PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS: A FACE OF FOREIGN POLICY

by

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

at

Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia
August 2011

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DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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The author examines Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) as a face, or tool, of foreign policy used by governments. PRTs are unique organizations that have been created to specifically satisfy the security and development requirements of failed or fragile states and in the context of this study, specifically Afghanistan. The essential questions are: how do PRTs meet the objectives for which they were organized and how effective are they at the job? This study seeks to answer these questions and to determine the motives for this type of international involvement from the perspective of contributing states that form the 26 PRTs that are part of the NATO/ISAF organization. This crisis has presented new challenges to governments at home as they attempt to design and field a group of military and civilians that are equipped and trained to meet the demands placed upon them for security and development in Afghanistan.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team
KPRT Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team
WOG Whole of Government
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
U.S. United States
U.N. United Nations
IPS International Policy Statement
RC Regional Command
U.K. United Kingdom
LAV Light Armoured Vehicle
NTM-A NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan
CCTM-A Canadian Contribution Training Mission – Afghanistan
START Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force
DND Department of National Defence
CF Canadian Forces
DFAIT Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CRS Chief of Review Services
USAID United States Agency for International Development
JIMP Joint, Inter-agency, Multi-national, Public
GOA Government of Afghanistan
CIMIC Civil-Military Relations Team
GIROA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
SSR Security Sector Reform
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration
KAF Kandahar Airfield
IED Improvised Explosive Device
TFK Task Force Kandahar
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
OGD Other Government Department
IASC Inter Agency Standing Committee
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my wife, Pamela Barrett, for her patience and understanding while I have worked on this program and thesis. In addition, I owe a large debt of gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Dr. Dan Middlemiss, without his guidance I could not have written this thesis; and the staff of the Department of Political Science at Dalhousie University for their assistance. I have, in the process, learned a great deal about the needs of fragile and failed states, and the resulting impact on national foreign policy, and that there are no easy or quick solutions for any country attempting to lend assistance. The men and women of the 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams deployed to Afghanistan have performed a great service to the Afghan people; the citizens of the many nations they come from should rightly be very proud of their accomplishments, service and sacrifice.
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Three quotes that were found during the research for this study which are applicable to the concept of intervention in failed states and international involvement:

“the shooting side of the business is only 25 percent of the trouble and the other 75 percent lies in getting the people of this country behind us.”


“This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin-war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him.”

– U.S. President John Kennedy addressing the graduating class of West Point Military Academy in 1962.

“Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.”

– T.E Lawrence, Twenty-Seven Articles, The Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917.

A Provincial Reconstruction Team, or PRT, is a special mixture of what some might consider strange bedfellows. It mixes together the military, who are very focussed on their mission that has very specific outcomes and results, development experts who deal with more elusive and less clearly defined goals, and diplomatic staff who have objectives that neither the military nor development partners may fully understand, or if they do, can fully appreciate that they will take far longer to accomplish than time permits in a mission window that is measured in a short time horizon of six months for the military and not much longer for some of the other participants.

Several PRT models have been used in Afghanistan. Each one is slightly different than the other and caters to the needs of the region where it is located. That may be part of the success of the concept of the organization, that it is not rigid and permanent. The ability to add and delete components is probably a feature that makes it attractive to countries that have formed PRTs.
PRTs can cater to the national interests of contributing nations without the cost of supporting large military forces in the field. Nations can be seen to be contributing to international security and stability and aiding in the short and long term development of the population. PRTs have been described as armed social workers, they have been attacked by insurgents and killed, and they have been criticised by traditional NGOs as inefficient in the development business and stealing the “humanitarian space” that NGOs have traditionally enjoyed. In the end some may believe PRTs are organizationally schizophrenic and not well suited for the challenges of international development, however many may think of them as saviours for the help that they bring to places where it is too dangerous for anyone else to go.

This study is a review of current debate concerning Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that are being employed in Afghanistan as a new face of foreign policy by several NATO countries. PRTs are a relatively new tool for states to use for intervention in post-conflict settings. In the case of Afghanistan there were, in 2009, 26 PRTs deployed in all regions of the country under the command and control of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The emphasis was focussed on providing legitimacy to the fledgling government of Afghanistan and developing within the people of the country the ability to lead their own nation. Afghanistan was a failed state in civil-society ruin at the hands of a radical Islamist regime, and was also home to al-Qaeda, who attacked the United States in its homeland: New York and Washington. What followed in late 2001 was the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom to defeat al-Qaeda and force the Taliban regime out of the country to allow a legitimate and hopefully democratic government to replace the regime that had reduced Afghanistan to a condition of extreme poverty. Human rights conditions, especially for women and girls, were some of the worst on the planet.

The PRT as a structure had its origins before the United States, and then NATO, deployed to Afghanistan in late 2001. Concurrent with the use of PRTs was the development of what has become known as the whole-of-government, or WOG, approach to international involvement. While all of the nations that provide the PRTs to Afghanistan do not use this method of resource coordination, there are some key participants, Canada, United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Sweden and Norway, which do use the WOG approach to coordinate the provision of
their national resources to their PRT. The WOG approach has provided some excellent results and as a study of the Canadian WOG effort will show, in addition to its successes, had much work remaining at the national government level to fully integrate efforts and thus leverage those resources for greater success. Analysis shows that the WOG approach lacks a central planning capability and this in turn limits the success of the program. An examination of Canadian foreign policy, which is the foundation of WOG, will reveal the government approach used in the provision of resources for the PRT that Canada operates in one of the most dangerous regions of the world, Kandahar province in southern Afghanistan.

The comparison of the PRTs created by the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Turkey and Canada will show that while there are major differences in the structure and organization of the various PRTs, each has followed the lead of the United States, which initially created the modern PRT concept, and is able to provide, through the design of the organizations, varying levels of security and development facilitation in the region in which they operate.

Plan for the study:

- Describe Provincial Reconstruction Teams in terms of the objectives and tasks that they are asked to perform. The list of jobs that they are tasked to perform is lengthy and complex and reveals national expectations that accompany the design of PRTs. The paper will examine some of the differing origins of the concept (UN, US experience in Vietnam, Canadian Mission in Somalia 1992/1993) and relate that to PRT missions and design.

- Compare the organization of the PRTs provided by the U.S., Germany, U.K., Turkey and Canada and draw out similarities but also highlight the differences that exist and how this informs the potential of each PRT. The main lesson will be that there are great similarities but that national political considerations have an impact on the ability of the PRT to function.

- Examine PRT functions and some of the major criticisms of PRTs. The conclusion here will show that the functions are often complex and while the military component is well trained for military tasks, they are not well versed in development work. The same is true for the
diplomatic and development parts of the PRTs, they are not well versed in the ways of the military, but that each brings to the job a particular set of skills that will be essential for the success of the PRT. The challenge will be in the way that the parts interact and the degree to which their limitations are either roadblocks to success or how they are overcome. As lessons are learned from successive deployments by military and civilian staffs, the body of knowledge on best practices is getting larger thus the chances of success are getting greater.

- Examine recommendations for changes to PRT organization and the method of operation. Early research indicates that the PRT concept is new as a political and civil-military tool and thus the jury is ‘still considering the evidence’ before there are major changes to the way ahead. One of the deductions of this and other studies will be that PRTs should be used in other settings to determine both practical function and organization. The structure needs to be flexible and will be determined by the both the security threat and the development needs of the recipient nation.

- Examine Canadian motives and reasons for supporting the PRT concept as a case study within this overall analysis. The 2005 International Policy Statement was explicit in that Canada must be involved internationally to avoid being marginalized. The question that comes of this is: are PRTs the answer to Canada’s needs as a tool of foreign policy implementation? There is no simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to that question as the cost of PRT deployment must be assessed by the Canadian government to determine if they are worth the benefit.

- Examine the Canadian whole-of-government experience and response to the need to be involved internationally as well as examine the civil-military relationship and the need for discussion between the government and civil-society. The many factors defining the WOG approach determine the ability of government to act, not all government departments have been without their own motives and objectives. This discussion is critical for the development of PRTs as a national face of foreign policy and will inform the level of success and the way that they will be employed in the future.
The examination of PRTs reveals that they possess enormous potential to be a first-class tool of a government’s foreign policy, but this will be tempered by the emphasis placed on the structure, organization, manpower and expertise, and the rules put in place to guide operations. The WOG approach to the planning and execution of foreign involvement results in new ways for individual government departments to contribute to overall government goals; each must learn to operate in new and innovative ways, putting aside some of the constraints that normally dictate how they work. Chief among these is the need to give up a measure of control over both the agenda and the budget of the department, a difficult thing to do considering their ‘essences’, their long history of how they have functioned and government legislation in place to control their work and the way in which their budget is spent. Financial accountability is always a key consideration for the bureaucrats who must show Parliament how and where the money is spent.

A core argument of this study focuses on the imperative for a central planning capacity within national governments that provide forces like a PRT to an international coalition. The evolution of strategic doctrine in such a setting will demand that states plan and operate in a similar fashion when they come together to provide assistance in fragile and failed states. The United Nations and NATO will in all likelihood transition away from accepting *ad hoc* arrangements as was the norm in Afghanistan at the commencement of the effort to assist that country. Efforts on the part of Canada to adopt common planning has seen advancement with the creation of a central agency, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force, as well, other nations have created similar agencies to oversee this critical work. Regrettably, the product has not met the expectations, and lessons learned as recent as 2009 have shown that much work remains to be done to fully create a Whole of Government solution. Military forces are expert at planning; they need to be to minimize the risk to life and limb during combat operations. Other government departments that do not face this level of risk to personal safety have not embraced a common planning process that unifies all departments and maximizes the product: security and development, and at the same time.
CHAPTER 2 - DEFINING A PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM

This chapter will describe the PRT through an examination of the background of the organization, and examine some models of PRTs and the functions that they are intended to serve. This will allow us to understand the nature of the organization and the context of employment within NATO/ISAF. As well, it will provide the basis for the discussion of utility of PRTs as elements of national foreign policy. As fundamentally military organizations, with civilian augmentation, PRTs are relatively new players on the international landscape but have enormous responsibility in the overall plan for the rebuilding of failed and fragile states. They are controversial and have come under attack by non-governmental organizations that accuse PRTs of eroding “humanitarian space” that they feel is necessary for them to do their work. They are in the difficult spot of being on the front end of interaction with the population that is being served in often highly dangerous areas. They are intended to provide security and development and do it with a relatively small contingent of people. In terms of size they are tiny in comparison with the task they are asked to achieve and the physical territory they are responsible to serve and protect. The work that PRTs are asked to do is well defined by a lengthy list of principles and fundamentals, however the indicators of success are not yet as well defined.

The modern incarnation of PRTs were first created in Afghanistan after the commencement of the U.S.-led military campaign, Operation Enduring Freedom, in late 2001/early 2002. This military operation was part of the response to the 9/11 attack on American soil by the international terrorist organization al-Qaeda. Afghanistan had been a home for al-Qaeda, in addition to it being ruled by an extremist Taliban regime; consequently the country was in dire condition following decades of deterioration caused by invasions, civil-wars and most recently general abuse at the hands of the ruling regime. To stop the growth of international terrorism the United States and its partners would not be able to simply invade Afghanistan and defeat “the enemy”, there would be an extensive rebuilding phase that would follow.
Living conditions in the country were so poor that in 2001 Afghanistan was rated 89th out the 90 least developed countries on the Human Poverty Index. Afghanistan was not given an overall ranking in 2001 since reliable information was not available to the UNDP for it even to be able to make an assessment, however it was generally accepted that Afghanistan was in particularly appalling condition at the time. The UNDP Human Development Report for 2004 had a separate report on Afghanistan with a ranking that placed it near the bottom, but ahead of five African post-conflict countries. The 2004 UNDP special report said:

> Years of conflict and political instability and the ravages of nature have taken a devastating toll on human, social and economic indicators. Today, Afghanistan has some of the lowest human development indicators in the world, way beyond all its neighbours, and falls at the bottom of the 177 countries ranked by the Global Human Index Report of 2004.²

Merely driving out the Taliban and al-Qaeda would not serve the interests of the United States or any other nation that signed-on to the coalition. To deny Afghanistan to the Taliban and other extremists would require it to be rebuilt.

**Role and Mission**

The mission of PRTs was initially limited with the objective of these military and civilian integrated units expressed in the Forward of the 2007 U.S. publication PRT Playbook: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. When this was published in 2007 the U.S. had also been using PRTs in Iraq as part of their solution to get that country back on its feet following the 2003 invasion and ouster of its ruling regime. The Playbook cites the background need for the development of PRTs in this way:

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Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were established as a result of the need to develop the infrastructure necessary for the Afghan and Iraqi people to succeed in a post-conflict environment. The efforts of the PRTs take place every day during a time when major conflict is commonplace in both countries. PRTs have become an integral part of the long term strategy to transition the lines of security, governance, and economics to the indigenous people. Integrated appropriately, PRTs serve as combat multipliers for manoeuvre commanders engaged in governance and economics, as well as other critical lines of operation. In addition, PRTs serve as force multipliers for U.S. government development agencies engaged across the stability and reconstruction sectors.³

The PRT is a multi-disciplinary organization that works toward both military objectives and more development focussed economic objectives; it serves several masters, from the worlds of diplomacy, defence and development; the so-called 3-Ds.

The use of military-type terminology to describe a PRT as a “combat multiplier” or “force multiplier” seems at odds with the nature of development work. The terms “combat” and “force” are generally only found in a military environment and used in relation to planning military operations, not economic ones. This signals a change in the civil-military relationship as the military becomes acquainted with development work and NGO organizations, and those government agencies that usually deal with development and governance, get to know the military. This is a change from the inherent civil – military tension that has traditionally existed.

Up until the commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom, the two have largely worked in their own domains with the NGO units carefully guarding their “humanitarian space,” their freedom of movement and action. This process of getting to know each other has not been without difficulty and it is in that adjustment process that the question gets asked, ‘how do PRTs meet the objectives for which they were organized and how effective are they at the job?’ This question is the central issue for this study and is in on the minds of all of the nations that contribute people and resources to PRTs especially since military and economic objectives would appear, at first blush, to be odd partners. PRT contributing nations have an interest in the security and development conditions in Afghanistan as they relate directly to security and economic conditions at home. The nations contributing to the many PRTs are very much aware

of the enormous impact that 9/11 had on domestic security requirements and on their economies in the weeks, months and years that followed. It became clear that stability at home depends on stability and development in places like Afghanistan.

The ISAF PRT Handbook, in 2007, describes a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) as “a civil-military institution that is able to penetrate more unstable and insecure areas because of its military component and is able to stabilize these areas because of the combined capabilities of its diplomacy, military, and economic components.” ISAF further added to that definition in 2008:

PRTs are the leading edge of NATO’s stability effort. The specific role of PRTs is to assist the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) to extend its authority across the country, through engaging with provincial leadership to support the growth of good governance and foster widespread support for security and development.

The core role of the PRT is to be the interface between ISAF and the Afghan people with the job of promoting the legitimacy and authority of the national government. They are defacto agents of the Government of Afghanistan; there to promote the objectives of the central government through their physical presence and the facilitation of aid.

The U.S. PRT Playbook is clear in the mission of a PRT stating that it “does not act as an alternative to a host nation’s government but rather seeks to improve the governing capacity of the host nation.” To fulfill that mission to some degree of success requires the integration of security forces, diplomatic agents and development agencies working in lock-step in a common mission. That mission for the United States is given in their PRT Playbook:

- Increase provincial stability through international military presence and assist in developing nascent host nation security and rule of law capacity.

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4 NATO, CIMIC and PRT Operations in ISAF, 2007, p. iii.
6 U.S. PRT Playbook, p. 3.
• Assist the establishment and improvement of local government, including its connection to the central government and populace, by advising and empowering stakeholders and legitimate governing bodies, influencing “fence sitters,” and countering obstructionists and spoilers.

• Facilitate reconstruction at a pace that begins to:
  o Provide basic services.
  o Provide an economic system that supports the people.
  o Gain buy-in for change and support of representative government.
  o Ensure popular expectations for international assistance are met or abated.  

U.S. doctrine makes it clear that the PRT is by itself not a development agency; it is a facilitator of development by others, principally Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and aid agencies from within the host nation, but largely from outside the host country.  
Afghans have cautious expectations that assistance and development will come to them in some measure and that their conditions will improve. They expect that they will eventually have some degree of freedom from fear and freedom from want; security brings freedom from fear and development brings freedom from want.

This is ultimately an exercise in managing expectations. The expectations are presented from both sides of the equation, the donor nation - the United States, and the recipient nation - Afghanistan. The U.S. intends to act as a facilitator of security and development through its presence and through training of Afghan soldiers and police and consequently influence Afghans who have not fully bought-in to the idea of change to convince them to make some commitment, or at the very least not oppose it.

The late 2009 survey conducted by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR) based in Kabul asked, “Generally speaking, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?” The answer they found was that fully 70% believed that Afghanistan was going in

7 U.S., PRT Playbook, p. 3.

8 Ibid, p. 3.
the right direction. This was up from 40% in 2009 but results from previous surveys expressed a mixed degree of hopefulness that reflected the influence of many factors such as economic, political, security, corruption, the drug trade, infrastructure, water, education, health care and other government goods.⁹ As the legitimacy and capacity of the government has increased so has the opinion of the people that the country is developing in the way it needs to.

The American PRT Playbook identifies four very broad but key objectives (not to be confused with the three missions listed earlier) that the U.S. expects PRTs to advance:

1. **Improve stability.** Determine the causes and means of conflict including resource competition, tribal/ethnic clashes, insurgency, criminal elements, and political instability; identify the triggers or opportunities to instigate conflict; determine ways to affect the causes and triggers; identify ways to mitigate or resolve the conflict; increase capacity of civil society and legitimate traditional processes to adjudicate and deter conflict.

2. **Increase local institutional capacity.** Build individual, organizational, and structural capacity to provide public safety and basic services; where relevant, tie legitimate informal governance (traditional) leaders to nascent formal government organizations; tie appropriate reconstruction and stability projects to legitimate governing bodies.

3. **Facilitate reconstruction activities.** Develop job creation programs for infrastructure activities; provide micro lending as soon as practicable; tie road improvements to commercial as well as political integration; and create value-added facilities to improve agriculture and natural resource capabilities within the local absorptive capacity.

4. **Execute a strong strategic communications program.** Expand local information dissemination capacity, especially by local institutions (remember that actions speak louder than words); take advantage of face-to-face communications (where traditional and expected); get provincial leaders and authorities out to see district population and traditional leaders; tie reconstruction activities to legitimate governing bodies.¹⁰

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⁹ Afghan Centre for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ASCOR), survey conducted for ABC News, BBC News and ADR. Interviews were conducted in person, in Dari or Pashto, among a random sample of 1,534 Afghan adults from 11-23 December 2009, available at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/11_01_10_afghanpoll.pdf](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/11_01_10_afghanpoll.pdf)

Taken item by item, the question becomes: how will the PRT achieve these very ambitious objectives? To address each of the four PRT objectives the method by which they do that is explained in the U.S. *PRT Playbook*:

1. The PRT will gather intelligence information on all aspects of the region they are in and determine who are the competing factions and individuals that are the power holders or those seeking control. Determine how competing groups interact and what the causes of conflict between them are. Estimate the ways of mitigating local conflict, or put another way, what will appeal to them to make them decide not to undertake some form of power conflict. The information gathering will be mainly achieved by getting out and meeting the people and identifying the local leaders. Put faces to the key players and find out what their interests are and what they want.

2. Once the PRT has identified who the key actors are in the region the next step is to determine what they want to see for development and assist them in the preparation of a plan to achieve their goals. If local leaders are not the same people as the formal government leaders there must be cooperation, otherwise progress will be slow and objectives will not be met. Local-leader plans must agree with the government plans otherwise there will be competition for resources and wastage without positive gains. Funding for projects must be tied to legitimate development goals and recognize central government authority.

3. Once agreement on the plan has been achieved the actual reconstruction work must be done by the local populace. Construction materials, people, machinery and other necessary components of the plan should be provided by suppliers in the community. Technical advice, money and security may be required from the PRT to make the project move forward and to make sure that materials and equipment are not stolen or destroyed by competing power actors. The civilian components of the PRT are important to the objectives by providing technical resources that are not available locally. The linkage to NGO organizations will widen the circle of available resources and expertise and help to move things forward and potentially see completion in a reasonable amount of time.

4. The communications plan must focus on transmitting the message of success out to the community and have people see the benefits that may be possible if they work with the PRT. Security will be essential to making sure that the project is not destroyed by competing factions (insurgents, other ethnic/tribal groups, criminals, extremists) thus it may be necessary to maintain a presence in the community or train national military and police forces to make sure that the hard work of the community is not lost or destroyed.\(^\text{11}\)

\(^{11}\) U.S., *PRT Playbook*, pp. 3-6.
The overall plan is simple in the concept; it is a long term intelligence gathering operation that allows the PRT to see what is going on in the countryside around them, interact with the people and get to know them and find out what they need and want, engage them to make a plan for development, help gather the resources needed to get to work, and finally to get the message out to the wider community so that they can all see the benefit of a stable Afghan government and to encourage others to be part of that solution. The challenge is that this must be carried out in tentative security conditions that will often risk the lives of those serving with the PRT. When the risk of IEDs or insurgent attack is high the mere act of driving out to a village to meet with the people can be a huge problem therefore the cost of security will substantially determine the nature of that interaction.

The ISAF PRT Handbook, a NATO document, is in overall agreement with the U.S. role and mission of the PRT but is more explicit in the description of how the work is to be carried out. ISAF shapes the mission for the PRTs as being two-fold; (1) reconstruction and development, and (2) governance:

Reconstruction and development. Through its Provincial Reconstruction Teams, ISAF is supporting reconstruction and development (R&D) in Afghanistan, securing areas in which reconstruction work is conducted by other national and international actors. Where appropriate, and in close cooperation and coordination with GIROA and UNAMA representatives on the ground, ISAF is also providing practical support for R&D efforts, as well as support for humanitarian assistance efforts conducted by Afghan government organizations, international organizations, and NGOs.

Governance. ISAF, through its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), is helping the Afghan Authorities strengthen the institutions required to fully establish good governance and rule of law and to promote human rights. PRTs’ principal mission in this respect consists of building capacity, supporting the growth of governance structures and promoting an environment within which governance can improve. 12

The Handbook further adds that the mission of the PRT should be to:

• Focus upon improving stability by seeking to reduce the causes of instability, conflict, and insurgency while simultaneously increasing the local institutional capacity to handle these on their own;

• Operate as a fully integrated military-civilian organization;

• Work to a common purpose or end-state with unity of effort;

• Link the people and their government and separate the spoilers/insurgents from the people, all the while transforming the environment to ensure both of these efforts are enduring;

• Facilitate the visibility of the GIRoA presence in the Province by assisting official visits to remote districts and villages (e.g., transportation, communications, etc). Do not dominate meetings and events by an overwhelming physical ISAF presence;

• Conduct joint patrols with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) whenever possible to mentor them as they serve as the primary security interface with local residents;

• Guide and mentor from behind and underneath, ensuring Afghan leadership and ownership. Promote Afghan primacy and legitimacy, understanding that the Afghan pace may be slower than PRTs may find convenient;

• Ensure that intervention at the provincial level and below support national GIRoA processes and the ANDS;

• In concert with other development actors, actively engage and help develop the capacity of the Governor, GIRoA officials, Provincial Councils, Provincial Development Committees (PDCs), District Development Assemblies (DDA), Community Development Committees (CDCs), Shuras, and other established and/or traditional bodies;

• Promise ONLY what you can deliver: manage expectations (under-promise and over deliver);

• Focus on achieving effects, not outcomes (e.g., what effect will helping the GIRoA to begin building a road from point A to point B have on extending the reach of government security and other services, particularly in comparison with the easier to-achieve but less significant “outcomes” of completing a few QIP projects during a four-month rotation?);

• Ensure that GIRoA officials and the PRT have “political buy-in” with each other in agreeing to address priority needs so that the appropriate authorities assume sustainment responsibility. Sustainability must be “planned in” at the outset of any project;
• Identify and implement projects through CDCs, DDAs, PDCs, and line ministries to build governance capability and enhance GIRoA leadership and ownership on projects. See PRT Project status checklist in Annex xxx;

• Commit to consulting and/or working with international partners such as UNAMA, IOs and NGOs;

• Ensure that projects do not duplicate the work of others and that they lay the foundations for long-term sustainable changes;

• Respect and be aware of civil-military sensitivities - lives may depend on effective planning and coordination with each other;

• Work towards a finite lifespan for the PRT, linked to an end-state of improved Afghan stability, governance capability and sufficient reconstruction to enable drawdowns and closure of PRTs; and

• Be aware that even-handed development across Afghanistan, in accordance with the Afghan Constitutional requirement under Article 6 to “provide for balanced development in all areas of the country” would likely provide a better opportunity for all the PRTs to disband sooner, without leaving a security vacuum in provinces where PRTs may be ready to close sooner than others.13

The NATO/ISAF plan is focussed more squarely on longer-term goals and objectives that puts a large measure of the responsibility for the work with the Afghans. The PRTs are facilitators and liaison between the many local actors and those who can be of benefit to them, such as NGOs and development agencies who can provide more complex programs and services that have long-term sustainable development objectives.

The Canadian definition of a PRT is contained within the mission and role that it was given by the government when it became part of the ISAF mission, “The Canadian PRT…will conduct operations to enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts in order to assist the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) to extend its authority and facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the Kandahar Province area of operations.”14 While the


mission statement is much shorter than the U.S. or ISAF versions, the Canadian PRT when it employs terminology such as ‘enable’ and ‘assist’ makes it clear that is is intended as a facilitator of security and development vice a distributor.

This 3-D mission is a lot for a relatively small civilian-military organization to undertake, but ISAF is not in the least hesitant to add to the PRTs “to-do” list with some additional key objectives:

- To support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) in the development of a more stable and secure environment;
- To assist in extending the authority of GIRoA;
- To support where appropriate the Security Sector Reform (SSR) initiatives;
- To facilitate reconstruction effort and reinforce national development priorities;
- To enable unity of effort amongst civil actors; and
- To demonstrate the international community’s commitment to Afghanistan’s future.  

I.D. Westerman points out that the objectives are sufficiently generic, or as he says “not particularly contentious,” so that any country can sign up to run a PRT without significant difficulty. Most importantly he observes that execution of the task on the ground is the key part of the overall effectiveness of PRTs and this is tied to the organization of the PRTs, what resources they have, and importantly, the relationship between the civil and military staffs. He says:

Where the disagreement comes is over what precisely those objectives mean on the ground, and how the deployed forces, both civil and military, should be organized, structured and resourced to carry them out. Here there is very little consensus, certainly between ISAF contributing nations, but even among the U.S. agencies themselves.

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16 Ibid., p. 14.

17 Ibid.
This disagreement on composition and structure agrees with Eronen’s observation that every PRT “fashion[s] novel approaches to civil-military integration”\(^\text{18}\). Gauster has also listed, through observation, some of the fundamental principles that characterize every PRT. This could be viewed as the practical list of what a PRT is supposed to be capable of achieving:

1. In PRTs, civilian and military aspects are intertwined;
2. They regard themselves as a stabilizing force;
3. They have a multinational, multifunctional and multi-institutional character;
4. PRTs act on the premise of the light footprint (Brahimi Report recommendation) approach and provide assistance at the invitation of the Afghan government;
5. Their mission is the strengthening of the Afghan government’s authority and influence, and they support the state building process in the shape of a “time-limited support offer;
6. They operate in the provinces away from the linchpin Kabul;
7. Their command and control follows the lead-nation principle;
8. PRTs are subject to considerable limitations in resources, personnel, conduct of operations, rules of engagement and armament;
9. They depend on consensus and cooperation with local power brokers;
10. They depend on logistic support provided by ISAF and robust force in the background (“B-52 factor”);
11. The Afghan population mainly regards PRTs as permanently installed international charities – quasi job centers or reconstruction offices, which seem to carry no time limit;
12. PRT lead-nations often pursue a proliferation of their own model, with an ad-hoc approach in the areas of security and development; and

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13. The PRTs’ long term aim and success criterion is to enable the Afghan government to establish itself as a credible and legitimate leadership in the eyes of the population.19

PRT commanders might consider this list an impossible challenge to fulfill with a relatively small unit made up of lightly armed military forces and a collection of civilian representatives of several government departments and agencies drawn from home.

