THE RESHAPING OF AID EFFECTIVENESS POLICIES
IN THE INTERNATIONAL, CANADIAN, AND TANZANIAN CONTEXTS

by

Molly den Heyer

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

at

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Halifax, Nova Scotia
January, 2012

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DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY

INTERDISCIPLINARY PHD PROGRAM

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores the extent to which transnational policies can change the international development bureaucracy. Over the last decade, significant resources were invested to integrate aid effectiveness policies into the global network of donor organizations and recipient governments in an effort to improve aid delivery. These policies adhere to five principles: ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability. They are organized around the principle of ownership, according to which control over the development process is transferred from donor partners to recipient countries. While seemingly straightforward, underneath the perceived consensus are layers of ambiguous terminology, assorted interpretations and competing discourses that influence the policies—often dissipating the potential for transformation.

This case study takes a multi-scalar approach in examining how aid effectiveness principles emerged as a transnational discourse and were embraced in Canada and Tanzania. The methods include a focus group, a policy review, qualitative observations, and interviews with practitioners from government, multilateral and civil society organizations in Canada and Tanzania. The analysis employs a reading of governmentality that focuses on the link between the microphysics of power embedded in day-to-day operations and the emergence of larger societal or discursive regimes.

The dissertation found that aid effectiveness policies were repeatedly modified as they moved through the international development bureaucracy, effectively subduing significant changes in the recipient government-donor partner relationship. In Canada, aid effectiveness policies were incorporated into an already weak policy framework, which resulted in a truncated version that emphasizes accountability and managing for results. This restricted how the field staff negotiated with other donor partners and the Government of Tanzania. In Tanzania, the emphasis was on the principles of harmonization, alignment, and ownership, which generated a high level of organizational change with only minimal adjustments in terms of control over the development process. This case study found that policy modifications occurred on a daily basis as bureaucrats negotiated implementation strategies, various interpretations, and underlying discourses. This process amplified the technical aspects and subdued the transformational aspects of aid effectiveness policy. The dissertation concludes with a brief discussion of possible ways to overcome this quandary.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AG-CS</td>
<td>Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEST</td>
<td>Business Environment Strengthening for Tanzania Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRM</td>
<td>Community Based Resource Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIC</td>
<td>Canadian Council for International Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td><em>Chama Cha Mapinduzi</em> (Tanzanian political party)</td>
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<td>CCO</td>
<td>Canadian Cooperation Office</td>
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<td>CDPF</td>
<td>Country Development Program Framework</td>
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<td>CIGAR</td>
<td>Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCF</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Forum</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Ireland (formerly Irish Aid)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DPG</td>
<td>Development Partners Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECAS</td>
<td>European Conference on African Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>External Payments Arrears</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESAF</td>
<td>Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESRF</td>
<td>Economic and Social Research Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agricultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of 8 countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-20</td>
<td>Group of 20 countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBS</td>
<td>General Budget Support</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<td>GTZ</td>
<td><em>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit</em> (German Agency for Technical Cooperation)</td>
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<td>HBS</td>
<td>Household Budget Survey</td>
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<td>HIPC</td>
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IBRF  Indo-British Rainfed Farming Project
IDRC  International Development Research Centre
IDS  International Development Studies
IFI  International Financial Institution
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IMG  Independent Monitoring Group
KfW  *Kreditanstalt Für Wiederaufbau* (German Development Bank)
JAST  Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania
JICA  Japan International Cooperation Agency
LGRP  Local Government Reform Program
LSRF  Legal Sector Reform Program
MCC  Millennium Challenge Corporation
MDAs  Ministries, Departments, Agencies
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals
MKUKUTA  *Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umasikini* (PRSP for Tanzania)
NACSAP  National Anti-corruption Strategy and Action Plan
NEPAD  New Partnership for African Development
NGO  Non-governmental Organization
NSGRP  National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty
NSM  New Social Movement
ODA  Official development assistance
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAF  Performance Assessment Framework
PBA  Program Based Approach
PER  Public Expenditure Review
PFMRP  Public Financial Management Reform Program
PIU  Parallel Implementation Units
PRBS  Poverty Reduction Budget Support
PRSP  Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSI  Policy Support Instrument
PSRP  Public Service Reform Program
RBM  Results-based Management
REPOA  Research on Poverty Alleviation
SAPs  Structural Adjustment Programs
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<tr>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation</td>
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<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAps</td>
<td>Sector-wide Approaches</td>
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<td>TAS</td>
<td>Tanzania Assistance Strategy</td>
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<td>TBS</td>
<td>Treasury Board Secretariat</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCAIDS</td>
<td>Tanzania AIDS/HIV Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCDD</td>
<td>Tanzanian Coalition for Debt and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAIDS</td>
<td>Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCDF</td>
<td>United Nations Capital Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UN-Habitat</td>
<td>United Nations Habitat</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations Commission on Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>WP-EFF</td>
<td>Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and Donor Practices</td>
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Thank-you.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

… excessive notions of and belief in governability and control have become the wax with which policy objectives are glued together like the feathers of Icarus’s wings.

—Quarles van Ufford and Roth, 2003: 76

As Quarles van Ufford and Roth suggest, the story of Icarus serves as a warning against modernity’s faith in humans’ ability to manage and control their surroundings. However, the modern illusion of control is often accompanied by a deep hope for humanity and a genuine desire to improve society. It is Icarus’s contradictory flight of hope and folly that makes it an excellent parable for international development and the latest policy initiative to make aid more effective.

International development is situated in the heart of political economy with its focus on addressing global inequality. The combined emphasis on international economics, foreign policies, and social justice issues creates, indeed requires, an interdisciplinary approach to world problems. While the majority of research focuses on the why and how of poverty, a smaller stream of literature has turned its gaze toward the network of organizations that forms the transnational and multi-layered aid administration. In keeping with the latter, the following dissertation will concentrate on aid bureaucracy, consisting of a network of multilateral organizations, bilateral donors, local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and recipient governments. One of the central hopes driving this vast bureaucracy, or what Raymond Apthorpe satirically refers to as “Aidland,” is that it can design and manage a series of aid interventions that will reduce and presumably help bring about an end to poverty.
The latest global policy initiative within the international development bureaucracy is an organizational reform package designed to improve the bureaucracy itself. In 2005, over ninety countries, multilateral institutions, and civil society organizations (CSOs) participated in the Paris High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. The subsequent Paris Declaration sets out a supranational policy framework built on the principles of ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability. More specifically, donor partners are expected to harmonize their administrative procedures and align their programming objectives with the recipient government’s priorities, as well as coordinate activities among themselves. Simultaneously, recipient countries are expected to strengthen good governance and fiscal management in order to assume full ownership of their development. The policies are intended to make aid distribution more effective by transferring ownership of the development process from donor partners to recipient governments.

The interim reports and technical evaluations show numerous changes in administrative policies, procedures, and practices in the international development field, but a significant impact in terms of efficiency and effectiveness of aid administration and transfer of ownership from donor partners to recipients has yet to fully materialize. Odén and Wohlgemuth (2011) warned that aid effectiveness policies might not achieve their intended effects:

Implementation problems, differences between the preferred modalities and processes for some of the larger donors, and the absence of necessary common values in many cases have been obstacles to the implementation process from Paris to Accra and up until now. We may therefore in the future see a weakening of the strong support for the Paris Declaration. (Odén & Wohlgemuth, 2011: 25)

The above quote highlights two important inclinations in aid policy. First, the observation that popular support for aid effectiveness policies is starting to wane speaks to a

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1 Throughout this dissertation, I will use the term international development bureaucracy to describe the dense network of multilateral and bilateral organizations, donor and recipient governments, non-government organizations, academic institutions, development consultants, and business organizations involved in aid. In making this decision, I consider a number of other terms such as architecture, network, ecosystem, and transnational organizations. None of these, however, fully conveys the fluidity and complexity of how aid is administered, and the scale on which this occurs around the world. Moreover, in using the word “bureaucracy,” I am not referring to the more popular usage of the word, where it describes “red tape,” but to a rich academic tradition beginning with Max Weber.
transnational policy cycle. A number of authors (Quarles van Ufford & Roth, 2003; Bergeron, 2003; Parpart, 2004) have documented a series of policy trends and promises in the international development bureaucracy that fail to meet their goals. Second, the briefing note quoted above is part of a larger body of organizational literature and empirical studies on aid policies that often conduct elegant but sometimes-simplistic analyses focused on pre-set indicators and implementation. In so doing, the studies often overlook the contextual and subtle points regarding where and how aid policies are modified. This dissertation argues that in order to avoid the cycle of unfulfilled policy initiatives, the international aid community must develop a more in-depth understanding of the challenges and strengths associated with transnational policies.

As with Icarus’s wings, aid effectiveness policies are held together with an overly optimistic belief that this global policy framework and its managerial concepts will reform the international development bureaucracy. The aid effectiveness framework creates the impression that there is a consensus surrounding development goals and how they should be reached. While the language of hope is essential for inspiring change, the managerial concepts and policies of coherency ignore the messy realities of aid.

A more thorough approach would require greater breadth and depth in its analysis. In terms of breadth, this research accounts for the transnational and multi-scalar nature of aid policies and how the policies are configured by various actors and in different locations throughout the international development bureaucracy. In terms of depth, this research considers how the smaller negotiations and subtle strategies of practice influence the policy configuration at the different locations. Thus, the following dissertation focuses on those messy realities by exploring aid effectiveness as manifested in ambiguous terms, silences, various translations and interpretations, and competing discourses.

The dissertation delves underneath the perceived global consensus of the Paris Declaration, in order to examine how aid effectiveness policies are shaped and reshaped as they are filtered through the international development bureaucracy. While vague
policy language contributes to agreement amongst partners, it also provides leeway for bureaucrats to interpret and adapt policies as they trickle through a network of organizations, programs, and projects (Lewis & Mosse, 2006). Further, the policies undergo daily negotiations in spaces that are imbued with complex configurations of power that mold outcomes (Brock, Cornwall, & Gaventa, 2001). The following research traces these various policy iterations from their conception in the international arena to their manifestation in the Canadian and Tanzanian contexts in order to identify how policies are being reshaped, where, and to what end.

2.0 Research Questions

This dissertation explores whether aid policies can change the international development bureaucracy through an in-depth case study of the latest articulations of aid effectiveness. More specifically, the research traces how policies are transformed as they move from global discourse “down the rabbit hole” to Canadian aid policy and the Tanzanian dialogue process. This multi-scalar approach is reflected in the following set of research questions:

A. Can aid effectiveness, as a transnational policy initiative, change the international development bureaucracy?

B. To what extent are aid effectiveness policies modified as they move through the international development bureaucracy?

   o What are aid effectiveness policies? How were they formed? How do the various actors within the international development bureaucracy interpret the policies?
   o How and to what extent is aid effectiveness integrated into Canadian aid policy and its partnership with Tanzania?
   o How and to what extent have aid effectiveness policies changed the dialogue process in Tanzania?

2 Harmonization and alignment efforts at the country level have resulted in an inter-organizational bureaucracy often referred to as the dialogue process. This sometimes-fluid structure provides a forum for coordination and policy dialogue between the recipient government and the in-country representatives of donor organizations. The administrative support for the system involves several practitioners housed in the UNDP compound and a network of practitioners from participating organizations.
C. What are the key factors, processes, and discourses that influence aid effectiveness policies?
   - Do they foster or hinder the intended policy change?
   - How can the identified obstacles be addressed?

In addressing these questions, the research involved a careful consideration of how the conceptual framework and research methodology will account for the subtleties of bureaucratic processes and how discourse frames policy and actions. In doing so, the dissertation takes a critical realist approach that employs empirical, constructivist, and critical theories. This strategy allows for the examination of facts and documents, the interpretations by various actors, and the entanglements of discourse. It is essential to look at all three of these elements in order to undertake a more in-depth investigation seeking to identify key factors, processes, and discourses that influence aid policy.

The research strives to understand how aid effectiveness policies, their meanings, and their implications undergo numerous incarnations as various practitioners in the international development bureaucracy incorporate them into their work. In this manner, the research focuses on the policy documents as well as the social networks in which they are embedded. This echoes Green’s observation about her own work in aid policy:

   The daily practice of working in the agency entailed the purposive manipulation of text; the specialized reading and writing practices around documents and emails, with a view to making documents work; that is to contribute to achieving policy objectives. This capacity of certain documents and the categories, which they evoked, was not in fact a quality of the documents themselves, or their style or content, but of the social context of the relationships in which they were embedded. (Green, 2007:145)

In this regard, the research found that policy negotiations occur within contexts or policy spaces imbued with relational power. The development practitioners operating in these spaces often work within the parameters of a range of action, pushing and pulling against each other. These power dynamics ultimately influence how a policy is understood and used, and give rise to larger discursive regimes.
As will become apparent throughout the dissertation, the research found that there are significant differences in how aid effectiveness is understood and used in the international, Canadian, and Tanzanian contexts. In Canada, the emphasis was on the principles of accountability and result-based management, while in Tanzania the emphasis was on the principles of ownership, alignment, and harmonization. Further, as the policies filtered through the various policy spaces embedded in the aid bureaucracy, technical aspects were amplified and transformational aspects were minimized. In the end, the study found that there was substantial change around the organization of aid delivery, but only slight changes in the relationship between Tanzania and its donor partners. Understanding the key factors, processes, and discourses that influenced aid effectiveness policies is the first step in determining how to create transformational change.

3.0 Scope of Study
This study focuses on how aid effectiveness policies are shaped as they move through global discourse, the Canadian government, and the Tanzanian dialogue process. Figure 1 outlines a rough cross-section of the international development bureaucracy. Starting at the top of Figure 1, a set of international organizations and conventions generate international discourse around standard policies and practices. Below that, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is part of a larger Canadian development policy sphere with intense interactions occurring among a number of departments and agencies. Adding to this complex dynamic, CIDA field offices are embedded in localized processes with other donors and recipients at the country level. In the Tanzanian case, this includes working with donors in the dialogue process through joint coordination groups and cluster and sector working groups. In turn, these groups work with the Tanzanian government, its ministries, departments, and agencies, as well as with local governments. Finally, international and local CSOs span the different spheres. This loose bureaucracy provides a multitude of policy spaces or venues within which policy is negotiated and translated.
While Figure 1 is helpful for identifying the primary actors and their interrelationships, it is still merely a snapshot of part of a very complex system. The categorizations are not based on discrete values but on loose groupings of people who are highly interactive.

A more accurate visual representation of the aid bureaucracy might be a beehive of activity wherein development practitioners circulate through different locations via joint programs, knowledge networks, field postings, and secondments. Development practitioners form epistemic communities that re-inscribe themselves within various capital cities and organizational headquarters around the globe. They create norms through shared experiences, research, and peer pressure, which in turn facilitate policy transfers and adaptation among organizations.

Within these sites, the research focuses on aid effectiveness policies in terms of two key delineations. First, instead of limiting the scope of the study to one of the five aid
effectiveness principles (ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results and mutual accountability), the research treats the policies as a set in order to understand the broader context of how the principles relate to each other, and if or how the configuration changes as it passes through different locations within international development bureaucracy. As will become apparent in the following chapters, different sites or locations within the international development bureaucracy emphasized different principles. Second, aid effectiveness policies are used as an example of the latest transnational policy trend. The research questions are focused on how the policy set is modified, rather than a judgment concerning the content of the policy set itself. Overall, these research parameters were designed to maintain the focus on policy modification highlighted in the research questions.

While a focused and coherent research project is vital, it is also important to maintain an awareness of the research context. On several occasions during the research process fluctuations in the surrounding political economic context influenced the data collection and analysis. The research was adapted to include unforeseen events, such as elections, the financial crisis of 2008, as well as the changing relationship between the OECD nations and the new donor nations including Brazil, China, India, and South Korea. These types of events strike at the heart of the North-South aid relationship and form a backdrop to my more focused investigation into aid effectiveness in the international development bureaucracy.

4.0 Canada-Tanzania Trajectory
The Canadian-Tanzanian trajectory was selected as a critical case study because of the strong historical connection between the two countries as well as Tanzania’s current reputation as a successful model for aid effectiveness. The relationship between Canada and Tanzania was forged in the early 1960s when President Nyerere of Tanzania sought the financial support of middle powers such as Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden as a means of reducing its dependence on aid from its former colonizers, Germany and Britain (Pratt, 1976). Canada responded quickly and in 1965-66 it disbursed C$73.91 million, making Tanzania seventh on Canada’s list of its top twenty
aid recipients (Morrison, 1998). Beyond the numbers, it is well established that Canadian Prime Ministers Pearson and Trudeau were considered to be good friends with President Nyerere (Chande, 2005). This type of long-standing relationship was extended to other officials who formed friendships around training and exchange programs between agriculturalists, military officers, hospital officials, legal experts, and academics.3 Further, Canada opened its doors to people from the East African Indian diasporas in the 1960s and 1970s, and many immigrants from this group still hold dual citizenship.4

Since 1965, Tanzania has consistently remained on Canada’s list of top twenty aid recipients with the brief exception of the mid-1990s. At that time the relationship between the Government of Tanzania and its donor partners deteriorated to the point where Canada, along with other donors, drastically cut aid. To move past this stalemate, both sides agreed on a series of reforms to manage the aid relationship. A number of the reforms and management tools became central tenets of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. As explored further in Chapters 6 and 7, Tanzania has earned an international reputation of being a “donor darling” and is often held up as the model for aid effectiveness, thus making it an important case study for exploring how aid effectiveness policies are negotiated in practice.

The major limitation in this case selection is the relationship between Tanzania and the island of Zanzibar. Zanzibar is a semi-autonomous state with separate government structures, poverty reduction strategies, and donor agreements. The inclusion of Zanzibar in the study would add breadth but sacrifice depth in terms of understanding the donor partner - recipient government relationship and Canada’s role in Tanzania. Thus, the research only focuses on aid policies and processes in relation to the Tanzanian mainland.

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3 Among the most notable Canadian academics to spend time in Tanzania were Cranford Pratt, who was the first Vice Chancellor of the University of Dar es Salaam, and Gerald Helleiner, who advised the Government of Tanzania and its donor partners’ how to restructure their partnership.

4 In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a rise in African Nationalism throughout East Africa, leading to concerns over violence towards the South Asian community. These fears came to fruition with reprisals against the wealthier Asian community in the aftermath of the Zanzibar revolution (1964) and their outright expulsion from Uganda (1972). While Nyerere’s moral leadership was able to tame this political trend in mainland Tanzania, many in the Asian community left preemptively.
This case study was selected because of the long-standing relationship between Canada and Tanzania, as well as Tanzanian’s status as a ‘donor darling.’ It is both critical in terms of Tanzanian’s significance within the international development literature and the international aid regime, and revealing in terms of the opportunity to observe and analyze the multi-scalar nature of the international development bureaucracy (Yin, 1994). In short, the Canadian-Tanzanian trajectory provides a particularly fertile case study for exploring how aid effectiveness policies change as they move through the various levels of the international development bureaucracy.

5.0 Significance of Research

Research on how aid effectiveness policies operate within international development bureaucracy is significant in terms of the topic and its academic contribution. Regarding the topic, the scale of international development bureaucracy and its policies is literally
global, with an estimated 136 countries, 27 multilateral organizations, and 14 CSOs participating in the Paris Declaration (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008). In the Tanzanian case, the stakes in 2008/2009 were US$ 2.1 billion in external finance channeled directly to the government and representing 34% of the national budget (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, 2008). Aid policy and administration therefore have a direct and considerable impact on the annual budgets of recipient countries and, beyond that, their ability to address the needs of their citizens.

Further, aid effectiveness is one set of policies, in a long line of frameworks that have been developed, promoted, and spread throughout the international development bureaucracy. The Human Needs Approach, Integrated Rural Development, Participation, Empowerment, and Sustainable Development represent just a few of the transnational policy trends to emerge over the past seven decades. These policy trends not only absorb a tremendous amount of human and financial resources, they most often fall short of their stated goals. It is important to understand if, why, and how policies are modified as they move through the international development bureaucracy so that the root causes of these changes can be addressed.

This research also contributes to the scholarly literature on aid effectiveness policies as a transnational policy framework and the inner workings of the international development bureaucracy. While there is a plethora of organizational reports, assessments of indicators, and descriptions, the majority of the literature assesses aid effectiveness policies in terms of their stated objectives (Oden & Wohlgemuth, 2011; Wangwe, 2002; Wood et al., 2008), there is only a small sub-group of scholars (Gould, 2005; Hayman, 2009; Hyden, 2008) who take a more critical approach in terms of examining how aid effectiveness policies operate in relation to power, knowledge, and discourse. The following research is situated within this sub-group in the belief that this approach can contribute to a greater understanding of how aid policy is shaped and whether it can change international development bureaucracy.
In addition to seeking a deeper understanding of how aid effectiveness is modified in the international development bureaucracy, this dissertation involves two experimental approaches. In terms of scope, the research contains an in-depth, multi-scalar approach that attempts to examine the linkages between different locations in the international development bureaucracy. In terms of the conceptual framework, the research uses a moderate form of governmentality, which focuses on the archaeology or vertical aspects of power. This approach investigates how policy spaces are infused with power and eventually influence the interpretation of policy. In doing so, it identifies development practitioners as subjects within a larger system. The combination of an experimental research scope, a modified conceptual framework (described further in Chapter 2 and 3), the findings regarding aid effectiveness, and a deeper understanding of transnational policies discourse represents a significant contribution to academia, and hopefully, will assist in the search for more substantive reform of the international development bureaucracy and its policies.

6.0 The Structure of the Dissertation

The dissertation is comprised of eight chapters. After this brief introduction, Chapter 2 will provide an overview of the conceptual framework, including the ontological and epistemological basis for critical theory and how it applies to current understandings of aid policy. The conceptual frameworks also provide a basis for the methodology described in Chapter 3. This chapter provides an overview of how this interdisciplinary research was conceived and carried out using a combination of critical theory and interpretative methods. The case study uses interviews, qualitative observation, a focus group, as well as policy and literature reviews to explore aid effectiveness discourse in various spaces within international development bureaucracy.

Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 comprise the main body of the case study and correspond to the above noted cross-section that traverses global discourse, Canadian aid policy, and the Tanzanian dialogue process. More specifically, Chapter 4 focuses on the formation of global aid policies and their rise to prominence within international development bureaucracy. Chapter 5 examines how international discourse, domestic politics, and the
micro-policy negotiations embedded in practice shape Canadian aid policy at the level of the donor state. This chapter finds that development practitioners working in CIDA’s Tanzanian offices are torn between the demands of CIDA headquarters and those that exist within the Tanzanian dialogue process. Taking a closer look at the evolution of the Tanzanian dialogue process, Chapter 6 focuses on how two main narratives are driving fast-paced and significant organizational change, with only minimal substantive changes. Chapter 7 explores the Tanzanian case further by examining the power dynamics and associated negotiation strategies deployed in the dialogue process. Finally, Chapter 8 contains a summary of the key findings and their significance in terms of current debates. The dissertation concludes with a discussion of the possibilities for change within international development bureaucracy.
CHAPTER TWO: RETHINKING GOVERNMENTALITY

1.0 Introduction

The focus of the study is whether aid effectiveness, as a transnational policies initiative, can generate substantive change in the international development bureaucracy. In addressing this question, the dissertation departs from standard disciplinary approaches that focus on a limited set of variables or a rich description of one location. Instead, this dissertation focuses on the multi-scalar nature of international aid policy as well as how power operates within the smaller policy spaces. As will be revealed in the following pages, this approach not only provides a fuller picture of the aid landscape, but also illuminates key processes and obstacles to change.

This dissertation incorporates a high degree of complexity in its conceptual framework, research methods, and analysis. Throughout the research process, efforts were made to examine the breadth and depth of aid effectiveness policies as they move through international development bureaucracy and to identify how and where they are modified. This approach is reflective of Eric Berlow’s statement that, “simplicity often lies on the other side of complexity, so for any problem, the more you can zoom out and embrace complexity, the better chance you have to zoom in on the simple details that matter most” (Berlow, 2010).

The following chapter situates the research within international development and public policy literatures and describes the conceptual framework that will be used throughout the dissertation. It begins with a description of the ontological and epistemological foundations of critical realism and the structuralist and poststructuralist branches of critical theory. Over the years, numerous scholars have drawn on critical theory for their research on the intersections between the international development industry, local populations, development administration, and development policy. The lessons learned from this literature and its critiques provide the foundations for the conceptual framework described at the end of this chapter. It is based on a moderate version of governmentality.
that emphasizes complex systems thinking, bureaucrats as subjects, and the power/knowledge dynamics that shape smaller policy spaces.

2.0 Critical Realism

In mapping the conceptual framework for this dissertation, it is important to start with ontology, or what critical realism presupposes the world is like, followed by epistemology, or identifying what types of knowledge are possible (Patomaki & Wright, 2000). The debate over worldviews can be traced back to the enlightenment split between Francis Bacon’s empiricist view that the world is knowable through experience and observable causal laws, and Immanuel Kant’s transcendental idealist or conventionalist view, which argues that what is experienced and observable is mediated through human perception, rendering the natural world a “construction of the human mind and/or the scientific community” (Frauley & Pearce, 2007: 7). It was not until the second half of the twentieth century that scholars like Thomas Kuhn and Roy Bhaskar moved past the either/or debate and started examining empiricism and transcendental idealism as components of a stratified way of knowing (Frauley & Pearce, 2007).

The term critical realism refers to a philosophy or metatheory that describes the relationship between the natural world of finite phenomena and events, and the social world as a complex set of generative mechanisms that mediate human experiences. From within the international relations discipline, Patomaki and Wright argue that it is possible to move beyond the dualism and incommensurability of the two spheres. They argue that critical realism can redefine the problem-field of international relations to make it:

…committed to ontological realism (that there is a reality, which is differentiated, structured, and layered, and independent of mind), epistemological relativism (that all beliefs are socially produced and hence potentially fallible), and judgmental rationalism (that despite epistemological relativism, it is still possible, in principle, to provide justifiable grounds for preferring one theory over another). (Patomaki & Wright, 2000: 224)

Critical realist ontology maintains the empirical notion that objects exist independently of our knowledge. It thus includes the concept of a stratified social reality, which contains
three domains of knowing: the empirical domain represents those limited phenomena and events that humans can experience; the actual domain represents the social accounts of phenomena and events; and the reality domain includes the actual as well as “systems of generative structures and mechanisms that have the capacity, which may or may not be exercised, to produce these and possibly other events and phenomena” (Frauley & Pearce, 2007: 16). It is within the domain of reality that critical realism focuses on how conceptual frames are deployed and how they produce social objects (Frauley & Pearce, 2007).

Rather than rely on positivist methods of inductive and deductive research, critical realism calls for a continuing spiral that attempts to synthesize empirical data, explanatory frameworks, and an interpretative understanding of those frameworks in order to engage in a dynamic learning process. Critical realism recognizes that linear causality does occur, but also that it is situated within complex systems that are interpreted and understood by humans. Instead of arguing over the distinction between facts and values, critical realism “situated a genuinely critical moment at the heart of analysis; a moment that depends at once upon values being factually explained and facts being subject to evaluation” (Patomaki & Wright, 2000: 234). In this way, critical realism analyzes how explanatory frameworks are shaped and thus form the ontological and epistemological foundation for critical theory.

The three-tier approach of critical realism is reflected in the following case study in terms of the types of data collected and analyzed. This mixture includes empirical evidence surrounding the definition and use of aid effectiveness policies, a description of how various actors interpret events and phenomena, and a discussion of the generative processes (narratives, metaphors, and categories) that frame or explain the empirical evidence and multiple interpretations of events. While consideration is given to all three domains, this chapter focuses on the more intricate aspects of critical theory as a way to access and analyze those generative processes.
3.0 Critical Theory

Critical theory, in its broadest sense, is understood as a critique of domination and how it shapes empirical and social accounts of what the world is like. It encompasses empirical data and explanatory frameworks; however, its main focus is on the formation of explanatory frameworks and how they reproduce inequality. This type of analysis examines the structures embedded within modern societies in the hopes of illuminating possible alternatives (Finlayson, 2005). As Finlayson states, “the original paradigm of critical theory is to understand the social world and to guide social change by illuminating potentials for social change” (2005: 4).

Initially identified in the 1930s, critical theory grew to include thinkers from the Frankfurt School, such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Jürgen Habermas. Based on Hegel’s dialectic conception of knowledge and Marxist analysis, the Frankfurt School analyzed social patterns and events, identifying rules or structures that cut across society and influence everyday life. These early incarnations of critical theory relied on reason as a means to complete the modern emancipatory project (Finlayson, 2005). Within this school, the tendency was to privilege structure and meta-narratives. This is reflected in most early social science principles ranging from supply and demand theory to historical materialism.

Post-structuralism, however, starting with the Russian Formalists in the 1920s and moving through the linguistic turn in the 1960s and 1970s, provided a more nuanced and fluid concept of structure based on language (Sturrock, 1986). Creating a second branch of critical theory, scholars such as Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean Baudrillard, Gilles Deleuze, and Jean-Francois Lyotard built on concepts rooted in linguistics to critique structuralism, modernity, and the Enlightenment project (Sturrock, 1986). Sturrock explains:

Structuralism allows us the considerable freedom to organize our acts of parole as we wish, respecting only the rules of language we are using, it leaves us still in command of what we say or write though consciousness that every sign that we employ is socially, not personally authorized. Post-structuralism argues that any
such “command” is an illusion, that once we enter language, as speaking or writing subjects, we are as subservient to it as it is to us (Sturrock, 1986: 163)

Pointing out that “‘command’ is an illusion,” poststructuralists undermined mainstream theories through their rejection of grand meta-narratives and teleological imperatives such as class struggle and unlimited growth. Schuurman describes one of Lyotard’s main observations as being that, “there is no single truth, as depicted by modern philosophy; rather, there is a plurality of perspectives, each with its own language, its own rules and myths” (1993: 23). Grand narratives or ideologies are then redefined as part of the power formations occurring within discourse.

This emphasis on language and discourse has effectively transformed structure from being an externally imposed force on a subject to being composed of many structures intersecting at the site of a subject. It thus becomes a dynamic component embedded in the subject itself as well as in the relationship between subject and society. The internalization of structure renders the subject a contextual agent and further enslaves the individual or limits their possibility for action outside the realm of discourse (Sturrock, 1986). Thus, instead of tracing the pathways of power through external lines or societal structures (i.e. mode of production, trade, gender, class), poststructuralists examine the minute capillaries of power captured in discursive formations (i.e. definitions, narratives, metaphors) that create structure.

In this way, structuralism (within the Marxist tradition) and post-structuralism (within the Foucauldian tradition) form two distinct branches of critical theory. There is some continuity in that both branches of critical theory emphasize emancipation and critique dominant social and theoretical accounts. However, discontinuity exists in how poststructuralists conceptualize structure and, consequently their rejection of modernity. As Poster argues, the “strategy of contextualizing theory serves to destabilize the concept of reason in its Enlightenment forms, to maintain a tension between discourse and situation, truth and function, theory and politics” (1989: 5). Since this dissertation is rooted in the second, poststructuralist branch of critical theory, the following section will take a closer look at several key elements or processes.
4.0 The Building Blocks

Within the poststructuralist branch of critical theory, there are several building blocks that create a basis for understanding how explanatory frameworks are formed. In terms of methodology, Foucault uses the term episteme to describe the discursive frameworks that shape and form “ways of thinking” during historical time periods. The episteme is a shifting and fluid concept that contains various discursive and disciplinary regimes (Mills, 2003). The poststructuralist understandings of structure, power/knowledge, and the identification of discursive and disciplinary regimes provide the basic building blocks for understanding the configuration of governmentality within specific epistemes.

These processes are part of Foucault’s overall shift in analysis from a narrow focus on the subject to a wider examination of the formation of the subject. In this vein, he redefines “archeology” as the study of the episteme in terms of the regulatory forms of discourse and “genealogy” as the study of how power congeals within the archeology (Deveaux, 1996). This shift in analysis leads to his “examining the development of the human sciences… to develop a form of analysis which does not focus on the subject at all, but which focuses on the discursive processes by which it is brought it into being” (Mills, 2003: 106). This emphasis on the archeology and genealogy of power and how they form of the subject is pivotal in understanding Foucault’s’ work.

4.1 Power/Knowledge Nexus

The traditional political science, or realist perception of power understands it as an object to be possessed and one which is in limited supply or caught in a zero-sum game. For example, Haugaard describes Dahl’s classical conceptualization of power as “A has power over B to the extent to which A can get B to do something which B would not otherwise do” (Haugaard, 2002: 6). Dahl applied this concept of power in his classic study of political decision-making in New Haven city council. However, Foucault and numerous other scholars have shown that power is far more complex and often covert. Post-structuralism reconceived power and knowledge as multi-variant, relational exercises diffused throughout society in a discursive web (Eyben, Harris & Pettit, 2006).
Foucault argued that power is not an object to possess but a relational force that can only be exercised. As a relational force, it forms an invisible or subterranean web that runs throughout society, via discourse, and is integrally tied to knowledge. Discourse encompasses all forms of communication (signs, language, categories, technical terms) in an interactive, meaning-making process that structures the way in which individuals understand the world and act within it. This edifying conversation forms the basis of knowledge. Mills succinctly describes Foucault’s arguments by stating that, “rather than knowledge being the pure search after ‘truth,’ in fact, power operates in that processing of information which results in something being [or not being] labeled as a ‘fact’” (Mills, 2003: 72). When using discourse, the fusion of power and knowledge gives rise to certain discursive formations, such as narratives, rationales, and explanatory frameworks.

There is a lot of variation in the power/knowledge nexus and the types of discursive formations it creates. Instead of one hegemonic discourse, there are many distinct types or sets of discourses. The different discursive regimes and practices exist in a fluid state or interact with each other in such a way that they can form coalitions, negate or accentuate each other, or even coexist despite inherent contradictions. In terms of this dissertation, the focus is on aid effectiveness as a policy discourse and how it engages with other more entrenched discourses such as neoliberalism, neo-colonialism, and good governance models. These various discourses reside in their respective subjects and are expressed through larger societal categories.

Individuals internalize dominant forms of thinking and knowing through processes of socialization. Foucault argued that these disciplinary regimes rely on five practices: (1) spatialization, (2) minute control of activity, (3) repetitive exercises, (4) detailed hierarchies, and, (5) normalizing judgments (Fillingham, 1993). All of these practices are articulated in Bentham’s well-known Panopticon, in which pervasive surveillance and control creates prisoners who essentially internalize disciplinary structures and self-regulate accordingly. This self-surveillance—inspired by perceived external surveillance—is part of a disciplining or regulation of the self that is exacted in order to conform to labels and definitions of normality. Orsini and Smith (2007) explained that
these are the “ways in which the individual is constituted to participate as a ‘free’ subject through the use and deployment of various fields of knowledge” (Orsini & Smith, 2007: 8).

Within this discursive web, VeneKlassen and Miller (2002) argued that there are three distinct layers. They are:

- **Visible Power**: Visible power represents the tip of the iceberg. It is power exercised along formal and legal decision-making lines. Authority is openly granted through societal institutions and reaffirmed through public transcripts.

- **Hidden Power**: This level describes the power to “set the political agenda.” It entails control over invitations, meeting agendas, and the structure of the decision-making process. Often entrenched in “hidden transcripts,” there are multiple ways in which the exclusion and de-legitimatization of groups and issues can occur.

- **Invisible Power**: This includes the subtle and often subconscious ways in which meaning is shaped. Power operates in a capillary and multi-variant manner that infuses every relationship from state to family. Regimes of discourse and discipline interact to create a web of covert power relations. Processes of socialization and surveillance entrench identities, traditions, habits, and expected behaviours. These ways of being eventually become internalized. (VeneKlassen & Miller, 2002)

In keeping with the critical realist approach described at the beginning of this chapter, this conceptual framework argues that it is essential to consider all three types of power in terms of how they interconnect and influence aid policy. Invisible forms of power act much like the root system of tree, feeding the upper branches and providing stability against the winds. In essence, invisible power as understood by critical theorists gives rise to the hidden and visible forms of power studied by constructivists and empiricists. This is exemplified in the next section, which describes how political issues are often
rendered technical in such a way that only the experts, or those with the “right” knowledge, are left in charge of decision-making.

4.2 The Discursive Frame
The power/knowledge nexus appears within specific discourses through the problematization or identification of issues and the depoliticization or rendering of said problems as technical (Li, 2007). In the first instance, an edifying conversation occurs in which problems are identified and defined within set parameters. Then, “the identification of a problem is immediately linked to the availability of a solution. They coemerge within a governmental assemblage in certain sorts of diagnoses, prescriptions, and techniques that are available to the expert who is properly trained” (Li, 2007: 7).

In a rare moment of convergence, Weber, Habermas and Foucault have all examined this relationship and found that the power/knowledge nexus in discourse often renders political issues technical (Barry, et al., 1996). In this process, problems are reduced to sets of rationales, scientific methods, and solutions. The resulting air of “scientific expertise” often excludes people from pertinent discussions and further entrenches the existing power dynamics. However, seemingly depoliticized bureaucratic decisions that follow standard policies and procedures have real political consequences (Ferguson, 1993; Fisher, 1997).

The consequences of these processes can be seen in three areas. First, political issues are removed from public debate, often excluding the people who will be impacted by decisions. Second, reliance on technical expertise removes or distances the politicians/administrators from accepting responsibility for decision-making. And third, technical specialization entrenches hierarchies and Western notions of “expertise” (Barry et al., 1996). As noted above, the act of generating knowledge and establishing expertise often further entrenches existing power dynamics.

This emergence of discursive frames and the process of “rendering technical” become apparent at several points throughout the case study. Chapter 4 outlines the discursive
frame that has formed around the concept of aid effectiveness, which contains clearly identified problems that have led to a set of technical solutions. Further, Chapters 6 and 7 illustrate the technical aspects of the dialogue system and the weight that expert knowledge carries in donor partner – Government of Tanzanian negotiations. These invisible and subtle forms of knowledge/power create discursive frames and eventually give rise to governmentality.

4.3 Governmentality
In a lecture given at the College de France in February 1978, Foucault described “governmentality” as a way of understanding the “complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security” (Foucault, Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991: 102). Governmentality is a strategic and/or tactical process in which particular types of power converge to create a governable society. The concept ties together Foucault’s work by linking the invisible and capillary forms of power that construct the subject to the instrumental and accumulative effects embedded in modern forms of governance.

This notion of the “mentality” of “governance” focuses on the individual subject. Basically, the individual is a product of societal constructs who intuitively learns to police him/herself in accordance with perceived normativity (Bevir, 1999). This configuration stems from the coupling of two epistemes: the idea of citizenship and order found in the res publica and the notion of patriarchal care embedded in Christianity’s shepherd-flock relation. This combination created the triad of “sovereignty-discipline-government” found in the modern European state (Foucault, 1978).

The configuration of sovereignty-discipline-government allowed the state to move beyond the dispossession of lands and resources to take responsibility for and thus administer its population. As seen in the imagery of the Jeremy Bentham’s design of the Panopticon, the tactics used in prisons switched from physical punishment to reform and rehabilitation through surveillance and training. These techniques were also reflected in
the wider population where citizens were increasingly studied, trained, and monitored. Government technologies, such as demographics and regulations, accumulate and have instrumental effects that create a limited field of possibilities for subjects; in essence, governmentality dictates the “conduct of conduct” (Foucault et al., 1991).

Within governmentality, processes are not controlled by individuals or groups of people, but stem from “constellations of control” or what Foucault calls “authorless strategies” (Ferguson, 1993: 20). Power is legitimatized and diffused through a complex, fluid, and relational network. Power operates at the site of the subject and is reproduced through the accumulation of actions expressed at a societal level. It is the overt and covert processes that give rise to certain disciplinary regimes, systems of surveillance, normalizing practices, discursive formations, and bio-power. This link between the microphysics of power and larger societal processes is essential to understanding how sets of contingencies or potentialities are shaped and which ones will actually occur. It is the configuration of these regimes that forms the archeological aspects of governmentality.

The literature on governmentality highlights some vital questions. Is the fabric of governmentality loosely or tightly woven? Is the web of power inherently negative or positive? Or, as posed on the cover of the International Development Studies (IDS) Bulletin, “What is power? Is it just about someone making other people act against their best interests? Or, is it also the glue that keeps society together?” (Eyben et al., 2007: 1). Foucault’s own writings often swing between these two extremes. In this regard, Bevir (1999) makes the distinction between excitable and composed Foucault to help us understand the complexity of the latter’s work.

Excitable Foucault argues that governmentality can lead to what Weber described as “étatisation, a taking into state control, of discipline: a continuous network of power connecting the vigilance of the sovereign to the minute regulation and supervision of individual conduct” (Gordon, 1991: 25). This totalizing effect cannot be transgressed or transcended because the concepts of freedom and protest are written into the texts as part of social construction and the maintenance of overall social order. This Orwellian
scenario equates power with the manipulation and coercion of entire populations. In this regard, Bevir states that in weighing the options between governmentality and direct rule, one should consider that, “after all, violence is at least visible and honest, whereas modern power renders us insipid and uniform while pretending to liberate our true, inner selves” (Bevir, 1999: 75).

In contrast to excitable Foucault, a composed Foucault acknowledges the possibility of transgression and creative action (Bevir, 1999). In fact, there are several cracks in the “totalizing” version of governmentality, including the possibility of multiple, hybrid, and nested discourses. Within these discursive formations, the meanings and usages of signifiers will drift. This fluidity creates room for concepts such as a paper-thin version of false consciousness and actor-oriented approaches to exist within governmentality. Furthermore, Dean (1999) argues that configurations of governmentality range from the welfare state to authoritative liberalism (Nazi Germany) and, more recently, neoliberalism. Thus, the modern state’s web of power can vary in intensity. The above factors have resulted in a version of governmentality that is in constant flux as different regimes negotiate with or compete for the adoption of their truths and rationales.

Pels elaborates on this idea by suggesting that the research surrounding governmentality should not be limited to actors or those who have “control of governmental technologies, but should focus on the appropriateness, application, and desirability of those governmental technologies” (Pels, 1997: 176). There is a possibility that more liberal forms of governmentality could provide the basis for a peaceful society. For example, Ibrahim (1997) reasons that the absence of governmentality can lead to conflict and societal upheaval over the long-term. He argues that the colonial administrators of Sudan sought control of lands and resources instead of engaging in a nation-making process:

According to Foucault, a government, as we know it now, evolved hand in hand with the evolution of the concept of population. As long as colonialism was essentially about land-grabbing, “a struggle over geography,” an imagination conceiving of its dependencies as a territory, never a people, a colonial administration could never have been other than a pre-government institution qualified to run a piece of land not a population. (Ibrahim, 1997: 28)
In another example, Agrawal (2005) builds a case for “environmentality.” He traces how government technologies and subject-making processes transformed how villagers in Northern India perceived themselves in relation to forest conservation over a 200-year period from colonization to the present. In doing so, he argues that the reconfiguration of the villagers as forest caretakers enhanced conservation efforts and thus illustrated a productive form of power. While many may disagree with his argument, he does illustrate that both the negative and positive aspects of power deserve discussion.

Bevir’s (1999) positing of the tension between *excitable* and *composed* Foucault, and the various configurations of governmentality put forth by Dean (1999), demonstrate that governmentality can be loosely or tightly woven, and negative or perhaps positive depending on the historical and contextual formation of the governance framework under analysis. They also highlight the gaps in this weave, leaving the subject with a limited range of action in this societal tapestry. In this manner, the question becomes not whether governmentality is good or bad, but how the boundaries of this limited range of action can be widened or reshaped. This question is discussed later in this dissertation. The next section takes on the important task of reviewing how post-structuralism, including its conceptualization of power, discursive frames, and governmentality, is used in the international development literature.

5.0 Critical Theory in International Development Studies

Critical theory and international development studies are a natural fit in terms of their mutual critique of and concern with various forms of domination and oppression. Veltmeyer (2011) uses the term critical development studies to identify a body of literature that uses critical theory to analyze international development. He describes the critical analysts of the development process as those who “are compelled to emphasize over and over again the importance of the conditioning and, in varying senses according to each thinker, the determining aspects of the social structure (and associated processes of change and development) in given times and places” (2011: 2). The varying treatment of social structures, or just how and to what extent individuals or groups are capable of
social action, falls along the structuralist-poststructuralist, or Marxist-Foucauldian divide described above in section 3.0.

This dissertation is situated within the genre of literature that uses poststructuralist-Foucauldian methods to analyze international development. Initially, post-development thinkers used genealogy to understand how development discourse was framed. However, large-scale interdisciplinary debates were dampened by the “development impasse” as scholars retreated back to their respective disciplines to debate amongst themselves. The next section provides a brief overview of the post-development literature, the critiques that have been leveled against it, and the scattered debates currently taking place, in order to position this research within the international development studies literature.

5.1 Post-Development
The post-structuralist strains of critical theory have been picked up and applied to international development by academics such as Cooper and Packard (1997), Escobar (1995), Esteva (1995), Ferguson (1993), Rist (2002), Sachs (1995), and Tucker (1999). These scholars combined the concepts of critical theory with ethnography to produce a more thorough analysis of how the development industry intersects with cultures at various locations. In doing so, they argued that the “development industry” is an extension of modernity, including Western culture and neoliberalism. Studies by these authors have exposed the connections between power/knowledge, discourse, cultural imperialism, and economics, and how their instrumental effects can have catastrophic consequences for developing nations.

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5 Over two decades have passed since international development and economic scholars declared a deadlock or “impasse in development theory.” At the time, it was argued that key development debates, such as those held by neoliberal economists and dependency theorists, and modernists and postmodernists, cancelled each other out, leaving development studies with no theoretical basis with which to define itself as a separate discipline. Booth’s (1985) seminal article scorned development studies as a weak form of interdisciplinary research. The result was a retreat back to traditional paradigms and disciplines, a dampening of scholarly debates, and the further separation of development theory and practice (Schuurman, 1993).
Post-development thinkers expanded the scope of analysis by undertaking a genealogical study of the discursive regime that encompasses the development industry. This dissection was implemented in three ways: critiquing Enlightenment ideas, examining discursive and disciplinary structures, and unpacking the hidden metaphors and narratives embedded in the discourse (Schuurman, 1993). In doing so, they analyzed development as a distinct and rich text that acts as an instrument or extension of the modern project. As Crush describes it, the purpose of this analysis

…of the development text (like most others) is to convince, to persuade, that this (and not that) is the way the world actually is and ought to be amended. But ideas about development do not arise in a social, institutional or literary vacuum. They are rather assembled within a vast hierarchical apparatus of knowledge production and consumption sometimes known with metaphorical precision as the “development industry.” (1995: 5)

By shifting the focus of analysis, post-development thinkers initiated an examination of the boundaries and functions of the development industry. Within this discourse, they uncovered a version of governmentality based on disciplinary and knowledge regimes that precipitate a systematic set of rules and regulations for a given population. Within this literature, an emphasis was placed on the genealogical aspects of governmentality, describing a situation in which people were governed from a distance. As Escobar notes, the system constructs “a space in which only certain things could be said and even imagined” (1999: 383).

