

PEACEFUL ABIDING SOLDIERS:
Incorporating Mind Training into the Canadian Forces

by

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This paper is dedicated to the soldiers and civilians that are faced with the horrors of War
May it be of benefit

Above calligraphy is *Shin/Kokoro*
The Japanese symbol for 'heart-mind' or 'spirit'

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES.....	vi
ABSTRACT	vii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED	viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ix
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER 2. SHAMBHALA AND THE DORJE KASUNG: HISTORY AND ORIGINS.....	11
CHAPTER 3. 4GW/WAR AMONGST THE PEOPLE: A NEW PARADIGM	19
CHAPTER 4. WAR BEYOND AN ENEMY: EXPLORING THE PARADIGM	31
CHAPTER 5. CANADA AS POTENTIAL VANGUARD: CF DOCTRINE AHEAD OF THE CURVE	44
CHAPTER 6. TODAY'S SOLDIER: NEW DEMANDS, NEW CHALLENGES.....	57
CHAPTER 7. THE FALLOUT OF WAR: MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES AND PROBLEMS AT HOME.....	67
CHAPTER 8. MIND TRAINING AND THE BENEFITS OF MEDITATION	76
CHAPTER 9. APPLYING SHAMBHALA AND THE DORJE KASUNG: HOW CONCEPT MEETS PRACTICE.....	90
CHAPTER 10. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE CF.....	109
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	118
APPENDIX. A SHORT LIST OF REFERENCES ON THE BENEFITS OF MEDITATION	129

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1	Annual New Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Diagnoses In All U. S. Services as of September 7, 2010.....	68
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ABSTRACT

The 4th Generation of Warfare, with its wars among the people, confronts soldiers with complexities, challenges and demands, which they are not adequately prepared for. We see this in the increasing level of mental health issues and operational stress injuries, and in the entrenchment and attrition of modern operations that struggle to achieve strategic goals. Given this, the training of soldiers needs to be adapted: mental and emotional capacity needs to be built and maintained. The Shambhala Buddhist tradition has developed a complete practice integrating meditation and mindfulness awareness training with Western military culture and forms, called the Dorje Kasung. Practices, principles, techniques, and insights, from this and other Eastern military traditions can be adapted and applied to the Canadian Forces. Answering a need to enhance, reinforce, and develop the understanding and embodiment of the military ethos and professionalism of CF members throughout their career.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

3GW	Third Generation Warfare
4GW	Fourth Generation Warfare
CAPS	Clinician Administered PTSD Scale
CF	Canadian Forces
COIN	Counter Insurgency
CSR	Combat Stress Reaction
DK	Dorje Kasung
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OSI	Operational Stress Injury
PTSD	Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
RAND	Research and Development (Health Institute)
REM	Rapid Eye Movement
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USD	United States Dollars

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

“A warrior’s honour is a slender hope, but it may be all there is to separate war from savagery. And a corollary hope is that men can be trained to fight with honour. Armies train people to kill, but they also teach restraint and discipline”¹

-- Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior’s Honour*

War is changing, has already changed: it confronts soldiers with complexities, challenges and demands, for which they are not adequately prepared. We see this in the level of mental health issues and Operational Stress Injuries (OSI) that has been increasing since the end of the Second World War. We see it in the media that questions and condemns military behaviour and decision making, but then makes its war movies about post-traumatic-stress. We see it in the entrenchment and attrition, in the expenditure of force, treasure and lives that is being applied “sub-strategically”, its effects neither directly nor indirectly achieving the strategic goal.² Given this, the training of soldiers needs to be adapted: mental and emotional capacity needs to be built and maintained, just as much as the physical.

The significant increase in psychiatric casualties and mental health issues among the Canadian Forces (CF) is but one example of this lack of mental preparedness in today’s soldiers. According to Veteran Affairs Canada the number of confirmed cases of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) among soldiers returning from Afghanistan has more than tripled since the initial deployment.³ Internationally, Canada is viewed as

¹ Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior’s Honour*, Found in: Canada Dept. of National Defence, *Duty with Honour: The profession of arms in Canada*, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, (Ottawa: Published under the auspices of the Chief of Defence Staff by the Canadian Defence Academy, 2003). 32.

² Rubert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, (London: Penguin Books, 2006). 271-272.

³ “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder surges among Canadian Veterans”, CBSNEWS, (February 29, 2008) www.cbc.ca (Accessed Aug. 8, 2011).

being a leader in its recognition and treatment of OSI⁴, with programs aimed at mental health education and awareness, and at building peer support communities for those suffering from traumatic stress. Particularly since the creation of the Croatia Board of Inquiry, and the Somalia Commission, the importance of addressing OSI has been acknowledged, and a broad series of reforms aimed at improving the profession of arms has been incorporated by the military as an organization.⁵ Yet, as Allan English describes, “not everyone accepts that the proposed reforms have improved the state of the profession”.⁶ The increasing need for reform, and the rising cost of psychological injuries, points to a significant gap in the training of CF members, and it is predominantly this gap that needs to be addressed.

In terms of doctrine, Canada is one of the first Western militaries to seriously respond and integrate lessons learned from the changing face of warfare over the last few decades into its ethos, mandate, and training manuals. It has been ahead of its allies in recognizing the need for a comprehensive approach, first with its 3D and later ‘whole of government’ approach to operations in Afghanistan. With the more recent Counter Insurgency (COIN) doctrine, it has been at the front of a fundamental shift in strategy for operations in Afghanistan as well as Iraq.⁷ A shift toward what General McChrystal described as being the physical and psychological displacement of insurgents from the

⁴ “NATO looks to Canada as leaders in MTBI (military concussion treatment) and OSI treatment and related issues” – Lt. Col. Rakesh Jetly, “Mental health and the Canadian Forces”, (Dal. U., Spring 2010).

⁵ Canada Dept. National Defence, “Chief of the Defence Staff launches Canadian Forces Mental health Awareness Campaign”, News Release, (June 25, 2009). www.forces.gc.ca (Accessed August 8, 2011).

⁶ Allan English, *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective*, (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2004). 31.

⁷ Canada Dept. National Defence, *Counter-Insurgency Operations: Land Force*, (Ottawa: Published on the authority of the Chief of the Land Staff by National Defence HQ, 2008).

people, through an emphasis on winning the hearts and minds of the local populace rather than the destruction of an enemy.⁸

However, while this shift in doctrine is important, it is only the first step. It must be met with a corresponding and real adjustment in both military culture and training, so as to effectively bring together intent and action. Words are not enough, and in terms of the additional challenge this new doctrine presents to soldiers who confront a brutal reality that they are not prepared for, mere words can add to the frustration of a psychological injury. McChrystal has said of Afghanistan, “The insurgents cannot defeat us militarily, but we can defeat ourselves”.⁹ The contradictions that lie between the conventional military training, and the demands and new realities of COIN warfare and its strategic goals, put impossible pressure on the already strained forces of the Canadian military. If soldiers are to “instil the military ethos to ensure high standards of professionalism and self-discipline”,¹⁰ their mental and emotional capacity needs to be increased. If they are to be able to achieve the “mission command” that is so important for success in this 4th Generation of Warfare (4GW), they must have some degree of mind training. To this end, the CF needs to begin training their soldiers in mindfulness awareness based meditation practices.

Military service, at its core, already contains a level of near religious dedication and faith. However, traditional notions of military service as a calling or vocation, “made legitimate by broadly based national values”, have gradually given way to “a perception

⁸ Lorenzo Zambarnardi, “Counterinsurgency’s Impossible Trilemma”, *The Washington Quarterly*, 33:3 (July 2010). 27.

⁹ General Stanley A. McChrystal, found in: Zambarnardi. 27.

¹⁰ Canada Dept. National Defence, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading People*, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, (Ottawa: Published under the auspices of the Chief of Defence Staff by the Canadian Defence Academy, 2007). 52.

that those in the military [are] performing civilian type jobs ... [Which] has led to reduced standards of accountability”.¹¹ Whether or not they recognize it as such, in their vow of service soldiers commit to something greater than just themselves: to the service of their country, essentially to the service of others. Non-conscripted soldiers volunteer to surrender their rights. Patrick Milehan describes, they “make a single, conscious and fundamental choice, [and] in so doing, take on multiple risks. The degree of personal choice then diminishes ... subsumed in the general willingness to serve”.¹² The particular level and type of ‘risk’ that is taken on is officially connected and attributed to a “precept of selflessness”, of “selfless commitment and respect for others”.¹³ Especially when it is naively done, whether merely for employment or education, entering into the covenant of military service implies a remarkable trust in the values and sanity of one’s society not to abuse this commitment and sacrifice.

The CF in particular, places specific emphasis on the notion of ‘unlimited liability’-- whereby all members understand and accept that they may be lawfully called upon to die and/or kill; and that their duty is to think of and serve others before themselves, in the knowledge that without this profound degree of service the entire military purpose will be “fatally undermined”. ‘Unlimited liability’ extends the meaning of service “beyond merely enduring inconvenience or great hardship”, to an association with a philosophy and ethos that underlies every action of the soldier, and is at the “heart of duty”.¹⁴ The focus that is placed by the CF on the importance of its military ethos is meant to instil in its members the profound responsibility of being “at all times

¹¹ English. 33-34.

¹² Patrick Milehan, “Unlimited Liability and the Military Covenant”, Journal of Military Ethics, 9:1 (2010). 28.

¹³ Milehan. 25-27.

¹⁴ *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. 26.

representatives of the government of Canada in the broadest sense”.¹⁵ Canadian soldiers are charged with manifesting the integrity of an entire nation, even in the direst circumstance.

Military service is, however, a two-way covenant, resulting in a corresponding obligation from society. Just as the people trust the military to act justly, with honour and integrity on their behalf, the military entrusts its own welfare to society. This societal responsibility, to ensure that the military has what it needs to do its job, and, to the best of its ability, survive doing it, has grown thin.¹⁶ Michael O’Hanlon writes, “At the individual level, many soldiers ... are facing enormous hardship, raising fairness and equity issues for a democracy at war ... asking so few to do so much for so long on behalf of the nation”.¹⁷ The notion of covenant denotes “characteristics of significant altruistic purpose”.¹⁸ But society does not support, and often fails to even recognize, this altruism on its behalf.

In a liberal democracy militaries are something one might support and take pride in, but often from a distance. They are uncomfortable things for a society that is based upon freedom and equality, with their structure, discipline, and hierarchy. Their messy realities of death and horror, and moral ambiguity, are preferably ignored, or else spectacularized, romanticized, or witnessed in-between sound bites with ghoulish fascination. Western societies distance themselves from their wars, geographically, intellectually, and emotionally, and in so doing distance themselves from the reality of their soldiers. There is no longer a warrior class that is honoured; instead the all-

¹⁵ *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. 49.

¹⁶ Milehan. 32.

¹⁷ Michael E. O’Hanlon, *The Science of War: Defense Budgeting, Military Technology, Logistics, and Combat Outcomes*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009). 40.

¹⁸ Milehan. 32.

volunteer militaries of Canada and the United States often result in an “economic draft” where active combat becomes the unrequited responsibility of the working class.¹⁹ These soldiers are then increasingly sent to wars of uncertain national significance, for which the public’s support often deteriorates rapidly.

Erosion of public support for the Canadian military presence in Afghanistan has largely been due to “sentiments regarding the appropriate role of the country’s military on the world stage”.²⁰ There is rarely any recognition that it is society that sends its soldiers to war. Canadians want their CF to be peacekeepers, but also effective soldiers who can hold their own. They want clear, clean, and quick victories, but they do not want to muddy their hands or their conscience by facing a possible complicity in the horror and confusion of the realities that their soldiers face. The covenant of military selflessness is met by a society’s selfish ignorance. This results in the growing distance between society and the experiences and understanding of its military.

The resulting fallout is only beginning to be realized, and is foreshadowed by an astonishing increase in suicide rates among Canadian soldiers, which doubled in 2006/2007 when CF members began to see more active combat, “rising to a rate triple that of the general population”.²¹ It is not just the intensity and tempo of operations that leads to the stress related health issues that military personnel are displaying, nor is it only for this reason that CF retention rates are down. It is equally the soldier’s disconnect from his society, the existential distance when interacting with those back at

¹⁹ English. 87.

²⁰ Joseph F. Fletcher, Heather Bastedo and Jennifer Hove, “Losing Heart: Declining support and the Political Marketing of the Afghan Mission”, *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 42:4 (2009). 911.

²¹ Amber Hildebrandt, “Canada’s Military Suicide Rate Doubled in a Year, documents show”, *CBCNEWS*, (April 19, 2008). www.cbc.ca (Accessed Aug. 8, 2011).

home, and the alienation when returning from duty.²² It is not merely the lack of support from society, but the shocking ease with which the average Canadian, or North American, can be unaffected by their nation's being at war that adds insult to a soldier's psychological injury. We want to believe that we can support the troops without having to face or support the reality of the wars that they are fighting. But such cowardice fails to recognize the intimate connection between society and its military. It is because of this that society continues to send its soldiers into wars, conflicts and situations, where the operational aims and strategic goals are not military in the conventional sense. It is because of this that the military itself must evolve in order to meet the requirements of victory in these new environments.

Because of the gap between society's awareness and the military experience, the responsibility falls to the military stewards and leadership to strengthen and adapt from within, so that members can "internalize critical aspects of the military ethos", as a means of caring for their people.²³ While new wars have led to institutional learning in the Canadian military doctrine, this has led to gaps in out-dated training. "Well cared for people are ... more motivated, committed to the mission, productive, and inclined to remain in service – all serious concerns, given the CF's high operational tempo and limited resources".²⁴ The loyalty found within the military heart and spirit is based upon trust in the leadership, which "imposes special obligations on all leaders and commanders [who] must ensure their subordinates are ... [trained] spiritually, mentally, and physically

²² Daryl S. Paulson, and Stanley Krippner, *Haunted by Combat: Understanding PTSD in War Veterans Including Women, Reservists, and those coming back from Iraq*, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2007). 20-21.

²³ Canada Dept. National Defence, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution*, Forward by General Rick Hillier, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, (Ottawa: Published under the auspices of the Chief of Defence Staff by the Canadian Defence Academy, 2007). 4.

²⁴ *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution*. 104.

for whatever tasks they're assigned".²⁵ The key to achieving this lies in the ability to learn from and adjust to new circumstances and realities, to be open to the possibilities that lie beyond the conventional thinking of the past and incorporate new ideas, techniques, and practices to meet the challenges of the future.

Introducing meditation practices into current training and education is not about religion or even spirituality. It is about "looking after [one's] people ... taking care of their physical, intellectual, and emotional well-being prior, during and after operations".²⁶ Many professions have begun to include meditation and mind-training into their curriculum; law enforcement,²⁷ medical professionals, lawyers, bankers, and corporate businessmen.²⁸ In 2005, 240 hospitals in America were using mindfulness training and meditation to assist their health professionals in dealing with stress.²⁹ Recent studies and research programs specifically aimed at "military cohorts", have found that 'mind-fitness' is as crucial to mission success as is physical fitness or mission essential knowledge and skills.³⁰

Despite the quantity of research on the benefits of meditation and mindfulness based training,³¹ and the adoption of these meditation practices by other professions, there is virtually no focus on mind training in Western militaries today. What programs there are deal mainly with stress, and are essentially reactive. Drs. Stanley and Jha

²⁵ *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. 30-31.

²⁶ *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading People*. 56.

²⁷ Victoria M. Follette, Melissa Polusny, Kathleen Milbeck, "Mental Health and Law Enforcement Professionals: Trauma history, psychological symptoms and impact of providing services to child sexual abuse survivors", *Professional Psychology: Research and Practice*, 25:3 (August 1994). 275-282.

²⁸ Cf: "Dialogue with Goldman Sachs on Compassionate Leadership, September 2008 - Media", *Compassionate Leadership*, Site creation and editing by Johanna Lunn and James Hoagland. Date of Access, June 15, 2011. <http://www.compassionleadership.com/Site/Media.html> .

²⁹ Shauna L. Shapiro, John A. Astin, Scott R. Bishop, and Mathew Cordova, "Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction for Health Care Professionals", *International Journal of Stress Management*, 12:2 (May 2005).

³⁰ Dr. Elizabeth A. Stanley and Dr. Amishi P. Jha, "Mind Fitness and Mental Armor: Enhancing Performance and Building Warrior Resilience", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No:55 (Oct. 2009). 5.

³¹ See Appendix.

describe, “The military generally lacks proactive mind fitness training programs designed to give warriors skills that optimize performances and protect against the stressors of deployment”.³² The point in adopting meditation practices and techniques as mind-training is to create more resilient, efficient and effective military professionals who are not only able to cope with the challenges, demands, and experiences confronting them in modern warfare, but are also able to excel: accomplishing the strategic goals that arise in a new kind of war.

Sun Tzu wrote, “The military is a great matter of the state. It is the ground of death and life, the [way] of survival or extinction. One cannot but examine it”.³³ The profession of arms is unlike any other, its needs, experiences, and insights are all unique. The quality and integrity of a military carries within it the health and future of its society. It is the way of our survival or extinction. It is not, therefore, enough to just add meditation practice to a military regimen. This may help deal with stress, but it will not train soldiers in the ‘warrior’s mind’. Meditation practices, principles, and techniques need to be specifically designed to bring forward and acknowledge the wisdom, power, and insights that are already inherently present in the soldier’s experience.

Various Eastern military traditions have included mindfulness awareness practices and mind training in their militaries and warrior classes for centuries; in the Mongol warriors,³⁴ the Japanese Samurai, and the ancient Chinese ‘art of war’ set out by Sun Tzu. More recently, the Shambhala Buddhist tradition has developed a practice that uses Western military disciplines as the basis for specific forms of meditation aimed at

³² Stanley and Jha. 5.

³³ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Translation and Essays by The Denma Translation Group, (Boston: Shambhala Publications, Inc., 2003). 17.

³⁴ Timothy May, *The Mongol Art of War*, (Yardley PA.: Westholme Publishing, 2007).

transforming aggression and training the mind. This is called the Dorje Kasung. Practices, principles, techniques, and insights, from the Dorje Kasung can be adapted and incorporated into CF training, education, and even culture. This development could answer the need to enhance, and reinforce the understanding and embodiment of the military ethos and professionalism of CF members throughout their career.³⁵

³⁵ Canada Dept. National Defence, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution*, Forward by General Rick Hillier, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, (Ottawa: Published under the auspices of the Chief of Defence Staff by the Canadian Defence Academy, 2007). 10-11.

CHAPTER 2 **Shambhala and The Dorje Kasung: History and Origins**

Teachings on Shambhala and the Dorje Kasung were originally developed and introduced by Chogyam Trungpa Rinpoche, one of the first Tibetan Buddhist Lamas to present Buddhist teachings in English, in the West. Following the Chinese invasion, Trungpa fled Tibet in 1959, studying at Oxford University in England before moving to North America. Over the next three decades he wrote and published numerous books on meditation, Buddhism, and spirituality, and developed a large community of students and practitioners. In 1984, shortly before his death in 1987, Trungpa wrote *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*, which presented meditation as the path to what he referred to as “secular enlightenment”.³⁶ The practices and principles described in this book were used to design a ‘secular’ or ‘non-religious’ training program aimed at integrating meditation into one’s daily life, regardless of one’s faith or denomination. This program, called Shambhala Training, is a series of contemplative weekend workshops that continues today in hundreds of cities and centers around the world.³⁷

The titular *Shambhala* is in reference to a legendary kingdom that existed in Asia during the time of the Buddha. Linguistically it is meant to represent the notion of an ‘enlightened society’, or more specifically, a society whose fundamental motivations are explicitly those of working with one’s mind and the world, so as to manifest genuine compassion for oneself and others in a sane and dignified way. What has come to be known as the ‘Shambhala teachings’, are the practices and principles originally presented

³⁶ Carolyn Rose Gimian “Editor’s Preface” *The Essential Chogyam Trungpa* Ed. Carolyn Rose Gimian, (Boston and London: Shambhala Publications, 1999). Viii.

³⁷ “Chogyam Trungpa” and “Shambhala Training”, *Shambhala*, 1994, Shambhala Int., (date of access: July 2, 2011), <http://www.shambhala.org/>.

by Chogyam Trungpa in the 1980s, and which continue to be developed and taught by his son, Sakyong Mipham Rinpoche, and others, today.³⁸ Trungpa wrote that one should regard Shambhala “not as an external place, but as the ground or root of wakefulness and sanity that exists as a potential within every human being”.³⁹

While the techniques of sitting meditation taught in Shambhala Training are “virtually identical to Buddhist meditation practice”, the principles and teachings that attend these practices present “an unmistakably secular rather than religious outlook”.⁴⁰ The fundamental premise of these teachings has to do with the belief in a basic human wisdom that is accessed and explored using a language of “warriorship”. Trungpa describes there being, “a tradition of human warriorship that has existed in many cultures at many times throughout history”.⁴¹ He explains his use of the word “warrior” as being connected not to aggression, but rather, to “one who is brave”, to the notion of “fearlessness” and to “a warrior tradition of wisdom”, which, he suggests, can be found in many indigenous traditions, the Japanese Samurai tradition, in King Arthur and the legends of knighthood, and in historical accounts of rulers such as King David, and Mohammed.⁴² The fundamental notion of Shambhala is that it can be used as a means of gathering and unifying the wisdom of all these cultures, of any culture or tradition, without partisanship or agenda.

Along with Shambhala Training, Trungpa fashioned various ‘new’ forms of meditation practice in the process of his bringing Buddha-Dharma to the West. “None of

³⁸ A further discussion of the various histories, origins, and meanings of ‘Shambhala’ can be found in the “Editor’s Preface” of: Chogyam Trungpa, *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*, Ed. Carolyn Rose Gimian, Dragon Edition (Boston and London: Shambhala Publications, 1988). Pp 13-18.

³⁹ Chogyam Trungpa, *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*, Ed. Carolyn Rose Gimian, Dragon Edition (Boston and London: Shambhala Publications, 1988). 25.

⁴⁰ Carolyn Gimian, “Editor’s Preface”, *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 13.

⁴¹ Trungpa, *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 25.

⁴² Trungpa, *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 28.

these was more effective, provocative, and controversial than the teachings of the Dorje Kasung”.⁴³ In the 1970s, during a period of intense spiritual seeking in the West, often characterized by an emphasis on love, and light, and personal realization, “Trungpa Rinpoche produced a cadre of uniformed guards who performed their duty in public, complete with salutes and a command hierarchy”.⁴⁴ For most people, at that time, the notion of working with conflict directly as part of a spiritual discipline, particularly one aimed at peace, was shocking; even today people tend to find it surprising, if not incongruous.

Peace is generally regarded as the antithesis, the antonym to War; if you are pro-peace it is assumed that you are therefore anti-war. While this is perhaps an easy thought to have, war and peace are the two ends of a spectrum that are intrinsically connected and a part of each other. The ‘forward strategy’ employed by many of the Western industrialized countries today, has become a multi-headed beast: here it is ‘peace enforcement’, there ‘humanitarian intervention’, and over there ‘counter-insurgency operations’, which may be a new kind of warfare, but embody elements of war nonetheless. War is waged so that ‘we’ can have peace, so that ‘they’ can have peace; the antithesis between war and peace is becoming much more of a dialectic.

Yet the loss of that polarity, of that clear distinction: peace v. war, can be the cause of great discomfort for those, particularly in the West, who might prefer to be pro-peace and anti-war, and not have to think about it beyond that. The Dorje Kasung practice challenges this directly. As a mindfulness practice in the style of Tibetan

⁴³ James Gimian “Introduction” in: Chogyam Trungpa, *True Command: The Teachings of the Dorje Kasung*, Volume 1: The Town Talks, Ed. Carolyn Rose Gimian, (Halifax N.S.: Trident Publications, 2005). Xv.

⁴⁴ Gimian, “Introduction”, *True Command*. xv.

Buddhism, it not only engages the military forms and culture, but actually uses these as a means of attaining spiritual peace and realization.

Dorje is a Tibetan word meaning ‘diamond-like’, or ‘indestructible’; and *Kasung* is made up of two syllables: *ka* meaning ‘sacred word’ or ‘command’, and *sung* meaning ‘to protect’. The overall translation of Dorje Kasung is usually given as, “indestructible protector of Dharma”. However, whereas in most cases ‘dharma’ is used to refer to the teachings of the Buddha, in this case it should be understood as meaning ‘truth’ or ‘sanity’, which is the actual Sanskrit translation.⁴⁵ Therefore, ‘indestructible protector of sanity’ conveys the most direct meaning of the term.