To add to Gauster’s fundamental principles, the U.S. PRT Handbook adds a further layer of definition of the role of the PRT by adding the *Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development* that were developed by Andrew Natsios, a former Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Natsios was inspired by the principles of war that the U.S. military employs and developed a parallel set of principles to use in the era of greater interaction between military forces and development agencies. Natsios has a long record of government and military service and is intimately familiar with the needs of both organizations. His nine principles, summarized here, include:

1. **Ownership.** Build on the leadership, participation and commitment of the country and its people.
2. **Capacity building.** Strengthen local institutions, transfer technical skills, and promote appropriate policies.
3. **Sustainability.** Design programs to ensure their impact endures.
4. **Selectivity.** Allocate resources based on need, local commitment, and foreign policy interests.
5. **Assessment.** Conduct careful research, adapt best practices, and design for local conditions.
6. **Results.** Focus resources to achieve clearly defined, measurable, and strategically focussed objectives.
7. **Partnership.** Collaborate closely with governments, communities, donors, NGOS, the private sector, IGOs, and universities.
8. **Flexibility.** Adjust to changing conditions, take advantage of opportunities, and maximize efficiency.
9. **Accountability.** Design accountability and transparency into systems and build effective checks and balances to guard against corruption.20

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This is an enormous and much-too-much generalized set of task objectives for a relatively small organization to achieve in a wide geographic area of operations. Considering that a good percentage of the organizational structure is designed to look after the mundane, but very necessary, security and housekeeping of the PRT, the actual number of military and civilian staff who do the core part of the job each day is very small. This brings into question the ability of the PRT to achieve sufficient development coordination to satisfy those particular needs of the recipient country and to promote the legitimacy of the national government as well as cater to the outcome needs of the contributing country.

*United Nations Influence*

The fundamental philosophy of the PRT also has origins in the doctrine that resulted from the 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, more commonly referred to the as the *Brahimi Report*, named after panel chairman Lakhdar Brahimi.

One of the Panel’s key recommendations spoke to the need for a new approach to looking at assisting communities and nations in making the transition from war to peace; to do that they said that there must be:

> A doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police and related rule of law elements in peace operations that emphasizes a team approach to upholding the rule of law and respect for human rights and helping communities coming out of conflict to achieve national reconciliation; consolidation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes into the assessed budgets of complex peace operations in their first phase; flexibility for heads of United Nations peace operations to fund “quick impact projects” that make a real difference in the lives of people in the mission area; and better integration of electoral assistance into a broader strategy for the support of governance institutions.\(^{21}\)

The July 1995 failure of the UN force at Srebrenica to stop the killing of over 8000 Bosniak men and boys still haunted the UN. The UN peacekeeping force in the location at the time had very restrictive rules of engagement and was unable to stop the killings; a mark against the

effectiveness of the UN that has determined the need for change of the way in which peacekeeping operations are carried out. The *Brahimi Report* endeavoured to do that and made several recommendations that directly led to the role, organization and design of PRTs.

The role of the PRT, as envisioned by the *Brahimi Report*, is defined as peace-building. The Report defines peace-building as a series of complementary activities that occur at the conclusion of the active war and are designed to assist with the reconstruction of those parts of civil society that give structure and order to the lives of the population and that allow them to live under the protection of the rule of law with the knowledge that there will be some enforcement of the law. It says:

> Peace-building…defines activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war. Thus, peace-building includes but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform); improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for free media); and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques.\(^\text{22}\)

This concept of peace-building is a foundational building block for the mission of the PRT; the fundamental means of achieving peace and stability in a post-conflict setting. Where there may be a problem occurs in the reality of conditions and opportunity on the part of those who will view this from the perspective of free-riding on the peace-building measures to carry on with illegal activity and contribute to the problem of corruption. The report continues:

> A growing number of reports on such conflicts have highlighted the fact that would-be spoilers have the greatest incentive to defect from peace accords when they have an independent source of income that pays soldiers, buys guns, enriches faction leaders and may even have the motive for war. Recent history indicates that, where such income streams from the export of illicit narcotics, gemstones or other high-value commodities cannot be pinched off, peace is unsustainable.\(^\text{23}\)

\(^{22}\) United Nations, 2000, p. 3.

\(^{23}\) Ibid., p. 4.
The *Brahimi Report* recommendations for peace-building operations focuses mainly on internal structural changes to the United Nations and how it goes about the task of getting ready to deploy a peacekeeping/peace-building mission and all of the minutia that takes place in the hallways and offices of the UN staff in New York and around the world. But more importantly, one of the key recommendations that the report brings forward concerns the ability of the military component to do its job, which frequently is the dirty work of peacekeeping/peace-building and includes deployment into a conflict/post-conflict area, getting set up with some sort of secure location from which to operate and then getting down to the business of peace-building. The recommendation from the *Brahimi Report*, that is central to the success of the PRT, gives that small force the ability to take action on a number of issues that have traditionally handcuffed peacekeeping forces; the ability to fight if needed. The *Brahimi Report* recommends:

> Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate, with robust rules of engagement, against those who renge on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence.\(^{24}\)

This recommendation, taken independently, is important in that it gives the UN-sanctioned force the ability to not only defend itself but also others that it serves, and to engage those who actively target the PRT. This is a new facet of the game for the peacekeeping/peace-building world where the force is equipped and trained to engage actors who are not as inclined to peace as the majority. This is a big step from missions like UNFICYP in the 1980s and 1990s where threats to the ceasefire agreement were met with sternly, but politely, worded letters.

Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affairs, in their review of PRT effectiveness, offered that PRTs had a place in a post-conflict setting and that it was after the conflict had ended, as opposed to the all too often reality that “post-conflict” was modern code to say that the conflict had not really ended. The report stated:

> PRTs are designed for areas where direct hostilities have ceased but conflict still poses a threat, and where the focus on rebuilding host government capacity has just begun.

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\(^{24}\) United Nations, 2000, para 49.
Unlike previous international peacekeeping missions, Iraq and Afghanistan are unique because the United States and its coalition allies have functioned as both combatant and occupying-forces. PRTs have been used in the absence of a definitive peace to improve local administrative capacity, enhance security, and develop opportunities for growth.  

Expansion and Deployments

The early history of the PRT concept may be traced to the period following the end of World War II in the reconstruction efforts of Germany and Japan to provide the conditions such that war would not be an attractive option that either nation would want to resort to in its foreign relations. The more recent history of the PRT originates with Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 when the United States, which was leading the anti-terrorism effort, began the task of pushing the Taliban and Al-Qaeda from the country and established PRTs in the regions of Gardez, Kunduz, and Bamian. The UK military established a fourth in Mazar-e-Sharif.

In August 2003, the UN Security Council issued Security Council Resolution 1510 authorizing ISAF, which at the time was limited to operations in the Kabul area, to enlarge operations and thus made way for the rapid expansion of the number of reconstruction teams that would be put to work in many more areas around the country. The PRTs would serve as a mechanism to extend the authority of the Afghan Transitional Authority beyond the confines of Kabul. Expansion in 2003 was quick and the United States set up operations with PRTs in Bagram, Herat, Jalalabad, and Kandahar. Germany set up a PRT in Feyzabad. This was a phased approach with the introduction of PRTs into other regions of the country. The catch here was

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that the fighting part of the war had not ended when this expansion and the peace-building phase had begun.

To give a perspective on the extent of PRT activity in Afghanistan a list of the currently operated PRTs is shown below. There are 26 PRTs in Afghanistan, 12 of which are under US command. ISAF Multinational PRTs are located in the following regions:  

TABLE 1 - PRT DISTRIBUTION IN AFGHANISTAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Host Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baghlan</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaghcharan</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayzabad</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herat</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunduz</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mazari Sharif</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maymana</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qala-e Naw</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lashkar Gah</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tirin Kowt</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wardak</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parwan</td>
<td>US/South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baymian</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asadabad</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardez</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghazni</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalalabad</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khowst</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehtarlam</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farah</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qalat</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sharana</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurestan</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalalabad</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panjshir</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ISAF PRT deployment map below presents the distribution graphically and shows their physical locations.

ISAF Headquarters, which commands all PRTs, through the Regional Commanders located around the country, issues the orders for PRTs to follow and in turn PRTs are able to give feedback to ISAF leadership regarding activities in their areas. In 2007 they were given orders to “start monitoring and assessing development levels in districts, including mapping existing infrastructure, new projects, and evaluating the basic conditions and needs of the judicial sector.”

Eronen observes that:

it seems the PRTs are conceived as a handy tool available when the international community needs to get something done fast and broadly across Afghanistan. The PRTs are present almost everywhere, they are fairly mobile and are capable of securing

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themselves. Freedom of movement is combined with civilian expertise able to guide simple fact-finding activities run by the military.\textsuperscript{30}

This description characterizes the PRT as an organization that is able to meet multiple challenges with speed of action and on a wide front. It is conceivable that military training prepares them to carry out a wide variety of tasks in diverse settings and under austere conditions.

Eronen makes a very important observation that “every PRT is one of a kind.”\textsuperscript{31} The reasons behind this are as diverse as the nations in which the PRTs are created. He notes that the differences derive from the capitals or the home nations of the PRTs. “The PRTs are a somewhat novel innovation in international crisis management in their way of bringing together different branches of home governments.”\textsuperscript{32} PRTs are civil-military units that act in a more or less self-sustained manner, controlled by the lead-nation.\textsuperscript{33}

With every advantage comes a disadvantage and in the case of a reinforced mission and rules of engagement for peacekeeping/peace-building teams this disadvantage comes in the form of risk to the people who make up the team. The threat of casualties from combat are increased and in proportion to the threat level in the region. The Brahim Report acknowledges this threat and sounds a caution to states that might be ready to contribute troops for peace operations. It says:

Willingness of Member States to contribute troops to a credible operation of this sort also implies a willingness to accept the risk of casualties on behalf of the mandate. Reluctance to accept that risk has grown since the difficult missions of the mid-1990s, partly because Member States are not clear about how to define their national interests in taking such risks, and partly because they may be unclear about the risks themselves.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{30} Eronen, 2008, p.9.

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., p.10.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{34} United Nations, (2000), para. 52.
The national interests of troop contributing states have to take into account the possibility of casualties and how that will be received at home. The memories from recent events where UN peacekeepers were killed have impacted the ability of the UN to recruit member states to provide military and police to UN missions in dangerous areas. The *Brahimi Report* does not hold back when it cautions:

Memories of peacekeepers murdered in Mogadishu and Kigali and taken hostage in Sierra Leone help to explain the difficulties Member States are having in convincing their national legislatures and public that they should support the deployment of their troops to United Nations-led operations, particularly in Africa.\(^{35}\)

Brahimi fully understood the reluctance that some UN members may have to become part of a mission, where the risk of casualties was high, without a clear sense of why they were involved and a stake in the outcome that was directly related to the national interests of the member. For instance, the United States was very clear when it committed forces to Afghanistan, the aim was to stop terrorism and thus avert future attacks on American citizens and territory. Overall there have been 1728 coalition non-Afghani soldiers killed in Afghanistan between October 2001 and April 2010.

Notwithstanding casualties suffered by ISAF members in Afghanistan, the threat to PRTs may be politically acceptable given the overall positioning of states in the relation to conflict. Crisis management is important to the national interests of developed states, especially where related to security policy. When a PRT is formed and sent to work the context within which it works is driven by three fundamental challenges that have been identified by Markus Gauster:

1. The demands and the political pressure to act rise to such an extent that previous approaches...which entailed a massive use of force, are made politically and financially prohibitive. Innovative models that save resources and meet high quality demands increasingly gain importance.

2. It is not enough simply to stop a war. Like it or not, international crisis management increasingly leads to comprehensive state building measures. This means that human and financial resources are tied up permanently and to an extent hitherto unknown.

\(^{35}\) United Nations, 2000, para 105.
European states’ willingness and capabilities to mobilize resources before war breaks out seems to be decisive for the settlement of conflicts. A preventive engagement [strategy] incorporating military and civilian leverage can very possibly prevent conflict escalation. State building will therefore determine the task profile of western foreign and security policy not only in the shape of post-conflict peace building, but also in the shape of conflict prevention for the foreseeable future.36

PRTs become appealing options for states that wish to minimize the military and other resources that they deploy to provide security and development in regions where both are in short supply. The perception of an invasion force sent to dominate a state experiencing conflict or in a post-conflict situation is avoided, especially where there may be a lack of national willingness (or desire) to commit to a costly military operation that may be expensive in economic cost and in lives. A PRT reduces the need for lengthy and costly large-scale deployments that could potentially be committed in a location far from the national support structure that is needed to provide the beans and bullets that Armies consume at a rapid pace. As Gauster puts it, “Countries such as Sweden, Norway and Lithuania perceived the establishment or takeover of PRTs as a chance to improve their international reputation [when] invited to contribute to international crisis management.”37 Stein and Lange note that for both Canada and the U.S., PRTs were seen as convenient political instruments to contribute to their respective “exit strategies” from Afghanistan.38 For the United States it was to get its allies into the country and pull its forces out and for Canada it was thought to be a means of withdrawal from the Kabul area where larger forces were deployed and to draw down to a small unit in a safer part of the country.39 The reality for both nations was that events did not work out as planned.

Gauster has reinforced the Brahimi Report conclusion regarding the challenges of peace-building as well as the concurrent reluctance of the citizenry to accept casualties and the financial cost of

36 Gauster, p. 13, refers to Michael Schmunk during the Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management (IFK) workshop “PRTs are innovative instruments of ICM” at the National Defence Academy, Vienna, 19/20 October, 2005.

37 Gauster, p. 17.


39 Ibid.
intervention in a failed state. There is a conundrum forming in the logic that puts international action at odds with fiscal pressures; how to conduct peace-building on the cheap and without getting someone killed in the process. The PRT appears to have become the solution to the problem; but there is rarely a perfect solution. In the case of Afghanistan the imperfection comes in the form of an active insurgency, an actual armed enemy requiring combat to defeat. The deployment of the PRT as part of the ISAF mission is a significant part of the overall ‘defeat terrorism and rebuild Afghanistan’ mission but not as kinetically focussed as the military operations that directly engage the insurgency. The Woodrow Wilson study recognized the problem of peace-building on the cheap when it says that:

contrary to popular perception, PRTs are not intended or equipped to engage in offensive combat operations. In Afghanistan, there are numerous cases where as few as a hundred soldiers are nominally responsible for vast swaths of territory. Expectations that a small military unit can influence regional security are overly optimistic.40

Expectations must be managed, especially given the limitations of size and resources (both military and non-military) that are in the PRTs possession. There are 26 PRTs in Afghanistan spread out in a country of approximately 30 million people with the PRTs varying in size from about 100 to approximately 400 members, and with the bulk of each PRT taken up with command and control functions and administrative duties

PRT Organization

Below is an organization chart of a typical U.S. PRT of approximately 90-100 members, military and civilian. A quick examination reveals those members of the unit that are administrative in nature, identified as Combat Service Support – they provide the food, maintenance, transportation, clerical support and run the PRT camp. There is the Admin/Ops section that provides the operational leadership – personnel, operations and intelligence officers; they will craft missions and orders that the PRT will follow; the FP/Security section provides the force protection, this is typically a combat platoon that is armed with armoured vehicles of some sort and light weapons including machine guns and smaller calibre rocket and grenade launchers.

40 Abbaszadeh, p. 11.
They are responsible for local protection of the PRT camp and for security on the move when the Enablers (CIMIC teams) move outside the camp. The Enablers are a small team of Civil Affairs officers who have an Engineer officer with them along with interpreters and a small Military Police Team. Civilian members of the PRT are from the Department of State and USAID and the Department of Agriculture. Finally, the PRT Commander will be assisted by a military Sergeant-Major and a Government of Afghanistan Ministry of Interior liaison. It is a small unit with a big job with only 13 out of 87 members engaged in work that fulfills the core mission of the PRT. The Enabler group along with security will go outside of the PRT camp area to interact with the Afghan people. It is they who will have the capacity to influence security and development in the region.41

FIGURE 2 – PRT CORE TASK ORGANIZATION

![Diagram of PRT Core Task Organization]

Source: USAID, June 2006

At the local level the threat of the insurgency and their use of IEDs has greatly complicated the task of travel around the countryside to do business and necessitated expensive and manpower intensive means of transportation such as armoured fighting vehicles and helicopters, not to mention highly protected and fortified encampments to live in. Military forces accept a certain degree of threat in the conduct of operations but diplomatic and development staffs may have a lower level of risk tolerance that will heavily inform the pace of their diplomatic and development work and the resultant measure of success.

In summary, the definition of a PRT is found in the many guiding principles and tasks and objectives that it is given to fulfill. These are dependent on the country in which the PRT originates and the threat level it is willing to accept. It is dependent on the resources available to form the three components of diplomacy, defence and development. It is a loosely derived military and civilian partnership of people and equipment that are put in place in a post-conflict setting, where often the conflict is still underway to some degree, and where there is no functioning government, military or police force to provide security or control the level of violence in a region. They are asked to provide security and to facilitate the renewal and modernization of both the capability of the people to rebuild their nation and the support mechanisms and bureaucracy that is needed to make a working state. Nation-building is a challenging task that the PRT must undertake often with a minimum of training and preparation. Military forces are asked to take on challenges that they have not previously been trained to do and civilian diplomatic and development workers are being asked to forgo some of the “humanitarian space” that they have previously enjoyed in less challenging situations; all this while living with the threat of an active insurgency that enjoys relative freedom of movement and action. The definition of a PRT is dependent on the description of what job they are asked to do; it is still under development itself.

Next we will see a comparison of the PRTs of several nations illustrating the variance between both size and composition and how this is affected by the security threat in the region in which they operate. Notwithstanding threat level, all PRTs have essentially the same basic organization and in terms of percentage of manpower that works towards the core task they are again similar.
The next chapter will examine the organization and structure of some of the PRTs to determine the way in which they have been structured to meet the challenges that they are asked to accept as part of their role in ISAF. We will see examples of Eronen’s observation that they are all “one of kind.”
CHAPTER 3 – PRT MODELS

Earlier it was determined that the definition of a PRT is contained in an extensive listing of principles, tasks and objectives that it is asked to do. These are dependent on the home country of the PRT and the physical threat level it is willing to accept. The PRT structure is an often ad-hoc derived military and civilian partnership of people and equipment that are put in place in a setting where conflict still exists to some degree and where there is little or no functioning government, military or police force to provide security or to control the level of violence in a region. The PRT is asked to provide security and to facilitate nation-building, an activity somewhat outside traditional military ‘arcs of fire.’

This chapter will examine the structure and organization of several of the PRTs provided by the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Turkey, and in some greater detail Canada. This will provide to us a cross-section of PRTs from some of the major troop contributors to ISAF as well as nations that have had long experience with peacekeeping operations in many parts of the world. The main conclusion that will fall from this comparison will be that while each PRT is different in size and structure, they each have different challenges to be mitigated both internally and externally related to the security threat found in the region in which they operate. This variance in size and structure is driven by both national direction regarding acceptable risk and the actual risk levels found in the area in which they operate. Even with differences between the PRTs there is extensive similarity in both design and the tasks that each are given. The way that the tasks and challenges are met informs the measure of success. Afghanistan was (still is) as good a place as any to mobilize the theory of a military-civilian team that would integrate DDR, facilitate peace operations, provide quick-impact projects to capture hearts and minds and provide the electoral assistance that the Brahimi Report suggested. Here are some examples of that new approach.

United States PRT

The U.S. model is a small organization of approximately 50 to 100 members and heavily weighted in favour of the military component in a civil-military affairs role. Non-military members are few and limited to one or two representatives of U.S. government sectors such as the Department of State, USAID, the Department of Agriculture and possibly other technical
organizations that are needed in the particular area of operations in which they are located. The diagram below depicts the organization of a U.S. PRT.

**FIGURE 3 – U.S. PRT ORGANIZATION**

While the U.S. PRT is heavily weighted to the military component, U.S. doctrine gives primacy to the mission of USAID and places the military portion of the PRT firmly within the supporting role function. Notwithstanding that civilian influence, the command of the PRT is filled by a military officer, normally at the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. The U.S. PRT Playbook recites the mission of the PRT:

PRTs are civil-military organizations that are designed to improve security, extend the reach of the Afghan government, and facilitate reconstruction in priority provinces. Their core objective is to implement projects that will improve stability so that more traditional forms of development assistance can resume. USAID’s programs work with PRTs to deliver services in less secure or under-served areas of Afghanistan. As USAIDs primary representative in the provinces, field program officers monitor all U.S. reconstruction and development efforts in the area of responsibility of the PRT and implement PRT-specific programming. The officers work to build relationships with local leaders, identify local needs, and report on significant developments.42

The command of a U.S. PRT involves a complex web of chains-of-command that originate at the Secretary level of the U.S. government. The diagram below shows that both the Secretary of

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Defense and the Secretary of State impact the overall mission of the PRTs and provide strategic level guidance.

**FIGURE 4 – DECISION MAKING AUTHORITIES OF A US PRT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>Composition</th>
<th>Roles</th>
<th>Chair</th>
<th>Meeting Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principals’ Committee</strong></td>
<td>Secretary-level officials from U.S. departments/agencies involved</td>
<td>Make decisions or proposals developed by Deputies’ Committee, resolve interagency disputes, provide information on policy, report to the President</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
<td>Monthly and as needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deputies’ Committee</strong></td>
<td>Deputy Secretaries from the U.S. departments/agencies involved</td>
<td>Make decisions or proposals developed by the Policy Committee, resolve interagency disputes</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy Coordinating Committee/Country Group</strong></td>
<td>Operations-level personnel from executive branch U.S. departments/agencies involved</td>
<td>Develop policy options on, among other things, assistance sectors to target; allocation of assistance funds; strategies for increasing international support; and the role of the PRT</td>
<td>DOS coordinator for U.S. Assistance/National Security Council</td>
<td>Daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. Embassy Country Team</strong></td>
<td>Representatives of U.S. agencies with personnel stationed or on temporary duty within country</td>
<td>Coordinate daily U.S. policy and assistance efforts</td>
<td>Chief of Mission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Department’s/Agency’s Country Office</strong></td>
<td>Operations-level personnel within a department/agency involved</td>
<td>Develop policy options on, among other things, assistance sectors to target; allocation of assistance funds; strategies for increasing international donor support; and the role of the PRT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: United States: Provincial Reconstruction Team Playbook

Other Secretariats may be involved depending on the role and mission of the PRT; Agriculture and Justice are two examples. It is important to note that USAID frequently has representatives located with the PRTs of other nations, for example the Canadian PRT has a USAID representative attached full-time.
**German PRT**

The German PRT model varies from the U.S. PRT model in that it follows the principle of multi-nationality and partners with several other contributing nations to form the two PRTs that it leads. Peter Runge, in his study of civil-military relations, examined the motivations of Germany in the deployment of the PRT. He says, “Germany’s involvement in Afghanistan can be attributed to its commitment to the NATO alliance rather than to important strategic interests.”

The German model is distinctive from the U.S. model in that it is much larger, has dual military and civilian leadership, a large force protection component, and a clear separation of the military, diplomatic and development parts.

**FIGURE 5 – GERMAN PRT ORGANIZATION**

![German PRT Organization Diagram]

The German PRTs operate under less risky conditions than some other PRTs (the Canadian PRT for instance) and have a strong emphasis on stability and reconstruction and will not normally engage in combat operations. In 2009 Germany was the third largest troop contributing nation to

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ISAF, but within the PRT, the actual operational military component is relatively small with the civilian component representing the majority of the staff. Other military members of the PRT carry out the day-to-day administrative and logistical functions that keep the PRT fed, housed and moving.44

There has been some criticism of the German PRT specifically related to what has been criticised as overly restrictive rules of engagement that limit where and when the PRT may operate. The criticism was openly voiced at a NATO summit meeting in April 2008 where the frustration with the German PRT’s limitations became very public:

At the Bucharest summit in April 2008, NATO leaders again pledged to continue to work to remove the limitations placed on their troops. Some allies had singled out Germany for special criticism, given that Germany at the time had a large contingent of over 3,000 troops most of which are deployed in what has been a relatively quiet area of northern Afghanistan. German troops reportedly patrol only in armoured personnel carriers, and do not leave their bases at night. This has led some to suggest that the implementation of excess force protection measures by the Germans has made their work, even in a safe area, far less effective. Former NATO SACEUR General Jones complained about German restrictions after he had specifically requested that Germany send some of its force in northern Afghanistan into the south to help combat Taliban activity, a request the German government initially refused. Since then, however, the combat tempo in the region has increased and Germany has allowed some of its forces to respond outside of their operating zone in emergency situations.45

ISAF leadership were keen to have all of the partners employing the same rules of engagement that they were subject to so that the ‘heavy lifting’ would be shared. From a practical perspective of military operations it is not feasible to have a military partner unable to lend tactical support to another ISAF member. It increases the risk level to an even greater level for those partners who do operate in higher threat areas knowing that other forces will not have the ability to lend tactical support if they are needed.

44 Runge, pp. 9-11.

**British PRT**

The British PRTs have been truly international efforts as the start-up of two PRTs in Marar-e-Sharif and Meymanah saw them transition to the control of Norway and Sweden, respectively, to be augmented later by people and resources from Finland, Denmark, Latvia and the United States. This modified British-Nordic model has been built upon and expanded. The British PRT in Helmand was created in 2006 and grew from a relatively small organization that mimicked the U.S. structure to a much larger size. The diagram below depicts the overall organization of the British-led PRTs.

![UK PRT Organization Diagram](image)

The control of the British PRTs is held by a committee of the three main actors, Defence, the Foreign Office, and the Department for International Development. This committee approach had been adopted by ISAF as a “best practice” and is encouraged as the means of decision making for PRT objectives and method of business. The size of the military component is dependent upon the geographic area to be covered and the security threat in the location. The main objectives of the PRT are security, capacity building and, where needed, quick impact projects through limited funding available to the PRT Commander for “hearts and minds” projects. The PRT also includes specialists that are responsible for political affairs, governance, development, civilian police, the penitentiary system, and counter-narcotics.

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46 Eronen, pp. 20-23.
agents.\textsuperscript{47} One of the flaws with the triumvirate method of leadership is that military forces normally are comfortable with defined chains-of-command and having three leaders may present difficulties in the deciding of priorities at the local level. The Nordic-run PRTs have opted for a modification and are ostensibly led by a military commander but have close cooperation with the civilian components.\textsuperscript{48} At the end of the day, the military component will follow whatever direction it is given as long as the mission is clear and there is a well defined chain-of-command.

\textit{Turkish PRT}

The Turkish government sponsored a PRT in Vardak, west of Kabul. The approach to the establishment and organization was quite different than the majority of PRTs; the emphasis was on reconstruction and governance capacity building along with working to establish some effective civilian police presence. The PRT is under civilian leadership, thus this defines the mission under those terms and conditions. The lack of a robust military force hampers the PRTs ability to move about outside their encampment and restricts the security role for the PRT. What military force that is assigned has largely administrative duties. The PRT organization is depicted in this chart:

\textsuperscript{47} Eronen, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p. 22.
The Turkish PRT is focused on reconstruction and governance capacity building and does not have a security role or capability. It has enjoyed success in agricultural development projects and, Eronen points out one of the main missions “in the security line of operation, it concentrates on longer-term investment in developing police forces.”\textsuperscript{49} The Turkish PRT can operate successfully as long as the security situation allows for operations without military security. If, and when, that changes the PRT will be forced to curtail operations, increase the security component of the PRT to provide whatever is needed to maintain a safe working environment or rely on other forces to provide security for them to operate, or withdraw.

\textit{Canadian PRT}

The Government of Canada official policy statement given by the Prime Minister of Canada’s office website writes that the PRT’s mandate closely mirrors the priorities of the Afghanistan Compact and Afghan National Development Strategy, namely security, governance and development. The PRT supports key national Afghan programs such as the National Solidarity

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., p. 24.
Program, and carries out a broad range of enabling roles such as police training and strengthening all areas of local governance capacity, justice and human needs assistance.\textsuperscript{50} The Government of Canada expressed the national interests as they relate to civil-military operations through this 1999 statement of policy and objectives found in the Canadian Army Manual: \textit{CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN PEACE, EMERGENCIES, CRISIS AND WAR},

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\fbox{
\begin{minipage}{0.9\textwidth}
\textbf{CANADIAN GOVERNMENT POLICY STATEMENT - CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION}

The Government of Canada has identified three key, interdependent and mutually-reinforcing objectives for its international actions:

The promotion of prosperity and employment. Canada wishes to see other countries and regions prosper. Thus helping anchor international stability and make progress towards sustainable development.

The promotion of global peace as the key to protecting Canadian security. Stability and security are prerequisites for economic growth and development. A whole range of issues that transcend borders, namely mass migration, crime, disease, environment, overpopulation and underdevelopment have peace and security implications at the local, regional and, in many cases, the global level.