A number of scholars argue that the contemporary conception of international development emerged from the colonial discourse of the 1930s and 1940s. The British Colonial Welfare Act of 1929 and the French Fonds d’investissement et de development economiques et sociale of 1946 (Cooper, 1997) marked a shift in language away from pure economic and military imperialism to connotations of guardianship or trusteeship (Esteva, 1995). Esteva notes that this is where the “‘dual mandate’ started to be sketched: the conquerors should be capable of economically developing the conquered region and at the same time accepting the responsibility of caring for the well-being of the natives. After the identification of the level of civilization with the level of production, the dual
mandate collapsed into one: development” (1995: 10). This form of paternal imperialism became a pervasive and underlying theme throughout development texts.

Based on this colonial foundation, international development discourse came together as a well-defined project in the years 1945–1955. The major touchstone during this period was President Harry S. Truman’s 1949 Four-Point speech. Against the backdrop of the cold war and the Marshall Plan, Truman defined the “underdeveloped areas,” made a break from the past by stating that the “old imperialism—exploitation for foreign profit—has no place in our plans” (Public Papers of the President of the United States, 1964: 115), and set out a modern “program” of industrialization, technological advancement, and democracy. It is often argued that this short speech set the discursive framework for the next sixty years of development (Crush, 1995; Escobar, 1999; Esteva, 1995; Rist, 2002).

Post-development scholars argue that some of the key narratives and metaphors used within the development industry’s discursive framework are the following:

- The development discourse is falsely disconnected from colonialism. The text presents an image in which the West developed separately from and not with (and some would say off the backs of) the global South. This allows the development project to be conceived of as “charity,” and sets up a relationship akin to what Freire (1970) refered to as “false generosity,” or what McKnight referred to as the “Mask of Love” (Rahnema, 1997).

- The “Third World” is conceived of as one passive, homogenous group. The lack of recognition for the diversity of vibrant cultures it includes contributes to the perception that people in the South are passive victims (Escobar, 1995).

- The concept of time and history is perverted. Both Karl Marx’s *The Communist Manifesto* (1848) and Walt Rostow’s *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (1960) depict development as a linear scale on which countries
can be “rated” according to the Western criteria for maturity. This teleological imperative has two implications for Southern nations. First, it presents the “third world” or “underdeveloped” nations as abnormally stalled or stagnant—the metaphor erases the rich histories of entire civilizations (Mitchell, 1995). Second, it defines the future of non-Western societies according to the West’s image (Sardar, 1999).

- Western knowledge is privileged. Western systems of knowledge are spread through a legitimatizing process of formal education, science and technology, and the mystique of the “expert.” The instrumental effect is an erosion of the world’s diverse knowledge systems. As Smith notes: “What makes ideas ‘real’ is the system of knowledge, the formation of culture and the relation of power in which these concepts are located” (1999: 28). The colonial and development projects undermine indigenous power-knowledge regimes and misrepresent their core theses (MacKenzie, 1995).

- Nation-states are depicted as discrete units within which the development process will unfold. Within state lines, people are seen as homogenous groups that can be adequately described by demographics and national averages. Ferguson (1993) illustrates, for example, how the World Bank’s and CIDA’s definitions of Lesotho as an isolated state led to the startlingly erroneous economic analysis that excluded the overwhelming influence of the South African mining industry.

These narratives and metaphors illustrate how development discourse frames issues while prescribing a limited range of technical solutions. As Escobar notes, the development text “brought into existence a space defined not so much by the ensemble of objects with which it dealt but by a set of relations and a discourse practice that systematically produced interrelated objects, concepts, theories, strategies, and the like” (Escobar 1997: 89). The arrangement of these objectives, concepts, theories, and strategies becomes part of the larger process governmentality.

Ferguson (1993), Escobar (1997), and Li (2007) used the genealogical aspects of governmentality to explore the interrelations between social objects and how they co-
emerge. They used the narratives and metaphors written into the development text to trace capillary forms of power and knowledge that give rise to certain discursive and disciplinary regimes, which in turn give rise to international development as a set problem-field with a limited range of technical solutions that is then imposed on developing populations. They found that through these discursive processes the development industry brings previously ungoverned communities or issues into the fold. In particular, Li found this process at play in her study of Community Based Resource Management (CBRM) projects in the Indonesian Uplands. She argues that, “rather than rolling back the state and reducing official interference in local affairs, [CBRM] is a vehicle for realigning the relationship between the state and upland citizens” (2002: 266).

It is often asserted that post-development scholars have shifted their gaze away from global poverty towards the development industry itself. However, my review of the literature revealed this shift occurred slowly and in two stages. Olivier de Sardan (2005) described the two stages as involving a move toward development anthropology, and then toward the anthropology of development. Initially, most post-development scholars used ethnographic methods to decipher development discourse and explore the effects of the development apparatus on local cultures around the world. In this scenario, the international development bureaucracy is conceived of as a monolithic entity representing hegemony. However, it was not until later that authors such as Dar and Cooke (2008), Ebrahim (2005), Hinton and Groves (2004), and Riles (2001) shifted their focus from the intersection of the development text and the targets of aid to an analysis of development administration itself. This distinction between the two shifts in analysis is important because it illustrates an increasing awareness of the complexity and contradictions embedded in bureaucratic life. Furthermore, the demarcation helps position this dissertation, which is located within the latter mode of analysis, focusing squarely on international development bureaucracy.

Within the anthropology of development literature, the project of development and its administrative machinery are seen as extensions of modernization and neoliberalism. Echoing the post-development critiques described above, Dar and Cooke’s (2008) edited
volume “reviews the uses of managerial techniques from (post)development orientations and reveals this colonization by the managerial; the folie-à-deux of soft managerialism and neoliberalism; and the potential and the real consequences, even for critical scholars, of privileging organization as an object” (Cooke & Dar, 2008: 6). This research has become more significant in light of the development industry’s increasingly pervasive use of soft management techniques—such as civil service reform programs, capacity building, and good governance—as new and subtler forms of aid conditionality. This type of managerial expertise generates legitimacy and renders issues technical. However, managerialism is not a requirement per se; it is internalized and self-imposed as part of the identity of a development professional. Cooke and Dar argue that in securing identity, or one’s professional reputation, there is a “conflation of identity and modernity [which] leads to practices naively considered politically neutral, promoting design and control as the only means to justifying development programmes worldwide” (2008: 16).

While post-development scholars have found considerable common ground in their analyses, they differ widely in their prescriptions. The literature ranges from extreme anti-development to more moderate forms of critical alternative development. On the anti-development side of the spectrum, scholars reject international development as a type of imperialism and argue that the role of the critical scholar is not to prescribe but to strip truth from power. On the critical alternative development side, there are several notable strains in the literature (described below) that are working towards what can be characterized as post-post-development theory (Parpart & Veltmeyer, 2011).

5.2 Critical Alternative Development

Critical alternative development is a corollary of thought emerging from alternative development and post-development thinking; it draws on alternative development’s methodological foundations in people-led development, combined with a post-development understanding of language and power (Parpart & Veltmeyer, 2004). Parpart and Veltmeyer describe the balance in critical alternative development thus:
It incorporates a critical understanding of the need to constantly guard against modernist tendencies to see the world through Western eyes, and calls for rethinking development in ways that permit technological advances (along sustainable lines) while retaining sensitivity to, and respect for, cultural and social differences. (2004: 52)

This would suggest that space for social change can be created through recognition and negotiation of the various power-knowledge regimes embedded in different discourses.

In this vein, critical alternative development scholars argue for the creation of a “post-post-modern” critical theory (Munck & O’Hearn, 1999). Tucker postulates that if development is based on “shared beliefs rather than on nature or destiny, it becomes possible to challenge them in a way that was not previously possible” (1999: 3). Thus, the project of modernity is reconceived as a negotiated space within which rationality is contested (Hickey & Mohan, 2004). This messy middle ground between modernity and counter-modernity rejects the superficial air of coherency and the illusion of control associated with modernity and replaces them with an arena in which different discourses and rationales are clarified and negotiated. Tucker further explains that, “the cultural sphere of action, the deconstruction and reconstruction of hegemonic discourses, is usually the first and most fruitful domain of action in the struggle against domination and exploitation. However, even if it starts here the struggle cannot stop here: it must extend to action in the political and economic arenas” (1999: 24).

This discussion of multiple discourses and contending rationalities and knowledges frames three related debates in critical alternative development. These debates have focused on exploring alternatives in romantic conservatism, new social movements, and participatory development.

**Romantic Conservatism**

Many post-development scholars call for the outright rejection of development and a return to small, self-reliant communities that respect local culture. Descriptions of the alternative to development include moving towards a Confucian aesthetic (Rahnema, 1997), a new commons free from economic claims (Esteva, 1995; Sahlins, 1997), Islamic
conceptions of *tazkiyah* (Sardar, 1999), or the Chinese values of *Kongsi* (Sardar, 1999). The intention is not to privilege one concept over another but to create space for multiple ways of being in the world.

The counterclaim of small communities is reminiscent of romantic conservatism. Kiely states that, “for all the alleged novelty of the post-development paradigm, we are left with the politics of that old Anglo-Irish conservative, Edmund Burke […] Although these critiques are of some value they too often rely on mythical notions of peasant communities” (1999: 44). This romanticism fails to contextualize the complexity of small communities, silences Southerners who aspire to modernity and wipes away the complexity and possible attributes of modernity. Ironically enough, these radical theorists are on a logical path that circles back to conservative politics.

*New Social Movements*

The international development studies and sociology literatures overlap in their discussions of New Social Movements (NSMs). Rooted in Marxism, the NSMs literature argues that there has been a shift from industrial era protests based on class interests to postindustrial movements that focus on a single issue, identity, ideology, or rights (Pichardo, 1997). Pichardo describes NSMs as:

Rather than focused on economic redistribution (as do working-class movements), NSMs emphasize quality of life and life-style concerns. Thus, NSMs question the wealth-oriented materialistic goals of industrial societies. They also call into question the structures of representative democracies that limit citizen input and participation in governance, instead advocating direct democracy, self-help groups, and cooperative styles of organization. (Pichardo 1997: 414)

The case studies used in the literature rely heavily on left leaning movements such as the Zapatista, feminist, gay-rights, and environmental movements.

Within the post-development literature, Crush argued that these types of movements exist outside of modernity because it is not based on structures “but on social actors; the
promotion of democratic, egalitarian and participatory styles of politics; and the search not for grand structural transformation but rather for the construction of identities and greater autonomy through modifications in everyday practices and beliefs” (Crush, 1995: 21). The central characteristics of NSMs include conscious-raising activities, constant questioning among participants, as well as a concerted effort to avoid institutionalism within the movements themselves. If there are formal procedures or organizations created, they often have a unique design intended to encourage direct democracy. Escobar (1995) argued that these new types of movements could be potential sources or incubators for counter-hegemonic discourses and could thus generate alternatives to modernity.

While the NSMs literature is full of examples and characteristics that generate hope for transformational change, there are two criticisms that cast a shadow over the literature. First, the distinction between old and new movements is based on the assumption that old industrial social movements were Marxist examples of class struggle, and thus distinct from postindustrial movements. However, a number of authors, such as D’Aneri et al. (1990) and Calhoun (1991), argue that there is little actual differences between the two types of movements, especially if one broadens the analysis to include more right-leaning groups (Pichardo, 1997).

Secondly, Schuurman’s claims that NSMs are not separate from or somehow immune to the “expectations of modernity.” In fact, he argues that “social movements (new and old) in the third world are not expressions of resistance against modernity; rather, they are demands for access to it” (1993: 27). Schuurman substantiates this by highlighting that most social movements are started because a portion of a population is denied access to modern forms of employment, wealth, education, health care, and/or other services. People often band together and protest because they want recognition of their right to participate in an improved version of modern society.
Participatory Development

When participation, a cornerstone of alternative development, was popularized in the 1980s and 1990s, development organizations tended to emphasize its instrumental aspects and de-emphasize its more difficult transformational aspects (Nelson & Wright, 1995). Edited volumes such as Cooke and Kothari’s *Participation: The New Tyranny?* (2001) used critical theory to understand the resulting widespread failure of the participatory approach to development. In response, Hickey and Mohan (2004) edited a volume, *Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation?* that built on the lessons learned from critical theory’s critique of participatory development in order to explore ways to mitigate the invisible power imbalances that exist in participatory practice. This theory moves beyond the typical oppressed/oppressor dichotomy to explore how participants can engage in spaces containing diffuse and relational webs of power. This also involves negotiating and balancing multiple identities, knowledges, and modernities (Parpart & Veltmeyer, 2004). Within critical alternative development, scholars were able to rethink participation by re-conceptualizing knowledge and participatory spaces.

In order to promote a reflective dialogue among multiple discourses, de Sousa Santos (1999) made the distinction between knowledge that generates emancipation and knowledge that generates regulations. Post-development scholars focus on how the knowledge/power configuration acts to entrench hierarchies and impose a single version of the truth. This corresponds with a postmodern conception of knowledge-as-regulation, which is defined as the process of bringing order to chaos or imposing categorization. This type of knowledge eventually becomes institutionalized through the organizational principles of modern science and gives way to domesticating tendencies (de Sousa Santos, 1999). In contrast, participatory development attempts to transform or create social action that focuses on knowledge-as-emancipation. De Sousa Santos describes this as knowledge “whose point of ignorance is called colonialism and whose point of knowledge is called solidarity” (1999: 36). This definition refers to Freire’s (1970) concept of *conscientization*, in which people learn to reflect and analyze issues in

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6 de Sousa Santos later associates the concept of solidarity with liberal ideas of equality and reciprocity. This definition is set within a post-colonial literature that frequently references a struggle between colonized and colonizer, or oppressed and oppressor.
participatory groups, becoming aware of and thus able to disrupt the oppressor/oppressed relationship. In critical theory terms, the participants would analyze their discursive frameworks and those of others in order to engage in definitional struggles.

The distinction between knowledge-as-regulation and knowledge-as-emancipation highlights an underlying contradiction within modernity, where knowledge-as-regulation is necessary to maintain a degree of order, but if left unchecked it can erode possibilities for knowledge-as-emancipation (de Sousa Santos, 1999). The interpretation and use of knowledge depends on how it is situated within particular spaces and places. Each space of engagement is infused with a power dynamic that includes competing identities, discourses, and knowledges. Further, Gaventa suggests that these “spaces exist in dynamic relationship to one another, and are constantly opening and closing through struggles for legitimacy and resistance, co-optation and transformation” (2004: 35). This network of spaces includes individuals or groups that exercise varying degrees of influence as they move from space to space.

Spaces occupy and overlap in geographical and virtual (internet-based or mythical) places. A place is filled with histories, symbols, and objects that tell stories and create an atmosphere (Hickey & Mohan, 2001). For example, a Church, Town Hall, and Bank frame a typical town square in Mexico. The centre is filled with park benches, a children’s play area, and a monument or statue dedicated to a great leader or revolution. There are visible signs of past and current celebrations, revolutions, crimes, and/or acts of kindness. Further, a place can be a site of intersecting scales (Hickey & Mohan, 2004). It can focus on local issues (the town budget, festivals, or elections) or international issues (such as free trade agreements). In this sense, a place has a number of competing and dynamic meanings attached to its configuration. This configuration informs how people behave as they enter and exit.

The parameters and atmosphere of participatory spaces and places is also shaped by the intersection of a variety of individuals. Parpart argues that in participatory development “individuals are generally assumed to play a particular role in the community, when, in
fact, they may play several, sometimes conflicting roles” (2002: 177). These different roles and identities can be played out simultaneously or at different stages within a person’s lifespan. Possible roles include worker, boss, mother/father, wife/husband, daughter/son, community volunteer, foreigner, religious member, military officer, midwife, etc. These multiple roles constantly influence how individuals participate in and negotiate a given space. Identities are forged through subtle or hidden forms of power circulating in and around the individuals. Languages, categorizations, experiences, and expected and/or perceived behaviors all stem from interactions ranging from public debates to intimate relationships (Cleaver, 2001).

Using the tools of critical theory, academics have gained a more nuanced understanding of participatory development. They have re-conceived the power dynamic occurring within participatory spaces and places, the relationship between these spaces, and its influence on whether knowledge is used as a form of regulation or emancipation. Furthermore, Gaventa also used these concepts in co-authored article (Brock et al. 2001) on how policy spaces imbued with particular power/knowledge dynamics can influence the smaller policy negotiations embedded in the international development bureaucracy, as is discussed in this dissertation’s later chapter. This approach partially compensates for some of the more substantive critiques of the post-development literature, which are described below.

5.3 Critiques
As is apparent from the above discussion, the post-development literature offers a rich terrain of thoughts and ideas. This dissertation is rooted in a critical realist approach that incorporates empirical, interpretative, and generative frameworks. Particular attention is given to the latter frameworks in order to identify the conceptual building blocks (power/knowledge nexus, the discursive frame, and governmentality) that allow the dissertation to explore aid policy as embedded within social or bureaucratic networks. While these concepts are frequently used in the post-development literature, only a small sub-section of the literature focuses on the international development bureaucracy, and within that group, only a few researchers attempt to use an in-depth approach that
considers different scales or locations within the bureaucracy. In this regard, the literature is still not a perfect match for this dissertation. There are two significant critiques of the post-development literature that must be considered. They are the ethnographic balance within key research and the conceptualization of governmentality.

**Balance within Research**

As discussed briefly at the end of section 5.1, post-development research tends to focus on the intersection of local culture and international development while privileging the local. For example, Ferguson (1993) and Li (2007) have paid a great deal of attention to interviews and observations made in rural communities (by the subjects of development) and have succeeded in rendering a rich description of social processes. However, that same degree of depth and rigor was not brought to bear on development organizations (Bending and Rosendo, 2006). Ferguson (1993) relies almost entirely on official documents. Li (2007) draws more from interviews and insights from her own experience working with development organizations, but she still does not spend as much time and effort on the international development bureaucracy as she does on “local culture.”

A number of post-development scholars revert back to the modern discourse of logocentrism, arguing that there is a global homogenizing process of westernization and imperialism rather than moving beyond dichotomies and recognizing the capillary nature of power and the complexity of local/global cultures (Pieterse, 2001). Unfortunately, the scholars who argue against “essentializing the other” inadvertently “essentialize” development practice and its practitioners. Kiely notes that, “While it champions cultural diversity and differences as a source of resistance against Western domination, development itself is portrayed in terms of a monolithic hegemony” (1999:38).

The tendency within post-development literature to treat the development industry as one dominant entity is accentuated by the language and grammar it utilizes. Scholars frequently use terms, such as “rendering technical,” “calculated design,” and “practices,”

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7 Logocentrism is the analysis of binary opposites that imply a dichotic relationship whereby one side is privileged over the other (Manzo, 1995).
that imply that a person or a group of people are acting intentionally. This generates a sense of conspiracy, even while most scholars recognize what Foucault (1991) termed a “constellation of authorless strategies.” In essence, the literature fails to clearly identify development professionals as “subjects” of societal processes.

Foucault’s approach envisions a web of power/knowledge and discourse that engulfs all members of society. In this vein, Scott argues that, “if subordination requires a credible performance of humility and deference, so domination seems to require a credible performance of haughtiness and mastery” (1990: 11). Both the ruling elite and its subordinates are expected to play their assigned roles or face certain risks. While the subordinates risk physical or economic punishment, the ruling elite risks ridicule and loss of legitimacy. The latter may eventually translate into a decline in socioeconomic status or even a physical penalty. Thus, in examining the social reproduction of inequality, it is important to study both subordinates and the ruling elite with the same depth of analysis.

Conceptualization of Governmentality

For Foucault, governmentality was only a minor theme in the ‘Security, Territory, and Population’ lectures given at the Collège de France in 1978-1979 (Gordon, 1991). Unfortunately, he was not able to answer questions or write extensively on the concept before his death in the Spring of 1984. Thus, the lack of detailed explanation concerning governmentality and its popularity within academic circles has resulted in significant variations in its conception and use. The conceptualization of governmentality tends to differ, depending on the author and how the specific research was sourced. In this section, two variations are considered that correspond with post-development literature’s early focus on the intersection of development discourse and aid recipients, and its later focus on international development bureaucracy.

Initially, post-development literature used a version of governmentality popularized by Rose and Miller (1992). In a chapter titled, “The Expulsion of Foucault from Governmentality Studies: Towards an Archaeological-Realist Retrieval,” Frauley (2007) argues that Rose and Miller’s version of governmentality emphasizes “indirect rule” and
“governing at a distance.” While scholars recognize the link between the micro and macro in terms of the social reproduction of inequality, they often describe development as a flat and distant form of governance that acts upon society rather than a process emerging from within society. This places the focus on a more empirical description of the concrete and causal action rather than the chaotic emergence of activities situated within discursive frames. In other words, Rose and Miller focus on genealogy or a horizontal description of who and what is governing the conduct of conduct from a distance, instead of focusing on the archaeology or vertical description of the multiple layers of relational power and the discursive structures that give rise to the conduct of conduct.

In examining horizontal versus vertical analyses, Frauley argues that governmentality “must be much more than the regulation of observable, horizontally distributed social objects; it must also be able to act on existing or potential relations, on vertical orders of relations and domains and processes of emergence; this would have a direct bearing on what could be actualized or realized as an object of governance” (2007: 268). Frauley’s argument affirms the description of governmentality as the accumulation of Foucault’s work. It is the capillary nature of power, its connection to knowledge, and how power and knowledge are embedded in discourse that eventually become part of the larger processes of governmentality. This link between the microphysics of power and larger societal processes is essential to understanding how sets of contingencies or potentialities are shaped and which ones will actually occur.

Both the horizontal and vertical versions of governmentality can be found in the post-development literature that focuses directly on international development bureaucracy. As described above, authors such as Cooke and Dar (2008) use post-development’s horizontal version of governmentality to examine development practices and governance from a distance. However, there is also a growing body of literature that takes advantage of the increased focus on development organizations to undertake a vertical analysis or archeological dig regarding how these discursive and disciplinary regimes are created. Authors such as Hinton and Groves (2004) have used complex adaptive systems to gain a
better understanding of development administration, while Riles’ (2001) ethnography tracked Fijian women’s networks as they prepared for the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995. This dissertation builds on lessons learned from these authors as it moves towards a more thorough understanding of horizontal and vertical governmentality and their implications.

In sum, the following dissertation is rooted in post-structuralism and uses a moderate form of critical alternative development to study how governmentality is configured within international development bureaucracy. From this point of departure, there is a significant amount of crossover between this more in-depth treatment of development bureaucracy and the policy literature. The next section will review three strains of the policy literature and highlight their linkages with international development.

6.0 The Policy Connection
As will become apparent, there is significant overlap between the international development literature and several of the themes that emerge from the policy literature. The following section reviews these trends. First, the trend towards networks, multilateral organizations, and increased connectivity came as a widespread response to the transnational nature of policy. Second, within public policy literature there is a school of thought that embraces postmodern understandings of knowledge/power and which has re-conceptualized how policy is constructed within a web of governmentality. Third, from within the anthropological tradition a number of researchers are using ethnography to understand how development policy operates within institutions and epistemic communities. These three approaches share common components with post-development literature, including: grappling with complexity and scale, understanding how content is conceived and constructed, identifying the many roles policy may play, and rethinking the scope of global issues and the extent of policy influence.

Concerning the first trend, the notion of scale has become a central feature in an era of globalization, as international issues (ranging from trade to climate change) and organizations (with their conventions, treaties, and laws) displace, or at least complicate,
a nation-state-centric approach. Scale is no longer limited to a “Russian nesting doll” concept where different levels of government (municipal, provincial, federal) fit neatly into a hierarchical nation-state. Instead, the different scales included within the nation-state are treated as important elements in a complex and fluid system. This approach embraces the fluidity of networks that reach across and over the different scales (Graefe, 2007). It has also sparked an increase in analytical terms, such as scalar rule regimes (spaces where rules intersect/overlap), inter-scalar discourse (policies and practices bridging scales), and scale jumping (when actors move between different scales) (Mahon, Andrew, & Johnson, 2007).

Advances in research have replaced images of mechanical hierarchies with complex adaptive systems. Hinton and Groves (2004) describe a process of increasingly inclusive development that transforms policy thinking from bureaucratic conformity to accepting diversity and, finally, to seeing it as a negotiated process. This approach “recognizes that the system has its own emergent dynamism and intended logic” (Hinton and Groves, 2004: 5). The dynamism consists of actors and institutions that create and recreate the system through the accumulation of their actions in a negotiated collective process. Underneath the hard and fast rules designed to manage the system, informal pathways often emerge. While seemingly chaotic, the interconnected elements are constantly fluctuating in order to maintain overall stability (Checkland, 1981). In this way, complex adaptive systems provide a more nuanced analogy with which to address dynamic policy processes.

In terms of the second trend, the public policy literature responded to key advancements in social science by adopting concepts from poststructuralist critical theory. Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) argue that critical theory has exposed how policy is interpreted, deliberated, and practiced. In terms of interpretation, authors have built on Foucauldian analyses of power to gain a deeper understanding regarding how policy content is
constructed and conceived. In the following case study where general agreement concerning Tanzanian ownership of development policy co-exists with donor partners who insist on establishing “good policy” as defined by their own analysis.

These theories translate into a new way of thinking about how discursive regimes inform how individuals identify, define, and attempt to resolve policy problems. Graefe describes policy “as a struggle of social forces acting within contexts set by institutions and structural relations of power” (2007: 33). The implication here is that the scope of policy analysis should be widened to include an interrogation of the discursive formations surrounding policy problems, expert knowledge, the identification of stakeholders, and proposed remedies.

In traditional policy analysis, many assume that policy deliberation occurs prior to policy construction through the exchange of expert opinions, political arguments, and citizen consultations. However, recent research has uncovered a far more convoluted process. Society’s intensified value pluralism and multi-faceted networks accentuate the chaotic aspects of policy deliberation and highlight the fact that conflict and disagreement are unavoidable parts of policy. In many cases, deliberation occurs as a reaction to policy, or in conflict with other policies, rather than as a contribution to policy formation (Hajer, 2003). It is often the case that “deliberative judgment emerges through collective interactive discourse” (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003: 23) and builds up slowly over time through a series of interactions. Thus, policy is never an end point but a statement in a larger societal discussion.

In addition to interpretation and deliberation, this second trend in policy analysis has grown to include a deeper understanding of practice. In this regard, the school of American Pragmatism conceives practice as more than mere implementation: it is as an...
area of simultaneous action, reflection, and adaption (Friedmann, 1987). Schön (1983) describes a reflective practitioner as a skilled jazz musician who combines theoretical, transactive, and tacit knowledge in conversation with other actors and contexts. While strategies may fluctuate, the primary goal remains the same. These types of practices will eventually influence policy direction. As seen in the case study, practices not only influence the implementation of policy, they also interpret and modify policy, and contribute to policy formation.

While the second trend in the public policy literature focuses on the interpretation, deliberation, and practice of policy in government bureaucracies, the third trend in this public policy literature focuses on the anthropology of development. This literature uses ethnographic techniques to explore the inner workings of international development bureaucracy. Regarding this third trend, authors such as Lewis and Mosse (2006), and Quarles van Ufford, Kumar Giri, and Mosse (2003) focus on how development policy is shaped, interpreted, and implemented. They have found that policy and program documents are more than just plans and activities; they are part of a system of representation within which the documents are merely temporary symbols.

For example, van Gastel and Nuijten’s (2005) study of good governance policy in the Dutch Ministry of Development Cooperation made the distinction between policy and the words on paper. The authors discovered that policy formation was the result of an embedded process involving negotiations and interpretations by a variety of actors and institutions that extended across time and space. Vague boundary concepts are strategically used in order to manage negotiations and reach a general level of consensus. In the end, the researchers concluded that, “policies tend to have less an instrumental function of problem-solving, and more a political-symbolic function of mobilizing people and institutions around a new agenda” (van Gastel & Nuijten, 2005: 101).

Formal policy acts as a symbolic representation to provide a measure of direction and a basis on which to build relationships among key stakeholders. Agreements are based on vague policy language that is constructed and deconstructed by a series of brokers and
strategic translations. The brokers (consultants, bureaucrats, fieldworkers, diplomats) interpret and adapt policy as it filters through the development industry. These translations are often based on intersecting relationships and mutual complicity, which create particular rationalities (Lewis & Mosse, 2006). It is within the overall chain or path of translation that policy displacement, layering, drift, and conversion take place over time (Mahon et al., 2007). For example, Nauta (2006) found that NGOs working in South African land reform tended to use workshops, reports, and proposals to modify information as it moved upward and downward within the development field. The aim of the translations was to maintain support from funders, politicians, and citizens even in the face of severe project challenges.

In Mosse’s well-known case study of the Indo-British Rainfed Farming Project (IBRFP), he finds that “good policy is unimplementable; it is metaphor not management” (Mosse, 2004: 663). Following this logic, his ethnography arrived at five propositions:

1) “Policy’s primary function is to mobilize and maintain political support that is to legitimatize rather than to orientate practice
2) Development interventions are driven not by policy but by exigencies of organization and the need to maintain relationships
3) Development projects work to maintain themselves as coherent policy ideas (as systems of representations) as well as operational systems
4) Projects do not fail, they are failed by wider networks of support and validation
5) “Success” and “failure” are policy-oriented judgments that obscure project effects” (Mosse, 2005: 14-19)

Mosse’s research was centered on the IBRFP, which spanned several regions in rural India and contained a number of smaller projects. While his initial research focus was more “on-the-ground,” Mosse (2008) later argued that his findings could also apply to global policy, especially in light of the recent trend within development organizations to scale-up their initiatives.

Mosse’s findings turn conventional understandings of planning and policy upside down by undermining the assumption that development management brings order, and presumably control, to areas of chaos and uncertainty. Quarles van Ufford et al. (2003)
argue that this assumption has intensified to the point where the field is now in an era of “high managerialism”—an era in which development policy uses technical language, the revolving door of new and improved concepts, and stepwise methods to screen people from politics, complexities and divisions. Further, when projects start to fail or lose their systems of support, the policies are re-scripted in a “future positive” manner. In Mosse’s case study, the policy language was reincarnated several times through agriculture extension work, participatory development and sustainable livelihoods (Mosse, 2005).

While the belief in managerial solutions is understandable given pressures to produce results from development projects, ethnographic analysis of development policy and projects tends to argue that understanding the complexity and disjunctures underneath official strategies is more important. Van den Berg and Quarles van Ufford (2005) identify three areas of disjuncture within development. First, there is the disjuncture between development politics and administration, practices of hope, and critical understandings. Second, there are vast differences in moral perspectives on development. These include disjuncture in how moral responsibility is enacted as part of the work world and social world. Third, and most pertinent to this study, there is disjuncture in development administration in terms of how large bureaucracies are designed as closed hierarchical structures with a mandate to solve problems that are global, complex, and constantly in flux. These deep philosophical fissures run through development discourse. In the end, these authors believe that a wellspring of creativity and innovation could be unleashed if development practitioners acknowledged and learned from disjuncture.9

Given this discussion, the scope of policy analysis must be expanded from official documents to include micro-policy negotiations: the diffuse network of smaller negotiations that help create, inform, shape, interpret, and apply policy. On one level, policy documents create the perception of consensus, motivate actors, generate a sense of control, and help coordinate activities. On another level, the “policy underground”

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9 While van den Berg and Quarles van Ufford (2005) do not delve into a detailed description of how embracing diversity and creativity might change the international development bureaucracy, their prescription is similar to Munck’s idea of multiple-modernities or paths to development. These possibilities are discussed briefly in the concluding chapter of this dissertation in regards to future research.
includes the constant negotiation of multiple interpretations and disjuncture. As Hajer and Wagenaar have described, policy:

…shows a practice of meaning-making that, although ambiguous and open-ended, is remarkably well adapted to the inconsistencies and contradictions that are characteristic of the everyday world of administrators in a fragmented bureaucratic environment characterized by power differential and lack of coordination, and, by extension, characteristic of the world of policy-makers and citizens in general. (2003: 18)

7.0 Conceptual Framework

The above literature review provides a basis for the conceptual framework employed in this research. The research will use an understanding of governmentality that emphasizes three characteristics. First, the idea of complex adaptive systems will be used as an analogy throughout the research in order to maintain the focus on the vertical or emergent processes within governmentality. Second, the research will pay special attention to the power dynamics embedded in the spaces in which policy is negotiated. This is connected to the third characteristic: the configuration of power within those spaces and how they inform what actors are and are not able to do. Individual actors within the development bureaucracy are analyzed as subjects, nested and shaped within their societal constructs. The three characteristics belong to a moderate form of governmentality that emphasizes the vertical analysis of how power works within the international development bureaucracy to shape its subjects and produce a certain range of outcomes found in the case study. Each of these concepts is described below.

7.1 Complex Adaptive Systems

As most historians note, the underlying metaphors or dominant images of how society works often change as society evolves. During feudal times, the natural order was seen as analogous to the patriarchal family; during the industrial revolution the metaphor of the machine was predominant; and now that Western society has embraced globalization the metaphor of complex systems is gaining momentum. Images of the Internet, networks, and ecosystems are increasingly being used to explain how society operates.
The study of complex systems has grown to include a number of branches, such as systems theory, complex adaptive systems, complexity theory, and chaos theory. While there is no single unifying theory, all of the variations examine systems: “the patterns of relationships within them, how they are sustained, how they self-organize and how outcomes emerge” (Zimmerman, Lindberg, & Plsek, 1998: 2). By studying how systems operate, rather than how systems should operate, complexity theorists root their analysis in practice. The influence of complex systems thinking can be seen in a wide range of literatures on topics ranging from conservation biology to organizational learning to computer science.

In a complex system the actors do not control or simply participate in the system; rather, they create and recreate the system through the accumulation of their actions. Actors and institutions within the system engage in a collective process of interaction that forms, maintains, and destroys various spaces within the system itself. The system consists of interconnected elements that are constantly fluctuating in order to maintain overall stability. Long-term evolution and stability within the system is based on absorbing and recreating the system itself. In this way, diversity is a source of strength or resilience within the system. While there are no clear protocols designed to manage the system, there is an underlying random logic in terms of how things operate. Actors may use various formal and informal pathways to achieve a desired action or set of actions, depending on the situation and the opportunities presented. These random pathways can be temporary or they can form stable networks through consistent use. In Carden’s analysis of international development policy regimes, he describes complex adaptive system as follows:

The process in a system is copoetic; order is created out of chaos through a collective process of interaction. The structure is dissipative; that is, order is achieved through fluctuation; stability is long-term not short-term and in the short term structures may appear highly unstable and uncertain. Evolution is self-transcendent. That is, the evolution of a system is through its changing its own consciousness and breaking the symmetry in which it exists. (1990: 37)
Further, the notion of scale is also essential to understanding how systems are entangled in their larger environments. The Resilience Alliance\(^{10}\) uses the concept of panarchy to refer to:

> the hierarchical structure in which systems of nature (for example, forests, grasslands, lakes, rivers, and seas), and human systems (for example, structures of governance, settlements, and cultures), as well as combined human-nature systems (for example, agencies that control natural resources use), and social-ecological systems (for instance, co-evolved systems of management), are interlinked in never-ending adaptive cycles of growth, accumulation, restructuring and renewal. (Holling, 2001: 392)

Although Holling’s work takes a natural science approach, the concept of panarchy illustrates how systems are interconnected. In particular, panarchy helps explain how external connections shape the different sections within the international development bureaucracy, as is discussed further in this dissertation’s later chapters.

Complex systems thinking represents a shift in how our social and natural environments are perceived and interpreted. Roe (1991) notes that one of the key implications of systems thinking is that practitioners no longer see themselves as outside of or apart from their work; instead, they see themselves as deeply embedded in the system and therefore attempting to direct change from within. Moreover, a wider scope of analysis is required to understand the nuances of complex systems. This includes grounding our understanding of these adaptive systems in a historical and contextual analysis that can reveal multi-variant connections.

Hinton and Groves (2004) used Figure 3 to illustrate how complex systems and relational power operate in the international development field. They suggested that:

> … adapting a complex systems approach involves two elements. On the one hand, it is essential to understand the choices being made by individual actors and their position and power within the system. On the other hand, it is equally important to

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\(^{10}\) Established in 1999, the Resilience Alliance is a consortium of institutions that works together for sustainable development. Their science program involves research into integrative or adaptive complex systems, modeling, and regional case studies (www.resalliance.org).
understand the wider context—the relationships and networks between actors in the system has its own emergent dynamisms and internal logic. (Hinton & Groves, 2004: 5)

This approach considers the wider cultural, political, and economic dynamics as well as the visible, hidden, and invisible forms of power.

Figure 1, “The Aid Ecosystem,” and Figure 3, “Complex Systems Illustration of Power and Relationships,” depict the international development bureaucracy as a network. While organizations, departments, programs, and actors work within separate compartments, there are also established interactions and a degree of overlap between the various groups and associates. These somewhat random patterns of interaction take place in spaces where influence is exerted. It is the accumulation of the participants’ actions within the system that creates the system or, for the purposes of this dissertation, international development bureaucracy.
Despite its newfound popularity, complex systems thinking does have its drawbacks. In particular, there is a tendency toward myopic thinking, or narrowly focusing on the description of a system. This description of the system should not be confused with the contextual or value assumptions embedded in explanatory frameworks. An example of this confusion can be found in Rihani’s (2002) work on complex adaptive systems and international development. While he makes a clear case for moving beyond linear development thinking, his analysis of development systems is steeped in a neoliberal economic perspective. Rihani (2002) continually references classical economic interpretations of markets as organizing principles for societal systems. In doing so, he illustrates (intentionally or unintentionally) that a description of how the system works cannot exist without an explanatory framework.

Therefore, while systems thinking can illustrate the multi-variant and fluid movement of systems, it cannot stand alone. An accompanying explanatory framework should clearly articulate its principles, assumptions, and interpretations for wider debate. In terms of this conceptual framework, complex systems are used in a limited way to describe the atmospheric conditions within which aid effectiveness policies are situated. The explanatory framework, or the “why” of the system in this conceptual framework, is grounded in post-structural understandings of power. The explanation’s emphasis on emergent processes provides an excellent analogy for the archeological or vertical aspects of governmentality.

### 7.2 Policy Spaces

Brock, Cornwall and Gaventa (2001) borrowed the concept of spaces from participatory development literature and applied it to the analysis of poverty reduction policies in the international development bureaucracy. They argued: “we must analyze the policy process as multiple spaces of contestation involving complex configurations of actors, discourses, and knowledges. By looking at how different discourses and actors interact in such spaces, we can better understand the ways in which power mediates policy processes” (Brock et al., 2001: 35). In doing so, they expanded the analysis of
development policy to include larger discourses and narratives as well as the smaller negotiations and translations that occur in various venues and meetings rooms throughout this global bureaucracy.

From this perspective, the international development bureaucracy is viewed as a transnational network that includes a number of smaller formal and informal policy spaces. Each policy space within the development bureaucracy contains power dynamics that frame negotiation strategies and policy outcomes. Therefore, as a global policy such as aid effectiveness moves through the development bureaucracy, a number of different iterations of the same policy are created. An analysis of the power dynamics within these various policy spaces can provide valuable insights into how policies are shaped and the extent to which development professionals can create change, whether small-scale or more far-reaching.

7.3 The Development Professional as a Subject

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past. (Marx, 1852: 1)

As Marx argued, the ways in which individuals are constrained and/or free to act lies at the heart of many social science debates, including debates concerning international development. The debates reveal two distinct narratives regarding agency and structure. Doty (1997) notes that, “one popular story is that of agents whose practices produce, reproduce, and sometimes transform the structures that make up society. The other story is that of the structures themselves which enable, constrain, and make possible the practices of agents” (1997: 367). While seemingly contradictory, Doty’s statement highlights how structures can constrain an individual as well as provide a platform for action. This section will briefly review agency in terms of the limited range of action available, or spaces of maneuverability, and how it is situated within the web of governmentality.
As with structure, the concept of agency has also moved through a series of developments. From a rational actor perspective, agency was often associated with an individual’s ability to act against external structures. Kabeer describes agency as “the ability to define one’s goals and act upon them. Agency is about observable actions; it also encompasses the meaning, motivation and purpose which individuals bring to their activity, their sense of agency or ‘power within’” (1999: 438). While the criteria of “observable actions” grounds the concept in practice and allows researchers and evaluators to operationalize agency as a measurable variable, it overlooks the minute processes that are hidden below the observable behaviour of allegedly autonomous individuals.

In Parpart’s (2010) recent work on how strategies of silence and secrecy suggest that non-action should be recognized as a component of agency, she argues that agency is not only about choice but also the range of possibilities available to an individual and how they employ them. The range of possibilities is embedded in what Emirbayer and Mische describe as:

…the temporally constructed engagement by actors of different structural environments—the temporal-relational contexts of action—which, through the interplay of habit, imagination, and judgment, both reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive response to the problem posed by changing historical solutions. (1998: 970)

Thus, an individual can quickly rely on their habitual behaviour, imagine possible scenarios, and evaluate the possible outcomes of those scenarios when engaging in action or, in some cases, inaction (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998).

Within agency, these three practices link past experiences with the present, even in initial encounters and new situations. A subject’s identity or attributes may be predetermined by the meanings and experiences that they carry forth in their actions (Doty, 1997). The temporal-relational context includes the structures that intersect at the site of the subject, creating a perceived position within those structures. As Doty describes:
Subjects… maintain a point of agency that is never fully identifiable with the categories of their social construction. This preserves the notion of a pre-discursive, pre-socially constituted agency that is at odds with attempts not to take agency as given and certainly ushers in an element of identity that is exogenous to practice. (Doty, 1997: 380)

The triad of habit, imagination, and judgment plays out within an individual and their narratively constituted identity (Suganami, 1999). Subject positions are constructed by discourse and are inherently unstable given that identity is based on reciprocal human interactions expressed through language. Subjects constantly negotiate spaces of maneuverability using subtle and overt strategies within larger societal networks.

As seen throughout this chapter, the concepts of structure and agency have moved conceptually closer. Specifically, the poststructuralist perspective relocated structure to the site of the subject, while agency was expanded to include habit, imagination, and judgment of the subject’s perceived position within societal structures. The link between structure and agency is highlighted by the fact that actions are dependent on antecedent structural material and the confluence of power and authority within a given setting. Patomaki and Wright assert that, “every social act, event, or phenomenon is only possible insofar as the conditions for action exist as well as the agents which act” (2000: 230).

By focusing on the configuration of agency and structure, the surrounding discussion provides a way to understand each subject’s space of maneuverability and how this space could potentially be extended or reshaped within the web of governmentality (Mosedale, 2005). There are numerous deviations within the agency-structure configuration that provide opportunities for social change. These structural variances include the natural process of drift and change that occurs when individuals continually recreate a system, the nuanced negotiations between individuals and the system, the overlap between multiple discourses, and responses to external changes in the environment.

The overall theme extracted from the above discussion of agency and structure is that the individual is resigned to some structures but challenges others through subtle strategies and hidden transcripts. This replaces the modern illusion of the hyper-individual, heroic
agent—created by prevailing Enlightenment ideas—with the idea of modest zones of influence (den Heyer, 2003). These modest zones of influence, with particular configurations of agency and structure, may vary depending on how tightly or loosely governmentality is woven.

8.0 Conclusion

As described in Chapter 1, the research seeks to understand if the aid effectiveness policy framework has achieved its intended reform of the international development bureaucracy, how the policies are shaped in different locations, and how those various interpretations are influenced. A critical realist approach was selected in order to avoid the heuristic traps of traditional disciplinary research methods and to provide a more detailed analysis of the social networks within which policy processes are embedded. From an interdisciplinary perspective, the research embraces the empirical data captured in policy documents and reports; the interpretations of various brokers or actors and how they translated policy from one scale to another; and how the smaller daily policy negotiations are situated in spaces caught in a web of power. As is demonstrated throughout the dissertation, this in-depth multi-scalar approach helps identify some of the key reasons why transnational policy initiatives continually fail to generate their prescribed radical change.

This chapter provides a theoretical foundation for the conceptual framework of this research. It starts with a definition of critical realism, and how it encompasses the empirical, actual, and reality domains of knowing. While the research uses empirical and interpretative data, the main focus of this chapter was on the multifaceted literature surrounding the generative processes that create our understandings of the world. In adopting this focus, this chapter reviewed the rich lineages of critical theory and post-structuralism, and described the conceptual building blocks of power/knowledge, discursive frames, and governmentality.

The middle part of this chapter grounds the research in two key bodies of literature. The post-development literature describes how critical theory was and can be applied within
international development studies. This includes several prescriptions and critiques, which were used later in the chapter to clarify the moderate form of governmentality used in the conceptual framework. The second body of literature focuses on public policy and a number of research trends, including grappling with complexity and scale, understanding how content is conceived and constructed, identifying the roles policy may play, and rethinking the scope of global issues and the extent of policy influence.

This dissertation’s conceptual framework uses governmentality to understand how aid effectiveness, as a social object, is generated and maintained within the international development bureaucracy. Particular attention is given to the archeology, or the links between the microphysics of power, discursive regimes, and governmentality. In order to maintain this attention, the conceptual framework evokes the image of a complex adaptive system consisting of networks of policy spaces imbued with visible, hidden, and invisible power dynamics. It is in these spaces that development bureaucrats negotiate aid effectiveness policies on a daily basis, often struggling with broad language, conflicting interpretations, and competing discourses.

It is important to note that during the research process the conceptual framework was used in an inductive and deductive manner. As is described more thoroughly in the next chapter, a balance was struck between the critical theory approach of using theory to guide the research and the constructivist approach of letting theory emerge from the data. In the end, the above conceptual framework was developed through an iterative process of sketching out the theory, allowing the narrative to emerge from the data, and then making adjustments accordingly. The research methodology used in this process is described in Chapter 3: Methodology.
CHAPTER THREE: METHODLOGY

1.0 Introduction
As this is an interdisciplinary thesis, the description of its methodology must begin by locating the research within the multidisciplinary-interdisciplinary-transdisciplinary spectrum. This spectrum illustrates how tightly key elements of traditional disciplinary silos are woven together and applied in research (Molteberg, Bergstrom, & Huag, 2000). Resolving or learning from the inherent tensions between the disciplines allows interdisciplinary research to bridge the silos and explore topics that blur traditional boundaries, such as international development. However, this requires a careful balance between ontology, epistemology, and methodology (Bassett, 2008). Done properly, the careful weighting of these elements within the research process will strengthen rather than compromise quality.

The balance must also create a platform upon which to answer the research questions. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the key research questions are:

   A. Can aid effectiveness, as a transnational policies initiative, change the international development bureaucracy?
   B. To what extent are aid effectiveness policies modified as they move through the international development bureaucracy?
   C. What are the key factors, processes and discourses that influence aid effectiveness policies?

With these factors in mind, the following chapter builds on the ontology of critical realism and the epistemology of critical alternative development (discussed in Chapter 2). This allows the research process to account for the generative framing, constructive understandings, and material consequences of aid effectiveness policies. The following sections describe how constructivist/interpretive and critical theory approaches were brought together in this case study of aid effectiveness principles in CIDA and Tanzania.
2.0 Study Design

The challenge of interdisciplinary research is to blend approaches in a manner that sheds a unique spotlight on issues that cross disciplines and have practical implications. This study’s design flows from the critical realist concept of stratified social reality, whereby it contains an empirical domain (experiences), an actual domain (social accounts), and a reality domain (generative structures and mechanisms that frame our social accounts). In order to address the generative frameworks and social accounts that surround the phenomena of aid effectiveness policies in the international, Canadian, and Tanzanian contexts, this study uses a constructivist and critical theory approach as seen in Appendix A: Research Map. This combination of methods in a single case study design offers the possibility of generating a deeper understanding of how networks of actors and international discourse contribute to and are restrained by development policy. Each approach is described below.