In the practice of Dorje Kasungship one engages with various forms from the military and joins them with the practice of mindfulness-awareness meditation, and the teachings of Buddhism and Shambhala. The purpose of this is to “transform a culture of aggression”.⁴⁶ Through the disciplines of the Dorje Kasung one works directly with one’s own aggression, but also with the aggression that is encountered from others, or in the world. While Trungpa introduced many different ‘meditation-in-action’ type practices, the Dorje Kasung is one of the most immediate and effective. The use of military forms, such as uniforms, command hierarchy, and marching drill, “allow practitioners to work directly with [their] ego and its various games of ambition, power, and control”.⁴⁷ It places students in the forefront of their neurosis, engaging with energy that is generally associated with destruction, but through a framework of self-discipline and contemplation that is used to redirect that energy into the service of wakefulness and compassion. The teachings of the Dorje Kasung suggest that it is specifically through

⁴⁵ Gimian “Introduction”, Chogyam Trungpa, *True Command*. xix.

⁴⁶ Dr. Mitchell Levy, Public Talk, Halifax Shambhala Centre, Tower Rd. Hfx. NS. May 16, 2010.

⁴⁷ Gimian, “Introduction”, *True Command*. xviii.

military forms that a disciplined gentleness of mind and body can effectively manifest as the antidote to aggression, and as a means of great accomplishment.⁴⁸

The conventional understanding of the role of the military is likewise challenged by this practice. While many meditative practices focus on individual salvation and personal realization, the Dorje Kasung practice, in the style of Mahayana and Vajrayana Buddhism, places its emphasis on benefiting others.⁴⁹ Like for most military organizations, the central precept of the Dorje Kasung is service. The practice recognizes that every aspect, each military form, can be understood and enacted with this motivation. Service is a profound motivation, which in fact differentiates the military from any other profession or organization. “The profession of arms is distinguished by the concept of service before self”.⁵⁰ This presents the opportunity for the realization of selflessness in every action taken. “Working for the benefit of others eases the self-centered grip of ego by removing oneself as the central reference point of all activity”.⁵¹

Central to the view of Dorje Kasung practice is the notion of ‘container principle’. Whether consciously or not, we use containers both physical and psychological to facilitate communication and function in various situations all the time. From a classroom to a boardroom, container refers to the procedures, techniques, practices, and protocols, the basic decorum that is utilized in various situations to create form. “Any container is the ground for what takes place within it, providing both accommodation and

⁴⁸ ‘Gentleness’ in this context refers specifically to a quality of warriorship, and should not be understood in its conventional sense alone. Cf. Trungpa. *The Sacred Path of The Warrior*. 45.

⁴⁹ For description and explanation of the three yanas of Buddhism: Hinayana, Mahayana, Vajrayana Cf: Reginald Ray, *Indestructible Truth: The Living Spirituality of Tibetan Buddhism*, (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2000); and Reginald Ray, *Secret of the Vajra World: The Tantric Buddhism of Tibet*, (Boston: Shambhala Publications & Random House, 2001).

⁵⁰ *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. 10.

⁵¹ Gimian, “Introduction”, *True Command*. Xxvi.

boundary”.⁵² This is embodied by the military, which provides a container for society but is a profound container for individual practice as well.

Trungpa often equated the Kasung’s use of military forms with the rich monastic tradition in Tibetan Buddhism. He described being a member of the Dorje Kasung as being in a situation of intensive practice: constantly working to cut through discursive mind and spiritual materialism, and to exchange oneself for others.⁵³ Like monasticism, the military creates an environment where all of one’s activities, thoughts, emotions, turmoil, etc., occur within a set boundary. “Fully entering into either total practice environment intensifies ordinary life experiences and provokes spiritual insight”.⁵⁴ Both emphasize structure, uniformity, and simplicity, and, particularly, service to others.

Patrick Milehan describes the ‘military covenant’ that a soldier enters into as creating, of the military, a “moral community constituting the essence of dedicated service – service taken under oath as [an] act of faith”.⁵⁵ Sakyong Mipham writes, “Culturally we have to get over the notion of aggression and how the military has been a destructive force. In terms of people taking care of each other and caring for [others] it is one of the best models that we have”.⁵⁶ The Dorje Kasung practice explores the military as protector and caregiver to society: it confronts the uncomfortable for us, does what needs to be done to maintain protection and safety, but does so, acting out of kindness and generosity. As with the container principle, the military can provide a sense of safety

⁵² Gimian, “Introduction”, *True Command*. xxiv.

⁵³ Chogyam Trungpa, *The Dorje Kasung Handbook*, (n.p., 1996). 47.

⁵⁴ Gimian “Introduction”, *True Command*. xxxv.

⁵⁵ Milehan. 32.

⁵⁶ Sakyong Mipham Rinpoche, “Understanding too tight and too loose”, *The Iron Wheel*, Fall edition (August 1997). 3.

and stability. This appreciates the complex role of military protection both as conveyer of help and accommodation, but also as a strong and definite unyielding boundary.

The concept of the military as being a protector and caregiver to society is not that far removed from our conventional understanding of a military's role and function, particularly in Canada with its 'aid to the civil authority', and its recruiting ads aimed at protecting peace and sanity: inviting you to "Fight distress, fight fear, fight chaos", rather than to fight to destroy an enemy.⁵⁷ Canada loves its Canadian Forces, they are our fresh faced youth, our international representatives, they come to the rescue of forest fires and ice storms; they are gallant and noble. This is the general view: how Canada regards the role of its military, they are not just killers and cannon fodder. The practice of the Dorje Kasung goes one step further. It appreciates that the combination of the forms that provide the military container, joined with the responsibility – to serve and protect – creates a situation where the realization of enlightened warriorship and basic goodness is much easier, and more directly accessed, because of the military's already disciplined and choiceless environment. Sakyong Mipham describes,

There is an attitude, when you become a kasung or join the military, you physically take on the uniform and duty, and mentally you cross a certain line . . . a lot of people hang out near [that] line but mentally they don't engage. When we take that oath, or make that commitment, we engage in terms of helping others. . . It is very important to have that, the container principle, the military; otherwise a society will just disperse and weaken. The container holds things, it protects things, and it also gets things done.⁵⁸

Within the Kasung practice, protection is viewed as coming from an attitude of non-aggression, manifesting as skillful compassionate action, which brings the neurosis

⁵⁷ Canadian Forces Recruitment Ad, "Fight Campaign – Ad 2", 2010, www.forces.gc.ca (Accessed July 2011).

⁵⁸ Sakyong Mipham Rinpoche, "Kasung Talk", Shambhala Mountain Center (Red Feather Lakes Co.) January 2006.

of oneself and others back to the present moment. Protection is the act of guardianship, of keeping something safe from harm. In the Dorje Kasung it is seen as extending sanity outward, rather than “solidifying personal or collective territoriality”.⁵⁹ The military view is larger than the civilian, because of these precepts of service, duty, and protection, there is a “deeper vision ... [one is] more concerned with the salvation of others than [oneself]”,⁶⁰ quite literally. “All accept that no one is exempt from being ordered into harm’s way. All accept the obligation to bear arms as required”.⁶¹ While the Dorje Kasung practice explores, to the best of its ability as a pacific spiritual practice, what the more profound affect of this ‘Unlimited Liability’ has on the mind and being, it also explores the potential and possibility of what it could be. It recognizes that the military has the potential to be the vanguard for an enlightened society; that “the inner journey is the protector mind”.⁶²

⁵⁹ Trungpa, *The Dorje Kasung Handbook*. 9.

⁶⁰ Sakyong Mipham Rinpoche, “Don Season Address to the Kasung”, Halifax Nova Scotia, (Feb. 2nd 2008).

⁶¹ *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. 54.

⁶² SMR, “Don Season Address”. 2008.

CHAPTER 3 4GW / War Amongst the People: A New Paradigm

Sir Rupert Smith writes, “War no longer exists”. Conflicts, confrontations, and combat continue, “And states still have armed forces which they use as a symbol of power”.⁶³ But traditional warfare, the events theorized upon by Clausewitz and Hart, the conventional wars between two clearly defined states or nations, are no longer being fought. Carl Von Clausewitz is considered to be the father of Western military thought; however, there has been a “transformation of war”. Van Creveld writes, “Contemporary strategic thought ... is fundamentally flawed ... [it] is rooted in a ‘Clausewitzian’ world picture that is either obsolete or wrong”.⁶⁴ It would be irresponsible to discount the many insights and wisdom that exists in traditional Western military theory. However, it can no longer be enough. As war changes so must our understanding. A new generation of warfare is evolving, and it must be met with a new generation of theory.

What has become known as 4GW is characterized by a blurring of the lines between what is military and what is political, between combatant and civilians. It manifests as political protracted conflicts most often in the form of insurgencies, and is unique in that “4GW does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy's military forces”.⁶⁵ Along with an emphasis on the political, 4GW recognizes the power and salience of the will, or moral spirit, of either side, as being the main determining factor of military victory.⁶⁶ Smith describes a “paradigm shift” in what constitutes war in all of its wider

⁶³ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 1.

⁶⁴ Martin Van Creveld, “Introduction”, *The Transformation of War: The most radical reinterpretation of armed conflict since Clausewitz*, (New York: The Free Press, 1991). ix.

⁶⁵ Thomas X. Hammes, “War Evolves into the Fourth Generation”, *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 26, No. 2, (August 2005). 190.

⁶⁶ Hammes. 201.

definitions and permutations.⁶⁷ He argues for the need to change our institutions and ideas in order to effectively, and efficiently, meet this new paradigm.

While various forms of feudal and city-state warfare preceded it, First Generation Warfare is used to refer to the Napoleonic wars: fought with large conscription armies over territory and directly between nation states. Second Generation describes wars of advanced weaponry and transportation such as the American civil war and the First World War. Third Generation Warfare (3GW) represents both an end and a transition. A phrase coined by American military officials after the Wehrmacht's development of the Blitzkrieg, 3GW is used to describe the movement into non-linear tactics of speed and surprise, which aim to out manoeuvre rather than directly over-power the enemy forces.⁶⁸ While Liddell Hart argues that the 'oblique' or indirect approach (which is very similar to this) has existed throughout the history of warfare,⁶⁹ 3GW represents what has been a substantive end to linear wars at the operational level.

Born from the ashes of linear warfare, 4GW began as insurgency: 3GW tactics in the hands of non-state combatants in an unconventional theatre. But it has since then moved deeper into the transition that was begun by Mao Tse-Tung in 1945, so that now it has become something more, something almost new. Thomas Hammes says that we should view this changing face of warfare as being an ongoing evolution, and writes, "If 4GW is a logical progression, it must reach much deeper into the enemy's forces in seeking victory".⁷⁰ It is in this 'reaching deeper' that the insights of Eastern military

⁶⁷ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 2-5.

⁶⁸ Hammes. 192-195.

⁶⁹ Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd Revised Edition, (New York: Signet, 1974). 6.

⁷⁰ Hammes. 195.

traditions can play a role, by helping to develop more comprehensive ways of understanding the enemy and what constitutes victory.

Smith explains that a new paradigm of war necessitates the development of greater insight and the “reconstruction of prior assumptions”, and that because of this it may be strongly resisted.⁷¹ “Advocates of the concept of 4GW say the US is now engaged in the only type of war it has ever lost”.⁷² Smith argues that this is because they have not adapted their ideas about military force, to understand how to truly *counter* an insurgency. “A new form of war has arrived, one that can defeat the previous generation, manoeuvre warfare, by making use of superior political will employed over time”.⁷³ In order to engage, let alone find victory, in this new ‘field’ of warfare, Western armies will need to adapt not just their ideas but also their training in order to create and control their effects at that level.

Expanding on the concept of 4GW, Smith calls this new paradigm of war: “War amongst the people”,

Both a graphic description of modern war-like situations, and also a conceptual framework: it reflects the hard fact that there is no secluded battlefield ... it is the reality in which the people in the streets and houses and fields – all the people, anywhere – are the battlefield.⁷⁴

Combat is no longer elite; it is now “in the presence of civilians, against civilians, in defence of civilians”.⁷⁵ Civilians constitute the targets, the objects to be won, the victims to be saved, and, simultaneously, the opposing force. However, especially when fighting ‘amongst the people’, it is important to recognize and factor in their element as a living,

⁷¹ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 3.

⁷² Col. Brian M. Rees, *The Application of Strategic Stress Management in Winning the Peace*, Graduate Research Paper, USA War College, Carlisle Barracks, (Pennsylvania, May 2, 2007.).

⁷³ Hammes. 205.

⁷⁴ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 3.

⁷⁵ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 4.

interactive entity. The people in 4GW are not powerless; indeed they represent a node of strategic power and influence. Smith writes, “Power is a relationship, not a possession”, thus the capability of a force can only be assessed, not measured: “opponents must be considered in relationship to each other”.⁷⁶ But they must also be considered in relation to the dynamic living body of their new ‘battlefield’. “In order to understand operations amongst the people, and to capture their will, we must first understand the people ... [as] an entity, but not a monolithic block”.⁷⁷ The further implications of this are that we must also come to better understand ourselves.

4GW has spent the better part of a century developing to the point where it has become this ‘war amongst the people’. The paradigm shift “has been evolving around the world over the past seven decades” moving from the war in Vietnam, through the various guerrilla conflicts, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, the interventions and operations following the end of the Cold War, into the post 9/11 counter-insurgency (COIN) operations that we face today.⁷⁸

For Canada, operations in the Balkans, Somalia and Rwanda particularly represented the end of peacekeeping ideals born in the Cold War, and since then missions have increasingly highlighted the confusion and blurring in Canadian minds of how and why and when Canadian military force is to be used. These non-linear missions that employed combat units to confront forces that were not controlled by nation states, and not subject to traditional diplomacy, inspired questions about the responsibility held by

⁷⁶ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 240.

⁷⁷ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 279.

⁷⁸ Hammes. 189.

Canada in the nation-building of others. Ambiguous answers to these questions have helped shape the new types of 4GW that we find ourselves in today.⁷⁹

These ‘wars amongst the people’ exist in a complex and manifold reality. Insurgency is no longer the representation of a movement or a people, it is a competition between the raw energy of various groups, energies that struggle and collide in ways that are incomprehensible “incoherent and incomplete”.⁸⁰ “As a manifestation of war, it is a competition of wills”.⁸¹ Clausewitz described “insurrection” not as a form of warfare, but as “another means of war”. It is something which the momentum of war, almost as a separate entity in and of itself, might spawn and create: “an outgrowth of the way in which the conventional barriers have been swept away . . . by the elemental violence of war. It is, in fact, a broadening and intensification of the fermentation process known as war”.⁸² This suggests the birth of something new, carrying within it both potential and possibility, as with anything, for either greater wisdom or greater confusion. Clausewitz writes, “The question only remains whether mankind at large will gain by this further expansion of the element of war”.⁸³

This new “paradigm” acknowledges a profound change that is occurring in the perceptions and realities of warfare. Clausewitz wrote, “The original means of strategy is victory—that is, tactical success; its ends, in the final analysis, are those objects which will lead directly to peace”.⁸⁴ However rather than victory being a means toward the end-state of peace, in COIN operations victory *is* this peaceful end-state: a resolution to

⁷⁹ Sean Maloney, “In the Service of Forward Security”, *The Canadian Way of War: Serving the National Interest*, Ed. Colonel Bernd Horn, (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2006). 316-17.

⁸⁰ “War turns into something . . . incoherent and incomplete” – Clausewitz, *On War*, Book 8, Ch. 2. 701.

⁸¹ *COIN*. (1 – 2).

⁸² Clausewitz, *On War*, Book 6, Ch. 26. 578.

⁸³ Clausewitz, *On War*, Book 6, Ch. 26. 578.

⁸⁴ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Book 2. Ch. 2. Ed. and Trans. Michael Howard, and Peter Paret, (New York: Random House, 1993). 165.

violence. War has become far more complex, and the role and expectations of the soldier more demanding.

With this new paradigm, a significant change takes place in terms of strategic goals: “The fundamental maxim of all COIN is that the strategic centre of gravity is the populace of the threatened state or region. Without the moral support of the people, no COIN campaign can succeed”.⁸⁵ Insurgents develop and expand interwoven and co-emergent with, and within, the civilian population and local space. “An insurgency requires only the indifference of a populace to operate, to give it manoeuvre space”, friend and foe become indistinguishable.⁸⁶ This brings a new level of significance and effect to every detail of an operation, every action performed by a soldier takes on deeper levels of meaning.

A near absurdity arises as military ‘force’ is subordinated to the entirely new concept of pacific military influence. The Canadian COIN manual states that properly conducted, “Influence activities may even convince certain portions of the insurgent group to either convert to support the COIN campaign or at least enter a peaceful negotiation process ... [thus] the subordination of fires”.⁸⁷ Even in the US strategy for Iraq and Afghanistan there has been a recent shift toward focusing on “protecting civilians over killing the enemy; assuming greater risks; and using minimum, not maximum force ... a radical departure from the precious doctrine based on force protection”.⁸⁸ The new paradigm of war is changing what it means to be a soldier.

⁸⁵ *COIN*. (3 – 1).

⁸⁶ *COIN*. (1 – 13).

⁸⁷ *COIN*. (5 – 20).

⁸⁸ Zambardini. 27.

Military objectives in this ‘new’ warfare are “softer, more malleable, complex, [and] sub-strategic”. Rather than wanting to hold and maintain the territory, military concern is now with how to effectively extricate itself after the confrontation. Smith writes,

The ends for which we fight are changing from the hard objectives that decide a political outcome to those of establishing conditions in which the outcome may be decided ... we seek to create a conceptual space for diplomacy, economic incentives, political pressure and other measures to create a desired political outcome of stability.⁸⁹

COIN doctrine is rife with the importance of “influence” activities. “Force must be used discriminately” because even a tactical success could cause an escalation of conflict if its secondary effects are not fully considered.⁹⁰ The primary strategic goal becomes establishing “a climate of order within which responsible government can function effectively and progress can be achieved”, rather than destroying an enemy. Indeed, within 4GW it is very difficult to discern a clear and specific enemy to be either vanquished or understood.⁹¹

However, all of this is not to say that 4GW is by any means peaceful, far from it. ‘War amongst the people’ is instead somehow more brutal, stressful, demanding, incredibly, it manages to be ever more horrific. Operational tempo and attrition rates increase almost as quickly as resources diminish, troops are over-taxed and pushed to such extremes that the military situation can often become not only unsustainable but also counterproductive.⁹² The Canadian Ombudsman states that, “The Canadian Forces and

⁸⁹ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 269-270.

⁹⁰ *COIN*. (1 – 8).

⁹¹ *COIN*. (1 – 5).

⁹² David Perry, “Canada’s seven billion dollar war”, *International Journal*, 63:3 (Summer 2008). 720.

Canadian Force Members are strained almost to the breaking point”.⁹³ 4GW exacts an enormous toll from soldiers, civilians, and governments alike.

4GW and ‘war amongst the people’ has no front line, no refuge or sanctuary.⁹⁴ There is no clear enemy and no clear friend, no simple straightforward decision-making framework upon which to place one’s mandate and training. Western armies are everywhere engaged in wars and conflicts where there is, and perhaps can be, “no decisive victory”.⁹⁵ “The perpetual uncertainty is mentally exhausting and physically debilitating, and often its effects linger even after returning home”.⁹⁶ Effects which are nefarious and often invisible: from the character of battle “the human spirit recoils”.⁹⁷

While traditionally war followed a sequence of peace-crisis-war-resolution, our military engagements today are born in attrition, exist in chaos and confusion, and tend to have no exit strategy but infamy. The dynamics of this new type of warfare involve “a continuous criss-crossing between confrontation and conflict, whilst peace is not necessarily either the starting or the end point”.⁹⁸ Indeed, a condition of peace is that elusive treasure being sought by both sides,⁹⁹ endlessly lost beneath an irony of bloodshed.

4GW presents new complications for the military that finds its actions bound by the need to factor in the potential second and even third-order effects of every action, on

⁹³ Mary McFadyen, “A long road to recovery: Battling operational stress injuries” Special Report to the Minister of National Defence, (Ombudsman for National Defence and the Canadian Forces, December 2008). 4.

⁹⁴ “The single most prevalent fixture in the experience of combatants was the recognition that there were no sanctuaries in Iraq”. Daryl S. Paulson, and Stanley Krippner, *Haunted by Combat: Understanding PTSD in War Veterans Including Women, Reservists, and those coming back from Iraq*, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2007). 19.

⁹⁵ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 5.

⁹⁶ Stanley and Jha. 2.

⁹⁷ Clausewitz, *On War*, Book 4, Ch. 11. 307.

⁹⁸ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 181.

⁹⁹ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 270.

both physical and psychological levels, as these will determine long-term success or failure for the campaign.¹⁰⁰ CF doctrine states, “Leadership at all command levels must be aware of the psychological implications of and the correlation between the political, the military, and the moral aspects of [a COIN] campaign”.¹⁰¹ Military units, however, tend to be “trained, organized and equipped for combating conventional threats that are similar to themselves in terms of aims, structures and doctrines”.¹⁰² They are not trained to be able to hold their mind to the present moment, or control their influence at a psychological level, or easily withstand psychological attack. Soldiers are trained to react on impulse with force and aggression, not to take pause and contemplate the ramifications of their actions.

4GW, typified by COIN operations, necessitates a new and different emphasis. Any killing of non-combatants, and sometimes even of combatants, can be counterproductive, creating political problems and contributing to the creation of fresh insurgents, especially when socio-cultural codes of conduct may “demand retribution for the death of a relative regardless of cause or justification”.¹⁰³ Instead of the traditional focus on ‘fires’, 4GW demands that many of the activities conducted by military forces seek to build confidence and support from within the local populace, “even [within] the insurgents themselves”, using soft ‘effects’ from the psychological plane to ultimately

¹⁰⁰ *COIN*. (6 – 5).

¹⁰¹ *COIN*. (8 – 2).

¹⁰² *COIN*. (5 – 2).

¹⁰³ *COIN*. (3 – 14).

affect “will and behaviour”.¹⁰⁴ Nation-building, reconstruction, diplomacy, all then become a means of this new psychological based warfare.¹⁰⁵

Gwynne Dyer wrote that the military “is an institution so powerful and so subtle that it [can] quickly reverse the moral training of a lifetime”.¹⁰⁶ Lt. Col. Dave Grossman describes the history of warfare as being “a history of increasingly more effective mechanisms for enabling and conditioning men to overcome their innate resistance to killing their fellow human beings”.¹⁰⁷ Coming from the overt training and conditioning that enables one to kill the enemy, into a situation where “minimum use of force should guide the actions of [all] security forces”,¹⁰⁸ accepting and adapting to a mindset where “short-term tactical success may have to be forsaken in order to meet the long-term operational objectives of the campaign”,¹⁰⁹ is challenging enough. However, a policy of suddenly working *with* insurgents toward a solution is almost impossible for the average soldier to grasp. With recent wars, the experiences that most haunt combat veterans frequently have to do with firing on a supposed enemy whom one then rushes in to try and save.¹¹⁰ Such incongruities serve to turn almost every combat experience into one of atrocity as well (the killing and/or witnessed death of a non-combatant), greatly increasing the potential for intense psychological trauma.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁴ *COIN*. (5 – 2).

¹⁰⁵ Van Baarda, Ted A., “Military Ethics in Peacekeeping and in War”, *The Role of the United Nations in Peace and Security, Global Development, and World Governance*, Ed. Michaela Hordijk, Maartje Van Eerd, and Kaj Hofman, (Lewiston, Queenston, and Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2007).

¹⁰⁶ Gwynne Dyer, *War*, (New York: Crown Publishing, 1985). 102.

¹⁰⁷ Lt. Col. Dave Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society*, Revised Edition. (New York: Back Bay books/Little, Brown and C., 2009). 13.

¹⁰⁸ *COIN*. (3 – 13).

¹⁰⁹ *COIN*. (3 – 13).

¹¹⁰ Paulson and Krippner. 47.