The projection of Canadian values and culture is important to Canadian success in the world. Application of values - respect for democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the environment - is critical to the struggle for international security in the face of new threats to stability. Their adoption internationally is essential to ensuring they are viable within Canada.\textsuperscript{51}

(Source: Government of Canada, National Defence)

\end{minipage}}
\end{figure}

Canadian national interests were clearly expressed for the military in this pre-9/11 document, although broadly stated and worded such that the government could shape a mission anywhere it wished based in these objectives and could deploy internationally to provide stabilization


through security which in turn would give an opportunity for development to flourish and provide for longer term development. The organization of the PRT is important to understand because this relates directly to its function. With the 3-D approach to the design and employment of a PRT the expectation is that components of defence, development and diplomacy will all be present and take on roles in direct support of Canadian government objectives.

The Canadian PRT in Kandahar is a force of about 330 people composed of military, diplomats, the RCMP, Corrections Canada and staff from CIDA. USAID has a staff member assigned in location and there are other national representatives that may be attached to the PRT depending on what type of projects are underway. The Government of Canada website gives very general information regarding the organization of the Canadian PRT along with a very superficial explanation of what it does and how it carries out the work assigned:

Based in Kandahar City in the southern province of Kandahar, the Canadian PRT is located in the former heartland of the Taliban regime, which previously controlled much of Afghanistan. Kandahar is one of the Afghan provinces in greatest need of support and is also among those most targeted by insurgents.

The 330-person PRT combines the expertise of diplomats, corrections experts, development specialists, the Canadian police, including the RCMP, and the military. It supports key initiatives in the province and carries out a broad range of enabling roles such as police training and strengthening local governance capacity, in line with Canada’s priorities in Afghanistan.

The PRT works on projects that have impact in the long, medium, and short term. The most important achievements will be those that foster long-term, sustainable benefits to the Afghan people. At the same time, "quick impact" projects are also being carried out across the province to respond to the immediate needs that Afghans face in their daily lives.  

The concept of operations sees the PRT acting in a mentor role with village and district leaders to guide the development process to achieve goals and objectives set by those same village and district leaders. The provision of quick impact projects are used sparingly and to get support

onside early and give a degree of credibility to the development effort. The following organization chart shows the structure of the Canadian PRT in Kandahar.\(^{53}\)

**FIGURE 9 – CANADA PRT ORGANIZATION**

Originally NATO, which took responsibility from the United States for all the PRTs, offered Canada several possible locations, including the PRT at Chaghcharan in Ghor Province and the PRT in Herat, but, under the leadership of General Rick Hillier, chief of the Defence Staff at the time, Canada chose Kandahar. Hillier’s choice was based on several advantages offered by the southern PRT:

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(1) It provided maximum international visibility for the Canadian mission in Afghanistan. Kandahar was among the Afghan provinces in greatest need and also one of the areas most often targeted by insurgents;

(2) Canadian responsibility for the PRT could be packaged with command of NATO’s RC South and stationing of a battle group in Kandahar;

(3) Kandahar, as the birthplace of the Taliban, the center of Pashtun power, and the former capital, was the linchpin for ISAF’s success in Afghanistan; thus, it offered Canada the opportunity to make a significant contribution to that success;

(4) It was close to the Kandahar Airfield (KAF), the second-busiest NATO-operated airport in the country, the entry point for huge quantities of military personnel, weapons, ammunition, equipment, and supplies, and the exit point in case emergency evacuation of Canadian soldiers and civilians was needed;

(5) It was close to major US combat units, based at KAF, which could provide support for Canadian Forces operations;

(6) The presence of British, Dutch, and American forces at KAF meant that Canada could cost-share the expenses of using the base with other NATO member-states, especially given the fact that the United States was paying a disproportionate share;

(7) The proximity of KAF made it possible for Canadian Forces to play a significant combat role and, thus, shed their image as peacekeepers. General Hillier is often quoted as saying, “We’re not the public service of Canada, we’re not just another department. We are the Canadian Forces, and our job is to be able to kill people.”

(8) By engaging in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency combat operations, Canada could improve relations with the United States, which was not pleased with Canada’s decisions not to join the coalition to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq or to participate in the continental ballistic missile defense initiative.

(9) The need to engage in combat for the first time since the Korean War provided an opportunity for General Hillier to modernize the Canadian Forces so that they could fight alongside American combat units.54

Hillier’s choice of Kandahar as the central focus of Canadian operations put the Canadian military front-and-center in a challenging strategic and tactical situation. The Canadian PRT was

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not particularly large considering the security situation it faced, but it had the luxury of having significant ISAF military forces in the region to call upon for assistance if needed.

The military portion represents the largest component of the 330-plus person PRT and is responsible for the deployment of civil-military affairs teams out to the villages in the Kandahar district. Force protection is a significant concern of the PRT and is necessitated by the proliferation of security threats posed by insurgents and especially by improvised explosive devices (IEDs). While the Government of Canada is publicly vague regarding the “how” of conducting business in the Kandahar region, the task for the PRT to extend the authority of the government of Afghanistan is one that is not easily achieved. Canadian defence doctrine gives the PRT a specific mission, albeit short on detail and long on the imagination of the military, diplomatic and development leadership who must plan and conduct the operations of the PRT. It says:

the Canadian PRT...will conduct operations to enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts in order to assist the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) to extend its authority and facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the Kandahar Province area of operations (AO).”

The main means of accomplishing this task is through the employment of military Civil Affairs teams who become the linkage between NATO/ISAF, the Afghan government and the civilian actors in a particular area. The PRT has a small number of civilian and other government department (OGD) members, such as Foreign Affairs, International Development, Civilian Police, Corrections Canada, USAID and others who provide linkage to development structures and agencies.

One of the methods of operation is to travel out to the towns and villages that are in the area and meet with the village and district leaders. Discussions take place to determine the needs of the village and to talk about how the village will meet its own needs, and then how the PRT can add to or facilitate those needs. Development (money) is not just handed over, in a direct sense, but

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it is a collaborative effort that must be led by the village and district leaders. Leadership is needed to get things started and keep the discussions and follow-on work on track. Often it is a slow process that is complicated by the practice of military personnel rotations every six months. New Civil-Military Affairs teams are often faced with having to go over the same ground with civilian district leaders as the new military members become accustomed to the country, the culture, the people, the environment and their way of working. It is time consuming and frustrating but it is a reality of the system that has been adopted by ISAF and Canada.

Security and force protection occupy a great deal of the thoughts, time and effort of the PRT and especially in an active counter insurgency environment. Military forces are a prime target of the insurgency, thus the need to ensure the safety of those moving from village to village to conduct meetings and to work on projects. The civilian members of the PRTs are as vulnerable as anyone and shoulder equal risk in order to do their jobs. Accordingly PRTs normally do business utilizing heavy armoured vehicles and carry weapons for self-protection and to be able to react to threats. The death of Glyn Berry in January 2006 and the serious injury to a DFAIT staff member in 2010 were a reminder to the civilian staff that they are equally vulnerable to the risks posed by the insurgency and have had an impact on how they conduct their work.

In 2006, the Canadian PRT was tasked with providing both quick-impact projects and larger projects that would be funded by a contingent Commanders fund, this in addition to the main task of security sector reform. The provision of reconstruction and development is normally outside the scope of operations for military forces but the PRT was, in any event, directed to get on with this new mission.

The Canadian military has a lot of experience in peacekeeping, peace-building and peace enforcement. This complete spectrum of field operations has previously been known as the “three-block war” where the military starts with fighting the battle at one end of the spectrum, progresses to shaping the battle to peace-building once the main battle has been won and then finally maintains that new peace through peacekeeping and development operations. The Canadian military has been successful in the transformation from a Cold War conventional

56 National Defence, pp. 8-10.
military force to a force more able to operate in failed states. An example of this transition from war to peacekeeping in a very short physical space is provided by an Army Captain who in 2009 wrote in the *Maple Leaf*, the official newspaper of the Canadian Forces,

There are days when theory gives way to practice, sometimes when you’re least attentive. In recent years, military operations have changed considerably from what they were before the Berlin Wall came down. Theorists talk about a “three-block war”, saying—to put it simply—that the soldiers of today and tomorrow should be able to operate in a high-intensity combat zone a few streets away from an area where, at the same time, other soldiers from the same unit are conducting stabilization operations, and while reconstruction operations are going on in yet another street just around the corner. In this concept, soldiers should be ready to operate in any of these modes.

This is nothing new for individuals, since career courses and field exercises have prepared us, to some degree, for the new reality. To my knowledge, however, few of us can honestly say we have experienced all three operational modes at the same time at the sub-unit level. This is what A Company (Coy) of the 2nd Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment Battle Group experienced during an operation in Dand District of Afghanistan, south of Kandahar City.

After a section patrol came under insurgent fire, the soldiers observed the insurgents’ withdrawal toward an Afghan compound. The company soon received orders to provide a platoon combat patrol to neutralize the danger. Nothing new up to this point; most units have conducted this kind of mission in-theatre. The difference is that A Coy is using a counter-insurgency method that involves living in Afghan villages in platoon houses, as we did in Bosnia during the 1990s. Consequently, each of the three platoons had its zone of operations centred on a village to facilitate the process of winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. With command decentralized to platoon level, considerable progress could be seen in the villages, thanks to quick-impact projects that benefit the residents.

A Coy applied the three-block war theory. We had to mount a patrol with an ad hoc platoon because the company’s forces were restricted by the demands of the platoon house operation. So, while one platoon conducted a kinetic operation on an objective, another was engaged in stabilization operations about three kilometres away and, three kilometres further on, the third platoon was in the midst of a construction project.57

His comments reinforce that kinetic and non-kinetic operations may be carried out in close proximity. In the case of the PRT, the military force protection portion of the unit will not normally work in the offensive mode (will not go looking for a fight) but must be able to respond

to safety threats. Accordingly, they are, when necessary, able to function in more traditional military roles such as combat. This is consistent with the intent of the renewed peacekeeping doctrine in the United Nations 2000 Brahimi Report. Three block war doctrine has given way to a newer version that is taken over by other terminology and dynamics that expands the capacity of not just the military component of the PRT but the other partners that are on the team.

This review of PRT organization and structure serves to highlight the similarities between the various national PRTs that are committed to Afghanistan, but as Eronen correctly says, they are all “one of a kind.” The Canadian PRT structure examined some of the Canadian motivations for contributing a PRT to ISAF and hinted at some of the challenges it faces. The conclusion that is apparent here is that there is no single best structure or organization for a PRT and that flexibility is needed, especially with national interests at work in the provision of manpower and resources to the PRT and considering operating limitations that originate at home. While it is not openly said, these limitations are expected as a necessary precondition for NATO/ISAF to accept in order for the alliance to get members states to agree to sign-on to the challenge of forming and deploying a PRT to Afghanistan; this reminds us of the saying ‘beggars may not be choosers.’

This look at PRT structure and organization is a snapshot in time. Structures and organizations are changing daily as additional capacities are added and old ones are taken away when no longer needed. The Canadian PRT is in the process of transitioning to more American control as additional staff and resources are added. The number of civilian staff is increasing and the mix of military and civilian members fluctuate continuously to meet current needs; the one constant is change.

The PRT is a multi-disciplinary organization that works toward both security and development objectives, what has become known as the 3-Ds. The military considers the PRT to be a counter-insurgency tool and treats it as a “force multiplier”, or a weapon that gives a military unit greater effectiveness than it otherwise might possess. The Afghan government expects the PRT to be its representative to the people of Afghanistan that the government cannot reach because of lack of resources and poor security. The PRT must promote government legitimacy and train people in
the art of governing. The PRT must dispense advice and aid, although the latter in small quantities since the real work of development must ultimately be the responsibility of Afghans.

The United States and NATO have given the PRTs lengthy lists of objectives to accomplish and set high expectations for both security and development. The United Nations have influenced the development of PRTs through the lessons that were learned in places like Rwanda and the Balkans in the 1990s. The *Brahimi Report* designed the way ahead for international involvement and gave legitimacy for nations to intervene and see the transition from war to peace. The United States developed the ‘three block war’ and described the actions of military forces as being a spectrum that was described by Brahimi as peace-building but included combat operations at one end with development at the other end.

There were 26 PRTs deployed in all regions of Afghanistan in 2009. They were all different to some degree and reflected the national interests of the contributing nation. Some, like the German PRT, worked in more secure areas and had very restrictive rules of engagement that dictated that they would not leave the compound unless conditions permitted secure travel. Some, like the Canadian PRT at Kandahar City, worked in a very dangerous region and during the course of their business in the region were the target of insurgents with frequent attacks and casualties. The observation by Eronen that every PRT was “one of a kind” accurately summed up the essence of PRT development.
CHAPTER 4 – PRT FUNCTIONS

Thus far this study has defined PRTs in terms of the expectations that are applied to them by both the nation that has deployed the PRT and the recipient nation that is seeking to improve the development and security situation that may presently exist. PRTs have a practical mission of improving security in a region and facilitating the delivery of critical development programs and services necessary for the welfare and betterment of the population. While the mission may on the surface appear simple and straightforward, the challenge for the military component is to achieve its mission with a relatively small group of soldiers and equipment, the challenge for the development side of the equation is to be effective in operating within a reduced “humanitarian space” than they would normally enjoy. The diplomatic arm of the 3-D structure is responsible for the overall coordination of the mission and gives guidance to both the military and development components.

We have explored the organizational structure of PRTs from various contributing states and saw that PRTs have certain core similarities but are all very different with a structure based on contributing state national priorities and capabilities. The U.S. PRTs are relatively small but operate from the perspective that larger US/ISAF combat forces are not far away should they require more robust security assistance quickly. The German PRT is much larger with a more robust security component but has more restrictive rules by which it operates to reduce the threat and the possibility of casualties. Each is different and seeks to achieve their mission through different mixes of resources but with common components of defence, diplomatic and development staffs. The 3-D structure is represented in all cases but with varying emphasis on the ‘D’s.

What is it that the PRT actually does to achieve greater security and development? This is not an easy question to answer. To begin to provide some reply is to examine how the expectations that we discussed in Chapter 2 are fulfilled. From a military perspective the response will be focused on those military matters that are necessary to carry out the mission they are ordered to do, from a development perspective the same essential conditions will apply. It is in the mixing
of the two that the really interesting part occurs; watching military and civilian members of the same team coexist, agree on the mission and agree on how it will be carried out.

This chapter seeks to clarify the ‘how’ of mission fulfillment and to explore some of the factors that affect the success of the PRTs. Of concern to those with a need to see results from resources and lives expended in the fulfillment of the mission is the measurement of results and the yardstick by which some declaration of success can be made. The metrics are elusive and not easily assessed and this particular concern will be addressed in the discussion of criticisms of PRTs. Overall, the day-to-day work of PRTs is informed by their structural strengths and limitations as well as the limits applied by the home state. In this section we will review what those strengths and limitations are and draw some conclusions regarding their effectiveness as tools for use by the contributing nation government and by extension, how effective they are at serving national interests. Lastly, the issue of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration will be brought up as a key factor in the success of the 26 PRTs and the overall plan of the Afghan government to rebuild the nation.

PRTs are essentially civil-military affairs (CIMIC) units but with add-ons from home state government departments and other stakeholders that have an interest in development of a particular type. The military usually takes the lead in security for the entire PRT and this in-turn facilitates the others to get involved in their particular area of expertise, be it police training or, for example, agriculture work.

Gauster lists the primary objectives of the units: “PRTs follow a three dimensional approach: (1) the implementation of security, (2) institution building and (3) the enabling and facilitating of reconstruction.” His assessment of the time factor involved is important in the execution of the overall plan by either the UN or NATO/ISAF when he says, “it will probably take generations to accomplish these objectives, a fact which often runs counter to the politically motivated short-term goals of the respective PRT-led nations.”

58 Gauster, p. 8
59 Ibid., p. 8.
a six to twelve month rotation schedule where the majority of the PRT is replaced by the home country and the new slate of members have to get up to speed on existing work and get to know the people in the region that they will work with in order to advance the mission of the PRT.

FIGURE 10 – PRT TASKS

\[\text{FIGURE 10 – PRT TASKS}\]

\[\text{FIGURE 10 – PRT TASKS}\]

*PRTs as a Security Agency*

Most PRTs operate from secure bases that they establish in the region they are assigned. The first concern is for security, therefore they need a sufficiently sized military force that can look after both local security of the compound they occupy and provide convoy security when moving around the countryside and in villages on patrols, making visits or at *shuras* (sit down meetings) with village and district leaders. This security is most frequently in the form of a mechanized infantry company group, normally over 100 troops, who are equipped with some form of armoured fighting vehicle. In the case of Canada, equipped with LAV III and RG 31 armoured fighting vehicles.
Vehicles like the LAV III and the RG31 Nyala, pictured above, provide the required physical security for PRT staff to move around the countryside. There have been frequent attacks on these vehicles by insurgents using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) normally buried under roadways and trails, and by suicide bombers using cars packed with explosives or wearing vests with explosives attached. The security group for the PRT members is frequently referred to as “force protection,” and is the first priority for the PRT and can consume a significant amount of their time and resources. The mere act of moving outside of the confines of the secure PRT
camp requires detailed planning and coordination to make sure that sufficient military force is available to meet the need (do they have the right people, vehicles, communications, and weapons?) and that routes being used are checked by military engineers and are clear of obstacles and are secure (ie: the threat of ambush or attack is low), that schedules are strictly maintained and that emergency drills are rehearsed and reinforced for all participants; all that just to get out the gate to go to work.

Gauster summarizes some of the macro tasks of PRTs:

PRT tasks include patrolling, mediation, setting up networks to the local population, running reconstruction projects, training and supervising armed forces and police personnel, demobilization and disarming, as well as intelligence.⁶⁰

To add to that the Canadian Parliamentary Information and Research Service, in its 2007 report *Afghanistan: Reconstruction and Development*, agreed with Gauster and the overall mission of the Canadian and other national PRTs:

the overriding objective is to contribute to the stability, security and outreach of the central government’s authority and to support local and provincial administrations. The primary mechanisms for achieving these objectives are regular interaction with the local authorities and the population, visibility, information-gathering with regard to security and stability, and support to the Afghan National Police.⁶¹

The easy conclusion drawn is that the PRT must have the capacity to move around the countryside in order to do its job and that means having the right equipment and weaponry and in sufficient quantity to achieve mobility and to counter threats. So, the first priority in the design of any PRT is to have sufficient security assets (manpower, armoured fighting vehicles, weapons) to meet the risk. In Kandahar and other southern regions of Afghanistan the threat is greater than in the northern parts of the country consequently this affects the design and structure

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 9.

of the PRT. PRTs in the safer regions of Afghanistan require less of a military security component than those in the south.

Gauster identifies a critical advantage of PRTs over larger military forces and it centers on the political justification at home. He says that European governments are more likely to get approval from the public by deploying a relatively small PRT made up of military and other government department staffs rather than a larger military force.\(^{62}\) One of the primary roles of the PRT is to improve security in a region through the act of possessing military firepower and therefore being prepared to use it if necessary. Consequently the conundrum created here by a small PRT structure means that the PRT will need to have the capacity to call on other military forces for additional firepower and support should the need arise.

Notwithstanding the presence of police, diplomats and development agency staff members; the bulk of PRTs are soldiers who are trained primarily in the art of war. To change their way of thinking in a kinetic environment (that is Army code for a place where the likelihood of attack is great and that the military force will be called upon to employ weapons and tactics to defeat an armed enemy) is difficult. The problem is to adjust the mindset to think about kinetic and non-kinetic operations at the same time.

**PRTs as a Development Agency**

Non-kinetic operations are those tasks that soldiers are asked to do that involve anything other than combat related tasks. The distribution of humanitarian aid, mentoring local officials to plan and build local infrastructure and governance capacity, and assisting in facilitating development work are all non-kinetic tasks for military forces working in a PRT setting. This mindset runs counter to the traditional training of the military and can quickly get pushed aside when those local actors working to disrupt development launch some form of kinetic action against the PRT. Andy Tamas, a development specialist who has spent considerable time in Afghanistan and worked with the Canadian military as part of the Strategic Advisory Team, identified the challenge of the military part of the PRT, to adapt the mindset to deal with combat and

\(^{62}\) Gauster, p. 10
development and be able to adjust from one to the other quickly to meet the needs of the moment. He discussed this with Brigadier-General Pepin, a senior General who was part of ISAF headquarters in Afghanistan, who offered:

I am of the view that the military is able to adapt itself, whether it is to respond to a threat or an enemy and to find ways to win when confronted with this threat, and they are also able to adjust themselves to a development environment (as they did successfully in Bosnia, for example.)

The challenge that is relatively new is to be able to do both at the same time. From my experience in Afghanistan I have observed that the military (both Canadian and American) has a tendency to be more comfortable with kinetic than non-kinetic activities such as development. That is why when a situation arises where both types of interventions are necessary, kinetic operations receive more attention.

This being said, my comments on changing the mindset referred to the capacity to develop an ability to act in both roles at the same time.63

The challenge is to be able to function on both levels, kinetic and non-kinetic, at the same time. This becomes a very difficult task for both the military portion of the PRT who are not traditionally trained in the non-kinetic and the civilian members who are not traditionally trained in the kinetic. Delving into each others areas of expertise is a factor that must be catered to in daily activities and in the final analysis will in all likelihood slow down the pace of activity as security will trump development productivity for all parts of the PRT. The simple fact is that neither soldier nor development worker can be effective if they are a casualty.

The method by which a PRT carries out its daily activities is rooted in the organization, resources, and rules of engagement that are provided by the nation that operates the PRT. In the case of the Canadian PRT, the organization is fixed in the whole-of-government (WOG) method of operating which itself is based on the 3-D (Defence, Development and Diplomacy) policy of international interaction. 3-D is best known from Canada’s 2005 International Policy Statement but originated as early as the 2000-2002 time-frames in the offices and hallways of the Department of Foreign Affairs in Ottawa. All of the PRTs operating in Afghanistan have

integrated other aspects of government beyond just the military component, to some greater or lesser extent. 64

The day-to-day operations of the PRT are a challenge to the military component that are trained to be decisive in their action, make plans to solve specific problems within defined timelines and to achieve a predefined outcome; one of the questions that commanders ask themselves in developing plans is ‘what should it look like at the end?’ Development staffs may not necessarily do that. Tamas says’ “The military is not accustomed to acting in anything but the role of a powerful intervener and controlling the field of action –they act on more often than act with the focus of their attention.” 65 This natural tendency of the military is very difficult to suppress in a PRT setting. That combined with a six month rotation schedule and the natural wish to have something to show for your efforts over that period of time results in the military wanting to get on with the development program and may result in the tendency to try to do the development work for the host country as opposed to working with them to achieve those same aims. As Tamas points out, the pace of development moves at the speed “that its slowest member with influence wants to move.” 66 Thus, if conditions for development are not ideal, the time spent as part of a PRT can be a frustrating experience for the members of the military.

One of the tools that the PRT has at its disposal is the use of “quick-impact” projects. These are relatively small and easy to achieve projects that can have a positive effect on the daily living conditions in a village or community. Often it is the digging of a well, construction or repair of a building or the provision of a generator. The project is mostly aimed at winning the hearts and minds battle but can come at a price, often an expectation that the PRT will similarly perform other work for the hosts. Tamas observes, “In a conflict zone where it is important to secure the support of local communities it is understandable that there will be the desire to find quick ways

64 Tamas, pp. 29-30.

65 Ibid., p. 96.

66 Ibid., p. 97.
of achieving this result." The quick impact project is attractive because it not only meets an immediate need of some sort but appeals to that part of the military that is accustomed to seeing more immediate results from their efforts. He notes:

The military operates on considerably shorter schedules than do most development agencies: they tend to think in terms of days, weeks, and possibly months rather than in years. A community’s norms and attitudes rarely change that quickly. While there may be a need for quick impact initiatives in an AO (area of operations), whenever possible these should be designed as an integrated series of inputs that exert an on-going and sustainable influence on the living conditions and patterns of relationships in the community.

This timeline may be outside of the planning cycle of the PRT. Projects that require planning, programming and funding over a mid to long term time horizon are more likely to see success under the supervision and control of agencies that will have staff in place longer than the norm of the PRT. NGOs or UN agencies may be better placed to oversee development that exceeds the PRT rotational schedule. As well, the expectation is that once the Afghan government and people have the sufficient ability to manage without the PRT it will begin to withdraw and return home.

Tamas also speaks to the main mission of the PRT – to strengthen the influence of the government of Afghanistan, “This is particularly important where the objective is to strengthen government operations at any level – most bureaucracies change relatively slowly.” The PRT may achieve some successes with the use of quick impact projects but they need to be planned as part of the overall development agenda for the region and they need to allow the military an opportunity to see results that confirm their worth both in the short-term and as part of the longer term development plan. For the contributing country’s national interests to be satisfied the PRT needs to be seen to be effective for both short and long term objectives; some real development must result for the host, in this case Afghans.

\footnote{Ibid., p.109.}

\footnote{Ibid.}

\footnote{Ibid.}
The military’s desire to see tangible results of their efforts in a timely manner, Tamas observes, is counter to the social practice of getting to know the people you are dealing with, building a relationship and understanding the culture they belong to and how things are achieved in that world. He cites an excellent example, close to home for Canadians, in discussing the way that aboriginals deal with those from outside the community who are there to do development work. It takes some time to acquire this understanding: in community work in Aboriginal villages in northern Canada it takes a skilled practitioner at least six months of building relationships with members of several sub-groups to begin to get a sense of how the informal dimension of the society operates. In a war-torn country where trust has been destroyed and where large-scale international development and military activity has had a major distorting effect on the society, achieving this understanding could take significantly longer.  

The practice of six-month military rotations does not allow the PRT staff to fully get to know the players in the village/community/region before they are replaced with a completely new staff and leadership who have to begin again the process of orientation and familiarization. This lack of mutual understanding will lessen the effectiveness of the PRT who will be viewed by the hosts as tourists versus valued partners in long-term development. Consequently the length of military rotations has a detrimental effect on the outcomes of efforts of the PRT. Military rotations should be on a yearly basis as opposed to six months as is now the ISAF policy.

The military portion of the PRT has a mission to accomplish, albeit sometimes ill-defined, but nevertheless it is the orders they have to carry out. In performing their mission they will necessarily intrude on the “humanitarian space” of the aid community that was discussed earlier. That intrusion can have the unintended consequence of greater risk to the aid providers as they become inevitably linked to the military mission. The effectiveness of the PRT will be reduced as the aid community work to distance themselves from the military. As the PRT works to increase the influence of the Government, the aid community seeks to protect the “humanitarian space” that they believe gives them protection and freedom of action. Afghanistan has significant foreign military forces under ISAF command including the 26 PRTs located throughout the country, thus it is difficult to achieve that separation. Tamas cites a former

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70 Tamas, p. 115.
Australian military officer now working for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) who says,

I think that the CF members in Kandahar have little comprehension of why the humanitarian community doesn’t like to see arms carriers in what used to be “humanitarian space.” This issue is fundamental to the different approaches of humanitarians and the CF, or other forces for that matter. Military people use humanitarian and development activities to support/achieve a military mission. Humanitarian organizations are fundamentally differently motivated! This is the issue where the major difference exists. I have been on both sides of this fence.  

The “militarization of aid” is a valid concern of the aid community, but the decision to create the PRT as a means of extending the influence of the Government of Afghanistan was not without the knowledge that this would have consequences. PRTs are agents of the Government and as such this forms the basis of the mission and informs the way in which resources are utilized. PRT effectiveness is conditional on the efficient use of all resources, and in this case humanitarian aid becomes one of them.

Tamas lists what he defines as the macro-level elements of governance. It is these things that the PRT seeks to implement or to facilitate for Afghanistan’s government. This is what the military commander, mentioned earlier, would like to see (or needs to see) as the outcome of their work. This is what the Afghan government, and by extension, the people must have for success of the PRT, and ISAF, to be realized:

1. Legitimate monopoly on the means of violence;
2. Administrative control;
3. Management of public finances;
4. Investment in human capital;
5. Delineation of citizenship rights and duties;
6. Provision of infrastructure services;
7. Regulation of the market;
8. Management of the state’s assets (including the environment, natural resources and cultural assets);
9. International relations (including entering into international contracts and public borrowing); and

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71 Tamas, p. 143.
10. Rule of law.\textsuperscript{72}

This shopping list of results becomes that tangible product of the PRT’s work; it is squarely in the realm of nation-building activities. PRTs, while they may possess elements of defence, development and diplomacy, are limited in the effect that they may have by the limited size of their organization and the resources that they may possess. In a post-conflict setting they are expected to be guides, teachers, motivators, leaders and providers for the people in a region that considers them the local authorities or conversely a population that may not recognize any person or agency as the government. Post-conflict settings that still include limited combat are particularly troublesome, dictating security for the PRT members as a first concern, and progress with the nation building agenda as the second.