Constructivist Approach: The constructivist approach focuses on how knowledge is formed through the generation of meaning or sense-making. These subjective processes are socially constructed through lived experiences and in conversation with others in their immediate network (Yanow, 2006). Thus, the approach recognizes the legitimacy of multiple realities, or what is often referred to as relativism. However, Haraway (2004) argues that the constructivist approach does not endorse an “everything goes relativism,” but acknowledges that all research represents partial or situated knowledge. In terms of this study, the constructivist approach will be used to build a description of aid policies through the various perspectives and understandings of the respondents.

Critical Theory: While critical theory also focuses on socially constructed knowledge and the meaning-making process, it attempts to expose the lines of power embedded in discourse. It first examines the genealogy or historic evolution of discourses and then examines the archeology or internal constructs thereof. Both steps should reveal the complex and hidden forms of power embedded in the knowledge being produced.
In this research, critical theory is used to trace the lines of power woven into the individual and organizational discourses on aid effectiveness policies.

As is apparent from these brief descriptions, there is a great deal of overlap between the constructivist approach and critical theory. Both of these research approaches emphasize transactional knowledge, subjectivism, and emancipation (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). However, there are three notable areas of tension as well.

The first area of concern relates to epistemology. The constructivist approach focuses on local knowledge formations whereas critical theory emphasizes historical analysis. Second, the constructivist approach focuses on individuals or localized communities, whereas critical theorists focus on the material, cultural and discursive conditions within which individuals are embedded (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). The research for this thesis does not strive to resolve these tensions, but uses them to generate further understanding. The methods juxtapose the individual’s interpretation and implementation of aid policies with the discursive structures in which they are formed. This is also echoed in the theoretical framework described in the previous chapter. The tension between locally constructed knowledge and larger historical structures underscores the dynamic that exists between agency and structure within transnational aid bureaucracy.

Finally, there is tension in the use and placement of theory. The constructivist approach uses an inductive strategy to build theory from data and in conversation with participants, while critical theory places theory in two key areas. First, it is used as a theoretical lens with which to analyze and interpret data, and second, theory is used to generate even more theory inductively from data. For this reason, the research used two sets of codes during the data analysis discussed in section 6.0. The first set was used to construct an understanding of the Tanzanian aid architecture and Canadian aid effectiveness policies in Tanzania through the interpretations of the respondents. The second set was informed by a critical development approach and discourse analysis in an effort to examine how power is woven through the international development bureaucracy.
The blending of constructivist/interpretive and critical theory approaches reflects the exploratory nature of the research questions. As a set, the research questions require greater depth and breadth in order to capture the minutia of policy negotiations and the contextual factors that influence the policy process. This includes examining the configuration of policy at different scales within the international development bureaucracy. In this regard, the research examines how and to what extent aid effectiveness policies are modified as they move through the international development bureaucracy; the key factors, processes and discourses that influence policy; and whether transnational policy initiatives can create transformational change. These concerns are reflected in the below methodology.

3.0 Methodology
The original proposal called for this dissertation to utilize a case study design based on three methods: literature review, policy review, and semi-structured interviews. During the field work, however, several additional data gathering opportunities emerged. The methods were therefore expanded to include qualitative observation of meetings, a focus group, and extensive field notes taken throughout the research process. The next section describes how the methods were used and the types of data gathered.

3.1 Literature Review
While an initial review was conducted during the comprehensive exams and in conjunction with the proposal, the type of literature required shifted as the study became more and more focused. It was also decided that, given the extent of the research project, it would be more fruitful to embed the literature and references within the chapters themselves. This allows readers to draw a direct link between the data, key arguments, and findings. It also allowed the research to expand and to fill in literature gaps as the data analysis and writing process progressed.

Sifting through the literature can be a daunting and lengthy process; three simple tools were used to structure it. First, a literature map was constructed to guide the process, mapping the references and where they would be added in the text. This helped to
maintain a wider overview of the literature. Second, the bibliographic information and abstracts were organized in a RefWorks database. Finally, research notes containing key arguments, quotations, and page numbers were recorded and used as references throughout the writing process. This kept the review organized and focused on relevant sources.

3.2 Policy Review

The policy review examined documents related to aid effectiveness policies from several sources, including the United Republic of Tanzania, CIDA, the OECD Working Group on Aid Effectiveness, International Financial Institutions (IFIs), lead donors, and CSOs involved in Tanzania. The documents provide an official or public account of how major donors are interpreting and applying aid effectiveness in the Tanzanian context. The data contributes to a description of the case studies as well as an analysis of emerging themes and patterns within the written text.

Similar to the literature review, several research tools were used to structure and organize data collection. First, parameters or criteria were developed to help focus the policy review process. They are:

1. Review the aid effectiveness policies of organizations directly involved in the case studies.
2. Review the policies of respondents’ organizations.
3. Search for any differences between CIDA’s aid policies at headquarters and those followed in the Tanzanian field office.
4. Review all policies mentioned in interviews or distributed at meetings.
5. Exclude policies that are not directly related to aid effectiveness.
6. Exclude policies that are not directly related to CIDA and/or Tanzania.

While these six criteria provided a strong sense of direction, there were some problems when it came to accessing a number of the policy documents. Some organizations, and some respondents, were not as forthcoming as others. The reasons for the lack of or
uneven access to policies became findings as well; they are further described in Chapter 6. Finally, similarly to the literature review, the bibliographical information for each resource was recorded in a Refworks database, and readings notes were taken.

3.3 Semi-structured Interviews

The interviews were designed to gather in-depth data on how development practitioners from different organizations interpret aid effectiveness policies in Tanzania and Canada. In total, there were 38 respondents representing 36 interviews. The recruitment categories included: (1) CIDA, (2) Multilateral and Bilateral Aid Agencies other than CIDA, (3) Dialogue Structure in Tanzania, (4) the Government of Tanzania, (5) CSOs, and (6) Other.

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<th>Table 1: Type of Organizations by Number of Interview Respondents</th>
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<td>CIDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral and Bilateral Aid Agencies (other than CIDA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dialogue Structure in Tanzania</td>
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<td>Government of Tanzania</td>
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<td>Tanzanian Civil Society Organizations</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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</table>

While all 38 respondents worked for a variety of organizations, 11 of the 38 held senior positions within the Tanzanian aid community. These included High Commissioners, Heads of Aid, and the Head of the External Finance Office. The remaining 27 respondents were primarily mid-level professionals, including policy analysts, program leads, and coordinators. All 38 respondents were directly involved with CIDA’s operations and/or active in the development community in Tanzania sometime between 1998-2008. Of the 38 respondents, 15 had over 10 years of experience working on development issues in Tanzania. However, because of the high turnover in international postings, it was often necessary to conduct interviews with a series respondents who held the same position at different time, in order to establish an understanding of how policies had evolved. The interviews were conducted until an acceptable level of saturation was
established; that is, until it seemed no new information that would contribute to the overall analysis could be obtained through further interviews.

The selection and recruitment process used a snowball technique in three stages. An initial list of potential respondents was compiled from names or titles referenced in policies and reports, as well as suggestions from my PhD committee and contacts in Tanzania. Potential respondents were sent an email containing a brief description of the research and a request for their participation. When the respondent agreed to the interview, the researcher followed up through email/telephone communication to arrange the interview time and location. Subsequent rounds of selection and recruitment were based on information gathered during the first set of interviews and further assessments of policy and literature data. Several interviews were targeted to fill in gaps and/or flesh out key themes. It is important to note that the researcher was also interacting with members of the development community while attending public workshops and networking events. A portion of the recruitment process occurred through these less formal networking opportunities.

The respondents were asked to provide written consent and to participate in one semi-structured interview regarding their work in relation to aid policy in Tanzania. The semi-structured interviews were between 45 and 90 minutes in length. Of the 38 respondents, 5 refused to be recorded. In these cases notes were taken and written-up within 24 hours of the interview. The interviews took place in the offices of development organizations, government, universities, and research institutes, and occasionally in restaurants.

Several procedures helped organize and manage the interviews: (1) a written consent form signed by respondents; (2) an interview guide developed and then customized for each respondent depending on their post (see Appendix B); (3) a contact list on an excel spreadsheet which recorded the participant’s contact information, type of organization, frequency of contact, status of interview, and random respondent number; (4) digital

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11 The interview guide contains several questions concerning who is and who is not involved in aid effectiveness policies in Tanzania.
voice recordings of the interviews were transcribed into text and uploaded into AtlasTi software for data analysis; (5) field notes developed after each interview in order to capture the contextual information and significant data; and (6) all the quotes used in the dissertation include a reference to the document and paragraph number in the database.

The interview guide (Appendix B) was used throughout the research process as a template for each semi-structured interview. Michael Quinn Patton (1997) noted that the act of interviewing engages respondents in a reflective process, urging them to step back and analyze the issue with the interviewer. In keeping with this, the guide was designed to lead the respondents through a reflective process, and it included warm-up questions, a description of events and policies, reflections on their meanings, and summary questions. Participants were urged to provide their opinions and narrative understandings of the international development bureaucracy and aid effectiveness policies. This provided data for the construction of a narrative understanding of how events occur, as well as fodder for identifying key terms, metaphors, and the rationales that underlie the narratives.

3.4 Qualitative Observation

While the research timeframe (two weeks in Ottawa/Gatineau and four-months in Dar es Salaam) was not long enough to use participant observation in a thorough ethnographic sense, the principles of this method were used to make qualitative observations during the fieldwork. Fettermen notes that participant observations “combines participation in the lives of the people under study with maintenance of a professional distance that allows adequate observation and recording of data” (1998: 35). The task was to understand patterns of everyday life at the panoramic and microscopic levels. In a professional setting these interactions take place in meeting rooms, corridors, cafés, airports, and even on-line.12 This was particularly important in terms of observing and understanding protocols, procedures, and typical routines surrounding meetings, as well as how respondents interacted with each other within various venues.

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12 Anthropologists, such as Gupta & Ferguson (2002), argue for a more fluid construct of ‘field sites.’ This includes aspects of globalizations (Appadurai, 2002), multi-site design (Hannerz, 2003), and observations of high-tech organizations and professional networks (Downey, 1997).
In addition to inserting myself in key social and business venues, I also attended four high-level meetings:

a. *Development Partners Group (DPG) Monthly Meeting*: During the fieldwork, I was invited to observe one half of the DPG’s monthly meeting. The agenda items included regular business as well as the National Bureau of Statistics’ presentation on the Household Budget Survey (HBS). After the HBS presentation and discussion, I was asked to leave with the one other invited guest as the meeting moved into a closed-door session.

b. *The Tanzania AIDS/HIV Review (TCAIDS)*: This meeting provided an open space for those working in the AIDS/HIV sector to review and discuss the progress of the sector leading up to the Annual Budget Review. There was estimated to be 100 people in attendance for a two-day meeting.

c. *PER/MKUKUTA Public Policy Week*: This meeting brought together government, donors, and civil society to review the public expenditures and progress on the MKUKUTA. There were approximately two to three hundred people gathered in a ballroom for a three-day meeting.

d. *Annual Budget Review*: The Annual Budget Review is the formal negotiation process between the 14 donors who provide General Budget Support (GBS) and the Government of Tanzania. Approximately three hundred people gathered in a ballroom for a four-day meeting.

During each meeting observations were recorded by hand. They ranged from room set-up, attendance, presentations, and crowd responses to side conversations with and between participants. Each set of meeting notes were typed up along with summaries of the documents distributed during the meeting. All four observation documents were added into the AtlasTi database and coded alongside the interviews, field notes, and focus group. As will become apparent in the latter sections of this dissertation, the data gathered from these qualitative observations provided important insights into how the

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13 The MKUKUTA is the Swahili acronym for Tanzania’s second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper discussed in detail later in the dissertation.
micro-physics of power operate in the various sections of the international development bureaucracy.

3.5 Focus Group
During the fieldwork, a number of respondents requested that I present my preliminary findings to the Canadian Cooperation Office (CCO) in Dar es Salaam before returning to Canada. While initially envisioned as a standard presentation, the session quickly evolved into a focus group. During the two and half hour meeting, I presented a series of propositions to five respondents for discussion and feedback. Probing questions and debate among participants allowed the group to further explore different perspectives and nuances surrounding each topic. As noted by Cameron, focus groups are in keeping with the idea of the socially constructed nature of knowledge because the “multiple meanings that people attribute to places, relationships, processes, and events are expressed and negotiated, thereby providing important insights into the practice of knowledge production” (2005: 117). This added depth to the overall understanding of the key research findings. The data from the focus group was also transcribed and uploaded into AtlasTi for coding and analysis.

3.6 Field Notes
While not technically a method, Fetterman (1998) argues that field notes guide a systematic research process. In this particular project, field notes were used in four different ways. First, the notes provided a place to reflect, note clues for follow-ups, and plan for further lines of inquiry during the fieldwork. Second, they provided space in which to record data that was informally gathered, such as conversations with people during coffee breaks, at airports, or at internet cafés. In many cases these short off-the-record conversations provided the honest insider opinions and detailed examples that people on-the-record would be too cautious to share. Third, the field notes provided an important context through which to compare and check other methods. For example, in one incident I overheard a conversation between several Heads of Aid critiquing the latest Government of Tanzania proposal. The opinions they expressed in an informal hallway setting differed from the more diplomatic answers provided during the
interviews. Fourth, the notes helped retrace particular issues as well as my own attitudes or judgments surrounding specific observations, providing background during the analysis and writing phases. In this way they played an important role in the overall research process. Thus, the information recorded in the field notes was edited, uploaded in AtlasTi, and coded alongside the interviews, qualitative observations, and focus group.

4.0 Mining the Data
Data analysis arguably occurs throughout the entire research process. Several distinct steps were taken, however, to ensure that the data was treated in a systematic way. These steps included: (1) data gathering, (2) transcription, (3) coding, (4) data analysis, and (5) writing. Each part of the process is described below.

4.1 Data Gathering
The data gathering process took place in two field sites over a period of five months. First, I spent a week in Ottawa interviewing respondents associated with CIDA’s Tanzanian desk and/or aid effectiveness policies. I also spent some time in institutional libraries looking for CIDA policies as well as additional information on Tanzania and aid effectiveness. Second, I spent four months gathering data in Dar es Salaam. This time included the majority of the interviews, qualitative observations, focus groups, and some policy reviews. I also visited a number of institutional libraries and CSOs. As information was gathered, it was recorded and backed up on a laptop, and USB and external hard drives.

4.2 Transcription and Summaries
Once the data was gathered, it was either summarized or transcribed into Word documents. The qualitative observation data, field notes, and the 5 interviews in which the respondents refused to be recorded were summarized in text documents in the field while memories were still fresh. However, given the short window of time, the recorded information, including the focus group and 33 interviews, were transcribed after the field research. This represented an estimated 32 hours of tape, of which 5 hours were outsourced to a professional transcriber. I transcribed the remaining 27 hours of audio
recordings. Each transcript was double-checked against the original recording before being uploaded into AtlasTi for coding.

4.3 Coding
The challenges of interdisciplinary research ripple throughout this entire project. In terms of coding, or highlighting and categorizing pieces of information relevant to the research themes, the techniques are rooted in the epistemology. As seen in Figure 4, the constructivist approach uses open-coding to piece together a socially constructed understanding of the case study while critical theory uses predetermined codes to uncover the lines of power within the discourse. Given the nature of the research question, this project blended the approaches in order to strike a balance between the two traditions.

![Figure 4: Data Analysis Map](image_url)

The blending required the drafting and redrafting of a set of codes. The steps followed in this regard included the following:

1. A rough set of codes was developed based on the research topic, discourse, and my early observations.
2. The draft codes were applied alongside open-coding techniques in the first ten interviews.
3. Based on the results, a second set of codes was drafted. However, the amount and randomness of the codes proved unmanageable. Thus, the codes were categorized into four major themes and several sub-themes. The themes included: location;
social processes or expressions of power; discourses such as narratives and metaphors; and specific topics that included sub-sections for aid effectiveness, aid modalities, CIDA, civil society, aid sectors, and Tanzania.

4. A final codebook was developed to clearly define the revised codes, clarify definitions, and record any changes or additions.

5. The database was recoded from beginning to end.

At the end of the process, the database contained a number of characteristics. First, it was a fairly large data set in which some codes were more pertinent to the thesis than others. Second, each code contained a series of quoted texts ranging from 1 to 266 in number. Third, it was also noted that most of the codes used in the database were constructivist in nature. They describe the multiple interpretations of policies and events that came from various actors and organizations involved in the study. Fourth, the codes that address how power was woven throughout the case were far fewer and used infrequently. These characteristics were evaluated during the analysis phase.

The constructivist and critical theory codes were treated slightly different in the analysis. The constructivist codes were used to build a story around aid effectiveness and to understand the different perspectives at play. The codes relating to critical theory, meanwhile, were used to understand the discursive frames (metaphors, terminology and narratives) used to describe situations and how they influenced the actors and their actions. This provides a deeper insight into the invisible power dynamics at play in governmentality.

4.4 Data Analysis

The original research questions asked whether aid effectiveness policies are modified as they move through international development bureaucracy and if they can reform aid administration. Given these lines of inquiry, the database, and preliminary observations, the research project employed a two-prong analytical strategy in keeping with the project’s interdisciplinary nature. The first stage developed a description of how aid effectiveness principles were understood and being implemented in Tanzania and CIDA.
This was achieved by running a number of queries or searches to isolate pieces of texts or observations on key themes. The themes were selected based on their relevance to the research questions and their prominence or the frequency with which they occurred in the data. Five categories of respondents were used to describe the various perspectives on each theme. These categories included CIDA, Bilateral and Multilateral Donors other than CIDA, Dialogue Structure in Tanzania, Government of Tanzania, CSO, and Other. The outputs were carefully analyzed for definitions, patterns, processes, key events, specific actions, etc. The findings were balanced with secondary data in order to build a descriptive case study.

The second aspect of the analytical strategy was discourse analysis. This type of analysis is based on four themes: “a concern with discourse itself; a view of language as constructive and constructed; an emphasis upon discourse as a form of action; and a conviction in the rhetorical organization of discourse” (Rosalind, 2007: 174). It is this archeological dig through the composition and configuration of discourse that uncovers more invisible forms of power that inform what can and cannot be done. In Hajer’s study of Dutch environmental policies, he describes this mode of analysis thus:

Firstly, the study of the terms of policy discourse, i.e. the (new) vocabularies, story lines and generative metaphors, the implicated division of labour and the various “positionings” for the actors and stakeholders involved; secondly, the formation of particular discourse coalitions around story lines; and, thirdly, the analysis of the particular institutional practices in which discourses are produced. (2003: 103)

The discourse analysis utilized the few codes that capture key terms, storylines, and practices in the database, and also built on the descriptive queries. The queries provided the researcher with a second, more thorough opportunity to examine the data for discursive patterns based on themes. The findings were used to enrich the understanding of the case study in terms of how overt and covert forms of power shape the various definitions and applications of aid effectiveness principles.
4.5 Writing
Fetterman simply describes the writing process as “sitting down to put thought on paper, [when] an individual must organize those thoughts and sort out the specific ideas and relationships” (1998: 112). In this sense, it involves equal measures of clear communication and analysis. The writing up of this research often involved double-checking data, fleshing out arguments, discovering and filling in knowledge gaps, rearranging sections, weaving themes throughout the text, and generally tying up loose ends. In essence, writing and rewriting becomes the last stage, or the “catch-all-stage,” of the research, but a critical one for sharpening and refining core arguments.

5.0 Reflectivity
There is much written about objectivity, bias, subjugated knowledge, interpretation, and reflexivity in qualitative research. The main focus of these concepts is the degree to which the researcher and research inform/influence each other. Particular attention is given to how the researcher’s experiences, social position, and political ideology influence the different stages of research. This research process uses systematic and rigorous methods as well as genuine reflection on the part of the researcher to address any effects on the research results. While any fieldwork leaves a lot of fodder for reflection, in the interest of saving space the following section will highlight the key areas within which my identity and the research topic intersected.

The first step in reflexivity is acknowledging the various social categories I represent. I most frequently find myself carrying the labels of graduate student, white, middle class, Canadian, single, female, and evaluator. The latter designation, from my time at the International Development Research Center (IDRC), played a particularly important role in the research because of my familiarity with donor agencies’ processes and language. However, these labels were interchangeable, depending on the setting and with whom I was interacting. All these labels (and probably some I am not aware of) were present throughout the research process but intensified around different issues described below.
5.1 Studying Up, Down, and Sideways
In the case study, the participant group consisted of international development professionals, high-level government employees, and CSOs. While the participants may have come from a variety of cultural and linguistic backgrounds, they were well educated and articulate, knowledgeable about aid policies in Tanzania, and shared a common work ethic. They can be characterized as a community of practice that has formed around the aid policies in Tanzania. Wenger has stated, “communities of practice grow out of a convergent interplay of competence that involves mutual engagement” (2003: 80). This convergence includes the joint establishment of norms and relationships, and a shared repertoire of approaches, policies, and methods (Wenger, 2003). It often results in pre-established roles, language, tools, and styles that correlate with Western academic and professional traditions.

While I originally thought the study could be characterized as “studying up” or gathering data from a respondent group with higher professional and social status than myself, I soon found myself studying up, down, and sideways. In textbooks, these three terms are often distinguished by differences in social status between the researcher and respondents, with each term carrying its own set of challenges and benefits.

*Studying Down:* Traditionally, international development studies (IDS) has focused its research on poor or marginalized populations in less developed nations, which by and large have less status or power than researchers. This has sparked a number of concerns related to political, economic, cultural, and religious influence within the population; subtle abuses of power; safety concerns for respondents; representation within studies; ownership of the research; respondents providing data that is perceived as desirable or pleasing rather than accurate; and so on. The reforming of ethics procedures at the university level and a groundswell of academic literature has addressed these concerns to some extent. However, it is ultimately up to the researcher to be aware of the power dynamics and to use sound judgment.
**Studying Up:** IDS has also grown to include research on elite social groups and their relationship to poverty. Nader (1972) used the term “studying-up” to refer to researching populations with a higher social status than the researcher. In IDS, these studies have focused on donors, IFIs, Western governments, big business, and large NGOs. As groups with a higher status, the researcher relates to them within a different power dynamic. More care must be taken to gain access to the respondents, documents, and venues. At the same time, the researcher must make sure that undue influence does not compromise the integrity of the study.

**Studying Sideways:** A researcher can also find themselves studying sideways or across (Sheehan, 1993). In these cases, the researcher and respondents may share the same social and economic interests, cultural concerns, and professional traditions. This type of studying may present fewer obstacles in terms of access, understanding the research process, and communication. However, Holmes notes, “this creates a different kind of bias towards familiarity of shared concerns” (2008: 95).

During my field research I found that these three study directions were often intertwined. In a number of cases, my background as an evaluator for IDRC, age, education, and middle class Canadian identity created a situation in which I had shared experiences. In other cases, it was clear that I was studying up due to the respondent’s position, age, and credentials. In these cases, I did not find that there was an overt attempt to influence the study, but access and trust were constant challenges. In a few cases, trust developed over time, and I was eventually allowed to slip into more of an insider’s role. This required time and effort to build confidence, an awareness of protocols and procedures, and the ability to judge when it was the right time to ask difficult or awkward questions. There were strategic trade-offs in some instances.

I also found myself in a dynamic that falls within the realm of “studying down,” despite having fewer credentials than the respondent. As mentioned above, my physical
appearance fits the typical description of “a donor.”14 While some Tanzanian respondents had higher professional and educational status than I, nationality, race, and social capital sometimes overshadowed formal qualifications. This situation resulted in a few interviews where I had to change my approach by distancing myself from donors, showing additional respect and repeatedly identifying myself as a student. In one case, my request and the subsequent interview resulted in an adversarial dynamic. The respondent and his staff did not think that western researchers should have access to the Tanzanian government. They argued, and perhaps rightly so, that they would not have the same level of access in Western countries. I felt the dynamic was the result of a backlash against a post-colonial history still resonating in the north-south relationship.

These examples illustrate that even within a community of practice there are a number of hidden social, national, racial, gendered, classed, ageist, historical, and economic-political fissures embedded in the community. These lines of power create an obstacle course for researchers because the relationship between the researchers and their respondents is primarily composed of first impressions and assumptions about each other. If and when fissures become apparent, it is not until the interview is well underway. Prior knowledge and reflection on these types of dynamics can help the researcher assess and adapt strategies in the field. This is particularly important because the influence of these power dynamics can extend to issues of access, representation, and authenticity.

5.2 Access and Representation

As mentioned above, the intersection between the researcher and their research influences the type of access granted by respondents, which in turn influences how the various sub-groups and perspectives within the study are represented. My initial strategy was to seek interviews with CIDA, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the Government of Tanzania, and Tanzanian CSOs. Once on the ground, I combined the category for USAID and DFID under the heading of Bilateral and Multilateral Agencies other than CIDA.

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14 In Dar es Salaam people who work for the bilateral and multilateral agencies were often referred to as “a donor.” The designation was often associated with privileges.
also added two categories for the Dialogue Structure and Other (which included a business person and a consultant). The various experiences that occurred in terms of accessing and representing these organizations and individuals are discussed below.

**CIDA**: Access to CIDA varied over the span of the fieldwork. Initially, I was provided excellent assistance in being given interviews with respondents in Ottawa and use of the CIDA library, but I was not allowed to review any working or current documents. However, by the time I arrived in Tanzania, Canada was in the midst of another election and the public service was instructed not to meet with reporters or researchers until a new government was determined. Further, one of my key contacts within CIDA had just reviewed Barbara Heron’s (2007) book, *Desire for Development*. As a participant in Heron’s research, my contact had major concerns regarding confidentiality and the nature of that book’s conclusions. It was not until five weeks into my field research that the election was held and a high-ranking official symbolically granted me the first interview. After that, the number of interviews grew, but still only a few respondents were willing to provide me with current documents. The lack of access to up-to-date policy documents could have changed the direction of the research, but as described in Chapter 5, the lack of transparency and the high level of risk aversion among CIDA staff became findings in themselves.

**Multilateral and Bilateral Donors other than CIDA**: As mentioned above, one of the challenges of studying up is gaining access to busy professionals. It quickly became apparent that a graduate student from Canada was not on the priority list of other bilateral and multilateral donors. While I did not gain sufficient access to conduct a full comparison between the different donor agencies (USAID and DFID), I was able to obtain seven interviews in order to gain a wider perspective on aid effectiveness within the donor community. These respondents were reached in a variety of ways, including recommendations from the Canadian High Commission, networking at formal meetings and informal social venues, and a mixture of patience and persistence.
**Dialogue Process**: The initial interviews revealed another sub-group of respondents who were working directly in the Tanzanian dialogue process. Access was granted through recommendations from inside the Canadian High Commission and because the respondents felt that there was a genuine need to record the evolution of the Tanzanian dialogue process. They also provided me with a number of key documents regarding the ongoing organizational changes.

**Government of Tanzania**: Access to the Government of Tanzanian proved to be the most valuable and difficult to gain. Obstacles included a highly bureaucratic system, lack of trust, fears concerning job security, and being overburdened with Western requests, among others. It took some time to figure out where to go and who to contact within the government. In the end, it was a chance encounter in a café with an acquaintance that gave me access to some names and phone numbers, strictly off the record. After that, my cold calls were met with lengthy delays and requests for letters of support from the Canadian High Commission and my university. Eventually, I was granted some interviews, in the last few weeks of the fieldwork. Once the interviews were about to begin, the majority of these respondents refused to be recorded. While some provided me with official perspectives in answer to my queries, others were more critical, particularly concerning donors. The data from the four interviews were supplemented by several off-the-record conversations contained within the field notes as well as secondary sources. Generally speaking, however, efforts to obtain a “southern perspective” proved more difficult than anticipated.

**Tanzanian Civil Society**: The issue of access to Tanzanian civil society was not so much a matter of gaining permission as it was a matter of finding local, credible Tanzanian civil society representatives. The research tried to target CSOs that addressed national political issues, had some relationship with CIDA, and were based in Tanzania. However, given the sociopolitical history in Tanzania, fully homegrown CSOs are rare, and those that do exist tend to focus on service provision. I was only able to identify a few groups that were conducting policy analysis. From
among these, I was able to secure three official interviews, in addition to several side conversations with civil society activists. Unfortunately, they refused to sign consent forms or be recorded. This degree of caution is understandable, given the Tanzanian political climate in which the government often exercises its power to close civil society organizations and newspapers. In these cases, the best I could do was record their important points of analysis and insights in my field notes.

Despite the concentrated efforts made during the fieldwork, differential access to various groups affected their representation within the study. The data analysis must consider, weigh, and identify the strengths and limitations of representation in terms of the overall research direction and results. In the end, one has to work with the data that he/she has collected. Thus, within this research project the focus was on CIDA and the dialogue process in Tanzania. The data from the Tanzanian government is limited to their relationship with donors. The dynamics within the Tanzanian Government and its relationship to the governing political party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), still remains unexplored.

5.3 Authenticity of Data

Throughout the data gathering, analysis, and writing processes the data was constantly being interrogated and cross-referenced with other sources. Each piece of data needs to be examined with a healthy dose of skepticism in order to gauge its legitimacy, determine what it represents, and establish its significance in relation to the research questions. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, in one instance field notes regarding an overheard conversation were used to balance the more diplomatic opinions provided during the interviews. In another instance, one respondent contradicted her/himself in the interview. In the first half the respondent recited official policy, and then in the second half s/he relaxed and provided a more critical perspective. Both of these examples speak to Scott’s (1990) distinction between public and private transcripts, or what people are allowed to say in public versus what they are allowed to say among their colleagues. The challenge presented to the researcher is gauging the authenticity of the various sections of text and
distilling the more substantial elements. It is an intuitive process framed by the methods, multiple sources, an interrogation of the data, and an awareness of potential bias.

6.0 Ethical Considerations

Prior to the field research, an ethics proposal was submitted, in accordance with the TriCouncil Policy Statement *Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans*, to the Dalhousie Ethics Review Board. The approved plan contained a number of procedural and ethical considerations that guided the research process. However, two issues of interest emerged during the research process that are worthy of mention.

The first challenge was in regards to avoiding covert or misdirected research techniques. As noted above, my Western identity often opened doors but also led to misunderstandings. There were a number of cases where Tanzanian Government Officials, members of the media, and civil society activists thought I was representing a donor agency. Despite the temptation of obtaining insider information, I had to be very clear that I was in Tanzania as a researcher and did not in any way represent the Canadian Government nor could I speak on their behalf. I had not planned to do covert research nor did I want to risk the withdrawal of my access and support from the Canadian High Commission. Being forthright about my role with respondents and people I interacted with at various venues became a constant challenge considering how frequently it was assumed that I was “a donor.”

The second constant challenge was managing and minimizing the risk to participants. Overall, the research posed a minimal acceptable level of risk to participants for two reasons. First, the research did not focus on the participants *per se*, but the institutional processes in which they were engaged. As a result, only a minimal amount of personal information was gathered. Second, the participant group is not considered to be vulnerable or marginalized. They are development professionals who are well educated and have some familiarity with the research process. Thus, the participants were able to engage in the research from an informed and secure position. On the other hand, there was also a slight probability that some participants could risk harm to their professional
reputations. In this regard, there were concerns over expressing views contrary to their employers as well as the release of sensitive information. Political or media gaffes represent a risk to the participants’ career aspirations. In order to mitigate the potential risk, the research ensured a reasonable level of confidentiality for the respondents.

A reasonable level of confidentiality in a single case study design requires constant consideration and safeguards. The safeguards included:

- A series of procedures, such as consent forms, data storage protocols, assigning random respondent numbers, confidentiality forms for transcribers, and so on.
- During the consent process, the distinction between anonymity and confidentiality15 was highlighted.
- The interviews were conducted in person in a secure location whenever possible. However, the majority of interviews were held in a closed office or meeting room with glass walls and sign-in sheets. This could have led to the identification of the person who was being interviewed. Thus, among the CIDA respondents, a significant number of respondents (18) were interviewed, which should further obscure the particulars of individual respondents.
- Lastly and most importantly, during the writing and presentation phase every possible effort was made to structure the text and presentations in a manner that does not reveal the identities of participants.

7.0 Research Standards

In the past, research standards have been commonly defined by the positivist criteria set out within the scientific paradigm. However, there is growing recognition that evaluation criteria for research should be internally consistent with the epistemology of the study. In this regard, several authors, starting with Guba and Lincoln in 1985, have developed criteria for qualitative or interpretative research (Schwartz-Shea, 2006). However, the literature also shows that common ground between these emerging criteria has not yet

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15 Anonymity provides respondents with a guarantee that their identity will be kept secret, while confidentiality implies that measures will be take to ensure a level of privacy. Since anonymity is near impossible in a single case study, the respondents were only provided a degree of confidentiality.
been established. Schwartz-Shea (2006) conducted a meta-study of research criteria recommended in 26 commonly used textbooks. She found that the four criteria most often recommended are rich description, trustworthiness, reflexivity, and triangulation.

I therefore used these four criteria as standards. They provide a well-rounded set, which focuses on depth and richness of data, research process and procedures, the role of the researcher, and breadth of data. They are described below:

**Rich Description:** First used by Clifford Geertz in reference to ethnography, this criteria calls for the researcher to provide a thick and detailed account of the area of study. The rich description of context, documents, and conversations not only proves that the researcher was there but articulates the depth of evidentiary data accumulated during the study (Schwartz-Shea, 2006). The criterion of rich description is particularly relevant to this research. The case study design provided space for a rich and in-depth exploration of the aid effectiveness policies in Tanzania and at CIDA.

**Trustworthiness:** First used by Guba and Lincoln in 1985, the term was initially viewed as a replacement for the more positivist standards of reliability and validity. Trustworthiness signifies the systematic and transparent nature of the research process (Schwartz-Shea, 2006). As noted above, this chapter includes a list of tools such as the interview guide, consent form, literature maps, databases, field notes, and a codebook. These tools helped ensure the research process was methodical, thoughtful, and well documented.

**Reflexivity:** Once the study design recognizes that knowledge is socially constructed, the researcher and research process becomes part of the study itself. Reflexivity is required in four overlapping areas of the research process, including “contact with empirical material, awareness of the interpretive act, clarification of political-ideological contexts, and the handling of the question of representation and authority” (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000:238). Reflexivity in these areas demands awareness,
tacit knowledge, and constant questioning. Reflections or insights concerning the research and research process were recorded in the field notes.

Triangulation: The interpretative definition of triangulation allows for multiple forms of data sources, methods of access, researchers, and/or applied theories (Schwartz-Shea, 2006: 102). Instead of pinpoint accuracy on a fact or variable, it illustrates different aspects or interpretations of the same topic (Appleton and Booth, 2005). The different methods and data sources allow researchers to compare and contrast between data sets and create an enriched understanding of the various perspectives or interpretation of facts. In this regard, this research project used a variety of methods to understand the different interpretations and applications of aid effectiveness principles in Tanzania and CIDA.

8.0 Conclusion
The set of research questions posed at the beginning of this dissertation required exploratory research that emphasized both breadth and depth. The research question asks how aid effectiveness policies are modified as they move through the international development bureaucracy, what are the challenges and obstacles, and whether the transformational promises these policies hold are even possible to achieve. This required a theoretical framework that incorporates empirical, interpretative, and generative understandings of how aid policy is framed, understood, and applied. By mapping this complexity, the analysis could move forward with a more grounded and elegant analysis of the obstacles facing transnational policies. This required an interdisciplinary approach that utilizes multiple methods.

This research project arrived at its findings through a series of systematic and intuitive steps. First, the research took an interdisciplinary approach by blending constructivist and critical theory approaches in order to gain a greater understanding of how aid effectiveness policies are being interpreted and applied at CIDA and in Tanzania. Second, data gathering methods included policy review, literature review, interviews, qualitative observation, a focus group, and extensive field notes. The subsequent transcripts and
summaries were uploaded into a database for coding. Then, reflecting the dual nature of the research, the coding and analysis used a two-pronged strategy in which a descriptive case study was developed from the respondents’ perspectives while discourse analysis was also used to understand the parameters of aid effectiveness. Throughout the process, steps were taken to ensure the integrity of the study. These included instituting a systematic and detailed approach to the methods and analysis, maintaining an awareness of ethical considerations, and reflecting on the researcher/research dynamic. The characteristics of rich description, trustworthiness, reflexivity, and triangulation are the basis for the research findings discussed in the following chapters.
CHAPTER FOUR: DEFINING AID EFFECTIVENESS

1.0 Introduction
In an early observation concerning aid effectiveness, a workshop participant noted, “No one will say that they are opposed to greater aid effectiveness. The real challenge is to give meaning to the term” (Foreign Ministry of Japan, 1993: 71). Ten years after the above statement was made, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) provided an official definition, enshrined in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. This chapter sets the stage for the case study by providing an overview of how aid effectiveness was officially defined, how it spread through the international development field, and the different interpretations it now carries.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the version of governmentality employed in this dissertation uses both genealogical (horizontal) and archeological (vertical) methods to understand how power operates in the international development bureaucracy. In particular, this next chapter focuses on the genealogical method that is more frequently used in the development literature. This method traces how power congeals within international development discourse, providing an overview of how aid effectiveness policies form and spread throughout the global development bureaucracy as a discursive practice. In this way, Chapter 4 sets the stage for the archeological excavation of regulative forms of power found in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.

2.0 Everything Old is New Again
The core principles of aid effectiveness circulated through the development literature long before the concept’s recent popularity. Initiatives to increase harmonization or donor coordination, for example, can be dated back to 1958 when the Indian Consortium was formed to address a crisis in exchange holdings (Barry, 1988). Since then, three multilateral organizations have steadily increased their use of donor coordination mechanisms. The World Bank developed consultative groups to address macroeconomic issues in individual recipient countries. These groups generally gathered in Western city centers and their meetings included a donor pledging process. The United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) often hosted roundtables or donor meetings around special issues. Less frequently, the OECD DAC organized development assistance groups for particular countries (Barry, 1988). In addition to this, there were compacts, debt rescheduling clubs, donor conferences, the Nordic+, and less formal “like-minded groups.”

In 1969, the Pearson Commission’s report noted, “The international aid system today, with its profusion of bilateral and multilateral agencies, lacks direction and coherence. A serious effort is necessary to coordinate the efforts of multilateral and bilateral aid-givers and those of aid-receivers” (Pearson, 1969: 83). The report goes on to recommend the formation of country level groups with the mandate to disburse aid and conduct annual reviews. The World Bank volunteered to lead the country level groups; however, other donors and recipients had concerns about the World Bank’s involvement, and this inevitably stalled the process (Barry, 1988). Nevertheless, the call for coordination reemerged again and again in official documents and reports issued throughout the second half of the twentieth century. A historical sampling of the grey literature (organizational reports, working papers, and other semi-published material) shows the use of remarkably similar language from decade to decade. Frequently used terms and concepts include donor coordination, policy dialogue, comparative advantage of donors, division of labor, coherency, sector approaches, strengthening economic management or government capacity, country aid groups, policy coherence, and scaling-up.

While country ownership is also mentioned in the literature, its definition underwent a significant change. The concept of country ownership in the literature prior to the 1980s mainly corresponded with post-colonial arguments for independence. It was generally understood as the recipient countries’ control over economic and development agendas within their borders. This rigorous interpretation was common in alternative development literature and post-colonial discussions associated with the independence movements of the 1950s and 1960s, the Non-Aligned Movement starting in 1954, the Arusha

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16 The Nordic+ countries are a group of donors that include the Nordic countries plus Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
Declaration (1967), and the struggle against Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in the 1980s. It then reappears in the discussion around the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) in 2001. Nuno Castel-Branco describes the definition as “From an African Renaissance point of view, ownership guarantees authenticity and signals a change from external influence to genuine African ideas and approaches to African development challenges” (2008, 10). However, this inspirational definition was blurred as the term became more popular.

From a donor-centered perspective, ownership was linked to generating buy-in for good governance and neoliberal economic policies. In an early workshop on aid effectiveness in Japan, one participant noted that aid is ineffective because of “the lack of recipient ownership and commitment towards aid activities” (Foreign Ministry of Japan, 1993: 48). In 1995, the World Bank stated, “Ownership is shorthand for the degree of intellectual conviction behind a program and the extent to which the impetus for a program or projects has come from the recipient country rather than from abroad” (World Bank, 1995: 9). The contradictions among the recipients concerning their commitment to good policy, who defines good policy, and where it comes from, is prevalent throughout the organizational or grey literature on ownership and speaks to an underlying paternalism in international development bureaucracy. For example, the 1993 Helleiner Report on the relationship between the Government of Tanzanian and its donor partners strongly supported the concept of recipient ownership, while still setting conditions with the idea that, for instance, “taking ownership seriously entails donors willingness to withhold or delay aid until the local conditions necessary for ownership are satisfied” (Helleiner et al., 1993: 19). As is discussed in Chapters 7, these contradictions have persisted in the Paris Declaration, and particularly the Accra Agenda for Action, which states, “We will continue to change the nature of conditionality to support ownership” (OECD, 2008b: 6).

The OECD DAC website recognizes the historical roots of the aid effectiveness principles in a 2010 statement: “Interest in the effectiveness of development cooperation is not new. What is new is the broad international consensus—embodied in the Paris Declaration—on what needs to be done to produce the results needed” (OECD, 2010). In
this sense the “new” aspect of aid effectiveness is the combination of standard management techniques with the concept of ownership. This set of principles has been packaged, disseminated, and applied at the global level. The above statement raises important questions regarding the changes in the global context that created the space for a discussion on aid effectiveness and how these changes came about.

3.0 Shifting Sands

It was not until the mid-1990s that the development context changed in ways that made room for its current focus on aid effectiveness. The major changes in the development context occurred through international politics, policy-based lending, fragmentation of aid, shifts in global monetary flows, and an onslaught of critiques of the development industry. The shifts also created space for a more public acknowledgement of the repeated challenges put forth by recipient countries that often quietly negotiate or openly demand reforms within the international development bureaucracy. Each of these shifts is described below.

a. International Politics: In the last twenty years, the end of the Cold War and the rise of the US War on Terror has changed the direction of international politics and, correspondingly, of international development.17 During this period we have seen the expansion and further entrenchment of neo-liberalism and, consequently, the rise of a narrative that argues that an open market economy is the basis for development. These shifts have also changed the way aid is distributed. Instead of falling along the lines of East/West allegiances, other considerations for the allocation of aid have greater prominence, such as economic interests, historical ties, and issues of security. For the recipient countries, there has been an increasing emphasis on good governance, poverty eradication, and adopting a neoliberal approach.

17 It is important to note that this generalization is in reference to the mainstream development text. It should be recognized that there are examples that resist the neoliberal narrative. The Asian Tigers, China, and the more or less socialist economies in Latin America are examples that call into question how and to what extent an open market is tied to development.
b. Policy-based Lending: The SAPs of the 1980s marked the beginning of policy-based lending. Due to a combination of the Washington Consensus and the tarnished reputation of recipient governments, it became acceptable for IFIs to intervene in the macroeconomic policies of sovereign nations. In fact, the majority of donors followed the IFIs’ lead by instituting their own set of policy conditionalities (Brock et al., 2001).

c. The Fragmentation of Aid: Since the 1990s there has been a steady increase in the number of players within the international development field. O’Keefe states that, “The average number of donors per recipient country rose from about 12 in the 1960s to about 33 in the 2001-2005 period” (O’Keefe, 2007: 1). This includes a number of new donors such as Brazil, China, South Korea, Turkey, India, Russia, and Mexico. Furthermore, the last 40 years has seen the ongoing expansion of the number of private or non-governmental organizations operating in the international development field and an increasing amount of funds administered. Edwards summarizes some of the more reliable estimates regarding aid flows when he notes that:

Globally, Northern NGOs contribute some $14.7 billion in foreign aid in 2005, or 14% of the total Official Development Assistance (ODA), up from 5% in 2001 and 2.5% in 1990. This figure rises to 18% if one excludes debt cancellation, and 30% if one include “all NGOs aid-funded activities” including aid to and from Southern NGOs and funds channeled through all NGOs by donor governments. (Edwards, 2003: 238)

A large portion of these growing numbers can be attributed to very sizable organizations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Millennium Challenge Funds, and the Global Health Fund. There are concerns that the fragmentation of aid is exacerbating issues of confusion, competition, and redundancy within the field.

d. Aid Flows: There have been substantial changes in the size and number of financial flows. While falling far short of the Pearson Commission’s ideal 0.7% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Pearson, 1969), the size of bilateral aid flows has steadily increased in recent decades. Total official development assistance (ODA) in 2011 prices (USD millions) rose from 4 675.67 in 1960 to 30 265.37 in 1985, reaching 136 104.59 in 2009
Philanthropic organizations contributed an estimated USD 3.5 billion per year to developing countries between 2000 and 2006 (Korsgard and Larsen, 2008). Understandably, the growing amount of aid dollars is often used to illustrate a need to enhance aid effectiveness through the more efficient use of said dollars. From a broader perspective, however, Korsgard and Larsen’s (2008) analysis of OECD and World Bank data demonstrated that ODA only represents a portion of total financial flows to developing countries. They found that private citizens remitting or transferring funds to families in developing nations contribute 39%, or the largest single flow, between 2000 and 2006. While numbers are hard to gauge at this level, the World Bank estimates that remittances fell somewhere between 350 to 650 billion dollars in 2008 (Shah, 2010). Of course, all of these figures are dwarfed by trade estimates that are measured in trillions.

e. Critiques of the International Development Bureaucracy: International development has withstood various exegeses in its long history, but by the 1990s academic critiques and negative media coverage of the industry had intensified. While there is not sufficient room in this dissertation for a full exploration, it is important to recognize the three different categories of critiques:

i. Mismanagement: One of the most frequent critiques of development practice focuses on the chaotic and uncoordinated nature of international aid. Common scenarios include: organizations implementing duplicate and competing programs and projects; field workers rewriting documents to meet different reporting requirements; one-off signature projects; and recipient countries receiving an excessive number of foreign missions. The media and development literature have explored these various issues in a series of well-publicized books written by, for instance, Hancock (1989), Cassen (1994), and George (1994).

ii. Alternative Development: Another set of critiques focuses on marginalized groups displaced by or suffering from the ill effects of large scale aid projects. Critics note

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18 The term signature project is frequently used in the development community to refer to projects that can be used to promote the profile and reputation of the donor agency and/or donor government. For example, wells, school, and hospitals often exhibit donor names to provide a quick reference for development results.
the mal-development of corrupt governments, conflicts of interest between businesses and aid organizations, ill-suited project designs, etc. Authors such as Freire (1970) and Chambers (1993) differ in their methods, but they both propose a form of people-led development that focuses on justice, human rights, and emphasizes the importance of local participation and citizen involvement in development projects and plans.

iii. Post-Development: As described in Chapter 2, this set of critiques uses Foucauldian analysis to trace the lines of power hidden within international development discourse. These critiques focus on how aid is an instrument for extending the power and influence of the global elite and rendering populations “governable.” Authors such as Escobar (1995), Ferguson (1993), and Li (2007) argue that the development industry is merely an extension of neoliberal Western hegemony.