¹¹¹ “Atrocities committed and witnessed [lead] to the most enduring and dysfunctional symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder” – Theodore Nadelson, *Trained to Kill: Soldiers at War*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005). Also Cf: Sharpe and Dowler, “Combat Stress Reaction and the Act of Disobedience”, *The Unwilling and The Reluctant: Theoretical perspectives on Disobedience in the*

According to George Kennan and Hans J. Morgenthau, the notion of working with insurgents is “particularly difficult for [Western] democracies, because these are political regimes that tend to demonize their enemies and, in so doing, find it difficult to reach a diplomatic solution”.¹¹² While being excellent at manoeuvre warfare and conventional operations these Western armies, in order to even hope to achieve strategic victory,¹¹³ are having to find new footing in an era of conflict where political and military developments go hand in hand, where “military force is considered a solution, or part of a solution, in a wide range of problems for which it was not originally intended or configured”.¹¹⁴

Rather than being “merely the continuation of policy by other means”,¹¹⁵ the military’s role is changing, evolving to meet the situation. Canadian COIN policy states, “Because of the focus on attaining political change, insurgencies are political problems ... not solely military [and] they require political solutions, with the military playing a largely supportive role”.¹¹⁶ However, in many ways the military is learning and transforming more quickly than its political counter parts. Our military institutions, as well as our political, were developed in a previous era. They “have at their disposal the implements of industrial war – but the paradigm in which they must use them has changed. They must therefore learn to use them to achieve a different outcome”.¹¹⁷

Military, Ed. Craig Leslie Mantle, (Kingston Ont.: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006). 159. And Rachel M. MacNair, *Perpetration-Induced Traumatic Stress: The psychological Consequences of Killing*, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2002). 25.

¹¹² George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951). 59. And Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993). 387. Found in: Zambarnardi. 23.

¹¹³ Rees.

¹¹⁴ Smith. *Utility of Force*. Xii.

¹¹⁵ Clausewitz, *On War*, Book 1, Ch. 1. 99.

¹¹⁶ *COIN*. (1 – 2).

¹¹⁷ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 26.

Smith describes the military as needing to become “The Impressionists of conflict”,¹¹⁸ ushering in a “brave new world”¹¹⁹ of new ways of perceiving the military and warfare.

Training and cultivating a mind of discernment and control is essential if soldiers are to be able to become these ‘artists’ of war. In ‘war amongst the people’, knowing what action to take, or not to take, not only has life and death consequences, but strategic consequences as well. US Army Sgt. Kendel describes his experiences in Iraq,

The Shambhala teachings ... proved highly relevant to my situation. At times my mind (as well as those of my friends) seemed hopelessly ruled by anxiety and blind impulse ... the path of discernment – the ability to be clear and aware of the emotional climate and the physical realities on the ground – was vital, not only for circumventing the effects of emotional rage, but also for cultivating military conduct that [avoided] causing unnecessary harm.¹²⁰

The Dorje Kasung provides a unique perspective on how to engage in the world in a military way, so as to inspire, protect, and stabilize peace and non-aggression. In the wars that we are now facing this mental and emotional capacity is as important for a soldier to have as the ability to kill the enemy. Indeed, in many cases it may prove to be more important. Sakyong Mipham writes, “The more force you have to apply, the greater your compassion should be”.¹²¹ If we are sending soldiers to fight wars in order to stabilize an end-state of peace, we must train them to deal with their own minds and aggression, as well as the minds and aggression of others.

¹¹⁸ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 26.

¹¹⁹ William Shakespeare, *The Tempest*, Act 5, Scene 1. (Britain, 1610).

¹²⁰ Paul M. Kendel, *Walking the Tiger’s Path: A Soldier’s Spiritual Journey in Iraq*, (Denver Co.: Tendril Press, 2011). xiv.

¹²¹ Sakyong Mipham Rinpoche, from a letter to Sgt. Kendel, in: Kendel, *Walking the Tiger’s Path*. 34.

CHAPTER 4 War Beyond An Enemy: Exploring The Paradigm

Over the last seven decades, as 4GW has developed, so also has our understanding of it and of what it has come to mean as an evolution of war. What constitutes ‘victory’ in this type of warfare, what it looks like, how it is won, has begun to transcend conventional notions of warfare entirely. Yet, Smith writes, it is “the model of war rather than its name [that] is no longer relevant: the paradigm has changed”.¹²² In this new paradigm, what we are fighting to conquer is essentially war itself. Rather than fighting for territory or resources the strategic goal is an end to violence. “The object of both sides [is] to establish their respective versions of peace”.¹²³

Warfare becomes not just a dance but a dialogue,¹²⁴ a collaboration even, between sides. Sun Tzu writes, “The military determines victory in accordance with the enemy”.¹²⁵ In a COIN campaign success is defined by the end-state, which falls often and increasingly outside “of an identifiable victory in a strictly military context ... dramatic tactical military success may in fact be counter-productive ... militarily speaking operational success [becomes] the containment or reduction of violence”. This changes how we must understand the utility of our placement and employment of military force. “The victories of Napoleon’s army were the result of [a] conceptual shift” and this is exactly what is again needed: a reorganization of method and perspective at both the conceptual and physical levels.¹²⁶

¹²² Smith. *Utility of Force*. 4.

¹²³ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 10.

¹²⁴ “Every cunning plan has to succeed against not blind nature but rather an adversary with whom [one] conducts a long-term tactical, operational, strategic, political and moral dialogue” – *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading the Institution*. 56.

¹²⁵ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Denma Translation. 40.

¹²⁶ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 34.

The world is in flux and what an army is, what it can or cannot do, is not fixed. There is no “unchanging essence” to what a military must be; indeed it *must* be as changeable as warfare itself.¹²⁷ The Dorje Kasung use the motto “Victory over War” as a reminder of a fundamental Eastern military precept that sees “true victory” as being that which arises only from “non-aggression”.¹²⁸ Sun Tzu states, “If the general is not victorious over his anger ... one-third of the officers and soldiers are killed and the walled city not uprooted – this is the calamity of attack”.¹²⁹ Many Eastern military traditions, from ancient Chinese generals to the Japanese traditions of the Samurai, hold this view. In the *Hagakure* (the code of the Bushi, or way of the Samurai), it is said, “Win first, and then go to battle”.¹³⁰ This refers to the importance of maintaining the warrior’s mind and spirit above and beyond just engaging in combat. A warrior must “be unfathomable ... remove doubt, and even death seems no disaster”.¹³¹ The mental and emotional training of these military traditions instils a level of certainty and confidence in the warrior, so that if fear and hesitation arise they have no power over the individual.

Expanding upon this, the perspective held by the warrior’s mind, is the notion of ‘Taking Whole’. Taking whole refers to a means of “conquering the enemy in a way that keeps as much intact as possible”.¹³² It is also a fundamental way of being, of connecting to one’s environment and viewing situations from a larger perspective than one might ordinarily have with a mind distracted by fear and aggression. This is the underlying premise of the familiar quote: “One hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the

¹²⁷ Denma Translation Group, “Taking Whole”, Essay in Sun Tzu, *Art of War*, Denma Translation. 85.

¹²⁸ Gimian, “Introduction”, *True Command*. Xxxii.

¹²⁹ Sun Tzu, *Art of War*, Denma Translation. 26.

¹³⁰ Yamamoto Tsunetomo, *Hagakure: The Art of the Samurai*, Trans. Barry D. Steben, The New Illustrated Edition, (London: Duncan Baird Publishers, 2008). 231.

¹³¹ Sun Tzu, *Art of War*, Denma Translation. 64-65.

¹³² Denma Translation Group, “Introduction” *Art of War*, Denma Translation Group. 8.

most skillful. Subduing the other's military without battle is the most skillful ... one must take it whole when contending for all-under-heaven".¹³³ Essentially this is an approach to warfare aimed at conquering the 'hearts and minds' of both the people and one's enemy. Taking whole is an attitude of fundamental non-aggression; it recognizes and respects the basic humanity of the enemy potentially rendering further conflict unnecessary. In this way what is accessed is an inclusive victory that goes beyond the divisions of conflict.

Though it has perhaps not yet been truly actualized, this is the victory that most effectively answers 4GW and 'war amongst the people'. This is the victory of the new paradigm. This is also the victory that the manuals of the CF explicitly seek. As is stated:

Military forces do not defeat insurgencies; instead, they create the security conditions necessary for the political resolution of the conflict ... [engaging in] political dialogue with potential or existing insurgent elements, there is a reasonable chance that the legitimate grievances underlying the insurgent cause can be addressed in a non-violent manner and progress made towards an enduring solution.¹³⁴

The CF COIN manual repeatedly emphasizes the need to recognize and address the "legitimate grievances" of the insurgents and the population. Focus is primarily on the intellectual and psychological aspects of a campaign, with force being applied selectively, and destruction viewed as a means not an end. It is well understood that "insurgents must be defeated psychologically".¹³⁵ In the entire manual the word 'enemy' is used only once or twice. The aim is not even to destroy the insurgents, but rather, to

¹³³ Sun Tzu, *Art of War*, Denma Translation. 25-26.

¹³⁴ *COIN*. (1 – 14) and (1- 20).

¹³⁵ *COIN*. (5 – 32).

disrupt and dislocate them, to create an environment where the insurgency can no longer exist.

Smith writes, “It is the appearance of a real enemy that brings the strategic level into play, for whilst it is possible to have a general policy identifying threats in peace time, it is not possible to have a strategy until there is an opponent”.¹³⁶ However, a shift is taking place even in how we understand what strategy entails and what it must become: something that is outside the general experience of Western war theory, and more in keeping with the military philosophies of the East. Clausewitz states, “In war, the subjugation of the enemy is the end, and the destruction of his fighting forces the means”.¹³⁷ While this statement may still be applicable, our interpretation of its meaning is substantially altered. No longer do only great battles produce major decisions,¹³⁸ and no longer can “the impulse to destroy the enemy [be] central to the very idea of war”.¹³⁹

It is important for strategy to become more comprehensive, more insightful than it has perhaps been in the past, particularly as the smallest action or detail in 4GW can be of strategic significance. General Alanbrook states, “The art of strategy is to determine the aim, which should be political, [and then] to derive from the aim a series of military objectives to be achieved”.¹⁴⁰ The strategic goal of warfare has become one of stabilizing the conditions for peace, the military’s purpose is increasingly to foster and create sanity within conditions of warfare and crisis. To what extent that same military may extend or bring with it said warfare and crisis is only an aspect of a conundrum; the strategic goal

¹³⁶ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 210.

¹³⁷ Clausewitz, *On War*. Book 7, Ch. 3. 637.

¹³⁸ Clausewitz, *On War*. Book 4, Ch. 11.

¹³⁹ Clausewitz, *On War*. Book 1, Ch. 1. 85.

¹⁴⁰ General Alanbrook, British Chief of the Imperial General Staff during WWII. Citation found in: Smith. *Utility of Force*. 213.

stands. Subsequently, the effect at a tactical level is significant, as everything becomes subsumed under ‘influence activities’ in order to win the hearts and minds of the populace, the insurgents themselves, and the international community who watches at a distance. The Canadian COIN manual states, “Influence activities are not considered separately from other activities, specifically fires. They are considered, planned, targeted and conducted together ... as comprehensive operations. ... The smooth integration of influence and physical activities is critical”.¹⁴¹ Not just strategy, but the very nature of conducting warfare is beginning to change. How we understand action, cause and effect, needs to both adapt and also expand.

Division and conflict are not inherent, “polarity lies not in the *things* but in their relationship ... [it] does not lie in attack or defense, but in the object both [sides] seek to achieve”.¹⁴² If the objective in war is to achieve peace, perhaps our understanding of that peace also needs to be adjusted. Eastern traditions recognize fearlessness as being, not in the absence of fear, but in its transcendence. Likewise, there are many levels and meanings of peace. Within this context of warfare it shouldn’t be viewed as the sudden absence of aggression, but rather a situation in which aggression and conflict is overcome. “Peace must be understood as a condition relating to conflict: not in the sense of the absence of conflict but as one in which that option is not chosen”.¹⁴³

Society continues to send its military forces into situations of insurgency, and regardless of the possible tacit intentions or desired outcomes, the explicit strategic goal is to create stability, to overcome violence and conflict. This is a tremendous ambition, but also a monumental task. To affect change within a society, to the degree that the

¹⁴¹ COIN. (8 – 2).

¹⁴² Clausewitz, *On War*. Book 1, Ch. 1. 93-94. (Italics in original).

¹⁴³ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 151.

political will, that the very attitudes and behaviour of a people change, is to engage with something that is “fundamental to the very being of a person”.¹⁴⁴ It can only be moved by a reciprocal connection to fundamental being on the side of the soldier or military force hoping to affect that change. “Views must widen in terms of what is considered a planned psychological activity ... effort must be correctly placed within a wider context”.¹⁴⁵ The soldiers confronting 4GW need minds trained to be able to maintain the integrity and decorum needed to influence the local populace, as well as the presence of mind to determine what actions are needed and when.

Insurgents want to create a situation where their narrative and message is perceived as reality, and they have numerous means of doing so. They communicate in tangible but also indirect and non-verbal ways. Their “message”, which cannot be underestimated, is that *their* leadership will best represent, even satisfy, the needs and end the frustrations of the local populace. Most importantly, this message is premised upon their opponent, COIN and coalition forces or the local government, being perceived as the aggressor, an oppressive force that is ultimately a threat and an enemy to the people and their way of life.¹⁴⁶ Undermining this message is critical to a COIN campaign. Words and philosophy are not enough, if actions, deeds, tactics, and the very being, or presence of the soldiers, doesn’t in every moment counter the narrative of the insurgent, then the strategic goal of the campaign has been lost.¹⁴⁷

To conquer at the strategic level is the most superior form of military accomplishment. However, “It is the will and the method of overcoming the enemy that

¹⁴⁴ Ryan Clow, “Psychological Operations: The need to understand the psychological plane of warfare”, *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 9 No. 1 (August 2008). 25.

¹⁴⁵ Clow. 24.

¹⁴⁶ *COIN*. (2 - 11). Also. Smith. *Utility of Force*. 280.

¹⁴⁷ *COIN*. (8 - 13). Also. Hammes. 210.

decides the outcome”.¹⁴⁸ What the evolution of 4GW is bringing with it, is the necessity for the armies and soldiers countering aggression to adapt, to become extraordinary. Sun Tzu states, “One skilled at battle takes a stand in the ground of no defeat and so does not lose the enemy’s defeat. Therefore, the victorious military is first victorious and after that does battle”.¹⁴⁹ The ground of no defeat refers to the warrior’s mind that is beyond aggression and therefore beyond an enemy, all action comes from a connection to the ‘heart-mind’ that is engaged completely in the present moment. In this way all activity truly becomes a form of manoeuvre, “not in terms of combining fire power and movement but in terms of psychologically out-manoeuving the insurgents to dislocate the insurgency and create lasting stability”.¹⁵⁰

The Japanese term *Kokoro* (or sometimes *Shin*) is used to refer simultaneously to the heart, mind, and spirit. It is often translated as ‘heart-mind’, and is a concept frequently referred to in the martial arts. “When the physical is transcended, the mind is emptied, and the spirit flows through the technique. This is Shin/Kokoro. This is mindfulness”.¹⁵¹ In Eastern military tradition it is essential that a warrior’s experience encompass enormous compassion. The *Hagakure* suggests that “the *Bushi* must seek compassion after the example of the monk ... above all what is needed is courage with compassion”.¹⁵² The warrior still wields his weapon, but it is with wrath, rather than hatred.¹⁵³ It is to protect, nurture, and secure, rather than to destroy. From an Eastern perspective, the greatest expression of the military “is when the weapon and all forms of

¹⁴⁸ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 13.

¹⁴⁹ Sun Tzu. *Art of War*. Denma Translation. 30.

¹⁵⁰ *COIN*. (5-4).

¹⁵¹ Crystal Gross, “Kokoro – The Heart of a Warrior”, Martial Arts Business Magazine, (December 22, 2009).

¹⁵² Tsunetomo. *Hagakure*. 155. (Italics in original).

¹⁵³ “Killing the enemy is a matter of wrath” – Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. Denma Translation. 23.

violence can be transcended, and if not transcended, than used as the means to establish peace”.¹⁵⁴

In contrast, Clausewitz writes, “We are not interested in generals who win victories without bloodshed. The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us take war more seriously, but not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity”.¹⁵⁵ However, a warrior, or a soldier, who is connected to the present moment and fully aware of their experience, whose activity comes from mindfulness and compassion, does not negate the ruthless enactment of bloodshed when necessary. Rather, such is a warrior who performs their duty more efficiently, more precisely, and with greater success at all levels. Clausewitz writes, “War is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst”.¹⁵⁶ But war has changed; objectives have changed; and to be kind does not necessarily mean to be ‘nice’. The sharpness of a blade is not dulled by the purpose to which it is put, or by the motivations that guide its use. In the meditation practice of the Dorje Kasung, a weapon is viewed as that which “focuses energy and changes the ground of a situation”.¹⁵⁷ The warrior’s gentleness becomes one of the most profound weapons in an arsenal.

Even in the history of Western war theory, the notions of ‘taking whole’ and of a warrior’s mind are not absent. Clausewitz writes, “In war more than in any other subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole; for here more than elsewhere the

¹⁵⁴ Gross.

¹⁵⁵ Clausewitz, *On War*. Book 4, Ch. 11. 308-309.

¹⁵⁶ Clausewitz, *On War*. Book 1, Ch. 1. 84.

¹⁵⁷ Gimian, “Introduction”, *True Command*. XI.

part and the whole must always be thought of together”.¹⁵⁸ He describes the activities that come from a “strength of mind or character” as being “beyond scientific control: [these lie] in the realm of genius, *which rises above all rules*”.¹⁵⁹ War produces its own wisdom, while it may take place in a fog or twilight of human perception¹⁶⁰ it engages the best and worst of humanity more directly and in a rawer form than any other experience.

War is inherently destructive, yet it can also become a means of connecting to a greater reality as it challenges the fundamental premises of security, life and death, that one otherwise takes for granted. “The very act of questioning the meaning of one’s existence offers the possibility of authentically coming to terms with life”.¹⁶¹ The world of the military professional, by means of its immediacy, more easily allows the connection to one’s *Kokoro*, to compassion. This connection is the warrior’s mind. It is this element of the will or spirit, the moral element, which even Clausewitz acknowledges, “moves and leads the whole mass of force”. He writes, “The moral elements are among the most important in war. They constitute the spirit that permeates war as a whole”.¹⁶² Even Napoleon wrote, “The moral is to the physical as three to one”.¹⁶³

The West has typically focused its theory and strategic development around linear warfare, whereas Eastern military philosophy and theory is primarily about the essential methods and techniques of the indirect approach. Much of Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War* could be read tactically as “a manual for the guerrilla’s operational method”.¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁸ Clausewitz, *On War*. Book 1, Ch. 1. 85.

¹⁵⁹ Clausewitz, *On War*. Book 2, Ch. 2. 122 – 157. (Italics in original).

¹⁶⁰ Clausewitz, *On War*. Book 2, Ch. 2. 161.

¹⁶¹ Paulson and Krippner. 56.

¹⁶² Clausewitz. *On War*. Book 3, Ch. 3. 216,

¹⁶³ Napoleon Bonaparte, quote found in Rupert Smith, *Utility of Force*. 242.

¹⁶⁴ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 159.

Strategically, however, it offers much more. It states, “When in battle, use the orthodox to engage. Use the extraordinary to attain victory”.¹⁶⁵ What is extraordinary, in this case, is the ability to use and control one’s personal energy or “chi”, which is essentially this will or moral spirit. This also, simultaneously, refers to how one engages the energy and power inherent in any situation or environment, to form the ground of that situation for victory.

A ‘victorious perspective’ is one that transcends the notion of an enemy, or even of an opponent. It recognizes all involved as being caught together in a complex situation, and works with that reality to try and find a long-term stable resolution that acknowledges the inherent value of each party. “The sage commander forms the ground and brings others around to his victorious perspective”.¹⁶⁶ Sun Tzu’s depiction is of a commander who takes a holistic approach and does not limit himself to only one perspective, but instead attempts to incorporate and understand all possible perspectives, in order to arrive at victory.

The potential that comes from 4GW is for the development of a strategy based on this perspective, and thus also of a military that values and acknowledges the richness of any situation, whether it be geographic, social, cultural, or even energetic. The potential arises for a theory of war that views victory as being that which comes from the dissolution of conflict, from the conquering of polarity and aggression, rather than the destruction or subjugation of one side by another. Although our political and societal institutions may not come along as quickly, the military that confronts this new paradigm

¹⁶⁵ Sun Tzu, *Art of War*, Denma Translation. 32.

¹⁶⁶ Sun Tzu, *Art of War*, Denma Translation. 123.

will have to begin to transcend traditional notions of enemy and conquest. It must do so if it is to find any hope of victory in ‘war amongst the people’.

The moral and the physical elements of war must be considered together, “they interact throughout: they are inseparable”.¹⁶⁷ The environment of 4GW shapes its participants in ways that we are only beginning to comprehend. Clausewitz writes, “The need for military *virtues* becomes greater the more the theatre of operations and other factors tend to complicate the war and disperse the forces”.¹⁶⁸ War has never been so complicated or dispersed, and the virtues of the military professional have never been so crucial, or so challenged. The psychological and moral plane has become the locus of affect, as the military professional fights to win the hearts and minds of his enemy. However, this warfare on the psychological plane likewise affects the heart and mind of the military professional whose mental and emotional strength is stressed and over-taxed, and even attacked by insurgents. “Beyond fear and exhaustion is a sea of horror that surrounds the soldier and assails his every sense”.¹⁶⁹ It is a ‘sea of horror’ that soldiers have not yet been trained to navigate.

As society’s support for the wars that they send their soldiers to fight steadily erodes, so increases the need for an honourable warrior class with an interpretive framework that can give the soldier’s experiences meaning. The importance of clear goals and objectives for a noble and just cause is essential to the psychological health of a soldier.¹⁷⁰ Yet clear goals and decisive victories are often exactly what are missing.

¹⁶⁷ Clausewitz. *On War*. Book 1, Ch. 2. 111. (Italics in original).

¹⁶⁸ Clausewitz, *On War*. Book 3, Ch. 5. 221.

¹⁶⁹ Grossman. *On Killing*. 73.

¹⁷⁰ Nadelson. 93.

Without these, the minds of our soldiers, as well as the wars they fight, are lost; and the distance between the military and society grows disturbingly vast.

Roger Crossland, a US Navy Seal Marine, laments the disappearance of heroes in society, but more especially, the loss of what they represent. “Heroism, by definition, implies a superior quality ... a superior individual by virtue of superior conduct”.¹⁷¹ When neither the soldier nor society can answer *why* the military is engaged in active combat in some distant region, at least not to their own satisfaction,¹⁷² the ability of a soldier to maintain that action with honour and integrity is almost impossible. The greatest statistical distinction among Canadians who continue to support the mission in Afghanistan, vs. those who do not, is that they are *proud* of the CF and its mission. However, what about the pride of the soldiers in what they are doing? Trungpa writes, “aggression desecrates the ground altogether”.¹⁷³ We must begin to train our soldiers to move beyond the rampant aggression of war and combat, so that they can perform their duty with honour and meaning, for society but also for themselves.

The notion of warriorship, both in Shambhala and other Eastern traditions, suggests that “in the face of the world’s great problems, one can be heroic and kind at the same time”.¹⁷⁴ The military that must meet and contend with the challenges and demands of 4GW and its wars among the people, must be able to manifest the warrior’s mind in order to take whole. This is a deeper expression of the indirect approach that one can see moving throughout the evolution of warfare. Hart writes, “To move along the line of natural expectation [only] consolidates the opponent’s balance and increases his resisting

¹⁷¹ Roger Crossland, “Why are victims our only war heroes?” The Blast: Journal of Naval Special Warfare, Vol. 36, No. 2. 2nd Quarter (2004).

¹⁷² Fletcher, Bastedo, and Hove. 914-915.

¹⁷³ Trungpa. *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 117.

¹⁷⁴ Trungpa. *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 28.

power”.¹⁷⁵ The dynamic phenomena of military strategy can only be effective when engaged by a flexible mind, capable of thinking critically and outside the limitations of precedence. “A change in reality is being acknowledged ... [but] there seems to be no acknowledgement that it is the vision that is in need of change rather than operational scope or nomenclature”.¹⁷⁶

This larger vision for a military is approaching; in the CF it has almost arrived. However, what is *as* necessary is the adjustment of training to bring concept together with practice. Only then can we begin to affect the realities on the ground with any benefit, only then can we attempt a victory that utilizes force to affect peace. Until then, our soldiers shall continue to flounder in attrition and chaos. Clausewitz writes, “In war the advantages and disadvantages of a single action [can] only be determined by the final balance”.¹⁷⁷ Transcending traditional notions of ‘the enemy’ and ‘conquest’, adopting a larger, more holistic, long-term view of the situation, will change the nature and face of warfare altogether. By changing oneself there is the ability to significantly affect the environment as well as others. The ability to control and alter perception is an ability to change reality. Sun Tzu writes, “Now the form of the military is like water”.¹⁷⁸ The victorious perspective of taking whole, changes the nature of warfare, just as it affects and reforms the enemy. In a world of dwindling resources, taking whole must become the future of warfare.