The relationship between the various components of the PRT will, in large measure, determine the effectiveness of the organization. Tamas identifies three conditions that may be at work in the relationship between the military and the development portions of the PRT. Essentially it boils down to the way that the team exists; as Tamas questions “is it cohabitation, assimilation or integration?”\textsuperscript{73} In asking this question he refers to three possible situations that may determine the relationship:

1. Cohabitation is where two parties coexist and may be aware of each others activities.
2. Assimilation happens when the larger party is in control and the smaller party is absorbed into the majority.
3. Integration occurs when both parties change a situation where the end product is greater than the sum of the parts.\textsuperscript{74}

The goal of the PRT is integration but there are roadblocks along the way which will determine the probable outcome:

\textsuperscript{72} Tamas, pp. 180-181.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., p. 189.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., pp. 188-191.
The ideal version of 3-D or the “Whole of Government” approach implies that CIDA’s development workers, DND personnel and DFAIT staff and members of other participating agencies should form collaborative units at each level that enable their diverse contributions to merge in a single integrated output. There is considerable work needed to implement the “Whole of Government” approach – the administrative machinery of all participating agencies needs to be changed to operate in an integrated fashion rather than in the parallel stovepipes to which they have been accustomed. They are shifting from cohabitation toward integration, and hopefully they will not become stuck in assimilation along the way.75

This all relates to the mindset issue raised earlier and the ability of the participants to think outside the paradigms of their respective professions. The military must include this as part of their training otherwise it will not become a possible plan of action that they are able to turn to the same way that tactical problems are dealt with when confronted with a threat. Similarly, the development community must make an effort to integrate their work to include the security objectives of the military along with the goal of promoting the authority of the government:

Being able to think about both kinetic and non-kinetic activities at the same time is a challenge requiring considerable effort, good interagency and interpersonal communications, and a clear and shared understanding of the purpose of the mission.76

The military will rely on leadership, training and a strong focus on the mission. The devil is usually in the details and making sure that it is the correct mission is critical, and that the other members of the team are working to accomplish the same mission. Tamas identifies leadership from all the parts of the PRT team as a critical element of success. “Leadership in these integrated missions requires collaborative personalities, members who are better at listening and fostering creative problem solving in others than in telling them what to do.”77 Both the military and the development partners in the PRT must learn to first tolerate each other, to listen to and understand each other and then to work with each other.

The civilian members of the team may be naturally risk-averse and reluctant to operate in an insecure environment. This certainly became true for Canada following the death of Glyn Berry

75 Tamas, pp. 192-193.

76 Ibid., p. 195.

77 Ibid., p. 196.
in 2006. The military are fanatical about security and without it will not progress beyond the mission of defeating the insurgency. Development and diplomatic agents, with their disparate agendas, must be willing to accept the risk of working in a place that presents a physical risk otherwise they will not be a credible partner in the team. Wearing body armour and riding around the country in armoured fighting vehicles with machine guns on the roof is not something that diplomats and development staff do in the normal course of business, but this is not the normal course of business. Paradigms are shifting for all the parts of the PRT team and if it is to be a successful experiment then all members of the team must adapt and be willing to find new ways of working toward that common aim.

The conclusions that result from the examination of the methods used by the PRT and the challenges they face to structure and organization in the coming together of the military and civilian portions of the team mean that there is a necessary shifting in the mindset of all the partners and the necessary training that they must do to get to know one-another, listen to one-another and then work with one-another. The military come from a background of strict discipline and attention to the mission. They are oriented to want to see results from their work and have relatively short time-lines in which to get in, find out what has to be done and then get it done. The development community take a longer view to time-lines and are not necessarily looking at the six month rotation schedules that dictate military operations. To repeat a lesson that was learned: paradigms are shifting for all the parts of the PRT team and if it is to be a successful experiment then all members of the team must adapt and be willing to find new ways of working toward that common aim.

“Humanitarian Space” as a Development Challenge

The United States Institute of Peace, in 2005, reviewed the way relations between PRTs and NGOs are managed and had several recommendations for improvement. The discussion focussed around the idea of “humanitarian space” and the need to preserve that condition to allow NGOs to do their work. “Humanitarian space” is expressed in the relationship between NGOs and the parties that they interact with, especially their clients. The U.S. Institute of Peace defines it this way,
The objective of humanitarian assistance is to help those in need. To have access to vulnerable populations in war-torn societies, assistance providers must have the ability to cross the “lines” of conflict. This access, or “humanitarian space,” may be compromised or lost entirely if the assistance community is perceived as undermining the interests and objectives of one of the parties to the conflict or having partisan sympathies.\textsuperscript{78}

Logically, the delivery of development is made easier for NGOs in a secure environment than an insecure setting. The U.S. Institute of Peace goes one step further and poses the question of the difficulty of aid delivery in a place where the threat level to the NGOs means that they are at risk:

To the extent that combat operations, including attacks by insurgents, are prevalent or persistent, the lack of a secure environment may prevent the deployment of civilian humanitarian assistance providers or may limit their effectiveness. The resulting void in relief and reconstruction assistance can, in turn, contribute to an environment that supports insurgent forces. The use of PRTs raises the question: Does the use of military resources to fill the void in civilian humanitarian assistance result in the pacification of hostile territory more effectively than using military resources exclusively to establish a secure environment so that civilian relief and reconstruction efforts can flourish?\textsuperscript{79}

To address interoperability concerns between PRTs and development agencies, the U.S. Institute of Peace makes four recommendations. One note of caution here; their recommendations were focussed on U.S. staffed and manned PRTs, but the lessons learned might certainly be valuable for all PRTs regardless of national origin:

1. Preserving Humanitarian Space. Military commanders need to be aware of the needs of humanitarian agencies and how they operate. This aid sensitivity training would include a familiarization with three key guidelines that form the norms of the NGO community. They are:

   i. *The Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*;
   ii. *The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief*; and


\textsuperscript{79} United States Institute of Peace, 2005, p.7.
2. **Providing Security.** The PRT can be central to the security needs in an area to facilitate the delivery of development. To do that the PRTs need well defined terms of reference and the resources (both military and civilian) to accomplish the task. The PRTs should concentrate on measures to strengthen local district and provincial leaders within the following areas:

a. Security sector reform and local governance;
b. Disarmament, demobilization and Reintegration efforts with militias;
c. Training and mentoring of local police and military forces;
d. Stay away from “quick-impact” projects and concentrate on strengthening the capacity of local governments including the security and judiciary sectors.

3. **Providing Assistance.** Military assistance is appropriate where civilian assistance is not available. Notwithstanding, there is a responsibility to make sure that the civilian providers are in place as quickly as possible and that they and the military members of the PRT have prior training and familiarization with their role and the projects that are under way in their region.

4. **Coordinating and Sharing information.** There must be cooperation and coordination at the national level between the PRT Executive Steering committee and the national government and with the main aid donors, international organizations and the NGOs. Coordination must also occur at the local level between PRTs and the aid agencies operating in the area. 

Aid agencies are concerned about the conditions in which they must operate. They worry about preserving “humanitarian space” and at the same time they need security to be able to operate even on a minimal level.

A collection of eight aid agencies (Action Aid, AfghanAid, CARE, Christian Aid, Concern Worldwide, Oxfam International, TRoCAIRE) voiced some of the concerns that they have in attempting to carry out their missions. The eight agencies are concerned that militarized aid is not effective and does not focus on alleviating poverty but rather focuses on winning the loyalty of Afghans through the provision of aid. They caution that the mixing of aid and security is not effective, especially so with quick impact projects that are poorly designed and executed. They cite examples of buildings that were not well designed or constructed and thus were a safety hazard that threatened to fall down or were placed in locations susceptible to mudslides in rain.

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They are critical of the U.S. Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding that does not provide for maintenance after a project is put in place.

Their collective concern reinforces the aid community’s desire for “humanitarian space.” They quote an aid worker who says “We try to keep PRTs away from our offices and do not interact with them because it brings threats from insurgents and suspicion from our target communities.” 81 In addition they quote a local official in the Daikundi area who said “We are very poor and need development projects but we know that wherever the international forces go, the Taliban follow them.” The need for separation from military forces, be they PRTs or ISAF battle groups, is important to both humanitarian actors and the aid recipients. The question that arises is one which speaks to the effectiveness of the security program and why it is not able to help both humanitarian actors and aid recipients overcome the fear associated with the existence of foreign military forces in their area. It would be plausible to assume that the existence of a well-armed and highly trained military force would provide a reassurance of security but it seems that according to this article it does not. They posit instead that providing security achieves the opposite by attracting the insurgents and the Taliban and inviting conflict.

This position may be questioned by an earlier appeal in 2003 for the opposite. At that time there was a call by a group of 84 humanitarian, human rights, civil society, and conflict prevention organizations for a stepping up of ISAFs mandate to allow it to expand beyond the Kabul region and to get a grip on the worsening security situation. They agreed that PRTs did not possess the necessary resources to effectively “address the security threats posed by warlords and other armed spoilers.” 82 This joint letter was explicit in supporting a robust military force when it said “We call on the international community to expand the ISAF mandate and provide the resources needed to secure Afghanistan so that democracy can flourish. Doing so will improve the prospect for peace and stability for the Afghan people and the world.” 83


82 Ibid. p. 2.

83 Ibid.
attitude amongst the NGO community suggests that not all of the agencies are in agreement regarding the need for security as a precursor to sustainable development.

The need to de-militarize aid is well understood but the more fundamental global need to defeat terrorist threats has still not been achieved in the region. Is it in the greater interests of Afghans, and the nations who have contributed resources to Afghanistan, to fix, once and for all, the terrorist threat in the region first? It is generally accepted that sustainable development cannot flourish without security; it is also accepted that lasting security will not be achieved without sustainable development. The trick lies in the formula to achieve both at the same time.

Amongst recommendations to keep a separation of military forces and NGOs and to keep aid firmly within the civilian NGO control, they recommend that the United Nations take a greater role in delivering and coordinating aid. They want the UN to “be more forceful in coordinating aid efforts, preserving their independence and improving their effectiveness, accountability and transparency.” This is in addition to the fact that NATO/ISAF military forces from 46 nations are in Afghanistan under a UN sanctioned agreement and acting as an agent of the UN to rout and defeat the Taliban and other insurgents that aim to take control of the country.  

The challenge for everyone is made difficult through an active insurgency that necessitates a higher level of physical security than might normally be necessary if the insurgency were not present. The threat to the safety of both military and civilian members of the PRT is very real and reinforced by the deaths of over 1700 military members of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) since the start of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, including members of the Canadian PRT in the Kandahar area. In addition there are the deaths of Afghani civilian workers in the employ of NGOs. In 2009 alone, The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office reported that for the year there were 172 incidents with 19 NGO staff killed and 18 seriously

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injured. The conclusion that is drawn is simple; security and development are risky work in Afghanistan and NGOs are not immune from that risk. PRTs are similarly at risk and are a target for armed opposition and insurgency elements.

Peter Runge, in his examination of the German military PRT experience in Afghanistan, tried to determine the new civil-military relationship that has emerged from this complex emergency. This is important in that Germany as a member of NATO is motivated in similar ways as other NATO members and is challenged by the need to balance domestic and international needs in the decisions that it has made regarding the deployment of its PRT. The lessons that Runge draws from the experience can be useful for all of the ISAF partners in Afghanistan and especially those who have contributed Provincial Reconstruction Teams to the country.

Afghanistan represents the first real large-scale operation where the international aid community is standing shoulder-to-shoulder with military forces and tensions are running a bit high. There are several standing rules for the engagement of military and civilian aid agencies in the same sticky situation. The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs published guidelines (the Oslo Guidelines) in 2006, to describe the key concepts for the use of military resources in natural disasters and technological and environmental emergencies. They also published Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies. Emergencies do not come much more complex than they do in Afghanistan. The Guidelines specify criteria when these resources can be used, how they should be employed, and how UN agencies should interface, organize and coordinate with international military forces. The Guidelines emphasize the following core principles:

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1. Military means should be employed by humanitarian agencies only as a last resort, i.e. only in the absence of any other available civilian alternative;

2. A humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian character;

3. The military should not engage in direct assistance in order not to be mixed up with UN activities in humanitarian aid; and

4. The use of military resources should be limited in time and scale and the military should withdraw from this area as early as possible.\textsuperscript{87}

These guidelines are helpful in that they inform the way NGOs and military forces can work together (at least coexist) to achieve a positive outcome. The devil is in the details and Runge is effective at bringing together the essentials of the PRT experiment. He says, “the PRT experiment can be considered “a crucible of civil-military relations in the future.”\textsuperscript{88}

Runge poses three key questions to examine in his review:

1. What is the impact of international military operations and the changing context of security and conflict in Afghanistan on different humanitarian actors?

2. What is the impact of the PRTs on the programs of humanitarian aid agencies and their concerns regarding the preservation of humanitarian space? and

3. What are the lessons learned with regard to the cooperation of military and humanitarian actors within the PRT framework?

A key conclusion of this report frames the civil-military relationship of the future in a set of guidelines (rules of the road) that will determine how military and humanitarian agencies will work together. The most important of these is the inescapable fact that without security there cannot be sustainable development and without sustained development long-term security is impossible. The two are linked and “that-is-that” so both military and NGO should get used to working with each other and find the best way for both to be of value and carry out their mission. The military have an operational mission to get done that underscores the security agenda. Humanitarian agencies have work to do to help needy populations to survive and to achieve

\textsuperscript{87} Runge, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., p. 6.
sustainable development. The blurring of the line between the two has resulted in the tension that exists.

There are valid arguments on both sides of the discussion that support the actions by both military and NGOs. Some of the points that Runge identified in his research were:

(1) Lack of physical distinction of the military forces as combatants when OEF troops wore civilian clothing and used civilian pattern vehicles so that they could blend in with the local populace and mover freely about the country;

(2) Use of QIPs to win the hearts and minds battle at the local levels;

(3) PRTs have attempted to leverage humanitarian aid as military tool. Some senior level authorities have likened humanitarian aid as a “force multiplier”, a nice military term to describe a weapon to be used in the battle;

(4) Military forces have attempted to apply conditions to humanitarian aid, with the implication being that cooperation level would determine aid levels;

(5) PRTs have used information gathered by aid agencies for military purposes to plan security operations. NGOs are hesitant to share information since they will be shut out by people who will refuse to cooperate with them; and

(6) PRTs have given a slightly different face of operations to the home state as the humanitarian aspects of their works are emphasized over any combat missions or pure military roles that have been performed. Budgets and resources are set at home so it is easiest to sell the less violent aspects of PRT work to the (German) voters.\(^89\)

\(^{\text{89}}\) Ibid., pp. 18-20.
Runge asks how one group could complement the other. The answer that he provides is one of a clear separation of mandates, and a division of labour based on respective comparative advantage or as he terms it, ‘complementarity.’ His recommendations for the employment of PRTs and humanitarian aid agencies in Afghanistan, and elsewhere, focus on the clear separation of the two halves of the equation but this also implies a level of cooperation and coordination. He says:

The separation will allow the military the ability to address the security agenda all the while enabling NGOs to preserve their humanitarian space which allows them freedom of movement and activity. The cooperation and exchange of information should take place under the auspices of UN coordination meetings but not in either PRT or NGO locations. Contact at the strategic, or home state level, should be utilized to the fullest to achieve better understanding of each other’s missions, cultures and political objectives.90

Summary – PRT Function

The description of the function of a PRT is peppered with terms like: enable, facilitate, and support. Ultimately the PRT is supposed to be a security agency and a development agency. The combination of the two is not an easy mix. The need for security consumes a significant portion of the time and effort of the PRT with the provision of security at the location where they are established and when they go outside the gate to interact with the people they are there to assist. The threat of attack by insurgents and especially by a popular weapon used by insurgents, the Improvised Explosive Device, or IED, caused every PRT to commit heavily to security precautions and necessitates equipment such as Armoured Fighting Vehicles and weaponry just to move about the country. The threat of attack is real and is shared by both the military and civilian members of the PRT.

The working relationship between the military and the civilian components of the PRT is important because this will condition the level of success that it will attain. Andy Tamas’ hope that the three arms of the PRT (defence, diplomacy and development) will integrate to some appropriate point of effectiveness, vice the traditional ways that each has worked, is important to keep in mind as the review of the whole-of-government approach by Canada, which will be the subject of a later chapter, will inform the success that is attained.

The practice of six month rotations for military members of some PRTs limits the ability of the PRT to get to know the people and to fully understand their needs. PRTs are CIMIC tools that have the ability to dispense aid and determine where resources should be applied to the problem of insecurity and lack of development. The critics of PRTs decry the militarization of aid and are concerned about the loss of “humanitarian space” in the pursuit of NGO objectives. These are real concerns that influence how development will take place.

The next chapter will examine some observations and criticisms of Provincial Reconstruction Teams with emphasis on the issue of measuring performance and effectiveness. This is especially difficult given the broad nature of the mission and wide-ranging objectives given to the PRT to attempt to achieve.
CHAPTER 5 - PRT EFFECTIVENESS

In previous chapters the study defined and described PRTs and placed them within the national context as it relates to the ability of states to contribute resources to NATO/ISAF. The functions of the PRTs were examined in detail and it was determined that they are given a set of often too wide-ranging responsibilities that require a paradigm shift in thinking for all parts of the PRT team if it is to be successful. All members of the team must adapt and be willing to find new ways of working toward a common aim. The proliferation of weapons and the strength of the insurgency limit success and increase the need for force protection measures. This slows down the pace of PRT activity since the first concern that they have is force protection for the members.

This chapter will examine some of the criticisms that have been levelled at PRTs along with the discussion of their intended function and resultant effectiveness. The level of criticism has been at a decidedly more macro level that deals with government policy, structure, and the overall way in which PRTs are being challenged to work in a difficult situation.

To begin, Markus Gauster identified some of the fundamental shortcomings of PRTs, essentially four key areas where there are operational challenges to the organization:

“PRTs are not suitable to fight the dominant drug economy in a direct way. This means they cannot and are not meant to destroy poppy fields or fight a war against the [drug lords] and their private armies”91

An “ISAF deployment often only last three to six months – even for key personnel – [this] leads directly in the sustainability dilemma of the PRTs”92

“PRTs executing a Stability/Reconstruction concept can operate maximally up to the seventh – out of ten – level defined by the instability scale. Operations executed in southern provinces Helmund (where the UK PRT operates) and Kandahar (where the Canadian PRT operates) can be categorized (in 2007) as level nine provinces – and

91 Gauster, p. 10.

92 Ibid.
therefore war zones – do not fit the PRT concept developed for post-conflict regions (ranging up to level seven) for northern or western Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{93}

“PRTs are a suitable device to add stabilization where post-conflict conditions dominate. A PRT deployment in war zones (level eight upwards) reduces this innovative concept and the meaning of “reconstruction team” to absurdity.”\textsuperscript{94}

His comments point to a disconnect between the expectations placed on a PRT as a complete security and development package - to bring security to a region of Afghanistan with the reality of a modestly sized civilian-military organization that is designed more for public relations than policing - and the broader mission of ISAF. When it comes to security the heavy lifting becomes the responsibility of the pure military portion of ISAF designed to engage in combat, who are seeking to destroy the insurgency and to stop the flow of new foreign fighters and weapons from entering the country. Overall, ISAF itself has a modestly sized force (the numbers are not precise but were about 60,000 soldiers in 2009) with plans to grow as the United States withdrew from operations elsewhere. The overall mission of ISAF complements the mission of the PRTs, to provide security and to enable development by both the government and international organizations.

At the organizational and structural level there are several arguments that can be made for adjustments to the method of operations, funding, command and control and relations with the non-military components of PRTs that the United States has created and are using in Afghanistan. Michelle Parker, a senior level civilian USAID staff officer, has experience both at the PRT level (2004-2006) and at ISAF Headquarters as the Development Advisor to the ISAF military commander (2006), and has first-hand experience with the challenge of implementing development. In 2007 she provided the benefit of her experience to the U.S. House of Representatives and made several recommendations for improvement to the way PRTs are funded and how they can spend the funding they receive. Her recommendations included:

1. Better alignment of resources for the each portion of the PRT mission including military funding that is given to the military commander as part of the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds. That money was not to be spent on

\textsuperscript{93} Gauster, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., p. 11.
security but was intended for quick-impact projects. Funding mechanisms for the Diplomacy and Development arms of the PRT are also cumbersome and controlled by separate departments through complex approval mechanisms that stretch back to the United States. This needs to be adjusted with flexible funding mechanisms that “allow people at the tactical level to address immediate needs that could become larger problems.” Parker recommends a CERP-like fund for USAID to use for development.

2. The United States need to clarify how it intends to deliver aid assistance. For three decades the U.S. government has contracted out aid delivery to private companies and NGOs. Now the signal that is going out is that specific government departments (State, Agriculture, Health, Human Services, Education, etc) are joining the fight and that the U.S. government wants to directly implement aid assistance by sending technical experts and officials to work in conflict zones. This is putting more and more civilian government staffers in war zones and in harms way. The use of the Peace Corps and USAID, who are not staffed to conduct field operations on a new increased scale, may demand that a new organization be designed to meet these needs or that USAID staff be increased to better aligned with U.S. government policy and objectives. This will increase the force protection needs of civilian PRT staffers requiring more security resources (likely military).

3. Better integrate the PRT mission with war-fighting activities. The U.S. model needs to be adapted to allow for increased input by the development staff as part of military operations planning. Stability operations should include a part of the plan that gives thought to what will happen after the battle has been waged and won.

4. Increase the number of civil-affairs teams within the PRT. They do not possess sufficient manpower to allow them to get out to the villages and places that they need to visit. They are the first link between the Government of Afghanistan and the population and are facilitators of communications first and foremost.95

Her recommendations are fundamental organizational changes that will allow the three arms of the PRT, defence/diplomacy/development, to better align the financial resources they receive with the main tasks they must accomplish. This may be a challenge, especially in regard to her third recommendation of better integration of the PRT mission with war-fighting activities. This may give rise to an increase in fears within the NGO community of a greater loss of “humanitarian space” and thus greater risk to development staffs, a slowdown of the delivery of development programs and materials to clients and a overall greater degree of difficulty in

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getting out to those they intend to serve. Her comments indicate that stability operations and what will happen after the battle has been won are very important to the success of the overall mission. When military forces defeat an enemy in a particular location they will normally occupy that area to make sure that it does not fall back into enemy hands; the situation with a PRT is no different. When PRTs withdraw back into fortified compounds at the end of the day they essentially give insurgents, or other actors with competing agendas, the opportunity to do as they wish often destroying or minimizing the results of the work that has been done. If villagers cannot protect the project then there is little hope for progress. The nation-building efforts to reconstitute the security agencies (police/military/courts) must be early on for the possibility of success to be good. The concept of the three-block war and the need for a presence in the areas in which you are working, which was discussed earlier, is reinforced by Michelle Parker’s comments and the need to have some control of security in the region.

At the end of the quick military campaign in 2001, which aimed to defeat both the ruling Taliban regime and the terrorist group Al-Qaeda, the challenge was the lack of a clear governmental authority for Afghanistan. That was, in theory, resolved through the creation of an interim government under the leadership of Hamid Karzai. This gap would otherwise quickly be filled with regional powers, popularly referred to as warlords, who operated by their own rules and who generally were not interested in cooperation with a weak government. Westerman did a comparison of the problems faced by the United States during the Vietnam War and the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan to determine if there were lessons learned from the Vietnam War that were applicable to the more recent conflict. His comparison is appropriate in the light of his hypothesis that:

The war that is being waged in Afghanistan has many of the same characteristics as that fought in Vietnam – it too is a classical insurgency in which the protagonists are fighting not for military victories or territorial gains, but for control of the population itself. For the coalition to succeed in this situation requires a clever blending of military, political and development strategies into a single comprehensive campaign.\footnote{I.D. Westerman, \textit{Provincial Reconstruction in Afghanistan: An Examination of the Problems of Integrating the Military, Political and Development Dimensions with Reference to the US Experience in Vietnam}, Small Wars Journal, 15 July 2008, accessed at \url{www.smallwarsjournal.com}, p. 3.}
Westerman’s comparison between the Vietnam War and the Afghan campaign highlighted an important conclusion that needed fast action:

It was clear this time that one unintended, but perhaps inevitable, outcome of both the rapid success of the operation and the use of indigenous forces to achieve it, was that a very unstable situation now reigned in the country. Although an interim government under Hamid Karzai was quickly established in Kabul under the terms of the 22 December 2001 Bonn Agreement, it was not truly in control of the rest of the country. As described…the situation was one of a revival of warlordism, banditry and opium production, where the power of the national government was really only effective in Kabul, with some influence possibly existing over the northern parts of the country and a few areas of the Pashtun south. Overall, the new Afghanistan was now more chaotic and less stable than before the fall of the Taliban. The requirement was for stabilization and aid and it became apparent early on that this was not something that the coalition forces were well structured to deliver. It was recognized that there was a need to unite the requisite civilian-led reconstruction skills together with the military expertise necessary to enable them to be effective; however, there was no obvious mechanism available with which to do this at that early stage.\(^9\)

The solution to that immediate need was found in the creation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. These civil-military affairs units would cater to the legitimacy needs of the fledgling government promoting it as the legal government and demanding provincial leaders acknowledge it as such if they were to be able to tap in to development funds and projects. The handing out of quick impact projects was a fast method of getting the attention of the people and advertising the benefits of a national government and all that it brought with it.

To add another measure of complexity to the already challenging puzzle that is Afghanistan involves recognizing and understanding the objectives of the fundamentalist Taliban and how that organization will conduct its campaign for control. This requires a shift in classical military doctrine and thinking, sometimes easier said than actually done. Westerman says,

> The Taliban’s objectives are not about land ownership and social reform, but about the application of the Islamic law and lifestyle and this makes it more difficult for non-Islamic forces to counter their propaganda. Even Afghans who associate with westerners can easily be targeted and are often preached against in the mosques by clerics who support the religious views of the Taliban. There is a very complex tribal and ethnic

\(^9\) Westerman, p. 8.
aspect to Afghan society, which is further complicated by the factors of warlordism and drugs.  

So, the challenge to establishing a central government includes several key overarching problems that must be resolved to one degree or other before a viable government can have control. Balancing the fundamentals of democracy, religious and ethnic pulls, along with power seeking by warlords, and the nagging issue of a very lucrative drug trade that fuels corruption and lawlessness; it should come as no surprise that the solution to provide security and development will not be found easily or quickly. At the level of national interests, for the countries that are providing the PRTs, there are also competing interests related to the original reason they are involved in Afghanistan. With no set structural template to work from each nation has been free to send whatever it feels is necessary to accomplish the mission that they see needs to be done. This has, as we saw earlier, made for a wide variety of organizations and is one of the factors affecting (limiting) the success of PRTs. 

At the level of national interests not all PRT participating nations are compelled by the same motives. Westerman, in his research efforts, interviewed David Barno, a retired U.S. Lieutenant-General, who was in charge of military forces in Afghanistan, who provided his opinion on national interests,

I think NATO’s objectives for example (which is the 800lb gorilla in the corner of the room we don’t talk about sometimes), are very unclear. I think the U.S. objectives are relatively clear, but the two of those don’t match up necessarily. The way to put it in my view is that Afghanistan within the NATO context has become about the preservation of NATO. The U.S. context for Afghanistan has been about the strategic interest the U.S. has in that region…which is a strategic outlook not shared by NATO in any way, shape or form. In fact, I had a discussion six months back with a former Defence Minister from one of the European contributors to NATO and I said this about the strategic region to the United States and this person said “I can’t go back to my population and tell them Afghanistan is about the strategic importance of the region, that’s not why they agreed to go to Afghanistan – they went there for humanitarian reasons.” And NATO is still very much stuck in that corner.  

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98 Westerman, p. 15.

99 Ibid., p. 25.
PRT contributing countries have varying reasons for involvement with ISAF. The comments of General Barno are a behind-the-scenes indication of that variance and the reality that NATO must deal with in order to have nations sign-on to providing PRTs. Each has been driven by national priorities and the result means very different PRT structures and operating rules.