In many circles aid effectiveness is seen as a reform process designed to address at least some of these criticisms. However, it is interesting to note that of the five aid effectiveness principles, only the principle of ownership addresses issues related to power imbalances embedded in the international development system, and this is only true if ownership is understood to mean genuine recipient control rather than as a euphemism for the commitment of recipient governments to donor policies. The other four aid effectiveness principles (harmonization, alignment, result-based management, and mutual accountability) are designed to provide technical support for ownership and to address critiques stemming from mismanagement. As seen in Chapter 6, ownership was originally associated with the alternative development literature and the argument for more country-led and people-led development. However, more recently the meaning of ownership has been reinterpreted to mean a commitment to good governance and neoliberal reforms.

None of the aid effectiveness principles address post-development critiques in terms of the invisible and hidden forms of power. Within development practice, these critiques are
often brushed aside as unpractical, if not impossible to address. However, Chapter 2’s discussion of critical alternative development argues that acknowledging, analyzing, and establishing a genuine dialogue surrounding these invisible and hidden forms of power can help address the deep-rooted discursive regimes that shape the power dynamics within the donor partner-recipient government relationship. This is particularly relevant to the success of transnational policy initiatives, such as aid effectiveness, and the possibilities for change discussed in Chapter 8.

Given the above configuration, aid effectiveness remains largely a managerial rather than a substantive response to criticisms of the development bureaucracy. The distinction between managerial or technical solutions versus substantive change in the power dynamics of aid delivery will reemerge again and again throughout the dissertation. This raises a number of theoretical questions: Do managerial reform programs offering only technical solutions lead to long-term change? Alternatively, as the post-development scholar would propose, are the technical solutions designed to tame or block change? Or, from a more moderate perspective, do these technical solutions represent one component in a larger process moving towards reform? These questions are addressed in Chapter 8.

4.0 The New Aid Architecture in an Era of High Managerialism

The above shifts in the international development field opened the policy arena for the reconfiguration of aid into a rational framework based on a coherent and streamlined architecture. O’Keefe (2007) describes this framework as a “consensus model” that separates the aid bureaucracy into four managerial tiers. The first two tiers include institutional commitments at the international level, while the third and fourth tiers include aid delivery at the recipient country level. The top tier contains internationally backed agreements on financing aid and targets laid out in forums such as the Doha Round, the Monterrey Consensus, and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The third and fourth tiers flow from the MDGs and goal eight in particular, which aims to: “Develop a global partnership for development to increase effectiveness” (UNDP, 2010). In reaching this goal, the OECD DAC Working Group on Aid Effectiveness blazed a trail
for the Rome, Paris, and Accra High-Level Forums with a series of aid effectiveness declarations described in the next section.

The third and fourth tiers represent the donors and recipient governments at the country level. The third tier calls for donor partner groups to work together on joint efforts such as sector-wide approaches, general budget support, and a division of labor. The fourth tier calls for the establishment of country-owned plans and priorities. In aid effectiveness, the path to ownership involves strengthening government and employing Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and Performance Assessment Frameworks (PAFs). These last two tiers highlight the dynamic and sometimes contentious space between donor coordination and country ownership.

Mosse (2005) argues that the new aid architecture has four largely unquestioned characteristics. First, the architecture is built on a foundation of neoliberalism and institutionalism. Second, the management reform agenda extends to all facets of governance (ranging from economics to public administration), corporate responsibilities, and civil society. Third, following the UN Millennium Summit (2000), the UN set out eight MDGs. The MDGs are a set of goals and indicators that member countries and associated organizations will strive to meet by 2015. As a set they present the very narrow and highly technical definition of poverty reduction based on common development archetypes set in a neoliberal context. Finally, there is a shift away from risky and intensive on-the-ground projects towards an emphasis on scaling up and policy dialogue (Mosse, 2005). These critiques are aimed less at the management process and more towards the generative practices that produce the current international development text.

Quarles van Ufford (2003) adds to Mosse’s critique by dubbing this an “era of high managerialism.” Within this category, he describes the dominant development discourse

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19 The eight Millennium Development Goals (MDG) are: Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education; Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women; Goal 4: Reduce child mortality rates; Goal 5: Improve maternal health; Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability; and, Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development.
as moving from a “must do” to a “can do” approach, from the logic of appropriateness to one of consequences or results, from narrowly to broadly defined methods, and from broadly to narrowly defined goals. More specifically, he argues that the entrenchment of modern managerial practices and technical language distracts from a more nuanced, ethical, and hope-driven mode of development.

This review shows that the literature, including the aid architecture and aid effectiveness policies, overwhelmingly focuses on specific technical and managerial frameworks. The discussion is framed by expert knowledge and quantifiable data that have practical (as oppose to political) applications. It contains a certain rationale or set of arguments within which only certain things can be said or done (Escobar, 1995). The following section will outline a set of rationales commonly found in the aid effectiveness literature.

5.0 The Frame

Changes in the global context have accentuated difficulties within the development industry and have given rise to the aid effectiveness problematique. As discussed in Chapter 2, the ways in which problems are defined can render only certain solutions possible, often transforming political issues into technical applications. This review of aid effectiveness literature and the research data found a common rationale. Five key arguments were identified as making up the problematique framing aid effectiveness discourse.

The first argument picks up on the mismanagement critiques, asserting that the current aid system is crippled by administrative mismanagement, bureaucratic deficiencies, government corruption, and a distrustful relationship between donors and recipient governments. As mentioned above, this argument includes the management critiques and more or less excludes the alternative and post-development critiques.

The mismanagement narrative is also the basis for the second argument, which states that donors are effectively drawing down the already weakened capacity of the public service in recipient countries. Donor demands for different types of reports, missions, and
conditions have created a heavy burden on underfunded and overstretched recipient bureaucracies. This wastes resources and distracts officials from their work.

The third argument takes a more conceptual approach by stating that donors who bypass national governments and disburse aid through their own administrative systems are unwittingly undermining good governance. The governance of society, including the provision of services, is an integral part of the contract between a government and its citizens. When donors insert themselves into the contract they obscure the government’s legitimacy and the citizens’ ability to hold their government accountable (van de Walle, 2005). One of the stated aims of aid effectiveness policies is to reduce donor interference and to encourage recipient governments to play a larger role in administering development programs and projects.

The rationale behind the fourth argument is that development policy failures are due to a lack of commitment or ownership by recipient governments. As mentioned earlier, the advent of policy-based lending in the 1990s forced a number of recipient countries, including Tanzania, to adopt neoliberal economic policies. In many instances, the policies were met with quiet resistance in the recipient countries and could not be implemented either due to extenuating circumstances or a lack of capacity within the recipient government. Further, in some cases the policies were implemented but did not achieve their stated objectives. However, the grey literature focused solely on the lack of uptake of certain policy conditions, emphasizing the lack of commitment and ownership on the part of recipient governments (Cramer, 2006).

With the problem framed thus, the aid effectiveness literature prescribes a combination of democratic governance, new public management techniques, donor coordination, multiparty elections, and neoliberal economic policies. Within the problematique, these options represent the only rational solutions. As will be made clear in the next section,

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20 This dissertation builds on Mosse (2005) assertion that the current aid architecture is rooted in Neoliberalism. Harvey (2005) describes neoliberalism as a hegemonic discourse that frames current political and economic thought. It is in favour of “strong individual private poverty rights, the rule of law, and the institutions of freely functioning markets and free trade” (Harvey 2005: 65).
the emphasis on highly technical management techniques sets the stage for the refinement of aid effectiveness policies.

6.0 The International Consensus on Aid Effectiveness

Within the international sphere, the OECD DAC has led the way in forming the new aid architecture and promoting aid effectiveness. The initial concepts for the MDGs and the Paris Declaration were laid out in the OECD DAC document, “Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation,” published in May of 1996. The organization went on to establish an Ad Hoc Task Force on Aid Effectiveness in 1998, which later became the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and Donor Practices (WP-EFF) in 2003 (Lalonde, 2009). Armed with goal eight of the MDGs (“Develop a global partnership for development to increase effectiveness” (UNDP, 2010)), the WP-EFF employed a range of strategies, such as knowledge creation, reviews, and high-level forums to capture international attention. The High-level Forums in Rome, Paris, and Accra became milestones in the establishment of an official definition of aid effectiveness.

The Rome Declaration on Harmonization (2003)

The Rome Declaration on Harmonization built on international momentum and commitments made in the Monterrey Consensus (2002) and the MDGs (2000). These agreements provided a platform for the OECD DAC to host three preparatory regional workshops (in Jamaica, Vietnam, and Ethiopia) before bringing together representatives from 28 aid recipient countries and 40 multilateral and bilateral institutions in Rome on the 24th and 25th of February 2003 (OECD, 2003).

The agreements reached centered on three headings. First, under “Improvements in Development Effectiveness,” the representatives in Rome committed to addressing the problem of multiple donor demands, placing an inordinate burden on recipient countries. They noted that they would use a “country-based approach that emphasizes country ownership and government leadership” (OECD DAC 2003: 1). Under “Good Practice Standards or Principles,” the group simply endorsed the current initiatives by the
Multilateral Banks, the OECD DAC Task Force, and technical groups. Furthermore, the Rome declaration set up the expectation that the UN would lead the country-level donor groups. The “Going Forward” section provided more extensive technical advice on harmonization. This advice ranged from aligning with country priorities as set out in the PRSPs, by promoting budgetary support and delegating cooperation at the country level, to the promotion of good practices throughout the development community. This includes generating and disseminating analytical work (OECD, 2003). Overall, the Rome Declaration focused primarily on donor coordination and country ownership.

The Declaration also emphasized the promotion of aid effectiveness concepts. Under the heading of “Next Steps,” the declaration states, “We will utilize and strengthen, including through partner country participation, existing mechanisms to maintain peer pressure for implementing our agreements on harmonization” (OECD DAC 2003: 1). Peer pressure was employed to promote aid effectiveness as a common sense practice in international discourse.

*The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005)*

Somewhere between the Rome and Paris High-level Forums, the official understanding of aid effectiveness began to take shape. The journey involved a series of technical working groups and international roundtables on topics ranging from implementing current commitments to managing for development results. Additionally, a series of policy experiments took place in the field. In Tanzania, the results of the Helleiner Report (Helleiner *et al.*, 1995) were beginning to shape country aid coordination. In Bangladesh, 11 donors created a sector-wide approach to health promotion in 2003. In Canada, CIDA developed a series of projects in order to experiment with new aid modalities. One project in particular, *Pro-Mesas*, established a series of multi-stakeholder, sector-level roundtables to coordinate donor activity in Honduras in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch. The same need for coordination was also apparent in relief efforts for the 2004 South Asian tsunami. These examples fed into preparations for the Paris High-level Forum, allowing for a more robust and action-oriented version of aid effectiveness.

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21 CIDA refers to the initiative as the 3-B project, named after the project’s placement on a meeting agenda.
Between February 28th and March 2nd of 2005, representatives from over ninety countries, multilateral and bilateral development institutions, and CSOs met in Paris to debate this supranational policy framework. As outlined in Table 2, the core principles were expanded from the emphasis on ownership and harmonization present in the Rome Declaration to include alignment, managing for results, and mutual accountability. The declaration also contains concrete actions, targets, and a monitoring system with 12 indicators and baseline data (OECD, 2005). The underlying rationale was that the reforms would lead to “building stronger, more effective partnerships to enable partner countries to achieve their development goals.” (OECD 2008b: 11).

### Table 2: The Aid Effectiveness Principles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td>Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies and strategies, and coordinate development actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alignment</td>
<td>Donors base their support on partner countries’ national development strategies, institutions, and procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmonization</td>
<td>Donors’ actions are more harmonized, transparent, and collectively effective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing for Results</td>
<td>Donors and partners manage resources and improve decision-making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual Accountability</td>
<td>Donors and partners are accountable for development results.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source OECD, 2005: 3)

The responsibility for these commitments was split between donors and partner or recipient countries. On one side, donors are generally expected to work with each other and to align their programming and procedures with partner countries’ priorities. This includes an increased emphasis on GBS and basket funding. On the other side, partner countries are generally expected to strengthen public financial management, and establish development plans and priorities (OECD, 2005).

The policy model depicted in Figure 5: The Aid Effectiveness Pyramid illustrates the ideal aid delivery system. The model places country ownership at the top of the system, with recipient countries setting development priorities and procedures. Then donor organizations align their aid disbursements with the stated needs of the recipient country.
and use the country’s administration systems whenever possible. This translates into harmonizing aid delivery through common arrangements, streamlined procedures, and information sharing. The model is held together conceptually by managing for results and mutual accountability.

The international consensus embodied in the Paris Declaration is not without its detractors. Brian Tomlinson of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC), who attended the High-level Forum, recalled that a number of NGOs and countries had reservations in signing the final document. In particular, the US almost walked out of the Paris High-level Forum because they had concerns about whether they could fulfill the policy commitments. In a last minute effort to salvage the talks, the officials adjourned the meeting and attendees were simply listed as participants. Thus, it could be said that the international consensus on aid effectiveness is built around a declaration that no one actually signed (Tomlinson, 2006).
Even without signatories, the Paris Declaration represents a turning point in international aid. Aid effectiveness was solidified and entered into the international development bureaucracy as conventional wisdom. The development machinery was set in full motion as efforts surrounding aid effectiveness expanded. The WP-EFF created a number of corollary committees or venture groups to address specific issues that came up during the Paris High-level Forum. A series of global surveys and evaluations were commissioned to assess the extent and success of the new policies.

*Accra Agenda For Action (2008)*

As interest in aid effectiveness grew, so did the excitement and preparation leading up to the Accra High-level Forum. The OECD DAC (2010) website refers to the Accra Agenda for Action as an “acceleration of Paris.” Preparation involved a series a country and regional workshops, the 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, and the meeting of numerous joint venture groups. In addition, a parallel process was initiated by CSOs, creating the Advisory Group for Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness (AG-CS), establishing an internet-based clearinghouse, and conducting six regional and international conferences. This increased interest also led to a high level of donor country involvement, including the involvement of a number of foreign ministers.22 This resulted in an expanded schedule in Accra, with a “marketplace for ideas” and eight roundtable meetings, as well as the ministerial-level meetings (OECD, 2008b). Furthermore, CSOs hosted a parallel conference nearby for those who were not on the Accra invitation list. These events attracted media coverage from around the world, with BBC Africa hosting special broadcasts from the event.

The discussions in the official market places and roundtables of Accra were based on the 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration. It contains 55 country studies, representing one half of aid delivery, and employs the 12 indicators and 21 targets established in Paris. The survey’s main finding was that “progress is being made, but not fast enough.” At their current pace the donors and recipient countries would not reach

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22 In Canada, Minister Beverly Oda had initially planned to attend but had to cancel due to unforeseen circumstances.
their 2010 targets. The survey’s recommendations highlight ownership, accountability, and building stronger partnerships. These recommendations are included in the Accra Agenda for Action (OECD, 2008c).

The central purpose of the Accra High-level Forum was to assess progress and refine the Paris Declaration. In doing so, the Accra meeting echoed the three main recommendations in the 2008 Survey. First, it focused on “Strengthening Country Ownership over Development” by broadening policy dialogue to include civil society and by strengthening the capacity of recipient governments. This includes demand-driven technical assistance, strengthening government financial systems, and setting plans and priorities. Second, the Accra Agenda for Action focused on “Building More Effective and Inclusive Partnerships for Development.” This deepening engagement includes working with all partners, including civil society, global funds, and south-south partnerships. It also targets aid fragmentation by endorsing donor coordination through the division of labour, untying aid, and common procurement. Third, the Accra Agenda for Action recommitted to “Delivering and Accounting for Development Results” through results-based management frameworks, administrative incentives, and transparency for parliaments and the public. This section also includes the recommendation that donors be accountable for disbursements or aid predictability. Like the Paris Declaration before it, the agreement concludes by committing to “continue high level support, peer pressure, and co-coordinated action at global, regional and country levels” (OECD, 2008c: 7).

While the agenda contained no surprises, the real stories in Accra were about civil society and the financial crisis. CSOs advocated for a place at the table as they wished to influence the agenda and to discuss their own role in aid effectiveness. As seen in the final draft of the Accra Agenda, they were able to successfully argue that civil society should be included in the new aid architecture, aiding in harmonization efforts and participating in country-level dialogue. However, attempts to influence the discussion or definitions of aid effectiveness in the official venues failed to take hold.
Leading up to the meeting, Tomlinson’s synthesis report on the AG-CS regional consultation process on aid effectiveness found that CSOs share a number of concerns related to the gap between aid effectiveness principles and field-level realities, as well as the criticism that the Paris Declaration is gender blind. Overall, the report states:

…CSOs said they broadly supported the principles of the Paris Declaration, but were critical of limitations in the commitments by donors and governments and the terms and processes for measuring their success. Commitments were seen to be too focused on implementing and measuring mechanisms for managing the delivery of aid. Most participating CSOs, while not ignoring the importance of improving aid delivery, thought that the effectiveness of these aid reforms should be measured primarily in terms of their explicit contribution to development effectiveness… From this perspective aid delivery is only effective if it is truly an instrument for realizing justice and human rights, characterized by conditions which permit free human development of person and communities. (AG-CS, 2008: 3)

The CSOs that gained a seat at the table were not able to refocus the discussions on gender, rights-based approaches, and “development effectiveness” instead of “aid effectiveness.” According to one respondent attending the High-level Forum, these types of discussions were more apt to occur behind close doors or in the CSO-sponsored parallel conference held nearby. In the end, the CSOs’ issues were overshadowed by technical discussions and concerns related to the 2008 economic downturn.

The discussions in Accra occurred while the world was in the initial throes of the 2008 global financial crisis. While the impacts had not yet hit recipient countries, the fear was that the economic crisis would eventually ripple through them as well. Discussions stressed the responsibility of Western donors to maintain their commitments to increase aid and for recipient countries to develop contingency plans. This backdrop merely served to strengthen the main aid effectiveness argument for a more coordinated and efficient use of aid dollars rather than focusing attention on the issue of development effectiveness.
7.0 Interpreting Policies

The discussions in the High-level Forums occurred on a global scale. While the broad language of the international agreements garnered a lot of rhetorical support for aid effectiveness, the definitions do not carry the same interpretation for everyone, nor do they carry the same level of commitment. In the end, it is up to practitioners to translate and implement aid effectiveness policies. Mosse (2004) found that development practitioners were constantly negotiating multiple versions of the same policy. This was confirmed in the Tanzania case study, as discussed in Chapter 6, where it was found that the power dynamics within multiple policy spaces as well as the larger societal and organizational regimes shape the interpretation of policies such as ownership. As a result, many individuals and organizations use different definitions, thereby increasing complexity at the field level.

The different interpretations of aid effectiveness in the case study are separated into four groups and the assorted perspectives of civil society, the dialogue process, donors, and recipient governments. There is a great deal of fluidity in terms of memberships and who participates in local, national, and global meetings. While the case study presented in the following chapters provides a greater understanding of the nuances within these groups, the next section makes some general distinctions in order to illustrate the different definitional struggles over aid effectiveness and set the stage for the case study.

7.1 Civil Society Organizations

Like CSOs themselves, the interpretation of aid effectiveness among this category of actors is diverse and depends on how organizations interact with governments and donors, as well as their raison d’être. Development concepts often spread along funding lines, or trickle down as practitioners adjust the terminology in proposals to match the latest trends. Divergent understandings of the terms range widely from those who are unaware of the declarations, to those who implement the policies, to those who are cynical or hold unfavorable opinions about aid effectiveness policies.
At a basic level of analysis, most CSOs identify with the assertion that donors place a heavy reporting and administrative burden on recipients, and that this could be reduced through pooled funds, joint reporting, and the alignment of policies and procedures. For example, a group of donors in Tanzania formed the Foundation for Civil Society to pool and distribute funding for local CSOs. This reduces the paperwork for local groups and concentrates a greater portion of funds in Tanzanian CSOs—bypassing international civil society or Western-based implementing agencies. There are also concerns that this concentrates and/or homogenizes funding. The majority of donors, however, still offer grants directly from embassies/high commissions.

Within international civil society, four approaches seem to be emerging. First, members of the Civil Society Working Group on Aid Effectiveness have fought to be included in aid effectiveness conversations. Their analytical work and advocacy at the High-level Forums aim to democratize the process of aid disbursement at the international and national levels. Second, a subset of these documents outline strategies and best practices for improving aid effectiveness among civil society organizations. Third, CSOs have launched a series of challenges and critiques. As mentioned earlier, a number of CSOs sought to make the distinction between aid effectiveness—focused on the technical and quantitative side of international aid delivery—and development effectiveness—focused on the substantive and qualitative effects of development activities on the ground (AG-CS, 2008).

And fourth, a large portion of CSOs are not involved in the debate whether because they are excluded, are unaware of national and international aid discussions, or they have become cynical and disengaged as a result of their exposure to the process. One CSO participant noted, “I spent four years of my time heavily engaged in this only to come to conclude that it’s a waste of time. One can spend much more productive time elsewhere” (32: 09). 23 He further explained that many CSOs were invited to the table as a form of tokenism, and it is more effective to spend time on providing services and engaging in politics within the recipient country.

23 This coding indicates the document and paragraph numbers of the quote in the AtlasTi database.
7.2 Dialogue Process

Given that the sole purpose of the dialogue structure is to implement aid effectiveness at the recipient country level, it is not surprising that it utilizes an interpretation of aid effectiveness that closely resembles the international declarations. On the one hand, country ownership is expressed through the establishment of PRSPs that contain clear plans and priorities with a promise to strengthen governance and public administrative systems. On the other hand, donor partners are making efforts to coordinate aid in support of harmonization. They are also being encouraged to align aid with government system through aid modalities such as General Budget Support (GBS). This shift includes a heavier emphasis on accounting for external finances in the national budget, often referred to as “putting aid on budget.”

While there is an emphasis on all five Paris principles in these processes, implementation tends to focus on initial, easily achievable tasks. Donor coordination, in terms of the formalization thereof and increased participation in the DPG, mission calendars, joint reporting and analytical work, and a deeper engagement in national-level policy discussions are often regarded as achievable first steps. However, some sectors involve more compromises than others. For example, in Tanzania the education sector has only a few donor partners, and was able to easily move forward with joint reporting and delegated authority. The health sector, on the other hand, has a large number of donors providing significant dollars, and thus it faces considerable difficulties in harmonizing and aligning. Consequently, the path of least resistance helps shape how aid effectiveness policies are operationalized in the field, as is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

It is also important to note that the dialogue process is still evolving. As discussed in Chapter 6, the dialogue process in Tanzania is a fluid, complex system driven by volunteer participation and peer pressure. Although terms of reference were created for some groups, new forums and committees often emerge or fade as different groups jockey for position. In this sense, practitioners are still working on the appropriate
organizational design for in-country policy dialogue between donor partners and recipient countries.

7.3 Donor Partners
While all the OECD donors officially support the five principles described in the Paris Declaration, their ability/willingness to implement these policies differs widely. The varying degrees of participation range from mere observation and coordination of projects to full support through funds and human resources. For example, in Tanzania USAID is heavily involved in the DPG—in terms of the coordination of projects—but cannot align its reporting mechanisms, pool its funds or contribute to GBS without special approval from Congress. On the other end of the spectrum, DFID is fully committed to pooled funds, GBS, and aligning reporting mechanisms. In fact, up to 80% of British aid to Tanzania was disbursed through GBS in 2008. Canada sits somewhere in the low to middle-range of donor coordination, close behind the Nordic+ countries.

Within the rubric of aid effectiveness, the main emphases are on donor coordination through the DPG, sector working groups, and pooled funds. There is a concerted effort to engage in country-level policy dialogue with “one voice.” This requires a great deal of time and negotiation among donor partners and has become the primary focus of aid effectiveness discussions in Tanzania. It has also called harmonization into question and whether the process is actually resulting in a reduction of aid transaction costs or is merely shifting these transaction costs from recipient countries to donor partners.

Within the donor community, alignment is interpreted as improving the governance and public administration systems of recipient countries without necessarily using them. The donors are concerned with their own ability to report back to their respective governments, and the capacity of recipient governments to manage for results and eliminate corruption. This dynamic requires a great amount of trust between the donor partners and the recipient government to administer each other’s funds appropriately. In many ways, this adds to the pressure on donor partners to engage in policy discussions and reform programs with recipient governments. This contributes to the donor partners’
tendency to interpret country ownership as a commitment to international economic and public administrative norms (Whitfield, 2009).

Despite widespread support for the Paris Declaration, the research found that most donors underestimated how much the Declaration would hinge on their efforts to transform their own organizations in four directions. First, moving from vertical to horizontal integration at the country level requires a significant power shift. Within donor organizations, aid effectiveness requires the decentralization of authority, expenditures, and responsibilities in order to adapt policies to the recipient country’s plans and priorities. Second, several donors made the point that they must start with harmonization within their own organizations. For example, the UN, Germany, and US have multiple agencies working independently from each other in Tanzania. They must tackle their internal parallel implementation units and resulting turf wars before they can effectively engage with other donors. Third, the donor community requires compromises, common language, delegated authority, and, most of all, a high level of trust among the donor partners to represent each other’s interest and oversee disbursements. Finally, GBS and delegated authority raise issues of sovereignty and accountability for taxpayers’ dollars within donor countries. As seen in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, it is difficult for donor countries to reconcile their rules and regulations for spending public funds with those of other donors and the recipient government.

7.4 Recipient Countries
On the other side of the development partnership, recipient governments use similar terms but have different perspectives on harmonization and ownership. The Tanzanian government often associates aid effectiveness with concerns about donor demands placing an undue burden on the recipient country’s ministries. One participant noted that, “Dealing with each donor coming with separate conditions really gives us big, big capacity challenges… the more donors get harmonized the more we can resolve this departmental issue and use our human resources” (25:31). Donor coordination focuses on pooled funds, mission calendars, quiet periods, and joint analytic and reporting documents. While this reflects the tenor of the official statements, there is another less
formal interpretation where the recipient governments are asking donors to just politely talk amongst themselves. This places increased pressure on the DPG to speak with “one voice” when entering policy dialogues at the recipient country level.

While it was expected that recipient governments would primarily interpret aid effectiveness as country ownership, unexpected complications have arisen. As mentioned earlier, ownership can be understood as control over the process and outcomes of aid negotiations or as a commitment to the economic standards and norms of the donor community (Whitfield, 2009). In two separate studies, Hayman (2009) and Hyden (2008) found that recipient governments often insisted that they have control of the development agenda, despite the fact that the research evidence clearly points to the concept of ownership as merely a commitment to international norms used in practice. Thus, it can be said that recipient governments often espouse or aspire to ownership as control, despite negotiating within the confines of ownership as commitment. This research found similar dynamics, as described in Chapters 6 and 7.

Working within the conceptualization of ownership as commitment, Tanzanian officials often downplay their own government reforms, focusing instead on the need for more predictable and on-budget aid, their alignment with government systems, and their work within joint assistance strategies. One respondent describes the rationale thus: “GBS strengthens the parliamentary role for decision making resource allocation and shifts government accountability from donor to citizens” (38:16). Hyden (2008) demonstrates that in Tanzania shifting aid modalities—from project to program to GBS—has served to strengthen the executive branches of government while weakening the line ministries as, again, is discussed further in Chapters 6 and 7.

8.0 Conclusion

In many corners of the world international development community, it [aid effectiveness] is bedding down, becoming, as it were, part of the conventional wisdom. (Armon, 2007: 653)
A genealogical investigation of aid effectiveness discourse reveals the *problematique* and policy prescriptions that set the parameters for aid effectiveness. In terms of a *problematique*, a number of managerial problems inherent to the chaotic nature of the international development bureaucracy were identified, such as PIUs, multiple lines of accountability, reporting frameworks, and the uneven distribution of aid. In addition, recipient governments’ lack of ownership and capacity was linked to poor governance and donor partners not using government systems to deliver aid. By identifying the reasons behind development failures, a set of policy solutions, under the umbrella of aid effectiveness, could then be designed and promoted.

Aid effectiveness policies represent a discourse coalition\(^24\) between two preexisting storylines circulating through the international development bureaucracy. The concept of recipient country ownership was combined with management narratives concerning harmonization, alignment, managing for results, and mutual accountability. The discourse coalition exists in two main forms. One defines ownership as recipient country control over economic policy and the other uses a modified form of ownership as commitment to donor-defined good governance and neoliberal economic policies. As a discourse coalition, more entrenched discourses’ engulf the concept of ownership and detach it from its radical foundation, then repackage it with a set of mainstream managerial ideas. This second version of aid effectiveness is arguably more predominant in the international development bureaucracy and will be discussed further in Chapter 7 and 8.

The expanding popularity and perceived global consensus around aid effectiveness serves as a playing field for contestation. Thus, it is important to balance the official definitions—those put forth in the Paris Declaration—with the different interpretations being used by developmental practitioners at all levels. In practice, struggles over the definition of “aid effectiveness” increased as the term was used by more and more “brokers” (consultants, development professionals, bureaucrats) and translated or interpreted to fit in various contexts within the development industry (Lewis & Mosse,

\(^{24}\) Brock et al. define a discourse coalition as “how particular story-lines are taken up in policy… through which previously independent practices are actively brought together and given meaning within a common political project” (Brock et al. 2001: 6).
Thus, as a policy framework, aid effectiveness is successful at garnering general agreement but it does not resolve fundamental differences that underlie aid management issues.

The remainder of this dissertation explores the above interpretations of aid effectiveness policies, and three areas in which they are influenced. First and most frequently cited, development practitioners must adjust policy based on the material reality of the policy spaces. This includes logistics such as regulations, resources, and physical capabilities of implementation. Second, development practitioners must construct their own interpretations of the policies and then negotiate it with others. The process of translating upward and downward within the bureaucracy creates long chains-of-meanings (Nauta, 2006; Mahon, et al., 2007). Third, this managerial discourse is reinterpreted in a manner that aligns it with more entrenched discursive regimes already existing within the policy space. The fluidity of its definitions contributes to the different manifestations of aid effectiveness in Canada and Tanzania. As is described in the next chapter, CIDA’s headquarters in Ottawa has a very different understanding of aid effectiveness than the field office in Dar es Salaam.
CHAPTER FIVE: CANADIAN AID POLICY

1.0 Introduction
As an OECD DAC member, Canada is committed to the aid effectiveness principles. However, the research for this dissertation found that the configuration of and the meanings attached to those policies change as they are transferred into the Canadian context. Historical accounts of Canada’s aid policies and overseas development assistance have shown that CIDA is trapped within a cycle of parliamentary reviews, external recommendations, and reform programs that continually fail to take root (Morrison 1998). As the main instrument of aid policy, CIDA often comes under fire for its sparse policy framework and a host of organizational maladies. In order to understand how aid effectiveness policies function within Canadian aid policy and CIDA, this chapter addresses the questions: What is the role of policy? Who makes policy? What is the relationship between policy and practice? How do these factors influence the formation of aid policy in general and aid effectiveness in particular?

The following analysis, which aims to address these questions, is based on the conceptual framework described in Chapter 2, and its expanded concept of policy, which includes external influences, official documents, and the nuances of practice. This holistic understanding of policy reveals how the external influences on CIDA create a contradictory mixture of goals and objectives. Competing agendas make Canadian aid policy documents difficult to draft and sustain over time. CIDA’s lack of policy and its frequently changing priorities undermine the effectiveness of its practitioners in the field; this is because practitioners rely on official policies for representation and legitimacy during the many micro-policy negotiations that occur in day-to-day practice. As this chapter demonstrates, the pressure to show results—and the absence of clear directives within CIDA—leads to further administrative delays at CIDA as it becomes more risk-averse and centralized.

This discussion of Canadian aid policy’s inner workings begins with a policy definition, followed by the mapping of CIDA’s aid ecosystem, its official policy framework, and the
organization’s micro-policy negotiations. The analysis shows how policy initiatives, such as aid effectiveness, are modified as they move through national-level politics and are adopted into CIDA. The research builds on three aspects of governmentality described in Chapter 2. First, it examines the vertical relationship between micro-policy negotiations and the larger policy discourses. Second, the chapter discusses some complex and contradictory findings, recognizing that policy discourse effectively constrains or excludes certain possibilities while including others and, at the same time, that the absence of a strong policy to provide a legitimate basis for action also limits the range of action. This has a direct bearing on the third aspect of governmentality, which explores the underlying power dynamics within policy spaces and how they affect smaller policy negotiations.

2.0 Expanding Policy Analysis

In keeping with this dissertation’s conceptual framework, Black and Smith (1993) argue that the analysis of Canadian aid policy must move beyond the mere description of policy documents to an understanding of why and how policy operates. This includes an understanding of the official policy framework as well as both external influences surrounding CIDA and the micro processes embedded inside the organization. The official policy framework includes the standard analysis of ministerial statements, strategies, and priorities. The documents should, however, be understood as the products of a wider negotiation process embedded in particular fields of knowledge and formed through an edifying conversation that extends across time and space (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). The instrumental function of policy documents is replaced by a politically symbolic function that creates the perception of consensus, motivates actors, legitimizes practice, and helps coordinate activities (Mosse, 2005; van Gastel & Nuijten, 2005).

The scale of the international development bureaucracy further complicates the context of development policy. Global initiatives, such as the Paris Declaration, are designed as broad statements that require participating organizations to draft and adopt complementary policies. Ideally, there is a cascade of policy that flows from the international agreements through national governments and donor organizations, making
its way down to field-level programs and projects around the world. This creates a scenario where global policy is practiced or implemented through the drafting of further national or organizational policy. However, the situation is complicated by the fact that these different levels of policy are rarely in sync. This research shows that global policy is often reshaped within national and organizational contexts. In many cases, the broader policies interact with alternative policy concepts, percolating up through the bureaucracy. The shaping and reshaping of policy in these different venues is evident in the CIDA case.

In the research, a series of micro-policy processes embedded in day-to-day operations support the official language of policy documents. These processes involve constant negotiation and the continual reinterpretation of key concepts in the various policy spaces. The diffuse network of micro-policy processes helps inform, frame, interpret, and apply the larger policy concepts. Referring to CIDA, Rawkins (1994) describes how:

…patterns of activity emerge from an ongoing series of small decisions around projects and programs made by project officers and country directors within their respective areas of discretion. These become codified as routine response and hence part of the “stuff” of organizational knowledge. Policy is then made incrementally from the pull of individual decisions towards a norm. (Rawkins 1994:167)

As seen in this chapter’s case study, the act of policy implementation not only contributes to policy formation, but also interprets and modifies it. This further blurs the lines between policy formation and implementation.

Analysis must also extend to the wider external influences that shape official policy statements and informal practices. CIDA does not act alone; it is just one organization embedded in a web of other overlapping networks. This web consists of actors and institutions that create and recreate the environment in which policy is formed through the accumulation of their actions in a negotiated collective process. This web of interactions influences policy formation in a number of ways, ranging from the adoption of new terms and concepts to policy transfers. Thus, analysis must include a survey of the wider policy environment.
3.0 The Canadian Policy Sphere
The Canadian aid context contains a wide array of external influences that help shape policy formation at CIDA. Brown and Jackson (2009) note that the international development community has a great deal of influence on the types of Canadian aid delivered and how, but the amount of aid and where it is directed is determined by the domestic political process. Building on their analysis, this study found that domestic politics in Canada sets the regulatory environment within which aid is disbursed. A combination of influences, from the international development community and federal or domestic politics, sets the parameters for Canadian aid policy.

3.1 The International Development Community
The international development community intersects with Canadian development policy on the topic of technical expertise and aid modalities, or the “how” of development (Brown & Jackson, 2009). The community’s influence operates at two key points of intersection. The first crossroads exists where Canada participates in international organizations such as IFIs, United Nations (UN), or OECD, and associations such as the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, G8, and G-20. International cooperation results in guidelines, agreements, treaties, and conventions that generate awareness of issues, shared vocabularies, and tether the government to a minimal level of commitment. The second, more local point of intersection occurs between professional aid networks and the donor communities in recipient countries. In capital cities, such as Dar es Salaam, donors form a community within which they coordinate and exchange information. A number of the development practitioners interviewed noted that they felt a degree of peer pressure to adopt the latest policy trend—in this case, aid effectiveness. This type of pressure is examined more closely in Chapters 6 and 7.

Swiss (2010) argues that development practitioners internalize new policy ideas and seek to promote them within their respective organizations. This internalization occurs through several processes. First, organizations such as the OECD set standards and create peer pressure for practitioners to conform. Second, policy makers often appeal to outside
authorities in an effort to convince government officials and development practitioners of their policies’ validity. As Swiss’s case study of gender policy shows, it is often easier to justify particular policies and practices if other large donors have adopted them. Third, development practitioners often mimic the leaders in their particular field of expertise. The setting of standards, establishment of authority, and mimicry of superiors operate concurrently to create legitimacy around certain policy norms and to delegitimize others (Swiss, 2010). This type of policy influence is a double-edged sword insofar as sharing research, setting professional standards and ethics, and identifying lessons learned can improve development practice, but it can also lead to herding behavior, the uncritical adoption of policy trends, and frequent policy changes.

The OECD DAC sets the standards for aid effectiveness through a series of global studies, reports, High-level Forums, and peer reviews. Canada, as an OECD DAC member, fully supports aid effectiveness policies and has generally committed to the key principles enshrined in the Paris Declaration. However, interpretations of the policies shift when the policies are applied in the Canadian context. When the aid effectiveness policies entered the Canadian context, a sequence of actors and organizations adopted the terminology, reinterpreted the concepts, and combined them with existing discursive formations. Two of the five aid effectiveness principles resonate with Canada’s existing discourse on accountability. This has created a Canadian version of aid effectiveness that emphasizes managing for results and mutual accountability, while minimizing attention to harmonization, alignment, and ownership (Lalonde, 2009; Brown, 2011). The configuration of aid effectiveness policies changes once again in recipient countries, such as Tanzania. CIDA staff members working in the field, alongside other donors and the recipient government, emphasize donor coordination and program-based approaches.25

Overall, the international community influences wider trends in Canadian development policy. However, this influence diminishes as policies are implemented at the national

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25 CIDA defines program-based approaches (PBA) as “a way of engaging in development cooperation based on the principles of coordinated support for a locally-owned program of development such as a development strategy, a sector program, a thematic program or a program of a specific organization” (CIDA, 2008: 1). This includes the aid modalities of GBS and pooled or basket funding.
level. Then, the external influence increases again as Canadian policies are applied within recipient countries. These varying levels of influence contribute to variations and contradictions in how policy is interpreted at the international, national, and recipient country levels.

3.2 The Canadian Government

While the international development community influences how development is delivered, the Canadian government determines why, where, and to what extent Canada contributes to international development assistance (Brown & Jackson, 2009). Regarding the purposes of Canadian aid, the academic literature reveals deep fissures running throughout the civil service. Canada struggles to reconcile a humane internationalist approach, based on an ethical obligation to help alleviate global poverty, with a realist approach that seeks to deliver aid while supporting domestic and foreign economic and political interests (Pratt, 1994). Competing interests involving commercial, security, diplomatic, and public concerns further complicate the tension between altruism and self-interest. The ambiguity around the purpose of aid weakens CIDA’s overall ability to define and defend its policy framework.26

While CIDA is a semi-autonomous agency, it does not have a legislated mandate27 and exists largely under the purview of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). Except for a brief period in 1979-1980, CIDA was not granted a Cabinet seat until the junior post of Minister of International Cooperation was created in 1996 (Morrison, 1998). Even with this junior post, CIDA’s lack of political sway is made evident by the fact that in the 14-year period that followed, the Minister for International

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26 While the political economy literature still uses the classic dichotomy between the humane internationalist and realist approaches to understand Canadian aid, many academics see evidence that the older altruistic impulse is starting to fade, pointing to the cuts to Canadian NGOs, the recent election of a Conservative majority, and the reallocation of ODA from CIDA to the Department of Finance to top up support of the World Bank and IMF.

27 While the ODA Accountability Act (Bill C-293) is legislation, it does not provide CIDA with a clear mandate. Instead, the Act outlines three very broad criteria (reduce poverty, incorporate the perspectives of the poor, and uphold human rights) for ODA spending for all federal departments.
Cooperation position was filled by a succession of eight relatively low-profile politicians.\textsuperscript{28}

Like all government departments and agencies, CIDA must jockey for resources within the federal system. CIDA, however, is particularly vulnerable to the political influence of other bodies. Brown (2008) describes CIDA as being trapped in a policy paradox: increases to CIDA’s annual budget and its political profile correlate with a reduction in CIDA’s capacity to promote aid policy focused on poverty reduction. The broad mandate of development provides an umbrella under which other departments may seek to further their own mandates through strategic “partnerships.” This tendency has been intensified with the government’s adoption of a whole-of-government approach that promotes policy coherence among departments without resolving the fundamental question of who is setting the standard for coherence around which other actors will cohere?

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Department} & \textbf{2008-2009 ODA Disbursement (in $ millions)} \\
\hline
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) & 3,575.19 \\
Department of Finance Canada & 676.31 \\
Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT) & 277.70 \\
International Development Research Centre (IDRC) & 175.75 \\
Citizenship and Immigration Canada & 92.05 \\
Royal Canadian Mounted Police & 19.61 \\
National Defense & 18.79 \\
Health Canada & 11.97 \\
Environment Canada & 4.04 \\
Labour Canada & 1.40 \\
Industry Canada & 0.97 \\
Parks Canada & 0.47 \\
\hline
\textbf{Total} & \textbf{4,854.25} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{ODA Disbursements by Government Department}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{28} Ministers for International Cooperation, starting in 1996, were: Pierre Pettigrew, Don Boudria, Dianne Marleau, Maria Minna, Susan Whelan, Aileen Carroll, Josée Verner, and Bev Oda. For more information please see http://www2.parl.gc.ca.
The strength of CIDA’s policy framework is of particular importance in terms of how its policies are entangled with the objectives of other departments. As seen in Table 3, CIDA managed only 74% of Canadian ODA in 2008-2009 (CIDA, 2009a). The remaining funds were divided amongst several government departments and agencies. For example, the Department of Finance is responsible for contributions to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. While these divisions build on the expertise of the different departments, they also hinder CIDA’s capacity as the principal provider of development assistance and its attempts to build a coherent policy framework for Canadian aid and development policy.

The Canadian government’s regulatory system also places constraints on CIDA and the ways in which it delivers aid. These constraints have been tightened with the election of a Conservative government and Parliament’s subsequent adoption of the Accountability Act in 2006. While the increased regulation of government finances was generally well received, the Act also had a number of unintended effects. As is explained throughout this chapter, the Act undermined nuanced understandings of accountability by focusing on quantitative indicators and checklists rather than genuine dialogue regarding aid effectiveness. It also accentuated the agency’s natural tendency towards risk-aversion, discussed in a later section.

The research participants for this thesis expressed concerns over the Accountability Act, as well as CIDA’s reliance on approvals from the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS). The TBS has a particularly uncomfortable relationship with CIDA. Often acting as a gatekeeper, the TBS sets the Terms and Conditions for International Assistance, which include drafting macro-management frameworks, delegating authority, and approving exemptions (Lalonde, 2009). The aid officials who were interviewed complained that the

29 After the 2011 election, the Harper government increased the portion of ODA dedicated to World Bank and IMF—effectively redirecting it from CIDA to the Department of Finance. It will be interesting to see if this trend continues in the future.
30 In 2004, the Auditor General of Canada, Shelia Fraser, exposed fraud within the Canadian government and Liberal Party of Canada. This was quickly dubbed the Sponsorship Scandal. It resulted in a lengthy public inquiry that highlighted the misuse of public funds and further shook the public’s confidence in government spending. In response, the Conservative government drafted the Accountability Act, arguing that it would address issues of transparency and accountability within the federal government.
terms and conditions are often ill suited to overseas work and place a heavy burden on CIDA staff. In many cases, submissions to the TBS consume large amounts of the CIDA staff’s time, cause lengthy administrative delays, and unnecessarily influence policy decisions. One frustrated respondent noted in 2008 that:

“The Treasury Board is so unpredictable for us because the Treasury Board is not CIDA. They are at the whim of what is happening politically in the country. But right now we are in a situation where the Treasury Board may not sit, Parliament may get dissolved… and we are trying to get an approval. It is completely at the mercy of the Treasury Board… and the Treasury Board has all sorts of other higher priorities. (52: 52)

The lack of a clear legislative mandate, junior status, and restrictive regulatory frameworks, combined with the political influence of other departments, has left CIDA in a weak position from which to negotiate development policy. Morrison’s (1998) detailed review of CIDA’s policies illustrates a series of compromises between trade, diplomatic, and development agendas. In this context, another author notes that CIDA, instead of asserting its position and viewpoints, “sought to safeguard its autonomy by anticipating what other departments were likely to want of it” (Pratt, 1994: 334). While this strategy allows the agency to muddle through on a short-term basis, it has hindered the formation of a long-term Canadian aid policy framework. These policy inconsistencies are evident in CIDA’s partnerships with NGOs.

3.3 Non-Governmental Organizations
The NGO community interacts with Canadian development policy on issues of aid contributions, recipient countries, and aid modalities. These junction points stem from three activities. First, NGOs generate public awareness of specific issues or events. They are often instrumental in mobilizing the public around easily identified issues such as humanitarian disasters (e.g. the 1980s Ethiopian famine, 2003’s Asian Tsunami, 2010’s Haitian earthquake). Second, a number of NGOs also lobby the Canadian government. For example, the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC) was instrumental in lobbying for the passage of the ODA Accountability Act in 2009 (Bill C-293). Finally, on a smaller scale, NGOs can become integrated into the day-to-day
functioning of CIDA through sharing information or knowledge and managing CIDA projects. For instance, one respondent working for a Canadian NGO described a situation wherein s/he drafted a brief on the latest advancements in her/his field for a CIDA counterpart. The information in the brief was later used at CIDA as the basis for a policy paper on food security. This example illustrates how a number of NGOs exert subtle influence within CIDA’s policy processes.

In the past, the partnership between CIDA and the NGO community was generally positive with only sporadic periods of contention. Some of the common complaints from NGOs included bureaucratic delays, excessive paperwork, budget cuts, and inconsistent policies. However, in 2010 funding cuts to well-respected organizations such as KAIROS,31 Alternatives, MATCH International, and CCIC sparked fears within the NGO community. The Conservative government has remained characteristically quiet on the issue, only vaguely alluding to the idea that the programs no longer fit within CIDA’s new policy framework. The NGO community, however, claims that the cuts send a clear signal that those who challenge government policies will lose funding. Furthermore, there may be a long-term policy shift in favor of organizations that provide services, and a concurrent marginalization of groups with a strong advocacy focus (Berthiaume, 2010a). Speculation notwithstanding, it is still too soon to tell whether the funding cuts will weaken the NGO community or prompt it to lobby the government more vigorously.

