Wang, Yufan2026-04-302026-04-302026-04-30https://hdl.handle.net/10222/86058This thesis examines the origins, evolution and early effectiveness of British strategic bombing warfare against Germany from 1914 to 1941. It traces the intellectual and institutional foundations of air power, from the creation of the Royal Air Force, which included the Independent Force and later Bomber Command. The treatise situates British air policy within the broader framework of interwar grand strategy, highlighting the expectations that bombers could deter enemies and deliver decisive results. Particular emphasis is placed on Winston Churchill, whose support for strategic bombing reflected both strategic calculation and personal inclination towards offensive actions. The work evaluates the limited effectiveness of strategic bombing from both British and German perspectives. Although early results fell short of expectations, British optimism and continued investment were not irrational given contemporary theorical and technological constraints. Ultimately, effective inter-service cooperation is more important than over reliance on single magic weapon in winning a war.enstrategic bombingthe First World Warthe Second World WarWinston Churchillairpowergrand strategy