One of the key elements of military success in any operation is leadership. Without digressing into a study of leadership this will be taken as a given because history has shown that leadership is an essential element if any project, be it military or civilian, is to succeed; PRTs in Afghanistan are no different. Leadership also begins at the top, and NATO, as the leader, must set the rules of the game if all of the actors are to be part of the same mission. In Afghanistan that has not been fully realized. Each contributing country has been allowed to design, operate and manage its own PRT rather than provide manpower and equipment that has been designed by NATO. The chain-of-command decision to keep national departmental reporting lines in place for the various elements of the organization vice local operational channels amounts to a failure of leadership that may be a costly lesson for NATO’s deployment to Afghanistan. In his examination of the lessons learned by the U.S. in the Vietnam War Westerman draws a parallel when it comes to leadership:

> Again we are seeing a lack of strong unified leadership, in which the civil and military aspects of the operation are run by separate command structures, resulting in the same lack of any genuine progress. Unfortunately in Afghanistan the situation is further complicated by the fact that the whole campaign is under the direction of a twenty-six nation military alliance, each member of which has their own chain-of-command in place and sets their own agenda for their PRT. Since it seems that the NATO hierarchy does not have the stomach for the political struggle that changing this would involve, this does not bode well for the future. If casualties continue to mount then overwhelming loss of public support for engagement in Afghanistan may occur before any real success in terms of stabilization can take place.\(^\text{100}\)

Recent chinks in NATO armour were opened following the announcement that Canada, currently committed in Kandahar which is arguably the most dangerous region of Afghanistan, would begin winding down combat operations in the summer of 2011 and withdraw from the Kandahar

\(^{100}\) Ibid., p. 27
region by the end of that year. The United States, even though it announced a surge in troop numbers in the short term also announced a decision to start the exit in 2011 in the hopes that the insurgency in the south of the country will be effectively reduced to the point that the rebuilt Afghan security forces can assume control of the region.

The Canadian plan to withdraw from the Kandahar region (Canada took on a new training mission in the Kabul area) in mid-2011 posed the question of whether or not conditions in Kandahar will be at a state where success of the mission has been achieved and the PRT can cease operations and withdraw leaving Afghans and NGOs to continue development work. That assessment question will, for now, be left unanswered but it points to a more fundamental objective of the PRT, which is to eventually make its purpose redundant, in other words and to put it bluntly, put itself out of business and go home. This is of course accomplished by successful work in facilitating long-term development and empowering Afghans to do the work for themselves. Westerman, in his research, quoted a former head of PRTs at ISAF headquarters who said:

It must be recognized that the end-state for a PRT is not to exist. It provides an umbrella of security within which development assistance can be provided. Once conditions are such that indigenous forces can maintain a secure and stable environment the military component is redundant. Further, its presence may well be counter-productive since its very existence undermines local perceptions of the capability of the local police and army and also may interfere with IO/NGO activities. PRTs should thus be prepared to work themselves out of a job. They should always seek not to create dependency and to build the capacity of the government to manage its own development. They should have their end state in mind and have plans in place to phase themselves out as soon as possible.

The establishment of an end point in operations for a PRT is important in that there must (or should) be some method to measure effectiveness of the PRT that enables planners to determine the proper time to end operations.

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101 Canada subsequently announced that it would continue a military commitment to NATO/ISAF with the provision of training cadre designed to provide military training to continue with the rebuilding of a defence and security structure. This new mission will be centered in the Kabul region and will commence very soon after the wind-down of operations in Kandahar in mid-2011. This new Canadian military operation is called Operation ATTENTION.

The issue of metrics can be a two-edged sword; it can certainly assist to identify progress or it can recognize failure. A PRT contributing nation may be anxious to show value for blood and treasure spent in Afghanistan but less desirous of having failure highlighted as the only pay-off for money and the lives of soldiers, diplomats and civilians pursuing security and development. A high level NATO PRT conference held in Maastricht in 2008 looked at the issue of metrics and came to agreement on three broad questions that could be asked to determine the level of success of PRTs. Westerman reported on these three questions as part of his research on PRTs. The conference asked the question “What broad criteria should be developed in monitoring and developing PRT impact?” The answers that were collected were as unclear as the question, but were a start; the NATO meeting summarized these broad indicators:

1. Broad criteria assessed as:
   - What stage are lead nations able to civilianize/dissolve PRTs?
   - What stage is responsibility for security transferred to ANSF?
   - The degree to which PRTs are developing capacity at the local level.

2. Criteria need to be based on implementation of Provincial Development Plan.

3. Measures of impact:
   - Are the PRTs coordinating with the right agencies and the degree of coordination between national and local level?
   - Facilitation of coordination.
   - Assessment in terms of problem solving.\\footnote{Westerman, p.57.}

Care must be taken to not too tightly tie PRT effectiveness with local actor effectiveness. The aim of the PRT is to make local actors effective at running their own country. If the local actors are effective then a conclusion might be that the PRT has been effective at its job and thus can now be folded and withdrawn. The PRTs must be effective at facilitating others to learn and then do the job of being a government and development provider. Small successes must be carefully assessed and, while a positive sign, not be confused with a longer term increase in governance capacity. That kind of metric will be a challenge to measure, or more importantly, gauge. Effectiveness will rarely be expressed as a numerical value on a scale (like a written test) but will be an impression of capability and a review of the presence of the essentials of governance and a civil-society that functions for the benefit of the citizens.
The survey conducted by ASCOR in late 2009 gives some indications of the effectiveness of PRTs as evaluated by the Afghan people. Fourteen critical conditions were evaluated in the questions asked by the survey, they included:

1. Overall living conditions,
2. Security from crime and violence,
3. Availability of jobs/economic opportunities,
4. Roads, bridges and other infrastructure,
5. Availability of clean water,
6. Supply of electricity,
7. Availability of food,
8. Availability of medical care,
9. Local schools,
10. Rights of women,
11. Your freedom of movement – the ability to go where you wish safely,
12. Security from the Taliban and other armed groups,
13. Your ability to afford the price of things you want and need, and
14. Support for agriculture, including the availability of seed, fertilizer and farming equipment.104

In almost every category the survey respondents acknowledged that conditions had improved in recent years.105 While the survey did not directly link improvements in these fourteen categories with the efforts of the PRTs and the ISAF military force, the connection can be drawn in the comparison to conditions in Afghanistan before the ouster of the Taliban as the ruling regime in 2001.

It is clear that identification of unambiguous metrics to assess PRT effectiveness are elusive and not merely tied to the quantitative tallying-up of numbers of water wells dug or school-houses


105 Ibid.
constructed. And while there may be value in doing that adding up of numbers there should also be other measures employed to give governments a clear picture of the best time to fold and withdraw the PRT. Since a PRT is both a security and development tool working in defence, diplomacy and development environments, the measures employed should be focussed on those three elements of the PRT structure. A proposal for assessment might look something similar to the following criteria:

Number and frequency of interaction with local leaders and the product of that interaction:
1. Regional development and rebuilding plans prepared by local/regional leadership; and
2. DDR activity and effects and assessment of impact on overall security (in relation to the level of security listed below) including local support for DDR.

Number, complexity and cost of infrastructure projects that have been funded, initiated and completed.

Assessment of security in the region:
1. In relation to the period prior to the establishment of the PRT in the area;
2. Changes (increases/decreases) observed during the time the PRT is in the region;
3. Presence of Afghan Police and Military units;
4. In relation to other regions of the nation; and
5. In relation to national and local insurgency and criminal activity.
(Note: what is normal criminal activity in society? And, for example, if criminal activity in Afghanistan were to be reduced to the level of the U.S., is that success?)

Threats to development agencies and to local people employed by NGOs including an assessment of the freedom of movement by NGOs and perception of “humanitarian space” that is allowed or desired in the region.
National and local political activity in the region. Participation in elections both as candidates and voter turnout.

Assessment of recognition and adherence to basic human rights particularly for women and girls. What were conditions when the PRT commenced operations and what are conditions now?

School enrolments and graduations. Numbers for both males and females and a comparison to pre-2001 enrolment numbers and an evaluation of the school curriculum’s

Capacity and distribution of electricity including the number of hours a day that electricity is available.

Health care availability as part of the greater national infrastructure development in the region.

Presence and effectiveness of Police, Judiciary and Prisons.

Other nation-building assessment criteria.

All of these evaluation criteria, and many others, may be used to determine the success of a PRT in a region. The degree of success must be gauged by the nation providing the PRT, and the nation in receipt of the PRT, before victory can be declared and the PRT can go home. When are elections free and fair enough? When are there enough doctors and hospitals and hours of electricity? What is an acceptable level of violence, crime or insurgent activity? All of these criteria are assessed against a yardstick that is held by several stakeholders at the same time and all have national interests that affect the point where the decision is made to withdraw the PRT home and allow those local and national leaders an opportunity to continue the work that is needed for development.
PRT effectiveness should be assessed in conjunction with tools such as the U.S. PRT Task Matrix. Specific tasks are listed, albeit in general terms, but can be given some qualitative assessment regarding the effectiveness of the proposed solution when it is implemented. Qualitative assessments are not new to military forces and are part of the assessment standards imposed in leadership training. Instructors must judge the effectiveness of aspiring leaders on formal training courses. As well, every soldier receives an annual performance review that is mostly a qualitative assessment of individual performance – how well have you preformed your job? This is not new terrain for the military or other government bureaucrats and thus could be part of a regular PRT effectiveness review.

Canadian assessment of effectiveness has resided in the quarterly reports to Parliament that assess progress on a wide variety of projects undertaken by the PRT. The reports were started in June 2008 and tallied up the successes of Canada in Afghanistan on six functional priorities and three signature projects. The reports cited successes and difficulties that were experienced by the PRT and other Canadian backed efforts in the course of operations in the Kandahar and wider region.

The U.S. Department of Defense assessment of success may be less focussed on metrics and more-so on command assessment. In a report released by the U.S. Pentagon in April 2011 the stage was set to announce the draw-down of U.S. military forces from Afghanistan. Assessment by the U.S. military was decidedly positive in tone telling that important gains had been made in defeating the insurgency and facilitating development. Notwithstanding localized attacks by insurgents, the report cited overall gains in the war against the Taliban and other insurgents. The report said,

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its Afghan partners have made tangible progress, arresting the insurgents’ momentum in much of the country and reversing it in a number of important areas. The coalition’s efforts have wrested major safe havens from the insurgents’ control, disrupted their leadership networks, and removed many of the weapons caches and tactical supplies they left behind at the end of the previous fighting season. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) continued to

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increase in quantity, quality, and capability, and have taken an ever-increasing role in security operations. Progress in governance and development was slower than security gains in this reporting period, but there were notable improvements nonetheless, particularly in the south and southwest. Overall, the progress across Afghanistan remains fragile and reversible, but the momentum generated over the last six months has established the necessary conditions for the commencement of the transition of security responsibilities to Afghan forces in seven areas this summer.107

The NATO Summit held at Lisbon, Portugal, in late 2010 set the stage for a transition away from NATO troops to Afghan military and police forces to begin shouldering the responsibility for control of some regions of the country. The communiqué issued at the end of the summit included a comment on the Afghan mission when it said,

We are entering a new phase in our mission. The process of transition to full Afghan security responsibility and leadership in some provinces and districts is on track to begin in early 2011, following a joint Afghan and NATO/ISAF assessment and decision. Transition will be conditions-based, not calendar-driven, and will not equate to withdrawal of ISAF-troops. Looking to the end of 2014, Afghan forces will be assuming full responsibility for security across the whole of Afghanistan.108

Metrics that determine effectiveness of PRTs may give way to other national interests that determine the end of a deployment or a shift in focus for that mission. It is clear following the 2010 Lisbon Summit that NATO partners were keen to begin the transition phase of the mission and start the process of reducing the number of military forces deployed in Afghanistan. For Canada it means a change of mission away from the combat role it has had since 2006 along with responsibility for a PRT in the Kandahar area. The PRT has been handed off to the U.S. to carry on work in the Kandahar region and the military force will downsize and redeploy to the Kabul region in late 2011 to begin work as a training cadre for Afghan military, police forces, and government agencies. Canada will be part of the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-
A). Canada’s contribution will be called Canadian Contribution Training Mission – Afghanistan or CCTM-A.¹⁰⁹

The Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs conducted a review of PRTs in 2008 entitled Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations, and in that review asked three questions:

1. Should the United States and coalition partners continue to use PRTs?
2. Are PRTs achieving the goal for which they are funded?
3. What are the best practices of countries that sponsor and contribute to PRTs?

These three questions were driven by observations in their review that saw PRTs “criticised for their mixed effectiveness, over-emphasis on military objectives and priorities, failure to effectively coordinate and communicate with the UN and non-governmental organizations, and differences in staffing and mission.”¹¹⁰ The lack of a common standard amongst the PRTs operating in Afghanistan was worrisome but explained in the analysis of host nation politics and bureaucracy, structure and organization, the civil-military relationship, activities and the evaluation of impacts or what defines success:

PRTs in Afghanistan lack an overarching strategy, set of common objectives, and a common concept of operation and organizational structure. Metrics to assess the success and impact of current PRT models are also missing from national PRT strategies. Shortfalls in staffing and the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan…[has] made it difficult for PRTs to function effectively. The importance of personalities, donor countries’ political caveats, and imbalances in program funding have also negatively affected PRT performance. However, there are examples of best practices that can address these problems.¹¹¹


¹¹¹ Abbaszadeh, et al, p.5
This ‘leave it up to the donor country’ approach to PRT organization, structure, mission and roles presents an enormous variation in doctrinal thinking that is inconsistent with normal military planning. While NATO organizational thinking is normally very structured and standardized, this divergence is troubling to the degree that the approach seems to be to muster a small military force, travel a long distance and show up to what is a very dangerous game with the military and civilian resources you think might be available to do some widely defined mission. For military planners this is the stuff of nightmares, for the military force that must deploy as a PRT it is a challenge that they are often unfamiliar with in the course of normal military training. For diplomatic staff that is normally unaccustomed to working that close to a conflict setting this is disturbing and often a risk that is difficult to take on easily.

As a fix to this problem the Woodrow Wilson study observed that countries that have a planning committee at home to coordinate their actions achieve a higher degree of synchronization than those that do not. They said:

> Field-level PRT planning and organization are directly impacted by the presence (or lack) of a standing institutionalized interagency organization in the donor country’s capital. Countries that have genuinely recognized the need for joint efforts by their development, defence and diplomacy agencies appear to have more success than others. This ‘WOG’ approach to nation building is becoming a salient feature of literature on the subject and gaining traction in a number of countries.\(^\text{112}\)

The study specifically recognized the United States, Canada and Britain for adopting this type of planning function as they “attempt to address the unique bureaucratic needs of planning for, and operating in, post-conflict environments.”\(^\text{113}\) The study cited the Italian government as having a weak level of coordination between the key ministries and a “misunderstanding about the purpose and focus of the PRT”\(^\text{114}\) The greatest degree of integration is recognized as occurring in the British PRT which is led by a three-way committee that must sign-off on decisions and

\(^{112}\) Abbaszadeh, p. 7.

\(^{113}\) Ibid.

\(^{114}\) Ibid.
plans. This committee made up of senior Defence, Foreign Office and DfID leaders operate together to set tasks for the PRT and allocate funding for projects.

Notwithstanding NGO fears of military encroachment of the “humanitarian space” they occupy, the NGO community is dependent upon the military for protection. This combined with the pressure on the military to achieve speedy success through quick impact projects in the effort to garner the cooperation of the population in their region creates a setting of potential frustration for both the military and development staffs and agencies as they compete for the same clients. As well, the Woodrow Wilson report points out there is fear within the NGOs that they may be identified as part of the military force; “While reliant on international military forces to provide a secure environment in which they can operate, NGOs consistently express worries that CIMIC projects implemented by PRTs place their personnel at risk by blurring the distinction between military and civilians.” The report goes on to identify a major challenge of PRT integration (one of many) is to increase interagency cooperation within PRTs, without blurring the civil-military distinction. The German PRT may have the solution to this problem in the way that it conducts business.

The German PRT, which is set up in the northern part of Afghanistan, takes an approach to operations that are a departure from the methods employed by other PRTs, but some might suggest successful. Security conditions are more permissive of this approach to the conduct of business where it would not permit the same approach elsewhere, such as in Kandahar. In addition, and ostensibly to assist in the preservation of “humanitarian space”, the military portion of the PRT does not have sufficient funding to enable it to undertake quick impact projects, their mission is narrowly focused on the task of getting out and talking to the residents of the communities in their region and determining what it is needed to enable development and then pass that information along to the development experts to sort out. This approach to the

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115 Abbaszadeh, p. 12.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
operation of a PRT follows the theory that the US PRT Playbook and the NATO PRT Handbook give as guidance for operations. The challenge of course comes in the implementation phase of the job and the desire to see results from effort and money spent. This desire for results in other PRTs may have contributed to a more hands-on approach than the doctrine may suggest is best.

The Woodrow Wilson report made specific recommendations for the United States to follow to adjust the way that the PRT is organized and operates:

1. The “whole of government” approach should be strengthened by the US government action to integrate various agencies and departments that have responsibility for a part of the PRT;

2. The office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should be better funded and given more control over PRT planning and operations, in a similar manner as the Canadian Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force and the British Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit;

3. Hiring and work practices must reinforce the need for people whose personalities do not become obstacles to progress and attract and reward qualified people to become involved;

4. The US and its international partners should standardize PRT organization and leverage best practices that have been a success for other national PRTs;

5. All PRTs should be civilian-led;118

6. Civilian-led PRTs must be fully supported by the military;

7. Pre-deployment training for PRT personnel should be mandatory, standardized and inter-agency;

8. Deployments should be synchronized across regions so that all the members of the PRT are changing over at the same time. It is important that there be an overlap in the deployments so that it avoids the problem of loss of institutional memory and that the new staff are properly introduced to the Afghans that they will be dealing with and get to know them;

9. Programs that include local stakeholders in decision-making should be strengthened and expanded. The inclusion of local government is an essential in this process; the ultimate goal of PRTs is to improve the ability of that body to make reasoned

118 The Canadian PRT in Kandahar became civilian led as of 2010 and was handed over to the United States for security and operations.
and legitimate decisions that will have positive impact on their community. PRTs should not engage in any arbitrary process of project design and implementation without full participation by local government;

10. Metrics should follow the establishment of objectives, be impact-based, and be measured against defined benchmarks;

11. PRTs should be used as part of a larger set of responses to post-conflict challenges. Analysis of long-term impacts is not yet available due to the relative immaturity of PRTs as a post-conflict tool. The viability of PRTs as a tool outside of Afghanistan or Iraq will require further research; and

12. PRT funding should be appropriated to a common pool and be capable of quick disbursement. Money from the various government departments that have a stake in PRTs should be pooled for allocation where deemed most useful and can be put into use quickly without excessively cumbersome approval processes.  

What do these recommendations mean to PRT organizational structure and operational procedures? The Woodrow Wilson report recommendations listed above are all valid recommendations that are applicable to some degree to all PRTs. Since PRTs are based on the contributing nation’s aid priorities and reflect the degree of capacity and political will on the part of the contributing nation to be involved, there must be some shaping of the PRT structure to reflect that reality. In the case of Afghanistan the contributing governments clearly expressed a desire to improve the capacity to govern at the national and local levels but are limited by the conditions and political will at home; that shapes action on the ground in Afghanistan.

There are other concerns that exist in addition (or counter to) the observations of the Woodrow Wilson report. Specifically, U.S. PRTs have already a significant input in terms of direction from the senior Secretary level from the various government departments that contribute resources. Where this appears to have fallen short, at least in the early days of international action in Afghanistan, is in the actual number of civilian member in the PRTs. Non-military representation has been small in numbers considering the large areas that PRTs must cover and only in recent times has the number slowly been increasing and the civilian control been enlarged. This study has not been able to determine if this is a result of internal pressure at home to get more civilian members into the PRTs or whether it has been an evolutionary progression that has been a gradual build-up in response to a maturation process in the structure. Those

119 Abbaszadeh, p. 15-18.
civilians who are willing to accept the risk of working in Afghanistan may not always be the best qualified to do the job but may be attracted by other financial and career incentives. In the end it will be crucial that the right people be selected for the mission.

The Woodrow Wilson report identified the need for civilian leadership but with full military support. The net effect on the structure that was shown earlier will be likely be minimal. The military must deploy sufficient forces to guarantee some level of protection for the PRT; to do that they will do an assessment of the security threat in the local area and the needs of the PRT for movement outside the confines of the camp where they live and work. As those civilian development coordinators get ‘outside the wire’ more often to do their jobs there will be a requirement to protect them. Not all regions of Afghanistan allow for movement as freely as in the case of the German PRT for instance. In Kandahar, and many other areas of the country, all travel outside the safe area is rigidly controlled and always with armed soldiers and in armoured vehicles like the ones shown earlier.

The study by Carter Malkasian and Gerald Meyerle, conducted in 2007 and 2008, asked two particular and essential questions regarding the effectiveness of PRTs: do PRTs make a difference, in other words, do they make a positive contribution toward stability and development in Afghanistan; and, are PRTs unique, or could another organization fill the PRT’s shoes?¹²⁰ Both of these questions are legitimate for the United States to be able to validate the concept and structure of the organization not to mention justify the enormous resources committed to the 12 PRTs that they operate in Afghanistan.

The two questions were examined in four regions of Afghanistan where American military forces were operating with PRTs and battalion or larger sized military units. The regions were Khost, Kunar, Ghazni and Nuristan. In the course of their research and interviews with military officers, development officials and local Afghani officials and citizens, they were able to draw some conclusions about the effectiveness and necessity of PRTs.

One of the key conclusions of their work is that “For counterinsurgency operations in dangerous areas...PRTs are the name of the game.”\textsuperscript{121} This simple fact is underscored by the counterinsurgency objectives of ISAF and the Afghan government and the experience learned that points to the PRT as the best weapon that is available to use in the counterinsurgency war. A tool of counterinsurgency is development, unfortunately development agencies are not always keen to go into areas of high physical threat. The PRT has the ability to operate in those high threat areas and thus becomes the tool best designed to achieve that objective. “The PRTs have become America’s primary tool for using large-scale reconstruction to improve security in Afghanistan; the executors of the softer side of counterinsurgency.”\textsuperscript{122} The PRT has guns and armoured vehicles that give it the capability to go into unstable regions and by their very presence give a measure of security.

PRTs are counterinsurgency tools and they have two primary means of fulfilling that role: the first is by executing (that is a terse military term to mean ‘get the job done’) reconstruction projects, and the second is by meeting village, district and provincial Afghan leaders.\textsuperscript{123} The physical act of meeting the people who live in the region that the PRT operates in will advance the mission and give the PRT military and development leadership the opportunity to find out what the region needs to get longer term development underway. The American PRTs found that the answer in many of the more remote regions was roads. The ability of people to move around was key to allowing for the shipment of goods and services and to re-establish markets and businesses. In addition there were the obvious things like water supplies, wells, medical needs, schools and other infrastructure projects that the PRT could provide, but in order to get all of those connected, the main asset needed in many areas were good passable roads and bridges. The idea was to pave the way to success. Once villagers were able to see the benefits

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., p. X.

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., p. 1.

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., pp. 6-8.
that development of infrastructure could bring them they were, in many cases, sufficiently
invested in the project that they were willing to defend the work against insurgents.

Having roads in many areas gave the Afghan government the ability to reconnect with people
and re-establish itself as the authority in the region. Having local officials involved with the
PRT, and agencies such as USAID sharing the decision making in regards to what development
was needed gave legitimacy to the government, went a long way to improve governance
capacity. The fear of development agencies that they were being marginalized was a valid
concern but the result of their research indicated that long-term development in secure areas was
still the job of development agencies and NGOs.

The key deductions of the research answered the two questions posed by Malkasian and
Meyerle. First, PRTs make a difference by improving security and strengthening governance in
the three regions that were examined. Second, PRTs are unique in that they are currently the
only tool that can do the work that they do. They are the “build” element of the ISAF clear-
hold-build strategy. Further, the PRT is able to give some degree of assurance that the money
and resources being spent on projects actually goes to the project by being physically present to
be inspect the work and make sure that it meets the standards that were part of the contract. This
reduces the possibility of corruption and the funnelling off of money to corrupt contractors,
officials and insurgents.

Malkasian and Meyerle very much identify PRTs as the pointy edge of the development wedge –
that is to say that PRTs are the leading elements of development in dangerous areas where other
civilian development agencies, like USAID and CIDA, will not go. The influx of a military
force along with a PRT will give increased security (it will not stop all attacks) and start the
process of getting a region back on its feet. Once the essentials are in place and the time is right
the agencies that are the experts at long term development can go to work with the expectation

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124 Ibid., p. 16.
that their efforts will not get destroyed by insurgents or stolen by bandits or that they themselves will be targets for violence or kidnapping.\textsuperscript{125}

Part of the success of PRTs has been to understand the limitations of the organization; to understand what it can do and what it cannot do. Malkasian and Meyerle are able to show that the PRT, as that thin edge of the development wedge, are a first step in the return of a region to stability and rebuilding. The PRT (and the military force that will normally be located with it) is not able to completely stop the violence but will certainly have an effect on the success of the insurgents and their ability to function. Their mere presence will have some mitigating effect on insecurity.

\textit{Summary – PRT Effectiveness}

Markus Gauster is critical of PRTs in that he believes they are not equipped to deal with the drug trade in the country, along with the private armies that are funded by and profit from the poppy fields. As well he believes that they are not meant to conduct kinetic operations and are designed for less dangerous tasks. He specifically refers to the UK PRT in Helmand and the Canadian PRT in Kandahar as examples. Michelle Parker is concerned with funding arrangements for the PRT commanders to use for projects and is concerned about the erosion of NGOs as delivery mechanisms for aid and being replaced by government agencies. She also wants to see better integration of PRTs and war fighters and an increase in the number of CIMIC teams that are part of the PRT. Westerman is concerned that coalition forces are not well suited for development work. He posits that ultimately the Taliban objective is not about land or who dominates it but about the hearts and minds of the Afghan people, and the application of Islamic law.

With significant military and civilian resources committed to rebuilding Afghanistan it is important to have some measure of success that will enable a PRT to identify when it has sufficiently achieved the aims for which it was created and to withdraw to its home nation. NATO has tried to define broad criteria based on the ability of Afghans to be able to defend themselves with viable military and police forces and for there to be people at the local level to

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., pp. 36-40.
form government and bureaucratic structures to serve the needs of the people. Local actor effectiveness is not standardized by any means and is affected by the security level of the area.

The U.S. has developed tools such as the PRT Task Matrix to guide measurement of success, albeit it is in very general terms that are a judgement call by those responsible to carry out the tasks. Academics, such as the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, have made recommendations for the adjustment of structure and operations to increase effectiveness. Malkasian and Meyerle pose two questions as a means of identifying the effectiveness of PRTs to fulfill the security and development task: do they make a positive contribution toward stability and development in Afghanistan; and, are PRTs unique? The answer to both questions drives the organization and deployment of PRTs as the ‘name of the game’.

The next chapter will examine the case of Canada and how it has responded using the whole of government approach to satisfy national interests and what this means specifically for the deployment of a PRT to the Kandahar region.
CHAPTER 6 - PRT AS IMPLEMENTER OF NATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY-
CANADA AS A CASE STUDY

Canada’s national interests and resulting foreign policy are shaped by several competing forces the most important of which is the government’s realization of what they term “a new global distribution of power.” The realization was that Canada was no longer a middle power influence in the world and that relative spending on the military had dropped to record low levels, even in comparison with the Nordic states, which have traditionally been relatively low in comparison with spending by some of Canada’s military allies such as the United States and Britain. Canada’s interests had shifted, as those of the United States shifted, especially in 2001.

The military and strategic gap between the world’s greatest power, the United States, and all the others has widened to unprecedented proportions. As their closest neighbours, Canadians appreciate the generosity of the American people and have witnessed their historic role in reconstructing Western Europe after World War II, creating international institutions such as the World Bank, and, after the Cold War, helping to rebuild the new democracies of Eastern Europe. The agenda of the United States has shifted and sharpened since 9/11, a national trauma for all Americans. As a trusted friend with shared liberal-democratic values, who deeply felt the trauma as well, Canada can and will collaborate with the U.S. on the many international issues where we have common objectives.126

This piece of government foreign policy gives the Canadian government the ability to tell its citizens that it is in Canada’s interests to collaborate with American interests. At the same time there is the stark recognition that increasing trade and maintaining growth in the economy are also primary interests of foreign policy. New economic powers are in the making and Canada has to be both seller and buyer with them to remain significant in the world. Consequently those dual recognitions bring Canadian foreign policy to the point where those interests fuse together in the statement:

the traditional notion of Canada as a middle power is outdated and no longer captures the reality of how power is distributed in the 21st century. If Canada stands idle while the world changes, we can expect our voice in international affairs to diminish. Instead, we will reach out to these emerging powers, both by developing new bilateral ties and by reforming how countries work together across regions to accommodate their needs. Their growing demand for commodities and energy has the potential to give Canada,

with our vast capacity in natural resources, increased economic and strategic leverage. These are essential considerations in developing a strategy for advancing Canada’s interests and values in the future.  