3.4 The Canadian Public

While the Canadian public has some ability to influence the size and direction of aid flows in cases such as the Ethiopian famine and Asian tsunami, a number of respondents felt that there is a mixture of eroding supporting and lack of awareness of aid’s complexity and long-term nature. A study by Noël, Thérien, and Dallaire notes that, “On average, Canadians think that 10.5% of the national budget is devoted to aid; only 20% know that, in fact, it amounts to less than 2%” (2004: 34). In actuality, Canada allocated .27% of Gross National Income (GNI) to aid in 2004, slowly climbing to .34% of GNI in

31 CIDA cut the funding to KAIROS in 2009, which was later the subject of considerable debate during a parliamentary committee in the Fall of 2010. The committee concluded that the paperwork for the funding was approved, until someone penciled in the word “not” on the signature page (Berthiaume, 2010b).
2008 (OECD, 2010). This compares poorly to an OECD average of .48% in 2009 and the UN target of .70% (DAC, 2010).

This contradiction between the public’s perception and the government’s level of commitment is further revealed by public perceptions of budget spending priorities. In the survey data analyzed by Noel et al. (2004), international development assistance consistently placed last in lists of funding priorities. However, the survey data did not contain sufficient evidence to arrive at a conclusion on whether respondents rank international development low because they had an exaggerated sense of the Canadian contribution, a distrust of government, or because they do not value international development. Whatever the case, this low prioritization is echoed in the government cutbacks of the late 1980s and early 1990s. In comparison with other departments, CIDA was subjected to the most drastic cuts, losing 33% of its annual budget (Black & Tiessen, 2007). The targeting of CIDA for a disproportionate share of budget cuts has been repeated in the latest round of austerity beginning in 2010.

Several observations may help explain the gap between public perception and reality. First, development policy differs from other public policy areas in that the targets or beneficiaries reside outside of Canada and do not vote in Canadian elections. This extra-territorial constituency must rely on Canadian CSOs and independent citizens for advocacy and support. Second, international development often has less immediate or visible results than other government departments. Development results are difficult to measure due to poor data quality, ambiguities of attribution, and the lack of infrastructure and stability in recipient countries. This is further complicated by significant changes in the nature of development work. As discussed in the previous chapter, the development field, and bilateral organizations in particular, currently emphasize scaling up and increasing donor coordination. In general, donors are focusing less on small, signature projects and more on larger, program-based initiatives and pooled funding. This shift has made development work more bureaucratic and abstract, allowing fewer results to be clearly attributed to specific donors. Consequently, it is harder for the public to understand the nature of the work and what types of results can be expected.
Third, the media’s coverage of development scandals has shaken the public’s faith in international development. Starting in the late 1970s, a series of articles and books placed a negative spotlight on the development industry’s “inept bureaucrats,” as well as the “corrupt governments” and “victimized poor” in recipient countries. This has encouraged public distrust of development organizations. The miscommunication is accentuated by the many NGOs that promote oversimplified problem-solving scenarios for fundraising purposes. The negative and simplified portrayal of international development in the media only serves to widen the gap between the public’s understanding of development and field-level realities. Given this gap, it is important to ask what these studies tell us about Canadian attitudes towards international development.

These studies illustrate that there are a bundle of cross-pressures informing Canadian opinions on international development. On the one hand, there is a firm belief that Canada is a nation of “do-gooders” who make an above-average contribution to international development and peacekeeping—despite the statistical evidence to the contrary. This creates an inflated impression of aid budgets that is exacerbated by a lack of understanding of the development industry. On the other hand, the lack of support for international development might simply stem from a political shift to the right. Noel et al. (2004) illustrate a correlation between respondents who self-identify as Liberals and New Democrats, and support of social programs and international assistance. Conversely, participants who self-identified as Conservative tended to be less supportive of social programs and international assistance. The election of consecutive Conservative governments (2006, 2008, and 2011) may indicate that Canada is becoming increasingly conservative and thus less supportive of international development. In either case, the Canadian public’s preoccupation with trendy issues distracts from long-term opportunities to influence CIDA’s policies or indeed the government’s disposition towards CIDA.

4.0 The Uncertainty of CIDA’s Official Policy

As shown above, the Canadian aid policy context contains a number of cross-pressures that influence CIDA’s policies. This situation has been exacerbated by an uncertain and changing political context in the 2000s, in which Canada moved from a long-standing Liberal majority government (elected 1993, 1997, and 2000) to a Liberal minority (elected 2003) and then through two Conservative minorities (elected 2006 and 2008) before the more recent election of a Conservative majority (elected 2011). Given this political uncertainty and the cross-pressures described above, CIDA has not been able to manage its own policy framework resulting in this framework’s sparseness and its inconsistencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIDA’s Policy for Environmental Sustainability</td>
<td>1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDA’s Policy for Performance Review</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDA’s Policy of Gender Equality</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDA’s Policy on Poverty Reduction</td>
<td>1996</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy for CIDA on Human Rights, Democratization and Good Governance</td>
<td>1996</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy Statement on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Results-Based Management Policy Statement</td>
<td>2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sustainable Development Strategy</td>
<td>2007-2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Securing the Future of Children and Youth: CIDA’s Children and Youth Strategy</td>
<td>2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increasing Food Security: CIDA’s Food Security Strategy</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stimulating Sustainable Economic Growth: CIDA’s Sustainable Economic Growth Strategy</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA’s Strategic Planning and Reporting Framework</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Agency Accountability Framework</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA’s Framework for Assessing Gender Equality Results</td>
<td>2010</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: www.acdi-cida.gc.ca, retrieved September 6, 2011

Table 4, “CIDA’s Policy Suite,” contains a list of policies and their publication dates as shown on the agency’s website (www.acdi-cida.gc.ca, retrieved September 6, 2011). Of the 14 documents, two are not dated and four were published before 2000. The last
document to contain an overarching policy vision was published in 2002. The only overarching policy document on CIDA’s list is *Canada Making a Difference in the World: A Policy Statement on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness* (2002). This policy features concepts and principles from the then-nascent aid effectiveness agenda, such as program-based approaches, ownership, donor coordination, and policy coherence. The new language is mixed with a series of recycled recommendations concerning countries of concentration, untying aid, doubling aid to Africa, and results-based management (RBM). While these recommendations are helpful, the document as a whole lacks a coherent vision.

Conspicuously missing from CIDA’s posted policy suite is *the International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*, coordinated by the Martin government and released in 2005. This statement attempted to bring all of Canada’s foreign policy initiatives under one framework. It contains five chapters, on commerce, defense, development, diplomacy, and a general overview, which were released in individual booklets. The development chapter emphasizes a whole-of-government approach, streamlining aid, enhancing partnerships, and doubling aid to Africa. Common critiques of the paper include excessive moralizing and paternalism around the notion of Canadian values, and an indulgent focus on promoting Canadian interests (Black & Tiessen, 2007; Brown, 2007). The version of the chapter on development found in CIDA’s archive is stamped with the following statement: “Please note that this was never officially adopted by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). It is available for reference only” (DFAIT, 2005). Thus, the document’s status has been relegated to a non-policy statement, highlighting partisan involvement and competition over ideas and approaches within and among government departments.

In the absence of overarching policy documents, CIDA has announced a series of lists containing priority issues and countries of concentration. Between 2000 and 2009, CIDA posted five different priority statements creating a situation in which the adoption of new

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33 While the ODA Accountability Act (Bill C-293) was in place at the time of the research, it was not included in CIDA’s policy suite. This is probably due to the fact that it is a federal Act rather than CIDA policy document.
priorities often outpaced the organization’s ability to redirect programming. In 2005 under the Martin government, the priorities included governance, health (with a focus on HIV/AIDS), basic education, private sector development, environmental sustainability, and the crosscutting theme of gender equality (Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2009). Simultaneously, they attempted to concentrate two-thirds of bilateral aid in 25 countries, 14 of which were in Africa. While the policy brought a degree of status and increased resources for the countries of concentration, the frequent changes to the list undermined any long-term policy commitment. Further, research shows that despite all its policy changes, CIDA still failed to significantly concentrate aid in designated recipient countries (Stairs, 2005).

The election of a Conservative government in 2006 marked a new era in Canadian politics and placed CIDA in a situation further characterized by uncertainty. International development was not a priority for the Conservative government and the two successive Ministers of International Cooperation, Josée Verner and Beverly Oda, were unknown factors lacking any visible experience concerning the topic. The only clear international objective of the government was to support the troops in Afghanistan (Black & den Heyer, 2010). Shortly after coming to power, Stephen Harper announced that Canada would re-focus on the Western hemisphere, while fulfilling previous commitments to Africa, and at the same time Oda suspended previous Liberal policies and began to revise the priority areas and countries of concentration. This left many people wondering how the government intended to offer more programs in Latin America and the Caribbean, maintain commitments to Afghanistan, and double aid to Africa, while at the same time concentrating aid in fewer countries. Instead of clarifying the new policy direction, the government issued a series of smaller reviews, financial regulations, and management frameworks for CIDA. This “drip-feed” of visionless instructions only served to create inconsistency and confusion within the agency (Gulrajani, 2010).

Under the new government, the 2005 list of countries of concentration and priority areas remained suspended until February 2009 when Minister Beverley Oda announced that the agency would henceforth concentrate 80% of its bilateral aid on 20 countries, with only
six of those being in Africa (Carin & Smith, 2010). Then, in May 2009, Oda made a second announcement that narrowed CIDA’s aid priorities to increasing food security, stimulating sustainable economic growth, and securing the future of children and youth, with a focus on three crosscutting issues of environmentally sustainability, equality between women and men, and governance (www.acdi-cida.gc.ca, retrieved September 6, 2011). Over the next two years (2009-2011) CIDA developed a strategy paper for each priority area.

In 2009, CIDA released a short (seven pages) and quite vague policy document called, *Securing the Future of Children and Youth: CIDA’s Children and Youth Strategy*. The strategy contains three objectives: improvement of child and maternal health, higher quality education and more learning opportunities, and guaranteeing rights and protection for children and youth (CIDA, 2009b). This strategy was later supplemented by the announcement of the Muskoka Initiative on Maternal, Newborn and Child Health during the G-8 summit in June of 2010. Canada committed to USD $1.1 billion in funding for Maternal and Child Health, with another USD $1.75 billion of current spending adding up to 2.85 billion. Pledges from other countries resulted in a total of USD $7.3 billion. The remaining strategy papers were developed in subsequent years, with the eight-page *Increasing Food Security: CIDA’s Food Security Strategy*, released in 2010, and the seven-page *Stimulating Sustainable Economic Growth: CIDA’s Sustainable Economic Growth Strategy*, released in 2011.

These intermittent and vague strategies suggest that international development is not a priority for the Conservative government and that when it does focus on aid, it relies on common charity-oriented archetypes. For example, the Children and Youth Strategy and the Muskoka Initiative for Maternal and Child Health can, quite literally, be perceived as motherhood statements. The depiction of women and children as victims of circumstance requiring immediate assistance cannot be contested. However, it is argued here that “victims” and their problems are considerably more complex than their portrayal in the strategies indicates. Further, many of the objectives stated in the strategies do not distinguish between humanitarian aid and long-term international development programs.
that address the roots of poverty. For example, one of the objectives is to offer “food aid and nutrition to provide more flexible, predictable, and needs-based funding to meet the emergency and long-term food and nutrients needs of the most vulnerable and high-risk populations” (CIDAb, 2010:3).

All three of CIDA’s new strategies abdicate a degree of responsibility for the conceptualization and execution of policies to multilateral organizations. For example, the Sustainable Economic Growth Strategy outlines neoliberal economic policies consistent with the World Bank and IMF. In fact, under the Conservative government, in 2007, Canadian contributions to the World Bank’s IDA fund jumped from USD 329.1 million to USD 653.36 million (OECD, 2010b). This trend is also reflected in the Food Security Strategy, which defines key terms and policies with reference to the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Food Programme (WFP), Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), and IDRC.

While the abdication of policy to multilateral organizations could be seen a way to avoid domestic interference and promote harmonization between bilateral and multilateral organizations, this is unlikely given CIDA’s policy track record. There are no indications from CIDA that the use of multilateral organizations for policy was undertaken with proper reflection and a sense of purpose. This was more likely an administrative shortcut. Further, the mixture of organizations and policies simply replicates contradictions in the international development bureaucracy. As a case in point, the Sustainable Economic Growth Strategy specifically supports industrialized farming and open markets, while the Food Security Strategy continually emphasizes the value of small sustainable farms as a key method of ensuring regular access to food (CIDA, 2011; 2010a).

While the government seemed short on policy, often downplaying development issues, some NGOs were advocating for change. Most notably, in 2008, the CCIC strongly campaigned for the passage of Bill C-293, or the ODA Accountability Act. The Act states that the purpose of Canadian ODA is to reduce poverty, incorporate the perspectives of the poor, and uphold human rights. Meant to strengthen the aid agenda, the Act has gone
relatively unacknowledged in government corridors. Two years after its release, CCIC reported that the government “technically meets the reporting requirements of the Act, but it fails to fulfill the Act’s spirit and intention” (Tomlinson, 2010:1). The ODA Accountability Act could have provided CIDA with the opportunity to initiate change, but according to my observations of the representatives speaking on behalf of CIDA at the 2009 conference, “The Future of Canadian ODA: Putting the ODA Accountability Act into Practice,” the CIDA representative simply provided a list of ways in which their organization already met the Act’s requirements.

Overall, the Canadian aid policy framework is missing an overarching visionary document that would represent Canadians’ approach to international development assistance. By definition, such a policy document would be a symbolic representation of Canada’s contribution to international poverty reduction. The document would provide parameters that could assist CIDA and its partners in building tangible relationships of mutual support and coordination. The lack of such a document, however, has left CIDA largely directionless and open to political intrusions and short-lived development trends. In 2008, one respondent explained: “CIDA’s priorities are a mess. They have shifted so many times that most people are still following the Liberal agenda because they are confused about the messages.” This has had a major impact on CIDA’s day-to-day operations.

Several of CIDA’s field staff noted that the lack of official policy makes it difficult to engage in long-term collaboration with other departments, international organizations, and recipient countries. For example, the increase in program-based approaches, such as GBS and pooled or basket funds, requires CIDA staff to increase its coordination with other donors and recipient countries. It is very difficult, however, for CIDA’s representatives to participate in such intra-donor processes without clear policy upon which to base or generate legitimacy. This type of policy confusion has increased the importance placed on the numerous smaller negotiations that occur in development practice.
Overall, when aid effectiveness policies were used in the Canadian domestic context, given its political inconsistency, departmental politics, and focus on accountability this influenced how the principles were interpreted. The research shows that the Government of Canada and CIDA in particular have not been able to create a coherent development policy framework. This has resulted in the partial and skewed uptake of aid effectiveness policies. The policies that were adopted formed a discourse coalition within the domestic context, emphasizing financial accountability and RBM while de-emphasizing harmonization, alignment, and ownership. While this configuration of aid effectiveness policy works within the Canadian context, it presents significant challenges in the international and recipient country contexts.

5.0 Micro-Policy Negotiations
A closer look at the Tanzanian case illustrates that the problems associated with CIDA’s policies extend into the field. During my field research in 2008, CIDA was still using a Country Development Program Framework (CDPF) for Tanzania that was issued in 1997 and should have expired in 2002. When this last CDPF was drafted, Canadian aid to Tanzania was in decline with discussions underway concerning a full withdrawal. The 1997 CDPF focused on smaller projects in primary education, health, and small enterprise development. Despite the absence of current policy documents, budgets and priorities have shifted significantly during the last decade. CIDA re-designated Tanzania as a country of concentration in 2003 and provided the country’s aid program with an expanded budget and decentralized administration. The aid program is actively involved in governance, education, health, and private sector development. Thus, while formal policy development was stalled, informal decisions regarding CIDA’s direction and programming in Tanzania were still being made on an ad hoc basis within the agency.

A number of CIDA employees expressed concern over the absence of a CDPF in Tanzania and cited several failed attempts to draft new versions. Efforts to develop a new

34 It is interesting to note that, according to CIDA’s project browser, the types of activities approved for Tanzania have not change despite the new 2009 priority areas focusing on children and youth, food security, and sustainable economic growth. This reflects the interview data where the respondents reported that policy changes take time to implement, which has led to policy confusion and delays within the organization.
CDPF were constantly postponed because the decision-makers were waiting for evaluation results, the designation of areas of concentration, or elections and ministerial appointments. At one point, the country office did draft a new CDPF, but it was not approved because the CIDA executive in Ottawa shifted their policy direction in the time between the CDPF’s submission and its approval. One CIDA respondent noted:

In 2002 is when our CDPF expired. So we went back to the Minster and we said there is an evaluation coming up so we wouldn’t do the CDPF. We will hold off on it until we have the evaluation done. So she said, “fine.” And we said health and governance is the important priority. And she said, “fine, do that.” (8: 29)

Another CIDA respondent expressed annoyance, stating: “Well we don’t have CDPF now. We are operating on the extension of the old CDPF” (8: 11). Despite the lack of official documents, policy decisions are still being negotiated by practitioners on an ad hoc basis in order for their work to continue.

Eventually, CIDA staff supplemented these ad hoc decisions with internal strategies. Staff members in CIDA’s Tanzanian country program are designated sector leads on issues such as governance, education, and health. Each sector lead developed a two-page strategy paper to be circulated and reviewed within the country office. Once vetted, the sector strategies were compiled into a ten-page engagement strategy for submission to headquarters. These interim strategies essentially acted as unapproved policies in the absence of more formal direction. While some staff members freely provided copies of their two-page strategies, others did not feel comfortable sharing unapproved documents. One of the more cautious staff members described the situation thus:

We are in a bit of an awkward position because they had this country engagement strategy that we were asked to prepare in June [2008]. Version 19, I think. It is two pages and one page of projects that come to approval for the next year, and there was a ten-page program document that gave the detailed rationale for the programs. But it is still uncertain as to the status of that document. We were told to operate as if it is approved, but it hasn’t been approved.... It is sort of an unwritten understanding that we have backing. (31: 60)
It is important to note that the sector strategies were not pulled out of thin air but were cobbled together from older CIDA policies, speeches, studies, other donors’ documents, and CIDA’s procedures, and then customized for the Tanzanian context. In a risk-averse environment, staffers regularly make efforts to accumulate supporting evidence to justify their programming direction. As one member explained:

“It is much easier to make that case if you can just say, we have already done this, this type of policy is exactly what we should be doing, this policy has been approved by so and so. It is much cleaner. So when you don’t have a clean policy that supposedly tells you what you should be doing—you need to rationalize it.” (26: 25)

In the process of cobbling policy together, staffers are often faced with the challenge of negotiating contradictory policy statements. For instance, CIDA’s commitment to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness conflicts with procedures required under the Accountability Act. One CIDA respondent, referring to these two policies, noted:

“There is no sort of clear policy over our two policies; these two interpretations can clash without being able to be resolved. Because there is nothing to draw on and say that this approach, this policy trumps, you rely on individuals—individuals are very risk-averse because they have no policy to stand behind to make these calls.” (18: 7)

Problems arising from these conflicting policies have created a stumbling block for determining whether CIDA should or should not provide GBS35 to Tanzania. In terms of aid policy, CIDA is committed to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the G8 initiative to double aid to Africa, and in 2003 the agency designated Tanzania as a country of concentration. This has resulted in a sharp increase in funding to Tanzania, moving from CAD 17.49 million in 1998/1999 (CIDA, 2000) to $36.61 million in 2003/2004 (CIDA, 2005), reaching $99.43 million in 2008/2009 (CIDA, 2010). Under this policy framework, GBS could theoretically promote country ownership and donor coordination, while allowing CIDA to disburse large sums of money with minimal

35 According to the OECD DAC, general budget support (GBS) “is aid to governments that is not earmarked to specific projects or expenditures items. The recipient government can use it to support its expenditures programme as a whole. The aid is mixed with the government’s own revenues and disbursed through the government’s own financial management system” (OECD, 2007:1).
administrative costs. However, it is difficult for CIDA to disburse GBS under the Financial Accountability Act and considering the controls described in the terms and conditions set by the TBS. Without an official policy on GBS, the conflict between aid policy and financial controls has not been resolved. As a result, Canada has simply waffled on GBS disbursements from year to year. In many cases, the decision to disburse GBS depends on personnel changes in the CIDA executive and Treasury Board.

CIDA’s administration also contains hidden or invisible structures that influence policy. As proposals move through the system they are vetted by a series of experts working, for instance, in gender, environment, and RBM, before they are finally approved. One respondent noted that s/he eventually learned, through word of mouth and personal experience, what types of proposals would or would not gain approval, thereby illustrating how organizational norms evolve and surface around approval processes. In the case of GBS, several respondents mentioned that the CIDA executive communicated to the staff that “it was not the right time” for a GBS submission to the Treasury Board in the months leading up to the 2007/2008 financial year. In retrospect, these were early warnings that a GBS submission to the Treasury Board would not be approved at that time.

These types of ongoing micro-policy negotiations are further complicated by varied interpretations of key terms and concepts. A CIDA respondent from the Tanzanian office noted, “Our individuals interpret policy differently than headquarters... The same words mean different things to somebody who is a financial management advisor as compared to a program officer sitting in the field” (18: 7). In many cases, conflicts are avoided rather than resolved. Practitioners often engage in strategic navigation of the bureaucracy when either there is no clear policy or obstacles must be faces. This is when skilled practitioners adapt to or bypass administrative roadblocks by using alternative procedures. Returning to the GBS example, when CIDA staff in Tanzania realized that they would not likely receive approval for a GBS contribution to the Tanzanian government in 2007/2008, they found another way through the policy confusion. CIDA disbursed the funds to the World Bank as an executing agency. The World Bank added
CIDA’s contributions to their Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) program, which in turn disbursed it to the Tanzanian government. A CIDA staff member described the situation as follows:

The Treasury Board said “we are not going to touch any more submissions until you [CIDA] sort out your country of concentration.” CIDA hadn’t sorted that out yet. So then we couldn’t do a GBS submission. And then, some senior management didn’t seem to be comfortable with budget support. We had very mixed, unclear signals about whether we could proceed with things. So, we had to bundle the package of budget support and PRBS together. (31:23)

While administrative gymnastics are common to all bureaucracies, they can have unintended long-term effects. In the example above, the total contribution under discussion was CAD 20 million, minus the World Bank’s administrative fees. The frustration among CIDA staff was evident in interviews: “We are the only donor going through the Bank right now and we are going to pay 5% in fees. We just got approval for 20 million and we are going to have to give a million of that to the World Bank and not the people of Tanzania” (31:27). The scenario also damaged CIDA’s reputation with other donors and caused confusion and delays with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs in Tanzania. In this case, the unresolved policy conflict between CIDA’s aid and accountability frameworks turned into an expensive administrative quandary.

6.0 The Pros and Cons of Micro-Policy Negotiations

As this case study shows, a holistic understanding of policy is based on a combination of official policy documents and micro-policy negotiated in practice. According to Mosse (2004), the primary function of a policy framework is to mobilize and maintain political support for international development initiatives, creating a legitimating framework for the day-to-day negotiations that occur in the field. Vague policy language contributes to agreement amongst partners, but it is also constructed and deconstructed by a series of brokers employing strategic translations. The brokers (consultants, bureaucrats, fieldworkers, and diplomats) interpret and adapt policy as it filters through the development bureaucracy (Mosse & Lewis, 2006). In CIDA’s case, the sparse policy
framework correlates with the unstructured nature of micro-policy negotiations in the field. In the Tanzanian field office, policy frequently exists in an unapproved state; as cobbled together, interpreted, and manipulated by administrative procedures; and/or as an outgrowth of organizational norms. While most development practitioners interviewed for this study were critical of this policy situation, a few chose to view the situation positively.

Some practitioners in the field see the lack of official policy as an opportunity to customize policies to the specific needs of the country or program. One respondent noted that policy confusion creates “wiggle room,” and went on to explain: “There is always a distinction between the policies and what actually happens on the ground. Sometimes the chaos on the ground provides staff the opportunity to do good work” (42: 11). This was confirmed by a number of Tanzanian officials who noted that one of CIDA’s strengths is that its staff listen to the needs of the country and then try to design programs that meet both the recipient’s and CIDA’s mandates.

On the other hand, however, a number of respondents expressed concern about the lack of an overall policy framework, noting that “It affects working in the field in the sense that a strong, coherent and agreed to framework, that is agreed to by senior management, would help us avoid the flavours of the month” (25: 21). Another respondent noted that a clear policy framework would provide CIDA with a better negotiation position with other donors. S/he stated, “we’ve been less engaged just because our policy void has put us in a difficult position to engage and be forceful in our interventions” (14: 40). The staff’s concerns clearly demonstrate that a lack of official policy correlates with a lack of legitimacy in the field.

Because CIDA has not created a strong official policy framework, it has virtually placed the full burden of policy creation on the micro-policy negotiations that occur in the field. CIDA’s fragmented policy framework has failed to generate support for international development assistance or to establish a legitimate foundation for practitioners. While this may give some practitioners a sense of freedom, it comes with costs and risks. In
most cases, the absence of a framework generates insecurity and caution amongst CIDA staff. Thus, the disequilibrium between official policy and practice serves to accentuate CIDA’s organizational maladies, to the point where the agency may be approaching paralysis.

7.0 CIDA: Approaching Paralysis?

As mentioned above, the problems associated with CIDA’s fragmented policy framework are seeping through the organization and accentuating the agency’s tendency towards risk-aversion and centralization. If the situation worsens, CIDA’s bureaucratic activity may slow to a crawl.

7.1 An Element of Risk

The federal government’s focus on accountability and its lack of an overarching development policy have created a culture of silence and risk aversion within CIDA. One respondent noted that CIDA “has become much more risk-averse… following the Liberal government, the scandals, and the Conservatives… now the accountability mechanisms are accentuated, and people are interpreting them very literally. So it gives us very little flexibility” (15: 22). Another respondent noted that these factors “sent a chill throughout the whole government in Canada about how we conduct business; the processes got even heavier especially in regards to financial management” (25: 79).

While accountability is important, when taken to an extreme it can have negative effects. Development practitioners may protect themselves by adhering to procedural accountability, seeking approval and referring decision-making up the chain of command. In many ways, this overcompensation slows down—and perhaps cripples—bureaucratic processes. One respondent noted that CIDA “is allergic to risk... It is scary the number of risk assessments and analyses and documents and papers that need to come out of the machine before something is approved. We need to go through so many people before it reaches the approval level, and it takes forever” (44: 34).
Beyond overburdening the bureaucracy, the focus on fiduciary accountability can diminish development results. International assistance is by definition difficult, risky, and long-term. CIDA and its staff must be able to tolerate a certain level of risk in order to achieve elusive results. This was highlighted in an internal audit in which the auditors noted that CIDA’s focus on fiduciary risk blinds them to the necessary risks involved in achieving development results, as well as the potential risks to its reputation for being ensnared in red tape (Office of the Chief Audit Executive, 2008). The auditor’s report and interview data show that CIDA is focused on fiduciary accountability and has a risk-averse culture that contributes to a centralized administration.

7.2 Centralized Administration
The DAC peer review of Canadian international assistance found that “one of the greatest impediments to Canada’s full implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda is CIDA’s centralized decision-making structure” (DAC, 2007: 57). The centralized administration is reflected in CIDA’s low spending authority and lengthy decision-making processes. Several respondents noted the difficulty this creates when carrying out tasks in the field. Spending ceilings for country directors are CAD 500 000 and anything over CAD 5 million must receive ministerial approval. Programs of more than CAD 20 million must be submitted to the TBS for approval (Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2009: 6). These approval levels are quite low in comparison with other donors. For example, the British Department for International Development’s field office in Tanzania can approve up to USD 15 million on new commitments, and there are no ceilings for renewed items (Gulrajani, 2010: 13). While the low spending ceilings at CIDA are set by the TBS to ensure financial control, they also increase the time and effort required to initiate and implement programs.

Lengthy decision-making processes also bog down CIDA’s bureaucracy. A recent review by the Auditor General of Canada revealed that the average project approval process involves 28 documents and takes about 3.5 years (Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2009: 6). While the above figures are official spending ceilings, a number of CIDA staff have indicated that unofficially the ministerial approval levels are much lower. One respondent provided an off-the-record example of programs as small as CAD 100 000 being reviewed by the Minister herself.
Canada, 2009: 27). This is especially significant given that donor coordination requires field staff to work with other donors and governments in administering pooled funds. CIDA’s delays become its partners’ delays and frustrations. One CIDA respondent noted that it was “embarrassing” and went onto explain:

I sit in a team of people where my colleagues from other donors are making decisions about the way forward, about the financing of the basket. I am being told by my colleagues in headquarters, “you can’t make those decisions.” What am I supposed to tell my colleagues [from other donor agencies]? (15: 20)

Respondents from Tanzania, other donors, and CSOs also complained of CIDA’s bureaucratic delays. One Tanzanian observed that, “the Canadians are always waiting for approvals from head office” (28: 5). A Tanzanian CSO member similarly remarked:

I have been looking at Canadians coming here, working with the local civil society, and they will start developing a proposal and it may take three or four years before the project is proceeding. So if it was something that needed to start within that year then they will miss the boat and that will lead to frustration. (32: 32)

Decentralization has been recommended to CIDA on numerous occasions. In fact, the organization began a process of decentralization in the early 1990s, before this was stopped by budget cuts. The decentralization process would have meant higher administrative expenses associated with maintaining offices overseas, but the benefit would have been the placement of more staff in the field and greater field-level direction over programming.

In 2003, another attempt by CIDA to decentralize was cautiously piloted with six countries, including Tanzania. While some respondents in Tanzania noted that having the director and policy analyst in the field was helpful, they did not think that the decentralization initiative went far enough. In fact, the focus group of CIDA staff suggested that the decentralization process was missing three essential elements: delegation of responsibility, control of funds, and authority to make decisions. One CIDA respondent commented that:
Other donors make decisions here, have the authority to spend in the field, do the
due diligence and risk analysis, etc. Everything that we do down here is vetted a
hundred times up at headquarters, which, of course, makes us inefficient. It kind
of makes us wonder why we have a decentralized program if it is just going to get
vetted all over again. (31: 35)

CIDA’s policy confusion and micro-management issues have caused numerous delays in
the disbursement of funds. For example, the government of Tanzania recently distributed
a chart rating the performance of GBS donors. Each country was given a score between 1
and 5 (1 being good and 5 being poor) for three categories: timing, predictability, and
front end-loading. CIDA scored the worst possible total score of 15 in the 2004/2005 and
received a score of 8. However, there was no rating for the 2007/2008 fiscal year because
CIDA was unable to disburse their funds directly to the Tanzanian government (Ministry
of Finance and Economic Affairs, 2008). As mentioned earlier, they re-routed the GBS
funds through the World Bank. Although the failure of Tanzanian counterparts to meet
funding triggers might explain some delays in disbursement, this does not explain
CIDA’s poor disbursement score in comparison to other donors. Overall, CIDA received
an average score of 12.7 for the three years that it disbursed directly to the government of
Tanzania, while the average total score among all 14 GBS donor partners over the four-
year period (including CIDA’s poor scores) is 4.5 (Ministry of Finance and Economic
Affairs, 2008).37 The inability to disburse aid on a regular and timely basis is a prime
indicator of the agency’s maladies.

8.0 Conclusion
The questions posed at the beginning of this chapter ask how Canadian aid policy is
formed, who is involved, the linkages to practice, and, how these factors influence the
formation of aid policy in general and aid effectiveness in particular. Ideally, Canadian
aid policy should form a loose but cohesive web that extends to international agreements,
government policies, priorities, and strategies, as well as the smaller micro-policy

37 In the fiscal year 2007/2008 the average scores for the members of the GBS group were: ADB-0; CIDA-
didn’t disburse; Denmark-3; EU-5; Finland-4; Ireland-3; Japan-6; KfW-9; Netherlands-3; Norway-3;
Sweden-3; Switzerland-3; UK-3; and, World Bank-4 (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, 2008).
negotiations that occur in practice. By bringing a diverse set of actors together, the primary function of policy is to generate support, establish legitimacy, and provide a general sense of direction. However, CIDA’s sparse national-level aid policy framework has left it in a chronically vulnerable position.

Canadian aid policy is situated in a larger aid landscape within which a number of influences or cross-pressures interact with policy formation at the international, national, and recipient country levels. Instead of managing these cross-pressures, the Canadian government has allowed these influences to direct its aid policy processes, especially in response to the Canadian government’s internal politics. This has left Canada with a fragmented aid policy framework and has exposed CIDA to outside influences, competing agendas, development trends, and political shifts. Internally, in order to compensate for the lack of official policy frameworks, more emphasis is placed on micro-policy negotiations in the field. It was found that policies in the field often exist in an unapproved state, are cobbled together, or grow out of organizational norms, and carry various and sometimes conflicting interpretations. At other times, ad hoc policies and procedures are developed to navigate through policy confusion. Without official policy frameworks to support their decisions in the field, practitioners often refer decisions up the chain of command in order to avoid risk. As this chapter shows, CIDA is becoming increasingly weighed down by an inordinate number of administrative procedures and long delays.

In terms of theoretical implications, this chapter indentifies three areas in which aid effectiveness policies were modified in the Canadian aid landscape. First, as aid effectiveness was adopted in the Canadian aid bureaucracy it was reconciled with more entrenched societal discourses such as neoliberalism, as well as Canadian-specific language around accountability and results. Second, government officials and development practitioners engaged in strategic translations with colleagues and counterparts from other organizations. This is particularly apparent in the different interpretations of aid effectiveness policies in CIDA headquarters and the field staff posted in Dar es Salaam. Finally, practitioners must negotiate very real resource
constraints, accountability procedures, and a centralized administration. These three realities are linked in terms of how discourse frames particular interpretations as well as administrative frameworks and procedures.

While critical theory usually focuses on dissecting and tracing the negative aspects of strong or hegemonic discourses, the CIDA case illustrates that these policy discourses are quite fluid and may even play a beneficial role. This chapter found that the interplay between different sets of discourses is often fluid and contradictory. In terms of fluidity, different sets of discourses interact in ways that can influence and even radically transform each other. For example, the framing of aid effectiveness discourse was combined with neoliberalism during its inception (Chapter 4), and then the accountability aspects were accentuated in the Canadian context. In terms of contradictions, post-development scholars clearly illustrate that discourse acts to constrain or exclude certain possibilities and include others. However, this chapter also shows that a strong policy discourses also provides a legitimate basis for action. Thus, discourses can contain a mixture of positive and negative characteristics. It is argued here that the question should not be whether discourses and governmentality are good or bad, but how constraining or enabling are they? Whom do they benefit? And, what are their ethical foundations?

While the case study clearly illustrates the need for a renewal of Canadian aid policy, a word of caution is required. In the past, CIDA has attempted to fix its problems by grafting policies onto existing system and tightening administrative controls. Such a response at the present time would, however, only accentuate the problems described above. Instead, the renewal process should include a robust policy debate leading up to the creation of an aid policy framework, in addition to the streamlining of priorities and procedures within CIDA. The goal would be to balance the larger policy framework with the micro-policy negotiations that occur in practice. This would provide development practitioners with coherent and legitimate guidance, while still allowing some flexibility for adapting aid programs to local and sometimes changing conditions. However, this can only occur if there is genuine reflection and debate concerning those entrenched societal discourses that hinder progressive change.
CHAPTER SIX: THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BUREAUCRACY IN DAR ES SALAAM

1.0 Introduction
As explained in the previous chapters, the international development bureaucracy is a transnational phenomenon consisting of a multitude of actors, institutions, funds, and ideas moving throughout the globe and intersecting at various sites. Within this landscape, CIDA and other donors are intimately engaged in aid management and policy dialogue in Tanzania. The five-block radius surrounding Tanzania’s Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs in Dar es Salaam hosts numerous government buildings, embassies, and aid offices. Here, the donor partners interact with the Government of Tanzania and non-governmental actors including private businesses, internationally based NGOs, local civil society, and the University of Dar es Salaam. This chapter discusses how national-level realities and international policies shape the “in-country” aid landscape in Tanzania, otherwise known as the dialogue process. As mentioned in the introduction, the stakes are the annual aid disbursements, which in 2008/2009 channeled USD $2.1 billion to the Tanzanian government, representing 34% of the country’s national budget (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, 2008).

The chapter begins with a history of the relationship between the Government of Tanzania and its donor partners, and then addresses recent developments in the dialogue process. Using the theoretical lens described in Chapter 2, this discussion demonstrates how the international development bureaucracy in Tanzania is designed not just as a conduit for policy dialogue but also as part of the dialogue itself. Continuous negotiations determine how, where, and who is or is not included in this complex adaptive system. This has sparked a fast-paced expansion of the dialogue system in terms of plans and priorities, donor coordination, aid modalities, government reform programs, the Government of Tanzania, and consultative processes. The continuous and often spontaneous technical adjustments within the aid landscape are emblematic of how complex adaptive systems undergo internal fluctuations in order to maintain overall stability.
This chapter maps these major technical changes, while Chapter 7 takes a closer look at the power dynamics embedded in the dialogue process. Combined, these chapters explore how various actors within the international development network come together to negotiate within various policy spaces. The actors, smaller policy spaces, and resultant negotiations combine to create a complex adaptive system. As discussed in Chapter 2, the principles of the complex adaptive system are used in this dissertation to explore the archeology of internal patterns of relational power.

2.0 A Marriage of Necessity

The relationship between the Government of Tanzania and the donor community can best be described as a marriage of necessity. In its first twenty years post-independence, under the leadership of Julius Nyerere, Tanzania experimented with two popular movements, one calling for African nationalism and the other for African socialism. In the first case, Nyerere’s moral leadership supported the national project through the promotion of a unified language (Swahili) and social programs, without the expulsion of the Indian population that took place in Uganda and Zanzibar. Many credit his work with the fact that Tanzania has been able to avoid the ethnic polarization that has crippled its neighbors (Pratt, 2002). In terms of the second popular movement, African Socialism, Nyerere did not achieve comparable success.

As part of the non-align movement, Tanzania set out on a course for African socialism as described in the Arusha Declaration and Ujamaa. The policies prescribed collectivized farming, nationalization, import substitution, and currency control. Despite their intention to be non-aligned, the policies effectively positioned Tanzania on the socialist side of the

38 Tanganyika gained independence in 1961, and then in 1964 the mainland joined with the island of Zanzibar. The country was renamed Tanzania under the new union.
39 The Arusha Declaration was signed on February 5, 1967, and outlined a program of African socialism that emphasized self-reliance and locally administered villages.
40 Ujamaa is a Swahili word referring to an extended family or family-hood. As a Tanzanian policy, it called for the villagization or relocation of rural Tanzanians into planned communities with collective agricultural enterprises. It was widely unpopular and the government eventually resorted to moving the population by force, burning old settlements and making political arrests between 1973-1976. This resulted in severe disruptions to society and, especially, agricultural production.
iron curtain, severely straining relations with the US and Britain. This was accentuated by Tanzania’s moral stance against the creation of Israel and South African apartheid (Pratt, 1976). One respondent, who was part of the Tanzanian delegation to the 1971 Commonwealth Conference in Singapore, recalled that Trudeau and Nyerere became trusted allies in the lead up to and during these talks. At this time, Tanzania and a number of other African nations were threatening to leave the Commonwealth if the British continued to sell arms to South Africa (Redekop, 1982). The respondent and Redekop (1982) credit Trudeau with brokering the key compromise and ensuring the Commonwealth of Nations remained intact. Outside the Commonwealth, the Nordic countries were also fascinated by the socialist experiment and remained strong supporters. As part of this legacy, Canada and the Nordic countries (particularly Denmark) are still seen as key members of the Tanzanian donor community.

In the 1970s, the Tanzanian economy was struggling, but it was the war with Uganda\textsuperscript{41} and the subsequent oil crisis that eventually crippled the economy and resulted in measures such as government rationing and currency control (Harrison et al., 2009). By 1980/1981 the Tanzanian economy was in ruins, and Nyerere was forced to seek support from IFIs. Nyerere was opposed, however, to the strict neoliberal and policy-based conditionalities that accompanied IFI loans. In an attempt to compromise, a team of World Bank and Tanzanian officials spent a year in Dar es Salaam trying to draft an aid package that would meet the requirements of both parties. The failure to reach an agreement and the rejection of the conditionalities is best summed-up by Nyerere himself. At different points during negotiations he was quoted as asking, “Who appointed the IMF Finance Minister of the world?” and as saying directly to his guests, “You know, gentlemen, I asked for money, not advice!” (Helleiner, 2002: 55).

Tanzania slipped further into economic ruin, and change was inevitable. In 1986, Nyerere stepped down as President and oversaw the country’s first multi-party elections. The new administration worked with the World Bank and IMF to implement structural adjustment

\textsuperscript{41} With tacit backing from the international community and Ugandan exiles, Tanzania invaded Uganda and deposed its military leader, Idi Amin, in 1979.
programs of fiscal austerity, privatization, and trade liberalization (Helleiner, 2002). On the donor side, this new arrangement opened the doors for an influx of aid, and Tanzania became the new “donor darling”. However, on the Government of Tanzania’s side, many people held a different perspective. As Wangwe notes, “the relationship had changed from one in which Tanzania owned its policies in the 1970s to one in which the policy agenda was largely driven by the Breton Wood Institutions with donor support” (2002: vii). This quiet resentment was further compounded by the downturn in the economy and persistent poverty.

By the early 1990s the relationship between donors and the government became strained once again. Donors were accusing the government of not fulfilling its obligations under the aid agreements. According to the donors, the main issues were a slumping economy, budget over-runs, corruption, failure to collect revenue, and the slow implementation of structural adjustment policies, particularly in the area of privatization (Helleiner et al. 1995). The World Bank halted preparations for the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), and other donors followed suit by cutting funding and/or suspending aid to Tanzania altogether. A CIDA official stationed in Tanzania at the time recalled that in the early 1990s, “we were thinking of completely divesting our funding. I think our economic reality and the political situation at that time came head to head, so the decision had to be taken—until they shape up. Fortunately, they decided not to withdraw completely” (4: 12). In fact, CIDA’s data shows that after being among the top 20 recipient countries since 1965, Tanzania fell off this list in 1995 (Morrison, 1998), only to be placed back on the list again in 2003.

Once again, the perception was different from the other side of the negotiation table. A number of respondents (including several donor partners and CSOs) as well as the Helleiner reports indicated that the donor partners’ accusations in the early 1990s were overstated in several ways. First, it was important to understand the enormity of the task being undertaken in Tanzania. It takes longer than five or even ten years to transform a bankrupt socialist state into a functioning free market economy. Second, Tanzania’s under-paid, under-resourced and over-worked civil service could not keep up with the
donors’ demands. One respondent recalled that within the Tanzanian External Finance Department, for instance, there was only one staff member assigned for every three or four donors. That staff member was also in charge of liaising with various ministries associated with a wide array of projects. Thus, meeting the donors’ information and reporting requirements was almost impossible. Third, facing global “aid fatigue” and a downturn in the international markets, the donors placed undue responsibility for development failure at the feet of the recipient government (Helleiner et al. 1995). From a Tanzanian perspective, the overreaction of donors further damaged relations.

This phase is important to take note of because it illustrates several issues. On the donors’ side there is a tendency to engage in groupthink, to try to exert influence over the government, and to blame program failure on the recipient government’s inability to implement policies and programs rather than on the policies themselves (Helleiner et al., 1995). This situation was exacerbated by Tanzania’s covert and subtle strategies of negotiation. Unable to compete with the well-funded and educated donor class who were able to articulate their views in accordance with Western professional standards, Tanzanians often used delays and claimed a lack of capacity to mask a general unwillingness to implement aid policies and programs. For example, one respondent noted that policies dictating the privatization of hospitals, which have been put forth ever since the 1980s, are still controversial in Tanzania. As discussed in the next chapter, non-compliance is frequently employed as a means to negotiate ownership of the development process.

In 1994, the Government of Tanzania and its Nordic donors sought mediation. They hired Gerald Helleiner to lead a team of senior-level consultants to study the government-donor relationship and to propose a process for revitalization (Harrison et al., 2009). In 1995, they released the report, Development Cooperation Issues between Tanzania and Its Aid Donors, authored by the Independent Group of Advisors, which would later become known as the Helleiner Report. While critical of both sides, its recommendations set the stage for a reconciliation process. This process involved a series of workshops, agreements, and monitoring reports to ensure the report’s recommendations were
implemented. Successive reviews in 1997, 1999, and 2002 eventually grew into a permanent process for which an Independent Monitoring Group (IMG) was created to assess the relations between the Government of Tanzania and its donor partners (Wangwe, 2002). The reviews were based on interviews conducted by the team and included recommendations and grades for each side. A Tanzanian respondent involved in drafting these reports noted that the process was successful because Helleiner “was tough on each side equally” (13: 23).

The underlying theme of the Helleiner report was effective management of aid flows and country ownership. The report’s overall vision can be broken down into three categories.

a. **Donors:** The report found that the donor community was placing unrealistic demands on the Government of Tanzania with serious disregard for ownership. The report recommended that donors avoid excessive technical assistance; decentralize their own organizations; take local ownership “seriously” in terms of reviewing their organizational culture and adopting flexible policies that allow for the incorporation of local conditions and priorities; organize with other donors in sector and sub-sector groups; combine and streamline assistance; provide long-term aid projections for the budget process; and resume aid as soon as possible, especially for non-project support of the government budget (Helleiner et al. 1995).

b. **Government of Tanzania:** The report found that the Government of Tanzania lacked leadership and capacity. Recommendations focused on building the government’s capacity to take ownership of development policies. They recommended that the government prepare first drafts of documents; build government capacity; set short, medium and long-term development priorities for the country in a consultative manner; incorporate external finance into the budget; use the Public Expenditure Review (PER) system to articulate, implement and monitor priorities and investments; stabilize revenues; reform the civil service; implement reform programs in a timely manner; strengthen the capacity of the
Ministry of Finance and its budgeting process; build capacity to coordinate aid; increase civil society participation in the design of social sector strategies; increase budget transparency; re-examine specific economic policies; and increase fiscal control (Helleiner et al. 1995).

c. Aid coordination: The report also suggested that both parties should coordinate on a number of key issues. They recommended that the two parties restore trust; coordinate aid under country priorities; avoid PIUs; harmonize procedures and information; and include external finance in the budgeting and monitoring processes (Helleiner et al. 1995).

These recommendations set the stage for the evolution of the aid ecosystem in Tanzania and for what Harrison, Mulley, and Holtom (2009) dubbed the Helleiner narrative. Harrison et al. build upon Roe’s definition of policy narratives, which compares the structure of “policies to that of the folktale, in which a crisis summons forth a hero, who battles a series of obstacles, emerges triumphant, and everyone lives happily ever after” (Brock et al. 2001: 5). In the case of the Helleiner narrative, this series of reports tells the tale of two well-intentioned groups who were unable to work together to reduce poverty. However, these obstacles can be overcome by a prescribed set of common sense policies created to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Tanzanian aid management system. It is the support and maintenance of this “Tanzanian model of development” that is driving development policy and the subsequent creation of the dialogue process. Further, the Helleiner narrative entered into a feedback loop within international development policy circles, reinforcing the discourse of aid effectiveness discussed in Chapter 4.

