted to address both of these interpretive problems by arguing that there is not one, but two cognitions which occur in instances of, not only rational motivation, but non-rational motivation as well. First, given the prominent role of pursuit and avoidance in Aristotle’s theory of action, as I have presented it, the good can appear
as the end of action, without the very appearance of the end bestowing the motive impulse which actually moves the body. According to the reading which I have presented, the connection between pursuit and avoidance and the efficient desires, i.e., the fact that judgments of pursuit and avoidance precede and cause the generation of motivational ‘moved moving’ desire, makes room for reason to be the predominant player in issuing action, despite the role of the moral virtues in supplying the ends of action. Second, my reading of the practical syllogism, as an account of the structure of structure of deliberation in its most general terms, is intended to support the view that it does not necessarily follow that if the ends of action are supplied immediately by virtue that practical reason can only play an instrumental role in relation to those ends. Deliberation results in a justification to act in a certain way: it contrives both a course of action to take, and, in cases where the agent possesses either art and phronēsis, an explanatory reason why that action is the best action to take.
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