There are two broad objectives of foreign policy: (1) collaborate with our neighbours and friends and (2) take those measures necessary to advance economic welfare in Canada. The government will focus its efforts where it believes it can achieve the best effect for the fulfillment of those interests. The 2005 International Policy Statement, written under the leadership of Prime Minister at the time, Paul Martin, enunciated in very broad terms what Canada’s interests are:

Canadians have a growing stake in international developments. The food we eat, the air we breathe, and our health, safety, prosperity, and quality of life are increasingly affected by what happens beyond our borders. At the same time, much of what we have accomplished at home enables us to contribute to a better world. Though of value in itself, this too is in our interest. A world that is peaceful and prosperous, in which democracy and respect for human rights flourish, is a world of opportunity for Canada and for Canadians.

As well it said:

Our choice is clear: we must be globally active if we are to create the society we want at home.

The International Policy Statement reminded citizens that Canada is not an island unto itself and that events that happen outside its borders affect what happens inside its borders. The quality of the existence inside Canada is affected by the quality of existence outside Canada. As an example of how easily Canada can be affected by events that occur outside, the example of the 2004-2005 SARS medical crisis was cited.

The SARS outbreak highlighted how deeply, widely and quickly an international problem can affect our society, from health to the economy. New policy must consider closely the growing links between what occurs inside and outside our borders, on issues

127 IPS, Overview, p. 2.

128 Ibid.

129 Government of Canada, Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Diplomacy, 2005,
from immigration and human capital development, to fisheries, agriculture and national
defence.\textsuperscript{130}

It is important to recognize that Canada’s national interests are affected by the interests of the
United States; they may not always be the same as the United States but will certainly be
influenced by them. Recall that one of the priorities of Canadian foreign policy is to collaborate
with its neighbours. Canada as the northern neighbour of the United States has been closely
allied with it militarily, economically, culturally and in many other ways for a significant period
of time. The national interests of the U.S., while they may be wide ranging internationally, are
also fairly simple in some respects. The U.S. President summed up the security interests, in his
speech to the class of the West Point Military Academy in 2009, this way:

I am convinced that our security is at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is the
epicentre of the violent extremism practiced by al Qaeda. It is from here that we were
attacked on 9/11, and it is from here that new attacks are being plotted as I speak. This is
no idle danger; no hypothetical threat. In the last few months alone, we have
apprehended extremists within our borders who were sent here from the border region of
Afghanistan and Pakistan to commit new acts of terror. This danger will only grow if the
region slides backwards and al Qaeda can operate with impunity. We must keep the
pressure on al Qaeda, and to do that, we must increase the stability and capacity of our
partners in the region.\textsuperscript{131}

The national security interests of the United States include the reduction in the capability of
terrorists to pose a threat to the U.S. and its citizens abroad. The question then becomes, how
does this concern for what happens outside the borders of the United States affect Canadians and
their peace and prosperity? How does it translate to action both inside and outside Canada’s
border? How will Canadians know when their foreign policy is effective, or will they know at
all? To answer those questions is at the heart of the International Policy Statement. All four
portions of the Policy Statement talk in general terms about meeting the challenges presented by
the new conditions posed by globalization and a post 9/11 world where security is key,
especially to the United States. Here is a brief summary of the four portions of the IPS:

1. Diplomacy

\textsuperscript{130} IPS, Diplomacy, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{131} Speech by U.S. President Barak Obama at West Point Military Academy, December 2, 2009.
The Department of Foreign Affairs is the government agency responsible for the implementation of foreign policy objectives, but in the new IPS age they must work with others to accomplish their mission. Foreign Affairs has never worked in a vacuum but the department has now the challenge of integrating other key departments into not just policy but plans as well. The IPS gives the department a big job when it tasks them to develop this sort of plan:

our strategy is to develop a diplomacy that is adapted to a globalized world. This “new diplomacy” will reflect the fact that our domestic and international priorities are increasingly interconnected and that success demands building wide and flexible networks at home and abroad to foster innovative partnerships. The Government has already, in Budget 2005, taken important steps to reinvest in Canada’s diplomatic role internationally.\(^{132}\)

As a practical approach to the implementation of that goal the government decided to focus its diplomatic efforts in four key areas:\(^{133}\)

1. fostering the North American partnership by supporting the revitalization of our partnership with the United States and expanding cooperation with Mexico, exploring trilateral initiatives, and devoting renewed attention to the Arctic;

2. making a distinctive contribution to Canada’s efforts to help build a more secure world, in particular with regard to failed and fragile states, counterterrorism and organized crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and human security;

3. promoting a new multilateralism that emphasizes global responsibilities, and a reformed multilateral system that tackles major global issues, including the environment and health, by putting results ahead of process; and

4. realigning bilateral relationships and building new networks (beyond North America) key to both our interests and values, taking into account the rise of new major players.\(^{134}\)

These wide ranging goals would require significant effort on the part of more that the Department of Foreign Affairs, they involved all aspects of Canada’s relationship with the

\(^{132}\) IPS, Diplomacy, p.1.

\(^{133}\) Ibid.

\(^{134}\) IPS, pp.3-4.
United States, and reached south to Mexico, a concern of the United States as well as looking outward to those problem areas that demanded attention, principally in regions that were home to terror threats. Trade and exports are never far from the thoughts of the government and this fundamental shines through in objective number four by building new trade networks to capture the success of the growth of new emerging economies such as China, India and others.

2. Defence

The international missions assigned to the military, in addition to the normal range of defence of Canada tasks, include the ability to operate around the globe for limited periods of time. Interestingly, while the Prime Minister mentioned the employment of a Provincial Reconstruction Team in the introduction and overview of the International Policy Statement, the Defence portion makes little reference to this task, but rather talks about an enhanced capability for the Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART).135 For the military the main emphasis is squarely placed on the need for an internal reorganization to allow it to better meet the diverse challenges that are anticipated to occur in the 21st century.

One of the subtitles early on in the portion on Defence clearly sums up the state of affairs: “The Canadian Forces in an Unpredictable World: Providing Security at Home and Abroad.” How it provides security at home and especially abroad is where the details become a bit vague, and it is at that point that the problem shifts to the military to make sense of it through a reshaping of the Forces internally via regrouping existing resources into effective task forces capable of rapid deployment that can be launched at a multitude of tasks in an environment that is characterized by the term ‘asymmetric threat.’

Recognizing that there is little threat to Canada at home, the government has looked outside its borders and concluded that,

Security in Canada ultimately begins with stability abroad. While we need to be selective and strategic when deploying military forces overseas, focusing on where our interests

135 IPS, Defence, p.31.
are at stake and where we can make a meaningful contribution, the Canadian Forces must retain a spectrum of capabilities to operate with our allies on international missions.

This is especially the case in failed and failing states. Canadians are proud of the role their military has played in protecting people who cannot protect themselves, in delivering humanitarian assistance to those in need, and in rebuilding shattered communities and societies. The Canadian Forces will focus their expeditionary capabilities on operations in these states, including in a leadership role when it is in Canada’s interest and ability to do so. In these demanding and complex environments, where civilians mix with friendly, neutral and opposing forces, often in urban areas, our military must be prepared to perform different missions – humanitarian assistance, stabilization operations, combat – all at the same time.  

Canada’s interests are met through the provision of stability, not just inside Canada, but more importantly, outside its borders. The Canadian military must deal with the evolution of conflict that has occurred since the end of the Cold War moving away from classical force on force type of conflict. One of the conclusions is that the military needs to be reformed to be able to operate not only as a peacekeeping force but, as a combat force and to some degree a humanitarian force at the same time. Afghanistan poses all those challenges for the Canadian Forces. Exactly how this renewed emphasis on the military’s capability translates into specific plans, programs and resulting actions is the problem for the Forces to solve. The Provincial Reconstruction Team appears to hold the answer to the problem.

3. Development

The government’s position on priorities for development assistance is tightly linked to the United Nations Millennium Development Goals and recognizes that “security and development are inextricably linked.” The hope expressed in the policy is that effective development will improve security and prevent the decline to chaos for failing states. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) as the dispenser of Canadian aid, recognizes the policy of the United Nations and agrees that,

136 IPS, Defence, p. 2-3.

137 IPS, Development, p. 1.

138 Ibid.
Development has to be the first line of defence for a collective security system that takes prevention seriously. Combating poverty will not only save millions of lives but also strengthen States’ capacity to combat terrorism, organized crime and proliferation. Development makes everyone more secure.\textsuperscript{139}

The challenge faced by Canada is in the provision (or lack of) security and what that means to development. Can sustainable development take place without a minimal level of security? Suffice to say at this point that sustainable development is very difficult to implement and support without some measure of security in place to allow the people on the receiving end of development to go about their daily lives without fear for their safety. It is also recognized that lasting security comes about because of sustainable development.

The International Policy Statement promised a major renovation to the way that CIDA dispenses aid and looked to reduce the number of bilateral aid recipients collecting Canadian dollars or goods. The criteria for aid would be based on three general principles: (1) level of poverty, (2) the recipients ability to use aid effectively, and (3) sufficient concentration of Canadian resources and presence to add value to the recipient population.\textsuperscript{140} The government will continue to give aid to those countries where it is deemed in the national interest to do so, especially in the case of failed or failing states where the consequences of the decline will only incur greater costs to fix the problem later-on.

Figure 1, is a graphical depiction of the influences at work affecting Canadian foreign policy. Canada’s interests, or expectations, are based on the domestic impact of events that occur both inside and outside the borders of the nation that will have impact within. To manage those interests or expectations the government has adopted the WOG approach to combine the resources of several government departments to bring about the best possible solution. Earlier we saw the WOG policy reflected in the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) that is operated by Canada in Afghanistan. The PRT is a relatively inexpensive method to bring about quick results for both the donor and aid recipient. PRTs form part of the overall government plan for

\textsuperscript{139} IPS, Development, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., p. 23.
development assistance. The key feature of the PRT is that it combines both security and development features together into one joint team that is deployable into an area that the government selects as worthy of assistance in accordance with the three criteria listed earlier.

FIGURE 13 – CANADIAN INTERESTS

CIDA, as the Canadian agency responsible to coordinate Canadian aid, has provided significant funding to projects in Afghanistan that directly impact the governance and capacity building aims of the Afghan government, education, health, infrastructure and other objectives that have been identified as critical to the success of the nation building efforts that have been underway since the Taliban were removed from power. CIDA provides direct funding to projects or partners-up with agencies and NGOs that are already at work but require additional resources to accomplish their objectives. Appendix 1 identifies the Canadian projects that have been undertake or funded since 2001. Canada has committed to an enormous amount of activity that directly impacts the ability of Afghanistan to eventually function as an independent and sovereign state. Notwithstanding all the time, money and blood spent by Canada in pursuit of stability in that country, the point at which some measure of success can be judged to have occurred is still elusive.
4. Commerce

While the International Policy Statement section on Commerce is aimed at the business of doing business, the emphasis here on national interests becomes very clear when the trade values are revealed in table “Selected Trade and Investment Partners.” 141 The United States is Canada’s best customer purchasing $348 billion of Canada’s $411 billion of exports. This is 84% of all exports leaving Canada. Canada’s economic interests are clearly tied to trade with the United States. In comparison, China, a rising economic power, is Canada’s number four trading partner with only 1.6% of exports. This gives a bit more emphasis to the Prime Ministers comment in the Introduction section where he says “all Canadians understand that our most important relationship is with the United States.” 142 Not all of Canada’s interests are entirely related to trade, but it becomes clear in the four parts of the IPS that trade is key to the continued prosperity of Canada, thus it is in Canadian national interest to continue actively trading with not only the United States but other customers around the globe. What does Canada need to do to make sure the flow of trade to the U.S. continues? This question plays heavily in the background of decisions and policy direction in the Diplomacy, Defence and Development portions of the IPS. Therefore, the interests of the United States are by deduction also the interests of Canada. This deduction affects all aspects of Canada’s foreign policy and the implementation of the policy.

Criticism of the International Policy Statement.

In a general sense the informed criticism of the IPS was limited to the same observations that political commentators and analysts have been making for decades, only now instead of having to read several White Papers issued separately they had the convenience of reviewing four policy documents at one time. One of the most scathing criticisms of the IPS was provided by Kim Richard Nossal whose commentary article entitled “The Responsibility to be Honest” said a great deal. His criticism assessed the goals for international involvement as being well beyond the actual capability of the government to deliver. He said:

141 IPS, Commerce, p.10.

142 IPS, Introduction.
In short, the responsibilities agenda, if one were to take it seriously, commits Canada, and thus Canadians, to a vast project of global reform, change and commitment. Any one of the Responsibilities – let alone all five together – would overwhelm any government in Ottawa that tried to embrace them. But Canadians can rest easy – the extravagant ideals articulated in the International Policy Statement are in fact not to be taken seriously. Rather, these ideals are nothing more than feel-good and sound-good rhetoric spun by accomplished speechwriters to be put in the mouth of a politician who appears to be addicted to self-referential and self-congratulatory rhetoric that can be fed to a populace that is itself deeply addicted to hearing flattering portrayals of Canada’s role in the world.\(^{143}\)

This less than flattering appraisal of the IPS’s goals dismisses the bulk of the policy as self-aggrandizing and with little possibility of fulfillment. The assessment of the policy by David Bercuson and Denis Stairs is more balanced but still points out the flaws when they say:

>The government has made a serious effort in the IPS to address Canada’s place in the world realistically, but there are still slips of rhetorical self-indulgence here and there. Some of the policy objectives are too ambitious by half, or by three-quarters, or more. In many cases, the real costs and sacrifices that would be involved in pursuing seriously the goals that the government has defined are concealed ignored or underestimated. In the service of miscellaneous political purposes at home, the accomplishments of the past are sometimes grossly inflated.\(^{144}\)

These veteran academics, and highly respected commentators, give credit where due and recognize one of the underlying goals of a foreign policy, that being to send a message to other states that watch what Canada does. “The IPS, after all, is as much about “selling” Canada to governments abroad and citizens at home as it is about policy implementation.”\(^{145}\) The IPS was sending a signal to the U.S. and others that Canada was getting its ‘act’ in order and was getting back to work internationally. The government was making big promises but the challenge would be, as pointed out by Bercuson and Stairs, to fulfill even a fraction of the policy pledge. The

\(^{143}\) Kim Richard Nossal, *The Responsibility to be Honest*, in David J. Bercuson and Denis Stairs (eds.) *In the Canadian Interest? Assessing Canada’s International Policy Statement*, (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, October 2005), pp. 40-43.


Canada First Defence Strategy, which could be considered a subsequent white paper on Defence and which was released in 2008, reinforces the need for the CF to be capable of deploying anywhere in Canada to meet a domestic threat (natural or man-made crisis) or indeed on the planet to work in a multi-lateral setting. This pulls back from the IPS pledge to work unilaterally where feasible, outside of Canada. There is also a reinforcement of the WOG method of business with the military frequently playing the lead role and forming the core of the government’s approach to dealing with crises. This may be a lesson already learned from international operations in Afghanistan in the 2005-2008 time frame.

What does come through loud and clear in the IPS is the plan to have several key departments concerned with foreign policy and plans work together to achieve better results from money and effort put towards a difficult job. The term “3-D” became part of the jargon used by government to describe how foreign policy would be delivered; it also became part of organization of the Canadian PRT in Afghanistan.

Denis Stairs weighed in again with a larger set of concerns, or really what should be considered warnings of the pitfalls associated with foreign policy in action, in his 2006 O.D. Skelton Memorial Lecture. He lectured on the conduct of foreign policy and some of the traps that may encountered along the route. He really sounded a cautionary note for those in charge of the policy offering the benefit of his vast experience in observing policy and its makers. He says, “The conduct of foreign policy is – or ought to be – a practical, utilitarian activity.” From a practical perspective there is ‘policy’ and then there is ‘policy implementation’.

The devil is usually in the details and in the case of foreign policy it is no different as Stairs says,

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146 Government of Canada, Canada First Defence Strategy, May 2008 (note that the document itself is undated but the CF website where it was obtained shows that it was released to the public on 12 May 2008). Accessed at http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/focus/first-premier/defstra-stradef-eng.asp.

Figuring out when, and how, the policy itself can be made to work is the hard part. And no one should think for a second that defending foreign policy initiatives by linking them to good intentions will ever be justification enough. In public policy, efficacy is measured by effectiveness. Other measures can be politically convenient, but they usually amount to self-serving blather.¹⁴⁸

He is quick to focus on what matters to Canada in foreign policy and says, “The North American environment is really what matters to us most.”¹⁴⁹ The North American environment is all about trade with the United States and all of those things that it takes to make sure that the flow of trade from the north to the south is not interrupted. “In short we lay down cosmetic claims to superior virtue, while concentrating our most expert minds on what it really takes to fill our pocketbooks.”¹⁵⁰ Stairs’ conclusion that foreign policy and economic policy are interdependent needs to be foremost in the thinking of government leaders during the explanation of foreign policy to Canadians. In addition to practical economic factors there remains the issue of Canadian influence globally and Canada’s diminishing power outside its borders.

The fact remains that a great deal has been made in recent years of our desire to rescue failed and fragile states, and to do so in task force style – with the help, that is, of the “3-D’s” or the “3-D’s and T”, or even “whole of government” operations, and even more recently still (it is hard to keep up!), “all of government” operations.¹⁵¹ “In National Defence they prefer to talk more modestly of “three block wars,” but the general conception is much the same. The premise is that by pulling several levers at once – manipulating a number of variables simultaneously – we can fundamentally transform the society, the polity, the economy, even the culture, of communities we target.”¹⁵² Stairs has described the fundamental idea of the PRT mission.

¹⁴⁸ Stairs, p. 2.
¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 3.
¹⁵⁰ Ibid.
¹⁵¹ Tamas, pp. 29-32.
¹⁵² Stairs, p. 4.
Denis Stairs proposes what he calls the *Comprehensive Social Engineering Model* as a construct that describes the actualization of foreign policy, in this case by Canada, as it translates to activity in another state. The model describes the actions that must be taken by a state to correct a situation in another state that has failed or is fragile. His description of the process goes something like this:

State X has failed, or is fragile and therefore in danger of failing, or to an unreasonably extreme degree is oppressively constructed at home and malevolently intentioned abroad. It therefore needs to be fixed. This requires first that its citizens be made secure from military menace. The polity itself then needs to be democratized, and buttressed by the rule of law and respect for human rights. An honestly-administered physical and social service infrastructure is also required, with decent roads, schools and hospitals prominently included. Gender equality is an essential pre-requisite. Education must also be universalized. A growing economy producing benign goods and services with reasonably full employment is vital, not only because the edifice as a whole cannot be sustained without adequate economic resources, but also because unemployed young males are a menace and need to be distracted from their ominously mischievous diversions by having something more useful and rewarding to do. If such conditions are satisfactorily met, a radical politics can be avoided, and a secularized politics of compromise and tolerance – a politics of amicable pluralism, a politics, in short, like Canada's – will take its place.\footnote{Stairs, pp. 4-5.}

Stairs points at the psychology of being Canadian and the need to be seen to be doing good things in the world. This combined with wholly practical matters of modern life determines national actions that he says strike a chord which reinforces that psychology. He says, “The enterprises we undertake are elective – ‘voluntarist.’ That being so, we can much more easily pretend in our operations overseas than in contexts closer to home that our performance is a function, not of our interests, but of our nature, our culture, our values.”\footnote{Ibid., p. 3.} As a result this manifests itself in certain beliefs or expectations of national virtue, he says, “All this allows us to claim that what’s in the enlightened interest of the international community at large is in the Canadian interest too.”\footnote{Ibid.}
Stairs’ *Comprehensive Social Engineering Model* has some problems that are built in and need to be identified. Stairs does this as part of the way of explaining his model; these are his cautionary words to the policy makers in Canada when planning to work outside the country. He cites five problems: (1) the model is static; (2) the model calls for more than we are prepared to do; (3) the model requires our doing things we don’t know how to do; (4) the model requires that we do things that run counter to our public philosophy; and (5) the model requires us to be better briefed than we are.

After identifying potential shortcomings with his model Stairs gives some possible solutions (he terms them “exhortations”) that should be kept in mind when planning and executing foreign policy in failed states:

1. Downgrade the *Comprehensive Social Engineering Model* as a framework for action,

2. Strengthen our intelligence analysis capacities in a way that will allow us to do our own homework before embarking on high cost and life-threatening interventions abroad,

3. In specific contexts, never include in our lists of purposes abroad objectives that we know we cannot possibly accomplish,

4. Never assume that others want what we want, especially when we know them to be operating at very different levels of material wealth, and under the influence of cultural, religious and other traditions that depart fundamentally from our own,

5. As a corollary to Exhortations 3 and 4, we should never forget that ways of doing politics and economics, and of conducting family and other social relationships, are deeply imbedded phenomena,

6. In the same vein, we need to remember that attempting to propagate our way of life abroad is an imperial enterprise – and no less so because we claim that our purposes are guided by what we regard as universal principles,

7. Coming closer to home, our political leaderships, and more especially the manipulative political operators, by whom they are most immediately staffed, should be wary of assuming that their intricate knowledge of what drives politics in Canada equips them to understand what drives politics abroad.

156 Stairs, pp. 7-8.
(8) In whatever overseas social engineering we do decide to undertake, we should remember to tailor the effort to the value of our real objectives,

(9) Avoid falling victim to the over-generalizations of social science,

(10) Whatever the domestic political incentive(s), avoids criticising your allies – or even your adversaries – gratuitously or ostentatiously, and

(11) If, in deference to the Comprehensive Social Engineering Model, you really do commit to a multi-dimensional programme of action, then do it properly and responsibly.  

Stairs’ list of exhortations is a practical list of the do’s and don’ts of foreign policy implementation that he endorses to the politicians and bureaucrats that actually make policy and plans. His Comprehensive Social Engineering Model describes the Canadian involvement in Afghanistan and potentially other regions of the world that are experiencing a similar fate. Canada was certainly not shirking its responsibility in the selection of Kandahar as a place to work as part of the ISAF coalition. As Kenneth Holland pointed out,

By selecting Kandahar as the site of its Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in 2005, Canada chose the largest role possible for itself as an ally of the United States in its effort to neutralize Afghanistan as a base for international terrorism. Canada’s prestige as a member of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and a major donor to the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan was substantially enhanced by its fateful decision to make its stand in Kandahar, where its efforts were leveraged by its close collaboration with the United States.158

Canada’s performance in the Kandahar region is fairly well known, regrettably (arguably mostly) through that casualties that occur as part of engaging in combat and development in a dangerous area. The Government of Canada, in 2007, commissioned a panel of experts to review the Canadian military and development mission in Afghanistan and to make recommendations concerning the way ahead beyond the February 2009 time frame which had become the target for the Government to end the main mission and to look at withdrawing the military home. The Government was keen to have an independent review of the mission and for it to make

157 Stairs, pp. 9-10.

158 Holland, p. 276.
recommendations for the government to pursue. The Panel realized all too well the need for
Canada to be an international actor and that sentiment is reflected in the comment in the report
that “Canada is a wealthy G8 country; our good fortune and standing impose on us both authority
and obligations in global affair(s).” This agrees precisely with the policy written in the
International Policy Statement of the Government of Canada in 2005 that determined the need
for Canada to be an international actor in order to not be marginalized by the international
community and especially the United States. Involvement in Afghanistan was necessary from
three perspectives: first, relations with the United States; second, support for the United Nations
and Canada’s long history of peacekeeping and third, Canada’s membership in NATO since its
inception. The bloody nose that the Canadian military took at Operation Medusa in 2006 was an
awakening for the country that had not seen significant actual battle since the Korean War. This
was if anything the final realization that Afghanistan was not peacekeeping in the sense that had
been the national expectation for decades but it was now real combat, with all of the
complications and casualties that battle brings. A year later, in late 2007, and with the list of
casualties getting longer, the Independent Panel was charged with looking at the way-ahead.

The Independent Panel appointed by the Government of Canada in late 2007, and headed by
John Manley (the report is commonly referred to as the Manley Report), visited Afghanistan and
received input from hundreds of sources, both in Afghanistan and at home in Canada, before
distilling it’s results down to a set of recommendations. There were five key recommendations
for the Government to implement in both policy areas and in terms of military equipment and
manpower. The central theme of the report balanced the need to recognize that ‘fixing’
Afghanistan is not entirely possible in either the short-term or by foreign forces. The job entails
all of the requisite aid and security work but with a close eye on the governance capacity issue in
the development of an Afghan government along with the security forces capable of eventually
providing for the security of the nation on its own.  

159 Government of Canada, Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, January
p. 32.

160 Ibid., pp. 34-39.
Canada, along with the other ISAF troop contributing countries were keen to see the job done and for a level of stability to be achieved that would allow for the orderly withdrawal home without Afghanistan quickly devolving into the chaos and depravity that was there in 2001 under the Taliban regime. The Panel said in the final report, “We believe that Canada’s role in Afghanistan should give greater emphasis to diplomacy, reconstruction and governance and that the military mission should shift increasingly towards the training of the Afghan Nations Security Forces.”\textsuperscript{161} This, while being a statement of the obvious longer-term intent, was also couched in the more practical realization that the security in the Kandahar region was poor in 2007 and that the insurgency was far from conquered. The Canadian military force was relatively small and was responsible for security in a region of about one million inhabitants. The Canadian military numbered only about 2500 and were divided into a Mechanized Battle Group, a Provincial Reconstruction Team and an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team. Included with that total was the all of the administrative people and resources at the Kandahar Airfield needed to resupply and look after the troops in the field. Actual troops outside of the Kandahar Airfield were spread perilously thin.

The Report identified five areas of work that needed to be improved: (1) diplomatic measures designed to get the ISAF mission better organized and coordinated between the UN and NATO and to resist the influence of unwanted elements from Pakistan in the form of foreign fighters and weaponry that they bring with them; (2) shift emphasis from security on the part of the Battle Group to training Afghan military and Police to allow them to take on the job themselves; (3) ramp-up reconstruction and development efforts for both short and long term needs; (4) assess the effectiveness of Canadian contributions against the objectives of the Afghanistan Compact, an agreement struck in 2006 outlining five-year goals for development; and (5) educate the Canadian public at home about national objectives so that citizens can make informed opinions and express those same to the Government.\textsuperscript{162}

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., p. 37.

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., pp.37-38.
The Panel’s report, while hopeful in tone, was consistent in making its comments within the realistic acknowledgment that all outcomes were security dependent. That is, they were not guaranteed to any extent unless the security of the region were to be improved to the point that development efforts could see success and that the Afghan security forces (military and police) could enforce the rule of law on their own, and they needed to be able to provide for the rights of the citizens consistent with international standards, and not return to conditions that were seen under the Taliban regime pre-2001.

The WOG effort was emphasized in the Panel report calling for both leadership on the part of the Prime Minister to set an example for the rest of the government and public to take notice of, and the creation of both a cabinet committee to oversee the government involvement in Afghanistan and a task force of government departments that had an interest in Afghanistan. All of this new coordination within government would be likely to see a greater return for the lives and resources that had been committed so far and was likely going to be committed in the days to come before the end of the mission, whenever that was.\textsuperscript{163} There is no clear end to Canadian involvement in Afghanistan right now. The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence released a report in 2010 that supported the Manley Report and supported continued national involvement in Afghanistan post-2011 in training and mentoring roles for security and police forces.\textsuperscript{164}

\textit{3-D Challenges}

The 3-D structure is not without its own issues to be considered. The IPS lacks sufficient detail to give observers a sense of how “3-Dness” will be accomplished. The devil is again in the details, so, it is one thing to say that Defence, Foreign affairs and CIDA will work together towards a common objective, but the ‘how’ part is where the IPS leaves off and fails to provide a level of explanation for this new way of doing business in the government. Michel Fortman and Frederic Merand pose excellent questions in their analysis of the 3-D concept of operations

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., p. 34.

within the Defence, Foreign Affairs and CIDA departments. They ask, and offer solutions to, three key questions:

1. Who will be in charge? While Foreign Affairs has been given the lead in Ottawa for 3-D structures such as START and the GPSF, the Afghan experience suggests that leadership on the ground is more likely to be taken by the military, which has the resources and the staff. This decoupling suggests that little thought was given to accountability. It is essential that an integrated 3-D command and control structure be more explicitly laid out.

2. How can [the] development, diplomacy and defence departments coordinate their action? Judging from the IPS, it is not at all clear that coordination mechanisms have been designed to ensure that 3-D action is efficiently carried out. In Canada, as in other countries, security policy is rife with institutional tensions. Can we simply assume that, because FAC, DND, and CIDA meet regularly to discuss START issues, or because a few department experts and a diplomat are assigned to a PRT, decision making and implementation will proceed smoothly?

3. What is the objective of 3-D action? It is not easy to find coherence amongst development programs, which aim at long term reconstruction; military tactics, which aim at short term stabilization; and foreign policy objectives, which are supposed to follow Canada’s strategic purposes in the region. If 3-D structures do not develop their own language and their own corporate priorities, there is a risk that they will fall prey to the short-termism of political decisions made in synch with the “crisis of the month.”