The Helleiner narrative presents a coherent set of recommendations and supporting ideas that gloss over the inherent contradictions between Tanzania’s ownership of policies and donors’ engagement in the policy dialogue. Within the narrative, governments will establish plans and priorities, conduct government reforms, and organize mechanisms for policy dialogue between donors and civil society in return for donors transferring
ownership and aid management to the Government of Tanzania. However, as pointed out earlier, the donors’ criteria for reforms and establishing a policy dialogue process allows them to be more, not less, influential in the national politics of Tanzania. This theme of ownership and policy dialogue will re-emerge throughout the following two chapters.

3.0 The Dialogue Process
Driven by the Helleiner narrative, the aid bureaucracy in Dar es Salaam grew substantially over the course of 15-20 years. Since the mid-1990s, the donor community and the Government of Tanzania created a series of consultative processes and coordination mechanisms on an ad hoc basis that took on a life of their own. The complicated maze of joint committees, secretariats, and sector working groups depicted in Figure 6: Cross Section of the Tanzanian Dialogue Process (page 151) is merely a snapshot of an evolving process as of 2005. Given the complexity of the organizational chart and the confusion of acronyms it presents, it is not surprising that many respondents admitted to not being aware of the entire dialogue process.

The general purpose of the dialogue process is to provide a space for the Government of Tanzania and its development partners to engage in policy dialogue and effectively coordinate aid flows. As stated in the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST), “Dialogue is a discourse between stakeholders on particular issues with the view to learning, exchanging of information and views, and guiding the development policy making process” (United Republic of Tanzania, 2006: 20). A few of the respondents described the dialogue process as constituting a parallel government in which the donor partners participate in aid management alongside the Tanzanian ministries, departments, and agencies. In keeping with the characteristics of a complex adaptive system described in Chapter 2, the dialogue process in Tanzania consists of a large number of loosely affiliated committees and working groups that form an interconnected web.

In some instances the international representatives and committee procedures follow unwritten diplomatic protocol and Western professional standards. In other circumstances working groups within the dialogue process have codified these procedures through
Terms of Reference and Memorandums of Understanding. Some groups have even engaged full-time staff to provide administrative assistance. As one respondent noted, the dialogue process “is an organic and evolving process” and the development of the various sectors depends on the “experience of the people” (2: 15). This has resulted in a dialogue process that is quite fluid and, at times, patchy in terms of its organizing principles and practices.

This uneven evolution is further complicated by the fact that the Government of Tanzania and its donor partners participate in the dialogue process on a voluntary basis and to varying degrees. This has created a situation in which the individual actors operating in the dialogue process represent and are accountable to their respective agencies, governments, and taxpayers outside the aid ecosystem. One respondent posed the questions: “Who is he or she accountable to? What will make that person get promoted or not? What can get that person in trouble or not? Those incentives and those accountabilities virtually never have anything to do with this dialogue process” (34:8). A respondent from the Tanzanian External Finance Office expressed concern that, “all the donors have signed on to Paris and JAST but they are restricted by their systems at home. There needs to be changes to the regulations and administration of aid flows in the home countries in order to allow field office to participate in the dialogue structure” (40:23). In this regard, practitioners are continuously balancing their engagement in the dialogue process with the demands of their home governments or organizations.

Despite the lines of accountability pulling away from the dialogue process, the broad international mandates, disbursement pressures, and peer pressure loosely hold the dialogue process together. International mandates such as the Paris Declaration provide the rationale or storyline for the policies, while disbursement and peer pressure provide some, albeit weak, incentives to follow the policies. Both the donors and the Government of Tanzania need to disburse aid. The donors are under pressure to spend their budgets in a timely and effective manner, and to ensure that they continue receiving budget allocations. The Government of Tanzania is under pressure to supplement its budget and provide services and programs to its citizens. These pressures are accentuated by
professional motivations. A number of respondents noted that their professional reputations among international colleagues, especially within the small cadre of transient development experts, depend upon their being knowledgeable concerning current policy developments. This combination of pressures drives the policy agenda.

The dialogue process is both a result of and a venue for negotiations between the Government of Tanzania and its development partners. In other words, the actors in the system are constantly negotiating the design of the various spaces for dialogue (attendance, timing, agendas, etc.). These designs are continually under negotiation and contribute to the evolution of the aid ecosystem. This evolution occurs during moment-to-moment decision-making that is based on a practical assessment of what works in a given situation. In this manner, the various sectors of the dialogue process are able to absorb and/or adapt to chaotic circumstances, which in turn can either contribute to changes or maintain stability within the international bureaucracy. This exemplifies the characteristics of a complex adaptive system.

The proposal to create a High-level Policy Dialogue forum for the Heads of Missions (HOMs) provides a key example of the fluidity and constant negotiation embedded in the aid bureaucracy. Within the dialogue process, the Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) was designed to be a high-level forum for the Heads of Missions and the Tanzanian Chief Secretary. While initially successful under President Mkapa (1995-2005), one respondent noted that things began to change under President Kikwete (2005-present) when the Tanzanian chair of the committee began to cancel or postpone meetings starting from 2006 onwards. S/he speculated that the Tanzanians did not want to face questions about a series of high-level corruption scandals being covered in the news media. Frustrated, the donor partners sought to create an additional venue for the HOMs to coordinate and address larger issues as they arose. It was hoped that if the HOMs spoke with one voice then they would have more sway with senior government officials and would eventually overcome obstacles within the aid management system. In this regard, the content and structure of the dialogue process are part of the negotiations.
The constant negotiation of content and configuration has led to fast-paced evolution around several organizing themes. The next section describes how the dialogue process was expanded and how the donor partners and the Government of Tanzania are now streamlining their aid mechanisms. The twists and turns in the evolution of this bureaucracy illustrate a complex adaptive system driven by aid effectiveness discourse, the Helleiner narrative, and a multitude of smaller micro-policy negotiations that occur in daily practice.

4.0 The Expansion of the Dialogue Process

In 2005, an organizational chart (Figure 6) of the Tanzania dialogue process was produced that highlights expansion in six areas: plans and priorities, donor coordination, aid modalities, government reform and capacity building, government bureaucracy, and the consultative processes. The expansion occurred in relation to two separate and sometimes conflicting practices. First, a number of venues for the dialogue process were designed to mimic the goals and objectives set out in Tanzania’s PRSP, while other groups were organized around aid modalities. Although it is recognized that the aid ecosystem in Dar es Salaam has always been complicated, the extent and nature of the recent expansion of the process has created an excessively complex labyrinth of venues/spaces for aid coordination and policy debate.

Figure 6: Cross Section of the Tanzanian Dialogue Process illustrates the complexity of this process. Without explaining each acronym, the chart above shows how the dialogue process is intended to flow from the plans and priorities established in Tanzania’s second PRSP (or MKUKUTA). Under the PRSPs, the Tanzanian government and donor partners agreed to engage in a series of consultative processes, Sector-Wide Approaches42 (SWAps), as well as scaling up and shifting their funds to government reform programs, pooled funds, and GBS. The SWAps and shifts in aid modalities resulted in the creation

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42 The JAST defines a SWAp as “a mechanism for organizing dialogue between the relevant Government agency, Development Partners and non-state stakeholders around a particular sector and its policies, strategies and programs. Development Partners adopt a harmonized approach to their engagement in the sector. A SWAp is not a funding instrument and all aid modalities (GBS, basket, and project funds) can be used under it” (United Republic of Tanzania, 2006: 34).
of more workings groups to coordinate aid activities. Membership in these groups ranges from the Government of Tanzania exclusively, to both Government and donor partners, to donor partners exclusively, depending on the circumstances in which the groups were created. On rare occasions, a few CSOs are invited to participate as well.

4.1 Plans and Priorities

The setting of plans and priorities provides an overall structure for the dialogue process. This is in keeping with the first Helleiner Report, which recommended that, “In consultation with the wider public, civil society and the donor community, the incoming government should urgently formulate a clear, practical, medium and long-term development strategy for the country and be far more vigorous in seeking to impose the resulting policy and project priorities on the donors” (Helleiner et al. 1995: 19). The authors argued that an overarching framework with clear plans and priorities was necessary for the Tanzanian government to take ownership and coordinate aid. This recommendation and international pressure gave rise to the reports and frameworks, listed in Table 5, that are often held up as examples of country ownership through domestically set priorities. While they serve to legitimize Tanzanian ownership within the dialogue process, there is much debate over whether the documents reflect ownership or donorship.43

A review of these documents reveals that Vision 2025 outlines very broad goals for the future, while the Tanzanian Assistance Strategy (TAS) defines the parameters of how the Government of Tanzania and the donor partners could work together to deliver aid. The TAS was first drafted in 1997 by the Government of Tanzania and mainly focused on changing the behaviour of the donor partners. However, it was put on hold for several years when the government applied for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program of the World Bank. The HIPC program required a PRSP

43 Cramer et al. (2006) use the term donorship to refer to a relationship between a donor partner and recipient government in which the donor has “omniscient external judgment” or the right of last refusal over economic and political issues in the recipient country. This is accompanied by the expectation that the recipient government will express the political committed to implement the sound policies as identified by the donor. The term also “incorporates the presumption that if development assistance fails in its goals, the blame lies with the recipient government” (Cramer et al., 2006: 423).
focused on government strategies, development policies, and priorities. One respondent noted that, initially, the Government of Tanzania was resistant to the PRSP requirement and tried to submit their draft TAS in lieu of a PRSP. The World Bank rejected the TAS and insisted the Government develop a PRSP based on the Bank’s format. Thus, the government suspended work on the TAS and focused on developing a PRSP.

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<td>The National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (PRSP II), also know in Tanzania as the MKUKTUA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

While at first glance it seems that the PRSP was simply drafted to meet the Bank’s conditions, Gould (2005) and Holtom (2005) found that the process was far more nuanced. First, they identified a pro-reform network of professionals who supported neoliberal economic policies as well as IMF and World Bank macroeconomic policies. This network included members from the Tanzanian government, research centers, NGOs, the University of Dar es Salam, and donor agencies. Holtom notes that, “Because both the government and donors, such as the Fund, agreed in principle on the need for neo-liberal economic reforms, it was not conditionality *per se* that drove policy and reform; it was the discursive power of institutions like the Bank and Fund, embodied in the sort of ‘epistemic community’ that developed in Tanzania and drafted the PRSP”
The network of pro-reformers that Holtom later describes as a “fraternity of economists” illustrates how organizations such as the World Bank or the Tanzanian Ministry of Finance represent groups of people who work closely together, sharing ideas and perspectives. Thus, it is important to recognize that there are multiple layers of negotiations between organizational positions and individual perspectives and practices.

Taking a more critical stance, Gould (2005) argued that Tanzania’s first PRSP illustrated that, “the rhetoric of partnership signals a strategic shift in the management of North-South relations away from the carrot and stick of credits and conditionality to a subtler dynamic of alleged mutual complicity” (2005: 63). This complicity is funneled through heuristic tools such as timing (scheduling events and deadlines for proposals), scale (ability to participate in trans-local dialogue), and style (communicating according to professional business standards) (Gould, 2005). In this manner, the old patterns of conditionality and paternalism continue to shape the PRSP process and its outcomes despite the appearance of mutual reciprocity. As is discussed later in Chapter 7, these hidden processes reinforce a form of governmentality, essentially maintaining the status quo.

Since Tanzania was the second country to submit a PRSP, there was a great deal of pressure on both the Tanzanians and the World Bank staff to develop a high-quality document. It was clear that IFIs had a strong influence on the document because, as one respondent involved in its development described, “the World Bank and IMF, of course, are always seeking perfection and just drilling down all the time” (5: 34). The desire for “perfection” or “good policy,” as defined by the donor partners, serves as yet another pressure point for conditionality. During Holtom’s research, “a senior government policy-maker confirmed allegations from two bilateral donors that the Bank rejected early drafts of the PRSP because they did not adequately address ‘cross-cutting issues’ like gender and the environment” (2007: 243). Holtom further noted that despite the fact that the Tanzanian Cabinet rejected the policy to abolish school fees, the Bank (with donor backing and additional funds) successfully pressed for the abolition of school fees during the last Tanzanian Presidential review of the document. In this case, the World Bank’s
influence was diffused through the technical negotiation process and a network of pro-
reformers within the Tanzanian aid ecosystem.

Globally, most critiques of the PRSPs focused on the process through which the plans were drafted. The first draft of the Tanzanian PRSP was based on a series of working groups that developed strategies for specific sectors. The working groups were chaired by Tanzanian officials and included a mixture of government representatives and donor partners. However, participation by CSOs and the public was generally weak and centered on several zonal workshops designed to facilitate wider participation. Most observers felt that this initial attempt to broaden participation was a positive step, even though the results were disappointing. A senior CIDA official who was involved in the process described the CSO participation as thus:

There was a road show for each of the strategies. So that was another first for the government, and it wasn’t without pressure. The donors felt it was particularly important because of the lack of NGO involvement. It was a situation in which it was really, really important to go out and field test the different sectors. So the government arranged basically town hall meetings throughout the country. For instance, if I recall correctly, the health group went north to Arusha and then there was a series of town hall meetings held in Arusha. It was basically explained to the villagers. I mean this was really unusual, right, to explain what was going on to the villagers and then to get their feedback on that. And again, there are always complaints about, well, there wasn’t enough and there wasn’t this, but it was done. It was actually attempted. The reports that I heard back from some sectors were that it was really appreciated. (4: 31)

In this regard, the donor partners insisted on participation that was done with at least some degree of consultation. The few donor partner respondents that participated in the first PRSP process suggested that the limitations placed on the participation of CSOs and the public are often linked to resistance from the Government of Tanzania,\(^4^{4}\) inexperience in organizing participatory processes, and a general lack of capacity within CSOs.

\(^4^{4}\) From a purely technical prospective the government is an elected representation of citizenry. Thus, it could be argued that the people of Tanzanian already participated in the process through elections.
Overall, my research found that the donor community generally felt that CSOs in Tanzania lacked the capacity to participate in high-level dialogues regarding national policy and macroeconomic issues. This lack of capacity is due to differences of professional style and language, a relatively young civil society developing in a post-socialist state that did not recognize citizens’ engagement outside of the national party prior to the 1980s, and the continuation of heavy government regulation. PRSP consultations included the country’s few available policy-oriented CSOs, including the now-defunct Tanzanian Coalition for Debt and Development (TCDD), Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), and Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF). It is important to note that the leadership of organizations such as REPOA and ESRF could also be included in the pro-reform group with the government and donor officials. The lack of participation in the PRSP process spurred a number of donors to create and support an NGO, called the Policy Forum, to monitor and advocate on national policy and macroeconomics issues.

With the approval of the first PRSP, the Government of Tanzania turned its attention back to its TAS. Officially adopted in 2002, the TAS “is a national medium-term framework for managing external resources and guiding development co-operation between the Government and its Development Partners” (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, 2003: 1). The TAS contains best practices for development cooperation and a long list of sectoral priorities. These were elaborated in the TAS

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45 While these technical observations are common within the aid bureaucracy, there is a critical approach that views the discourse around capacity as a yet another means of asserting power within the existing discourse. This is discussed further in Chapter 7.
46 The case study shows that the research agendas of institutions such as REPOA and ESRF tend to support neoliberal economic policies. In fact, there is a circulation of high-level personnel between these institutes, the Government of Tanzania, and the University of Dar es Salaam. As of 2008, most international and local NGOs were focused on service provisions for particular issues such health, education, micro-finance, etc. However, a few organizations, such as the Tanzanian Gender Network Programme, Haki Elimu, and the Tanzania Media Forum are taking a more critical stance towards government policies and the dialogue process. During the 2008 Annual Budget Review, representatives from a group of NGOs were allowed to observe from seats in the corner behind the donor partners. They were only given one opportunity to speak during the four-day meeting, at which time their comments were merely acknowledged. This example supports the arguments of Kiondo and Mogella (2006) who suggest that the Government of Tanzania’s perspective on CSOs is limited to service provision. Kiondo and Mogella’s arguments are supported by the tone of the Non-Governmental Act proposed in 2002 (Ndumbaro & Mvungi, 2006) as well as the closure of Haki Elimu after it launched a successful advocacy campaign (Ranji, 2005).
Implementation Report 2002/2003 – 2003/2004, which includes an additional four priority areas designed to strengthen the government’s position on aid management:

1. Improving the predictability of aid flows
2. Integrating external resources in the Government budget system
3. Harmonizing and rationalizing processes
4. Capacity building for aid coordination and external resource management
   (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, 2003: 2)

The TAS also includes an IMG, which is tasked with the responsibility of assessing the condition of Government of Tanzania – donor partner relations. The language used here clearly carries forward the policies of the Helleiner narrative and echoes international discourse on aid effectiveness.

Tanzania’s second PRSP (2005) was titled the *National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty* (NSGRP), and is better known by its Swahili acronym, MKUKUTA. While the updated version makes a number of minor modifications to the original process and format, the overarching themes remain the same. The three main, broad clusters in the MKUKUTA are:

1. Growth of the economy and reduction in income poverty
2. Improvement of quality of life and social well-being
3. Governance and accountability
   (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005: 3)

These clusters, along with the crosscutting issues of gender, environment, and HIV/AIDS, are the basis for the main body of the dialogue process. One respondent described the clusters as pillars of development and organizing principles for the SWAps.

Despite some changes in the second PRSP, the coordinating committee remained situated in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs and the document still required approval by the boards of the IFIs. In fact, there has been relatively limited circulation of the official and popularized versions of the MKUKUTA outside the development community in Dar es Salaam. One respondent from a well-respected CSO in Dar es Salaam joked, “if you ask the Tanzanian people what the MKUKUTA is, they have no idea. Some would
say it is a village; it doesn’t sound like a strategy” (10: 49). Another Tanzanian observed, “the MKUKTUA is not for us” (21: 32). Figure 7 contains a cartoon found in the popularized version of the MKUKUTA that unfortunately illustrates the Government of Tanzania’s approach to participation.

The impact of the MKUKTUA is found not so much in its content and circulation as it is found in how the document is used in practice. In this regard, the PRSP functions differently for the various actors involved in the dialogue process. The Government of Tanzania uses the document to meet the conditions for debt relief, to defend their position within domestic politics by stating that they are working according to the plan, and as proof of ownership over its own plans and priorities. The donor community employs the PRSP as a means of legitimizing their activities in Tanzania. Donor partners continually refer to themselves as “working within the MKUKUTA,” insinuating that they are following the Government of Tanzania’s leadership. Yet, as discussed above, these are
not necessarily government-owned documents and contain excessively vague language. A prominent member of Tanzanian civil society noted that the “MKUKUTA is another charade. There are too many priorities, so the government [and donor partners] can decide what they want to spend their money on” (22: 118). Nonetheless, the international community uses the PRSP as a key component of the Tanzanian model and part of its aid effectiveness discourse.

The different strategic uses of the same document illustrate several sometimes-contradictory processes. Broad policy statements can bring diverse groups together and generate legitimacy for certain sets of action. However, this legitimacy does not necessarily translate into a high level of coherence. In many cases, terms were redefined and used to justify existing policies and new sets of activities. Further, actors within the dialogue process negotiate with each other, creating a high degree of peer pressure to follow certain policy norms and frameworks. It is this process of push and pull that creates a veneer of continuity or a common policy discourse, but numerous discontinuities or disjunctures exist just below the surface.

With the second PRSP in place, the Government of Tanzania and its development partners returned their attention to the TAS once again. While the TAS received general support in 2002, the donor partners did not fully participate in drafting the document, nor did they sign it. Thus, in 2006, an updated version was developed in cooperation with the donor partners, called the JAST. This document contains much broader commitments and includes non-state actors, while also strengthening connections to the international aid effectiveness discourse. One respondent stated that, “the JAST is the embodiment of the Paris Declaration in Tanzania” (40: 31). In fact, the JAST Action Plan and Monitoring Framework is organized around principles of ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability, and incorporates indicators used by the OECD DAC for gauging the Paris Declaration’s progress.47

47 The indicators shared by the Paris Declaration and the JAST include: “Percentage of technical assistance for capacity development through coordinated programs managed by the government; Reliable public financial management; Reliable procurement system is in place; ODA recorded in national budget as percentage of actual ODA to Government; Number of PIUs; Percentage of ODA disbursements that use
One of the most challenging objectives under the JAST is the division of labour between donor partners. This is a process of rationalization through which the Government of Tanzania organizes the donor partners into different sectors and thematic working groups focusing on health, education, governance, etc. It would reduce the overcrowding in some sectors, such as health, and increase representation in other sectors, such as land reform. The intent is to divide the labour in a manner that will improve representation and distribute the workload more evenly among donor partners without reducing the overall amount of aid.

The division of labour process also plays a symbolic role in signifying substantial changes in the international development bureaucracy. If the Government of Tanzania is successful in corralling the donor partners into specific sectors or themes, this will mark a reversal in how aid is traditionally delivered. For example, instead of CIDA making large global commitments and then setting aid policy in Ottawa/Gatineau before negotiating conditions for the disbursal of funds with the recipient countries along those thematic lines, CIDA’s engagement would be determined at the mission level, meaning that the Government of Tanzania would give CIDA directions to disburse aid to certain sectors. The donor policy would essentially move up from the mission level to headquarters. While the policies’ reversal of direction is a step toward Tanzanian ownership of aid, the major challenge of implementation remains.

According to the JAST, the division of labour will be implemented in two stages. First, the donor partners will voluntarily reduce their number of representatives (not dollars) in each sector. As seen in Figure 8, the different sectors will ideally transition from a situation wherein all donor partners participate equally to a situation in which donors voluntarily sort themselves into the categories of lead, active, and delegated partners. The donor partners expand their leadership roles to include a tripartite arrangement of in-

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national financial reporting procedures; Percent of ODA disbursements that use national auditing procedures; Percentage of ODA disbursements that use national procurement procedures; ODA disbursement recorded in Government accounting system as percentage of ODA commitments to Paris; Percentage of total missions that are joint/coordinated; and, Percent of country analytical work that is joint/coordinated” (United Republic of Tanzania, 2007: 3-18).
coming, current, and outgoing chairs. This aims to ensure more continuity from year to year while also reinforcing trust and accountability among the members. The process has already begun in sectors where there are fewer donors and less controversy, such as law. However, it will be much more challenging to implement this process in sectors such as health where there are a greater number of donors, more substantial contributions, and controversial policy debates.

The delegation of active roles to a small group of donor partners is constrained by the donor partners’ level of trust and by administrative procedures. The delegation process is based on trusting colleagues to ensure accountability for spending and in terms of their engagement in policy negotiations. This has generated concern over which donor partners will make weak or strong leads. The need for trust and accountability translates into organizational procedures that may limit donor partners’ abilities to participate in the division of labour. As one observer noted, “for some donors it is fine, but certain donors cannot delegate. It is a standing order from headquarters. If they are asked to delegate, they will have to pull out financially. They cannot provide...
funds to a sector without being active” (17: 19). It seems the voluntary process can only work for a limited time before a more active approach will be required.

The second, more difficult step was just beginning to be taken at the time of this research. The Government of Tanzania and its donor partners started a negotiation process to divide the donor partners between the various sectors and thematic working groups. According to planning documents and the aid effectiveness discourse, the government must take the lead on deciding which donors invest their aid in which areas. The selection should be based on criteria described in the JAST document:

The selection of the areas of focus for individual development partners and their roles as lead or delegating partners will be based on their comparative and, where applicable, competitive advantage. This is determined by a Development Partner’s established international and field office expertise, based on past successful experience, in a particular sector, thematic area or sub-sector. It also includes in-depth knowledge of local conditions at mission level. It does not depend on a Development Partner’s funding capacity. (United Republic of Tanzania, 2006: 13)

Despite the rational agenda outlined in the JAST—a document that both donor partners and the Tanzanian government agreed upon—officials were hesitant to start the process. As one respondent noted, “it is a little like putting your hand in a nest of bees” (17: 1). However, in 2008 the Government of Tanzania circulated a chart with a breakdown of sectors and themes, active donor partners, and designated leads without a written rationale to explain the selection (see Appendix C and D). When asked during interviews, most donor partner respondents provided a diplomatic response to the plan laid out in the chart; however, in the corridors I heard outright rejections of the plan. There was some suspicion among the donor partners that the Government of Tanzania may be selecting weak donor partners to lead as an overall aid negotiation strategy. Further, some donors are questioning whether it is the government’s role to dictate donor leadership. One respondent noted that, “I don’t think it should be up to the Government of Tanzania to tell us who should lead on the behalf of donors. It should be the donors who should be

48 USAID has been clear on its position that it is not allowed to delegate authority without special approval from Congress—making this process virtually impossible. However, USAID is not alone in this regard. Other donor partners, including CIDA, will not be able to fulfill their agency’s reporting requirements if they delegate authority for spending.
deciding who they want to trust as the lead donor” (25: 60). This suggests that issues of trust and reputation among peers play an important role in ownership among donor partners and with recipient governments, as is discussed further in Chapter 7.

In response to the Government of Tanzania’s proposal, the donor partners decided to develop their own self-assessments of how they can add value to their preferred sectors. The self-assessments will then undergo a peer review process before they are submitted to the JAST working group. While it is too early to judge the success of this process, it is apparent that establishing the division of labour will be a lengthy process with numerous negotiations and informal conversations. One respondent described the difficulty of the task ahead thus:

Wow—what happens if we are told to get out of a sector? Are we going to? Are we going to push back? In the spirit of Paris we may have to. We may have to say, “fine, we’ll take it,” in which case we will have to re-jig the machine—change the programming. One thing is for certain: it will not happen overnight. It is like trying to turn an oil tanker on a dime! (8: 13)

Each donor will have to work within their home organization to establish policies and procedures that will allow them to participate in the division of labour. This could entail headquarters moving from an issues-based allocation of funds to allocating funds based on the recipient country’s priorities and directives. A number of respondents questioned whether this could be done without reducing their overall contribution to Tanzania. Other respondents pointed to aid management systems in Rwanda, Ghana, and Ethiopia as cases where governments play a more active role in informing the donor partners where their aid will be most productive. One thing is clear: underneath the rational plans, there is a lengthy process of negotiation and contestation and at least uneven progress, especially with many donor partners still stumbling over the first steps in the division of labour.

As mentioned above, this process would require CIDA to decentralize its administration and completely reconfigure its policy framework. The decentralization would involve creating an administrative framework that provides country-based staff with the resources, responsibility, and authority to make decisions. The intent is to create a
legitimate basis for development practitioners to draft specialized policies and programs that respond to the requests of the Government of Tanzania. These site-specific policies would then move up through the agency and help shape the broader framework in Ottawa/Gatineau. This means that Canadian aid policy would have to move away from its focus on designated priorities (food security, sustainable economic growth, and children and youth) towards a more in-depth description of Canada’s philosophy and general commitment towards development. This would involve outlining guiding principles for development in a manner that could be adapted to each recipient government—an unlikely scenario in the current political climate.

As this section highlights, plans and priorities are the backbone of the dialogue process. The TAS and eventually the JAST provided general terms of engagement between the recipient government and donor partners. At the same time, successive PRSPs created a common framework within which government, donors, and, increasingly, civil society could work together. This storyline provides a cohesive narrative concerning how a technical-rational process generated agreement regarding a national development framework. The research also shows, however, that the planning documents gloss over the subterranean pathologies involved in their formation and eventual implementation—or lack thereof. Thus, the narrative is designed to allay fears and to reassure all parties that technical solutions will indeed overcome obstacles—whether active resistance or inertia. This is also reflected in the issues surrounding donor coordination, aid modalities, government reform programs, the Government of Tanzania, and large consultative processes.

### 4.2 Donor Coordination

One of the most significant areas of expansion within the Tanzanian dialogue process is donor coordination. Coordination among donor partners is based on the collegial relationship that has long existed in Dar es Salaam. Most of the major donors (with the exception of USAID) and multilateral organizations are literally neighbors in an area of
the city known as the “four-corners.” One respondent noted that “there has always been a donor group, but they were not as prominent. In Dar es Salaam the donors, multilaterals, and residential areas are all physically close” (5: 50).

As a group, the donor community has embraced the lessons of the Helleiner narrative and has built on the aid effectiveness principle of harmonization through common agreements, simplification of procedures, and information sharing. One donor explained that, “the architecture is pretty complex but the idea now is that the donors should speak with one voice” (4: 38). The examples range from simply coordinating mission trips to negotiating common positions. One participant noted that when the Government of Tanzania was drafting the first PRSP it received an estimated 44 sets of commitments from different donors. During the drafting of the second PRSP, the donors reviewed the early drafts together and submitted one set of comments. In this way, donor partners attempt to operationalize the harmonization principle by focusing on coordinating their engagement in policy dialogue with the Tanzanian government as well as their programming activities in each sector.

Overall, donor coordination in Tanzania has developed into a three-tiered structure in which SWAps or cluster working groups are intended to feed into the DPG, which in turn is intended to feed into the DCF. Starting with SWAps, these coordinating bodies are comprised of sector leads or program managers from the various donor agencies, their respective Tanzanian counterparts, and, on occasion, representatives from NGOs. The intention is to coordinate the various activities in specific sectors, such as health, education, and governance. The SWAps are meant to ensure that the various programs complement one another and that they are evenly distributed across the country.

The central forum for donor coordination in Tanzania is the DPG. The DPG grew from an informal group of “like-minded donors” in the 1990s into the DAC working group of

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49 The “four-corners” refers to the intersection of Mirambo Street and Garden Avenue where the majority of donors have their country offices. It is only a few blocks away from the Bank of Tanzania, the Tanzanian Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, and other major Ministries.
the early 2000s, finally becoming formalized as the DPG in 2004. Membership has expanded over the years to include representatives from UN organizations, IFIs, and the Heads of Aid from bilateral donors. Two co-chairs manage the DPG, with a permanent position for the Resident Coordinator of the UN and a rotating one-year post for an elected bilateral donor. There is also a permanent staff member stationed in the UN compound to provide organizational support. The DPG Terms of Reference state that their purpose is to “promote the implementation of the Paris principles on Aid Effectiveness in Tanzania’s growth and poverty reduction goals. In its efforts, the DPG under the Government leadership exists to organize better to improve quality of aid and development partnerships” (DPG, 2007: 1).

The DPG often discusses overarching issues and brings the donor partners together to speak with “one voice.” However, when significant issues arise the DPG can refer issues to the DCF. As discussed earlier, the DCF is supposedly the highest level of dialogue between the Heads of Missions and the Tanzanian Chief Secretary; yet the status of the forum was uncertain at the time of this research in 2008. There was speculation concerning whether the DCF would be dissolved, if the donors would create a second group for the HOMs to have private discussions, or if the DCF would transition into a Joint Coordination Group. At this level, the lead group would have more political leverage and could expect an audience with high-level officials from the Government of Tanzania. It is also noteworthy that, as members of the diplomatic community, the members of this group represent aid alongside a host of other interests—including trade, security, and immigration—on behalf of their home governments. In light of this, the DPG has remained the main forum for coordinating aid at the time of the research.

Given the voluntary nature of the DPG, the donor partners participate to varying degrees. Participation ranges from mere observation and coordination of projects to full support.

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50 DPG Membership as of 2007 was: Belgium (embassy and BTC), Canada (CIDA), Demark, European Union Delegation, Finland, France, Germany (GTZ, Embassy, and KfW), Ireland (DCI), Italy, Japan (Embassy and JICA), Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden (SIDA), Switzerland (SDC), UK (DFID), US (USAID and MCC), UN (UNDP, UNICEF, ILO, UNFPA, UNIDO, UNAIDS, UNCDF, WFP, UNHCR, FAO, UNESCO, WHO, UN-Habitat, IFAD), AfDB, IMF, and World Bank.

51 Follow-up research discovered that the lead group was eventually called the Joint Coordination Group (JCG).
through funds and human resources. For example, the Chinese representatives attended their first DPG meeting in October 2008 as observers only. USAID has been heavily involved in the DPG in terms of the coordination of projects but, according to the respondents, they cannot align with its reporting mechanisms, pool funds, or contribute to GBS without special approval from Congress. While Nordic+ countries tend to hold the middle ground, DFID is fully committed to the DPG, pooling funds and making large contributions to GBS. My research found that CIDA’s collaboration is constrained by its accountability framework and financial regulation, resulting in a lower ranking than the Nordic+ countries. However, CIDA field staff members have attempted to compensate for their lack of financial contribution with significant contributions to the dialogue process in terms of human resources, including holding the co-chair position in 2004 and again in 2008.

The varying levels of participation are accentuated by DPG’s internal negotiations. A number of respondents recognized that there are power differentials between the various individual bilateral donors, multilateral donors, UN agencies, and World Bank and IMF representatives. While the official discourse emphasizes equality, there is general recognition that reputation, area of expertise, value of contribution, allocation amounts, experience in the field, and length of posting play an important role in establishing status. One participant noted that “the World Bank might be a team player sometimes, and other times they have their own needs. The bigger the player the more you can be stronger, so smaller players have to basically make do with what is there” (32: 15).

The complex nature of this system often leads to contradictory positions. For instance, in 2008 the chair of the health sector was a representative from USAID. Speaking on behalf of the health donor group, s/he conveyed the message that the donor partners were committed to basket and GBS funding even though it was against his/her own agency’s policy. This type of contradiction or disjuncture is inherent in a complex system and seems to generally be accepted by both sides.
While the majority of respondents in this study felt that progress was being made in terms of donor coordination, concerns were beginning to emerge about the corollary effects. A number of donor partners expressed concerns over: the number of time-consuming meetings; varying levels of commitment and participation; fluctuating access to Tanzanian government officials; and, losing direct control/accountability over their allocations. While recognizing the difficulty in keeping the DPG focused, relevant, and efficient, there is a fear that “it has become a little like a mini UN” (8: 60). These concerns are raised with full acknowledgment that donor partners have only taken the first and somewhat easy steps of sharing information and coordinating activities around work that is already underway. Referencing the challenges posed by the division of labour, one donor noted, “the next step is harder: actually being proactive” (4: 27).

4.3 Aid Modalities
The transformation of aid modalities, or the mechanisms through which aid is delivered, is a central theme emerging at the recipient country level. The local Helleiner narrative and the international aid effectiveness discourse identified the tendency of donor agencies to create project islands as a root cause of the proliferation of Parallel Implementation Units (PIUs). The PIUs also increase administrative costs, contribute to the chaotic nature of aid distribution, and undermine the Tanzanian government’s ability to administer aid programs. The proposed solution is for donors to channel their funds through the Tanzanian Exchequer or “put their aid-on-budget” and coordinate their activities. This requires scaling up and participating in new aid modalities. Since the mid-1990s, donor partners have been expected to slowly shift their funds from projects to basket or pooled funds and eventually GBS. The latter would then transfer earmarked and non-earmarked funds directly to the Tanzanian Exchequer for the Government of Tanzania to disburse.

There are four underlying rationales of aid effectiveness at play here. First, pooled funds and shared reporting mechanisms will translate into the more efficient use of funds, which will have a greater impact on development. Second, using the recipient government’s administrative systems will strengthen and build the capacity of the Government of Tanzania. Third, funnelling aid through the recipient government’s
systems will promote national ownership of development policies. And fourth, it is envisioned that donors will gradually move from projects to pooled funds and then finally to GBS as their predominant aid modality. The discourse claims that the final transition to GBS will remain in place until the recipient government eventually transcends its requirement for aid, although most respondents expressed doubt that this final stage would be reached.

In practice, the mixture of aid modalities varies from donor to donor. As noted above, only USAID exclusively uses the project modality while DFID devoted 80% of its aid to GBS in 2007/2008. The majority of the Nordic+ donors are situated in the middle, using a combination of the three aid modalities. CIDA seems to be backing away from GBS in order to focus their aid contribution on the narrower but safer realm of pooled funds. Despite their commitment to Paris principles, all the donors continue to use off-budget project modalities to some extent.

<table>
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</table>

Source: Government of Tanzania, 2008

Despite early indications of a shift in aid modalities, a number of respondents indicated that the excitement about and momentum towards GBS in the early 2000s is starting to wane and the trend is now moving towards mixed portfolios. As seen in Table 6, the overall total aid flow recorded in Tanzania’s national budget still remains mixed with only a marginal increase in GBS and basket funds over a seven year period. The slight decrease in GBS in 2007/2008 occurred just after the Government of Tanzania came under close scrutiny during the corruption scandals of 2006/2007. The scandals contributed to the donor partners’ already nervous dispositions, making it more difficult
for them to relinquish control to aid recipients. In this regard, the shift in aid modalities touches on one of the key drivers of donor behaviour—to ensure accountability for aid dollars. It was also noted that pooled funds seem “safer” and allow for the collective negotiation of specific agreements with the recipient government. In this regard, the different types of aid modalities are not seen as the graduated process theorized in the aid effectiveness literature but as discrete modes of delivery.

While shifts in aid modalities did not have the significant impact theorized in the aid effectiveness literature, they contributed to the expansion of the dialogue structure in two areas. First, as groups of donors contributed to basket funds, they formed new spaces within the dialogue process. One respondent suggested that, “structures started forming in response to the basket funds… and then will eventually grow to include the strategy discussions” (16: 13). The financial controls, policy directions, and implementation of the baskets require committees and administration. These administrative units consist of only those donor partners who are contributing funds under the pooled agreement. They essentially become donor partner sub-groups within the larger SWAps.

Second, the increased emphasis on GBS has led to the creation of one of the more prominent venues in the dialogue process. The consultative process between the Government of Tanzania and GBS donors52 revolves around the Annual Budget Review. The review is a weeklong event involving the Government of Tanzania and the GBS donors. Its agenda includes discussing the Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) and donor pledges for the upcoming year. Preparation for this event involves a series of technical working groups that conduct reviews and negotiate ratings for each sector. The growing status of the Annual Budget Review is creating an imbalance within the overall dialogue process, as is discussed in section 4.6.

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4.4 Government Reform Programs

Tanzanian ownership of development policy stems from an awkward agreement between the donors and the government. On the one hand, the Helleiner narrative, aid effectiveness discourse, and jargon used within the dialogue process clearly indicate that Tanzania must assume ownership of aid management while donors must increasingly harmonize, align, and integrate their aid into government systems. Yet, on the other hand, the government must be committed to good policy, governance reform, the elimination of corruption, and to building their technical capacity before the donor partners will fully sign over the management of aid funds. This compromise is captured in the following statement from the JAST:

In order to achieve Tanzania’s development and poverty reduction goals and strengthen national ownership and the Government leadership of the development process, the capacity of individuals, organizations and institutions to efficiently and effectively manage the development partnership and perform their function in the development process needs to be strengthened at all levels of the Government and across society. (United Republic of Tanzania, 2006: 9)

This makes government reform programs and technical assistance a key condition of ownership and an integral part of the dialogue process.

As part of the Helleiner narrative and aid effectiveness discourse, this awkward agreement was mapped onto a pre-existing space in which the aforementioned governance issues already existed. There is ample evidence that inefficient government procedures, a lack of capacity, corruption, and a number of aid-backed government reform programs existed in Tanzania before the Helleiner Report. However, it is the articulation and definition of good governance as a condition for ownership that has renewed pressures on the reform programs. This also highlights a fundamental contradiction embedded in the narrative; namely, that the path to ownership is through government reform, but in order to ensure that government reforms are implemented, the donor partners need to become more involved in the government’s daily operations. This is clearly articulated in the negotiations around GBS:
These big reform programs are considered to be the most ambitious ever undertaken. These are being undertaken because donors are pouring nearly 800 million dollars worth of general budget support into the government’s coffers every year, so the big incentive is that you have to reform. These big reform programs are underlying processes to GBS. (25: 39)

These government reform programs have expanded the dialogue process even further as more working groups are created in order to ensure that government is moving forward with the programs at all levels, including ministries, departments, agencies, regions, local government, and village committees. Some of the core programs include: Public Service Reform Program (PSRP), Public Financial Management Reform Program (PFMRP), Legal Sector Reform Program (LSRF), Local Government Reform Program (LGRP), and National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan (NACSAP). While reform programs create a venue for the donor partners to influence the Government of Tanzania, their effectiveness is debatable. One respondent noted that, “In the last meeting the people were saying that the reforms were not working, while the other people were saying it is working” (24: 40). This effectively captures a great deal of frustration around the authority, direction, and pace of government reforms moving between officials from the Government of Tanzania and the donor partners.

4.5 Government of Tanzania

One of the limiting factors for research in Tanzania is the difficulty involved in gaining access to and understanding the political processes within Tanzania’s ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). The findings in this case study are similar to Hyden’s (2008) and Harrison et al.’s (2009) research findings, indicating that CCM’s decision-making processes exist in a “black-box” hidden from outsiders. This blocks research and generates mistrust and suspicion among donor partners. One respondent from the donor community expressed concern in the following terms:

I mean none of us [donor partners] know what is going on in the CCM… that party is the link between development and politics. It is not the government—it is the party that calls the shots. And that is the frustrating part, because we [donor partners] rotate out every three or four years as the case may be. Our Tanzanian colleagues have access to information and knowledge networks that sometimes they
are not at liberty to disclose to us. They live here so they may not be able to necessarily share information as that may harm them later in life. It is a tough situation. (18: 121)

Nevertheless, the research does show that the Government of Tanzania has adapted to keep pace with the evolution of the dialogue process. This research found that changes occurred in three areas. First, the Government of Tanzania expanded the number of secretariats for special issues and established additional coordinating bodies for plans such as the PRSP and PER. At the same time, the coordination of external resources was streamlined. Instead of dealing with each donor partner separately and then liaising with the various ministries, departments, and agencies, the external finances office, located within the Tanzanian Department of Finance and Economic Affairs, works directly with groups of donor partners who are making some progress in aligning their administrative systems. Second, insisting on working with groups of donor partners who speak with one voice may also be seen as a strategy to keep the donor partners at a distance, or, more informally, the Government of Tanzania is politely asking donors to just talk amongst themselves.

The third area of change is the extent to which the management of external resources is centralized within the Government of Tanzania. While this research was unable to gauge the full extent to which this occurs, it found that the portion of aid dollars that were once negotiated separately through the various line ministries and local governments has now shifted towards more basket and GBS funding that is “on-budget” or routed through the Department of Finance and Economic Affairs. Thus, alongside Hyden’s (2008) and Harrison et al.’s (2009) research, this case study found that changes in the dialogue process are linked to power shifts occurring within the Government of Tanzania, even though the type and extent of these shifts remains unclear.

4.6 Consultative Processes
The dialogue process went through a period of fast-paced expansion between the late 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century. With every additional planning mechanism or shift in aid modality, a corresponding consultative process was created,
often involving large annual meetings, negotiated agreements, performance measurements, and working groups. This has created a maze of policy venues with overlapping organizational structures, goals, and personnel. As the above discussion demonstrates, contradictions and redundancy are inherent in any system with a high level of complexity.

Table 7, extracted from the JAST, provides a list of the consultative processes that made up the dialogue process in 2008. The MKUKUTA and PER consultative processes include a series of cluster working groups and annual meetings with government, donor partners, and NGO representatives who oversee budget processes and sector reforms. The shift in aid modalities included the proliferation of smaller baskets and the expansion of the GBS consultative process. As donor partner interest in GBS grew, the World Bank’s PRBS program quickly transformed into the GBS Annual Budget Review. As one of the more prominent consultative processes, it includes annual agreements between the Government of Tanzania and donor partners, a PAF, and a host of technical working groups. Participation in the Policy Support Instrument (PSI) is limited to the Government of Tanzania and Development Partners, and focuses on macroeconomics, financial policies, and national budgeting processes. Efforts to improve coordination between donors also created a consultative process in which the different actors strive to speak with “one voice.” While it is referred to as the DCF in the table below, the system is still evolving and has recently been changed to the Joint Coordination Group. Finally, consultative processes have emerged around the JAST agreement that include a monitoring system and biennial IMG reports, which are direct descendants of the Helleiner narrative.

The dialogue process, as a complex adaptive system, is composed of individual actors who are engaged in day-to-day policy negotiations within policy spaces. There are constant internal fluctuations, but the overall power dynamic within the system is maintained. For example, there is growing concern about the overlap between the GBS review and DPG coordination mechanisms. While the two consultative processes evolved
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forum</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Issues to discuss</th>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Linkage to other processes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MKUKUTA/ MKUZA process, Poverty Policy Week</td>
<td>Government, Development Partners, non-state actors</td>
<td>Assessment of the progress in implementing MKUKUTA/MKUZA, including sector reforms and cross-cutting issues</td>
<td>Annual MKUKUTA/MKUZA Report, biennial PHDR</td>
<td>Feed into national budget, JAST process, and the preparation of plans, programs, projects at national, sector, local levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PER</td>
<td>Government, Development Partners, non-state actors</td>
<td>National and local government budget performances and resource allocation in line with MKUKUTA/MKUZA, public financial management and procurement, macroeconomics issues, financial accountability, fiduciary risk, Development Partner adherence to JAST aid predictability criteria</td>
<td>Cluster Studies, PEFAR report, data on aid predictability</td>
<td>Feed into national budget preparation, MKUKUTA/MKUZA and JAST process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Government, BOT, IMF and other Development Partners</td>
<td>Macroeconomic performance</td>
<td>Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies</td>
<td>Provide inputs into GBS process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Co-operation Forum</td>
<td>Government, Development Partners</td>
<td>Strategic debate, consultation and policy advice on MKUKUTA/MKUZA, JAST, cross-cutting issues, key policy and public sector reforms, aid exit strategy</td>
<td>Advise on high-level political decisions</td>
<td>Feeds into JAST process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAST Process</td>
<td>Government, Development Partners, non-state actors</td>
<td>Assessment of Government and Development Partner implementation of JAST</td>
<td>Annual JAST report, reassessment of JAST actions, biennial IMG report</td>
<td>Informs Government-Development Partner relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JAST, 2006
alongside each other, the GBS has achieved particular prominence within the dialogue process. This is linked to the Government of Tanzania’s preference for GBS as an aid modality and the circumstances surrounding a series of corruption scandals. At the height of the media coverage in 2006, the Government of Tanzania avoided addressing donor concerns by postponing and then canceling the DCF meetings, leaving the DPG without a high-level voice. In response, the donors used the GBS annual budget review to address their concerns related to the scandal. One respondent described this approach as a “carrot and stick analogy that is pretty effective. It was the GBS that negotiated with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs and said ‘you have to clean up this mess, tell us what you are doing.’ And so they did. They met for months with the Minister” (8: 65).

The persuasive powers of the GBS donor partners regarding the Bank of Tanzania scandal bolstered the reputation of GBS and created an imbalance between the GBS and the DPG. As one respondent heavily involved in the DPG explained, “the umbrella group is the DPG, and we [the DPG] are the ones who are the official body for recognizing, coordinating, harmonizing, aligning and all that sort of stuff because the Americans don’t fit in the GBS group, nor does the UNDP, or the Chinese, or the Koreans. So not everyone is in that elite group of donors” (8: 61). However, with a defunct DCF and the DPG becoming a large and unwieldy group, it was difficult for the donor partners to react with one voice. In the end, it was the GBS group that had greater access to and influence with government officials.