¹⁷⁵ Hart. *Strategy*. 5.

¹⁷⁶ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 306-307.

¹⁷⁷ Clausewitz. *On War*. Book 3, Ch. 1. 214.

¹⁷⁸ Sun Tzu, *Art of War*, Denma Translation. 39.

CHAPTER 5 **Canada As Potential Vanguard: CF Doctrine Ahead Of The Curve**

Major-General (ret.) Lewis W. Mackenzie writes, “For the past half-century we [Canadians] have defined ourselves as a culture and society largely by our efforts at peace rather than war”.¹⁷⁹ Even with our recent participation in homeland defence and international security, this has been an “identifiable Canadian way of war”, representing our cultural and philosophical approach as a nation.¹⁸⁰ This distinct military culture is uniquely suited to foster soldiers who are able to comprehend and accomplish the strategic goals sought in ‘war amongst the people’. Allan English writes, “Canada’s long tradition of ‘non-violent anti-colonialism’, lack of imperial ambitions, and technical expertise has made Canadian military forces ideal for peacekeeping and other similar operations”.¹⁸¹ It is not surprising then, that the strategy and doctrine of the CF should be ahead of the game when it comes to a generation of warfare the aim of which is peace.

The Canadian military is tied to Canadian society’s perception of itself. CF members “are often seen as heroic peacekeepers, distinct from their American counterparts who are seen as traditional war fighters”.¹⁸² A particular Canadian character is trumpeted through this image of the Canadian soldier, who is considered to be a distinguished warrior of exemplary courage and the highest moral integrity. The ongoing prevalence and veracity of this perception is extremely important to both the CF as an institution, and also Canadian society.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁹ Major General Lewis W. Mackenzie, “Foreword”, *The Canadian Way of War: Serving the National Interest*, Ed. Col. Bernd Horn, (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2006). 7.

¹⁸⁰ Mackenzie, “Foreword”. *The Canadian Way of War*. 8.

¹⁸¹ English. 102.

¹⁸² English. 114.

¹⁸³ Bernd Horn, “Intro”, *The Canadian Way of War*. 13.

This image was, however, badly shaken by atrocities, both caused and witnessed, during peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda. The shadow of which continues to haunt the Canadian society, so often described as being a “military averse nation”.¹⁸⁴ Sherene Razack writes of Canada, “What has been most striking in public conversations about peacekeeping ... is our relentless collective pursuit of redemption”.¹⁸⁵ Because of this, Canadian military policy and approach has moved rapidly forward, pushing its doctrine ahead of the curve in many areas. However, a ‘crisis in leadership’ arising from failures and deficiencies in professionalism continues to persist. To some extent, as English describes, this is due to “the absence of a clear military purpose for the CF since the end of the Cold War”.¹⁸⁶ But it is also due to the lack of corresponding development and adaptation in training, which could lead to an internalized shift and transformation in military culture allowing the new CF strategy and doctrine to be effectively realized.¹⁸⁷

In response to brutal acts and severe ethical lapses of soldiers in Somalia,¹⁸⁸ particular emphasis has been placed on the importance of the “Military Ethos”, which the CF now require be the guide to its members’ conduct and decorum at all times. Included in this is the mandate that members “perform their tasks with humanity ... respect the dignity of all people; serve Canada before self and ... obey and support lawful

¹⁸⁴ Jack Granatstein, “The Defence Budget after Afghanistan” Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, (April 2009). Also Cf: “[The] essentially unmilitary characteristic of the Canadian people” in: Middlemiss, D.W. and Sokolsky, J. J., “Notes” Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants, (Toronto, ON: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Canada 1989). 113.

¹⁸⁵ Sherene H. Razack, *Dark Threats & White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism*, (University of Toronto Press: Toronto & London, 2004). 165.

¹⁸⁶ English. 106.

¹⁸⁷ English. 143. Also: “There is a direct link between military culture and operational effectiveness”. English. 72.

¹⁸⁸This reference is to infamous brutal torture and executions enacted by Canadian Force members in Somalia in 1993 Cf: Sherene H. Razack, *Dark Threats & White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism*, (University of Toronto Press: Toronto & London, 2004).

authority”.¹⁸⁹ The military ethos “comprises values, beliefs and expectations that reflect core Canadian values ... [it] acts as the centre of gravity for the military profession [establishing] an ethical framework for the professional conduct of military operations”.¹⁹⁰ The military values that it mandates are: duty, loyalty, integrity, and courage. These come together to create the cornerstone of “that highly regarded military quality: honour ... [which] flows from practicing the military ethos”.¹⁹¹ However, while these are lofty and worthy aspirations, such sentiments alone are not enough to protect the hearts and minds of the soldiers in 4GW.

Canada has responded to the psychological wounds that their soldiers are receiving from 4GW. But this has been predominantly treatment centric. Beginning with the “high-profile breakdown of former general, now Senator, Romeo Dallaire ... attention [was focused] on stress injury in the armed forces”.¹⁹² Then, in the early 1990s, while deployed to the Balkans as part of ‘Operation Harmony’, Canadian soldiers witnessed unspeakable atrocities and were subjected to an increased tempo and intensity of operations that was almost unprecedented. When these soldiers, many over time, began exhibiting physical and psychological symptoms that defied medical explanation, a board of inquiry was established. It was eventually recognized that the soldiers’ complaints “resulted from the stress to which CF members had been subjected”.¹⁹³ This Board condemned the failure of the military medical system that had not recognized or treated these stress-related illnesses, instigating a reformation of that system.

¹⁸⁹ *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. 21-29.

¹⁹⁰ *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. 25.

¹⁹¹ *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. 31-32.

¹⁹² Dene Moore, “Canadian Forces Battling Post Traumatic Stress among Afghanistan Vets”, [Canada News and the Canadian Press](#), (November, 2009).

¹⁹³ *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading the Institution*. 107.

Subsequently OSI has become a leading consideration for the care and treatment of today's CF.¹⁹⁴ However, while there has also been an acknowledgement of the need for greater resiliency training in soldiers, as well as increased judgment, ethical decision making, and mental/emotional capacity, no actual adaptation of available techniques such as meditation or other mind training methods, has been seriously introduced or considered.¹⁹⁵

Canada's national character and mythology has traditionally been connected to ideas of non-violence and non-militarism. Isabel Gibson writes, "Two generations [of Canadians] have grown up believing that our military's proper role is disaster relief at home and peacekeeping abroad—[not] actual fighting".¹⁹⁶ The image persists even while Canada's contributions to UN peacekeeping missions have been "on a clear decline". In 2006 Canada ranked at only 55th out of 108 troop contributing countries.¹⁹⁷ At the same time, the "comprehensive approach" developed and outlined in Canada's International Policy Statement of 2005 has had its most noticeable achievements in terms of enhancing defence engagements and policy.¹⁹⁸ This approach has resulted in the use of the CF to "enhance international diplomacy through the application of defence and security" in many areas other than peacekeeping.¹⁹⁹ Yet the Canadian attachment to peace is tenacious. David Wright describes Canadian operations in Afghanistan as being aligned with a national interest in global peace and stability, as being a "part of our world

¹⁹⁴ Lt. Col. Rakesh Jetly. Dal. U. (Spring 2010).

¹⁹⁵ *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading People*. 55.

¹⁹⁶ Isabel Gibson, "the Bitter Necessity of Force: Canadian Debate Highlights the Paradox of Peacekeeping in Afghanistan", *National Catholic Reporter*, 42:26 (April 28, 2006). 19.

¹⁹⁷ "Myths and Facts: Canada and UN Peacekeeping" *UNAC: UN Peacekeeping*, www.unac.org (Accessed Aug. 9th, 2011).

¹⁹⁸ Andrew Godefroy, *Canada's International Policy Statement Five Years Later*, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, (Calgary, CDFAI, November 2010). 8.

¹⁹⁹ Godefroy, *Canada's International Policy Statement Five Years Later*. 5.

citizenship”.²⁰⁰ The ‘new paradigm’ arising from 4GW necessitates militaries to adjust their strategic orientation. However, this orientation is one that the Canadian military and society already accept.

The Canadian public has always felt most comfortable and supportive when using their military force as an instrument of peace.²⁰¹ They like ‘politically correct’ military engagements, wars that their soldiers can fight with daring and courage, but also integrity. “Canadians may be inclined to pacific solutions but [they] are not collectively pacifist”.²⁰² If there is a collective reluctance toward military confrontation it is in part because such clear and noble warfare is hard to come by in the complexity of 4GW. As well, there is an increasing ambiguity about what exactly constitutes Canada’s vital interests.²⁰³ Its national security is maintained by, and based upon, a balance of hard and soft power with interests that include a forward strategy of multilateral cooperative security, but also, an investment in the creation of a stable and peaceful international community.²⁰⁴ However, to ‘keep’ the peace, one must first find it.

Recent CF policies and doctrine have moved away from the irony of trying to enforce peace, to a more holistic approach to state building and post conflict reconstruction “that combines defending, diplomatic, and development efforts into an integrated operational strategy”.²⁰⁵ This has developed into a comprehensive COIN doctrine that is ahead of its peers in understanding and describing the military operations

²⁰⁰ David S. Wright, “Darfur and Afghanistan: Canada’s choices in deploying military forces”, (Toronto Ont: Munk Center for International Studies, 2006). 5.

²⁰¹ Lane Anker, “Peacekeeping and Public Opinion”, *National Defence and the Canadian Forces*, Public Affairs, July 14, 2008. www.forces.gc.ca (Accessed Aug. 10, 2011). Also Cf: English. 142.

²⁰² David Rudd, “A Post-Modern Military for a Post-Modern Country” *Strategic Datalink #132*, (Toronto, ON: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, Feb. 1999). 3.

²⁰³ Rudd. 3.

²⁰⁴ Wright. 5.

²⁰⁵ David S. McDonough, “The Paradox of Afghanistan: Stability operations and the renewal of Canada’s international security policy?” *International Journal*, 62:3 (Summer 2007). 630.

of the future. Godefroy describes, “Abroad [this] comprehensive framework is a mature concept already [being] applied by several international organizations including the UN and NATO”.²⁰⁶

The concepts behind CF COIN policies are at the forefront of effective strategy and have garnered significant attention even from US Generals, leading to a corresponding shift in the overall approach being taken to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. There has been a “massive re-orientation”, from anti-insurgency to a true *counter*-insurgency placing the emphasis on “winning the support of the population as much as killing the Taliban”.²⁰⁷ These operations have subsequently entered a new phase where “victory in the field must be linked to development ... [and] reconstruction must keep pace with, if not replace, military force as the primary purpose of the military”.²⁰⁸ While only “glacial progress” is currently being made on human security in these regions, this should not be viewed as a failure or even criticism of the approach. Rather, it points to the need to further meet these concepts with the practices and realities on the ground.²⁰⁹

One of the main techniques now being employed in CF COIN operations is the *tache d’huile* or ‘ink spot’ technique, formalized by the French in the first half of the 20th Century. Its aim is “to physically and psychologically separate the insurgent from the population and to slowly expand government control by using the army not as an

²⁰⁶ Godefroy, *Canada’s International Policy Statement Five Years Later*. 4.

²⁰⁷ John Duncan, “Canadian Military quietly preps for longer Afghan mission”, *THIS Magazine*, (March 8, 2010).

²⁰⁸ 2nd Lt. T. Fitzgerald, “Kandahar Tour: The turning point in Canada’s Afghan mission: A review”, *Canadian Army Journal*, 12:2 (Summer 2009). 111.

²⁰⁹ Godefroy, *Canada’s International Policy Statement Five Years Later*. 4.

instrument of repression but as a positive social force”.²¹⁰ This, however, requires that the security forces “live and interact intimately with the population”, thereby attaining strategic goals of: building and securing bonds between the people and the military; enhancing intelligence networks; and creating a hostile environment for the insurgency.²¹¹ This technique and policy entails an extremely high level of risk, sacrificing a traditional emphasis on force protection for the crucial development of genuine relationships with the people and with “the communities that the security forces are trying to protect”.²¹²

Particularly in regards to this sort of technique, Zambernardi describes, “The impossible trilemma in counter-insurgency”: it is impossible to simultaneously maintain force protection; kill insurgents and protect civilians; and also have a strong enough relationship with the population so as to tell the two apart.²¹³ “In pursuing any two of these goals, a state must forgo some portion of the third objective”.²¹⁴ However, the CF COIN policy reconciles this by not prioritizing the destruction of insurgents. It states, “The number of insurgents killed should be no more than is absolutely necessary ... wherever possible, non-lethal methods of neutralizing the enemy such as arrest, physical isolation or subversion are more likely to advance the campaign’s cause”.²¹⁵ Canadian policy is early in recognizing the importance of capturing and influencing the insurgent’s will, rather than destroying it. Smith describes this as being “a very basic concept, yet one that is either misunderstood or ignored by political and military establishments

²¹⁰ *COIN*. (3 – 10). Also Cf: Robert Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History*, (New York: Morrow, 1994). Pp 150-157.

²¹¹ *COIN*. (3 – 10).

²¹² *COIN*. (5 – 25).

²¹³ Zambernardi. 22.

²¹⁴ Zambernardi. 22.

²¹⁵ *COIN*. (5 – 33).

around the world”.²¹⁶ He states that, when this is finally recognized as being the main strategic goal at both the political and military level, “Only then will the forces we send have utility and [be able] to deliver the political results desired”.²¹⁷

CF policy is rapidly moving away from the notion of an enemy. Insurgents are viewed with understanding, compassion, even empathy. The CF COIN manual states,

Insurgency usually begins with the perception of oppression . . . It must be remembered by those at all levels of command that at the root of most insurgencies are legitimate grievances. Indeed a certain amount of empathy may be justified in dealing with insurgents.²¹⁸

It emphasizes the use of diplomacy and recognizes the vast majority of most insurgent groups as being comprised of “less highly motivated people who simply want to achieve a better life”.²¹⁹ COIN strategy views such individuals as being “key targets for influence activities”, and struggles to balance the tactical use of force so as not to dissuade their potential conversion.²²⁰

CF policy is adamant that all COIN operations be conducted based upon the specific policies of “minimum necessary force and the legitimacy of all actions”.²²¹ The conduct of military personnel and the application of combat power must be of the highest standard in order to succeed. Military conduct must be “distinctly different from the conduct of an insurgency itself . . . the lines of operation within the COIN campaign must counter the lines of operation of the insurgents”.²²² The concepts underlying the CF COIN approach are profound. They are particularly attuned to the new strategic environment of ‘war amongst the people’.

²¹⁶ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 277.

²¹⁷ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 278.

²¹⁸ COIN. (2 – 1).

²¹⁹ COIN. (3 – 13).

²²⁰ COIN. (2 – 9) (2 – 10).

²²¹ COIN. (3 – 2).

²²² COIN. (1 – 3).

However, beyond just concept and approach, Canadian history and culture combine to create an especially conducive ground for policy and training that is suited to understanding and engaging in 4GW. Historically, the type of warfare best known and understood by Canadians, who were often the target of Iroquois war parties, was “*La petite guerre*”, a form of “small-scale irregular warfare” focusing on the tactical rather than the strategic, due to lack of resources.²²³ This was a savage 4GW style of warfare that both Canadians and Natives practiced and developed in battle against their enemies (often each other) well before the Napoleonic era. It was not intended to “seize strategic points or terrain. The objective was not to capture territory or destroy the enemy’s army. Rather, it was to terrorize the enemy population into seeking peace as the only alternative”.²²⁴

Trained and raised in this environment, the CF by the end of the First World War had established themselves, domestically and internationally, as soldiers who were fearless and could go into battle even without a leader, having resourcefulness and intelligence enough to lead themselves. “Canadians were loathed and admired by their imperial regular officers [they were] free-spirited, independent, and difficult to control, [but] also courageous, hardy, intelligent, and brimming with initiative”.²²⁵ This became a unique Canadian military style that has since developed into policies aimed at cultivating soldiers and officers able to “think critically and innovatively”.²²⁶ It is “guided by the

²²³ Bernd Horn, “La Petite Guerre: a strategy of survival”, *The Canadian Way of War: Serving the National Interest*, Ed. Col. Bernd Horn, (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2006). 22.

²²⁴ Horn, “La Petite Guerre.” *The Canadian Way of War*. 36.

²²⁵ Horn, “La Petite Guerre.” *The Canadian Way of War*. 13.

²²⁶ Stephen J. Harris, “A Canadian Way of War: 1919 to 1939”, *The Canadian Way of War: Serving the National Interest*, Ed. Col. Bernd Horn, (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2006). 200.

twin notions that men [are] more valuable than shells, and that [they can] be trusted to know what they [are] about to do”.²²⁷

This has emerged in current command models such as ‘mission command’ “which is a command philosophy that promotes decentralized decision-making, freedom of action, and initiative”, and is crucial to a successful COIN campaign or 4GW operation.²²⁸ Also the Pigeau/McCann C.A.R model of command and control has recently been adopted by the CF. This is a command model which transcends traditional leader-centric approaches encouraging a new focus not only on the intellectual and physical competency and capacity of soldiers, but on their emotional competency as well.²²⁹

An essential part of this model is the assumption that the exercise of command is not limited to the commander alone, but rather that every member of an organization has the ability to effect command within their specific sphere . . . thus allowing for an understanding of the command environment from the perspective of the individual soldier.²³⁰

Emotional competency may become one of the most important elements for the combat functioning, and post-combat functioning, of soldiers. It is particularly relevant at the platoon and infantry level where many soldiers tend to be unprepared “to handle the type of atrocities and operational tempo that they [are] exposed to”,²³¹ let alone the demands and responsibilities that are now being placed on them by the strategic goals of 4GW.

Along with these distinct models the CF also employs a broad view of effective leadership, incorporating and even emphasizing ‘transformational’ as well as just ‘transactional’ forms of influence and command. Beyond the basic level of ‘carrot and stick’ type exchanges and motivations, “transformational leadership challenges followers

²²⁷ Harris, “A Canadian Way of War: 1919 to 1939”, *The Canadian Way of War*. 196.

²²⁸ *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading People*. 36.

²²⁹ Sharpe and Dowler. 150-151.

²³⁰ Sharpe and Dowler. 150-151.

²³¹ Sharpe and Dowler. 161.

to rise above their immediate needs and self-interests ... [emphasizing] individual growth, empowerment, and team enhancement”.²³² However, while this is the CF policy and doctrine, there are gaps in the reality of these concepts being actualized by CF members. English writes, “Bureaucratization and civilianization have spawned a new culture built on business practices and efficiency rather than the virtues of the traditional warrior ethos ... the result has been a conflict between espoused values and values-in-use in the CF”.²³³ As 4GW proceeds it will be imperative to recognize and address the gaps between doctrine and behaviour.

As warfare moves onto the psychological plane it is essential for military policy and training, as well as doctrine, to recognize that command at that level transcends the conventional compartmentalization of strategic, operational, and tactical.²³⁴ Along these lines, the CF doctrine and policy encourages the understanding of command as being a multi-dimensional concept. Whereas concepts of authority or management are based on position, “leadership relies on influence ... [and an] individualistic power ... that allows commanders and leaders at all levels to shape or alter the environment” thus influencing the attitudes, behaviour and actions of others.²³⁵

The practices of the Dorje Kasung understand how the military, as it creates a physical environment, becomes psychological “shaping the perceiver”. When someone experiences a person in uniform, or wears a uniform themselves, there is a discernable effect upon the mind.²³⁶ The notion of command within the Dorje Kasung refers specifically to an individual’s ability to connect to the inherent power of a situation and

²³² *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading People*. 34-35.

²³³ English. 148.

²³⁴ Clow. 21.

²³⁵ *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading People*. 26.

²³⁶ Trungpa. *True Command*. 116.

communicate it clearly and without personal agenda, so that the resultant effects at the psychological level lead to sanity rather than confusion.

CF policy is essentially similar, recognizing “the importance of leader self-awareness”.²³⁷ “Institutional leaders need to understand profoundly ... how to shape the environment so that it can flourish”.²³⁸ CF leadership manuals emphasize personal power, as opposed to just positional power. This is earned by individual effort and must be constantly maintained by “ethical and effective conduct and performance ... leaders must be conscious at all times of their actions, attitudes, conduct and decisions ... mindful that they are always ‘on parade’”.²³⁹ “Loyalty can only be sustained ... through exhibiting unassailable integrity ... leaders [must] act courageously, both physically but more especially morally”.²⁴⁰

Canada has the positional, historical, and cultural ability to effectively change the military conventions by which we understand and engage in warfare. As early as 1905, the Canadian infantry was training its men for an “elasticity of mind”, encouraging them to work not by “rule and formation” but by “exercise of their wits ... initiative and intelligence”.²⁴¹ Likewise, *La petite guerre*, was “diametrically opposed to the conventions of warfare at the time”, it used precision, speed, surprise and insight, and revolved around an individual soldier’s ability to hold their mind in the moment, to know and act upon their opportunity when it came.²⁴² The CF today continues this trend with doctrine that is ahead of its time. However, with the proper training, and the daring to go

²³⁷ *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading People*. 30.

²³⁸ *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading the Institution*. 6.

²³⁹ *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading People*. 29-30.

²⁴⁰ *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. 55-56.

²⁴¹ Andrew Be Godefroy “Canadian Military Effectiveness in the First World War”, *The Canadian Way of War: Serving the National Interest*, Ed. Col. Bernd Horn, (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2006). 174-175.

²⁴² Horn. “La Petite Guerre”. *The Canadian Way of War*. 29.

beyond the limits of conventional thinking, it can also more effectively prepare and protect its members when facing the new challenges and demands of 4GW.

CHAPTER 6 Today's Soldier: New Demands, New Challenges,

4GW brings with it a heightened level of stress at a less tangible level.²⁴³ Its conflicts are represented by increased operational tempo, mission requirements, stressors, and traumas. It inter-mixes concepts of offensive, defensive, and stability operations. It has no front lines and no sanctuaries, no clearly demarcated enemy and no certain friend. It constantly places soldiers in morally ambiguous situations requiring them to win the 'hearts and minds' of the people, but also be able to defend and destroy as their military training dictates; it thrusts some of the most advanced ethical decision-making down to the most junior levels of command. "Such challenges require a tremendous amount of attentional capacity, self-awareness, and situational awareness".²⁴⁴ CF COIN policy states, "The various inter-related dynamics of an insurgency will present profound intellectual challenges for commanders and staff".²⁴⁵ The ability to actually meet these intellectual challenges, has yet to be incorporated into training and education.

If there is only courage without purpose, the darkness and degraded mindset of war will conquer and overwhelm the soldier. "In the dreadful presence of suffering and danger, emotion can easily overwhelm intellectual conviction".²⁴⁶ War heightens experience, and the conventional reaction is to respond by numbing the soldier so that he isn't overcome by the natural terror and horror that confronts him.²⁴⁷ But this is no longer a viable approach. The complexities and challenges faced, the demands being

²⁴³ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 295.

²⁴⁴ Stanley and Jha. 1.

²⁴⁵ *COIN*. (3 – 6).

²⁴⁶ Clausewitz. *On War*. Book 1, Ch. 3. 125.

²⁴⁷ Kirtland C. Peterson, Maurice F. Prout, and Robert A. Schwarz, *Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: A Clinician's Guide*, (New York: Plenum Press, 1991). 20-24.

placed on the soldier, require him to be completely present and aware in every moment, able to function effectively even amid heartbreaking realities. Clausewitz writes, “Any move made in a state of tension will be more important, and will have more results, than it would have if made in a state of equilibrium”.²⁴⁸ War no longer has these same states of equilibrium, and so the soldier must adapt.

War alters a soldier’s concepts of ‘normal loss’ and destroys the carefully socialized rules that provide support and meaning in our lives.²⁴⁹ It “demeans all participants by its nature. That is, it removes dignity and drives soldiers to unimaginable actions”.²⁵⁰ The conventional approach to war and combat is one of aggression and hatred. Clausewitz describes, “two different motives make men fight one another: hostile feelings and hostile intentions ... even where there is no national hatred and no animosity to start with, the fighting itself will stir up hostile feelings”.²⁵¹ Trying to control anger and the momentum of compounded rage often becomes one of the most important issues confronting an average soldier who must be able to perform missions with clear judgment and discretion.²⁵² Junger describes the “irony of modern combat: it does extraordinarily violent things to the human body but requires almost dead calm to execute well”.²⁵³ Combat is not made up of quantifiable abstract variables or trials of strength alone. It is about emotion and the moral element that either lends strength or weakness to the physical.

²⁴⁸ Clausewitz. *On War*. Book 3. Ch. 18. 261.