The 3-D way of doing business internationally saw its genesis in the (what has come to be called “failed”) Canadian mission in Somalia in 1992-1993. Notwithstanding the obvious and well documented individual failures that occurred there were organizational successes. They were not well publicized at the time but have been recorded through the telling of the story. Grant Dawson tells the story of Canada’s participation in the U.S.-led mission to Somalia, a failed state in chaos

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166 This refers to the Global Peace and Security Fund, a Government of Canada project designed to provide financial and operational resources to facilitate timely, effective and accountable conflict prevention, crisis response, peace operations, civilian protection and stabilization interventions in fragile states. Information on the Fund is available from DFAIT at [http://www.international.gc.ca/START-GTSR/gpsf-fpsm.aspx](http://www.international.gc.ca/START-GTSR/gpsf-fpsm.aspx).

with no functioning government and under the control of several competing factions. The purpose here is not to retell the story of the Canadian mission that started in late 1992, but to highlight a key lesson of that mission. In summary, the mission commander determined that the best plan, considering the limited forces that he possessed and the number of weapons that existed in the region of Beledweyne, was a “hearts and minds” operation and that it was the only method that could be employed to gain any degree of security in the region and to allow NGOs any hope or degree of success.

A liaison officer to the NGOs was appointed and met with them regularly to determine their needs and to coordinate their local actions as much as possible. The military conducted round-the-clock patrolling and attempted to limit the number of weapons that were in the hands of local militias. They banned weapons that were mounted in vehicles, (these were called “technicals”) and tried to convince the local people that life in the region would improve if they were provide a degree of cooperation. They established a working dialogue with the citizens and leaders in the region and acted very much in a CIMIC role. “Arms control, patrolling, and unceasing vigilance yielded security sufficient for humanitarian operations and the winning of hearts and minds.”

The plan used in 1992-1993 is the underpinning of the approach used by Canada and other ISAF partners in Afghanistan in the attempt to help that failed state. A program of contact with local leaders through active patrolling and involvement on the part of CIMIC teams and to provide help to the local leaders to determine what their development needs where and how to get started. The Canadian soldiers in Beledweyne carried out what are now called quick-impact projects, helping to re-establish some of the destroyed or decaying infrastructure such as schools, roads and bridges as well as helping with local medical needs and procuring uniforms for the local police force. Initially there were no representatives from the Canadian Foreign Affairs Department or CIDA, but the mission commander was able to gain help through the Canadian High Commissioner in Kenya who was able to lend assistance on a regular basis by assigning a


169 Dawson, p. 40.
political and development advisor who was able to work with the mission several days each month.

This was the 3-D and PRT processes in a very early incarnation and much of the credit for the development must go to the mission commander Colonel Serge Labbe (now retired Brigadier-General). The U.N. was watching and the 2000 Brahimi Report suggested that here was a need for an “overarching command and control structure that uses humanitarian aid as a tool in the toolbox of conflict management” This led to the establishment of Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) teams within UN peacekeeping missions.170

*Canadian Forces Chief of Review Services Report - Key Findings*

In 2007 the Canadian Forces Chief of Review Services (CRS) organization conducted a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of Canada’s Provincial Reconstruction Team and was overall critical of the lack of essential policy and training, along with the lack of a cohesive plan and actions from the 3-D components. One of the key findings of the review was that the military portion of the PRT lacks doctrine, training standards and a plan for the PRT to be an effective and coordinated part of the ISAF counterinsurgency efforts. They concluded that the PRT is so new to other government departments that they have not become adjusted to being part of the organization and consequently have not trained or integrated effectively and developed into a functioning part of the structure. Termed a “non-doctrinal ad hoc construct” the PRT suffers from a severe shortage of government direction, or what is referred to in military parlance as a ‘mission.’171

Some of the struggles with fulfilment of the PRT concept were serious flaws that inform the level of success of the PRT as a tool of government foreign policy. The challenge in the analysis is in the objectives of the government, in this case as given in the International Policy Statement

170 Fortman, et al, p. 44.

Some of the developmental challenges of the PRT, from the perspective of the Canadian Forces, include:

1. There was an initial lack of coherent vision of what the Kandahar PRT (KPRT) was meant to accomplish, and how objectives would be attained. Complicating this lack of a coherent vision was the fact that within the CF, the KPRT was never universally viewed as a key counterinsurgency tool, and it does not have a basis in CF doctrine. The KPRT was initially shaped to a large extent by the vision, objectives and concept of operations of successive Commanding Officers and supplemented by the Government of Canada Campaign Plan, the Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF-A) Base plan, and other strategic and operational-level directives.

2. Training for this mission was hampered by an inability to gather the WOG team together at the same time for pre-deployment training.

3. There is a lack of CF counterinsurgency doctrine, which adds to the problem of where the KPRT fits into the larger plan and their role in the counterinsurgency campaign.

4. A key component of the ISAF counterinsurgency plan was Information Operations and the KPRT role in this was not fully understood nor exploited. The KPRT lacked the ability to handle intelligence information that was collected and thus it was not sent to the appropriate agency in time to be useful.

5. While the KPRT has developed over time into an effective tactical (low-level) structure there are challenges that exist within Canada where interdepartmental committees and working groups have been created to facilitate policy integration and resolution of emerging issues.

6. There is good evidence of KPRT activities and progress in Kandahar to accomplish ANDS goals but there is no method of determining the actual influence that the KPRT has had on development in the area.

7. Better preparation is required for Military members to interact closely with staff from other government departments, non-governmental organizations and other civilian organizations. This requires new skill sets and consideration of selection criteria for key interagency positions. ¹⁷²

While the report focuses on what the Canadian military has to do to become more effective at PRT operations, it is clear from the wording and tone of the report that these shortcoming apply as well to the other government departments that contribute to the KPRT. The report comments that efforts were commenced by all to rectify these deficiencies. One of the other issues that

¹⁷² CRS, pp. iv-vi.
becomes important as the mission goes forward is the creation of some form of measurement to attempt to determine effectiveness, and if this is possible does it provide a means to determine the future for provincial reconstruction teams.

As was discussed earlier, performance measurement for a provincial reconstruction team that is working in the midst of an active and determined counterinsurgency is likely to be a challenge that defies detailed evaluation. However, the intent is for the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) to be used as the yardstick by the international community to measure success. This, combined with the United Nations Millennium Development Goals and the 2006 Afghanistan Compact identify broad goals for development in Afghanistan. The ANDS is focussed on three Pillars – (1) Security, (2) Governance, Rule of Law & Human Rights, and (3) Economic and Social Development. There are five cross-cutting themes that impact all three Pillars: gender equality, counter narcotics, regional cooperation, anti-corruption and the environment.

The challenge is to measure success or identify a lack of success. The CRS report says, “It is too early to tell whether the KPRT is a cost-effective way of supporting the achievement of Canada’s national objectives in Afghanistan.” What it recognizes is the complexity of the security and political environments in which it operates. The report concludes:

There is good visibility of KPRT activities and progress in Kandahar in achieving effects as laid out in the ANDS. However, the complexity of the situation in Kandahar is such that the extent to which the KPRT itself can claim credit for progress is still difficult to measure. The task of isolating KPRT effects achieved from those resulting from non-KPRT activities, such as CIDA or USAID projects that would have been initiated regardless of the existence of the KPRT remains a challenge.

Identifying the metrics of PRT operations defies success; success for the Government of Canada is found in the achievement of very broadly based goals detailed in the International Policy Statement. It is straightforward to keep track of activities but complicated to keep track of effects. The CRS report recommended the development of metrics to measure the effects of

174 Ibid., p. 25.
reconstruction and development efforts with emphasis on KPRT activities. It was, however, unable to say how this was to be attempted.

**Whole of Government Involvement in Kandahar PRT**

The Chief of Review Services report defined “whole of government” action as one where a government actively uses formal and/or informal networks across the different agencies within that government to coordinate the design and implementation of the range of interventions that the government’s agencies will be making in order to increase the effectiveness of those interventions in achieving the desired objectives.  

The actualization of the whole of government plan for the PRT ran into some early roadblocks where the federal government departments (other than the CF) were asked to move outside their comfort zone and to conduct planning and training to be part of the PRT mission. This was slow to get underway due principally to the lack of a planning capability. The CRS Review report said:

Much of this shortfall can be attributed to individual departments having different resource allocation priorities. Very few departments and agencies outside of DND have adequate human resources to allocate to a strategic planning cell, or even to what the military would call “operational” level planning staffs.

Daniel Sing, a Canadian military officer, studied the Whole of Government (WOG) approach to international involvement in detail and worked to identify some of the key elements of the WOG way of providing for coordinated actions.

Coordinated actions by various departments of governments are not necessarily new concepts that should surprise anyone. It is common sense that for a government to be efficient and effective that it needs to coordinate its internal actions to see that result. Daniel Sing points out that internal government coordination (not necessarily always Canadian) has existed since Roman times; so why is the introduction of a WOG way of doing business so radical to the

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175 CRS, p. 21.

176 Ibid., p. 22.
bureaucratic mind; why is this not the logical thing to do?  And why is this only obliquely referred to in the 2005 International Policy Statement?

Sing argues that the Government of Canada does not possess an inter-departmental planning process that would enable it to think strategically across the many departments that make up the government. He cites his work as a senior officer in the Canadian Forces and the opinions of senior military leaders in the wake of efforts at a WOG approach to Canadian work in Afghanistan, earthquake relief in Haiti in early 2010 and the provision of security at the 2010 Winter Olympics in British Columbia. Not all efforts have flowed smoothly because of a lack of a strategic plan.

Lessons learned at war have shown the need for planning as a key element of success in the art of war. The military are fanatical about planning and employ large groups of staff officers who have been well trained to analyse a problem and work through what they refer to as the “estimate” process to arrive at a plan of action. The military have a clearly defined process that is able to provide detailed plans for military operations. The rest of the government departments have not always possessed such a process.

To put the WOG development into context there is a comparison to the planning process that was developed in the military, which has not always operated as a single entity. The coming together of the component parts of the Canadian Forces, the Army, Air Force and Navy, produce what is referred to as Joint operations; all three branches of the military working together to achieve a common aim. When the Canadian military works with the military of another country it is referred to as Combined operations. New terminology has been created to represent the coming together of several military forces, other government departments, civilian organizations and other nations, all in a setting where they work together towards a common aim or objective. The

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178 Sing, p. 7.

179 Ibid., pp. 4-7.
Canadian Army refers to this type of operation as Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public or JIMP.\textsuperscript{180}

Doctrinally the three-block war has been replaced by the concept of JIMP operations. While the fundamental principle is essentially the same there are some significant differences. The three-block war was a major step forward from thinking of military operations in the classical sense of either pure combat or peacekeeping, but not together, as was the norm in the period before the 1990’s. The three-block war combined warfighting, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance in one military mission. The three-block war was primarily about military operations but the new doctrine of JIMP pulls in non-military components to the family.\textsuperscript{181}

JIMP operations are complex and require a group of planners that have been trained in this sort of complex planning and are fully aware of what each component brings to the table and what their part will be in achieving the mission. Afghanistan is a good example of JIMP operations where the Government of Canada has committed the military, foreign affairs assets, CIDA, RCMP, and staffs from other government departments such as the prison service, agriculture and any other department that may add to the mission. Canadian assets work together with militaries and governments of other nations, Non-governmental organizations, civilian contractors, Afghan government and non-government groups, and the United Nations. The WOG approach should not be radical thinking but rather a logical result of determining the best way to solve a very complex problem. Planning by doing an ‘estimate’ would help to guide the government in finding that best possible WOG solution.

As Sing capably points out, governments do an enormous amount of planning and preparing of policy and directives, but often in isolation as individual departments. This is a normal procedure since often the business of one department will not intersect with the business of another department in any detailed way. Every department has a budget and must report their


spending to parliament through reports that are tabled and reviewed. No department willingly exceeds its budget and carefully plans for spending. War is a difficult adventure to plan for in terms of the budget. Once committed, a nation must be willing to accept the cost of doing battle with the enemy and then at the cessation of hostilities, sort out the cost and move ahead. The key decision makers must be fully engaged along with their planners at an early stage and have an idea of what the outcome of the problem should look like.\textsuperscript{182}

While the objective here is not to revisit management theory in light of examining the WOG approach, it is clear that there are great similarities between the military planning process and that employed in modern management practices. While the terminologies may differ the process is similar. “In the end, the plan reveals the: who, what, where, when, why and how of the actions required by an organization, as envisioned and championed by its leader.”\textsuperscript{183} The outputs of a plan are the short term objectives and the outcomes are the longer term objectives, and care should be taken to not confuse the two.\textsuperscript{184} Performance measurement needs to be careful in differing between them as well, i.e., an output might be tallying up the number of wells that have been dug in six months or the number of school classrooms built, and an outcome might be measured in the advancement of governance capacity in a region. Water and education may contribute to good governance in the long term, but are not necessarily indicative of it in the short term.

Key to any problem solving approach is the job of defining the problem. Sing is correct when he says that “From a management perspective, correct definition of a problem, challenge or issue, regardless of the complexity or lack of structure, is the purview and one of the key responsibilities of the leader of the organization.”\textsuperscript{185} He goes on to add, “in the case of complex problems, which require the attention of more than one department to resolve, it is most

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{182} Sing, pp. 6-7.
\item\textsuperscript{183} Ibid., p. 14.
\item\textsuperscript{184} Ibid., p. 15.
\item\textsuperscript{185} Ibid., p. 18.
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important that a common understanding of the problem and of the potential solution-sets be
developed collaboratively between all participants.‖\textsuperscript{186} The definition of the problem itself will
turn on national interests and how the plan to solve a problem meets those overall aims.

Sing looks to Steven Kendall-Holloway and Stephen Krasner to find that they believe that
national interests should not vary over time and that “most states share similar interests of
sovereignty, peace and security, and economic prosperity.”\textsuperscript{187} The start point is the grand
strategy given in a government policy document, for Canada it is the 2005 International Policy
Statement. This in turn creates other policy and plans that fall out of the original policy/strategy,
such as defence policy and then Army/Navy/Air Force specific plans to meet the nation’s
defence objectives. This is a cascade effect that expands as it moves downward and as greater
layers of detail are added to the plans. The same principle will apply in other government
departments as they fulfill their primary mission as given by the government.

Sing identified some key terminology issues that are important to understand:

The use of the terms collaboration, coordination, cooperation, integration and alignment
are all used by various levels of governments to describe working together in some
fashion to achieve an outcome. Collaboration is that part of the process of working
together at the beginning of a project when a common objective is selected. Cooperation
is that part of process which takes place once the project has been launched and work
begun. Coordination is somewhat distinct from both collaboration and cooperation and
refers to the act of making or ensuring people work together. Integration and alignment
appear to be related to the concept of ensuring coherence of objectives and efforts
throughout cascading sub-organizations within a large organization, so that sub-
organization objectives and efforts are complimentary and not at odds with one another
or with the objectives and efforts of the parent organization.\textsuperscript{188}

While terminology is important in a professional dialogue it can appear confusing in a broadly
focused policy document such as the 2005 International Policy Statement. For the military, who
possess a very detailed and task specific set of terminology, being non-specific in the use of

\textsuperscript{186} Sing, p. 18.

\textsuperscript{187} Ibid., pp. 21-22, cites Steven Kendall-Halloway, Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the

\textsuperscript{188} Ibid., pp. 28-29.
terminology can be an irritant. Military officers can often be heard asking their civilian colleagues “what do you mean specifically?” Notwithstanding the use of any particular terminology the objective is the efficient and effective use of resources to resolve a problem. For the WOG discussion clarification of the terms efficient and effective is valuable since they can be mistaken if not assigned their own meanings. Efficient is to be doing things right and effective is to be doing the right things.189

Sing observes that the civilian-military working relationship in the WOG setting needs to be well understood by all the players when he says,

> Understanding the similarities, nuances and differences of management concepts, language and modus operandi used by politicians and public servants on one hand and military officers on the other is important if a WOG approach to be truly successful. One way to attenuate these differences would be to create shared understanding and ownership of policies and programmes by adopting a common planning process.190

Since the idea of a collection of independent groups working together towards a common objective is not new, why is it that Canadian government departments do not do this as a normal method of conducting business? The answer is that they have been doing this in some situations and to a varying degree for quite some time. The reasons for not working together internationally becomes evident in the analysis; there was not a need to work together before since international problems had previously not been as complex and had not required multifaceted solutions to be resolved. Afghanistan was (still is) a challenge to Canada and other ISAF partners to provide a solution to not just the ouster of the Taliban regime, but to rebuild the country.

The adoption of a common planning process is one of the key recommendations that Sing finds in his analysis of the problem faced by Canada in the WOG approach. The lack of a common planning process has reduced the efficiency and effectiveness of the Canadian contribution to getting Afghanistan back from the abyss of failed state status. The Canadian military has possessed a common planning process that has been derived from joint operations between the

189 Sing, p. 1.

190 Ibid., p. 32.
Army, Navy and Air Force. As well, training with its NATO and other military partners has taught the Canadian military a great deal about joint planning. The recently developed JIMP planning process takes the evolution of common planning one step further and puts it squarely into a setting involving many government, public and private agencies from Canada and other ISAF partners.

A Canadian Forces Task force Afghanistan 2009 report that was written to capture the lessons learned from a Canadian military operational rotation ending and handing over to new leadership noted that the lack of a central planning capacity was one of the major drawbacks that limits the success of Canada’s commitment to Afghanistan. It said,

Whole of Government integrated planning is essential to the success of interagency operations. All of the members of TFK interviewed…identified civilian planning capability and military planning capacity as deficient. While the military invests significant training and professional development in producing military planners, the civilian side does not.\(^{191}\)

Regrettably the situation that Andy Tamas had cautioned about, one part of the WOG team being assimilated by another, was taking place. In 2009, after four years of operations in the Kandahar area, the Governments WOG plans had still not been fully implemented and thus continued to hamper the success of the organization. The TFK report went on to say,

Given the differences in numbers and in the absence of a common language, processes, procedures and actions, the military format and SOPs dominate, and at times overwhelm the civilian partners. As indicated…there is a knowledge and skill gap in that both groups lack a common understanding. Furthermore, the lack of training in integrated operational planning hinders performance in these areas, which causes avoidable friction and frustration. It was suggested that an integrated operational planning model needs to be developed that accommodates both the civilian as well as the military requirements. It can also be argued that the military operational planning process is flexible enough to allow for integrated WOG planning efforts…which incorporates contributions from the military-civilian team. However, the civilian team is not skilled in its application and

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\(^{191}\) Canada, Headquarters Joint Task Force Kandahar, THEATRE LESSONS REPORT (TLR) 03/09, PRELIMINARY REPORT: APPLICATION OF WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT (WoG) APPROACH, AFGHANISTAN, 2009, pp. 9-10.
regardless of the power and flexibility of the planning model, it is not endorsed by OGDs.\textsuperscript{192}

The Task Force Kandahar report noted that local efforts were made to try to mitigate but that the lack of a central planning capacity along with a common language and processes would certainly mean the departments outside of the military would not enjoy either the success or acceptance of the military when it comes to operations. The language of the report leaves no doubt that the WOG approach to international action by Canada was not fully realized even four years after the commencement of operations in the Kandahar region.

The lack of a common planning process within the Canadian government slows down the ability of the government to react to challenges in the provision of services. Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States have all, to one degree or other, adopted a joint or WOG planning process in dealing with international operations and in the case of Australia to deal with domestic issues as well. Joint planning, while not a revolutionary concept has been left to flounder by the Government of Canada even though the emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness is regularly reinforced by agencies like the Treasury Board and the Auditor General for Canada. There are federal laws and regulations that govern how departments spend and report their spending to Parliament. The Treasury Board Secretariat is the keeper of the policy and the regulations that drive the actions of the many federal government departments. Most of the Treasury Board regulations speak to financial management with little mention of the concept of WOG.\textsuperscript{193} Overall, government wide planning is approached in an uncoordinated fashion, not to say that it is not well thought out, but that it is not done so with a view to being coordinated across the government as a WOG effort.

Sing says that leadership is a key factor affecting the way that government makes plans and that, in addition to the Prime Minister, the Privy Council fulfills a key role in the process through managing the flow of information to Cabinet. The process is bound in a method that while it may have been sufficient in earlier times is not sufficient to meet the demands of complex

\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., p. 10.

\textsuperscript{193} Sing, pp. 58-62.
problems requiring WOG solutions. The establishment of a Cabinet Committee to deal with Canada’s efforts in Afghanistan was a step forward.¹⁹⁴

Some of the roadblocks to the implementation of a common planning process in government in Canada, as pointed out by Sing, include:

- The Privy council office, which exercises a challenge function vice a coordination function amongst departments and agencies is failing to champion the issue,
- There is a tradition of *ad hoc* resolution of issues that is not being challenged by either the Prime Minister or the Clerk of the Privy Council, the senior bureaucrat of Canada,
- The principle of Ministerial responsibility still exists and thus Ministers will be protective of their portfolios and issue ownership,
- Resource allocation and accountability is still very much vertically oriented and thus government regulation that affects all departments will continue to colour the way that departments do business to satisfy Treasury Board regulations and other federal laws,
- There is an inability or lack of willingness to share information between departments, and
- The differences in the nature, culture size, funding, language, and modus operandi of departments do not always permit easy collaboration and cooperation.¹⁹⁵

Most of the roadblocks that Sing identified above have existed as part of the paradigm of Canadian federal government life. A large federal bureaucracy has been developed and schooled in doing business in this way. The process of change will understandably be an evolutionary one spurred on by the need to adapt to new circumstances. The WOG planning process has seen a start and will likely be expanded as government realizes that there are benefits to a common planning process that will achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of public goods and services. The lesson that has already been learned from Afghanistan resulted in the

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., pp. 81-82.

¹⁹⁵ Sing, pp. 83-85.
creation of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force, led by a senior public servant, and composed of stakeholders from Defence, Foreign Affairs and CIDA. The lessons of Afghanistan should not be lost following the end of Canada’s mission. It would be easy for government to be able to slip back to the normal ways of doing business with a vertical reporting chain to Treasury Board, the challenge for the government will be to surrender the *ad hoc* way of departmental planning and adapt the *modus operandi* of the entire government to capture the benefits of a common planning process.

Civilian government staffs do not normally deploy to regions where personal safety is not reasonably assured, thus there were only limited numbers of OGD staff who were initially deployed as part of the PRT. While this situation has improved with successive operational rotations it was an indicator of OGD commitment to the PRT and thus dictated the level of overall success of the PRT early-on. Notwithstanding limitations that may exist from OGD participants it is the view of other ISAF partners that success cannot be achieved without the OGDs and NGOs. The CRS report cites the comments of the UK Chief of Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshall Sir Jock Stirrup who said, “So the situation has arisen where the military alone cannot deliver that success but where equally is cannot be delivered without the military. Hence the need for what is called the ‘Comprehensive Approach’; that is, the coordinated and synergistic application of all lines of development: political, diplomatic, military, legal, economic, social and so on.”\(^{196}\) In broad terms, Canada has worked very hard through significant effort from the military and other government departments and through an extensive program of CIDA funding for programs and services in Afghanistan. Appendix 1 lists the programs undertaken, or funded by, Canada in Afghanistan up to 2008 and details significant development efforts in that country, all designed to address the ANDS goals.

The Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2007 said, “Our foreign policy is clear. It is aimed at restoring Canadian leadership in the world. Our priorities are to play a leading role in peace

\(^{196}\) CRS, p. 28.
and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.” His objectives were affected by the security situation and the death of the Political Director of the PRT, Glyn Berry, in a car bombing in January 2006, just one kilometre outside the confines of the PRT camp in Kandahar. Since then, non-military PRT members have been somewhat restricted in movement outside the camp to the point that the Chief of Defence Staff at the time, General Hillier, commented, “yes we have 3-D and the military does all of the three D’s.” But even when diplomatic staffers began moving outside the confines of secure military controlled facilities there were physical consequences with the serious injury to a civilian PRT member who lost a leg in an IED incident. This highlighted a major shortcoming of the diplomatic and development parts of the PRT to be seen in Afghan communities.

Another weakness involved the many chains of command and how they were stove-piped and mixed to the extent that each part of the PRT reported to the home department within the government. This applied to many of the non-government agencies within Afghanistan. Who is responsible for what is a confusing mix of organizational responsibility matrices; the PRT falls under the command structure of NATO and is governed by the Regional Command’s Steering Committee which sets the direction for the operations of the PRTs. Funding and resupply comes from the contributing country as well as troops and staff rotations; this makes for a confusing command relationship. The United States, Britain and Canada all have developed inter-agency planning and coordination committees that are tasked to develop responses to emerging international situations. The U.S. has the Office for the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stability, Britain has the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit, and Canada now has the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force.

WOG seems to make sense; what about working together in a cooperative way toward a common purpose does not appeal to common sense? Marie-Eve Desrosiers and Philippe

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198 Ibid., p. 5.
199 Ibid., p. 6.
Lagassé argue that the Canadian government’s “whole-of-government” plan was hollow in terms of substance to the idea of departmental coordination. They document the plans of the two main actors: DFAIT and DND/CF, and the use of the concept of helping failed and fragile states (FFS) in order to preserve the traditional roles and missions of the two departments, referred to as the bureaucratic ‘essence’.

foreign affairs and defence departments embraced the idea of failed and fragile states to reinforce their organizational essences and recycle their existing missions, roles and capabilities. In addition, the departments used a “whole-of-government” approach to secure their autonomy, fence their respective functions, and enlarge their unique capabilities, under the guise of greater efficiency.\(^{200}\)

Desrosiers and Lagassé’s analysis of efforts by DFAIT and DND/CF to embrace the whole-of-government plan for international action determined that “the unity of purpose and action between DFAIT and DND/CF has been more rhetorical than real.”\(^{201}\) The reason for that lack of substance was essentially to protect the organizational essences that each department had developed over time. The ‘essence’ is defined by the mission or objectives that it wants to attain, the roles are the activities that a department undertakes to achieve the mission, and the capabilities are defined by the assets and resources that organizations use to perform the roles to fulfill the mission.\(^{202}\)

The theme of helping FFS through intervention started out under the appearance of the responsibility-to-protect doctrine that was promoted by the Canadian government. The 2005 International Policy Statement was anchored by the theme of working to fix state failure and fragility as one of Canada’s principle international policy priorities and linked both the DFAIT and DND/CF policy reviews that were included in the IPS.\(^{203}\) A significance of the need to work cooperatively was viewed by each department as a means to reinforce the ‘essence’ they had


\(^{201}\) Ibid., p. 660.

\(^{202}\) Ibid., pp. 660-661.

\(^{203}\) Ibid., pp. 668-669.
developed and to improve upon the degree of authority over their respective domains in the competition for budgets and ultimately to protect their ‘turf’. DFAIT was committed to the policies of human security and the example of Canadian values as a means of international influence which was reinforced under the ‘soft power’ leadership of former Minister Lloyd Axworthy. DND/CF was determined to protect the ability to train and field combat capable flexible armed forces that could deploy anywhere in the world and working across the spectrum of conflict.\(^{204}\)

Following 9/11 the DND/CF was in a good position to protect its ‘essence’ especially with the public support that was present for the war on terrorism to be fought in Afghanistan. Public opinion was fully in support of the military to go to war.\(^{205}\) The pressure was also on to adopt a whole-of-government approach to fixing the problem of Afghanistan especially when the U.S., the World Bank, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development put failing and fragile states on their agendas and acknowledged that development, human security, and governance issues would be included in any intervention plans.\(^{206}\) The message for Canada was clear; the whole-of-government approach to international intervention, especially as it related to FFS, would be the normal way of doing business. This dovetailed nicely with the DFAIT doctrine of R2P and also with the DND/CF determination that combat capable military forces were the best tools to use to achieve the aim.

The pressure to find a better way of doing business reached a tipping point for the government in the 2006-2007 time-frames with the realization that Canadians did not have sufficient awareness of the mission in Afghanistan that was using up lives and resources at a quickening pace. Canada’s first significant battle casualties started in 2006 as the pace of operations in Kandahar picked up and 36 Canadian soldiers were killed that year along with diplomat Glyn Berry, a

\(^{204}\) Desrosiers and Lagassé, pp. 663-664.

\(^{205}\) Ibid., p. 666.

