Corkett, Christopher J.2012-10-312012-10-312012-10-31http://hdl.handle.net/10222/15671It has not always been realised that Karl Popper's analytic distinction between the logically stronger falsificationist's view of science and the logically weaker verificationist's and inductivist's view of science is a modification of Aristotle's distnction between the notions 'all' and 'some'. This document traces this distinction anew in a way that corrects my earlier (Corkett, 1997) account in which a semantic rather than a logical view was taken of this distinction. For example: when writing the 1997 paperI was not aware that the universal law "All swans are white' represented a universal categorical proposition 'All S is P' where 'S' represented the subject 'swan' and the 'P' represented the predicate 'white'. In this document I try to cover some of the main points of my 1997 paper in a way that clarifies their origin in the Law of Tripartite Entailment, a logical rule unknown to me fifteen years ago.enAristotleLaw of Tripartite EntailmentKarl Popper's non-inductive theory of methodFalsificationist's view of scienceVerificationist's view of scienceFisheries managementArticle