²⁴⁹ Nadelson. 100.

²⁵⁰ Nadelson. 101.

²⁵¹ Clausewitz. *On War*. Book 1, Ch. 1. 84. And, Book 2, Ch. 2. 159.

²⁵² Kendel. 58.

²⁵³ Junger. 33.

Soldiers are often disillusioned by the capricious nature of combat. But in wars where national interest and motivations are ambiguous and strategic values are not always clear, it can become impossible to find meaning and dignity.²⁵⁴ The noble aspirations and virtues of a military ethos become subsumed in the day-to-day survival of a hellish reality, where the mind and heart are pulled into dark regions that they cannot survive intact. Grossman writes, “not only does the average soldier’s psyche resist killing and the obligation to kill, but he is equally horrified when exposed to the aggression of an enemy” that is trying to kill *him*. The soldier’s response “is usually one of profound shock, surprise, and outrage”.²⁵⁵

Killing is a psychological burden so great that most soldiers avoid relating to it directly. They try not to admit that they have killed, or may have to kill, not even to themselves.²⁵⁶ Grossman describes, “Killing is a private, intimate occurrence of tremendous intensity, in which the destructive act becomes psychologically very much like the procreative act”.²⁵⁷ Yet, this act is made public by war and especially by the wars of 4GW. In order to kill, soldiers must go through an extreme psychological process, “even the language of men at war is full of denial of the enormity of what they have [to do] ... the enemy [is] knocked over, wasted ... taken out ... the enemy’s humanity is denied, and he becomes a strange beast”.²⁵⁸ However, in ‘war amongst the people’, in order to counter an insurgency, the humanity of the enemy must be recognized

²⁵⁴ Paulson and Krippner. 53.

²⁵⁵ Grossman. *On Killing*. 78.

²⁵⁶ Grossman. *On Killing*. 91.

²⁵⁷ Grossman. *On Killing*. 2.

²⁵⁸ Grossman. *On Killing*. 91.

and engaged. “Military professionals today require the abilities not only of the soldier warrior, but also of the soldier diplomat and the soldier scholar”.²⁵⁹

Soldiers still have to be able to kill, they just have to be able to do it with “the highest standard of discipline, especially self-discipline ... critical judgment and discrimination”.²⁶⁰ In many ways the ability to perform one’s duty agitates against the professional identity embodied in the ethos. “Both combat operations and peacekeeping operation put the moral integrity of the soldier under pressure”.²⁶¹ CF military professionals are supposed to be “trained for war, [but] not to have a killer mentality”.²⁶² There is the need then for training in an approach that recognizes something other than rage and aggression as being able to strengthen the will of a soldier enough to kill when faced with that necessity.

While militaries respond to 4GW with leaps forward in theory, policy, and strategic insight, it is important that the soldiers actually fighting the wars are not left behind, especially when the responsibility for strategic victory is suddenly placed in their hands. Sebastian Junger describes American troops in Afghanistan: “The moral basis of the war doesn’t seem to interest soldiers much, and its long-term success or failure has a relevance of almost zero”.²⁶³ The CF states that all operations, not just COIN campaigns, “pre-eminently rely on the human dimension for success”.²⁶⁴ Yet, the system is antiquated. If, as Nadelson writes, “all severely traumatic experiences damage the moral

²⁵⁹ *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. 17.

²⁶⁰ *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. 17.

²⁶¹ Van Baarda. 77.

²⁶² Bercuson. Citation found in: English. 33.

²⁶³ Sebastian Junger, *War*, (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2010). 25.

²⁶⁴ *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. 34.

sensibility”,²⁶⁵ the CF is not currently training soldiers with the mental awareness and emotional capacity to succeed.

In 4GW the soldier’s experience, and the demands being placed on him, are rife with contradictions and impossibilities. The weapons given to soldiers are constantly being developed and upgraded to inflict massive damage on combatants and non-combatants alike, often from a great distance. This poses “peculiar ethical problems with regard to the basic concept of performing [one’s] task with humanity”.²⁶⁶ As well, it creates inherent contradictions between the scope and purpose of that weaponry and the strategic principles of “proportionality”, “discrimination”, and “minimal” force.²⁶⁷ Never have the consequences of the smallest mistake been so great or so vast.

In 4GW asymmetry is used to give strength and advantage to an otherwise weak position. The insurgency deliberately maintains ground where advantages of numbers and equipment are neutralized. It causes disorder and chaos, and advances its cause with propaganda and public action, employing tactics of provocation to test the willingness and ability of COIN forces to act, and attempting to make strategic gains via COIN overreaction.²⁶⁸ An insurgency, even in its many random physical attacks, is constantly conducting an extensive assault at the psychological level against the government and COIN forces.

While heavily equipped with superior fighting power, the COIN soldier is always a step behind, “The initiative at all levels lies with the insurgent. The insurgent will pick the moment at which to begin ... [and] will continuously be in a position to accept or

²⁶⁵ Nadelson. 101.

²⁶⁶ *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada.* 73.

²⁶⁷ *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada.* 14-17.

²⁶⁸ Smith. *Utility of Force.* 276.

decline engagement”.²⁶⁹ This places an intangible yet pervasive strain on the nerves and spirit of the COIN soldier. Compounding this strain are then the contradictions between doctrine and strategy, and “the actualities of war”.²⁷⁰

Even when opportunities arise to wrest the initiative from the insurgent with “hasty attacks”, the soldier is confronted by conflicting messages. COIN forces must at any moment be prepared to rapidly transition from stability activities where they are working with the populace to offensive activities. Any opportunity “should be fully exploited in order to gain the initiative and undermine insurgent will and sense of impunity”.²⁷¹ However, “any [such] attack should [also] be conducted with a view to avoiding undesired effects such as collateral damage and civilian casualties”,²⁷² and “with a view to their second and third-order effects on the psychological plane”.²⁷³ Soldiers are confronted by an impossible task to reconcile these contradictions in a moment. What is more, it is in a moment where their emotional capacity to view a situation with clarity is often compromised, and where any action or inaction has ‘first-order’ effects that can mean life or death.

Meanwhile, the insurgents are “unencumbered by rules of engagement and the laws of war”, and justify their use of subversion and violence, even terrorism, with propaganda that paints themselves as being the victims of COIN persecution.²⁷⁴ They have no compunction about inter-weaving truth and deception, and so long as there is the slightest legitimacy to the messages they put forward, the strategic initiative as well as

²⁶⁹ *COIN*. (1 – 16).

²⁷⁰ Reference: Field Marshal Lord Wavell, from a letter to Liddell Hart. In: Grossman, *On Killing*. 50.

²⁷¹ *COIN*. (6 – 12) (6 – 13).

²⁷² *COIN*. (6 – 12) (6 – 13).

²⁷³ *COIN*. (1 – 10).

²⁷⁴ *COIN*. (1 – 12) - (1 – 18).

the operational will be on their side. The profound importance of the shift in emphasis away from the physical destruction of insurgents and into comprehensive influence activities, defines the success of a campaign.²⁷⁵ It also requires the COIN soldier to have far greater “awareness of intelligence, information and the socio-cultural milieu of the area of operation”, than has ever before been the case.²⁷⁶

The need to respond and adjust is as much a part of any “plan of attack unfolding as the original blueprint”, and the importance of learning continuously what the enemy intends, and what the situation accommodates, “rather than assuming knowledge”, is crucial.²⁷⁷ Yet, “The tempo of operations and the pressures of difficult, time-sensitive work are often such that time to reflect and learn from experience can easily be neglected”.²⁷⁸ There is no moment in 4GW to take pause and re-group, re-assess the situation and one’s role and motivations within it. In 4GW death most often arrives when it is least expected and such moments are filled with anxiety, associated with sudden attack.²⁷⁹ Because of this there is an increased need for training in greater moral resiliency and a better intellectual grasp of situations. English writes, “We now need much more intuitive moral judgment at all levels”.²⁸⁰

With the strategic emphasis on capturing the will of the people, “a compression [develops] across levels of command, in which tactical activities may have operational and strategic level effects”.²⁸¹ The conduct of a soldier at a checkpoint or on patrol, for

²⁷⁵ *COIN*. (3 – 19).

²⁷⁶ *COIN*. (5 – 3).

²⁷⁷ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 7.

²⁷⁸ *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading People*. 82.

²⁷⁹ Junger. 57.

²⁸⁰ English. 117.

²⁸¹ *COIN*. (5 – 21).

example, can “influence the perceptions of the whole populace”.²⁸² The presence, decorum, and activity of all soldiers, at all levels and at any given moment, have the ability to either gain or lose the strategic goal. “Patrols create links with the population and are the most obvious representation of a nation’s tone and resolve ... the tone and demeanour set by the patrols is critical and demands exemplary standards of conduct”.²⁸³

When any ‘civilian’ that a patrol encounters might just as easily be considered a threat it is difficult to remain grounded enough to know what one’s conduct should be. This is especially true for the highly stressed and paranoid mind of a soldier who has not slept, or who has just been shot at, or had a friend blown up in front of them. Sgt. Kendel describes being on a patrol,

When I pivoted the gun around at that car, if I had been more aggressive, acted out of more fear, or maybe hate, I could have killed that little girl as well as her father. And ... the really frightening thing [is] the convoy and my vehicle would have driven on as if nothing had happened.²⁸⁴

The demand for ‘exemplary conduct’ is often beyond the limits of a soldier’s current training. It is too much to ask them to hold their presence of mind enough to recognize and maintain the proper decorum that any situation might need to obtain strategic goals, when a brutal war of insurgency confines and threatens them at every move. The demands of 4GW are beyond the capacity of a soldier whose army has trained them to hate the enemy and believe that “compassion and kindness are for the weak”.²⁸⁵

4GW specifically extends warfare onto the psychological plane, using the stress and confusion that arise from irregular tactics as additional weaponry. “Counter-

²⁸² *COIN*. (5 – 21).

²⁸³ *COIN*. (6 – 2).

²⁸⁴ Kendel. 153.

²⁸⁵ Kendel. 156.

insurgent forces will often be forced into a position of reaction”.²⁸⁶ Insurgents will instigate or provoke various levels of violence during public demonstrations, or may purposefully conduct terrorist activities and even atrocities “in the hopes of provoking a heavy handed reaction from COIN forces that will ultimately undermine their own credibility and legitimacy”.²⁸⁷ Soldier’s minds are attacked as well as their bodies, yet every interaction with a member of the local populace will affect the strategic goal.

CF training has not traditionally focused much attention on interpersonal or emotional competency. “However, as the operational tempo experienced by CF members increases ... this will need to change”.²⁸⁸ Along with increased demands and challenges confronting a soldier, 4GW brings with it unprecedented levels of stress. In COIN campaigns, areas of operation are non-linear and often non-contiguous, the “lack of a localized, obvious target against which to apply combat power ... preclude[s] a rapid defeat of the insurgent’s forces”,²⁸⁹ and “the threat [is] irregular, no area can be assumed to be safe”.²⁹⁰ At all times, and at all levels, the soldier exists in a state of uncertainty, insecurity, and constant vigilance. Army Sergeant Dustin Flatt describes,

The second you left the gate of your base, you were always worried ... constantly watchful for IEDs ... If you’ve been in firefights earlier that day or week, you’re even more stressed and insecure to a point where you are almost trigger-happy.²⁹¹

The ability to rise out of this narrow mindset and be able to operate effectively at a strategic level can only be accomplished through some degree of mental training.

²⁸⁶ *COIN*. (1 – 16).

²⁸⁷ *COIN*. (1 – 16).

²⁸⁸ Sharpe and Dowler. 151.

²⁸⁹ *COIN*. (1 – 18).

²⁹⁰ *COIN*. (6 – 9),

²⁹¹ Army Sergeant Dustin Flat in: C. Hedges and L. Al-Arian, “The Other War”, *The Nation*, 11:31, (July 30-August 6, 2007). 23.

The strategic success of the entire campaign rests on the shoulders of individual soldiers. “A thoughtless move or overreaction at the section or platoon level can easily have ramifications above the immediate tactical level”.²⁹² A lapse in judgment, or one bad day, can be amplified by the media and immediately projected around the world. Collateral damage as well as casualties tends to sour the support of a Canadian society who wants to view its CF members as peacekeepers rather than soldiers.²⁹³ The greatest challenge in COIN operations is “maintaining the moral high ground”.²⁹⁴ Soldiers are given a mandate to maintain the most extraordinary and exemplary behaviours at all times, but with no training to actually do so, and the resulting psychological stress that soldiers face is unprecedented, as can be witnessed in the ever increasing prevalence of psychological casualties.

²⁹² *COIN*. (5 - 31).

²⁹³ Fletcher, Bastedo, and Hove. 929. Also, English. 89.

²⁹⁴ *COIN*. (4A - 3).

CHAPTER 7 The Fallout Of War: Mental Health Issues And Problems At Home

Operational stress has been recognized as “the expected and predictable emotional, intellectual, physical, and/or behavioural response of service members who have been exposed to war, or [other] military operations”.²⁹⁵ *The Military Leadership Handbook* for the CF describes the causes of OSI and combat stress reaction (CSR) as being particularly exacerbated by characteristics of 4GW, for example, “the inability to distinguish between friend and foe ... [and] having no clearly defined front.”²⁹⁶ Stress has a greater effect in the ‘fog of war’, where the imperfections of human perception and judgment are more pronounced than anywhere else.²⁹⁷ It also takes a greater toll.

The physical, social, moral, and economic cost of stress injuries to Western governments and society is substantial. Research from the RAND Health Institute states that as of 2008 over 300,000 returning vets from US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan suffered from either PTSD or major depression. These conditions affect quality of life, job performance, family life, and they place veterans at greater risk for violent and self-destructive behaviour. The economic cost in treatment has averaged to \$6 billion USD every two years, and is only likely to increase as it is estimated that “only half of affected veterans [currently] seek care”.²⁹⁸

Table 1 shows the rate of increase in veterans specifically diagnosed with PTSD.

²⁹⁵ J. Don Richardson, Kathy Darte, Stephane Grenier, Allan English, and Joe Sharpe, “Operational Stress Injury Social Support: A Canadian innovation in professional peer support”, *Canadian Military Journal*, 9:1 (August 27, 2008). 61-62.

²⁹⁶ George Shorey, “Combat Stress Reactions”, *The Military Leadership Handbook*, Ed. Col. Bernd Horn and Dr. Robert W. Walker, Forward by Major-General JPYD Gosselin, (Kingston Ont.: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2008). 94.

²⁹⁷ Clausewitz. Book 3, Ch. 16. 255.

²⁹⁸ Terri Tanielian and Lisa H. Jaycox, “Invisible Wounds of War: psychological and cognitive injuries, their consequences and services to assist recovery”, *RAND Health Institute*, (April 17, 2008). www.rand.org (Accessed Aug. 10, 2011).

Table 1. Annual New Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Diagnoses In All U. S. Services As of September 7, 2010

<u>Year</u>	<u>Not Deployed</u>	<u>Deployed</u>
2000	1,614	0
2001	1,703	0
2002	1,709	138
2003	1,524	1,169
2004	1,577	3,901
2005	1,648	6,788
2006	1,714	7,762
2007	2,069	11,660
2008	2,371	14,183
2009	2,432	13,595
2010	1,423	7,739
Total	21,784	66,935

Source: Personal communication with Dr. Michael Carino, Army Office of the Surgeon General, September 21, 2010. Data source is the Defense Medical Surveillance System (DMSS).²⁹⁹

In Canada there has been a similar increase in psychological injuries. Veteran Affairs Canada states that after the first five years of operations in Afghanistan the number of returning veterans with a psychiatric condition had tripled, increasing from 3,501 to 10,252, between 2002-2007; and that those with diagnosed PTSD had more than tripled going from 1,802 to 6,504. Rates for psychological and stress injuries among those still active can only be imagined, especially after several tours of duty.³⁰⁰ Based on post-deployment screening, however, it is estimated that 28 percent of all returning veterans will suffer from some form of “significant” mental health injury, with treatment costs specific to OSI mounting to over \$100 million by 2009.³⁰¹ However, “the CF also suffers a serious financial loss as a result of this type of injury ... [represented by]

²⁹⁹ Hannah Fischer, Information Research Specialist, “U.S. Military Casualty Statistics: Operation New Dawn, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom”, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, (Sept. 28, 2010). www.crs.gov . Table found on page 2.

³⁰⁰ In 2008 27% of soldiers who served one tour in Iraq or Afghanistan reported PTSD, many soldiers are now doing 2 or 3 tours and are therefore increasingly at risk. *Cf*: O’Hanlon. 38.

³⁰¹ Veteran Affairs Canada, citation found in: “Post-traumatic Stress Disorder Surges among Canadian Veterans”, CBCNEWS, (Feb. 29, 2008). www.cbc.ca (Accessed, Aug. 10, 2011).

hundreds of thousands of dollars in personnel replacement costs”,³⁰² not to mention the intangible prices paid by CF members and their families.

It is difficult to accurately assess or project the potential scope, or cost, of these injuries that develop and emerge over time. It has been found that almost 25 percent of those consciously suffering from OSI do not seek professional help, and that those who do “often delay doing so for up to seven years”.³⁰³ For many of those suffering from PTSD, symptoms can go unrecognized or unacknowledged for a substantial period of time.³⁰⁴ The paradox inherent in these symptoms of OSI and PTSD is that they are the direct result of the soldier’s success in combat. Extreme combat experiences, particularly those experienced as some form of atrocity, are psychologically indigestible. Unable to assimilate an experience, or forgive the part that they have played in it, soldiers often become fixated trying to reconcile or rationalize the irrational and this develops into some form of psychological injury, in extreme cases resulting in a disorder.³⁰⁵

Veterans Affairs Canada states, “There are no hard and fast rules to define trauma”.³⁰⁶ Likewise, resultant OSI or PTSD can manifest through many different symptoms, and in many different ways.³⁰⁷ These symptoms can lead to serious difficulties for a soldier when readjusting to civilian life, often resulting in alcoholism, divorce, and unemployment. Current studies have shown that a large percentage of veterans coming back from tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, have developed mild drug

³⁰² Richardson et al. 58.

³⁰³ Richardson et al. 58.

³⁰⁴ MacNair. 7-8.

³⁰⁵ Solomon, Laor, and McFarlane. 108.

³⁰⁶ Veterans Affairs Canada. 2.

³⁰⁷ Grossman. 285.

habits, which upon returning home develop into more serious problems.³⁰⁸ US Veteran Affairs estimates that 107,000 veterans are homeless on any given night, with 1.5 million others at risk due to “lingering effects of PTSD and substance abuse”.³⁰⁹ More often than not, these symptoms lead to violent crimes: drug or alcohol related assault, harassment, or domestic violence, causing an estimated 63,000 veterans to sleep in US county jails every night.³¹⁰

An American study by Appel and Beebe concluded “that 200-240 days in combat would suffice to break even the strongest soldier”.³¹¹ The military psychiatrist Richard Gabriel states, “The chance of becoming a psychiatric casualty - of being debilitated for some period of time as a consequence of the stresses of military life - is greater than the chances of being killed by enemy fire”.³¹² Combat Stress Reactions (CSR), OSI, and PTSD are strongly affected by the intensity and duration of a combat experience. A study by Swank and Marchand during the Second World War “determined that after sixty days of *continuous* combat, 98% of all surviving soldiers [would] become psychiatric casualties”, and that the 2% who were able to “endure sustained combat” were likely to possess a “predisposition toward aggressive psychopathic personalities”.³¹³ Never before has the operational tempo and intensity of combat been so continuous or so great. Navy

³⁰⁸ Daryl S. Paulson, and Stanley Krippner, *Haunted by Combat: Understanding PTSD in War Veterans Including Women, Reservists, and those coming back from Iraq*, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2007). 48.

³⁰⁹ “FAQ about Homeless Vets: Background and Statistics”, *National Coalition for Homeless Veterans*, (2010). www.nchv.org (Accessed Aug. 10, 2011). Based on a study done in 2009.

³¹⁰ James T. Mulder, “Syracuse VA medical center visits county jails, searches for military veterans who need assistance”, *News from the Post-Standard*, (May 21, 2011). www.syracuse.com (Accessed Aug. 11, 2011).

³¹¹ Herman. 23-25, quotation is specifically taken from p. 25.

³¹² Richard Gabriel Cited in: Grossman. 43.

³¹³ Grossman. 43-44. (Italics in original).

Seal Marine Greg Burham explains, “PTSD is not about being crazy. It is ... a normal response to an abnormal situation”.³¹⁴

Society pays a significant price for the psychological injury suffered by soldiers. Beyond just the recognized financial cost,³¹⁵ military families in particular share the burden of soldiers returning from combat operations and suffering from psychological trauma. “They may develop stress-related mental health problems themselves, or the dynamics within families may be adversely affected”.³¹⁶ Many military families have described the need for anger management courses for their children, couples counselling, and financial caregiver support. Such issues are only peripherally on the CF agenda to be addressed, and are not currently subsidized by the government.³¹⁷

A tragic cost is also extracted by the rising rate of suicide among military professionals. Reaching record levels in both Canada and the United States in 2006 suicide rates among veterans and active duty personnel have only increased.³¹⁸ In 2009 the US Army counted 160 suicides, its highest total ever. The rate was above that of the civilian population for the second year in a row, and did not include the additional 146 deaths that were attributed to either drug or alcohol overdose, or other ‘risky behaviour’.³¹⁹ The Veterans Affairs Department shows an average of 950 suicide attempts each month resulting in 18 deaths every day; however this data only includes

³¹⁴ Greg Burham, “One team mate’s journey with PTSD”, *The Blast: Journal of Naval Special Warfare*, 36:4 4th Quarter (2004). 37.

³¹⁵ Cf: David Perry, “Canada’s seven billion dollar war”, *International Journal*, 63:3 (Summer 2008). And, Jomana Amara and Ann Hendricks, “Healthcare issues of the Iraq and Afghan Wars: short and long-term impacts on US veterans’ healthcare”, *Defense & Security Analysis*, 25:3 (2009). 292.

³¹⁶ McFadyen. 4.

³¹⁷ McFadyen. 19-20.

³¹⁸ O’Hanlon. 37-38.

³¹⁹ “Army Suicide Rate Highest Ever Last year”, *CBSNews*, (July 29, 2010). www.cbsnews.com (Accessed Aug. 10, 2011).

those veterans receiving registered treatment.³²⁰ Thomas Insell, director of the National Institute of Mental Health, states, “The number of suicides among veterans of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may [eventually] exceed the combat death toll because of inadequate mental health care”.³²¹

The Ombudsman for National Defence and the CF reported, in both 2002 and 2008, that PTSD, depression, and alcoholism, continued to be very serious problems for “hundreds-if not thousands- of members of the Canadian Forces . . . [and that] the military’s approach to mental health injuries [was] inadequate”.³²² While there has been a great deal of advocating around the topic, only 18 out of the 31 recommendations made by the Ombudsman in 2002 had been successfully implemented by 2008. A number of mental health care centers have been created across the country. However, many CF personnel continue to fall through the cracks, failing to get proper diagnoses and treatment,³²³ even while the CF spends approximately \$500 million a year on healthcare services.³²⁴

The CF has begun to adopt practical initiatives that directly affect the level of intensity and prevalence of stress related injuries in their military personnel. The most significant of these is the practice of “third location decompression”, which began in 2002 with Canada’s first tour of duty in Afghanistan. This ‘third location decompression’ is when units spend approximately 5 days in a neutral environment

³²⁰ Rick Maze, “18 veterans commit suicide each day”, ArmyTimes: News, (April 22, 2010). www.armytimes.com (Accessed Aug. 10, 2011).

³²¹ Thomas Insell, citation found in: Avram Goldstein, “Post-War Suicides May Exceed Combat Deaths, US Says”, Bloomberg: News, (May 5, 2008).

³²² Mary McFadyen, “A long road to recovery: Battling operational stress injuries” Special Report to the Minister of National Defence, (Ombudsman for National Defence and the Canadian Forces, December 2008). 1. (This same quote can also be found in the annual report for 2008).

³²³ McFadyen. 5.

