Thorne, Gary Wayne Alfred2024-12-062024-12-061977-09https://hdl.handle.net/10222/84731The notion of resemblance has adopted many metaphorical senses and as a result has grown in language to become a very powerful and pregnant concept, a concept which deserves philosophical attention and clarification. Mere similarity in just any regard is insufficient for resemblance. Only sufficient similarity in some regard which is contextually indicated to be relevant , or in which the person making the judgement has interest, is sufficient . Two things need to be understood when a resemblance statement is made, and these will figure in truth conditions: (1) respects in which x and y are being compared; (2) comparison class. The statement 'x resembles y' implies that x and y share common characteristics, or that they are similar in certain regards; and also that x is much like y in these regards in comparison to other things in a specified class that x belongs to. Resemblance is a symmetrical, but is neither a reflexive nor a transitive, relation. Not all information is equally important or significant in judgements of resemblance. Two notions of pictorial resemblance ought to be distinguished, one which relies upon a literal interpretation of the concept of resemblance, and another which trades upon a highly metaphorical use of the notion. Artistic resemblance, the metaphorical application of pictorial resemblance, is often the goal of good artistic representation.enResemblance (Philosophy)