The reputation and position of donor partner representatives and Government of Tanzania officials engaged in policy dialogue is a significant factor in the negotiation process. From the donor partners’ perspective, access to and political sway with high-level

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53 According to Transparency International (2009), the Government of Tanzania has struggled with extensive and persistent corruption. Some of the larger scandals included the External Payments Arrears (EPA) with USD $116 million illegally paid out to 22 companies; in 2006 a shell company called Richmond Development Company was paid $179 million for generators that never arrived; and, the BAE scandal in which an estimated $12 million in kick-backs were paid out for an over-priced radar system. These examples contributed to the US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor’s conclusion that in 2008, the total cost of corruption in Tanzania equaled to an estimated 20% of the government’s annual budget (Global Integrity, 2009).
government officials ensures political support and draws resources toward their programs. From the Government of Tanzania’s perspective, there are concerns about engaging with donors both on an equal footing and at arm’s-length. A respondent noted that the “government does not want political dialogue with the DPG. You can have political dialogue between a minister of one country and a minister of another country, but you cannot really have political dialogue between an ambassador and a minister” (17:9). The emphasis on the ranking of officials corresponds with the objective of keeping the donor partners at a distance, or “talking amongst themselves.” Some would argue that the shifts in the dialogue process have actually left the donor partners less engaged with the daily operations of line ministries.

It is important to note that changes in the organizational design of the Dialogue Process did not necessarily automatically translate into changes in the overall power dynamics between the donor partners and the Government of Tanzania. When some donor partners, such as USAID, felt their views were not being heard in the DCF or DPG, they began lobbying the more influential GBS members on key issues. In fact, I observed that many of the donor partners who were not members of the GBS group were allowed to observe the Annual Budget Review and engaged in side conversations. This provides another example of how actors adapt or shift negotiation strategies in order to maintain influence within the system. These strategies and power dynamics are discussed further in Chapter 7.

Despite the negotiations among the various consultative processes, both sides have repeatedly called for a simplification of the dialogue process. In 2008, the PER/MKUKUTA were consolidated into one process and then, in October 2008, the Chief Secretary of Tanzania approved a new streamlined dialogue process, as shown in Figure 9. In this incarnation, the dialogue process is organized around MKUKUTA and JAST. The cluster working groups and sectors are designed to bring donor coordination in line with the strategies of the MKUKUTA and a focus on poverty reduction. Each committee has two leads, one from the donor partners, and one from the Tanzanian
Ministries, Department, or Agencies (MDAs). Figure 9 presents a more streamlined version, and does not include the basket funds, GBS, or Policy Support Instrument (PSI).

**Figure 9: The Tanzanian Dialogue Structure**

![Diagram of the Tanzanian Dialogue Structure]

**5.0 Conclusion**

A historical review of the government-donor partner relationship in Tanzania revealed that the dialogue process co-evolved with the international discourse on aid effectiveness. In the early 1990s, the Government of Tanzania and the donor partners asked Gerald Helleiner to lead a committee of experts to restore the government-donor relationship. The committee’s recommendations set in motion a series of initiatives that reshaped the dialogue process. The subsequent Tanzanian model is frequently cited as an example of success in international policy circles, and it is reflective of the core principles put forth in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005). The Helleiner narrative and the international discourse on aid effectiveness thus reinforced each other’s storylines and metaphors.
Driven by the Helleiner narrative and international aid effectiveness discourse, the dialogue process has undergone two decades of fast-paced evolution in terms of its composition, design, and content. As a complex system, it is composed of development practitioners and government officials who continuously balance the extent of their engagement in the dialogue process with the demands of their home governments or organizations. This has led to an inherent tension between the lines of accountability that are fixed outside of the dialogue process and the broad international mandates, peer pressures, and disbursement pressures that hold it together. This mixture of incentives and constraints informs how actors engage with one another and, eventually, organize themselves.

The various actors and institutions involved in the Tanzanian dialogue process come together to create a particular version or configuration of the aid effectiveness principles and policies. While each actor or association has their own interpretation of aid effectiveness, they must negotiate their understanding with other actors in their immediate network. These negotiations occur in the formal and informal policy spaces located throughout the Tanzanian dialogue process. As reflected in the above policy documents, the accumulation of these negotiations reshaped the aid effectiveness framework in a way that emphasized the principles of ownership, alignment and harmonization (through donor coordination), while simultaneously de-emphasizing mutual accountability, and managing for results.

The research found that one of the most significant features of the Tanzanian dialogue process is that it is both the result of and a venue for negotiations between the Government of Tanzania and its development partners. Over the last two decades the dialogue process expanded in terms of setting country plans and priorities, increasing donor coordination, shifting aid modalities, implementing government reforms, and establishing large consultative processes. The different actors and institutions attempting to gain a better position within the dialogue process are continually negotiating the design, venues, participation, timing, and agendas associated with these shifts. As in any
complex system composed of a diverse set of actors and institutions, frequent internal fluctuations do not necessarily translate into system-wide changes. The next chapter addresses the gap between the technical application and the substance of the dialogue process by exploring the power dynamic between the Government of Tanzania and its donor partners. Particular attention is given to how the radical aspects of aid effectiveness policies—those that seek to transform the donor partner-recipient government relationship—are understood and used by actors and institutions within the Tanzanian dialogue process.
CHAPTER SEVEN: CAUGHT IN THE WEB

1.0 Introduction
When the conceptual framework described in Chapter 2 is applied to the dialogue process described in Chapter 6, it reveals a complex adaptive system driven by power dynamics accumulating in a larger web of governmentality. The web determines not only what can and cannot be said but also how it is interpreted. This influences how aid effectiveness policies, and ownership in particular, are understood and applied in the Tanzanian dialogue process. Ownership is framed by power dynamics embedded in the various policy spaces, as different actors, or groups of actors, engage in day-to-day policy negotiations. This includes the push and pull over ownership in terms of visible or official negotiations, hidden negotiation strategies around agendas, representations, scale, and timing, as well as invisible frames that inform how actors engage in the discussion. The analysis identifies three key areas in which aid effectiveness policies are modified in the international development bureaucracy.

2.0 Ownership by Whom and of What?
As noted in Chapter 4, the discursive coalition between alternative development and management literatures in aid effectiveness policies has created the appearance of a general consensus regarding the importance of ownership while simultaneously reproducing inherent contradictions. The development field is full of terms, such as ownership, that are entangled in multiple layers of practical and definitional struggles. In this regard, the following section highlights some of the key delineations in the current perceptions of ownership, the types of scholarly work underway, and identifies several points within the international development bureaucracy where the principle of ownership is modified.

While the Oxford Dictionary succinctly describes ownership as “the act, state, or right of possessing something” (www.oxforddictionaries.com, retrieved November 22, 2010) the term’s meaning has become blurred in the international development context. Thus, it is important to highlight two important delineations found in the literature. The first
The second distinction in the definition of ownership is between the “African Renaissance” and commitment versions of ownership. Nuno Castel-Branco (2008) used the term African Renaissance to refer to a version of ownership that is rooted in post-colonial literature and calls for an end to the Western influence over Southern nations. The emphasis here is on the recipient government exerting control over their economic and social policies, including having the ability to critique and design their own policies and processes. While all the participating actors share the rhetoric of this version of ownership, it is not surprising that the Southern officials, and especially those involved in NEPAD, are more likely to negotiate from this definition. The interview data shows that all government officials involved in this study claimed that the Tanzanian government has full ownership over its development and economic policies. However, when the contextual factors shaping the conceptualization of ownership are taken into account, these views feel less like statements of fact and more like aspirations.

In this regard, the present case study substantiates the findings of Gould (2005), Hyden (2008), Harrison et al. (2009), Hayman (2009) and Whitfield (2009), all of whom argue
that the African Renaissance version of ownership exists in common rhetoric among donor partners and recipient countries, but that the definition of ownership as commitment to global policy norms is more often used in practice. An undercurrent of paternalism, which still lingers within international development bureaucracy, dilutes the concept of ownership, creating the commitment version. This version is framed by several rationales, including the notions that development failures are due to the lack of “buy-in” from recipient governments; recipient governments tend be authoritarian and corrupt and therefore must prove they are capable of ownership; Western expertise defined a universal standard for good governance and economic policies as expressed in neoliberalism; and, once recipient governments earn ownership through a commitment to global policy norms, they will be able to grow out of their aid dependency. As addressed elsewhere in this dissertation, the development discourse sets the parameters for a particular *problematique* within which only certain technical solutions are thinkable.

The technical solutions offered within the definition of ownership as commitment are described by Nuno Castel-Branco (2008) in his research on Mozambique:

> The consensus within the aid community and literature seems to be developing around … : government ownership around a national vision, supported and controlled by broad governance mechanisms, combined with decentralization and de-construction of power and resources to local communications. (Nuno Castel-Branco, 2008: 4)

While this definition is technically sound, the underlying issue of ownership often comes down to who participates in the national vision, broad governance mechanisms, and decentralization processes, and how. As illustrated in the discussion of the PRSP process in Chapter 6, the donor partners exerted a great deal influence over the creation of these documents and processes designed to promote ownership. In addition, political resistance and logistical constraints often obstruct the implementation of policies and plans.

The delineation between ownership as African Renaissance and commitment to international policy norms is reflected in the policy documents. The official documents define ownership as control over the development process, but they also set terms and
conditions that modify this formal definition. The modification of ownership essentially transforms the concept from an expression of control to one ensuring recipient countries’ commitment to mainstream development and economic policies. For example, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness defines the principle of ownership as “Partner countries exercis[ing] effective leadership over their development policies and strategies and co-ordinat[ing] development actors” (OECD, 2005: 3). Further, Jan Cedergren, the 2008 chair of the DAC WP-EFF, stated that ownership is about “a change in the power relationship between donors and recipients” (DAC, 2008). These fashionable statements and sentiments regarding country ownership are reshaped, however, by other principles and conditionalities.

For example, the Paris Declaration outlines the principle of alignment as dictating that, “Donors base their support on a partner country’s national development strategies, institutions and procedures” (OECD, 2005: 3). However, donor partners will only align if the recipients:

…provide assurance that aid will be used for agreed purposes, increase aid effectiveness by strengthening the partner country’s sustainable capacity to develop, [and] implement and account for [their] policies to [their] citizens and parliament. Country systems and procedures typically include, but are not restricted to, national arrangements and procedures for public financial management, accounting, auditing, procurement, results frameworks and monitoring. (OECD, 2005: 4)

The contradictory definitions of ownership are also reflected in the interview data. As one respondent from the donor community admitted, “To be honest, most donors don’t use old school conditionalities anymore. They are all connected to governance issues” (16: 47). As discussed in the last chapter, the subtle conditionalities of government reform programs often result in donor partners becoming more involved in the operations of the recipient government, not less. These conditionalities and governance issues are combined in such a way as to influence the definition of ownership used in practice.
3.0 Analytical Lenses

Given the above definitions of ownership, the concept tends to be analyzed differently in the organizational, political science, and critical theory literatures, leading to distinctly different findings. In the first instance, the grey literature tends to sidestep issues regarding the definition of ownership, instead focusing on concrete indicators and technical solutions. For example, the Paris Declaration defines ownership as a recipient country’s “effective leadership over their development policies and strategies” (OECD, 2005), and decides the level of success regarding the implementation of this definition according to the “number of countries with national development strategies (including PRSPs) that have clear strategic priorities linked to a medium-term expenditure framework and reflected in annual budgets” (JAST, 2007: 16). While this approach effectively operationalizes the concept of ownership, it does not address ownership in terms of its stated goal: to reverse the long-established power dynamic according to which donor partners maintain a great deal of influence over the economic and social policies of recipient governments. Nor does the technical approach address the political economic context currently informing the donor partner – recipient government relationship. Instead, indicators such as the PRSPs are used as technical objects, effectively ignoring the social, political, and economic contexts within which the document was created.

While the political economy literature tends to embrace the contemporary history and political economic contexts surrounding the donor partner – recipient country relationship, more traditional approach is taken in identifying linear causation between sets of key variables. For example, Whitfield’s (2009) comparison of ownership in eight African nations54 examined the factors that affect a recipient country’s economic and political context and its negotiating capacity within the dialogue process. She found no correlation between recipient government control and the amount of aid dollars received or national growth rates. However, her research does show a positive correlation between a recipient government’s weak negotiating position, the government’s forced acceptance

54 The country comparison included case studies on Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zambia.
of policy-based lending from IFIs during an economic crisis, and the governing party’s inability to maintain a strong ideological framework (Whitfield 2009). In this regard, she argues that the negotiation capacity of recipient governments, in terms of challenging donor partners, is hindered by the historical and political economic context of the country.

The case study by Harrison et al. (2009) found that while Tanzania was able to forge a strong national identity, CCM’s political platform of African Socialism disintegrated with the introduction of policy-based lending in the late 1980s. As a result, CCM took a broader umbrella approach to politics, encompassing the pro-reform group within Tanzania’s political elite as well as other domestic interests. Tanzania’s historical context thus weakens the country’s present negotiating position with its donor partners (Harrison et al. 2009). While findings such as these contribute to our understanding of ownership, they miss the power dynamics embedded in the policy spaces comprising the Tanzania dialogue process. By treating both donor partners and recipient countries as discrete values influenced by a finite set of variables, they overlook important observations concerning policy processes, especially in terms of the challenges and opportunities that become evident over longer periods of time.

Using the conceptual framework described in Chapter 2, this dissertation makes a broader and more in-depth examination of how the principle of ownership is modified as it moves through the international development bureaucracy. This dissertation widens the analysis to consider a network of policy spaces, imbued with power, and how they impact the outcome of smaller policy negotiations occurring within the bureaucracy. The result is a more nuanced understanding of how aid policy operates within the international development bureaucracy, as well as the identification of some common areas in which it is altered. These findings are discussed in more detail below.
4.0 Beyond the Tug-of-War

In aid effectiveness discourse, ownership is often treated as a possession that donor partners can simply give to the Government of Tanzania once they are deemed ready. However, this analysis identifies two fatal assumptions embedded in the discourse regarding the participants in the dialogue process and the nature of power. From the complex adaptive systems perspective, the dialogue process does not consist of two cohesive and opposing groups but rather a loosely affiliated set of actors and networks embedded in a larger system. The dialogue process is shaped by the behaviours of individual actors who, in turn, are shaped by the historical and present contexts of the dialogue process, as well as their own linkages outside the dialogue process.

A closer look at the process reveals a network of activity rather than two cohesive sets of actors. Actors in the dialogue process often interact and form subgroups that include a variety of professionals with different organizational affiliations. My research found that development practitioners form subgroups for a wide range of reasons, such as:

- Actors within the Government of Tanzania and donor partners differ in their perspectives, positions, experiences, and levels of education.
- Officials from both sides overlap and build relationships through epistemic communities that include members from the Government of Tanzania and donor partners. As Holtom (2005) pointed out, there is a pro-reform group within the government that shares its political ideology with representatives of IFIs and the private sector, the University of Dar es Salaam, and some CSOs.
- Actors in the dialogue system are constantly balancing pressures from within the dialogue process with the pressure for accountability that comes from their home organizations outside the dialogue process.
- The Government of Tanzania – donor partner relationship exists within a larger national and international context that includes the private sector, CSOs, academics, and, mostly importantly and, sadly, least influentially, the people of Tanzania.
Given these factors, the superficial notion of a clean separation between recipient governments and donor partners is better viewed as a network of actors. The power dynamics embedded in this network’s interactions shape the dialogue process.

The second flaw in aid effectiveness policies is the conceptualization of power as a possession rather than a relational force. As discussed in Chapter 2, power is not an object trapped in a zero-sum game; rather, it is exercised within a relationship between two or more actors. The tension between espoused and practiced concepts of power and ownership is reflected in the interviews. When discussing ownership with respondents they often referred to the technical aspects of ownership, such as the establishment of plans and priorities, appointing Tanzanian representatives to chair official meetings, and so forth. At the same time, a number of respondents took a more reflective approach, equating ownership with power and situating it within the working relationships between members of the dialogue process. Descriptions of ownership included: “it is a very intangible concept” (14: 62); “it has more to do with personalities” (16: 37); and, “it is in the attitudes” (11: 27). One respondent described ownership as,

Those relationships between the government representatives and the donors [which are] very much based on the intellect of those people, the experience of those people, the mannerisms of those people who really determine how ownership is felt and the power that those politicians/government representatives bring to the table versus what CIDA brings to the table. (18: 88)

The above statement illustrates how power is expressed through a partially visible web of relational forces. Interactions are framed by a series of disciplinary and discursive regimes that inform how individuals are perceived and engage with each other. It is within this web of power that actors employ various strategies of negotiation. Thus, the dialogue process is a network of loosely affiliated actors within which the accumulation of behaviours tends to lock individuals into certain roles and categories that frame the range of actions available to them. This dissertation’s critical approach reveals that the official representations of policy processes often obscure the underlying forces at work.
5.0 Negotiations, Strategies, and Power

As noted above, the Government of Tanzania and donor partner organizations consist of hundreds of officials who have a nuanced understanding of the situation and individual motivations driving their work in the public service. They can neither be described as passive nor malign; they are active participants in their communities, organizations, and the dialogue process. In this regard, the case study revealed numerous examples of negotiation strategies being deployed with varying degrees of success by officials from the Government of Tanzania and donor partners. The strategies were grouped into three categories correlating with VeneKlassen and Miller’s (2002) distinction between visible, hidden, and invisible power, as discussed in Chapter 2.

Visible Power and Strategies

The first category includes the visible negotiation strategies exercised through formal and legal decision-making. The authority for these strategies is granted openly through societal institutions and reaffirmed through public transcripts (VeneKlassen & Miller, 2002). These formal negotiation strategies focus on the development of official agreements through a series of preparatory documents and meetings. They include studies and reports, advanced meetings between officials at various levels, benchmarks and conditionalities, plans for technical assistance, performance measurement frameworks, and official signings.55

For example, the Government of Tanzania and the GBS donor partners spent most of 2008 preparing documents and negotiating the performance measurement framework for the Annual Budget Review. During this four-day event in 2008, I observed a formal parliamentary-style debate in which the Government of Tanzania and donor partners sat on opposing sides of a ballroom, separated by a small stage for the chair of the session and various presentations. After the Government’s presentation on the progress made

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55It is interesting to note that the Tanzanian Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs has a room set aside exclusively for signing formal documents with donor partners. This indicates the number of documents being negotiated on a regular basis.
towards prosecuting capital corruption cases,\textsuperscript{56} donor partners questioned the government’s slow pace in dealing with this matter. The Government responded by explaining that they were having difficulty tracing the money because the donor countries were not providing immediate access to the banking information of the defendants. The ensuing back and forth across the room was accompanied by parliamentary-style jeers and clapping. In the aftermath, one participant, who worked for a donor partner, described the outcome of the session as, “The government gave as good as they got and donors gave as good as they got, and they sort of made compromises at the end that seemed to be beneficial to both parties” (33: 61). However, other interviews and my qualitative observations revealed a distinctly different impression.

The design and atmosphere of the Annual Budget Review reflects an underlying asymmetrical power imbalance that favors donor partners over the recipient government. As discussed in the last chapter, the purpose of the Annual Budget Review is to negotiate GBS, giving the donor partners an opportunity to use the PAF to assess Tanzania’s progress and question the government before making their pledges for the year. In the 2008/2009 financial year, the pledges added up to USD 2.1 billion (DPG, 2008). During this meeting, pressure was placed on the Government to prove they were moving forward with reforms and efforts to spend aid dollars wisely. This exemplifies the argument of Cramer et al. that, “The funder reserves the right to pass unilateral judgment on the appropriateness of commitment to policies prescribed for the recipient government” (2006: 423). Thus, while Tanzanian Government officials are active agents in negotiating GBS, there is an underlying but visible asymmetrical power dynamic due to the last right of refusal.

Within the formal debates in the Annual Budget Review there seemed to be two general strategies. The donor partners sought to put pressure on the government to increase

\textsuperscript{56} As mentioned earlier, there has been a series of corruption cases that have grabbed the attention of the donor community; in particular, the External Payment Arrears (EPA) scandal in which the Bank of Tanzania improperly disbursed an estimated Sh133 billion or USD 116 million to 22 companies (Said, 2008). As a condition for GBS, the donor partners devised an indicator for the Government of Tanzania to initiate at least 10 capital corruption cases in relation to the scandal. As of 2010, there have been 15 arraignments and no trials (Mosoba, 2011).
results and accountability. Meanwhile, the Government of Tanzania’s strategy was to hold its ground in the official venues while simultaneously using more hidden or subtle strategies to exert influence over policy. These hidden forms of power and subtle strategies are discussed below.

**Hidden Power and Subtle Strategies**

Beyond the formal negotiation processes, there are subtle strategies employed on a daily basis that can significantly influence the political agenda without seeming to do so. VeneKlassen and Miller (2002) describe hidden power as the ability to set the political agenda. Power is exercised through control over invitations, meeting agendas, decision-making processes, or through individuals exerting peer pressure, including by “public shaming.” Often entrenched in hidden transcripts, there are numerous ways in which groups and/or issues are excluded/included or emphasized/delegitimized via the exercising of hidden power. These subtle or hidden strategies often carry more influence than the official strategies discussed above.

During the course of the research a number of hidden negotiation strategies were recorded in the interview and observation data. The following list is a synthesis of the strategies used by various actors in the dialogue process:

- Not showing up for meetings or sending junior staff who did not have the authority to make decisions
- Invoking the phrase “lack of capacity” in order to negotiate for more resources, justify non-compliance with agreements, or impose a conditionality through technical assistance
- Enforcing diplomatic protocol
- Building support networks and hosting side meetings
- Frequently re-negotiating agreements or appointing new personnel
- Slippage or non-compliance with agreements
- Successive delays
- Silence or selective sharing of information
One respondent noted that development practitioners and Government of Tanzania officials often switched to "shortwave," or communicated in a secondary language in order to undercut the conversation. This particular respondent had the opportunity to observe this strategy in action because s/he was fluent in several languages.

Keeping with the Annual Budget Review example, there were numerous side meetings regarding invitations lists, wording of reports, minutes, progress on programs and projects, and so on. One respondent, referring to the PAF, explained that:

I think the way the incentive structure works for donors and for individual advisors within donor agencies, because the whole budget support process was perceived to be a reasonable amount of traction, [is that] if you were advisor with a particular set of interests, then your ambition would be to ensure that your area of work is somehow captured in the assessment framework (31:11).

There is intense competition among development bureaucrats to have their work represented in the PAF because having such an official marker will garner higher-level political support and attention. However, the opposite is also true insofar as some programs lobby to be excluded from the PAF in order to avoid the attention it would garner.

It is important to emphasize that representatives from the Government of Tanzania play a very active role in negotiations. For example, a high-level CIDA respondent noted that the Tanzanian External Aid Office often “publicly shames” them during general meetings. S/he went on to explain that because of this negative attention and CIDA’s poor track record, CIDA staff cannot advocate as vigorously as they would like to in the various policy forums. S/he described the situation thus:

I personally choose to keep a very low profile. It doesn’t do any good for Canada’s reputation and credibility. Canada’s reputation here is not the greatest because we are so unpredictable. We have been shamed twice by the government of Tanzania and with a very public audience…. They put a big chart up in the annual review of 2006, and said here are all the donors, and we can see Canada is the least
predictable. Most recently I was at a presentation where the Ministry of Finance came up and said, “with the exception of Canada, most donors are predictable.” (8: 59)

As noted in Chapter 5, CIDA’s confusion over GBS has tarnished its reputation and diminished its legitimacy within the dialogue process. This not only weakens the ability of CIDA staff to negotiate with the Government of Tanzania, but also with other donor partners and CSOs.

The interactions and negotiation strategies are not limited to a binary relationship between the recipient government and its donor partners; there is also a lot of interaction and intense competition between the different donor partners. This was observable in such activities as elections for chair positions and participation in basket funds. In the first instance, the dialogue process consists of a series of committees where the majority are managed by elected troika of incoming, current, and outgoing chairs. These are desirable positions for a variety reasons including their considerable influence and oversight concerning key issues, provision of access to high-level government officials, potential to advance one’s career, and so forth. In fact, one respondent noted that s/he was under pressure by headquarters to obtain the chair position in particular sectors. Further, some prominent committees, such as the GBS group, are organized by a ‘troika plus’ in which the World Bank maintains a permanent position alongside the three elected representatives from other donor partners.

Another area of contestation among donor partners is that surrounding basket funds. They are organized by groups of donor partners who want to focus their funds in a particular area. Who participates in the basket and how it is organized varies from case to case. In most situations, the donor partners who manage the larger funds will pick and choose whom they wish to work with. This places donor partners like CIDA at a disadvantage because of their reputation for lacking funds, having lengthy approval processes, and having strict accountability requirements, as discussed in Chapter 5. In the case of the Business Environment Strengthening for Tanzania (BEST) program, the other donor partners discouraged CIDA from participating. According to one CIDA official,
They [other donor partners] actually didn’t want us. Well, they said we could attend the opening and closing sessions but for the specific meetings they didn’t want us to attend, mostly for strategic reasons because of what they wanted to do [threaten to withdraw funds until the program improved]. But we assessed whether we should be getting into BEST and our assessment was to really follow what the other donors are doing right now which is basically a wait and see attitude. (31:5)

The research found that the dialogue process is filled with these hidden negotiation strategies that act to include/exclude those who wish to exert influence over the development process. This is constantly occurring between and among representatives from the Government of Tanzanian and its donor partners. However, it is also driven by the invisible power and subconscious perceptions that everyone carries with them into the policy spaces.

**Invisible Power and Subconscious Perceptions**

Hidden strategies often play on the subtle and sometimes subconscious ways in which meaning is shaped. Power operates in a multi-variant way that infuses every interaction, from state to familial relationships. Regimes of discourse and discipline interact to create a web of covert power relations. Processes of socialization and surveillance entrench identities, traditions, habits, and expected behaviours. These ways of being in the world eventually become internalized and are subsequently expressed in official venues (VeneKlassen & Miller, 2002). They reflect who has and who does not have the legitimacy to convey expert knowledge, provide commentary, and/or make decisions.

As noted earlier, Gould (2005) argued that heuristic tools such as timing, scale, and style determined who was and was not able to participate in the first Tanzanian PRSP process. This is particularly important in regards to how expert knowledge and good policy are defined. One respondent from the donor community clearly illustrates how these factors weigh in favor of the donor community:

The whole issue of ownership is very complex, and what has happened here in Tanzania is that a great number of good minds from developed countries, technical advisory experts, are here looking at the country and examining it, assessing it. I
think that creates a great deal of tension over ownership. Because I think at the technocratic level there is a real desire for these intelligent people to do that analysis and provide input, and then there is also a more broad agreement [concerning ownership and] how we should move forward in interacting with the government on this agenda. (18: 88)

The perceived legitimacy of foreign experts contributes to the maintenance of the Helleiner narrative and aid effectiveness discourse. This was apparent in a DPG meeting that took place in the fall of 2008 concerning the release of the 2006/07 Household Budget Survey (HBS). The survey found that despite the number of sizable aid programs and high growth rates in Tanzania, the poverty indicators had not changed significantly since the first HBS in 2000/01. I observed that when this information was presented, the donor partners responded by posing a number of questions regarding the survey’s methodology and where the aid dollars and increased growth rates had gone—implying government corruption. There were also concerns related to the fact that Tanzania will not meet the MDGs “despite all the money donors have poured into the country” (19: 24). Only one person in the meeting deviated from this public transcript. After a series of very tough questions, the Tanzanian representative from the National Bureau of Statistics was asked directly, “Where did the growth go?” In frustration, s/he responded by stating, “I don’t know … maybe the trickle-down effect doesn’t work” (19: 27). This statement was met with startled expressions and stares from the room full of top-level officials representing donor partner organizations. The Tanzanian presenter then quickly added, “But I’m not an economist… you are the experts.” After this, her/his comments were ignored as the discussion moved on without his/her input.

Despite this reaction, a number of experts in the meeting probably shared the Tanzanian representative’s skepticism regarding neoliberal policies, speaking freely of this only when speaking “off-the-record” or informally with colleagues. In official venues these types of discussions are quietly and effectively prohibited through social pressure. They are dismissed as a waste of time or an academic debate that distracts from the practical aspects of day-to-day operations. This example illustrates the difficulties people face if they approach issues or facts that are considered heretical or contrary to widely accepted truths.
Another important process captured in the above example is the reinforcement of subconscious stereotypes around Western expertise, corrupt African governments, and questionable Southern research. As a discursive mechanism, the phrase “lack of capacity” is linked to underlying assumptions regarding Western expertise and Southern incompetence. While used frequently by donor partners, government officials also use it to frame issues and exert their influence. In fact, my research found that the word “capacity” was used in a number of ways, such as in genuine assessments; diplomatic insults; excuses to gain and retain authority; excuses not to do work; subtle strategies of resistance; reasons to extend contracts; reasons to design training workshops; reasons to charge sitting fees; and so on. In these examples, it is apparent that the three levels of power and the strategies outlined in this section are not discreet values but play upon each other. The deep-seated assumptions and subconscious power dynamics around capacity feed into hidden strategies (i.e. the donor partners’ conditions for government reform programs, and the recipient government’s reasons for delays and slippage) and are expressed in formal venues through negotiations over documents and PAFs.

The above description of power within the dialogue process makes evident the visible hierarchies, administrative process and procedures, hidden or subtle negotiation strategies, and discursive regimes that surround and infuse the process. In general, invisible forms of power shape the hidden and visible strategies. For example, the discourse of neoliberalism is deeply entrenched in the international development discourse (Mosse, 2005) and frames aid effectiveness policies in terms of the legitimacy of good policy and conditionality. This frame is then used to justify the hidden strategies used to set agendas, create invitation lists, and guide negotiations within meetings. Eventually, the discourse of neoliberalism moves up through this complex adaptive system to become reflected in formal debates and documents such as the PRSPs and

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57 It should be noted that the Household Budget Survey was managed by a partnership between the Government of Tanzania and Oxford University. However, the questions focused on how the National Bureau of Statistics collected and analyzed the data.
Annual Budget Review. These forms of power accumulate into a larger system of
governmentality, providing a rough configuration for the societal structures and for
individual agency that shapes the possible range of actions available to those working
within the system.

6.0 Negotiating Change
History has shown that the development community often operates in cycles within
which it adopts transformational concepts such as participation, sustainable development,
and poverty reduction, only to re-interpret these concepts into docile, technical policies
that often fail to create substantive changes (Brock et al., 2001). In terms of ownership,
the case study clearly shows that the rhetoric of reform presented in aid effectiveness
policies glosses over inherent contradictions, how key concepts are reinterpreted, and
how policies are redefined as they move through a system of smaller negotiations,
compromises, and deals. In the Tanzanian case, these processes often work to maintain
stability in the dialogue process rather than to reform it.

While aid effectiveness discourse prescribes a series of policies that claim to transfer
ownership of the development process to recipient governments, the policies in fact
provide donor partners with more access to the daily operations of the Government of
Tanzania and expand the dialogue process. This case study found that the dialogue
process continues to act as a parallel government system. An East African respondent
working for the IMF in Tanzania noted that s/he would not like aid effectiveness if s/he
were still working for the government. “The donors are too involved and make too many
demands without giving the Tanzanian people time to think” (21:51). Further, the
respondent felt that there was less ownership after the aid effectiveness policies began to
be implemented.

At the same time, officials within the Government of Tanzania have used the tenets of aid
effectiveness to negotiate for a greater degree of political influence within the dialogue
process. While my research found that there is now more emphasis on government
reform, donor partners also have less access to high-level officials from the Government of Tanzania. A long-time member of a Tanzanian CSO reported:

I happen to think that the level of dialogue that we had in 2001 was much stronger, much more robust than what we have now. It was lighter; there was not this whole set of parallel machinery. There was a very important two-day meeting once a year, called the Consulting Group or the Paris Club. But, the President of the country was chairing the meeting. Right now they get excited if the Permanent Secretary of Finance shows up. They never get the President. I mean what’s telling is how the low level of attendance of government at these [consultative meetings], and donors are constantly begging and requesting an audience with people in government… if a Permanent Secretary shows up, they usually show up for the perfunctory ceremonial functions and often leave. And again, they know they can get away with it because, look, whatever one says, the number one imperative for the donor is to disperse funds. (34:14)

Thus, as the donor partners legitimize their role in government reform programs, the government has distanced itself by limiting access to high-level officials. This illustrates that there is give and take among the actors in the dialogue process, each using different points of influence within the larger network. Examined separately, these variables may indicate change in the power dynamic between the donor partners and recipient government; however, analyzed together, the changes can be seen as merely a cluster of internal fluctuations, with no significant change in the overall dialogue process. As is common to complex adaptive systems, the smaller adaptations that occur around internal issues work to maintain overall stability within the established system.

This description of what is happening in the Tanzanian dialogue process provides a more nuanced basis for a discussion of how to create substantive change. The case study shows that official discussions of the dialogue process tend to focus on the technical implementation of aid effectiveness policies, while only side conversations are concerned with the surrounding politics. Further, there is an absence of normative debates to address entrenched societal discourses and discuss what ought to be the purpose of development and who should be involved.
As discussed in Chapter 4, the new aid architecture is built on the foundation of neoliberal economic principles, the MDGs, and aid effectiveness. While there is ample room to debate how these principles and policies will be implemented and measured, there are subtle but powerful sanctions against any public questioning of their central tenets. As the HBS discussion illustrates, those who question the larger neoliberal development goals tend to be excluded or lose their legitimacy within the aid community. Further, aid effectiveness gives way to more entrenched discourses. This suggests that if change is going to take place, there needs to be a much more in-depth and open discussion concerning the goals, values, and principles that guide the development process, and these discussions need to take place both inside and outside official spaces. These findings lead to another area of research discussed in Chapter 8.

7.0 Three Areas Where Policy is Altered

While Chapters 4, 5, and 6 illustrate how aid effectiveness policies, and ownership in particular, carry a wide array of definitions, the more important question is where and how these policy modifications occur. My research found three transition points where aid effectiveness policies were altered in ways that diminish their transformational or more radical characteristics. This occurred when development practitioners worked within the confines of their organizational resources and administrative procedures, when development practitioners interpreted the policies based on their own experience and negotiate with other actors in their immediate networks, and when the aid effectiveness discourse was combined with existing and more entrenched societal discourses.

In the first area, aid effectiveness policies were modified when development practitioners tried to implement them within existing policy frameworks, administrative procedures, and budgets. For many donor partners, efforts to give control back to recipient governments are in direct conflict with their organization’s accountability frameworks. One respondent noted that,

As donors we say it is the Government of Tanzania’s ownership, but when push comes to shove, there are agendas. Each donor has its own set of agendas, where you can go from the DFIDs, who are the most liberal of donors, to very
conservative donors like the Swiss or even the Canadians. I think we have certain parameters that affect this whole ownership dilemma. (8: 86)

As seen in Chapter 5, CIDA’s field office is caught between two conflicting policy frameworks, the first supporting aid effectiveness principles (Policy Statement on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness) and the second demanding government bureaucrats adhere to strict accountability procedures (Accountability Act).

In Dar es Salaam, one of the Tanzanian respondents noted that while most donor partners have signed on to the Paris Declaration, they have yet to transform their administrative procedures to accommodate the new policies. On the other side of the debate, a respondent working for one of the donor partners explained:

Ownership: there is a very fine line. If the Ministry is giving us work plans with more cars, more computers, or hardware, or buildings, etc. to continue delivering the same old process, to keep the existing dysfunctional machinery, and when they give us those work plans we say “sorry, it’s not good enough,” their ownership feels threatened. (25: 74)

The language and tension captured in these two perspectives is emblematic of the second and third areas of policy modification.

A second transition point occurred when development practitioners interpreted and adapted aid effectiveness policy in terms of their professional experiences, organizational affiliation and interactions within the dialogue process. As Nuno Castel-Branco explains,

Recipient governments, donors and other social interests may not only have different perceptions of ownership, but these perceptions may also make sense within specific interactions between them at some point in time as they are part of complex and dynamics interactions between different agents and contested, conflicting and complementary strategies to influence the direction of policy change and development. (Nuno Castel-Branco, 2008: 12)

Development practitioners, using their different interpretations of aid effectiveness, engage in negotiations with one another and effectively translate or reinterpret policies as
they move through the various policy spaces embedded in the international development bureaucracy. Small negotiations, compromises, and deals are part of day-to-day development practice. These smaller translations add up and create different chains-of-meaning or definitions of the key terms and concepts in aid effectiveness. For example, donor partners and representatives from the Government of Tanzania may have very different understandings of ownership when among fellow staff members as compared to when they work together in a committee. Further translation is then often necessary when the work of the committee is conducted and/or shared with the larger community.

The third point of transition occurred during the formation and dissemination of aid effectiveness as a transnational policy discourse. As discussed in Chapter 4, the rationales and policy prescriptions framing aid effectiveness are rooted in neoliberal and institutional discourse, emphasizing the technical aspects in the reforms. Only the principle of ownership calls for transformative change, or a reversal of the current power dynamic between donor partners and recipient countries. However, from the beginning, the more radical goal of reversing pre-existing power dynamics has been diminished due to the influence of the mainstream development discourse that emphasizes the technical or managerial application of the policies within current norms. Further, when aid effectiveness discourse spread through the international development bureaucracy, it was subject to additional modifications when it was reconciled with the entrenched mainstream discourses found in the field. In practice, aid effectiveness as a policy discourse would have to replace, compete, or merge with other more entrenched societal discourse.

The above processes describe how the transformative aspects of aid effectiveness policy, captured in the principle of ownership, are modified within the international development bureaucracy. This occurs when ownership is reconciled with more entrenched discourses, interpreted by development practitioners, negotiated within the dialogue process, and constrained by organizational procedures and resources. It is through the course of these encounters and exchanges that the definition of ownership as control is eventually transformed into ownership as commitment.
8.0 Conclusion

The discussion in Chapter 6 found that aid effectiveness policies sparked dramatic shifts in the terminology, venues, and design of the dialogue process in Tanzania. This chapter explores the extent to which those changes influenced the power dynamics between the Government of Tanzania and its donor partners, by focusing on the principle of ownership. In this regard, the discussion highlighted two important distinctions in the definition of ownership. First, aid effectiveness policies largely focus on government ownership as opposed to national or citizen ownership. Second, aid effectiveness policies contain an inherent contradiction between ownership as government control over economic and social policies, and ownership as the government’s commitment to global policy norms. The research shows that the Government of Tanzania and donor partners share the rhetoric of ownership as control, but operate within the confines of ownership as commitment.

The literature review revealed a number of studies that focused either on implementation issues or the historical political context of the donor partner – recipient government relationship. Instead of searching for linear causation, this study sought to understand the complex and underlying power dynamics that shape ownership. This research found that donor partners and government officials are not discrete groups; rather, they exist within a web of relational power. The actors exert their influence in the dialogue process through a variety of strategies that fall within three general categories: visible or official power, hidden or subtle power, and invisible or subconscious power. These three levels of power are connected insofar as invisible forms of power create a foundation for the hidden and visible forms. As a whole, relational power shapes the day-to-day negotiations that occur within the various policy spaces located in the Tanzania dialogue process.

The numerous negotiation strategies at play within the dialogue process generate a great deal of technical changes with only a few minor skirmishes occurring around the increase/decrease in ownership. This chapter shows that while the recipient government has increased influence in some areas, it has decreased influence in others. This is in
keeping with complex adaptive systems—larger systems undergo frequent internal fluctuations in order to maintain stability in the larger existing system. Thus, at the time of this research, aid effectiveness policies in Tanzania had not undergone any significant changes in terms of the underlying power dynamics that shape ownership of the countries’ economic and social policies.

Negotiations consist of a constant process of push and pull involving people and agencies enmeshed in the institutional entanglements and power dynamics of the dialogue process. The result is a diminished and truncated version of ownership defined as a commitment to the good governance and macroeconomic polices prescribed by the donor community. These modifications occur in three areas: within organizational and implementation constraints; in the interpretations of the actors and institutions, and as these actors and institutions negotiate with each other in the dialogue process; and through a process whereby this newer policy discourse is reconciled with other more entrenched societal discourses.

This is not to say that the asymmetrical power dynamic between the Government of Tanzania and its donor partners is permanent. There is some truth to the old adage that “first we pretend to change, and then we change.” However, we cannot rely on technical solutions alone; transformative change must encompass the subconscious and invisible power dynamics embedded in everyday relationships. As Nuna Castel-Branco notes,

The real issue, then, is not ownership per se but how those groups can articulate the interest for change in order to build a sufficiently strong alliance to influence the direction of change. Thus the difficulty is not only, not even essentially, of organization, harmonization and alignment—it is an issue of political economy of development, and fundamental for the 21st century. (Nuna Castel-Branco 2008: 47)
CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION

1.0 Introduction

This dissertation began with the story of Icarus as a parable for aid effectiveness policies and international development bureaucracy. It then examined the discursive formations surrounding aid effectiveness policies within a cross-section of the international development bureaucracy, spanning the international, Canadian, and Tanzanian context. In doing so, it found that the international development bureaucracy embodies hope and a desire to improve the plight of the world’s poor, as well as the misplaced belief that progress can be managed and controlled through a series of technical policy prescriptions. This contradiction often limits the ability of transnational policy initiatives, such as aid effectiveness, to achieve their transformational intentions.

In an effort to understand the full breadth and depth of transnational policy trends, this dissertation is grounded in critical realism. The research findings fall within a stratified social reality encompassing three domains of knowing. In the empirical domain, the research provides a description of the limited phenomena and events surrounding aid effectiveness policies in international development bureaucracy. Within the actual domain, the data gathered is used to understand the different social accounts of aid effectiveness policies within the international development bureaucracy. The research then uses these social accounts to understand the generative structures and mechanisms that produce aid effectiveness discourse within the reality domain (Frauley & Pearce, 2007). In terms of this last domain, discourse analysis is used to explore the underlying power dynamics that persist within international development bureaucracy.

In order to more fully understand the generative structure and the mechanisms surrounding aid effectiveness, the conceptual framework uses a version of governmentality that differs from the one employed by most post-development thinkers. Instead of focusing on horizontal aspects of governmentality that emphasize “who and what is governed from a distance,” my research emphasizes the regulatory mechanisms that shape governmentality. In addition, the framework incorporates the concepts of
complex adaptive systems and policy spaces, and perceives aid bureaucrats as subjects nested within governmentality. This allows the research to develop a broader, more detailed understanding of the contextual landscape surrounding aid effectiveness policies.

The following chapter discusses the research findings in three areas. The first set of findings work within the empirical and actual domains to describe aid effectiveness policies. This provides an account of how aid effectiveness policies are understood and applied in the international, Canadian, and Tanzanian contexts. The second set of findings uses these social accounts of aid effectiveness policies to uncover the main narratives, reoccurring themes, and metaphors embedded in the discourse. As discussed throughout the dissertation, the micro-processes of power shape policy spaces and give rise to the larger discursive formations expressed through governmentality. The third section addresses where these policy modifications occur and how they impact the success of transnational policy initiatives such as aid effectiveness. The research found that aid effectiveness policies were constantly modified as actors struggled to reconcile the implementation of policies and procedures; their interpretations of broad concepts as negotiated within their immediate network; and the power dynamics within the various policy spaces. The dissertation concludes with a brief discussion of the possibility of transformational change and the need for further research.

2.0 Aid Effectiveness Policies

This section reviews the findings in the empirical and actual domains, providing a sketch of the various social accounts of aid effectiveness policies within the international development bureaucracy. It starts with international or global policy formation and then moves to the Canadian domestic context before exploring the dialogue process in Tanzania. These findings correlate with the second research question discussed at the beginning of the dissertation: to what extent are aid effectiveness policies modified as they move through the international development bureaucracy?
2.1 What are aid effectiveness policies?

The managerial concepts embedded in aid effectiveness policies are not necessarily new, but this configuration of these policy concepts emerged as a distinct discourse in the mid-1990s. At that time there were several significant shifts in international development policies and practices that allowed for the emergence of this managerial discourse. These shifts included changes in international politics, policy-based lending, global monetary flows, the fragmentation of aid, and an onslaught of critiques of the development industry. Further, the aid architecture began to form into four distinct tiers, with the first tier being international financial agreements such as the Doha Round and Monterrey Consensus, and the second tier being the MDGs. Donor partners and recipient governments form the third and fourth tiers, respectively (O’Keefe, 2007). This categorization allowed for a distinct set of narratives or rationales to emerge around the donor partner - recipient government relationship, which eventually came to be defined as the aid effectiveness *problematique*.

The *problematique* embedded in aid effectiveness discourse is steeped in the philosophy of high managerialism, where a strong belief in modern managerial practices and technical language overshadows a more nuanced, ethical, and hope-driven mode of development. The literature generally argues that aid effectiveness is a response to critiques of mismanagement and concerns over ownership. Notably, this approach excludes post-development and most alternative development critiques. The managerial critiques highlight the argument that donor partners overburden the public service in recipient countries with administrative requirements. Further, the problem with economic and development policies in recipient countries is a lack of ownership or lack of commitment to implementing them properly. The literature then explains that when donors use their own administrative systems to disburse aid, they essentially bypass national governments and unwittingly disrupt democracy. This diagnosis of an inefficient and redundant aid management system created a platform from which to launch large-scale policy reform within the international development bureaucracy.

As the proposed solution to these problems, aid effectiveness policies represent a supranational policy framework built on the principles of ownership, alignment,
harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability. Donor partners are expected to harmonize their administrative procedures and align their programming objectives with the recipient government’s priorities, as well as coordinate activities among themselves. At the same time, recipient countries are expected to strengthen good governance and fiscal management in order to assume ownership of their development. Aid effectiveness policies are intended to make aid distribution more efficient and thus more effective by transferring ownership of the development process from donor partners to recipient governments, thus generating buy-in.

Aid effectiveness policies were adopted through a series of OECD DAC-sponsored High-level Forums in Rome (2003), Paris (2005), and Accra (2008). During this lengthy international process, aid effectiveness evolved into a highly technical and comprehensive policy framework complete with numerous working papers, key principles, corresponding methods and tools, and a performance measurement framework that set out concrete targets and indicators. Ideally, as a global policy framework, the participating donor partners, recipient governments, and CSOs would draft additional and corresponding policies at various levels within their own bureaucracies, creating a cascade of related policies moving throughout international development institutions. However, the research showed that the focus on managerialism glosses over a tremendously complex policy environment.

This research confirms Mosse’s (2005) findings that the role of policy is not only to direct change but to generate legitimacy for a set of diverse activities. In this regard, aid effectiveness could be considered successful in terms of its maintaining a broad foundation of rhetorical support through knowledge generation and the broad language of international agreements. However, aid effectiveness does not hold the same meaning or level of commitment for everyone. The research found that just below the surface of these policies multiple interpretations span the different networks and scales within the international development bureaucracy. Terms such as ownership and accountability mean very different things to donor partners, recipient governments, and NGOs.
The research found that the discourse surrounding aid effectiveness policies does not amount to the monolithic hegemony depicted in the early post-development literature, but is instead a fractured discourse that needs to be constantly re-inscribed in order to generate legitimacy for the international development bureaucracy. Underneath the perception of consensus, the research found numerous configurations of aid effectiveness policies, many distinct to groups such as CSOs, donor partners, and recipient countries. The next section reviews how aid effectiveness policies are being used in the Canadian aid context.