³²⁴ McFadyen. 15. See also: Moore.

before returning to Canada after a tour of duty. It was developed by Lt. Col. Pat Stogran, who, “mindful of his own problems with reintegration after serving in Bosnia ... recognized the need for a gradual transition from the theatre of operation” before returning home.³²⁵ These cool down periods often foster a kind of group therapy that helps to buffer re-integration into society, and is increasingly focused on trying to process events that might lead to psychological injury over time. “Third location decompression does not necessarily prevent psychological difficulties from arising ... [However] it can help soldiers cope with psychological trauma ... [and] recognize the need to seek treatment should symptoms arise”.³²⁶

Responses to OSI and related mental health issues have tended to be treatment-centric. Although the CF has initiated greater pre-combat psychological screening, and has enhanced the psychological components of pre-deployment training somewhat, prevention is not seen as being as salient an issue as treatment. However, stress has both biological and psychological consequences. Physiologically it reduces the capacity to process new information and learn, it also biases decision making towards the more reactive, unconscious, emotional choices available. Recent studies by Drs. Stanley and Jha have found that “the negative effects of stress ... degrades soldiers’ capacity to manage their own emotions and thereby control impulsive, reactive behaviour, [leading to] a decrease in their ability to perform their mission effectively”.³²⁷ The negative effects of stress are just as important during deployment as they are afterward.

³²⁵ Michel Rossignol, “Afghanistan: Military personnel and OSI” Political and Social Affairs Division, (Nov. 7, 2007). 1. Article can be accessed at: prb0720-e.pdf

³²⁶ Rossignol. 2.

³²⁷ Stanley and Jha. 3-4.

This fallout from war: the trauma and mental health issues that haunt our soldiers both on the field and off; the scrutiny, and also the importance, of every decision and action made in the midst of combat; these not only affect the aggregate victories of strategic goals in-theatre, but also the domestic support for the troops and for the campaign. “From the perspective of Canadians ... it is not only what the [military] profession does, but how it does it. In other words, the profession must meet public expectations of consistent and exemplary behaviour and conduct”.³²⁸ Yet, as Grossman writes, “the aspects of combat trauma impact profoundly upon the individual’s contribution to the battlefield”.³²⁹ For both soldiers and society an atmosphere of defeat at a strategic level can inspire a sense of “wasted effort” and lead to a steady erosion of morale.³³⁰

Clausewitz describes all engagements in war as being comprised of two forces, the moral and the physical, “the two cannot be separated”³³¹ and of the two, it is the loss of the moral “that has proved the major decisive factor”.³³² A recent report from the Pentagon based on polls taken from US military personnel between 2007 and 2010 found “a significant decline in reports of individual morale”, and increasingly high reports of “acute stress”.³³³ Increasingly the soldiers of Western militaries feel that the demands being placed on them are too great, that the reasons for war are too vague, and that the

³²⁸ *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. 61.

³²⁹ Grossman. *On Killing*. 85.

³³⁰ Clausewitz. *On War*. Book 4, Ch. 10. 303.

³³¹ Clausewitz. *On War*. Book 2, Ch. 2. 157.

³³² Clausewitz. *On War*. Book 4, Ch. 4. 273-274.

³³³ Charles Keyes, “New Pentagon Study Finds Psychological Toll From Years of Fighting”, [CNN:NEWS](http://www.edition.cnn.com), (May 19, 2011). www.edition.cnn.com (Accessed Aug. 11, 2011).

virtue of their actions is either unclear or unending. The subsequent decrease in morale can have far reaching effects on operational effectiveness and mission success.³³⁴

The most important assets in war are the soldiers who have “the intellectual qualities to rise above the narrow and particular to comprehend the whole ... to act with a single purpose and as the supreme commander would, even if he [is] not there”.³³⁵ The CF recognizes that with the conditions facing leaders and soldiers today current training is insufficient.³³⁶ CF doctrine states, that “flexibility of thought and behaviour is the wellspring of resourcefulness and adaptability”.³³⁷ Yet such qualities and abilities need to be specifically cultivated and taught, they cannot just be assumed or taken for granted. “The key issue is the need [for] members of the military to retain a measure of integrity and humanity that transcends a world of hatred and bloodshed”.³³⁸ But in order to do so soldiers must be trained to have mental and emotional stability that comes from a place of inner strength. Otherwise, the expression of force will be ineffectual and meaningless, resulting in experiences that soldiers cannot psychologically integrate or overcome.

³³⁴ English. 84.

³³⁵ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 93.

³³⁶ *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading People*. 58-59.

³³⁷ *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading People*. 84.

³³⁸ Van Baarda. 77.

CHAPTER 8 Mind Training And The Benefits Of Meditation

The CF COIN manual emphasizes the need for awareness and consideration, cultural awareness, communications and ethics, authentic leadership and the ability to transform people and environments.³³⁹ Yet there is no discussion of awareness training. Although the need for mindfulness and for the awareness of one's own mind is tacitly implied throughout, it is never explicitly mentioned. The CF recognizes that "conventional armies may not necessarily be routinely structured to conduct a COIN campaign", as they don't specifically foster the qualities in a soldier that are needed: flexibility of mind, confidence, ingenuity and resourcefulness, "down to the lowest levels of command".³⁴⁰ Manuals describe the need for additional "intellectual training for all ranks to ensure that they understand the unique aspects of a COIN campaign, the potential operational and strategic impacts that low-level decisions and actions can have, and the need to influence the will of the local population".³⁴¹ But there is no exploration of how this might be done.

Leaders and commanders are admonished to understand and appreciate the importance of sophisticated and integrated influence activities. They are asked to develop a personal commitment to working at this psychological level:

Placing faith in influence activities may seem counter-intuitive ... however it is essential that this cognitive leap is made ... the commander must understand that [these] may reside outside of some soldier's 'comfort zone'. The confidence to trust in and properly employ influence activities will only occur if the commander demonstrates his own faith in non-physical activities.³⁴²

³³⁹ *COIN*. (6 – 29).

³⁴⁰ *COIN*. (1 – 15).

³⁴¹ *COIN*. (10 – 3).

³⁴² *COIN*. (8 – 4).

Influence activities are mentioned again and again, but while “leaders must insist upon meeting ... primary physical needs”, there is no time or space given to specifically working with and training the mind.³⁴³ Stogran says, “The military trains from a physical perspective to the highest possible level to meet the challenges overseas ... what’s missing right now [is] psychological training”.³⁴⁴

To some extent other Western militaries have already begun to address psychological training through the use of meditation and mind-training programs. Recently the US Army and the Defense Department have begun to send their soldiers to participate in a voluntary program called ‘Warrior Mind Training’ that utilizes meditation to train soldiers “in the art of mental toughness”.³⁴⁵ As well, Drs. Stanley and Jha completed a preliminary study in 2009 that found significant and positive effects resulting from a program of daily meditation practice over the course of a single deployment in Iraq. Their case study presents findings from a detachment of US Marines who received Mindfulness-Based Mind Fitness training prior to deployment. It found that the more time spent engaged in meditation practice corresponded to greater self-reported situational awareness, an increase in quality of life, and a decrease in perceived stress.³⁴⁶ For years now, US Navy SEALs have been offered the ‘Silva Mind Control Course’ which offers training to get to an “alpha state” where brainwaves are those associated with meditation, R.E.M., and creativity.³⁴⁷

³⁴³ *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading People*. 57.

³⁴⁴ Col. Pat Stogran, quoted in: Craig Oliver, “Military reaches out to soldiers with PTSD”, *CTV News*, (June 28, 2009). www.ctv.ca (Accessed May 11, 2010).

³⁴⁵ Bonnie Rochman, “Samurai Mind Training for Modern American Warriors”, *Time US*, (Sept. 6, 2009). www.Time.com (Accessed June 5, 2010).

³⁴⁶ Stanley and Jha. (2009).

³⁴⁷ Crossland. 15.

The campaigns of 4GW require soldiers at every level to take on a ‘big view’, to comprehend and act from a larger perspective. “The transformation of the CF into a force that is more relevant, responsive and effective in today’s complex and dangerous battle space requires ... leaders capable of executing ... a mission command philosophy” driven by an internalization of the military ethos.³⁴⁸ In order to stay relevant the military must be “demonstrably capable of succeeding across the full range of missions that could be assigned by the government”.³⁴⁹ These are increasingly outside the current purview of military education and training.

Sun Tzu states, “Knowing the other and knowing oneself, in one hundred battles [there is] no danger ... Not knowing the other and not knowing oneself, in every battle certain defeat”.³⁵⁰ Self knowledge from the perspective of Eastern military philosophy includes awareness of the full condition of one’s forces and the terrain. It involves knowing one’s strengths, weaknesses, advantages and limitations. But it begins at a very intimate level of knowing one’s own mind, and because that mind is known, the knowledge of everything else falls easily into place. It creates a victorious perspective that includes the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy.³⁵¹ Clausewitz describes the “strength of mind” or “character” that gives rise to military genius, as being “simply the sense of human dignity ... that will not be unbalanced by the most powerful emotions”.³⁵²

While perhaps simple, there is nothing easy about developing or maintaining, let alone manifesting, strength of mind and character, or even human dignity. Meditation

³⁴⁸ General Rick Hillier, “Forward”, *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading People*. Iii.

³⁴⁹ *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. 66.

³⁵⁰ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Denma Translation. 28.

³⁵¹ Denma Translation Group, “Introduction”, *Art of War*. Denma Translation. 3.

³⁵² Clausewitz. *On War*. Book 1, Ch. 3. 122.

and mindfulness practice can be difficult, especially at first. Working with taming the wildness of mind and emotion takes diligence, patience, and incredible commitment. US Marines involved in meditation programs through the US Defense Department³⁵³ describe strengthening the mind as being “harder than push-ups”.³⁵⁴ However, results can be immediate. A pilot study done with veterans from Iraq found a 50 percent reduction in symptoms of PTSD after 8 weeks of meditation, conducted using the Clinician Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS) as the primary measure for assessing effectiveness. It was found that regular practice even over the short-term produced changes in sympathetic nervous system activity, decreased blood pressure, and lowered reactivity to stress.³⁵⁵

Meditation is currently being used with soldiers and veterans, mostly in dealing with stress, it is a highly effective treatment for depression and stress related illnesses.³⁵⁶ However, beyond just this, meditation and mind training should also be considered as crucial for militaries facing the new demands and challenges of 4GW. Sakyong Mipham states, “What is striking is how much the role of the military has to do with understanding the minds of others, as well as understanding the mind of oneself”.³⁵⁷ Eastern philosophy recognizes the power and volatility of the mind. When the mind is untrained it is like an untrammelled horse and every encounter acts upon it with provocation; anger, fear, depression, irritation, desire; whatever it is, it pulls the mind away.³⁵⁸ The military is an excellent container for working with this discursiveness because a soldier doesn’t have

³⁵³ Cf: <http://warriortraining.us/>

³⁵⁴ Rochman, “Samurai Mind Training for Modern American Warriors”.

³⁵⁵ Joshua Rosenthal, Sarina Grosswald, Ross Richard, and Norman Rosenthal, “Effects of Transcendental Meditation in Veterans of OEF/OIF with Post-traumatic Stress Disorder: A Pilot Study”, *Military Medicine*, 176:6 (June 2011). 626-630.

³⁵⁶ See Appendix.

³⁵⁷ Sakyong Mipham, “Dharmapalas and Simple Soldiers”, International Address to the Dorje Kasung. Halifax Nova Scotia, (March 2, 2001).

³⁵⁸ Sakyong Mipham, *Turning the Mind into an Ally*, (New York: Riverhead Books, 2003). 18-20.

the luxury of loosing himself in every thought or impulse. However, the military also leads the soldier into encounters of enormous intensity.

Gwynne Dyer writes, “All soldiers belong to the same profession, no matter what country they serve, and it makes them different from everybody else ... for their job is ultimately about killing and dying, and those things are not a natural vocation for any human being”. In a study conducted during the Second World War by US Army Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall, it was found that only 15-20% of American riflemen fired their weapon at the enemy during combat.³⁵⁹ Marshall writes,

[Even] the man who can endure the mental and physical stresses of combat-still has such an inner and usually unrealized resistance towards killing a fellow man that he will not of his own volition take life if it is possible to turn away from that responsibility.³⁶⁰

These findings led many Western militaries to adjust their training programs to incorporate cognitive and behavioural conditioning, and stress inoculation training taken from studies in Pavlovian conditioning with dogs. These were used to counter the natural resistance to killing, often by replacing it with emotional responses “oriented toward hate” and aggression.³⁶¹ By the end of the Vietnam War, the percentage of soldiers who were firing their weapons in combat had dramatically increased to 95%. Grossman writes, “We may have enhanced the killing ability of the average soldier ... but in doing so we have not made them capable of handling [it] ... severe psychological trauma becomes a distinct possibility when psychological safeguards of such magnitude are over-ridden”.³⁶² Recent increases in psychological casualties have proven this.

³⁵⁹ Grossman. *On Killing*. 3-4.

³⁶⁰ S.L.A. Marshall *Men Against Fire*, Found in: Grossman, *On Killing*. 1.

³⁶¹ Grossman. *On Killing*. 80-81.

³⁶² Grossman. *On Killing*. 295 and 252.

Current pre-combat training programs also encourage “psychic numbing”, which specifically represses or inhibits a soldier’s natural compassion or inter-personal sensitivity.³⁶³ Studies on this have focused mainly on its compression of the effects of traumatic stress, and its interaction with a condition called “impacted grief” whereby a soldier’s normal grief and mourning reactions are inhibited through pre-deployment and in-theatre conditioning. Findings suggest that both of these create psychological scarring, dissociation, and significant decreases in cognitive functioning.³⁶⁴ But they also suggest that a soldier’s ability to successfully engage in influence activities is being compromised.

Mind training can help to counteract the cognitive degradation that results from this stress inoculation and other pre-combat training. Major Dickey writes, “Mindfulness cultivation fosters the development of an internal locus of control [that] encourages association as opposed to dissociation, and promotes opening up the field of awareness as opposed to restricting it”.³⁶⁵ Well documented theories of neuro-plasticity suggest that with the repetition of certain mental processes, through meditation, the structure of the brain is neurologically altered so that mental processing and function becomes more efficient, and more resilient to stress.³⁶⁶ Stanley and Jha argue that far beyond its use in relieving and addressing issues of stress, meditation can help soldiers “perceive and relate to deployment stressors differently”, and can be used as “mental armour” that actually protects the soldier’s mind.³⁶⁷

³⁶³ Peterson, Prout, and Schwarz. 22.

³⁶⁴ Peterson, Kirtland, Prout, and Schwarz. 22.

³⁶⁵ Major G. W. Dickey, “Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy as a Complementary Treatment for Combat/Operational Stress and Combat Post Traumatic Stress Disorder”, Master’s Thesis- US Marine Corps U. Quantico Va. (April 18, 2008). ii.

³⁶⁶ Stanley and Jha. 3-7.

³⁶⁷ Stanley and Jha. 6.

Mindfulness awareness meditation practices have been shown to build resiliency and lead to faster recovery from cognitive degradation and psychological trauma. In studies with the military, they have also been proven to “enhance mission performance” as well as help manage stress.³⁶⁸ The commanders and leaders of the CF are responsible for ensuring their own ability, and the ability of those beneath them, “[to be] capable of transforming from the art of the familiar into the art of the possible”, where it is understood that anything might be possible given the right perspective.³⁶⁹ This is a noble, but frankly outrageous concept. One that cannot be actualized without the proper education and training

Meditation has begun to be utilized in many different areas and by various professions. Scientifically its beneficial effects on the brain and cognitive function, the nervous system, the lymphatic system, and even the cardio-thoracic system have been found to be significant.³⁷⁰ Meditation is used in schools, hospitals, and prisons,³⁷¹ by bankers, businessmen, paramedics, and police, to name but a few.³⁷² The most common form of meditation in these circumstances tends to be mindfulness meditation, which is a process of bringing the attention to the present moment in a relaxed yet purposeful and non-judgmental way.³⁷³ However, meditation practices that also foster compassion have

³⁶⁸ Stanley and Jha. 15.

³⁶⁹ *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading the Institution*. 139.

³⁷⁰ See Appendix.

³⁷¹ Fleet Maul, *Dharma in Hell*, Ed. Kate Crisp, (Boulder Co.: Prison Dharma Network, 2005).

³⁷² “Dialogue with Goldman Sachs on Compassionate Leadership, September 2008 - Media”, *Compassionate Leadership*, Site creation and editing by Johanna Lunn and James Hoagland. Date of Access, June 15, 2011. <http://www.compassionleadership.com/Site/Media.html> .

³⁷³ Stanley and Jha. 8.

been shown to have more significant effects over a longer period of time.³⁷⁴ Stephen Pincock writes,

The approach to dissipating negative emotions ... is to train the mind to focus on the phenomenon of the emotion rather than the cause ... the notion of mind training is that attention, altruism and compassion, emotional balance and happiness are skills that can be trained ... meditation is not a mere relaxation method but an in-depth, long-term cultivation of human qualities.³⁷⁵

Through the training found in meditation the mind becomes tamed, it is not so easily overwhelmed and carried away by the thoughts and emotions that act upon it. Sakyong Mipham describes how in “peaceful abiding” meditation, also called shamatha, “we can create an alliance that allows us to actually use our mind, rather than be used by it”.³⁷⁶ He points to the fact that the mind is constantly meditating on something, it is just usually done without awareness or control. “Meditation is the natural process of becoming familiar with an object by repeatedly placing [the] mind upon it”.³⁷⁷

With shamatha (mindfulness) meditation practice the object of meditation is the breath, the practice is in keeping the mind there and noticing when thoughts and emotions arise to pull it away. Mind training comes from the discipline of noticing that one has been distracted, and then returning the mind to the object of meditation. In vipashnya (awareness) meditation, the object of meditation is on the surrounding space and environment. The combination of these two techniques is called mindfulness-awareness meditation and is primarily used by the Shambhala tradition.

³⁷⁴ Thaddeus W.W. Pace, Lobsang Tenzin Negi, Daniel D. Adame, Stevven P. Cole, Teresa I Sivilli, Timothy D. Brown, Michael J. Issa, and Charles L. Raison, “Effect of Compassion Meditation on Neuro-endocrine, Innate Immune and Behavioural Responses to Psychosocial Stress”, Elsevier: Psychoneuroendocrinology, Volume 34 (2009). 87-98.

³⁷⁵ Stephen Pincock, “Uplifting Thoughts: the adage that happiness is a state of mind is being lent weight by scientists and Buddhists researching the effects of meditation”, Financial Times, London UK. (January 15, 2005). 13.

³⁷⁶ Mipham, *Turning the Mind into an Ally*. 5.

³⁷⁷ Mipham, *Turning the Mind into an Ally*. 24.

The mind does not respond positively to brute force. In meditation, when thoughts arise, it is imperative that they are noticed with a light touch. The point is not to stop thoughts and emotions from arising, but to stop the mind from following them when they do. Meditation works with the notion of being “too tight, or too loose”. The purpose is to relax into a “middle ground” that is beyond fixating and grasping. This allows one to be in the present moment and cultivate “an awakened state of mind”.³⁷⁸

Meditation in this way fosters a gentleness of mind that is necessary in developing the mental qualities that are cultivated by a military engaging in 4GW. This particular intellectual quality is gentle not because of an inherent weakness but rather because of an inherent strength. It is gentle because it is not fixated. Fixation is often caused by doubt, therefore when the mind has experienced synchronization with the body and reality, through the practice of meditation, trust and certainty arise from that experience of being grounded. A mind that is free from doubt, because it is not fixated on any specific perspective, can act without hesitation.³⁷⁹ Sun Tzu states, “So the skilled general forms others yet is without form ... The ultimate in giving form to the military is to arrive at formlessness. When one is formless, deep spies cannot catch a glimpse and the wise cannot strategize”.³⁸⁰

Through meditation one can experience a fundamental state of being that includes thoughts and emotions but is not conditioned by them. Trungpa writes, “You experience your world directly and you do not have to limit that experience. You can be completely open, with nothing to defend and nothing to fear”.³⁸¹ That vivid and direct experience of

³⁷⁸ Mipham. “Understanding too tight and too loose”. 1.

³⁷⁹ Trungpa. *Shambhala: Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 51.

³⁸⁰ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*. Demna Translation. 37.

³⁸¹ Trungpa. *Shambhala: Sacred Path*. 67.

the present moment is sometimes referred to as wakefulness, basic goodness, or any number of terms depending on the tradition. Meditation is a particular way of experiencing this by relaxing the mind into equanimity, which is considered to be “the proclamation of fearlessness”.³⁸²

Particularly in today’s culture based on ego and individualism, meditation is quite daring as it requires disowning one’s thoughts and impulses, letting them dissolve without pursuit. “To step beyond ... hope and fear, the ups and downs of the thinking process ... [to] just let yourself be, without holding on to the constant reference points that mind manufactures”.³⁸³ This takes both patience and bravery. The space beyond reference point can be terrifying without the proper training and container. However, once you “let go of yourself in that way, you develop trust in the strength of your being and trust then in your ability to open and extend yourself to others”.³⁸⁴

This ability to connect directly to a very simple and fundamental reality, creates a perspective in the mind where whatever arises is workable.³⁸⁵ “When you sit upright but relaxed in the posture of meditation, your heart is naked. Your entire being is exposed – to yourself, first of all, but to others as well ... by simply letting yourself be, as you are, you develop genuine sympathy towards yourself”, and towards the world.³⁸⁶ Army

Major Victor Won describes the benefits of meditation for soldiers:

Once [they] develop strong awareness and learn to self-observe their thoughts, feelings and [reactions] the individuals have the power to choose how they want to feel and apply the right attitude ... with mindfulness, you

³⁸² Mipham. “Understanding too tight and too loose”. 1-2.

³⁸³ Trungpa. *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 68.

³⁸⁴ Trungpa. *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 68.

³⁸⁵ Trungpa. *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 42-43.

³⁸⁶ Trungpa. *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 45.

can choose to see things as they are and accept them as they are ... and then work to improve the situation if possible.³⁸⁷

In the complex and ever changing battle space of 4GW, “where combat is an ever-present implicit threat ... CF leaders must be prepared to lead in times of uncertainty, ambiguity, confusion, danger – and, above all, fear”.³⁸⁸ Training the mind to be present in any given moment is the most effective way of dealing with both uncertainty and disappointment. “Resilient individuals have more flexible self-concepts ... they can assimilate new experiences more easily than someone with a rigid worldview and self-concept”.³⁸⁹ If the mind can be trained to hold no fixed position and to relax in a space that is without habitual reference points, then chaos is not a threat and one is not undermined by uncertainty. Sun Tzu states, “The fight is chaotic, yet one is not subject to chaos”.³⁹⁰ By training in meditation one can maintain a calm and present state of mind even in extreme situations, because the chaos and inner turmoil of thoughts and reactions has been conquered.

Meditation practice is aimed at breaking the habitual patterns of impulsive and emotional reaction. Clausewitz writes, “Habit breeds that priceless quality, calm”.³⁹¹ Relevant to a combat soldier’s experience, “The practice of mindfulness can mean the difference between a state of calm and the experience of frenzied panic when taking in direct fire”.³⁹² Clinical studies have shown that meditation increases the ability “to

³⁸⁷ Major Victor Won, quote found in: Army Spc. Daniel Schneider, “Mindfulness Helps Soldiers Cope in Iraq”, *U.S Department of Defense: News*, (Aug. 3, 2010).

<http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=60294> (Accessed on May 10, 2011).

³⁸⁸ *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading People*. 9-10.

³⁸⁹ Paulson and Krippner. 12.

³⁹⁰ Sun Tzu. *Art of War*. Denma Translation. 34.

³⁹¹ Clausewitz. *On War*. Book 1, Ch. 8. 141.

³⁹² Dickey. 12.

adaptively manage or tolerate intense emotion”.³⁹³ It also enables a soldier to keep from dissociating during extreme and traumatic experiences, which not only increases mission efficiency, but also decreases the chances of developing PTSD.³⁹⁴

In the Shambhala tradition the practice of mindfulness awareness meditation is specifically used as a means of relating to fear, and of cultivating fearlessness and daring. Trungpa explains, “True fearlessness is not the reduction of fear; but going beyond fear. In order to experience fearlessness, it is necessary to experience fear”.³⁹⁵ Similarly, the CF leadership manual states,

The essence of the issue is not whether a person experiences fear, but how fear is controlled and utilized ... The leadership challenge is to first understand fear and then cope with it ... The antidote for fear is often depicted as courage. This is valid if leaders understand that courage is not fearlessness; courage is being able to do the job even when one is afraid.³⁹⁶

Meditation works directly with the mind that is experiencing this fear. Looking at that mind and exploring it, dissolves the power that fear or any other emotion has. “Going beyond fear begins when we honestly examine our fear: our anxiety, nervousness, concern, and restlessness”.³⁹⁷ As well, meditation is extremely boring, especially mindfulness awareness meditation which is not aimed simply at relaxing but rather on developing focus and strength. “When we are bored we begin to feel anxious. We are getting closer to our fear”.³⁹⁸ Training in how to utilize boredom is especially important for military personnel who face long periods of inactivity during which they must maintain their awareness.