\(^{206}\) Ibid., p. 667.
senior member of the DFAIT staff. Fletcher, Bastedo and Hove, in their assessment of the efforts of the government to shape the message to Canadians cited the work of The Strategic Counsel, a market research organization, who was asked to look at “current levels of understanding and beliefs about the mission, factors and issues driving support and/or opposition to the mission, as well as reaction to facts and information both about Afghanistan and the broader international presence in the region.” The result was that the Canadian government added an element of education to the official messages and speeches that were being made to educate the public and get the message out to people that the contribution being made by Canada was both needed and effective. The Prime Minister and key Ministers were sending the same messages citing “concrete examples of progress (focussing on women and children), UN and NATO involvement, and clarify the need for security and stability in order to provide aid and undertake diplomacy.” This was put in the context of a new military mission, different from the peacekeeping role that Canadians had come to recognize and now a mission involving combat. This was added pressure on the government to work in a WOG approach in order to make sure that the message to the public was working to a common aim and to add support for the mission overall.

To meet the challenge of operating together as a whole-of-government team DFAIT created the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), designed to coordinate whole-of-government policy and program engagements in fragile states. The DND/CF went about the process of modernizing equipment, recruiting additional soldiers and increasing the preparedness of the military to engage in the three-block type of war. The budget for defence was significantly increased from the level of 1998 when Canada spent about $14 Billion on defence

208 Fletcher, et al, p. 914.
209 Ibid., p. 914.
211 Desrosiers and Lagassé, pp. 669-671.
to just over $21 Billion in 2009.\textsuperscript{212} Both departments gave the impression of inter-departmental synergy but continued to operate with the same mission, roles and capabilities as they always had.\textsuperscript{213} General Hillier was certainly correct when he commented that the CF was doing all the ‘Ds’ but he forgot to mention that the military was continuing on pretty much the way that it had for several decades, just with better equipment.

WOG implementation challenges do not exist solely in Canada. Norway has experienced growing pains in the development of both national policy on the deployment of military forces in a new role and just how the new organization was going to function. There are parallels to be drawn between Norway and Canada’s experiences. The experience of Norway in Afghanistan has been revealing in that its national contribution is Norway’s first attempt to employ the WOG approach to a foreign policy issue and intervention in a foreign country. The analysis of the policy and its implementation revealed both success and failure in varying degree.

The analysis compared Norway’s efforts with Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom and in the end determined that “Norway lacks a comprehensive strategy for engaging in fragile states in general, as well as a WOG strategy for any particular country – including Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{214} A key observation of the report is recognition that Norway has begun the WOG process in its dealings with the provision of assistance to Afghanistan, but the actual working together of the components had not begun, the various agencies: defence, diplomatic, development, and other government agencies, all continued to take direction independently from the home offices back in Oslo. They coexisted but had not started to work together at the tactical level; the actual coordination was limited to a central committee in Oslo (Afghanistan Forum),


\textsuperscript{213} Desrosiers and Lagassé, p. 675.

where the real goal was the maximization of Norwegian influence internationally.\textsuperscript{215} While Norway had provided all of the tools for the WOG work to be done, the reality was that each component was working independently.

The 2009 NUPI report was critical, yet hopeful, of the interaction of the WOG efforts with civil society in that the perception was that the two were working to a common aim but that Norwegian NGOs were concerned about the issue of preserving their “humanitarian space.”\textsuperscript{216} Internal to the government, involvement in Afghanistan had been a catalyst that drove the attention of the many government agencies that provide resources to Afghanistan, and others, to be more aware of what is happening internationally. The NUPI report says, “An important effect of the Afghanistan Forum, and the Norwegian WOG approach in general, is that it has created a process that facilitates ongoing attention on Afghanistan, at all levels of the bureaucratic and political hierarchy, and across all the relevant ministries.”\textsuperscript{217} This side benefit is likely repeated within the governments of Canada, United Kingdom, United States, Sweden, the Netherlands, and other countries that have provided PRTs to Afghanistan. Even without the formal recognition of the WOG approach as a formal government policy there are likely secondary benefits to be had in developing policy and procedure for working toward common aims.

A recommendation of the 2009 NUPI report was for a closer dialogue between the Norwegian government and civil society to openly debate the WOG concept of international operations. It is considered essential for Norway as question arises regarding the usefulness of debate in other countries that have adopted the same approach. Would the U.S., U.K. and Canada benefit from further debate and interaction between the government and civil society to discuss WOG as a normative process the same as traditional peacekeeping was adopted in the Cold War period. This has been an important post-9/11 development for several states and deserves the attention of vigorous debate, whatever the outcome. Stakeholders need an opportunity to weigh-in and provide argument to the debate; civil society must be given voice for there first to be an

\textsuperscript{215} De Coning et al, pp. 20-21.
\textsuperscript{216} De Coning et al, pp. 24-25.
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid., p. 28.
understanding and then possibly public acceptance of the WOG approach as the norm in international involvement. The future use of PRTs as a tool of national foreign policy will be an important by-product of the outcome of the debate but it will take some time for people to come to recognize a new civil-military mission that is different from the peacekeeping that they have come to relate to so well.\textsuperscript{218, 219}

\textit{PRT: Model for the Future?}

The Canadian CRS report offered up an opinion regarding the future of the 3-D concept of operations and the viability for use elsewhere. Notwithstanding all of the limitations cited in this paper the CRS opinion parrots the USAID conclusion that “PRTs are most useful in a mid-secure environment where traditional NGOs do not have freedom of movement, but where the level of instability is not so acute that combat operations predominate.”\textsuperscript{220} A conclusion of the examination of the structure and composition of PRTs examined here is that the concept provides room for a high degree of flexibility in the organization and structure of a PRT but most important in the design is the level of security in the region in which it will be deployed and what that means in deciding how robust a military component it has. The threat level also determines how the PRTs work will get done. The national capacity to accept threat will also determine PRT structure and organization. The German PRT operates in a more secure region thus has greater ability to conduct business. Notwithstanding that lower threat, the German government is less willing to accept casualties and has given the PRT a larger security component to manage.

\textsuperscript{218} London School of Economics, accessed at \url{http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm} on 21 July 2010.

\textsuperscript{219} The LSE definition of civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women’s organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups.

security concerns and needs. The Canadian PRT operates in a region where the insurgency is highly active and thus security is low. The Canadian PRT has a robust military security component that is present in all activities and maintains a high degree of military readiness and is involved in all aspects of PRT operations. On the opposite end of the spectrum the American PRTs are small with only minimal security but to mitigate any threat generally have large military forces nearby to call upon where needed. How the PRT is structured and what components it possesses is variable and can be adjusted to meet Afghan and contributing nation specific needs.

A key conclusion that falls out of the analysis is that the 3-D concept reveals that the conceptual process must be managed along with the expectations of both the contributing nation and the recipient nation. If this can be managed effectively the PRT objectives will be clear for all the component groups and then the possibility of success will be greater.

Canada’s national interests that were written in the 2005 International Policy Statement are achieved through the use of a PRT in Afghanistan. Canada is partnering with the U.S. and other NATO allies to provide security and development in a country and region sadly lacking in both. The 3-D/WOG/JIMP concept of international involvement has been validated through Canadian use as well as several allied nations including the U.S., U.K., Norway and others. The PRT represents good value for the resources committed to it but lacks the specific metrics to validate tactical success. Notwithstanding that shortfall the PRT achieved strategic success.

Summary – PRT as implementer of national foreign policy: Canada as a case study

Canadian foreign policy was crafted by the government and enshrined in the 2005 International Policy Statement. The government had adopted the principles of international action to promote Canadian values abroad, to resist being marginalized internationally and to shore up its influence with the United States, traditionally a strong ally and a major trading partner. The government resisted the call to become involved in Iraq in 2003 but was mindful of the need to commit to Afghanistan in order to fulfill the policy objectives. The IPS was written in four parts that committed the four departments, DND/CF, Foreign Affairs, CIDA, and Commerce to working in
a whole-of-government approach to meet the challenges posed by Afghanistan and other failed and fragile states.

There was some criticism of the IPS that it was too ambitious and that it would be difficult to achieve even a portion of it. There was criticism of the selection of Kandahar for the Canadian government to deploy a PRT. Nonetheless, the decision had been made and Canada would take on a major commitment to deploy about 3000 soldiers and civilians to a very dangerous area to undertake a very difficult job of dispensing security and development. Canada quickly got its nose bloodied in combat in Kandahar province and in 2007 set up a Panel to examine the mission and the way ahead. The Panel recommended that Canada remain committed to Afghanistan in the longer term but that its role is reshaped to one of lesser danger. A small force had performed superbly in tactical kinetic operations and had worked very hard to improve security and development. The 3-D and whole-of-government ways of doing business came under scrutiny and were, by some, found to be less than completely successful.

The government did not have the mechanisms in place to facilitate the degree of cooperation that was envisaged by the IPS. The CRS Report determined that the government lacked a common planning process thus failed at coordination of efforts to meet the objectives that they were given. Old ways of doing business that were grounded in the bureaucratic practices of departments who were concerned with budgets and reporting their spending failed to understand the need to surrender some measure of control. Daniel Sing examined the planning process and was able to see that the military is fully committed to careful planning since lives are often at stake if they do not. Other government departments are less inclined since they seldom face physical harm in their duties. Service in a PRT brought new challenges for diplomatic and development staffs as they too were asked to deploy to Kandahar. Lessons learned in Afghanistan showed that even well into the mission the whole-of-government approach still lacked a common planning structure and that civilian staffs were lagging behind the military when it came to ability to function as part of the team.

Desrosiers and Lagassé’s examination of the Canadian government’s whole-of-government approach identified the desire on the part of DND/CF and DFAIT to protect their organizational
‘essences’. This determined how the two would work together, or not, to deploy the PRT. Both departments would use Canada’s commitment to Afghanistan to shore-up traditional roles and missions.
CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSION

“The contents of the toolbox do not tell the carpenter what to make. They only give him options.” The authors of that passage provide a useful metaphor to describe the problems that are faced by governments that employ PRTs in post-conflict situations. The carpenter may want to build the house but if he does not have the right tools then no amount of good intentions will get it built. As a tool of foreign policy the PRT must possess all the right tools; a military force to enable security, diplomats who can provide governance and capacity progress, and development coordination staff that can facilitate projects and work with NGOs to see them provide the service to the people that need it the most. Areas where fighting is still occurring will require the PRT to be militarily robust with the full complement of vehicles, weapons and soldiers that can engage in combat. If the PRT does not possess the tools to protect itself and others then it cannot do the job that it is being asked to do.

This study has worked to define PRTs and determined that essentially they are civil-military affairs organizations that possess defence, diplomacy and development arms that enable it to carry out a wide variety of tasks in support of the national aims of the contributing nation and the recipient nation. PRTs in Afghanistan were tasked to extend the authority of the national Afghan government which possessed little capability to function outside of the Kabul region. The government infrastructure was in ruins following the ouster of the Taliban regime in 2001 and the country was left in a state of chaos with no effective military or police force to provide security or the rule of law. The U.S. in conjunction with NATO has attempted to provide that security while facilitating the rebuilding of all of the components of a nation.

PRTs suffer from a lack of organizational consistency in that they have been collectively described as “one of a kind.” This organizational variance was clearly seen in the review that looked at the way in which they are planned and manned. This variation in structure is explained by the point of view of each contributing nation as some are there only in a development role and

avoid the hard fact of the security situation by limiting the rules of engagement in an attempt to minimize the chance of casualties. Canada and the U.S. have more aggressive rules of operation and employ resources to go out to the people in the region they live in. This has resulted in casualties to soldiers, diplomats and civilians.

The efforts have been costly in terms of time, money and lives since the insurgency remains a powerful force to be controlled and corruption is fuelled by the narcotics trade. PRTs have been deployed to most regions of the country to provide a semblance of security and to facilitate development and the rebuilding process to see the nation get back on its feet. The international community has poured a significant amount of money and resources into Afghanistan to return it to a condition where free and fair elections can be held and the basic conditions of freedom from fear and freedom from want may exist. Afghans have rejected the Taliban and other insurgents and believe that the nation is generally moving in the right direction and want NATO to be continue to help them.

NATO members have determined that stability at home depends on stability and development in places like Afghanistan. Canada has formally written this into the 2005 International Policy Statement and partnered with the U.S. and NATO to be part of the effort to rebuild Afghanistan and to be seen to be a vital influence in the world. This is important to Canada’s interests as partnerships are valuable in key matters such as trade, and nowhere is this more important to Canada than in the relationship with the U.S.

PRTs are not without criticism and this is highlighted in the lack of metrics that give feedback to contributing nations and to the Afghan government to allow it to determine whether or not PRTs are time and money well spent. The determination of national usefulness is a qualitative assessment of the government that owns the PRT. There are however questions that must be asked to determine an appropriate time to say when the PRT has been a success and may be withdrawn. The concern was voiced that there are precious few metrics available that are able to determine that effectiveness of the PRT.
Success will not be defined quantitatively in tallying up numbers of wells dug, convoys of food delivered, or schools built; success will be defined more qualitatively in the ability of the national military and police to provide security, for political leaders and bureaucrats to go about their work without fear of being killed by insurgents or criminal elements. Success will be measured in the ability of government to conduct some form of free and fair elections and to give the people the ability to voice their political beliefs without fear of reprisal. Success will be measured in the ability of the nation to provide food, water, shelter, medical care, education and the rule of law. Assistance may be needed for some time, but the fundamentals of sovereignty must be in place and enforced by the people of Afghanistan, not from an outside security force.

The success of PRTs will be measured by that qualitative review. If nations like Canada consider that the PRT has contributed to the rebuilding of Afghanistan then the verdict will be that the PRT is a valuable tool of foreign policy.

The test will not be complete until PRTs have been used in several other development and crisis situations. The United States has employed PRTs in Iraq with some success, according to their assessment, but Canada has not yet committed a PRT to some other location of national interest, such as Haiti, where a massive earthquake destroyed a large part of the national government infrastructure in early 2010. This might be an opportunity to test the PRT concept in a situation where the security threat is less challenging and the PRT may operate with less need for expensive vehicles and weaponry to provide protection to the team. This would allow greater freedom of movement, more rapid response to regional needs, and easier coordination between the 3-D components and would permit development agencies to maintain the “humanitarian space” that they need to be able to operate.

Haiti would have challenges that would be unique but is in a similar situation as Afghanistan in that it requires significant work to rebuild the state. Even before the earthquake levelled a significant part of the infrastructure of Haiti there has been a need to provide development to what is one of the poorest countries in the Western hemisphere. A second test of the PRT/3-D approach would be a key opportunity to test the effectiveness of this element of Canadian foreign policy.
The competition between the largely military/sponsor government PRT and the NGO community will colour the ability to provide effective development in regions where security levels are low and the resultant risk to all parties is high. NGOs are concerned about encroachment on “humanitarian space” and the impact that this has on their ability to deliver services, programs and materials to their clients. NGOs understand that security is an essential and have in many cases offloaded the actual work they do to local hired people. This reduces the threat to foreign workers and allows the NGO agency to continue to deliver on promises of aid. 

Another aspect of the civil-military relationship is reflected in the need for debate within national governments that are providing PRTs. The Norwegian civil-military relationship has come under scrutiny as the role of Norway’s military has changed as it begins to undertake military missions that are dramatically different than that previously carried out since the end of World War II. Canada has similarly undertaken a dramatic shift toward kinetic operations since deploying military forces into the Kandahar region of Afghanistan in 2005/2006. This shift away from more traditional peacekeeping operations (notwithstanding Canada’s commitment of a Brigade sized military force along with a fighter squadron to NATO in Europe from the 1950’s until the early 1990’s) has challenged the way that Canadians view their position in the world and their role in international affairs. The governments of both Norway, Canada and other liberal democratic states that have had a history of international peacekeeping engagement will have to engage its citizens in a dialogue that both educates people regarding the modern day realities of security and national interests and to seek opinion on those national values that are worth the price of international engagement and all that it entails.

Progress is being made to make PRTs more effective and useful tools of foreign policy for nations like Canada, and to make the time, money and lives spent in places like Afghanistan worthwhile. One of the questions that rest on the minds of everyone is “how long will this process take?” That question does not have an answer but the simple response might be that the more effective PRTs are, the less time it will take. PRTs do not operate alone in Afghanistan, there are efforts underway to build an army, create a police force and put a judiciary system in place. There are thousands of NGO organizations in the country and there are massive resources being committed to the rebuilding of Afghanistan. There is still an active insurgency and there
are a myriad of other problems to be ironed out before this former failed state can say that it is sovereign, free, and possess peace, order and good government.
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## Appendix - Canadian (and Canadian Funded) Projects Undertaken in Afghanistan 2001 – 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Details of the Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education quality improvement project</td>
<td>2007-2011</td>
<td>$60,000,000</td>
<td>This is part of a World Bank education project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls Education Support Program</td>
<td>2008-2013</td>
<td>$8,000,000</td>
<td>This is funding for the Aga Khan Foundation in the south-central area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls Primary Education</td>
<td>2006-2010</td>
<td>$14,500,000</td>
<td>This is funding for the Building Resources across Communities-Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Program in Kandahar Province</td>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>$1,400,000</td>
<td>This is joined up with a World Bank Food Program and attendance at the program is rewarded with food rations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Training for Afghan Women</td>
<td>2007-2011</td>
<td>$4,950,000</td>
<td>This is a World University Service of Canada and CARE project that offers jobs skills training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Solidarity Program</td>
<td>2003-2011</td>
<td>$131,500,000</td>
<td>Government of Afghanistan community development program. The program facilitates community leader planning and development agenda decisions to identify, plan and monitor their own development projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Area Based Development Program</td>
<td>2005-2009</td>
<td>$28,700,000</td>
<td>Part of the UN Development Program to reduce poverty. Somewhat similar to the National Solidarity Program but differentiated by being applied at the district vice village level. Rural focus to the projects supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Renewal Program</td>
<td>2005-2009</td>
<td>$7,300,000</td>
<td>This program is located in north-eastern Afghanistan and is implemented by the Aga Khan foundation. It is aimed at creating agricultural alternatives to poppy cultivation to support the anti-narcotics efforts of the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Basins Water Resources</td>
<td>2006-2009</td>
<td>$15,000,000</td>
<td>This is CIDA funding to an Asian Development Bank project to improve irrigation systems in some of the western provinces of Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regeneration of Murad Khan</td>
<td>2008-2011</td>
<td>$3,000,000</td>
<td>The Murad Khane is a region of the city of Kabul. This project is operated by the Turquoise Mountain Foundation, a British based NGO and is aimed at rebuilding that part of the city along with the getting businesses back in operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horticulture and Livestock</td>
<td>2007-2009</td>
<td>$4,000,000</td>
<td>This is CIDA funding to a World Bank project at building a horticulture food products (nuts, grapes and fruit) and livestock farming capacity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar Rapid Village Development Project</td>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>$5,000,000</td>
<td>This is a business stimulus project around Kandahar aimed at labour intensive projects with locally produced and purchased materials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spin Boldak Highway Construction</td>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>$15,300,000</td>
<td>This is CIDA funding to an Asian Development Bank project to fix the highway between Kandahar and Spin Boldak, a major highway link to Pakistan. The project is a combined effort with the Afghan government using local contractors to do the work. The idea is to improve the all-weather carrying capacity of the highway, allowing for goods and people to more easily move between Afghanistan and Pakistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Alternative Livelihoods Program in Kandahar Province</td>
<td>2006-2010</td>
<td>$18,500,000</td>
<td>This project is CIDA funding in conjunction with the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development and is aimed at persuading farmers to grow food crops vice poppy to feed the narcotics industry. This will provide irrigation systems, seed and tools to framers and other growers and work at assisting in the marketing of whatever they produce.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Accelerated District Reconstruction Program in Kandahar Province

**Period:** 2007-2009
**Funding:** $18,500,000

This is a CIDA funded and PRT monitored project to construct roads, aqueducts (a type of canal), waste management, sewage systems, as well as refurbishing schools and medical clinics throughout Kandahar province. It is designed to complement the Afghan national reconstruction program.

### National Rural Access Program

**Period:** 2006-2010
**Funding:** $4,800,000

This is CIDA funding to a World Bank road-building project to improve the road infrastructure from rural areas onto main routes in the Kandahar region. The Canadian funding intends to build about 70 Km of roads.

### Kabul Procurement Marketplace

**Period:** 2005-2008
**Funding:** $1,160,000

This is CIDA funding for a project operated by an NGO Peace Dividend Trust that finds local suppliers to provide goods and services that are needed by outside development agencies and organizations such as the UN and ISAF.

### Microfinance Program in Afghanistan – National Program

**Period:** 2003-2011
**Funding:** $96,350,000 (to end of 2007/2008) budget is set annually

CIDA funding for the Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA) program operated by the Government of Afghanistan. Directed mostly at women it is a means of empowering Afghans to start small businesses. It is designed as an alternative source of credit for urban and rural Afghans who lack collateral. MISFA also provides training and technical assistance.

### Integrating Women into Markets

**Period:** 2006-2010
**Funding:** $4,950,000

This is a CIDA funded Mennonite Economic Development Associates project designed for 1500 women to produce fruit and vegetables in small home based gardens.

### Kandahar Local Initiatives Program

**Period:** 2007-2009
**Funding:** $5,000,000

This is funding given to the Canadian PRT to spend on local development projects to meet local reconstruction and development initiatives and build the capacity of government institutions.

### Provincial Reconstruction Team: Reconstruction and Development

**Period:** 2006-2011
**Funding:** Cost not reported

The PRT works in the Kandahar province to provide stability and enable the development efforts of the Afghan government and NGO organizations to work. PRT projects are collaborative between CIDA, PRT team members, Afghan and multi-lateral partners.

### Humanitarian Assistance and National Institutions/Nation Building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Details of the Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food Aid to Vulnerable Families</td>
<td>2006-2008</td>
<td>$38,900,000</td>
<td>This is a World Food program initiative to deliver food aid to vulnerable families (war, drought, disaster). The Canadian funding is intended for use in Kandahar province. This project works in concert with the Food-for-work program that has infrastructure projects as the goal and the Food-for-Education program that provided literacy and skills training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE-Kabul Widows Humanitarian Assistance Project</td>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>$2,000,000</td>
<td>This project is intended to provide food to widows in the Kabul area who are marginalized and excluded from other forms of government assistance. It includes health care, nutrition and sanitation education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micronutrient Initiative</td>
<td>2006-2009</td>
<td>$750,000</td>
<td>The Micronutrient Initiative is a Canadian NGO that will distribute iodized salt to 10 Million Afghans to reduce the incidence of mental retardation and iron-fortified flour to 2.5 Million to reduce anaemia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Polio Eradication Initiative and Tuberculosis Control Program</td>
<td>2007-2011</td>
<td>$17,500,000</td>
<td>This is CIDA funding to a WHO project to administer the oral polio vaccine to children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Appeal for the Humanitarian Consequences of Rising Food Prices</td>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>$10,000,000</td>
<td>This is designed to offset the 60% increase in the price of wheat on world markets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Description</td>
<td>Start-End</td>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal Health Initiative in Kandahar Province</td>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>$350,000</td>
<td>This is CIDA funding for a UNICEF project in Kandahar Province to set up a residential obstetric care facility next to Kandahar’s Mirwais Hospital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance to Vulnerable Families in the South (Four Provinces in the Southern portion of the country)</td>
<td>2006-2007</td>
<td>$4,500,000</td>
<td>This is CIDA funding for a UNICEF and Afghan Department of Public Health wide-ranging project to include health care, clothing, education, water supply and sanitation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal and Child Healthcare: Supporting Hospitals and Health in Southern Afghanistan</td>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>$10,000,000</td>
<td>This is CIDA funding for the Afghanistan Ministry of Public Health and the National Midwifery Education and Accreditation Board. The objective is to improve emergency obstetric care at Mirwais Hospital, the adjacent nursing school and the maternity waiting home in Kabul. Will provide training for health care professionals in other regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC Emergency Appeal for Afghanistan</td>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>$7,000,000</td>
<td>This is an CIDA grant to ICRC in response to an emergency appeal in 2007. 50% of the grant is earmarked for health sector activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR Global Appeal</td>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>$5,000,000</td>
<td>This is a CIDA grant to UNHCR to fund core activities primarily intended to assist with refugee work and returns to Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Action National Development Budget</td>
<td>2005-2009</td>
<td>Budget allocated on an annual basis - $21,800,000 in 2007-2008</td>
<td>Funding for the UN Mine Action Service to continue to clear mines from agricultural lands in Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Personnel Mine and Ammunition Stockpile Destruction</td>
<td>2006-2008</td>
<td>$7,000,000</td>
<td>This project supports the Government of Afghanistan to find, collect and destroy stockpiles of unexploded ordinance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups</td>
<td>2005-2009</td>
<td>$7,000,000</td>
<td>This is money for the Afghan New Beginnings Program to disarm illegally armed groups on the basis of voluntary compliance through community development incentives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (Recurrent Costs)</td>
<td>2003-2011</td>
<td>$199,500,000 spent to 2008</td>
<td>This is money given as part of the World Bank program to support the Government of Afghanistan’s working expenses and help it to provide services to the people of the country. It also pays for the wages and salaries of government employees and the operating costs of the various government departments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the Rule of Law</td>
<td>2004-2008</td>
<td>$6,300,000</td>
<td>This is funding for the International Development and Law Organization to train participants of the judicial system (lawyers, judges and other officials) on criminal, civil and business law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to the National Program Support Office</td>
<td>2005-2009</td>
<td>$9,000,000</td>
<td>The NPSO is an arm of the Presidents office and aims to provide government ministries with expertise, quality control and program management capacity to implement priority programs. The NPSO does not provide policy advice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission</td>
<td>2007-2009</td>
<td>$7,000,000</td>
<td>This is CIDA funding to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission to provide for training of police, judiciary, and Parliament on laws, systems and procedures from a rights based perspective. It also monitors and investigates complaints, in particular by tracking information related to detainees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalizing Legal Aid in Afghanistan</td>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>$2,900,000</td>
<td>This is CIDA funding for the International Criminal Defence Attorneys Association and the International Legal Foundation – Afghanistan, to establish a national legal aid system that can operate independently.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coaches and Advisors Program</td>
<td>2007-2009</td>
<td>$5,000,000</td>
<td>This is funding to the UN Development Program to provide training and mentoring services to Afghan civil servants and to help develop their knowledge and skills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Description</td>
<td>Years</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making Budgets and Aid Work</td>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>$4,000,000</td>
<td>This is funding to the UN Development Program to provide budgeting training to the Afghan Ministry of Finance and other government departments. It also provides budgetary training to three provincial governments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to the Afghan National Development Strategy</td>
<td>2007-2009</td>
<td>$4,400,000</td>
<td>This is financial support to the Government of Afghanistan to assist in the implementation of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) which was developed in conjunction with the UNDP, UNAMA, and in consultation with the donor community. The ANDS and the Afghanistan compact are key development programs for the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhancing Legal and Local Capacity for Tomorrow</td>
<td>2007-2009</td>
<td>$5,000,000</td>
<td>This is funding to the UN Development Program to build an Independent Election Commission to manage democratic elections. This includes training for officials and communications to the population to educate them regarding elections, how they are held and is designed to create a voter registry, get the marginalized involved and out to vote and to hear electoral complaints.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Sub-national Governance Program</td>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>$5,000,000</td>
<td>This is funding to the UN Development Program to establish and train provincial and district level governing institutions to include officials and civil servants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsive Gender Fund for the Advancement of Women</td>
<td>2007-2011</td>
<td>$5,000,000</td>
<td>This is CIDA funding to local Afghan organizations for the advancement of economic empowerment, education and legal protection of women’s rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building for Promotion of Gender Equality</td>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>$5,000,000</td>
<td>This is funding to the UN Development Program and the Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs to establish a Gender Studies Institute at the University of Kabul, collect data on the status of women in Afghanistan and train community and religious leaders in the promotion of women’s rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights in Practice – Women’s Rights and Family Law Reform (national project including Kandahar Province)</td>
<td>2007-2011</td>
<td>$5,000,000</td>
<td>This is CIDA funding to the NGO Rights and Democracy, a Montreal based organization, and is to create a public awareness campaign to promote women’s rights and family law issues. The program will appeal to legal and religious leaders to promote women’s rights and to create a public debate on the issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Advisor to the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI)</td>
<td>2007-2009</td>
<td>$680,000</td>
<td>This is CIDA funding to the Ottawa NGO CANADEM for the deployment of a gender advisor to the MOI. The focus of the project is on the Afghan National Police and the development of family response units staffed by female police officers, training for female police officers, and providing female police officers at girl’s schools to lecture on security, legal and police matters, counsel on family violence problems.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CIDA, 2008, available at [www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/prnEn/JUD-12514940-QGL](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/prnEn/JUD-12514940-QGL) accessed on 29 September 2008. All information was current as of the date of access and is shown in order to demonstrate or represent the level of development support that the Canadian government has provided in addition to the military commitment to Afghanistan.