2.2 How and to what extent is aid effectiveness integrated into Canadian aid policy and its partnership with Tanzania?

While Canada officially supports aid effectiveness policies in the international arena, it has not been able to fully integrate them at the level of Canadian aid policy. When aid effectiveness policies entered the Canadian domestic context, they were subject to the political configurations and discourses embedded within the national dialogue. The Canadian policy context is plagued by a set of cross-pressures that includes competing discourses and interests in terms of national politics, government departments, NGOs, and the Canadian public. These pressures act on and within the Canadian government, making it difficult for politicians, the government, and CIDA in particular to maintain a coherent development policy framework.

The lack of an overarching policy or vision for Canadian aid became apparent in this study’s review of CIDA’s policies. It uncovered a series of fragmented and conflicting reviews, studies, and management frameworks. Further, CIDA’s frequent revisions of its priority areas and countries of concentration have created confusion and discontinuity throughout the organization. The overarching policy statements that are in place tend to be outdated and often contradict each other. For instance, CIDA’s policy, Canada Making a Difference in the World: A Policy Statement on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness (2002), and the Agency’s corresponding commitment to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) frequently conflict with administrative frameworks and procedures required under Canada’s Accountability Act (2006). Given that the Accountability Act
has a stronger legal status than CIDA’s aid effectiveness policy statement, it is not surprising that the conflict has weakened aid effectiveness initiatives.

In the end, the integration of aid effectiveness principles within the Canadian aid context, as influenced by political agendas and CIDA’s own organizational maladies, resulted in a uniquely Canadian interpretation. The aid effectiveness policies that were adopted formed a discourse coalition within the Canadian domestic context, emphasizing financial accountability and results based management while effectively de-emphasizing harmonization, alignment, and ownership. While this configuration of aid effectiveness policies conforms to the Canadian context in terms of the emphasis on accountability and centralization, it presents significant challenges within the international and recipient country contexts—especially for CIDA staff who bridge the international and recipient country contexts.

This study’s exploration of the relationship between CIDA headquarters and the Tanzanian field office is consistent with Lewis and Mosse’s (2006) central argument that policy undergoes a series of transitions as it moves through international bureaucracy and large organizations. In terms of CIDA, some variations in the interpretation of aid effectiveness policies between its head and field offices can be expected. However, the research found that development practitioners rely on official policy frameworks as a basis for representation and legitimacy in the field, even when they interpret the framework as meeting the imperatives of a particular context. It was also found that the lack of a coherent, overarching policy framework and the interpretation of aid effectiveness as privileging financial accountability has increased the amount of pressure placed on micro-policy negotiations in the Tanzanian field office.

The research found a significant imbalance exist between CIDA’s official policy discourse and the micro-policy negotiations that occur in day-to-day practice. CIDA’s policies and practices in Tanzania often exist in an unapproved state, are cobbled together, or grow out of organizational norms and administrative loopholes. While a few intrepid staff members viewed this as an opportunity to push through their own
initiatives, most staff members became more risk-averse in this context of uncertainty and frequently referred decisions up the chain of command. With low administrative ceilings for projects and lengthy approval processes, it was concluded in Chapter 5 that CIDA is weighed down by its own organizational maladies.

The CIDA case illustrates two important findings that are discussed in greater detail in the following sections. First, policy discourses are quite fluid and are often translated and re-interpreted as they move through different levels of bureaucracy. This highlights the interaction between the micro-processes of power that shape the day-to-day negotiations and underlying societal discourses. Second, Chapter 5 provides an example of what happens when there is disequilibrium between the overarching policies and micro-policy negotiations. For better or worse, the larger policy discourses do play a role in creating legitimacy for action, and without a legitimate basis for action the organization’s activity can grind to a halt. Thus, it is argued here that the question should not be whether policy discourses are good or bad, but how constraining or enabling they are? What are the ethical foundations of certain configurations of power? And, how desirable are they for the various actors?

2.3 How and to what extent have aid effectiveness policies changed in the dialogue process in Tanzania?

The relationship between the Government of Tanzania and its donor partners has a rich history, from independence in 1961 and Presidents Nyerere’s well-articulated critique and refusal of foreign aid conditionalities to his acquiescence in 1986, and then through a series of ups and downs as parties negotiated the path to and expectations for development. In the early 1990s, when the relationship was at an all-time-low, both sides sought advice from a team of independent advisors led by the development economist Gerald Helleiner (Wangwe, 2002). The recommendations and language included in these early reports are remarkably similar to current aid effectiveness policies, confirming the observations of a number of respondents who pointed out that Tanzania served as a model for the global aid effectiveness discussions. Within Tanzania, the Helleiner
process grew into an influential narrative alongside the international aid effectiveness discourse, and the two narratives drove the evolution of the dialogue process in Tanzania.

The research found that various actors in Tanzania used the Helleiner narrative and aid effectiveness discourse as a basis or justification for their work within the dialogue process. The result was two decades of fast-paced expansion of the dialogue process with the emergence of large-scale consultative processes, a donor partner group, sector-working groups, basket funds, and designated committees. Yet, despite all the organizational growth, changes in the content of the dialogue process were modest. These changes included the drafting of plans and priorities, a moderate increase in donor coordination, slight shifts in aid modalities towards program-based approaches, and further emphasis on government reform programs. The research found that there were no significant shifts, however, in the overall power dynamic between the Government of Tanzania and its donor partners.

The research found that the dialogue process has several characteristics that are consistent with complex adaptive systems. First, the dialogue process consists of a diverse set of actors who are accountable to people and organizations outside the dialogue process itself. This creates a situation where actors within the system are loosely held together by disbursement pressure and peer pressure, often expressing varying levels of commitment to collective processes and objectives. Second, it is the accumulation of actions and constant negotiations that form the networks and organizations. All the actors within the dialogue process are engaged in constant negotiations with each other, and in this way move the dialogue process forward. Third, actors often negotiate the design of various venues within the dialogue process to increase leverage, and thus the dialogue process is both a result of and venue for negotiations between the various actors. In this way, the dialogue process is constantly evolving by absorbing fluctuations resulting in an overall stability in the donor partner – recipient government relationship.

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58 There was only a 6% increase in GBS from the fiscal year 2002/2003 to 2008/2009 (Government of Tanzania, 2008).
My research targeted three levels of analysis in order to adequately understand how aid effectiveness policies were modified as they moved through the international development bureaucracy. This approach allowed my investigation to explore beyond the bounds of practical implementation issues and Lewis and Mosse’s (2005) description of translators and brokers, to the generative frameworks and power dynamics that form the basis of the various manifestations of aid effectiveness policies. The three levels of analysis are used to address the three types of power that occur simultaneously in the various policy spaces located throughout the international development bureaucracy.

The different types of negotiations embodied in the dialogue process correspond with VeneKlassen and Miller’s (2002) categorization of invisible, hidden, and visible forms of power. Invisible forms of power are based on subconscious filters and categorizations that all members of society accumulate through processes of socialization. This includes negotiations concerning the different roles individuals and organizations can legitimately play within the dialogue process and what types of knowledge are or are not privileged. Second, many professionals use hidden forms of power such as control over invitation lists, timing, and agenda to shape policy spaces and outcomes. Lastly, visible forms of power are expressed through formal negotiations between officials in the dialogue process. The above categorization highlights the vertical aspects of governmentality or how power and discourse underlie policy negotiations and give rise to particular configurations of power.

The principle of ownership provides an excellent example of how these different forms of power and negotiation strategies can maintain stability within the system despite the rhetoric of reform. The research shows that there are plenty of changes occurring in the official venues of the dialogue process, with only modest shifts in the hidden strategies used in the negotiations. For example, the Paris Declaration and related documents clearly state that ownership is based on the condition of good governance and reform programs. These conditionalities effectively allow the donor partners to be more—not less—involved in the operations of the recipient governments. However, the research also found that the Government of Tanzania is gaining ownership by distancing itself, and
especially its high-level officials, from the donor partners. This indicates that, despite the structural constraints, there are some opportunities for actors (including donor partners and recipient governments) to promote or subvert dominant power narratives. However, these skirmishes over ownership often accumulate and sustain pre-existing asymmetrical power dynamics rather than reform them.

From a holistic perspective, the visible, hidden, and invisible forms of power exert influence within the various policy spaces, effectively acting as barriers to the long-term transformational change promised in the aid effectiveness policies. The barriers confine development practitioners to working within a given set of parameters. These include: organizational policies and procedures; monetary and social resources; individual experiences, education and worldview; engagement with others; underlying perceptions regarding legitimate forms of knowledge; and entrenched societal discourses. As will be discussed in a later section, these structural constraints determine the range of potential actions for individual actors within the international development bureaucracy.

It was also noted in Chapter 7 that aid effectiveness focuses on the technical or implementation aspects of policy with only some recognition of the hidden forms of power, and invisible forms of power also go relatively unacknowledged in practice. This omission weakens efforts to truly transform the international bureaucracy or to substantially alter the power dynamic between the donor partners and recipient governments. It is argued here that transformative change will only occur if there are efforts to address the deep-rooted and entrenched societal discourses that drive international development bureaucracy. This would also create a shift in the potential range of actions available to development practitioners working within the system and perhaps carry enough force to push the current power relationship to a tipping point, allowing for a reversal to occur.
3.0 The Contrary Nature of Discursive Regimes

One of the more interesting research findings in this dissertation stems from the contradictory results regarding discourse. Critical development scholars tend to view dominant discourses in a negative light, illustrating how discourse often entrenches established power dynamics. At the same time, the literature shows that policy language must play an important role as a form of legitimization and for the garnering of support for reform programs and projects. Both of these arguments are reflected in the research. Chapter 5 illustrates what happens in the absence of a strong overarching policy narrative, and Chapters 4, 6, and 7 provide examples of how the aid effectiveness and Helleiner narratives limit the space in which development bureaucrats can act. It is the contradiction between the findings in Chapter 5 and those in 4, 6, and 7 that proves most revealing in this analysis.

This research found that global aid effectiveness discourse and the Helleiner narrative exist within the context of mainstream development beliefs regarding the validity of neoliberalism, the MDGs, and new management approaches. Going back to Escobar’s observation that a text or discourse is a space wherein only certain things can be said or done, this research similarly found that policy discourses and the framing of problematiques with techno-rational solutions include some possibilities for action while excluding others. This also has the effect of giving some people the legitimacy to act but not others. In this regard, Chapters 4, 6, and 7 highlight the negative aspects of discourse, and especially how it can further entrench prevailing power dynamics within the international development bureaucracy.

In juxtaposition, Chapter 5 shows that Canadian aid policy has been stunted by a set of competing agendas and a lack of political support. This has hindered the development of an overarching vision that Canadian development practitioners could use as a legitimate foundation for their activities. Without such a vision, another more insipid narrative emerged within the organizational culture. On numerous occasions, CIDA respondents discussed how they were tied down by bureaucracy and had to avoid risk, as they were afraid of negatively impacting their careers. This narrative strengthened an already
centralized bureaucracy and further constrained CIDA staff in the field. Chapter 5 thus illustrates that some discursive framing is necessary for action to take place.

In acknowledging this contradiction, it is argued here that either/or questions regarding discourse are misplaced. The critical development literature should take a more balanced approach by examining the complexity within discursive practices. Mills suggests that “discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines it and exposes it, renders it fragile, and makes it possible to thwart it” (Mills, 2003:55). Efforts to examine the complexity within discursive practices would include asking questions such as: Are particular discursive practices negative or positive? What are their ethical foundations? How are they modified? Can we change them?

4.0 Governmentality

The conceptual framework is based on a moderate version of governmentality, in which Foucault describes how power operates through and within society, rendering it governable. Foucault theorizes that the capillary nature of power—its connection to knowledge, and how power and knowledge are embedded in discourse—eventually gives rise to the larger discursive and disciplinary regimes that comprise governmentality. This link between the micro-processes of power and larger societal structures is essential for understanding how sets of contingencies or potentialities are shaped. As noted in Foucault’s essay on governmentality, it is a triad of sovereignty-discipline-government that produces or frames the “conduct of conduct” within a given population (Foucault, 1991).

More specifically, the version of governmentality used in this dissertation highlights three aspects: its complex and vertical archeology, how policy spaces are infused with relational forms of power, and how that power acts on and within all subjects in society, including professionals working within the international development bureaucracy. Thus, individual actors within the development bureaucracy are analyzed as subjects, nested and shaped within their societal constructs.
The above characteristics result in a moderate form of governmentality that uses the principles and imagery of complex adaptive systems to understand how power is embedded in discursive regimes and regulatory mechanisms that shape transnational policy initiatives. Governmentality creates a web in which development practitioners are framed by structure with only a limited amount of agency, establishing a limited range of possible actions. It is important that we understand these dynamics in order to better assess how development professionals are and are not able to influence policy and whether their range of actions can be reshaped. These features of governmentality are described below in relation to this case study.

4.1 Complex Adaptive Systems
The concept of the complex adaptive system is used in the research to describe how the international development bureaucracy functions and to maintain a focus on the vertical aspects of governmentality. The research found that aid effectiveness policies operate within a global bureaucracy and correlate with the main organizing principles of complex adaptive systems.

- The international development bureaucracy is made up of a number of interconnected and overlapping systems. These include individuals, networks, and organizations that often work in and across different scales. For example, the interview data showed that CIDA respondents posted in Dar es Salaam, were constantly negotiating with the CCO, High Commission, CIDA’s head office, other donors working in the Tanzanian dialogue process, the Government of Tanzania, CSOs, and a network of associates stationed around the world.

- Close examination of the Tanzanian dialogue process revealed that an accumulation of individual actions, including negotiation strategies, creates and recreates the system over time. The dialogue process evolved out of constant interaction between the Government of Tanzania and the donor partners. Disbursement pressure and peer pressures loosely hold the dialogue process
together, while formal documents such as the JAST and Terms of References for individual committees and groups only provide basic, non-binding guidelines.

- The international development bureaucracy uses various avenues and follows the path of least resistance. Chapter 5 provides an example of how CIDA was unable to get approval for GBS from the Treasury Board of Canada. Since the official procedures were blocked, development practitioners used an alternate route through the World Bank in order to disburse the committed funds to the Government of Tanzania.

- The system is constantly evolving by absorbing fluctuations in order to maintain stability. In Chapter 6, the donor partners felt that the DCF was not working because the Government of Tanzania cancelled meetings and ignored the donor partners’ concerns about government corruption. Thus, the donor partners stepped up their preparations for the Annual Budget Review, using that venue to ask questions about corruption and argue for improved government reform programs. This led to permanent organizational changes in the dialogue process, privileging the Annual Budget Review but still maintaining overall stability in the relationship between the Government of Tanzania and its donor partners.

- The Tanzanian dialogue process is both a product of and a venue for negotiations. Chapter 6 illustrates the fluidity of the dialogue process and how large consultative processes are created and merge, how donor-government forms are being redesigned, and how membership in sector working groups is constantly fluctuating. The lack of a formal organizational chart is a reflection of how the dialogue process is constantly evolving as actors compete for better negotiating positions. One of the proposals in 2008 was the creation of a venue for the HOMs. As one respondent noted, this was precisely so they could have more access “to the decision making levels, to the political levels, so as to have a conversation with Ministers, even the Prime Minister, even the President. And so increasingly, we have been trying to find a way for Heads of Missions to coordinate better
amongst themselves and to agree on how we would like to approach the government issues that we haven’t been able to resolve at the technical level” (30:11).

Complex adaptive systems provide a vivid description of the different components that make up international development bureaucracy and how they interact. This description of the international development bureaucracy’s internal functioning allows the research to stay focused on the vertical or archeological aspects of governmentality. However, the description is not complete without an explanation of what drives the system. Using the conceptual framework laid out in Chapter 2, the research also explores how visible, hidden, and invisible power dynamics frame interactions within the international development bureaucracy and accumulate into a web of governmentality.

4.2 Policy Spaces

The internal functioning of the international development bureaucracy does not occur in a vacuum but rather in spaces framed by power and knowledge. Policy spaces exist both in moments of time and in physical locations, such as meetings rooms, cafes, airports, media outlets, and offices located throughout the aid bureaucracy. These spaces are filled with power dynamics emanating from their history, design, artifacts, actors, and language. As a relational force, power is understood and negotiated in each space in terms of societal biases, discursive frames, past experiences, expert or technical knowledge, expected behaviours, etc. This research confirms Brock et al.’s (2001) argument that the power dynamic of policy spaces sets the tone for interactions between actors, their negotiation strategies and potential policy outcomes. As policy filters through these spaces modifications accumulate, acting as building blocks for particular discursive regimes and eventually governmentality. There is also a feedback loop in which development practitioners or bureaucrats become subjects of governmentality.

The dissertation illustrates that as aid effectiveness moved through the different policy spaces in the international development bureaucracy, it was modified and re-configured. In terms of organizations, Chapter 4 outlines how different types of organizations (CSOs,
the Tanzanian dialogue process, donor partners, and the Government of Tanzania) have
developed and advocated from a set of diverse interpretations of aid effectiveness
policies. In terms of the locations or research sites, Chapter 5 describes how development
practitioners in Ottawa tend to interpret aid effectiveness in terms of accountability and
results based management, while Chapters 6 and 7 describe how development
practitioners in Dar es Salaam tend to interpret aid effectiveness in terms of ownership
and harmonization. The research shows that the modifications to the policy framework
within the various policy spaces are related to the influence exerted by visible, hidden,
and invisible power.

4.3 Development Bureaucrats as Subjects
The focus on vertical aspects of governmentality and policy spaces accentuates the
argument that development practitioners can be both perpetrators of modernity and
subjects of it. The research found that instead of having unlimited free will, development
practitioners act within zones of influence framed by structure and a modest amount of
agency. In this regard, development practitioners were both constrained and enabled by
visible, hidden, and invisible forms of relational power. This often limited their ability to
implement the transformational elements of aid effectiveness policies.

Figure 10: Agency and Structure provides a rough illustration of how development
practitioners are limited in their spaces of maneuverability. Both structure and agency are
located in the individual subject and are created and recreated through the interactions
between subject and society. Individuals (represented by smiley faces) work within
organizations with certain sets of expected professional behaviours, practices, and
hierarchies. This conceptualization involves a poststructuralist understanding of structure
as intersecting in the individual through gender, race, class, education, and language, as
well as institutions. These formal and informal rules are reinforced by deeply entrenched
discursive regimes that set the parameters of analysis and reinforce certain narratives or
rationales.
For example, the development literature argues that the international development bureaucracy is taking on a new form of aid architecture. Global financial arrangements, such as Doha and Monterrey, and the MDGs form the first and second tiers of this new architecture, while the donor partners and recipient governments form the third and fourth tiers, respectively. The underlying narrative in the third and fourth tiers tells a story of all parties working together within a neoliberal framework to build recipient government capacity, foster ownership, and alleviate poverty over the long-term. This rationale is embedded in aid effectiveness policies, the Helleiner narrative, and in the Tanzanian context that currently drives the Tanzanian dialogue process.

The policy discourse is maintained through processes of inclusion and exclusion, as seen in the HBS example in Chapter 7. Individuals, networks, or organizations often face overt or covert sanctions when the public transcripts are violated. At the micro-level, agency is how a person engages with the range of possibilities available to them. Internally, the
subject uses habits or lived experiences to understand situations, imagination in order to assess possible actions/inaction and potential responses, and judgment to evaluate the best possible option. Embedded in this internal process are often subconscious understandings of societal structures such as identity, class, gender, and race that affect how one judges the legitimacy of knowledge, the types of actions or behaviours that would be appropriate, and expected responses. These relational power dynamics affect how one evaluates others as well as one self.

Chapter 7 describes how a representative of the Tanzanian Bureau of Statistics was met with silence and ignored by members of the DPG when s/he questioned neoliberal economic policies. Another example of how relational power works to include some and excludes others, was when the Government of Tanzania publicly shamed CIDA representatives by labeling them the least predictable donor in the context of a larger public forum. The CIDA respondent not only indicated that s/he felt embarrassed at the time of the incident, but also s/he decided to maintain a “low-profile” in the Annual Budget Review because s/he was aware of CIDA’s tarnished reputation and expected there would be backlash if they attempted to exert too much influence over other donor partners and/or the Government of Tanzania. The research revealed that development practitioners in the field were constantly aware of their professional and their organization’s reputation and felt an intense sense of peer pressure. It is this factor that helps drives interest in the latest policy trends and terminology.

This renders all member of society (donor partners and recipients) subject to the same web of power, albeit a distinctly more fluid conception than the post-development and liberal ideas. In both these cases, the subject’s ability to act or transgress against societal norms is exaggerated. The liberal notion of freedom depicts development practitioners as heroic agents of change or fat-cat bureaucrats who possess unlimited power. In comparison, the post-development thinkers, such as Ferguson (1993), Escobar (1995), and Li (2007) rely on the extreme version of Foucault’s work, the method of genealogy, and governance from a distance. This type of analysis tends to render the subject incapable of agency. This dissertation’s data reveals a moderate form of governmentality
in which actors are partially aware of the contradictions in their own discourse and practices while still being subject to a degree self-discipline and subconscious action. In this way, development practitioners operate within modest zones of influence that allow for some agency but which are also limited by structure. By acknowledging and understanding what development practitioners can and cannot do, this research provides more realistic insight into the possibility of change.

If new forms of thinking are going to be adopted, then the configuration of agency and structure needs to be expanded or reshaped to allow people to act in new ways. Returning back to the HBS example, what if the TBS representative was recognized as a legitimate expert and given the space to openly discuss how the survey findings could indicate failures in Tanzanian economic and development policies? Would these types of debates be able to bring about greater change? While there is not enough room in this dissertation for a full investigation of these potentials, the research raises questions regarding how we could—and whether we should—expand or reshape the range of possible actions available to development practitioners.

5.0 Can aid effectiveness, as a transnational policies initiative, change the international development bureaucracy?
This dissertation examines whether aid effectiveness policies are, or could be, used to reform the international development bureaucracy. As seen in Table 8, my research is grounded in critical realism and three levels of analysis (empirical, actual, and reality domains). These correspond with VeneKlassen and Miller’s (2002) three layers of visible, hidden, and invisible power that create a relational web of power. The research used these levels of analysis and layers of power to understand the complexity of transnational policy and to identify areas in which aid effectiveness policies were modified as they moved through the international development bureaucracy.

Row A of Table 8 focuses on empirical, visible, and practical elements of aid effectiveness policies. The dissertation records finite objects and events, including descriptions of publicly recognized authorities, formal institutions, and procedures that
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<th>Level of Analysis</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>A</strong></td>
<td>Empirical Domain: This level of analysis focused on the more concrete objects and events that exist independent of human interpretation. This research is based on statistics or factual information regarding aid effectiveness.</td>
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<td><strong>B</strong></td>
<td>Actual Domain: This level of analysis took a constructivist approach in understanding social accounts of certain phenomena and events. The research is based on the views and interpretations of participants in aid effectiveness.</td>
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<td><strong>C</strong></td>
<td>Reality Domain: This level of analysis used the constructive understanding of aid effectiveness in order to examine the terms, metaphors, and narratives used in the aid effectiveness discourse. This method identified the generative mechanisms and discursive regimes that shape the language of aid effectiveness.</td>
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<th>Category of Power</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>A</strong></td>
<td>Visible Power: Formal authority that is granted to specific actors and institutions. They are publicly recognized as legitimate experts in their areas.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>B</strong></td>
<td>Hidden Power: This type of power represents the influential processes that operate behind the scenes. It includes setting agendas, allocating resources, back room lobbying ...etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong></td>
<td>Invisible Power: These are the subconscious or internalized constructs that inform societal interactions. Forms of discursive and disciplinary regimes combine to create an overall system of governmentality.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>A</strong></td>
<td>Practical: The adoption of new policy frameworks involves the technical implementation of new procedures and practices. Development practitioners modify policy in order to operate within resource and/or organizational constraints.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>B</strong></td>
<td>Interpretative: Development practitioners interpret new policies in terms of education, work experience, and worldview. They then engage with others in their immediate network and negotiate meanings that are applicable to their position within the international development bureaucracy.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong></td>
<td>Discursive: The emergence of discursive regimes is influenced by and competes with other discourses. As they move through the international development bureaucracy, the newly emerging discourse is adapted or reconciled with other more entrenched societal discourses.</td>
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encircle the aid effectiveness framework. The literature in this layer emphasizes the technical aspects of policy implementation, provides official definitions, and setout measurable indicators. Efforts are made to ensure the procedures and processes are in place and aid effectiveness is adopted accordingly, however, implementation is rarely simple.

The research found that development practitioners, who are managing very real resources and/or organizational constraints, frequently modify aid effectiveness policies in order to make them work in practice. As a result, the emphasis is placed on designing programs, projects, and administrative procedures that meet technical requirements and accountability checklists, rather than the content or spirit of the policies. For example, Chapter 6 discusses how donor partners articulated their contribution to the principle of harmonization through donor coordination. In doing so, they created a tiered system with sector wide approaches, the DPG, and a joint coordination group. The fast-paced evolution of the system achieved technical success in terms of creating new processes and procedures; however, there is still limited movement on transparency and the division of labour. Many of the respondents from donor partner organizations freely admitted that donor partners have only taken the first easy steps or focused on the “quick wins.”

While Row A focuses on the empirical aspects of aid effectiveness, Row B takes a constructivist approach in understanding the social accounts of the finite events and phenomena. The vague terms and inherent contradictions in aid effectiveness policies encourage a wide array of interpretations. Actors in the international development bureaucracy interpret aid effectiveness policies and events differently depending on their worldviews, education, work experiences, and position within the international development bureaucracy. They then engage in an interactive meaning-making process as they negotiate with each other in various policy spaces.
The research confirms the accuracy of Lewis and Mosse’s (2005) description of how brokers (or development practitioners) interpret and translate policy as it moves through the international development bureaucracy. The result is a sophisticated version of “whisper-down-the-lane” and long chains-of-meanings. Within various policy spaces there are hidden forms of power and subtle negotiations. This type of power works behind the scenes to influence agendas and resource allocation. These adjustments are often made to accommodate different interests or positions as terms are negotiated within the policy spaces. The above area of modification is reflected in the research. For example, CIDA staff in Ottawa/Gatineau emphasized the accountability and results based management aspects of aid effectiveness while their colleagues in Dar es Salaam focused on donor coordination and ownership.

The reality domain described in Row C refers to the generative mechanisms and discursive regimes that inform how subjects construct the reality around them. In terms of aid effectiveness, the analysis focused on the metaphors, narratives, and rationales used by the respondents to interpret and categorize events and processes. These discursive regimes are used to identify the subconscious and internalized forms of power that influence how subjects interact with each other and society in general. However, there are many different types of discourse that compete, replace, and combine and co-exist with each other.

The case study shows that more entrenched societal discourses such as neoliberalism, the paternalism associated with neocolonialism, and Western expertise influenced how aid effectiveness was framed (as seen in Chapter 4) and was reconciled with current practices (as seen in Chapters 5, 6, and 7). Figure 11 depicts how policy discourse is modified by and within the context of invisible power. In the international development bureaucracy there are many smaller and often fashionable policy discourses or narratives. While the actors and organizations within the international development bureaucracy may have clearly committed to the larger policy initiatives, an invisible barrier or covert form of relational power exists between the policy prescriptions and their implementation.
The new policy discourses are often interpreted in terms of larger, more deep-rooted, societal-level discourses that consist of grand narratives and underlying disciplinary regimes, allowing some ways of thinking to persist subconsciously. These entrenched discourses create an undertow or constant pull towards mainstream norms, limiting the transformational elements in aid effectiveness.

Overall, the research arrived at several observations regarding the extent to which change has occurred in the dialogue process. Chapter 6 shows significant change in the formal or visible design of the dialogue process. Further, there has also been a more modest change in the technical language and hidden or subtle strategies used by actors when they engage with each other in policy negotiations. However, the invisible or subconscious power dynamic between the Government of Tanzania and its donor partners has remained more or less the same. Without change at this deeper level, the push and pull over ownership in the dialogue process will continue to persist at a superficial level.
It is important to note that this analysis does not indicate that significant policy change is impossible. Instead it suggests that new policy language and technical solutions are not enough to reform the power dynamics within international development bureaucracy. As discussed in the next section, reform efforts must focus on several fronts simultaneously. These include further research on whether normative discussions and analysis can unearth deep-rooted discursive practices and illuminate how to reconfigure structure and agency, allowing development practitioners to imagine and partake in a new range of actions.

6.0 The Possibility of Change
The key question driving this research is whether aid effectiveness, as a transnational policy initiative, can change the international development bureaucracy? The research found that the technical solutions captured in the aid effectiveness policies are not enough to achieve the stated transformational goal of reassigning ownership from donor partners to recipient governments. If substantial change were to occur, it would have to encompass the visible, hidden, and invisible power dynamics embedded in the interactions among actors in the international development bureaucracy. These findings lead to yet another set of questions: How to generate transformational change? What would this change look like? Is there room for multiple versions of development?

Post-development theorists typically call for practitioners to “bring politics back in,” in order to address the discursive regimes and technical-rational mystiques that engulf international development studies (Munck, 2001). However, I argue that the calls for repoliticization contain two ill-founded assumptions regarding the development process. First, the development project is and has always been engulfed in politics. While the public transcript or project documents may not record the contestation, it is inherent in the hidden transcripts used by everyone from the large donors to the village councils. Secondly, from a practical perspective, in most cases it would be foolish to record political disputes in public reports or communications. This may accentuate problems or result in a loss of confidence from participants and funders. Scott (1990) eloquently
illustrated that successful and meaningful ruptures in the public transcript must be strategically orchestrated if they are to have a long-lasting and positive effect.

Manrsha and Gasper (2009) provide insight into the potential for strategic ruptures in the public transcription in their comparison of the “daughters deficit” policy in Delhi with the successful campaigns of Mahatma Gandhi’s Salt March (1930) and Martin Luther King’s historical “I Have a Dream” speech (1963). The authors argue that underlying discursive powers can be altered through the use of additional policy tools and strategic reframing. The traditional policy tools, characterized as carrots (incentives), sticks (disincentives), and sermons (persuasion), need to be supplemented by dialogue and unconditional support for all sides of the debate in order to reach the subconscious discursive regimes. These additional strategies speak to the possibility of establishing a genuine exchange around issues of mutual trust and respect. In describing the work of Gandhi and King, Manrsha and Gasper (2009) state that, “The tools they used varied. They enhanced their frame’s resonance with the experiences of the target audience by using common parlance, easily understood symbols and metaphors and elements of ‘myth’ relevant to and revered by all” (Manrsha & Gasper, 2009: 305). Gandhi and King created “motivational framings” that attacked the underlying discourse and power dynamics while at the same time avoiding placing blame or furthering societal divisions. This gave everyone a chance to participate in discussions and to create a new vision for society.

Beyond Manrsha and Gasper’s (2009) analysis of discursive framing, it is important to also acknowledge the context in which these movements existed. While Gandhi’s Salt March and King’s speech on the National Mall were pivotal, they were only one part of lengthy and often brutal struggles. Both the India Independence and Civil Rights Movements involved decades of activism and concerted efforts to cultivate a legitimate political voice. From a complex adaptive systems perspective, internal fluctuations and adjustments are accommodated in order to maintain the overall stability in the social system—that is, until it reaches a tipping point and a new norm is established. I suggest that the Gandhi and King examples illustrate the importance discursive framing as well as
how smaller events accumulate, allowing influential figures to lead (or push) their society beyond the tipping point, hopefully creating a new (more just) social order.

This discussion is particularly relevant to international development and its supposed goal of progressive social change. Michael Edwards proposes that, “ethics are ever-present in debates about development, because development is about things which ought to take place” (1993: 80). He highlights the need to combine theory and action in a way that focuses on the wellbeing of people. This wellbeing should include what Nussbaum calls the ethics of “care of oneself” and “care of others” (qtd. in Quarles van Ufford et al., 2003). However, the matter of who defines care and how, or who decides what “ought to take place,” presents the principle challenge to international development.

The concept of justice stretches across a universalism/relativism schism firmly embedded within the development discourse. On the one hand, in order to engage in the concept of justice, there must be some measure of universalism. On the other hand, development thinking must move beyond linear constructs to acknowledge and respect a plurality of discourses and multiple modernities (Tucker, 1999). Tucker suggests that this can be achieved through “multiple perspectives, which engage each other dialectically in a process of mutual criticism and mutual correction, [and] are a necessary acknowledgement of the different contexts of experience, description and theorizing” (1999: 16).

This dilemma is echoed in the 1971 debate between Chomsky and Foucault on human nature. During this exchange, Chomsky agreed with Foucault’s analysis that all justice is imbued with power, but then goes on to explain that:

…. in the intellectual domain of trying to construct a vision of a just and free society on the basis of some notion of human nature, we face the very same problem that we face in immediate political action, namely, that of being impulsed to do something, because the problems are so great, and yet knowing that whatever we do is on the basis of a very partial understanding of the social realities, and human realities in this case. (Chomsky, 2006: 44)
The exchange highlighted the folly of striving for one truth, and instead sought a negotiated and partial understanding through an ongoing dialogue, or what Rorty refers to as an edifying conversation (Hartstock, 1996). It also suggested that critical analysis includes social and human realities as well as the generative mechanisms that produce knowledge. In this sense, normative debates may not empirically determine what ought to be, but they open up such discussions for reflection and the transparent analysis of how society should engage in action. While recognizing the complexity of post-structuralism, it is still important to cobble together an imperfect framework for action based on a dialogical or deliberative process that engages people in normative debate.

7.0 Further Research
As with every research project, there are always lingering questions or avenues left unexplored. While there are places where additional data would help draw a more complete picture, in the end there are two pertinent questions that fell just outside the scope of the research. They are: Will additional case studies of the donor partner-recipient government cross-section generate similar findings? And, considering the obstacles identified in this dissertation, what are the possibilities for generating transformational change?

In regards to the first question, the scope of this dissertation is based on a unique multi-scalar approach that incorporates definitional struggles and transnational networks spanning international, donor, and recipient governments. However, a project of this scale needed be balanced in terms of “relatively coherent bundles of ideas and practices as realized in particular time and places” (Tsing, 2002:472). Thus, in the interest of focus, the cross-section of the international development bureaucracy was limited to a single case study of the International-Canadian-Tanzanian trajectory. It is important, however, to see if the findings apply to other cross-sections of the international development bureaucracy. Generating further case studies focused on the international development bureaucracy and transnational policy is key to extending this understanding of how power and policy operate in “aidland.”
The second outstanding question explores the various ways in which transformative change can be generated in the international development bureaucracy. The question emerges from this dissertation in two ways. First, from establishing how broad terminology, multiple interpretations, and discursive regimes emphasize the technical and de-emphasize the radical aspects of reform initiatives. Second, from establishing how power is embedded in the international development bureaucracy, and creates a limited range of possible actions or modest zones of influence for practitioners. From this vantage point, the research found that transformative and progressive change in the international development bureaucracy requires not only a shift in the technical policies and procedures, but a vibrant debate that challenges individual interpretations and deep-seated discourses. Further research should be conducted on how concepts such as discursive framing, dialogue, and deliberative democracy could be used to generate changes, and help construct a better, albeit still imperfect, platform for actions.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW GUIDE

The following document outlines a list of possible topics and questions for semi-structured interviews. The guide is designed to be adapted to individual respondents based on their position and organization. The respondent group will include professionals from CIDA, other multilateral and bilateral agencies, dialogue process, Government of Tanzania, and civil society organizations. Relevant questions will be selected for each interview, which should take an estimated 45 to 90 minutes to conduct.

1.0 Consent Process
The interview process will commence with a review of the written consent form including permission to audio record and quote the interview. Time will also be taken to answer any questions the respondents may have about the interview and nature of the study.

2.0 Warm-up Questions
How did you become involved in international development / government work?
What is your background? Education? Work experience?
How long have you been with the program? Where were you posted before?

3.0 Main Questions
This section is broken down to match the different groups within the study.

3.1 Canadian Aid
Section A: Canadian Aid Policy in Tanzania
What are CIDA’s priorities in Tanzania?
How have these policies changed over the past 5 years? 10 years?
What have been the major shifts or areas of debate in CIDA policies?
What have been the greatest successes in Canadian aid programming? What have been the greatest frustrations?
How has Tanzania’s designation as a core development partner affected the operations of Canadian aid policies and programs in the country?
How has the Canadian approach to civil society evolved? Key strategies?

Section B: Aid Effectiveness
What are the key debates or elements?
How are aid effectiveness policies being used at CIDA? In Tanzania? Please describe?
How has CIDA’s structure adapted to work more closely with other donors and government? Specific sectors? DPG? budget support? projects?
What percentage of CIDA funds are delivered outside of the pools or baskets?
Have the policies changed how aid is delivered at CIDA? Positive or negative?
What are some of the driving forces behind the changes? What are the obstacles to change?
What type of policy constraints are staff members operating within?
What types of changes need to occur within CIDA to meet the demands of harmonization and alignment? In Dar? In Ottawa?
Section C: Other Donors/Government/Civil Society
Who does CIDA most often collaborate with in Tanzania (among official donor organizations and NGOs)?
Who do you regard as the most capable donor agencies operating in Tanzania, and how does CIDA compare with these agencies? What are the most valuable qualities?
What are the most valuable qualities for government? Strengths/challenges of harmonization?
What are the most valuable qualities for civil society? Strengths/challenges of harmonization?

Section D: Ownership
Has this new emphasis on aid effectiveness changed the dynamics among donors? Government? Civil Society?
How has the emphasis on Tanzanian “ownership” affected practice? What are the implications/limits?

3.2 Other Bilateral and Multilateral Organizations
Section A: Your Organization (from a wider perspective…)
How has your organization’s policies in Tanzania changed over the past 5 years? 10 years?
How is your organization involved in the Dialogue Process?
What have been the major shifts or areas of debate in policies?
What have been the greatest successes in programming? What have been the greatest frustrations?
What is your organization’s take on aid effectiveness? Key debates or lessons learned?

Section B: Aid Effectiveness (in the larger development community …)
How are aid effectiveness policies being used Tanzania? Please describe?
What are the key debates or lessons learned?
How has the development architecture in Tanzania evolved/adapted? Please describe?
What are some of the driving forces behind the changes? What are the obstacles to change?
Have the policies changed how aid is delivered in Tanzania? Positive or negative?
What types of changes need to occur within the donor community to meet the demands of harmonization and alignment? Within your organization?

Section C: Canadian Aid Policy in Tanzania
Are you familiar with the Canadian aid program? How have you been engaged?
How have their policies changed over the past 5 years? 10 years?
How have they been involved in harmonization and alignment?
What has been the greatest success in Canadian aid programming? What have been the greatest frustrations/disappointments?
What types of changes need to occur within CIDA to meet the demands of harmonization and alignment?
Do you have any recommendations for CIDA?

Section D: Other Donors/Government/Civil Society
Who do you regard as the most capable donor agencies operating in Tanzania, and how does CIDA compare with these agencies? What are the most valuable qualities? What are the most valuable qualities for government? Strengths/challenges of harmonization? What are the most valuable qualities for civil society? Strengths/challenges of harmonization?

Section F: Ownership
Has this new emphasis on aid effectiveness changed the dynamics among donors? Government? Civil Society? Challenges? Strengths? How has the emphasis on Tanzanian “ownership” affected practice? What are the implications/limits?

3.3 Dialogue Process
Section A: Aid Effectiveness
What are the key debates or lessons learned? How are aid effectiveness policies being used Tanzania? Please describe? How has the development architecture in Tanzania evolved/adapted? Please describe. Specific sectors? DPG? Budget support? Projects? Programs? Independent Monitoring Group?
In terms of aid flows, what percentage of funds is delivered outside the pools or baskets?
Have the policies changed how aid is delivered in Tanzania? Positive or negative? What are some of the driving forces behind the changes? What are the obstacles to change?
What types of changes need to occur within the donor community to meet the demands of harmonization and alignment?

Section B: UNDP
What is the role of UNDP? One UN Program? What types of changes are currently being discussed?

Section C: Canadian Aid Policy in Tanzania
Are you familiar with the Canadian Aid program? How have you been engaged? How have their policies changed over the past 5 years? 10 years? How have they been involved in harmonization and alignment? What have been the greatest successes in Canadian aid programming? What have been the greatest frustrations/disappointments? What types of changes need to occur within CIDA to meet the demands of harmonization and alignment?
Section D: Other Donors/Government/Civil Society
Who do you regard as the most capable donor agencies operating in Tanzania, and how does CIDA compare with these agencies? What are the most valuable qualities? What are the most valuable qualities for government? Strengths/challenges of harmonization? What are the most valuable qualities for civil society? Strengths/challenges of harmonization?

Section E: Ownership
Has this new emphasis on aid effectiveness changed the dynamics among donors? Government? Civil Society? Challenges? Strengths? If you picture ownership as a pie graph, which actors would have a slice? Size? How has the emphasis on Tanzanian “ownership” affected practice? What are the implications/limits?

3.4 Government of Tanzania
Section A: Aid Effectiveness
How are aid effectiveness policies being used in Tanzania? Please describe? What aspects of Aid Effectiveness are being emphasized in Tanzania? How and by whom? How has the aid architecture in Tanzania evolved over the last five to ten years? Please describe? Helleiner Report? Specific sectors? DPG? GBS? projects? Programs? What types of changes has the government made? What are the government’s priorities? What types of changes has the donor community made? How would you compare GBS with basket and project modalities? What are some of the driving forces behind the changes? What are the obstacles to change? Have the policies changed how aid is delivered in Tanzania? Positive or negative? What types of changes need to occur to meet the demands of harmonization and alignment? From the Donors? From the government?

Section B: Other Donors/Government/Civil Society
Has the new emphasis on aid effectiveness changed the dynamics among Donors, Government and Civil Society? Who are the lead organizations or key people involved in aid policy? What do you think the roles should be? What are the most valuable qualities for government? Strengths/challenges of harmonization? What are the most valuable qualities for civil society? Strengths/challenges of harmonization? What are the most valuable qualities for donors? Strengths/challenges of harmonization? Who do you regard as the most capable donor agency operating in Tanzania, and how does CIDA compare with these agencies? What are the most valuable qualities?
Section C: Canadian Aid Policy in Tanzania

Are you familiar with the Canadian Aid program? How you have been engaged?
How have their policies changed over the past 5 years? 10 years?
What have been Canada’s priority areas? (health, PSD, governance, education…)
In what ways has CIDA participated in the process of harmonization and alignment?
What is your assessment of CIDA’s strengths and limitations in Tanzania? As a partner to Tanzanian organizations?
What have been the greatest successes in Canadian aid programming? What have been the greatest frustrations/disappointments?

Section E: Ownership

How has the aid effectiveness debate influenced government-donor relationships Tanzania? Which came first?
Who sets the development agenda in Tanzania?

3.5 Civil Society Organizations

Section A: Your Organization

To start off, could you tell me a little bit about your organization? Origins? History? Tasks?
What are the main priorities?
How have they evolved over the past 5 to 10 years?
What has been your organization’s role in the PRSP process? Budget Review?
Dialogue process?
What is your assessment of the strengths and limitations of these processes?
Who are your funders?
What are some of the costs and benefits of your funding structure?

Section B: Aid Effectiveness

Have you been involved in aid effectiveness policies?
What is the CSO take on aid effectiveness?
What are some of the key debates or discussions?
Are aid effectiveness policies being used in Tanzania? Please describe?
Are there factors/influences that enable/hinder these changes?
Have the policies changed how aid is delivered?
What are the advantages/disadvantages of establishing coherent aid policies?

Section C: Canadian Aid Policy in Tanzania

Are you familiar with the Canadian aid program? How have you been engaged?
How have their policies changed over the past 5 years? 10 years?
How have they been involved in harmonization and alignment?
What has been the greatest success in Canadian aid programming? What have been the greatest frustrations/disappointments?
What types of changes need to occur within CIDA to meet the demands of harmonization and alignment?
Do you have any recommendations for CIDA?
Section D: Other Donors/Government/Civil Society
Who do you regard as the most capable donor agencies operating in Tanzania, and how does CIDA compare with these agencies? What are the most valuable qualities? What are the most valuable qualities for government? Strengths/challenges of harmonization? What are the most valuable qualities for civil society? Strengths/challenges of harmonization?

Section E: Ownership

4.0 Summation
What do you think the future will hold for aid policy in Tanzania? What types of changes are currently being discussed? Can you recommended other people for interviews? Do you have any documentation that will help me understand our discussion?
APPENDIX C: DIVISION OF LABOUR IN TANZANIA 2008
### Sector Working Groups

- **Cluster 1**: Growth and Income Poverty
- **Cluster 2**: Quality of Life and Social Well Being
- **Cluster 3**: Governance and Accountability

### Thematic Working Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster 1</th>
<th>Cluster 2</th>
<th>Cluster 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Industry and Trade</td>
<td>Social Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Development and Tourism</td>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Governance and anti-corruption programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>Strategic Planning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Cluster Leads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Lead</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 1</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Apaa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>UN-Habitat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1. UN Agencies with *** is a UN Lead Agency, speaking on behalf of the UN System. UN Agencies with **** mark is a current chair of relevant DPG WGs.
2. UN in Tanzania: This has not been decided upon. Currently, UN is a lead in Tanzania.
3. Tier 2: Baseline matrix combined Natural Resource and Environment as one. The baseline had Governance Themes as one thematic area.
4. Humanitarian Assistance and Refugee support are formally placed under the Legal Sector. However, given the special operational demands of this sub-sector, this matrix includes a separate column on Humanitarian Aid.
5. Sweden is outplacing Lead of Industry and Trade from July 1st 2005. In addition, from July 1st Sweden will be Lead of Anti-Corruption.
6. US involvement in Water, Infrastructure and Energy is through IPCC.
APPENDIX D: PROJECTED DIVISION OF LABOUR FOR 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector Working Groups</th>
<th>Thematic Working Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cluster 1: Growth and Income Poverty</td>
<td>Cluster 2: Quality of Life and Social Well Being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Industry and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>Water and sanitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>Industry and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Social Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health</td>
<td>Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protection</td>
<td>Public Health</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DPG Division of labour - Tanzania - 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Sector Engagement</th>
<th>Total Thematic Engagement</th>
<th>Total Delegated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

Note: The table and diagram provide details on the projected division of labour for different regions and sectors in Tanzania for the year 2010.
### Cluster Leads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster 1</th>
<th>Cluster 2</th>
<th>Cluster 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-Lead 1</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-Lead 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Coding:**
- Lead door marked by: [Lead]
- Active door marked by: [Active]
- Disabled sector marked by: [Dd]

**Notes:**
1. Belgium: The Sectors and themes marked as active for 2010 are tentative. The number of sectors and/or themes in which Belgium will be active in the future programme will be 2, excluding GBS.
3. UN Agencies with "***" is a UN Lead Agency, speaking on behalf of the UN System. UN Agencies with "****" mark is a current chair of relevant DPG WGs.
4. Humanitarian Assistance and Refugee support are formally placed under the Legal Sector. However, given the special operational demands of this sub-sector, this matrix includes a separate column on Humanitarian Aid.
5. US involvement in Water, Infrastructure and Energy is through MCC.