³⁹³ Dickey. 11.

³⁹⁴ Paulson and Krippner. 5.

³⁹⁵ Trungpa. *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 47.

³⁹⁶ *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading People*. 10.

³⁹⁷ Trungpa. *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 48.

³⁹⁸ Trungpa. *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 48.

Habitually, Western society avoids boredom (with extreme prejudice). The Western mind is not adequately socialized to deal with the waiting that is an inherent aspect of warfare, the boredom that is inherent to being a soldier. But in meditation, working with boredom is like going to the gym. Experiencing one's mind is not always comfortable or particularly pleasant. "Awakened heart comes from being *willing* to face your state of mind".³⁹⁹ By doing so, one is essentially redirecting neuro-pathways in the brain, cutting through habitual patterns of reaction that have developed over a lifetime.

This 'awakened heart' refers to the direct experience of reality. "If we look into our fear, beneath its veneer, the first thing we find is sadness ... when we slow down, when we relax with our fear, we find sadness, which is calm and gentle ... this is the first sign of real warriorship".⁴⁰⁰ Actually experiencing this takes enormous courage, particularly when coming from a society or culture that values toughness and views emotion and tenderness, as being weak. Clausewitz describes "Courage is of two kinds: courage in the face of personal danger, and courage to accept responsibility ... before the court of one's own conscience".⁴⁰¹ Weakness comes from not being genuine and honest with oneself.

However, the courage of a warrior cannot be blind, a soldier's bravery in order to be effective must be discerning. Integrity allows us to see the "right choice among difficult alternatives" and it is courage that enables us to make it, often through the renunciation of fear.⁴⁰² Courage is a moral virtue far more than it is a physical one, and it must be constantly nurtured, it "is not suddenly developed during operations".⁴⁰³ Ultimately,

³⁹⁹ Trungpa. *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 44.

⁴⁰⁰ Trungpa. *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 48-49.

⁴⁰¹ Clausewitz. *On War*. Book 1, Ch. 3. 116.

⁴⁰² *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. 31.

⁴⁰³ *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. 31.

“courageous actions are dictated by conscience, of which war is the final test”.⁴⁰⁴

Integrity demands “honesty, the avoidance of deception and adherence to the highest ethical standard”.⁴⁰⁵ Likewise, the most fundamental aspect of bravery is being without deception, particularly self-deception.⁴⁰⁶ The ability to be honest with oneself is developed and maintained through a constant discipline of meditation. “For the warrior, [the] experience of sad and tender heart is what gives birth to fearlessness”.⁴⁰⁷

Sad, gentle, and tender, in this lexicon cannot simply be understood in their conventional sense. Placed in the context of warriorship, these refer to experiences of mental focus, stability, and connection with the life force or spirit of the warrior. They represent the *Kokoro* or heart-mind. The warrior, in relying on his own genuineness can create the ground for victory. The Sun Tzu describes taking a position outside the reach of attack, and describes this as being “death ground”, or the “ground of no defeat”.⁴⁰⁸

In the *Hagakure* it states that the way of the samurai is found in death. “If every morning and every evening one dies anew, one will become as one who is permanently dead. Thus will one obtain a realm of freedom in *Bushido*. ... Only dying is completely sincere”.⁴⁰⁹ Trungpa cautions, “It is very important for us to realize that there is tremendous strength and power, as well as gentleness, in awareness and mindfulness”, in the face of panic it allows one to rise up with confidence and force of spirit.⁴¹⁰

⁴⁰⁴ Lord Moran, *The Anatomy of Courage*, 1st Edition. (Gateshead, UK: Northumberland Press, 1945). 159. Found in: *Canadian Forces: Duty with Honour*. 31.

⁴⁰⁵ *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. 31.

⁴⁰⁶ Trungpa. *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 83.

⁴⁰⁷ Trungpa. *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 45.

⁴⁰⁸ Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. Denma Translation. 121.

⁴⁰⁹ Tsunetomo. *Hagakure*. 44 and 224.

⁴¹⁰ Trungpa. *True Command*. 146. “Force of spirit” is being used here instead of what Trungpa refers to as “Lungta” or “windhorse”, which is a specific experience of confidence that is referred to by various names throughout many Eastern traditions.

CHAPTER 9 **Applying Shambhala And The Dorje Kasung: How Concept Meets Practice**

In Shambhala, the goal of warriorship is to perceive the unbiased reality of any situation, in a clear and direct way.⁴¹¹ This is done using meditation to work with the mind. Mindfulness awareness meditation relaxes the mind by pointedly ‘letting go’ of anxiety and other concepts that usually restrict the direct experience of any given moment. By opening to the reality of the world as it is, the mind develops a wealth of gentleness, strength, clarity, and courage.⁴¹² It then has the stability and focus to be able to act from a ground of sanity, without becoming overwhelmed or distracted by intense sensations or experiences. Individuals develop the ability to be gentle and skillful while still being firm and direct, so as not to introduce undue chaos or additional confusion and emotion into an already heightened situation. “War is a pulsation of violence”,⁴¹³ Clausewitz writes,

If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen, two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.⁴¹⁴

Through meditation one is able to both find this ‘inner light’ within oneself, and also develop ‘the courage’ to be guided by it.

The Shambhala tradition views the military as being the ideal situation in which to work with meditation and the mind. The goal of the Dorje Kasung is to be both gentle and tough. Within the military forms, the opportunity to engage in meditation practice is

⁴¹¹ Trungpa. *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 100.

⁴¹² Trungpa. *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 132.

⁴¹³ Clausewitz. *On War*. Book 1, Ch. 1. 98.

⁴¹⁴ Clausewitz. *On War*. Book 1, Ch. 3. 117.

continuous, every detail, every activity, can be used as the object of meditation (just as formal meditation practice uses the breath). This is the fundamental practice of Kasungship. Pageantry, culture and camaraderie, hierarchy, uniform, drill, each and every form, all are symbols, devices for transmitting meaning and insight. Subsequently, every detail and aspect becomes as much a meditation as it is a military practice, carrying within it “coded messages about enlightened mind”.⁴¹⁵ This premise that military service can be used as a spiritual discipline, is echoed by Sun Tzu and in other Eastern traditions, where it is accomplished through the internalization of a warrior’s ‘code of conduct’.⁴¹⁶ In Japan, *Bushido* – the way of the warrior - has long been considered an approach to life “that turns living and dying into an art”.⁴¹⁷

Elements of this commitment to a way of being already exist in CF doctrine: the “values at the heart of the military ethos must be reflected in day to day decisions and actions. They cannot be just words ... or empty commitments. They must be publicly visible as consistent ethical behaviour, on and off duty”.⁴¹⁸ Strong principles of integrity, nobility, and honour in a military culture act as protection for the minds of soldiers. They create a framework for working with situations and making decisions. The CF has this framework already in place, what it needs now are the techniques and training to enable these concepts to be met with practice.

The strains of 4GW challenge a soldier’s ability to maintain personal dignity and integrity. The combat veterans of 4GW “often cannot find value in their combat service from within” and are unable to integrate a personal view of their involvement, either

⁴¹⁵ Gimian “Introduction”, *True Command*. xxxii.

⁴¹⁶ Steben “Introduction: Death in the life of the Samurai”, *Hagakure*. 8.

⁴¹⁷ Steben “Introduction: Death in the life of the Samurai”, *Hagakure*. 7.

⁴¹⁸ *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading People*. 21.

during operations or afterward.⁴¹⁹ Junger describes soldiers on deployment in Afghanistan behaving with depravity and mindlessness. He writes,

Soldiers made a distinction between the petty tyrannies of garrison life and the very real ordeals of combat, and poor garrison soldiers like to think it's impossible to be good at both ... 'what do you expect from the infantry, you know? I know that all the guys that were bad in garrison were perfect [expletive] soldiers in combat. They're troublemakers and they like to fight. That's a bad garrison trait but a good combat trait – right?'⁴²⁰

This is the resounding attitude, environment, and reality for soldiers in-theatre, and it becomes increasingly savage and seemingly futile the deeper into remote regions that the operations venture. This is exactly where, more than anywhere else, there is “the need for tact, understanding and compromise”.⁴²¹

If all CF members were fully aligned with the military ethos, and had completely internalized and integrated its values and principles, there would be no need for ethics training, or “formal programs that are specifically designed to reduce behaviours and attitudes such as harassment and racism”.⁴²² However, a synchronization of mind and body needs to occur for this to happen. Soldiers need to be trained and encouraged to engage their minds and emotions in order to draw the words of the military ethos together with their meaning. Clausewitz wrote, “Envy and generosity, pride and humility, wrath and compassion – all may appear as effective forces in this great drama”.⁴²³ CF members should be directed to explore the broad scope of their experience, to ask, what does it actually mean to “internalize the values of the military ethos and [live] by them”, to

⁴¹⁹ Paulson and Krippner. 55.

⁴²⁰ Junger. *War*. 14-15.

⁴²¹ *COIN*. (6 – 33).

⁴²² *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading People*. 20.

⁴²³ Clausewitz. *On War*. Book 2, Ch. 2. 160.

“instil the ethos in others”?⁴²⁴ The practice of the Dorje Kasung demonstrates how day-to-day military details and activities can be utilized to enable soldiers to do this, to not only comprehend the words of integrity, loyalty, courage, and duty, but actually embody them.

“Being a member of the Dorje Kasung is being in a situation of intensive practice”.⁴²⁵ This practice extends beyond a duty shift: to be a Kasung is to always be a Kasung. The quality of mind that an individual has on duty, of being present, aware, precise, and “on the spot”, extends into all aspects of the individual’s life so that when ‘off duty’ there isn’t the usual tendency for “flopping” or getting depressed.⁴²⁶ Instead, the view of the Dorje Kasung is to foster an appreciation for the quality of contentment and stability that comes from being steady and steadfast within a crisp military discipline, “of feeling whole and complete”.⁴²⁷ The incorporation of this principle into the CF could be found in adjusting current training to reflect this concept of military service as being a psychological container within which one can relax one’s mind while maintaining continuous discipline and dignity.

One of the main principles that can be adapted from the Dorje Kasung and applied to the CF is this approach to discipline. Rather than being seen as restrictive or constraining, discipline should be viewed as a means by which the individual can overcome self-absorption. Discipline, in all of its many military forms, provides the container for working with one’s mind as meditation-in-action. It allows the individual to

⁴²⁴ *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading People*. 21.

⁴²⁵ Trungpa. *DK Handbook*. 47.

⁴²⁶ Mipham. “Don Season Address to the Kasung”. (2008).

⁴²⁷ Mipham. “Don Season Address to the Kasung”. (2008).

become genuine in every moment. Discipline in this context is viewed as being the basis of “fundamental freedom”.⁴²⁸

The military dedication to physical discipline, mental discipline, and the disciplines of speech and conduct, should be emphasized and appreciated. These are the means for developing an awareness of the environment, and for synchronizing body and mind. In such discipline there is a potential for meditation that already exists in militaries around the world. Soldiers’ minds are being trained by military discipline every day. However, in order to extract the greatest benefit, utility, and power from this, the process needs to be made explicit, and reinforced through training and education. Soldiers need to be made aware of what they are inherently doing, so that they can make fuller use of the opportunities for practice available to them for psychological training.

The CF states, “Discipline helps build the cohesion that enables individuals and units to achieve objectives that could not be attained by military skills alone ... [it] is fundamentally self-discipline ... [and] instils self-assurance and resiliency in the face of adversity”.⁴²⁹ The general concept is already there. All that is needed is for soldiers to be trained in meditation and then directed to work with their military disciplines as a form of mindfulness awareness practice. Whether the discipline involves drill, the uniform, punctuality, or command, it will be best performed through developing constant self-awareness in terms of one’s relationship to the environment and one’s own mind. In this way discipline becomes delightful instead of just irritating, and is therefore easier to maintain both on and off duty. In combat situations this is especially important in terms of maintaining a strong container of form and meaning in order to protect the mind.

⁴²⁸ Sakyong Mipham, quote from MPE 1995. Found in: Trungpa. *DK Handbook*. 46.

⁴²⁹ *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. 27.

What is required in adapting practices and concepts from the Dorje Kasung and Shambhala, and incorporating them into the CF, is merely a shift in approach rather than any particular substantive change. Drill sergeants might still yell and tear down the outer layers of a civilian's self-centered mind, to reveal the soldier within. But every detail is understood as having a deeper purpose that is of benefit to others. In this way the quality of duty and service more explicitly permeates the military environment. The concepts of the military ethos are drawn out of the ether of doctrine and actually brought into a soldier's experience. Drill becomes a formal walking meditation where posture is used as a focus for mindfulness, and one's movement and spacing in relationship to others a focus for awareness. Any soldier knows that if they do not maintain presence of mind they will miss a call, make a sloppy turn, or even fall temporarily out of formation. This is no different than the thoughts that arise during sitting meditation practice, and in terms of strengthening the mind, can be related to in the same way. Incorporating ideas from the Dorje Kasung into the CF, is merely about acknowledging the strengths that already exist, it is a matter of highlighting various opportunities that could be utilized as a form of meditative mindfulness training.

A discipline such as wearing uniform can be used as a meditative practice, as a means of gauging the focus and stability of one's mind, as well as, a conduit for creating mental stability. In the Dorje Kasung, the uniform is used as a reminder of one's duty and commitment to serving others. It represents egolessness, and is a way of inspiring confidence and moral spirit within both the wearer and the observer. It is a means for invoking what is understood to be the positive power inherent in any situation or

environment.⁴³⁰ The uniform is used as a skilful means for ‘cutting through’ discursiveness or frivolousness of mind. If worn properly, it is said, it should make an individual feel naked, open and exposed; vulnerable and therefore invincible. Trungpa states, “This uniform is part of my skin and my nakedness. It is the expression of my mind ... The warrior is not embarrassed by such nakedness, brilliance or gentleness”.⁴³¹

For a soldier to relate to uniform in this way, “encourages a high level of personal decorum, mindfulness of one’s body ... and posture”.⁴³² In turn, this affects how they relate to others, and how others relate to them. It is a direct means of training soldiers to affect their posture and presence while on patrol and elsewhere. As a tangible physical reference point for sanity, and discipline, the uniform can also be a means of protecting the mind. Providing it with a touchstone for patience, generosity, and gentleness toward oneself and others, it represents a further synchronization of mind and body.

Incorporating the use of the uniform in this way can extend a subtle level of support to CF members when, “The need to win the minds and hearts of the population ... try the soldier’s patience and morale as he is obliged to adopt a less aggressive stance than he might otherwise have chosen”.⁴³³ In this way, the uniform becomes something meaningful that has a real purpose, rather than just being the focus for criticism and trivial faults.

Duty is achieved through discipline. The CF states, “Duty is the first core military value and exemplifies what it means to be a military professional. To do one’s

⁴³⁰ Trungpa. *DK Handbook*. 31.

⁴³¹ Trungpa. *True Command*. 31-32.

⁴³² Gimian. “Introduction”, *True Command*. Xxxvii.

⁴³³ *COIN*. (7 – 3).

duty means understanding and meeting all responsibilities with integrity and courage”.⁴³⁴ In the Dorje Kasung, discipline is used to tame the root sources of confusion in oneself, and thereby provide a powerful framework of experience in working with others and with society.⁴³⁵ Diana Mukpo writes, “The kasung training provides ... a tight, disciplined situation. The neurosis of the greater society can only be met with sanity if individuals have already processed themselves in a way that is based on overcoming ego and their own neurosis”.⁴³⁶

In Kasung practice, discipline, in this way, is connected to the notion of surrendering. This term is used to describe a moment that occurs in the experience of meditation whereby the practitioner actually lets go of their resistance to the practice, and of their self-prioritization. It is not about giving up so much as it represents giving in. In the CF this notion of surrender is very similar to a recent concept called *Followership*, which is “a new label for a well-established and widely accepted concept that has been known ... throughout history”. It is defined as being “fully committed service to the achievement of mission success by being receptive, implementing change, and helping to build a culture consistent with the military ethos”.⁴³⁷ It is a quality that is considered to be essential to leadership. Regardless of terminology, this moment within the military experience must be recognized and addressed as being a fundamental aspect of a soldier’s duty. In this way the experience can effectively be utilized and brought into a deepening of commitment, through the deepening of understanding.

⁴³⁴ *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. 54.

⁴³⁵ Gimian. “Introduction”, *True Command*. Xxxvi.

⁴³⁶ Diana Mukpo, “Foreword”, *True Command*. Xiii.

⁴³⁷ *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading People*. 9.

The combination of boredom and demand that comes from duty shakes out preconception of entitlement and self. Sooner or later, it is understood that every kasung will experience a loss of heart. “Loss of heart is not an obstacle on the path of the Dorje Kasung ... [it] is simply the mark of the erosion of petty mind, the entry into the vastness of the warrior’s mind”.⁴³⁸ For a soldier this experience of giving in to military discipline happens a million times a day: from putting on the uniform, to not disrespecting a superior officer, it is the essence and heart of service. By giving soldiers a specific framework with which to relate to this, it can be utilized as further mind training, and can also be used as a form of psychological shielding.

Often this ‘loss of heart’ comes out of a resistance to boredom. In 4GW, “many of the tasks are routine and boring, and soldiers tend to lose their vigilance after long periods without incident”.⁴³⁹ From an Eastern perspective, clinging to hopes of entertainment or fear of boredom, “simply carries no weight in the warrior’s life. [Their] loyalty is to something greater than that”.⁴⁴⁰ The reason one gets bored is because there is a fundamental problem with ‘liking yourself’ and just having a sense of being. Meditation teaches an individual how to be alone, to transcend the sense of burden that this creates, and use the opportunity to experience a sense of “just being”.⁴⁴¹

Duty is lonely; much like a meditation session. However, when one comes into it in a selfless way, offering oneself for the benefit of others, then that loneliness develops into strength of mind.⁴⁴² Trungpa describes, “When you walk into this world of reality ... you will find a deep sense of aloneness ... this kind of aloneness is painful, but at the

⁴³⁸ Trungpa. *DK Handbook*. 49.

⁴³⁹ *COIN*. (6 – 9).

⁴⁴⁰ Trungpa. *DK Handbook*. 48.

⁴⁴¹ Trungpa. *True Command*. 133.

⁴⁴² Mipham. “Dharmapalas and Simple Soldiers”. (2001).

same time it is beautiful and real”.⁴⁴³ The *Hagakure* suggests that the sentiment of ‘service no matter what’, keeps the mind of the samurai “in constant readiness ... [and] needs to enter into the very marrow of our bones”.⁴⁴⁴ The world that goes on around the warrior is considered to be fine just as it is.

The “true warrior” is said to transcend warfare and an enemy by being “all-victorious”, there is nothing to conquer, and no fundamental problem or obstacle to overcome.⁴⁴⁵ Trungpa says of the Kasung, “Our objective is to ride energy gently, so we can make friends with the enemy”.⁴⁴⁶ With a mind that can maintain stability in a fundamental state of non-aggression, all action becomes more efficient, discriminating, and controlled. The mind has no need to construct or “fantasize an enemy” in order to act.⁴⁴⁷ As the *Hagakure* states, “Those who are called strong do not think about things like victory and defeat. Without caring about appearances, they just single-mindedly push forward into death, and right in the midst of this their true self comes back to life”. This is the mindset that needs to be trained into soldiers confronting ‘wars amongst the people’ where there is the greater need for compassion and pliancy as well as firmness.

Sun Tzu says, “On the day that orders are issued, the tears of seated officers moisten their lapels, the tears of those reclining cross their cheeks”.⁴⁴⁸ Recognition that the intensity of emotion and experience that confronts a soldier is the mark of warriorship, is essential yet absent in today’s military. Incorporating a framework for working with the complex emotional experiences of a soldier into culture, training, and

⁴⁴³ Trungpa. *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 142.

⁴⁴⁴ Tsunetomo. *Hagakure*. 40.

⁴⁴⁵ Trungpa. *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 64.

⁴⁴⁶ Trungpa. *DK Handbook*. 42.

⁴⁴⁷ Osel Tenzin, quotation found in: Trungpa, *True Command*. 27-28.

⁴⁴⁸ Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. Denma Translation. 65.

education is crucial. The responsibility and the act of killing, the confrontation of aggression, all of this falls to the role of the military, and with it come profound emotional and psychological experiences. Whether these manifest as sickness or elation, sadness or relief, whatever the response, there is a fundamental experience of non-duality that touches the soldier. “The effects of war are inevitable, and even if measures are found to address or counter act them their movement will nevertheless occur”.⁴⁴⁹

Burham explains,

Forewarned is forearmed. Knowing ahead of time what the normal range of human responses might be can often help remove a great deal of the fear and self-doubt ... [it] can free folks up to deal with the reality of an event without all the added layers of negative self-judgment.⁴⁵⁰

Integrating discussion and psychological exploration (or contemplation) of these experiences is a necessary aspect of mind training for the soldier.

Often relating to these experiences is held back for later, for afterward when the psychological trauma has already become like a sliver of shrapnel “insinuating itself into every banality”.⁴⁵¹ Or else they are subsumed under the notion of “military spirit”,⁴⁵² or as in the CF, “fighting spirit”. Fighting spirit relates to the “will and ability” to do what needs to be done, focusing merely on the issue of combativeness. However, there must be more to this experience that “imparts to individuals the moral, physical and intellectual qualities necessary to operate in conditions of extreme danger ... to act decisively –

⁴⁴⁹ Clausewitz. *On War*. Book 4, Ch. 10. 304.

⁴⁵⁰ Burham. 37.

⁴⁵¹ Jeffrey Kirkwood, “Introduction: Private Traumas, Personal Mythologies”, *Haunted by Combat*. xvii.

⁴⁵² Clausewitz. *On War*. Book 3, Ch. 5. 220. “The spirit of an army may be envisaged as a definite moral factor that can be mentally subtracted, whose influence may therefore be estimated ... a tool whose power is measurable”.

including the use of lawful lethal force”.⁴⁵³ To be willing and able just to fight is an inadequate description of “one of the most important moral elements in war”.⁴⁵⁴

Something more is occurring within a soldier’s experience that is not being addressed, even though it is being recognized. Why else would the ‘fighting spirit’ be necessary in all occupations? How else would it foster strong bonds “as comrades-in-arms”, instilling cohesion and esprit de corps? Why would “inculcating this spirit in all military members [be] a key responsibility of CF leaders at every level”?⁴⁵⁵ This spirit is not about cultivating killers; it is not so crass and disaffected. Inherent in a fighting spirit must also be sadness, compassion, and heartbreak. “If a *Bushi* does not put his courage on the outside and possess a heart of great compassion within that is enough to burst his belly, he will not be able to discharge his fundamental duty”.⁴⁵⁶ The new paradigm of warfare demands a higher calibre of soldier who is able to incorporate these qualities of courage and compassion into their activity, therefore something more is needed from CF training and education that specifically addresses the cultivation of these qualities.

In the Dorje Kasung that fighting spirit is described as *Lungta*, which is a particular form of confidence. It represents an energy that can be cultivated and purposefully experienced by an individual. In Eastern traditions it is sometimes referred to as ‘wind’ or ‘chi’, and is considered to be ‘life-force energy’.⁴⁵⁷ The warrior who experiences lungta “feels the joy and sorrow of love in everything he does ... remaining in this state of confidence ... an unconditional ... unwavering state of mind that needs no

⁴⁵³ *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. 26-27.

⁴⁵⁴ Clausewitz. *On War*. Book 3, Ch. 5. 221.

⁴⁵⁵ *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. 26-27.

⁴⁵⁶ Tsunetomo. *Hagakure*. 155. (Italics in original).

⁴⁵⁷ Paulson and Krippner. 122.

reference point”.⁴⁵⁸ Doubt and fear do not arise. In Kasung practice, experiences of compassion, of tender heart and sadness, are appreciated as being opportunities for practice and insight. Sadness in this sense is not some form of feeling sorry for oneself or being deprived, rather it is “a natural situation of fullness. You feel so full and rich, as if you were about to shed tears ... In order to be a good warrior, one has to feel this sad and tender heart. If a person does not feel alone and sad, he cannot be a warrior at all”.⁴⁵⁹

This is a common attitude held by Eastern traditions. Trungpa describes, “The warrior, fundamentally, is someone who is not afraid of space ... cowardice is turning this unconditional into a situation of fear by inventing reference points, or conditions, of all kinds ... people are afraid to be vulnerable”.⁴⁶⁰ The teachings of Shambhala and of the Dorje Kasung describe the fundamental quality of this space as being compassionate. The underlying role of the Kasung is one of compassionate military service. As with the CF, the role of the military is one of maintaining boundaries. It is to nurture and protect, “Taking care of people is critical to mission success”.⁴⁶¹ Giving soldiers the means to cope with doubt and fear is a mechanism for developing such care and concern.

The CF encourages their soldiers to act *with* compassion: “Soldiers must be made to appreciate the fear, stress and frustration that the civilian populace will feel in times of an insurgency ... [and] develop an understanding attitude and empathy towards civilians during operations”.⁴⁶² They are even encouraged to empathize with the enemy.⁴⁶³

However, in order to effectively do this, they must be encouraged to act from a place *of*

⁴⁵⁸ Trungpa. *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 85.

⁴⁵⁹ Trungpa. *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 65.

⁴⁶⁰ Trungpa. *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 155-156.

⁴⁶¹ *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading People*. 5.

⁴⁶² *COIN*. (6 – 28).

⁴⁶³ *COIN*. (1 – 15).

compassion as well. Awareness and acknowledgement need to be given to the unique experience of heartbreak, loneliness, compassion, elation, emptiness, hopelessness, whatever it is that arises in a soldier's experience that is the result of his exposure to the realities of war.

Richard Holmes argues that “without the creation of abstract images of the enemy, and without the depersonalization of the enemy during training, battle would become impossible to sustain ... [if] men reflect too deeply upon the enemy's common humanity, then they risk being unable to proceed”.⁴⁶⁴ However, Eastern military philosophy contends that a true warrior engages and even destroys his enemy specifically with a heart of compassion. The Samurai, or Sun Tzu's ‘Sage commander’, conducts all action from the *Kokoro* or heart-mind that is open and in the present moment. The *Hagakure* states, “There is nothing outside of the present moment. Life is nothing but a series of moments following one after another ... The loyal heart is completely present in this moment”.⁴⁶⁵ Being in the moment is what gives rise to military genius, it is found in not turning away. Clausewitz writes, “The battlefield in strategy is simply a point in space ... the duration of a battle ... only a moment in time ... significance lies not in [the] course but in [the] outcome and its consequence”.⁴⁶⁶ The logic of this is consistent with Eastern thought. Through the incorporation of concepts and practices from Shambhala and the Dorje Kasung the CF can develop an individual's capacity to connect to the present moment and to act decisively from a ground of compassion and awareness.

Faith must be had in the current pre-combat training of soldiers. They are trained to be able to employ lethal force, to kill, if and when necessary. They have many

⁴⁶⁴ Richard Holmes *Acts of War*. Quote found in: Grossman, *On Killing*. 186.

⁴⁶⁵ Tsunetomo. *Hagakure*. 81.

⁴⁶⁶ Clausewitz. *On War*. Book 6, Ch. 9. 467.

variables working on them to cause them to fulfill this duty, they will do so. The question remains however, what will they do with their minds? More frequently than not a soldier will ‘check out’, will rely on impulse and training and psychologically dissociate from the experience; from the horror of what is happening. This tendency is one of the leading causes of CSR, and PTSD.⁴⁶⁷ It is not enough to train the mind to be present, even in the most disturbing moments, if soldiers are not also given a dignified framework for working with their emotions. Compassion is there, it is inherent in one’s existence as a human being, it cannot be gotten rid of. But if it is given a place, integrated into the experience of combat as not only being acceptable, but also as being a beneficial experience for the warrior to have, the use of lethal force can become more effective and also more psychologically sustainable. Greg Burham argues that just because the day-to-day realities of an active soldier on deployment can involve impossible or super human feats, this “doesn’t mean that they are no longer human beings ... we deny our humanity at our peril ... the warrior understands, manages, and even employs his emotional responses. He doesn’t simply deny they exist”.⁴⁶⁸ These key points are currently missing from CF doctrine as well as training.

One of the main functions of Kasung practice is as a means of working with aggression.⁴⁶⁹ The power inherent in military forms provokes reactions of aggression in oneself and others. The antidote to this is the insight that arises from contemplation, and which ultimately leads to gentleness. Contemplation is a practice of meditation that uses a theme or concept as the object of meditative awareness.⁴⁷⁰ Contemplation is

⁴⁶⁷ Kirkwood. “Introduction” in Paulson and Krippner. Xvii.

⁴⁶⁸ Burham. 37.

⁴⁶⁹ Trungpa. *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 85.

⁴⁷⁰ Trungpa. *The Essential Chogyam Trungpa*. 12.

particularly useful for soldiers in combat, as it is a form of meditation that can easily be done in any situation. It is just a matter of bringing the mind to one's experience in a way that is reflective, honest, and aware.⁴⁷¹

Using military forms as a meditation practice transforms aggression, “by disarming our own aggression first ... we can then skillfully disarm that of others”.⁴⁷² This is a particularly important aspect that needs to become integrated within CF training. For successful ‘mission command’ operations, intelligence gathering by all soldiers, and the successful accomplishment of techniques like the *tache d’huile*, it has become imperative that soldiers understand how to work with their physical and psychological manifestation and issues of aggression. The military must learn how to “provide space for those agencies and elements of power working [toward] a shared campaign end-state”.⁴⁷³

A well trained mind “responds to aggression by creating space, which relaxes the situation and paradoxically brings it more under [one’s] control ... aggression [only] gives the enemy something against which to fight”.⁴⁷⁴ There is an enormous sense of daring, or boldness, in the idea of being gentle and open in confrontation with intense or aggressive situations. Clausewitz describes ‘daring’ as being an important quality in war. “It is the very metal that gives edge and lustre to the sword ... it is a genuinely creative force”, and represents the quality of “equilibrium”.⁴⁷⁵ Gentleness in this sense possesses an element of unshakeability, and takes great conviction in oneself and one’s purpose.

⁴⁷¹ Kendel. 27-29.

⁴⁷² Trungpa. *DK Handbook*. 25.

⁴⁷³ *COIN* “Introduction”. 1/3.

⁴⁷⁴ Denma Translation Group, “The Sage Commander”, *Art of War*, Denma Translation. 122.

⁴⁷⁵ Clausewitz. *On War*. Book 3, Ch. 6. 223.

Saint Francis De Sales said, “Nothing is so strong as gentleness, and nothing is so gentle as real strength”.⁴⁷⁶ In the Dorje Kasung gentleness is used as a weapon as well as a means of communication, so it must have weight. In this way, it is not a matter of being polite so much as being without aggression. Gentleness involves a great deal of consideration and concern for others.⁴⁷⁷ From an Eastern perspective, the higher one goes in the military the gentler one should become, though not in the sense of being soft. The toughest people can be incredibly tender. Junger describes the “hardest” staff sergeant in Afghanistan, “He was just so god-damn strong ... because he cared”.⁴⁷⁸ An individual who is tough or hard without also being gentle will always break at some point, only gentleness and compassion are truly invincible.⁴⁷⁹

Actually being gentle and genuine when confronted with aggression is a matter of training and commitment far more than natural proclivity. In the Dorje Kasung, this is facilitated by a technique called ‘being practice’. Being practice is very simple. It is a uniquely military practice connecting to “the soldierly simplicity of character that has always represented the military at its best”.⁴⁸⁰ Clausewitz states, “Knowledge in war is *very simple*”.⁴⁸¹ Being practice involves an individual giving pause, noticing their existence, ‘just being’, aware and present. It is a means of centering, synchronizing the mind and body very simply, quickly, and then moving forward in activity from that grounded space of being ‘genuine and open’. This practice is used by individuals in the

⁴⁷⁶ Saint Francis de Sales, French Saint and Bishop of Geneva 1567-1622.

⁴⁷⁷ Trungpa. *Shambhala; The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 117.

⁴⁷⁸ Junger. *War*. 20.

⁴⁷⁹ Mipham. “Kasung Address”, MPE. (2008).

⁴⁸⁰ Clausewitz. *On War*. Book 2, Ch. 2. 160.

⁴⁸¹ Clausewitz. *On War*. Book 2, Ch. 2. 160.

Dorje Kasung to cut through experiences of doubt and hesitation, or when they find themselves becoming overwhelmed. It is also a means of rousing *lungta*, or confidence.

This practice can be adapted and given to soldiers in the CF as a means of effectively holding their mind in the midst of 4GW. It can help them to achieve aims of “minimum necessary force”, and to psychologically confront the use of atrocity and provocation by insurgents, all of which “must be a key aspect of training”.⁴⁸² This is especially important in helping to avoid the trap of “confusing activity with outcome ... doing ‘something’ because it is possible or because a reaction, any reaction is apparently needed”, which rarely achieves a desirable outcome and can often incur “substantial cost, in human lives and material”.⁴⁸³ Effectiveness in CF institutional leadership “requires the cognitive complexity that goes beyond the linear, analytic logic appropriate for solving well-defined problems toward a creative, abstract and flexible process ... Strategic leadership is about *becoming*”.⁴⁸⁴

The military principle is about container: how it trains, how it operates, in-theatre and out. It is about creating and affecting the atmosphere or environment where either confusion or wisdom occurs. The role of the Dorje Kasung is to protect from obstacles, but not just protect, to also “promote a counter reaction, which could be physical or psychological”.⁴⁸⁵ The practice is about producing and protecting sanity.⁴⁸⁶

Incorporating an adaptation of this into the CF can address current needs of the CF.

Particularly, “in preparation for COIN, there is a requirement for additional training that

⁴⁸² *COIN*. (3 – 20).

⁴⁸³ Smith. *Utility of Force*. 213-214.

⁴⁸⁴ *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading the Institution*. 126. Reference includes citation from: RB Hughes and KC Beatty, *Becoming a Strategic Leader*, (San Francisco, Ca.: Jossey-Bass Publishers and Centre for creative Leadership, 2005). xiii. (Italics in original).

⁴⁸⁵ Trungpa. *True Command*. 39.

⁴⁸⁶ Lady Diana Mukpo, “Foreword”, *True Command*. Xiii.

is campaign and mission specific. This training and preparation across all ranks is as much intellectual as it is physical”.⁴⁸⁷ Interacting in a specific and purposeful way with the military forms can enable a soldier to relax their mind, to let go and just be a human being, while still performing their duty with professionalism and competency.

⁴⁸⁷ *COIN*. (10 – 1).

CHAPTER 10 Conclusion: The Future Of The CF

In a COIN operation, “Although the military’s role is limited, the manner in which it conducts its responsibilities will influence the overall environment and success in all facets of the campaign”.⁴⁸⁸ Through mind training soldiers can develop the kind of strength, stability, and awareness needed to execute mission command and accomplish strategic goals. By incorporating practices and principles from Shambhala and the Dorje Kasung, CF members will be able to develop the capacity to actually meet the demands being placed on them by 4GW in terms of “situational awareness”,⁴⁸⁹ “presence and posture”,⁴⁹⁰ as well as the “discriminate use of force” and productive rather than destructive engagement with the enemy.⁴⁹¹ The minds of soldiers will become “open and flexible” which will allow them “to see problems from more than one perspective, allow complex problems to be reframed so that solutions become clearer, and allow the accommodation of seemingly ambiguous solutions”.⁴⁹² What is more, the incorporation of these practices will increase the psychological strength and resiliency of soldiers to better withstand the stresses and horrors of war.

The recommended adjustment in CF training, education, and ultimately culture, involves the inclusion of brief periods of formal meditation practice, at least 10-20 minutes every day. The greatest challenge facing this adjustment is the need for a transformation of culture, so that the practice of meditation and the notion of working

⁴⁸⁸ *COIN*. (1 – 14).

⁴⁸⁹ *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading People*. 50.

⁴⁹⁰ *COIN*. (6 – 18). Soldiers on patrol should “through their presence and positive influence on the public, dislocate the influence of insurgents and their psychological hold over the populace”.

⁴⁹¹ *COIN*. (1 – 15). “The causes and symptoms, such as the insurgents themselves and their popular support, must be addressed through comprehensive operations . . . by addressing root causes . . . [only this] will create enduring solutions”.

⁴⁹² *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading Institutions*. 134.

with one's mind and emotions are not resisted or considered to be outside a soldier's comfort zone. In order for mind training, and particularly formal meditation, to be effective it must be normalized and presented as a legitimate form of specialized training by the CF leadership, so that individuals will engage with the practice properly.⁴⁹³ While the enormity of this challenge must be acknowledged, it is by no means insurmountable. The momentum toward an inclusion of the concepts presented by Shambhala and the Dorje Kasung is already present within CF doctrine, as is the need for a cultural shift. "True organizational change ... requires a cultural transformation".⁴⁹⁴ The results that will accrue to CF members following the proper application of meditative mindfulness awareness practices may actually end up facilitating the cultural change that is already needed.

Numerous studies have shown that with daily meditation practice significant results can be noticeable "even after only a brief training period"; these include increased memory performance and the ability to focus, improved attentional processing, reduced anxiety, reduced fatigue, significant reductions in systolic blood pressure, as well as an increase in feelings of contentment and compassion for oneself and others.⁴⁹⁵ Just as the CF employs civilian specialists to help build comprehensive training for physical fitness,⁴⁹⁶ official meditation instructors should be brought in to help design mind

⁴⁹³ Col. Pat Stogran. In: Craig Oliver, "Military reaches out . . ." CTV News. (2009).

⁴⁹⁴ English. 117.

⁴⁹⁵ Fadel Zeidan, *The Effects of Brief Mindfulness Meditation Training on mood, cognitive, and cardiovascular variables*, PHD Dissertation, The University of North Carolina at Charlotte US-NC (2009). Retrieved June 13, 2011, from Dissertation & Theses: Full Text. (Publication No: AAt 3388986). Both physiological and psychological results began to be registered after 14 days of regular practice.

⁴⁹⁶ *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading People*. 57. See also: Jennifer Graham, "Regina researcher wants to treat soldiers suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder with aerobics", The Globe and Mail, (Aug. 7, 2011).

training regimens. Regular meditation when possible will help reinforce the effectiveness of all other mindfulness awareness practices.

Beyond just meditation it is recommended that the CF incorporate an adaptation of the Dorje Kasung use of military disciplines as the means for mindfulness awareness practice. An application of this approach to understanding the meaning and purpose behind disciplines such as drill and uniform could be used to help shape the motivations and diligence of soldiers. Adaptations of concepts such as giving-in to the military container, working with boredom, as well as a framework for engaging and understanding emotions, and working with aggression, could also be incorporated into CF training and education. Soldiers should be given an adaptation of practices connected to rousing confidence and connecting with experiences of compassion to help them confront the challenges and demands of 4GW.

However, the most useful tool to be offered to soldiers confronting combat situations is the practice of contemplation. The CF recognizes that “the function of strategy – making and conducting campaigns requires contemplation before action”.⁴⁹⁷ Contemplation is about creating space and openness in one’s mind to observe an idea or a situation in a simple, honest way, accepting whatever arises. It is a form of meditation-in-action that enables direct experience. Sgt. Kendel writes in a letter from Iraq,

Riding around all day in a humvee waiting to get blown up provides one with unusual opportunities for contemplation ... as ugly as this place is, I have been able to gain a unique perspective on human nature that I might never have experienced in any other situation.⁴⁹⁸

Meditative contemplation fosters a mind of discernment by creating little gaps that give one an intimate look at the choices and decisions being made, and at the mind behind

⁴⁹⁷ *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading the Institution*. 57-58.

⁴⁹⁸ Kendel. 29 and 58.

them. These can prevent a soldier from blindly reacting to whatever happens around them, enabling them to stop and think before making a decision that might otherwise be based upon anger and fear. Kendel writes about his experiences in-theatre, “Controlling our rage in a hostile environment was undeniably one of the most difficult challenges we faced”.⁴⁹⁹ Mindfulness awareness practices can be used as tools for soldiers to employ in accepting the savagery both around them and within them as being a unique presentation of reality, perhaps in a horrific form, but one from which the possibility for insight and understanding can still arise. “To perceive the reality of life and death accurately in a situation empowers one with the clarity of vision necessary to begin to discover the warmth of human compassion”.⁵⁰⁰ In this way, appreciation for oneself and for the world can replace experiences of depression, numbness, or futility that otherwise might permeate life in a combat zone.

In warfare, where the strategic goal is developing and stabilizing peace, soldiers must be able to find peace within themselves. Ultimately this peace comes from an individual’s ability to be mindful of their thoughts and actions. Trungpa writes, “There is something basically good about our existence as human beings. Unless we can discover that ground of goodness in our own lives, we cannot hope to improve the lives of others”.⁵⁰¹ Using meditation to develop a steadfast quality of appreciation for oneself and the world will assist the soldier in finding insight and ways of being beyond habitual patterns of aggression, avoidance, or denial. It will give them the ability to open to the present moment with greater awareness and personal control. It will enable them to more fully and effectively internalize the values and philosophy of the military ethos. As

⁴⁹⁹ Kendel. 62.

⁵⁰⁰ Margot Neuman, “Introduction” *Walking the Tiger’s Path*. 6.

⁵⁰¹ Trungpa. *Shambhala: The Sacred Path of the Warrior*. 29.

recognized by CF doctrine, “This is particularly important in a security environment characterized by complexity, ambiguity, volatility, uncertainty and danger”.⁵⁰²

Mindfulness awareness practice not only protects the mind from the horrors and stresses of combat, it can also enable soldiers to connect to the present moment and thereby adjust the ground of a situation to their advantage. In war, power rests in particular configurations that one can learn to recognize, harness, and even induce.⁵⁰³ Through these practices soldiers can develop the ability to actually manifest the CF virtue of “external adaptability, [which] refers to a capacity to fit into the larger operating environment, an ability to anticipate shifting circumstances, and a willingness to adapt to change ... [embracing] the need for flexibility, creativity, diversity and innovation”.⁵⁰⁴

Heading into the 21st Century, with its shifting demographics and confusion over what exactly constitutes a State’s interests and values, Western society is “rapidly losing its belief in the utility of war”.⁵⁰⁵ Yet it nevertheless sends its militaries in to face the darkness, the confusion and chaos of conflict and confrontation. Bern Horn describes, “A mythology has evolved of Canadians as reluctant warriors – destined to fulfill a role to bring peace to others in a hostile and unstable world”.⁵⁰⁶ But if the nation is to “meet its strategic ends with tactical means, in the end it [comes] down to ... saliency”.⁵⁰⁷

Canada, as a middle power country with its smaller, more agile and unified CF, is better

⁵⁰² *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading People*. 3.

⁵⁰³ In the Sun Tzu this is referred to as ‘Shih’; Sun Tzu. *Art of War*. Denma Translation. 32-35.

⁵⁰⁴ *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading People*. 5.

⁵⁰⁵ Major Todd Strickland, “From the Boers to the Taliban: How Canadian attitudes towards war have changed”, (Toronto Ont: Canadian Forces College, 2008). 92.

⁵⁰⁶ Horn. “Introduction”. *The Canadian Way of War*. 11.

⁵⁰⁷ Horn. “Introduction”. *The Canadian Way of War*. 14.

situated than its American allies to confront the challenges of future warfare with innovative solutions, providing “a model for its larger allies to emulate”.⁵⁰⁸

The broadening of the CF approach through the incorporation of practices from the Dorje Kasung will only enhance the maintenance of “a world-class combat capability”. It will be the very “evolution to a more inclusive conception of military professionalism” that the CF has been seeking.⁵⁰⁹ “It will be more internationalist, receptive to a wider range of missions, roles and tasks, and cognizant of the underlying causes of large-scale violence that often precipitate military action in many parts of the world”.⁵¹⁰ It will also serve as an international model for innovative military training specifically oriented toward the strategic goals of 4GW.

General (ret.) Rick Hillier states, “Canada must play a significant part in the world to prevent . . . violence and conflict coming home”.⁵¹¹ Canada’s defence policy has always been based on the ‘away game’ and the concept of ‘forward strategy’. But it has never been a forward strategy of war; rather it has always been premised on the promulgation of peace and stability. Canada is a strong proponent of the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine that was born out of Kosovo: “States have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophes . . . but when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader [international] community”.⁵¹²

This is how the Canadian government and its military views the future of international conflict.⁵¹³ The Canadian International Policy Statement of 2005 says, “Our

⁵⁰⁸ English.151.

⁵⁰⁹ *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. 69.

⁵¹⁰ *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. 69.

⁵¹¹ Gen. Rick Hillier, quote found in: Horn, “Introduction”, *The Canadian Way of War*. 15.

⁵¹² Wright. 2.

⁵¹³ McDonough. 630.

military could be engaged in combat against well armed militia in one city block, stabilization operations in the next block and humanitarian relief and reconstruction two blocks over”.⁵¹⁴ The future of the CF is seen in terms of unconventional warfare abroad, taking place on 360 degree battlefields. Lt. General Andrew Leslie, who is in charge of Canada’s land forces, says that “counter-insurgency operations will eventually displace the army’s traditional peacemaking capabilities as it prepares for life after the Afghan mission”.⁵¹⁵ This rubs, however, against the ongoing issue of resources and the gap between CF commitments and capabilities. It also does not adequately represent the issue of declining public support for military engagements that involve “a steady diet of sacrifice” and ambiguous chances for success.⁵¹⁶ A transformation of the CF culture could help to address these issues, as well as affect the confidence and spirit of Canadian society.

The military can be the vanguard for a society. The CF adoption of concepts that engage compassion and mindfulness, its creation of a culture and environment aimed at fostering dignity, discipline, and sanity, can have an uplifting and positive affect on Canada as a whole. English writes, “Armed forces have an impact on [their] society’s culture”.⁵¹⁷ It is important to recognize that “Canada’s Afghan mission is more than just a security operation. It is also about making a real difference in the quality of life for thousands of Afghan families”.⁵¹⁸ It is about sowing the seeds for peace and endurance,

⁵¹⁴ Taken from Sean Maloney and Tom Fennell, “Soldiers Not Peacekeepers: Canada wages war in Afghanistan”, *The Walrus*, 3:2 (March 2006). 50.

⁵¹⁵ Jonathan Montpetit, “Canadian army’s future lies in counter insurgency: General”, *Military World*, (November 15, 2009).

⁵¹⁶ David J Bercuson ed. “In the Canadian Interest? Assessing Canada’s International Policy Statement”, *Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute*, CDFAI Calgary (October, 2005). 4-5.

⁵¹⁷ English. 68.

⁵¹⁸ Canada, Government of Canada, “Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan, March 2009: Report to Parliament”, (Ottawa Ont: Government of Canada, 2009).

to build and support an international community that is stable and sane. This is a “cultural predisposition” that already exists in both Canadian society and its military.⁵¹⁹

The CF leadership manual explains that the military profession is required to be flexible in orientation and capability:

[It] must incorporate a philosophy of openness to novel ideas and anticipate changes to meet future challenges. New responsibilities and different ways of doing things must be welcomed if they strengthen professionalism ... moving the profession as a whole to higher planes of effectiveness depends on this principle of being open.⁵²⁰

Bernd Horn laments that Canadian soldiers in the past “have largely been used at the tactical level of war”.⁵²¹ Likewise, Granatstein describes, “Canada ... has always served the Grand Strategy of others”.⁵²² By incorporating these practices and principles of mindfulness awareness and meditation, the CF can become a model of military training for the international community. One that is better equipped to successfully address the strategic goals and potential challenges in the warfare of the future. In this way Canada can implement global strategies for peace and stability, and become an international military asset without having to significantly increase the resources being put towards defence. The strategic and operational impact on decision making processes will be profound.

The CF is well on its way toward being more influential already. It only needs a further shift, and the skillful means to bring its concepts together with the practice and experience of its soldiers. Mind training, including meditation practice, must be pervasive throughout the military experience. It must begin at basic training, well before

⁵¹⁹ *Canadian Forces Leadership: Leading the Institution*. 50.

⁵²⁰ *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. 66.

⁵²¹ Horn. “Introduction”. *The Canadian Way of War*. 13-14.

⁵²² Jack Granatstein, “Can Canada Have a Grand Strategy?” *Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute* (April 2011). 2.

deployment, and continue throughout a campaign.⁵²³ By connecting in this way to the disciplines already integrated into every moment of their lives, and through brief periods of formal meditation practice every day,⁵²⁴ soldiers will develop the cognitive and behavioural skills they need to confront the unique challenges and demands of 4GW, as well as the mental protection that wars of this generation require to survive.

⁵²³ “Actions and activities [of commanders and soldiers] must be guided by the philosophy and principles of COIN. This must begin in the training for deployment and continue throughout the operation. It is very much an intellectual challenge that must accompany the training ... specific to COIN”. *COIN*. (6 – 28).

⁵²⁴ Stanley and Jha. 12-14.

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APPENDIX

A SHORT LIST OF REFERENCES ON THE BENEFITS OF MEDITATION

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